The Day of Rest

Rev. James E. Marsh

The Believe of Two Old Men

Am. Marsh, '29
THE REPUBLIC
OF
PLATO

BOOKS I. AND II.

WITH

AN INTRODUCTION, NOTES, AND THE ARGUMENT OF THE DIALOGUE

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The present text is that of C. F. Hermann, with the exception of Stallbaum's conjecture, ἐμποιήσας for ἐμποιήσαι, p. 333 E.
THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. 'The finest of human intellects, exercising boundless control over the finest of human language.' If these words, in which Plato's genius has been described, are to be taken, not as the language of misguided enthusiasm, but as the verdict of competent criticism, we may well pause, in approaching the Republic, in order to attempt to grasp the situation, philosophical and political, that produced the masterpiece of Greek literary effort which lies before us.

After the storm comes the calm. The Peloponnesian War was over; Athens had passed through the oligarchical revolution of the Four Hundred, and through the tyranny of the Thirty; Socrates and Plato, amongst their fellow-citizens of Athens, had looked upon the destruction of their city's walls, the walls which had made Athens what she was; public irritation and private resentment had cut short Socrates' few remaining years of life—he was more than seventy years of age at the time of his impeachment—when Plato relinquished that promiscuous intercourse with all classes of citizens, which he had practised as Socrates' companion, for the private study of philosophy. He made the Academeia, a gymnasium lying on the north-east side of Athens, his
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home; whence, without passing through the city,¹ he could reach the Lyceum, another gymnasium on the north-west, which had been Socrates' favourite haunt (τὰς ἐν Λυκείῳ διατριβὰς, Euthyphro, ἑιτ.); and in the Academeia he delivered the results of his philosophical inquiries to all those who came to hear him.

In the intervals of his systematic studies, his mind continually reverting to the friend and master whom he had made the companion of his life, he poured forth a continuous series of biographical sketches, in which he treated all those ethical questions which engaged atten-
tion at the time, in relation to Socrates' life and Socrates' opinions with regard to them. It was a labour of love, demanding systematic work and careful elaboration, and could never have been carried out without an absorbing interest in the character of the man who is the hero of these Dialogues.

In the Republic of Plato, the completest and most elaborate of all his Dialogues, we find ourselves at a new point of departure in Greek philosophical thought.

The first philosophers were the Ionian physicists, such as Thales and Anaximenes, with whose systems Socrates had little or no sympathy. Next came Pythagoras, who thought that number was the essence of all things, a belief which must have swayed Plato's dictum in Republic, Book VI., page 546 C, viz. that disregard of a certain 'perfect number' (ἀριθμὸς τέλειος) is fatal to the existence of a good city. Reference to Pythagoras' teaching is also found on pages 600 B and 530 D.

But although this philosopher exerted no small in-
fluence over Plato's fancies, we must pass to the Eleatic

¹ See Lysis, ἑιτ. ἐπορευόμενυ μὲν ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας εὗθος Λυκείου τὴν ἔξω τεῖχους ὑπ' αὐτὸ τὸ τεῖχος.
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school to trace the origin both of Socrates' method and of Plato's philosophical system.

Socrates' method was that of the Eleatic Zeno, who is styled by Aristotle the father and founder of dialectic; it was principally a negative method, i.e. it tended towards the destruction of error and the testing of facts. This method Socrates' shared with the Sophists, a number of men professing to teach ethic, some of whom had applied this Eleatic method of criticism to all relations of life with a corrupting and subversive effect that had roused the indignation of orthodox and constitutional Athenians.

Passing on from the method to the system, we find that the Eleatic school held the belief that the world of sense, that is, tangible objects, did not really exist. This is in direct agreement with the system of philosophy which Plato constructs in Books VI. and VII. of the Republic¹; where objects of sight and touch (φαυνόμενα) are stated to be three times removed from their Real Originals, of which they are emanations.

Independently of this negative, or Eleatic belief, Plato's philosophy also had its positive side; it recognised as the origin of all being certain forms (είδη) cognisable only by pure reason (Nous). Δόγμα τελευτά είς είδη, page 511 C. In this belief we see the influence of Anaxagoras, a philosopher who was driven from Athens, B.C. 432, who spoke of νοῦς, or Intelligence, as the designing and arranging principle of the universe.² Since the expulsion of Anaxagoras, positive philosophy had held no place in Athens. As a substitute for it the lectures of Sophists had engaged public attention and

¹ See abstract of the Dialogue, libb. cit.
² See Aristotle, Metaph. i. 3.
had fostered private inquiry. The Sophists' lectures, like their method, were rather critical than positive: the Sophists did not contribute to general knowledge; they proved the fallacy of this question or that, and those of them who were inclined to rhetoric, taught the art of persuasion. But Plato, following upon hints dropped by Socrates, and not merely reproducing the words of his teacher, struck out again into the path of constructive philosophy. Whilst he shows us in his Dialogues that no one appreciated the Socratic and Sophistic method, or ἀλεξος, better than himself, it is in the Republic, beyond the other Dialogues, that he demands, under the characters of the sons of Ariston, a positive and coherent account of Justice, of Being, and of God. Whilst therefore sharing in the general tendency of Eleatic thought, Plato must be regarded as having developed and elaborated the main tenet of Anaxagoras' philosophy.

With this brief account of the conditions which furnished the occasion and the speculative direction of the Republic, we proceed to inquire into what divisions the Dialogue naturally falls.

§ 2. Setting aside the division into books, at once arbitrary, and, as in the case of Books II. and III., incorrect, we find that, speaking very generally, there are three main divisions of the Dialogue.

I. There is the preface, or, as Socrates calls it (page 357 C), the προοίμιον, which lasts from the beginning of the work to the end of the first book, and is carried on to page 367 E, that is, rather less than half Book II. This first part is occupied with a refutation of popular and Sophistical definitions of, and opinions concerning, justice, and with an elaborate statement of
the advantages of injustice, given as a challenge to Socrates by the two sons of Ariston.

II. In the second division of the Dialogue we have a defence of Justice given at length by Socrates, who finds it necessary to put the growth of an imaginary city before the minds of his hearers (εἰ γνωρίσθης τὸλν 
θεασαίμεθα λόγος, page 369 A), in order to discover the growth of Justice in that city, and to transfer it analogically to the mind of individual man. The description of the origin, the life, the requirements of this State, and the education of its members, together with sundry ἀπορίαι, i.e. difficulties, put forward and discussed, occupy the remainder of Book II. and the whole of Books III.—V. inclusive. But in Book V. the Dialogue is beginning to assume a more analytical and esoteric phase. Socrates has already thrown out a hint of this: he has already admitted that his State and his Justice hitherto described are accommodated to popular comprehension: καὶ εὖ γ' ἢσθι, ὡς ἢ ἐμὴ δόξα, ἀκριβῶς μὲν τὸῦτο ἐκ τοιοῦτον μεθόδων, οἰκος νῦν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις χρώμεθα, οὐ μὴ ποτὲ λάβωμεν ἄλλη γὰρ μακροτέρα καὶ πλείων ὀδὸς ἢ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἀγουσα: page 435 D.

III. Now, however, as the last ἀπορία, viz. 'The ruler of the State must be a philosopher,' is proposed, and to some extent settled, Socrates suggests that the thorough and complete solution of the whole of this point would be quite sufficient to set the main inquiry at rest, without entering upon other points connected with it: ἐμοὶ γ' οὖν ἐτι δοκεῖ ἄν βελτιῶνος φανὴραι, εἰ περὶ τούτων μόνου ἤδει βηθὴναι καὶ μὴ πολλὰ τὰ λοιπὰ διελθεῖν μέλλοντι κατδιδέσθαι τί διαφέρει βίος δίκαιος ἄδικον (Book VI. init.). And this, on the whole, is the purport of the rest of the Dialogue, i.e. Book VI. to X. fin. This part starts with a study of the philosophic nature, gives the education
necessary for its development, propounds and accommodates to the philosophic nature the theory of Ἰδέα, and with a digression upon the various degenerated forms of the perfect State, comes to an end in an account of the rewards that follow upon a life lived according to philosophy and justice.

To sum up, then, there are three parts into which the Republic may be divided. First, the prelude; secondly, the discovery of Justice through the creation of an Ideal State; thirdly, the elaboration and idealization of this State through a carefully worked out system of philosophy.

This division has been called a rough one; we proceed to give a more detailed view of the structure of the work.

I. The first part, or preface, may conveniently be kept, viz. Book I. init.—Book II. page 367 E.

II. Next we have the creation of a State, and the nature of Justice as found in it, pages 367 E—435 A.

III. Transference of Political Justice to man by analogy, pages 435 A—449 B.

IV. Three ἀπορίαι, or τρικυμία, arising out of the question, 'How is the State to be managed?' pages 449 B—505 A.

V. Philosophical system of Ἰδέα, or Real Existence, pages 505 A—541 B.

VI. Different forms of degeneration from the Ideal State, and the types of man corresponding to them, pages 543 B—579 C.

VII. Comparison between the just and unjust man; and their respective rewards, 579 C—fin.
§ 3. Following upon the first division of the Dialogue, the question demands attention—How far is the Republic a constructive dialogue? With a few exceptions, such as the Apology, and perhaps the Cratylus, which Professor Jowett looks upon as of a neutral stamp, Plato’s Dialogues may be divided into two kinds: positive and constructive, and negative and destructive; i.e. those which try to prove, and those which try to disprove, some position or positions. Of the former the Phaedo, Crito, Symposium, and Phaedrus may be taken as examples; of the latter the Lysis, Charmides, Laches, Protagoras, and Meno. The Dialogue before us is compound, i.e. it partakes of both kinds. In the first division of the book, viz. init.—367 E, Socrates is avowedly trying to disprove, and not to prove. He first destroys that definition of justice which is attributed to Simonides or Homer, or some other wise man; see 335 E, Majouμεθα ἂρα, ἂν δ’ ἐγὼ, κοινῆ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ, εάν τις αὐτὸ (sc. this definition of justice) φη ἡ Σιμωνίδην ἡ Βίαντα ἡ Πιττακὸν εἰρηκέναι. He next combats at length a definition given by the inferior Sophist of the day, and shows that it is incorrect, see 352, seqq.; and, when he has twice shown the falsity of existing opinions on the question, ‘What is Justice?’ he openly confesses that he himself knows nothing at all of its true nature; see 354 B: πρὶν δ’ ὁ πρῶτον ἐσκοποῦμεν εἰρεῖν, τὸ δίκαιον δ’ τι ποι’ ἐστίν, ἀψεμένος ἐκείνον ὁμιᾶσαι ἐπὶ τὸ σκέψασθαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐπε κακία ἐστὶ καὶ ἁμαθία, εἴτε σοφία καὶ ἀρετὴ . . . . ὅστη μοι νυν ἔχονεν ἐκ τοῦ διαλόγου μοιδὲν εἶδέναι.

So far in the Dialogue we have nothing of constructive import, with the exception of a few points by means of which Socrates overcomes Thrasymachus’ position, which will be noticed in the text. And in the beginning of
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Book II. we merely encounter a re-statement of Thrasymachus' position and an elaboration of his arguments; with which re-statement the first part of the Republic is held to conclude.

The earnest challenge of the sons of Ariston, πότερον ἡμᾶς βούλει δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι ἢ ὁς ἄληθώς πεισάι ὅτι παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀμεινόν ἐστι δίκαιον εἶναι ἢ ἄδικον (Book II. init.), has roused Socrates to an unusual effort, which he veils, as always, under the pretence of incapacity. He begins, not to tell them what Justice is, but to ask them to try with him if they cannot find a larger organism than the human soul wherein Justice dwells, and so to overcome the difficulty. 'Let us,' he says, 'construct a State, and find where Justice dwells in the State' (page 369 A). The word γνωμένη here shows that we now have something to look for from Socrates himself,—that he has for the time renounced the destruction of error, and is entering upon the construction of a truth.

This constructive character the Dialogue maintains to its end. For the construction of a State is found to involve the construction of a complete system of education for all classes, and out of this system, again, there arises the necessity for constructing another and a more esoteric system of education for the upper class, and this involves the complete elaboration of a philosophical system. And besides these two systems of education and this system of philosophy which are contained in the Republic, we have a great deal of information and suggestion upon various other subjects conveyed to us by the way; for the Dialogue, although it has its unity, is far-reaching and discursive.

It must therefore be apparent to any one at all
familiar with the negative character of Platonic writing, what a valuable link in the chain of Greek thought lies before us in the Republic. Two complete systems of education and one of philosophy; a treatise upon the interdependence of classes in a State, trade, medicine, poetry, political economy, religion, the position of woman, death, slavery, the relation between mind and body, music, courage, temperance, science, immortality, all different systems of government, love, war, the stage, revolution, such, and many more questions of minor interest, do we find treated, in many cases with great care and elaboration, in this unique and universal Dialogue.

§ 4. We next come to inquire if it is possible from internal evidence to discover the motives that induced Plato to compose this Dialogue?

There can be little doubt that, amongst other motives, Plato approached the composition of the Republic with the intention of vindicating Socrates' life and opinions. It is an Apologia pro vita ejus. It may be replied to this that nearly all Plato's Dialogues partake, more or less, of this intention; and the reply would be true. Plato, we can see, had an unbounded veneration for the protagonist of his Dialogues as a man, as a philosopher, and as a dialectician. He must have experienced the bitterest grief at Socrates' death, and must have devoted a great part of his life to storing up, in these vivid dialectical portraits, reminiscences of his guide, philosopher, and friend. Now the Dialogue before us is at once the longest, with the exception of the Laws, and by far the most wide-reaching in the subjects of which it treats. (These subjects have been briefly summarized above.) It is, in fact, Plato's greatest effort. We expect, then, in
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Plato’s greatest effort to find the completest and the best account of Socrates’ life and opinions. Those who look in Plato for anecdotes about Socrates will be disappointed, and must turn to the Memorabilia of Xenophon. Plato does not deal in anecdotes. He never fell into what the author of Vivian Grey called his anecdotage. He is too much of an artist to endeavour to depict a man solely by what he did; he gives us the true account of his character by showing what he would have said and done under certain circumstances.

If we view Plato and Xenophon in their respective ways of treating the character of Socrates, we find that Plato’s manner is romantic or poetic, whilst Xenophon’s is matter-of-fact; that there is, in fact, the same distinction between them which Aristotle draws between poetry and history. He says, ‘There is this difference between the historian and the poet: the former tells us what has happened, the latter what would happen. For poetry is concerned with the general, and history with the particular.’ Plato has clearly laid down for us the general lines of Socrates’ character, as well as Xenophon; but he has done so by means of giving us a broad and a coherent account of the principles which formed his character.

Plato himself would have been loth to hear himself termed a poet; he condemns most poets and their poetry, and drives them from his Ideal State; he even depreciates Homer, although his endless quotations show

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1 See Poetic. ix. 1451 b, τούτῳ διαφέρει τῷ τῶν μὲν τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τῶν δὲ οἷα ἀν γένοιτο. διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστὶν. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἢ δ’ ἱστορία τὰ καθ’ ἑκαστὸν λέγει.

2 See p. 398.

3 See Book X. ini. 602, C.
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how he read and admired him; but he was a poet in this, the real, sense, of which Aristotle speaks. He tells us what were and also what would have been Socrates' opinions.

Plato, then, was a poet in this respect; but it does not follow, as a writer supposes in his preface to Xenophon's Memorabilia (Oxford Ed.), that Plato's portrait of Socrates given us in the Dialogues is an idealization. To us the otherwise marvellous consistency of the character renders this an impossibility, especially in regard of Socrates' religious professions, his method of dialectic, his humour, and, a point difficult of illustration, but of the greatest weight, his manner.

To place before his readers a complete account of Socrates, his beliefs, his method, and his character, is the general object of Plato's Republic. But there is another object which Plato had in view, bearing no direct reference to Socrates, viz. the presentation of an Ideal State; and this object is to be explained by the absorbing interest felt by every Greek in the politics of a free city, the love of a Republic and the hatred of a Despotism. Each citizen of a Greek city had his political opinions, and no doubt each citizen had his political hobby. Putting together this philo-political feeling, and a further one, viz., the love of one's own creations, upon which Plato himself insists, we may feel certain that the work grew under his hands, and that the gratification of watching his city's growth urged the maker of the city to further efforts than he at first intended.

1 ον δε κτησμένοι διαλήγην ο οι ήλλοι ἀσπαζονται αὐτὰ. θανείρ γαρ οι ποιηταὶ τα αὑτῶν ποιήματα καὶ οἱ πάτερες τοὺς παιδας ἄγαπῶσι... p. 330, C.
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Again: Plato's Republic is evidently a work of art, the work of a mind bent on a complete and beautiful creation. The definition of such a work is laid down by Aristotle in his Poetic (1450 fin.) in these terms, το γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστὶν. And he also states that the magnitude of the work must be in proportion to its importance: μέγεθος ὑπάρχει μὴ τὸ τυχόν. If we allow that the principles of artistic construction are correct, and if we grant that Plato considered justice to be a subject demanding the most lengthy and detailed treatment, and the most elaborate development from popular to scientific definition, we may at the same time gather that he looked upon it as a theme specially susceptible of artistic treatment, from various points of beauty which distinguish the Dialogue. We do not here speak of such points of beauty as the simplicity of the style and the lucidity of the argument: they are natural to the writer, and inseparable from his style.\(^1\) We speak rather of conscious and exceptional efforts to adorn his work. Such an effort results in the elaborate sketching of character which presents to us the admirable portraits, among others, of the violent Thrasymachus and the sincere yet sceptical Glaucon. Another such effort relieves the monotony of constructive dialogue, whilst it illustrates the text of the speaker, by the introduction of short romances, fables, and allegories. Such are the story of Gyges and his ring in Book II., the allegories of the cave in Book VII.,

\(^1\) To the simplicity and lucidity of Plato's writing John Sterling bears witness. See Carlyle's Life of John Sterling, Library Edition, p. 139, 1870: 'For philosophic inquiry and truths of awful preciousness, I would select as my personages and interlocutors beings with whose language and "whereabouts" my readers would be familiar. Thus did Plato in his Dialogues.'
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and of the ship's captain in Book VI., and the narrative of Er concerning the after life in Book X.

Theognis wrote—

Κάλλιστον τὸ δικαίωτατον, λῶστον δ' ύμιανεων
"Ηδίωστον δὲ τυχείν ὑν τις ἐκαστὸς ἔρα,

where it is noticeable that Justice (the theme of the Republic) is placed first amongst human blessings, and described as 'the fairest'; and Plato in his Dialogue concerning Justice felt with Theognis that it was a subject which called for the decoration of the artist as well as the research of the philosopher.

Another and a more special motive makes itself apparent here and there in the Dialogue, viz., the desire to rebut specific charges against Socrates, and especially to answer those brought against him in the Clouds of Aristophanes and the indictment of Anytus. We know that the latter was expressed in the words: Σωκράτης ἄδικας οὖς μὲν ἢ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἤπα πέτα λευνά διαμονὴ εἰσφέρων ἄδικας δὲ καὶ τοὺς νεών διαφθείρων.

To take the latter charge first: we find a distinct statement as to the corruption of young men, in Book VI. 492 Δ. ἣ καὶ σὺ ἤγεί, ὃστερ οἱ πολλοὶ, διαφθείρων τινὰς εἶναι ἀπὸ σοφιστῶν νέους, . . . ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτῶν τοὺς τεῦτα λέγοντας μεγίστους εἶναι σοφιστὰς; Here he denies that corruption of a class can be effected by individuals, and asserts that society and its depraved

1 In Rep. p. 583, B, we meet this expression, after two proofs have been given of the superiority of justice to injustice, διὸ γε μικρῶς δ ὁ diamos τὸν ἄδικον. This expression cannot fail to recall at once the episode of the word-battle between the ὄντως and ἄδικος λόγος in the Clouds; and if we add the other points of coincidence between the two works, we shall not fail to conclude that Plato wrote with distinct reference to that comedy of Aristophanes.
taste is the real corrupter. Thus he answers the latter count of Anytus' indictment and the whole plot of Aristophanes' play. Of the charge of impiety we must speak more in detail, because we have to gather, not from a single passage, but from many scattered up and down in the Dialogue, Plato's opinion as to this charge against Socrates. In the Clouds Socrates is represented as repudiating the existence of the gods—

Ποῖος Ζεὺς; οὐ μὴ ληρήσεις, οὐδὲ ἔστι Ζεὺς.

l. 367—

just as he is charged in Anytus' indictment; and he is also represented, καὶ νὰ δαμόνια εἰσφέρων (in Anytus' words), by Aristophanes in the same play.

ΣΤ. ὁ δ' ἀναγκάζων ἔστι τῆς αὐτῆς οὖχ ὁ Ζεὺς, ὡστε φέρεσθαι;

ΣΩ. ἥκιστ' ἀλλ' αἰθέριος Δίνος.  

ll. 379, 80.

How does Plato answer these charges? In the first place he represents the Socrates of the Republic as eminently orthodox in religious belief and religious observance. When Socrates comes to these subjects in the course of founding his city, he remarks that to Apollo of Delphi must be left the greatest, the best, and the first legislation, τῷ μάντου Ἀπόλλων τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς τὰ τε μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα καὶ πρῶτα τῶν νομοθετημάτων . . . ἱερῶν τε ἱδρύσεις καὶ θυσίαι καὶ ἄλλα τε θέσιν τε καὶ δαιμόνων καὶ ἱρών θεραπεύαι, p. 427 B. This is the teacher who was accused of disregarding the gods of his country! For, be it noted, it is to Apollo, 1 Θεὸς πατρῴος of Attica, and not to Zeus, that Socrates refers questions of religion, a course that should satisfy the most fasti-

1 ν. Euthydemus, 302, C fin. Ἀπόλλων πατρῷος διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἰωνός γένεσιν.
dious of Athenian ritualists. And this is not a solitary instance of his orthodoxy.\(^1\) We find on page 461 E, that the family regulations of the State are to depend upon a system of lots subject to the consent of the Pythia, ἐὰν ὁ κλήρος ταύτη ἐξαμπτυγματα καὶ Ἡ Πυθια προσαναμερή.\(^2\)

In the next place Socrates in the Republic is represented as removing from the gods all those charges of cruelty and lust which legend had attached to them; thus on page 377 E seqq. ὁ εἰπὼν οὖ καλῶς ἐγκυσάτο, ὡς Οὐρανός τε εἰργάσατο ἡ φησὶ δρᾶσαι αὐτῶν Ἡσίοδος, ἢ τε αὖ Κρόνος ὡς ἐγκυσάτο αὐτῶν. τὰ δὲ δῇ τοῦ Κρόνου ἐργα καὶ πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ νικώς, οὔτ' ἂν εἰ ἦν ἄρηθή, όμην δέν ῥοώς οὖτω λέγεσθαι. And in the same passage he states his disbelief in quarrels between the gods, the stories of Hera being bound by her son,\(^4\) of Hephaestus being thrown out of heaven by his father, and so forth.\(^5\)

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1 Xenophon bears strong and direct testimony to the falsity of the charge of heresy against Socrates in Mem. 1, 2, fin. Πῶς οὖν ἐνοχὸς ἢν ἡ λήγαρη; ὃς ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ μή νομίζειν τοὺς θεοὺς, ὡς ἐν τῇ γραφῇ γέγραπτο, φανέρος ἡν θεραπεύων τοὺς θεοὺς μόλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων. And v. also on this point, chap. iii. 1–4, and iv. ad fin.

2 Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 3, init. τὰ μὲν τοινυν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς φανερός ἢν καὶ ποιῶν καὶ λέγων, ἢ περὶ ἡ Πυθια ὑπόκρινεται τοῖς ἐρωτηματικοίς, πῶς δεὶς ποιεῖν ἢ περὶ θυσίας ἢ περὶ προγόνων θεραπεύως ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τοιούτων; ἢ τε γὰρ Πυθια νόμῳ πόλεως ἀναγεί ποιούντα εὐσεβῶς ἄν ποιεῖν, Σωκράτης τε οὕτως καὶ αὐτῶς ἐκοινεὶ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους παρῄει.

3 The rejection of popular legend about the gods caused the cry to be raised that Socrates did not believe in the gods themselves.

4 A confirmation of this hypothesis, that Plato is writing with the express purpose of vindicating Socrates' teaching from accusations brought against it, is afforded by Xenophon in his Memorabilia, 1, 2, 49; where he expressly mentions that Socrates was accused of inciting youths to 'bind,' i.e. imprison their fathers, an accusation which this present passage of the Republic would answer: Ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης, ἐφη δὲ καθήγορος, τοὺς πάτερας προπολιακίζειν ἐθίσατο ...φάσκων κατὰ νόμον οἰκείαι παρανολαῖς ἐλόντι καὶ τὸν πάτερα δήσαι.

5 For an explanation of this inconsistency, viz. the belief in
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Thirdly, Socrates lays down in plain language the terms of his religious belief, his creed. The God in whom he believes is one, and eternal, and true; and knows the just from the unjust.

God cannot harm any being, because he is good himself, and therefore cannot make anything bad: on the contrary, he is the author of all good to mankind, page 379 D. τῶν μὲν ἄγαθῶν οὐδένα ἄλλον αἰτιατέν, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄλλ' ἄττα δεῖ ξητεῖν τὰ αἴτια, ἄλλ' οὐ τὸν θεόν. All his works are for the best, page 530, A. νομεῖν μὲν, διὸ οἴν τε κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔργα συντήρασθαι, οὕτω ξυνεκτάναι τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ δημιουργῷ αὐτῶν τε καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ. And one more point in support of Socrates' orthodoxy may be added: that the occasion itself of this Dialogue arises on the return of Socrates from a religious observance, προσευξόμενος τῷ θεῷ, whither he had been, like any other good citizen.

It would be a great mistake to suppose that Socrates was an irreligious man or an atheist. On the contrary, and in accordance with what has been said above, Xenophon bears witness that Socrates' belief in divine supervision of earthly life amounted almost to superstition. His words are (Mem. 1, 3, 4), 'And if Socrates thought that he had any intimation from the gods, he would have been less likely to disobey it than to take a blind guide in a journey instead of one who could see. And he used to speak in severe terms of those who prefer the blind counsel of men good and beneficent gods existing side by side with a number of immoral and revolting tales concerning them, see Sir G. W. Cox, Aryan Mythology, Book I. chap. vi. ed. 1870; also chap. iv. p. 66.

1 382, E.
2 612, E. θεός· γε οὖ λανθάνει εἰκάτερος αὐτῶν οἷς ἐστίν.
to warnings from the gods.\textsuperscript{1} With this religious feeling is associated the δαιμόνιον, or actual supernatural check, which, so he devoutly believed, prevented him from entering upon a wrong course of action. δει ἀποτρέπει, προτρέπει δὲ οὕτως.\textsuperscript{2} And this belief no doubt partly accounted for that clause in the indictment of Anytus, καὶ δαίμόνια εἰσφέρων.\textsuperscript{3} But we cannot help asking, if Socrates' religious teaching was as pure as it is represented by Plato, and it is hard to believe otherwise, how are we to account for the charge, ὡς ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεὸς οὗ νομίζων, in the face of such testimony as we possess to Socrates' regular observance of religious forms? We can only say that the original worship of Zeus, the mighty king who dispenses justice to gods and men, had become totally corrupted, that legend had come to be regarded as the essence instead of the accidents or accretions of religion, and that belief in legend was jealously demanded by ultra-orthodox Athenians from any one who practised as a teacher.

At the same time it must be remembered that the anti-Socratic agitation took its rise in political animosity; the indictment, like the scorpion, bore the sting in its tail: διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους. Alcibiades and Critias were no doubt the νέοι, who had attracted the special attention of the accuser: they were more or less responsible for their country's ruin, and in their excesses we see the more immediate cause of Socrates' indictment. The first count, viz. that of heresy, arose from an

\textsuperscript{1} See also Socrates' remonstrances with Aristodemus the Little, a man who habitually disregarded sacrifice, consultation with oracles, and other religious duties.—Mem. 1, 4.

\textsuperscript{2} See however Xen. Mem. 4, 3, 12, where it is hinted that the δαιμόνιον initiated action. ἐγὼ μηδὲ ἐπερωτώμενοι (sc. θεοί) ὑπὸ σου προσημάνοντι σοι ἃ τε χρή ποιεῖν ἃ τε μῆ.

\textsuperscript{3} For the δαιμόνιον, v. Euthydemus, 272 E.
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ignorance of facts, the second from a confusion of causes.

§ 5. Another interesting question meets us as we follow Socrates' creation of his State, viz. How far Plato thought it possible to realize such a State and such a life? That this question had engaged Plato's own attention we can be sure. Not once nor twice do the hearers interpose with the question, 'But, Socrates, is such a state of things possible?' See page 471 C. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδέποτε μνημήσεσθαι ὃ ἐν τῷ πρῶτῳ παρωσάμενος πάντα ταῦτα εἴρηκας, τὸ ὡς δυνατή αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία γενέσθαι καὶ τίνα τρόπον ποτὲ δυνατῇ εἰπτὰ Ἐ, τοῦτο αὐτό ἣν πειρὼμεθα ἡμᾶς αὐτῶς πείθεω, ὡς δυνατὸν καὶ ἡ δυνατὸν. Socrates' reply to this challenge is characteristic. 'You swoop down upon me and my argument just as I was coming to the most difficult part of it. Now we are inquiring what Justice and the just man are: very good: we are, in other words, trying to find the model, or pattern, or canon, to which we can apply individual cases, judge of their merits, and so build up our own definition of Justice.' We never started with the idea of proving that such things can be. No! a painter may be able to paint a most beautiful figure, and yet it will not follow that such a figure has ever existed, or does, or will exist. But such a figure is none the less beautiful, it is none the less useful; for it serves as an ideal towards which painters may direct their efforts.' In this answer Socrates parries the question: he has not sufficiently unfolded his scheme, nor sufficiently prepared the minds of his hearers to approach such a question.

But in the third τρυπεύα (473 D), that is, the statement that evil and trouble will never cease till kings
are philosophers and philosophers kings, Socrates has delivered his mind, and he adds, 'Until this is so, our State will never come to be a possibility (φύγ[eis τὸ δυνατόν) and see the light of the sun.' The further question at once arises, 'What does Socrates mean by kings being philosophers, and philosophers kings?' The answer to it is found in the conclusion of Book V. and in Book VI. Briefly, he means by philosophers those men who are gifted with a strong will, that can master the desires of the body (λογιστικοί), and a clear head that can discriminate real from false (φιλοσοφιάς ἐρωτικοί).

Even in this place he does not distinctly commit himself to the statement that such a city is actually to be realized; he only mentions here a necessary condition for its realization, which he repeats in slightly different terms in 499 B., οὐτὲ πόλις οὐτε πολιτεία οὐδὲ γ' ἀνήρ ὁμοίως μὴ ποτὲ γένηται τέλεος πρὶν ἀν τοίς φιλοσόφοις τούτοις τοῖς ὀλίγοις καὶ οὐ πονηροῖς ἀνάγκη τις ἐκ τύχης περιβάλλῃ πόλεως ἑπιμεληθῆναι καὶ τῇ πόλει καθῆκου γενέσθαι, ἢ τῶν νῦν ἐν δυναστείαις ἡ βασιλείαις ὧν τε ἐν κακίας ἐντονω νεότητι καὶ αὐτοῖς ἐκ τινος θείας ἐπινόης ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινὸς ἐρως ἐμπέσῃ. ‘Until philosophers are compelled to govern the State, or kings receive, through some divine afflatus, a real love of real philosophy, our city can never exist.’ And he adds, as before, ‘And whether either or both of these conditions can be realized, I maintain is a question wide of the mark.’ But let us see what follows;—‘Now if in some bygone age, or at the present time in some foreign country far from our ken, or in the future, it happens that men of a truly philosophic nature be

1 A succinct definition of ‘philosopher’ is given in 484, B. φιλόσοφοι μὲν οἱ τοῦ δεῖ κατὰ ταῦτα ὀσαίτως ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι.
found managing the State, I am ready to maintain in argument that the city we speak of has, or is, or will be realized. We confess the difficulty of the thing, but we deny that it is an impossibility. Χαλεπὰ τὸ ὄντι τὰ καλά.' Here then we have at least Plato's, and probably Socrates' opinion, clearly laid down, that the State he speaks of is not merely Utopian. By the side of this passage such a remark as 'I forgot that we were not in earnest' (page 536 C, ἐπελαθόμην ὦτι ἐπαίξομεν') may be dismissed as not affecting the question, as being a façon de parler on the part of Socrates. And if further confirmation be needed, we may turn to the end of Book VI., where Socrates appeals to Glaucon to allow that his State is not all cloudland, μὴ παντάπασιν ἡμᾶς εὐχὰς εἰρηκέναι, that it is difficult to realize, but not impossible. Glaucon however is not convinced; on the contrary, he expresses farther on in the Dialogue (Book IX. fin. 592 B) his opinion that the State only exists in the Dialogue, and not in the world, πόλει τῇ ἐν λόγοις κειμένη, ἐπεὶ γῆς γε οὐδαμοῦ οἷμαι αὐτὴν εἶναι. To which Socrates repeats his original answer, 'Whether such a city exist or not, it matters little; but we have it in heaven as an ideal towards which we can strive.'

Such is the internal evidence of the Republic with regard to Plato's belief in the possibility of his State. This evidence we leave to the reader, first adding a few remarks upon the different conditions of political existence at the time this Dialogue was written, conditions which materially affect the question as to the possibility of the existence of such a State. These conditions may be gathered into two heads:—

First, the great pliability at that period of a mass

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1 It is perfectly true that Socrates 'was in jest,' but he was also in earnest. Επαιζεν ἡμα σπουδάζων, v. infr.
of people or material from which organized. 

Secondly, the small extent of the material.

The second point may be dismissed in a few words. Aristotle in his *Ethics* (9, 10, 3) lays down that the limits of a State must be more than ten citizens and less than 100,000: τοῦτο ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἐν πόλις, οὗτ' ἐκ δέκα μυρίάδων. Plato, it is true, mentions four or five as the least possible number that could compose a State, but he is speaking only of its origin, not of its complete form: see page 369 E. Εἰ δ' ἐν ἡ ἀναγκαστάτη πόλις ἐκ τεττάρων ἡ πέντε ἀνδρῶν. According to Ctesicles, at a census of the population of Attica taken under Demetrius Phalareus, the number of free burghers was 20,000, 10,000 μέτοκοι, and 400,000 slaves. And the frequency with which whole communities migrated or were transplanted in Greek history will serve to show that Aristotle's 100,000 is an extreme limit towards which the average πόλις did not nearly approach. To take a few examples of this fact, and omitting mention of the numerous parties of κληρονόμοι or colonists continually leaving Hellas, as being rather off-shoots than transplantations, we may call to mind the several movements of the Thereans under Battus, of which Herodotus speaks (see Book IV. 155, seqq.); or the exodus *en masse* of the Phocaeans, who are said to have sunk a stone in their harbour as a pledge of eternal exile; or the sudden transplantation of citizens from forty districts to the newly-founded town of Megalopolis in Arcadia by Epaminondas. And this ease of manipulation could only be afforded by comparatively small numbers.

1 Similar instances in ancient history are afforded by the removal of the Jewish nation to Babylon, and the deportation of the Cilician pirates to Soli by Pompey.
With regard to the former point, viz., the great pliability of these bodies of men, it must be remembered that the range of human thought at the period of the Athenian empire was much less extensive than at the present day, and that the general tone of a State was depreciated, in the case of democracies, by the admission of the mass of the lower classes to a share in the management of public business. Hence the whole πόλις was easily influenced by a powerful, or ambitious, or unscrupulous mind. At Athens, Peisistratus, Pericles, and Cleon, men of very different stamp, all exercised at different times an undisputed empire over the Athenian mind; and, in the case of the two latter, the people followed their leader obediently, and ratified with constitutional voting whatever measures that leader might put forward. Even in matters requiring the gravest and the longest deliberation, a burst of rhetoric would carry a majority on the side of the speaker; as in the case of the condemnation of the Mytileneans, where the audacity of Cleon was sufficient to blind the whole Athenian assembly to the atrocious nature of his proposal. 'The most violent man in the whole city, and at the same time the most influential.' (ὅν καὶ ἐσ τὰ ἄλλα βιαστάτοις τῶν πολιτῶν, τῷ τε δήμῳ παρά πολὺ ἐν τῷ τότε πιθανώτατος, Thuc. III. 36.) Such is Thucydides' description of Cleon, and although it is evidently pointed by oligarchical feeling, it is generally borne out by the story of Cleon's career. And if the most violent man in a city is also the most influential, we can see that the mental and moral standard of the whole city must be low, and the city itself easily swayed. Cleon's history is an example of the power

1 In Xen. Mem. 2, 6, 13, Pericles is said to have charmed the city into following him. ἐπάθων τῇ πόλει ἐποιεῖ αὐτὴν φιλεῖν αὐτὸν.
wielded by a violent or unscrupulous mind. When Pericles’ influence was in the ascendant, the city followed his guidance to the bitter end, even to enduring the worst hardships of a siege and a blockade; thereby illustrating the truth of Plato’s belief, that the people are usually traduced, and only need proper guidance to bring them up to better things. (See 499, E.) But Cleon’s case is the reverse of Pericles’, and his influence depreciated the public tone, whilst it also shows how blindly the average citizen was led by the man whom he believed, rightly or wrongly, to be working for his interest. Now, as such a man could lead the populace when champion (προστάτης, see 565 D, and also C, ὅταν περ φύηται τιραννος ἐκ προστατικῆς ῥίζης καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοθεν), so he could impress them when he had constituted himself permanent despot, as Peisistratus (τιραννος) ; or when he availed himself of his influence only for a time, as Lycurgus and Solon and Pericles are said to have done (νομοθέτης). Such men, in fact, stamped their individuality on the peoples with whom they had to deal.

Let us see how Plato himself bears out this fact. In page 502 B, Socrates states that one single man, supposing he have the city in obedience to his will, can bring everything to pass that seems to his hearers so difficult of accomplishment. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἥν δ’ ἐγὼ, εἰς ἰκανὸς γενόμενος, πόλιν ἐχων πειθωμένην, πάντ’ ἐπιτελέσαι τὰ νῦν ἀπιστούμενα. The constitution of the Spartan community is a striking instance of a whole people voluntarily submitting themselves to an irksome military régime (said to have been inaugurated by one man), lasting far on into middle life, against which they are known to have secretly, and in some cases openly,¹

¹ E.g. in the case of Pausanias and Lysander.
rebelled. To this opinion of Socrates, that a single man could impress himself upon an entire community, we must add one of his reasons already mentioned, viz., his above-mentioned belief that the common people were usually traduced, and really merited a much better reputation for capacity of improvement. See 499 E. ὢ μακάριε, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, μη πάντα ὦτω τῶν πολλῶν κατηγόρει· ἄλλοιαν τοι δὲ ἔκαν ἔχωσιν . . . κ.τ.λ.

Such are the considerations which help to explain Plato's belief in the possibility of his State—a possibility, however, not to be realised, as he thought, till the existing generation with their traditions and prejudices had given place to the next, on which the legislator might work. See page 415 D. ὡς μέν' ἂν οἱ τούτων νικήσ καὶ οἱ ἐπείτα οἱ τ' ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι οἱ ὄστεροι.

§ 6. The first step towards the constitution of a defending and protecting body in the State is education (Book II. page 376 E). And the first part of education is music, i.e. all learning which demands a direct effort of the mind, and is opposed to gymnastic. Again, the earliest step in musical education is fiction (ψευδεῖς λόγοι). But to the usual tales of fiction which relate to gods and heroes, Socrates takes great exception, because of their lightness, their impiety, and their immorality. A great deal is said in this Second Book, and a great deal more in Book III. upon the same subject, a subject which has been formulated in the expression, 'the conflict between religion and mythology.'

It is well known to all what cruel and immoral deeds are attributed to the members of the Greek theogony. Socrates mentions several of them in this Second Book
of the *Republic*, e.g. the binding of Hera by her son Ares, the mutilation of Ouranos by Kronos, how Ouranos devoured his own offspring, and so forth. But it is not equally well known that by the side of this variety of legends there existed a clear and well-defined belief in the existence of one Supreme Power, almighty and just, from the earliest time of which we have records in Greek writing. The object of this belief was not well defined, nor can we expect it to have been so; there was no attempt to define in strict terms the nature of God.

But the co-existence of this belief and this mythology challenged criticism in the mind of the people, conscious or unconscious. Sometimes the criticism broke out in the writings of the poets in the form of a declaration of faith in the Supreme Being and his purity; sometimes it appeared as a direct protest against the wickedness of the celestials or the impiety of attributing wickedness to them. At another time both declarations of faith and protests were combined with an attempt to grasp with the mind that which must be by its nature transcendent.

The necessity under which the human mind lies of believing in God is put forward in the *Odyssey* in simple and beautiful language,

πάντες δὲ θεῶν χατένειν ἀνθρώποι.—*Od*. iii. 48.

‘All men yearn after gods’; and the recurrence of the expression θεοῦτις in that poem points to a God who is to be feared by those who violate the laws of hospitality (*see Od*. vi. 121, where the expression is joined with φιλόξενος), and who upholds justice (*Od*. xix. 109, in connection with εἰδυκίας). Justice is also said by Hesiod to originate in its purest form from Zeus, ἱθείγει δίκαις,
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\[ α\iτ' \ek Δι\wos \e\i\wos \e\ions \ά\wισ\tau\aι; \; and \; the \; same \; poet \; bears \; witness \; to \; the \; omniscience \; of \; Z\e\wos, \]

\[ \o\w\ius \o\w\ius \p\e\i \e\i\ous \ \\w\et\i \ \Delta\wos \ \n\o\w\ous \ \e\x\u\a\l\a\w\a\v\a\d\a\i\a\i; \]

and speaks of the race of heroes who succeeded to the gold, silver, and bronze ages, as juster and nobler than their predecessors—

\[ δικαιότερον \; κα\i \; \ά\wρε\i\o\u; \; \ά\wρ\o\w\ous \; \υ\e\i\o\u; \; γέ\wν\o; \]

Where it is noticeable that they seem to be termed \the\w\o\w\ous or godlike, inasmuch as they are just and noble. In the same way, and in the same poem, men who fail to honour parents in old age are described as \o\u\d\e\i\e\i \the\w\o\w\ous \; \o\i\o\i\o\i\o\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i\i}\]

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From these passages it will be seen that Hesiod believed the relation of God to man to be one of justice and active supervision:—

\[ πάντα \ \i\o\w\o; \ \Δ\w\o; \ \ο\f\w\a\l\a\m\o; \; κα\i \; πάντα \ νο\u\i\o;\a; \]

are his words later on in the same poem; and although he speaks of Zeus' hatred of particular individuals and the harsh punishment which mortals incur at his hands, his general and his final conception of the Deity is of a pure and monotheistic character.

Pindar's religious belief finds its expression in a
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strong protest against the credibility of mythological tales; thus in Olymp. 1, 82,

εμοὶ δ’ ἄπορα γαστρίμαρ-
γον μακάρων τιν’ εἰπέων ἀφίσταμαι.

And another of the early lyricists claims Virtue as the peculiar gift of Heaven—

οὕτις ἀνεύ θεῶν ἀρέτην λάβεν
οὺ πόλις οὐ βροτὸς. Θεὸς ὁ παμμῆτις.

Whilst another says the same of what is noble—

ὅτι καλὸν φίλων ἄστι· τὸ δ’ οὐ καλὸν οὐ φίλων ἄστι·
toiv' ñpos áthanátwv ἥλθε διὰ στομάτων;

and Sotades speaks of Temperance as their especial gift:—

ἄν δὲ σωφρονῆς, τούτο θεῶν δῶρον ὑπάρχει.

Empedocles (Fr. 437-9) expressly states that the same law of right (θέμις) is invariable for all—

οὐ πέλεται τοῖς μὲν θεμιτῶν τὸδε τοῖς δ’ ἀθέμιστον·
ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νομίμων διὰ τ’ εὐρυμέδουντος
καθέρος ἣνεκέως τέταται, διὰ τ’ ἀπλέτου αὐγῆς.

Here the language is vague, and the principle of justice is not referred to one Being as its originator, but the principle itself is none the less distinctly laid down. And a similar thought occurs in Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus, line 863—

εἰ μοι ξυνείη φέροντι
μοῖρα τάν εὐπεπτων ἄγνειαν λόγων
ἔργαν τε πάντων, ὃν νόμοι πρόκεινται
ὑπόποδεσ, οὐρανίαν
δι’ αἰθέρα τεκνωθέντες, ὃν "Ολυμπος
Here, as Professor Campbell says, we have Olympus used to express 'a sort of unseen heaven,' a holy place. And all words and deeds are said to be fixed and defined by heavenly laws as pure or the reverse. A vagueness of expression pervades the poet's words, but there is no vagueness in the principle; just as in the same play (line 903 infr.), we have an invocation to Zeus, qualified by the condition 'if so thou art rightly called'—

\[ \alpha \lambda \lambda ' \, \delta \, \kappa rατύνων, \, \varepsilon \piερ \, \delta ρθ' \, \acute{α}κούεις, \]
\[ Zει, \, \piάντ' \, \acute{α}νάσσων, \]

a sentiment to be closely paralleled by a similar expression in the *Agamemnon* of Ἀeschylus, line 162, 'Zeus, who'er he be,'

\[ Zεις, \, \acute{ο}στις \, \piοτ' \, \acute{ε}στιν \, \varepsilon \, \tauόδ' \, α\nu'— \]
\[ \tau\omega \, \φιλον \, \kappaεκλημένω, \]
\[ \tau\omega \, \ νιν \, \προσεννέπω. \]

Here the use of the indicative \( \acute{ε}στι \) shows that there is no doubt in the mind of the supplicant as to Zeus' existence, which the context confirms; but there is the same confession of ignorance as to the form of his manifestation. And so in *Choēphoroe* 951, when speaking of Justice, the poet first speaks of her as Διός κόρα, adding that her name among mortals is called by a happy chance Δίκα, implying that her divinity and her being are alike derived from Zeus:—

\[ \Delta \iota \acute{o}, \, \Delta \acute{i}καν \, \acute{δ}ε \, \acute{ν}ιν \]
\[ \piροσαγορεύομεν \]
\[ \betaροτοι, \, \tauυχόντες \, \kαλ\varsigma s. \]
These passages show that in the minds of the best thinkers there was no doubt as to the existence and the preeminence, and the justice and purity of Zeus and the gods. They may have believed to a small extent in mythological tales; they cannot have accepted them entirely; in Pindar's opinion, in fact, they are to be unconditionally rejected—ἀφίστημαι. And no doubt all those poets and thinkers who approached to Pindar's intellectual standpoint thought with Pindar and with Socrates that tales of the sort should have no place in a man's serious belief.¹

§ 7. We have now seen what the Republic is, how it is divided, why it was written, what kind of information or addition to philosophy it contains, and how far Plato believed in the possibility of his State. We have also seen that in the first two books of the Dialogue we must only expect critical and negative results with the beginning of the creation of a State. It remains to say a few words upon the light in which Socrates is brought before us in the first two books of the Republic, which form the proem or prosodus of the dialectical drama.

We have spoken above of Socrates' religion, his belief in God, and the terms of that belief; we have

¹ In this apparent inconsistency, viz. the coexistence of a pure morality with a debased mythology, some have seen the traces of an old cult of personified natural forces, the growth of which cult is thus described by Buckle: 'The aspects of nature when very threatening stimulate the imagination. . . . . Among an ignorant people there is a direct tendency to ascribe all serious dangers to supernatural intervention; and a strong religious sentiment being thus aroused, it constantly happens not only that the danger is submitted to, but that it is actually worshipped.'—History of Civilization, vol. i. page 113, 2nd Edition.
seen that, so far from being an atheist, Socrates was a man of lively belief in the gods of his country. We cannot speak here of his moral earnestness, his deep conviction of the serious nature of life, and the tenacity with which he applied himself to the preaching of that conviction. That, in spite of a superficial lightness and a gay humour, he was earnest and serious, the perusal of a single Dialogue of Plato will satisfy us. We have to speak rather of this gaiety and humour, characteristics which stand out in the brightest light in this prelude to the more serious business of the Dialogue.

"Επαιζεν ἁμα σπουδαζων, 'he used to jest in earnest.' This epigram of Xenophon's expresses in the happiest terms Socrates' power of mingling the grave with the gay, the lively with the severe; it shows how he could joke and quibble apparently in the lightest strain, and yet bring out of his jokes and quibbles the solid grain of truth. And who shall quarrel with Socrates for this habit? The first principle of teaching, of preaching, of imparting knowledge of any kind, is not to instruct, but to interest. Μαθηματικαν ἐπαιγωγη ἰ ἀποδεικτη are the words of Aristotle¹; and induction, the marshalling of facts in detail, must precede deduction, if we are to interest our hearers. This is Socrates' manner of argument. He presents in their humblest guise the humblest facts, garnishes them with his humour, and links them effectively but not obtrusively into a more or less perfect chain of argument; until the hearer is struck with amazement and conviction to find what power and what knowledge the barest facts can yield if they are manipulated with a skilful hand.

Let us, then, see how this humour is employed with

¹ Post. Analyt. 1, 18, p. 81, a 40.
effect in the scenes of dialectic which the first two books of the *Republic* present. Socrates is quietly walking home from Piraeus; in reply to the jocular threat of forcible detention he suggests the possibility of gaining his release by persuasion; he falls with pleasure into a conversation with Cephalus, who is approaching the evening of life, and begins an apparently short discussion with Cephalus' son and heir Polemarchus. Thus far Socrates has shown only in his quiet and speculative mood; but, as the discussion with Polemarchus advances, he begins to apply his ἄλεγχος or critical method with such effect that it rouses the envy of Thrasymachus, a Sophist present among the audience, described by Socrates in the *Phaedrus*¹ as the mighty Chalcedonian, who trusts, as the sequel will show, rather to his lungs than his logic for dialectical success. It is to Socrates' treatment of this braggart and to Socrates' bearing under the infliction of his declamations that we invite attention; for by his treatment of others the best insight is gained into a man's character.

The first result of the dialectical collision between the mighty Chalcedonian and Socrates is that the former is made ridiculous (see page 338 C); the next that he becomes furious; and this again is naturally followed by his discomfiture in the argument. But all these results are attained by Socrates without the slightest violation of those rules of good feeling and good breeding to which Thrasymachus is an entire stranger. In his account of the discussion Socrates compares Thrasymachus to a wild beast and a bath-man, and very well are the similes deserved; but in the actual

¹ 267 D.
conversation his politeness stands out in marked contrast to Thrasymachus' overbearing conduct. We know that there is nothing so provocative of anger to a violent person as a calm and cool demeanour under his attacks. Of this demeanour Socrates was a perfect example. His humour led him also to take a positive relish in exasperating men who showed any violent intentions—we see traces of this in his treatment of Thrasymachus, and we have another case of it in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, which deserves, for the illustration it affords of Socrates' manner in this respect, to be quoted in extenso.

'Critias and Charicles (two of the Thirty) called Socrates and showed him the law which forbid him to converse with the young . . . . Then he said, "I desire to obey the law; but I wish to know if you think dialectic is on the side of that which is spoken rightly, or against it, that you bid me discontinue it. For if it belongs to the former class, it is the same thing as if you ordered me not to speak rightly, and if it belong to the latter, it is evident that we should try to learn to speak rightly." At this Charicles was angry, and said, "As you cannot understand us, Socrates, we tell you clearly not to converse with the young at all." Socrates replied, "To prevent any misunderstanding, will you define what you mean by the young?" And Charicles answered, "All those below thirty years of age." "But supposing that I am making a purchase," said Socrates, "and the seller is under thirty years of age, may I not ask him what he charges?" "Of course," replied Charicles; "but you are always asking questions with a purpose; these questions you must not ask." "Nor answer, I suppose," replied Socrates, "if
INTRODUCTION.

a youth were to ask me, for instance, 'Where does Charicles live?' or, 'Where is Critias?'" "Such questions as those you might answer," said Charicles. And Critias said, "But your cobblers, and your carpenters and your coppersmiths, those illustrations that you are always dinning into our ears and working to death, you must have done with." "Then," said Socrates, "I must also have done with all my inductions from those illustrations, about justice and piety and the rest?" "By Zeus, you must!" said Charicles.¹

In this interesting and characteristic scene, we have Socrates treating in his humorous way a command that must have been of the greatest seriousness to him. ἐπαυγεῖν ἄμα στροφάλγων. He is trying to show his enemies the mistake into which they are falling, by exhibiting their command in a ridiculous light. But Critias and his companions were not men who could be influenced by words; and it is only when Socrates has fair play accorded to him that his reductio ad absurdum is of avail. Then, however, it is of the highest efficiency; and nowhere is it employed with greater effect than in the First Book of the Republic. And if it be asked, 'Why is it that Socrates was so given up to his humour that we find it glancing on every page of these biographical sketches?' we must answer that its very value and force lay in the fact that it was spontaneous, redeeming Socrates' teaching from the charge of dulness, and investing it with an interest for all. So far was Socrates even from lying under the imputation of flippancy that the Athenians who condemned him must have felt that in him they had to deal with one who

¹ Xen. Mem. 1, 2, 33, seqq.
exerted a real power and a real influence over the citizens. Earnest he was in every action, inasmuch as he did nothing without a definite object; and so far was he from wasting his energies in mere logomachy that his teaching may be fairly summed up in Plato’s noble words, 'Αθληται μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ μεγίστου ἄγωνος, 'Men are athletes in the greatest of all contests—the arena of life.'
THE

ARGUMENT OF THE REPUBLIC.
BOOK I.

I went down to Piraeus yesterday with Glaucon, Ariston’s son, to see the festival of Artemis; and, as we were coming back, Polemarchus, son of Cephalus, overtook us, with Adeimantus, Glaucon’s brother, and others with them. And Polemarchus constrained us to go home with him; where we found amongst others Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, and the old man Cephalus, just finishing a sacrificial rite. He gently upbraided me for not coming oftener to see him, adding that at his time of life the pleasure of conversation with friends was very great. I replied that nothing gave me also greater pleasure than communing with those who have gone before on the road of life; for they could describe whether it were hard or easy, rough or smooth. ‘Why,’ he said, ‘many of my friends, Socrates, when they come to see me, are always lamenting their old age and longing after the pleasures of youth; whilst I tell them that to be quit of the desires of youth is to freed not from one but from a host of hard and age masters.’ ‘Yes,’ I said, ‘but you must recollect or easy circumstances, Cephalus.’ ‘No doubt,’ he
replied, 'my circumstances make life easier; but though I might be discontented if I were poor, I am sure some of those friends of mine would never be contented, even if they were rich; as Themistocles said to the Seriphian. And I have worked hard to repair my grandfather's fortune, which my father left me in a dilapidated state. But when you come to my age, Socrates, you begin to think over your past life, of the good you have done, and then you are comforted: and of the evil, and the more it be, the unhappier a man is.' 'And what is this "doing good" or justice?' I said. 'Oh!' he said, 'I must bequeath the disposition to Polemarchus.' 'Who is your heir?' I said. At this he smiled, and then left us. 'Come now, Polemarchus,' I said, 'with your legacy of argument, what is that definition of justice "Tell the truth and pay your debts," given by Simonides, which you support? You don't say that you ought to give back to a friend everything that you have borrowed? You might, at that rate, have to give a sword to a madman.' 'I suppose Simonides meant,' he said, 'that we ought to give that which befits each to each.' 'In other words,' I said, 'to do good to your friends and harm to your enemies; as a good steersman is capable of carrying his friends safely and drowning his foes. But in what circumstances is justice useful to our friends?' 'To help our friends,' he answered, 'when they need help, and give back money when they lend it us.' 'So that,' I said, 'if they have no attacks made upon them and never lend money, there is no place for this justice of ours. And on the principle that a good keeper makes a good poacher, our just man will be good at thieving, be good at keeping. So that Simonides' and I saw definition of justice has assumed a strange aspect you
again, often those who are apparently our enemies are really our friends; so that from our definition it would in some cases, turn out that doing harm to friends is justice—the very reverse of Simonides' meaning. 'Let us change the definition then,' he said, 'and substitute "our real friends" for "our friends."' 'But,' I said, 'the function of justice is to make men just and good, as the function of each art and trade is to make the objects of their work better in respect of that art or trade. How then can it be the function of justice to harm any one, that is, to depreciate his powers? For all harm is depreciation. We must therefore remove that part of the definition.' 'We must,' he said.

Now Thrasyvachus before this had tried to interrupt the conversation a good many times, but the rest prevented him; so that when we stopped he gathered himself together like a wild beast and hurled himself upon us. 'You fools!' he said, 'why, if you really want to know what justice is, do you exhibit all these pretty tricks of dialectic? Now answer me in a straightforward manner, what you really think it to be. And don't say that it is the beneficial or the advantageous or the profitable or that which is to a man's interest.' 'Nay! pity us, Thrasyvachus,' I said, 'and give us your help, for we do not profess to know what it is.' 'Ah!' said he, 'Socrates' usual self-deprecation! 'By no means,' said I; 'but if you ask a man to define twelve, and say, you must not answer twice six, or three times four, or four times three, what is he to say?' 'Nonsense!' he said; 'but supposing I tell you what justice is, what will you say?' 'I shall receive the information and be thankful for it,' I said.

1 _eiporia._
'Well, pay your money,' he said. 'I have none,' I replied. 'We will all contribute for Socrates,' said Glaucos. So Thrasymachus, after beating about the bush for a time, and pretending that he was not anxious to be the speaker himself, defined justice as the Interest of the Stronger.' 'Do you mean,' said I, 'that if it is to the interest of Polydamas, who is stronger than we, to eat beef, that we ought to eat beef too, and that that would be justice?' 'You are a brute, Socrates,' he said. 'You know that, in every city, whether the government be tyranny, oligarchy, or democracy, the laws are always made by those in power in their own interest; and justice is acting according to law, therefore justice is the Interest of the Stronger, or the Governing Portion.' 'But stay, Thrasymachus,' I said, 'you told me not to use interest in my definition, and you have done so yourself. But, passing over that objection, I ask you if the Governing Portion does not sometimes make laws which turn out badly for themselves; and if so, whether justice, i.e. acting according to law, may not therefore sometimes turn out in the exactly opposite way, viz. against the Interest of the Stronger?'

'I did not mean that at all,' said Thrasymachus, 'I do not call the man who makes a mistake in legislation the Stronger, when he makes his mistake. For a man is not a scribe, a doctor, or a calculator, when he makes a mistake in transcribing, doctoring, or calculating.' 'Well, that may be,' I said; 'but all the arts have some definite object, as arts (I do not mean as remunerative, because in that respect they are all phases of the art of money-making); and these arts need no external assistance as long as they are correctly and wholly practised, but are free from defect and mistake,
as arts. And these arts are superior to and command those subjects on whom they practise. And their object is merely and solely the interest of the subject, which is inferior to and weaker than themselves; and in the case of the arts, therefore, the interest of the weaker is their object and not the interest of the stronger. And in a ship the steersman governs the ship, and directs all his efforts to the safety of the crew, who are his inferiors in steering. And in every kind of government, in short, you will find that it is the interest of the weaker that is sought after by the stronger, and not that of himself.

At this point Thrasyphrachus suddenly asked me: 'Have you a nurse, Socrates?' 'Why do you ask foolish questions,' I said, 'instead of going on with the argument?' 'Because you drivel,' he said, 'and don't understand the difference between sheep and shepherd. For the shepherd takes care of the sheep, just as your steersman or captain takes care of his crew, but it is for his own ultimate profit and interest. You can prove it by what you know of public office. When a strong, unscrupulous man takes a public position, he farms it, he uses it to help his friends and spite his foes, he comes out of it with full hands, even if he went in with empty ones; but a just and upright man lets his own household go to rack and ruin, whilst he is transacting the public business of such a post, and offends his friends, and spends much of his private fortune, and comes out of his position much poorer than he was when he accepted it. And in a contract between a bad man and a good one, which do you suppose will come off the better? And I do not speak of thieves, and sacrilegious persons, kidnappers, and so forth, but of those specious rogues who compass the
ideal of injustice, and are highly respectable members of the State.'

After this burst of rhetoric Thrasy machus would have made off, but the others detained him, and compelled him to stay and defend his words. 'Well,' said I, 'in plain words, I do not believe all that. For you will not keep to your strict definition with which you began, when you said that the ruler, or the Stronger, never erred as a ruler; but now when you say that the shepherd takes care of the sheep only for his own ultimate interest, I answer that, respecting his own ultimate interest, he is a money-maker and not a shepherd. Therefore, as shepherd he has regard for the interest of the weaker. And this is proved, Thrasy machus, by the attachment of salaries and honours to official posts, to induce men to come forward, or even fines, if they will not offer themselves; because it is not for their own interest that men hold office, but for the interest of those whom they govern. And therefore in a perfectly fair and prosperous community there would be exactly the same struggle to avoid office as there is now to enjoy it. On these grounds, among others, I repudiate Thrasy machus' definition of justice. But I consider that a much graver position which he upholds, viz. that an unjust life is better and more profitable than a just one. Come, Thrasy machus, let us enter on this question. You call injustice profitable, so I suppose you call justice vice."

1 This refutation of Thrasy machus is substantially a reply to Adeimantus also, in Book IV. init., when he maintains that Socrates has not made the rulers of the State, the φίλακτες, comfortable; for the answer there is, although not distinctly expressed, the same as this, viz. that the rulers are for the people and not the people for the rulers, and that this principle is evident, consistent, and universal, at any rate in a free State.
'No,' he said, 'but great folly.' 'You grant,' I said, 'that the just man does not try to overreach the just, but the unjust?' 'He might try,' he said, 'but he would not succeed.' 'Whilst the unjust,' I continued, 'tries to overreach both.' 'Yes,' he said, 'and the ideally unjust man succeeds completely.' 'But,' I continued, 'in any art whatsoever, it is the unskilful and ignorant man who tries to take advantage both of the ignorant and the skilful; whilst the skilful man would take advantage not of the skilful, but of the unskilful only. So that according to the analogy of all the arts, if we call the skilful man wise and good, and the ignorant useless and bad, your unjust man resembles the latter, and your just man the former.'

Thrasymachus was obliged to confess the justice of my proof, but he fought hard against it, and got very hot (for it was a summer day) and actually blushed, for the first time, I should say, in his life. 'Well,' I said, 'with this conclusion, that other position of yours is turned, viz. that injustice is strong and justice weak. For which city is more likely to hold her own amongst other cities, the skilful or the unskilful, i.e. the just or the unjust? You must remember that, where there is injustice, there is sedition, and the house divided against itself. So that the more injustice there is in a State the less efficient it will be. And your unjust man will incur Heaven's hatred, for he is opposed to the just, and I suppose you call the gods just; whilst the just man will be the friend of the gods. And hence we may conclude that, when we see an unjust man prospering, or a number of unjust men carrying out a project to a successful issue, that, in so far as they succeed, they are not entirely unjust, but have a certain consistency and
coherence, by virtue of which they succeed, whereas if they were perfectly unjust they would fail altogether. And if you grant that we live in virtue of our souls, and that the soul has a function, or mode of action, as the eyes' function is seeing, and the ears' function is hearing; and if you further grant that these functions have an excellence proper to each, viz. their highest state of efficiency; we must conclude that the excellence of the soul is justice; for by it the soul best performs its part of originating right action. And so the just man will live a good life, and the unjust man a bad one. It is by your consideration, Thrasymachus, that we have arrived at this happy conclusion: since you began to take a calm view of the question. But for all this I know no more of what justice really is than when we began; for we have been considering whether it is wisdom or folly, virtue or vice, profitable or unprofitable, before we have even obtained its definition.'

1 κομίδη δυτες ἅδικοι.
BOOK II.

When we had gone so far in our discourse I thought that there was an end of it, but as it turned out, this was merely the preface. For Glaucon would not accept the conclusion, but said, 'Are you content to suppose that you have set the question at rest in our minds by this mode of arriving at a conclusion, or will you thoroughly prove the truth of the position that justice is better than injustice? Is justice one of those things that we pursue for its own sake, or for the sake of its results, or for the sake of both?' 'Of both,' I answered. 'Well,' he said, 'I should like to have it satisfactorily proved. Thrasymachus gave up long before he ought to have done (for I will revive his argument), and did not bring half the objections against the just life which he might have brought. And all the apologists of justice, whom I have ever heard speak, confine themselves to the advantages which follow from a virtuous life, and do not support justice for its own intrinsic worth. So I am going to bring various counts against justice with all my powers. First, then, in its origin justice is described as a compromise, effected by the weaker, who find themselves habitually ill-treated, and make an arrangement that there shall be no ill-doing by themselves or against themselves. It is a compromise between the height of success, viz., doing evil with
impunity, and the depth of misfortune, which is being ill-treated without hope of redress.

There is no principle in doing good and being just. If a just man had a ring like that of Gyges the Lydian, he would be as bad as the unjust. For Gyges’ ring had the power of making its wearer invisible, and he committed adultery with the king’s wife, and by her help slew the king, and reigned in his stead. Now strip off from the unjust man all things that make him unlovely to the world’s eyes, and let him stand forth completely and efficiently equipped with his injustice. If he ever fail, imagine him as one capable of restoring his fortunes; let him be considered a just man; let him be master of persuasion, and, if need be, of force. On the other side place the perfectly just man, and, to complete the antithesis, subtract from him even his appearance of justice, for otherwise he will be rewarded according to his appearance, and let him go on unaltered until he die, so that he may be consistently and continuously just. How then will these two fare? The good man will be scourged, fined, tortured, imprisoned, and deserted by every one, will end his days in solitude and misery; whilst the unjust man will be called to rule over his fellow citizens, receive crowns and rewards, will attain to the summit of earthly prosperity, and will have all the means of helping on his poorer friends and of paying duteous sacrifice to the gods. This is the completest indictment against the just life that I know.’

I was about to begin a reply to Glaucon, when his brother Adeimantus chimed in: ‘He has not said half enough, Socrates. The apologists of justice tell us that in the after life the good enjoy different senses, e.g. a never-ending intoxication, and that sentenced to pour water for ever through a si
are the rewards and punishments by which the minds of young are incited to virtue. The poets again are hopelessly at sea on the question of justice and morality, for they sing of the beauty of holiness, but they tell us that spells and sacrifices and prayers of all kinds can easily sway the judgments of heaven. And when young men see how injustice prevails, and learn from professors of rhetoric and persuasion how to move the hearts of men, what wonder is it if they turn altogether away from justice, saying to themselves that they can always get rid of their sins by a few sacrifices, when they are coming towards their end. And all this is due to that custom of praising justice for its rewards, and dissuading people from injustice because of its penalties. In your apology, then, for justice, remove the reputation and the accessories that attach to each. Bring both bare before us, and prove to those who will hear you with eager ears that justice is right and good, and injustice wicked and bad.'

I had always felt a regard for Glaucoun and Adeimantus, but on this occasion I was especially struck with them, so cleverly had they stated their case, and so earnest were they in their desire to have the question settled. I replied that I feared I was unable to make such a defence of justice as would satisfy them, but I was ready to try. To discover justice in the human soul, let us see if we cannot find justice first in some larger organism, just as if we were unable to read something written in small letters, and were to seek for the same thing written large in another place. Justice perhaps may be 'writ large' in a State, and could then be transferred by analogical argument to the Soul of man. Let us then picture to ourselves the actual birth and growth of a State,
THE ARGUMENT

Now the origin of a State lies, I take it, in the insufficiency of a man's resources. For man needs much, but cannot always satisfy his needs by himself. Therefore this man joins that man to himself in a society to profit by his powers, and an interchange of benefits is made between them. What, then, is man's first need? Food. And the next is that of lodging, and the third that of clothing. We shall require for our city, then, a tiller of the soil, a house-builder, and a weaver, and perhaps, too, a cobbler. Hence four or five at least is the original number of our citizens. The next question is this: Is the husbandman to produce enough corn for himself and no more, or is he to supply the others with corn on the condition that they supply him with the produce of their labour? Is he to make his own clothes and build his own house, besides raising food enough for his consumption? No; we must lay down this principle at once, that each man must share the results of his toil amongst all the citizens, because every man has one art and only one, generally speaking, in which he excels; therefore let him confine himself to this art, and not waste his time and his art by attempting other arts. So there must be a smith to make the husbandman his plough, and a carpenter, and various other mechanics. And we cannot help feeling the necessity of importing commodities from other places; for each place, like each man, is not self-sufficient, but needs supplementing from the resources of other places. And so we shall have merchants in our State. And, seeing that a seller cannot sit down and waste his time till a buyer may happen to come by who wants his commodity, we must have middle-men, i.e. tradesmen, to form a convenient link between the producer and the consumer. Those of our citizens whose body is more efficient
than their mind will become hired servants, and so
the different inhabitants of our city will grow and
multiply.

'This is our city. Now comes the question, What
manner of life will they live? They will till the ground,
build them houses, make them garments; in summer
working lightly clad, in winter well protected; they
will make them fine loaves and cakes of the wheat and
barley which they grow; they will lie on leaf-couches
and will live pleasantly, drinking their wine and praising
their gods, training their children carefully to avoid
poverty and contention. And, if you please, we will
give them a relish, olives, cheese, figs, and nuts. And
living moderately they will spend a long life, and
bequeath the same happy existence to their children.'

'Tis a city of swine, Socrates, and nothing more nor
less,' said Glaucon. 'You must give them the usual
amenities of life, tables and chairs, and a few delicacies.'

'Ah!' I said, 'you want me to create a luxurious city,
with all its accompaniment of cooks, sweetmeats, sauces,
dancing girls, and doctors. And to keep all this mob
of accessory populace we shall want to cut off a little
piece of our neighbours' land, and they will feel the
same necessity regarding ours, so that at once war is
generated, with its horses, and soldiers, and weapons.
And if war is an art or trade (and I do not see how it
can fail to be so) we must confine our soldiers to their
trade of war, and keep a standing army. Nay, of all
other trades in the city, it will be the most important,
because the duty of the warriors will be to keep intact
the whole Body Politic. Hence the most time and the
greatest care must be spent on our warriors or guardians
as we may call them. They must be keen, quick, strong,
courageous, and withal gentle; so that their great
strength and spirit may not be turned against their own fellow citizens; like dogs of a noble nature—very savage when they see a stranger, who may have done them no harm, but gentle to any one whom they know, although he may never have done them any kindness. In other words they must be philosophic, i.e. quick to apprehend what is to the interest of their fellow countrymen and what is against it. How then are we to produce such a type of man?

'Education is divided into music and gymnastics. In the music¹ the first step is fiction.' 'I do not understand you,' he said. 'I mean,' said I, 'that as we teach our children by telling them stories, so we must begin the education of our guardians, but with this difference: the tales that our children hear, told by Homer and Hesiod, contain a great deal of noxious fiction, which must be expunged with the greatest care from our system of education. The foul and ridiculous stories about many of the gods are not true, to begin with, and, if they were true, I would not have children's ears defiled with them. What, then, are we to use in their place? you say. And I reply that we are no poets; but in our city there will be poets, and we shall instruct them as to the poetry they are to write, we shall lay down the lines on which they are to work, and if they transgress them, we shall punish the irregularity. God is good, and he must always be represented so: he cannot be the author of evil to any living being; he cannot lie or deceive; he cannot even change, for if he were to change it would be for the better or for the worse. Now he cannot change for the better, because he is the Best; and he would not desire to change for

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the worse. Therefore he is true and unchangeable. We will, then, strive with all our might and main against those writers who attempt to traduce the nature of God, and drive them from our city. And we shall have great fault to find with Homer and Æschylus, and many other poets who have failed to give a consistent account of the goodness of the gods.'

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With the year of our Lord 1956
BOOK III.

"Our poets must be careful when they speak of the after life, not to malign it, and when they are singing of gods and heroes they must not attribute anything unseemly to them, either in grief or in joy, for example, excessive laughter. And the rulers of the State are to be the only persons who have control over the songs and myths of the State."

"Again, sobriety and temperance are necessary for our young men; and therefore all things intemperate, either in word or in action, must be struck out of our poetry, especially in mentioning gods and heroes. The matter of our poetry having been considered, and rules for its guidance having been laid down, we come next to speak of its manner, or style."

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compound order; whilst tragedy leaves out, "and he replied," or "so the goddess spoke," and gives the dialogue as it actually comes from the speakers. This kind is purely imitative. Whilst in dithyrambs it is the poet speaking all the time; and in them we have the narrative pure.

'Now one man is seldom or never a good imitator in more than one subject. A writer of tragedy does not succeed in comedy, nor vice versa. Man's nature is of so small a capacity that, as in craftsmanship, so in art, we must be specialists if we wish to succeed. And the manner of imitation must correspond to the matter. We shall not allow our artists to give us presentations of anything foul or dishonourable. For as a good man will never lose control over his actions, so he should never imitate in word or action those who have lost control of themselves. As he will not imitate everything he sees indiscriminately, but only those things which are worthy of imitation, so he will not even read such imitations from the poets, or allow them to give such imitations. In fact, our citizens must be men of single, not double or multiple\(^1\) mind; and in their words, actions, and writings, they will follow the ideal of the upright and single-hearted man.

'Next, the music of the poetry. This must be adapted as far as possible to the poetry itself; and if we observe this rule we shall not go wrong. Remove at once then those melodies of a pitiful and wailing character like the mixolydian and syntonylydian; the soft, effeminate,

\(^1\) In the *Laelius* of Cicero, the single-minded man is held up for our admiration as a friend. 'Simplicem præterea et communem et consentientem, qui rebus iisdem moveatur, eligi par est; que omnia pertinent ad fideltatem. Neque enim fidum potest esse *multiplex ingenium et tortuosum*.’—Ch. xviii. sec. 65.
and revelling strains.' 'At this rate,' he said, 'you will leave none but the Dorian and Phrygian.' 'I dare say not,' said I, 'for the first-named have many strings and many chords, and are altogether of too complex a nature for our simple and unaffected songs. And then the rhythm, or flow of the verses, must be fixed; for instance, dactylic, epic, iambic, or trochaic. But we will consult Damon on this point; for it is a difficult one. Only we may be sure of this, that, if we have a good style to begin with, our metre and rhythm will more easily flow well with it; and the whole composition will ultimately depend for its style and music and rhythm on the character of the composer. If we take pains with our teaching of temperance, courage, and magnanimity, we shall find our music and poetry falling naturally into a good groove; and thus we shall avoid all intemperance and vulgarity.

'Now we come to the gymnastic training of our youths. And let me remind you that men are athletes in the greatest arena, that of life. Their bodily training must be of the highest efficiency; excluding Syracusan luxuries, Sicilian cookery, Attic sweetmeats, Corinthian courtesans; for by the presence of luxury in the State the door is opened to intemperance and a whole horde of diseases, which will come trooping in; and our city will be full of doctors, cooperating up wrecked constitutions. Nay, our men will have no leisure to be ill; but if a man is unsound we will have none of him, for it is neither to his own interest nor to that of his fellow citizens that he live in our State or anywhere else.'

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but you might as well say that the best judge, and the most honourable man, is he who has had most-experience of crime. Whereas, on the contrary, the fact is that the fresher the mind and the purer, which approaches the administration of justice, the better able is it to discern between good and evil. For a wicked man would be always suspecting others to be as bad as himself, and would attribute the worst motives to every man. And no doubt the good man, on the contrary, would now and then lay himself open to the charge of too great a simplicity. But it is a fault on the right side.¹

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elder of course, and the best of the elders. And the best of the elders I should define as those who can best withstand the temptation and the bewitchment of pleasure and fear, who can keep their mental and moral balance and live a harmonious and consistent life.

'To keep our youth firmly imbued with their responsibility and their duty, I would invent a fiction of this sort; that all those citizens who are found worthy to rule are golden in their nature, and the defenders are silver, and the common people iron; and that there is a prophecy that, when a silver or an iron nature shall be found at the head of the state, then it shall fall and come to nought.' 'Well,' said he, 'you might imbue a second generation with this fable perhaps, but not the present.'

'And so our community will live, well governed by its guardians, and well defended by its protectors, who will not turn against the sheep they defend like wolves; and all will live in common, not calling this mine and that yours, but, like a great army will be happy and powerful in the loyalty of each individual to the colours. Gold and silver, except the gold and silver of their own natures, they will never touch; for it is avarice that breeds disunion in a city, and it is disunion which is political ruin.

1 Sir Thomas More following this principle of Plato in his *Utopia*, finds one result of proprietorship and inequality of possessions in the great number of laws required to regulate conflicting rights. Thus: '... where every man calleth that he hath gotten his owne private and proper goodes, where so many newe lawes daylye made be not sufficiene for everye man to enjoye, defende, and knowe from another man's that whych he calleth his owne.' A few pages further on we have his description of the Utopian life in common: 'Whoso will may go in (to the houses), for there is nothing within the houses that is priuate or anye man's owne.'—Pp. 67 and 79, ed. Arber, London, 1869.
BOOK IV.

'BUT supposing some one objected to all this, Socrates,' said Adeimantus, 'that you have made your State and appointed your guardians, and that they turn out to be by no means the happiest and most comfortable people in it, what would you say?' 'I should answer,' I said, 'that the people are not for the guardians, but the guardians for the people, or rather "each man for himself and God for us all."' In other words, we do not make the happiness of a particular class our object, but the general welfare. It would be absurd, would it not, to dress up our farmers and potters and shoemakers in fine clothes, and tell them to do as much work as they pleased, and how they pleased? Every man then must do his quantum of due labour, and thus we shall avoid the two extremes of riches and poverty, which are the mainsprings of discontent and sedition.

'But are we to have no resources, no wealth, Socrates?'
'Certainly not; for if we have no wealth we shall have no enemy coming to despoil us, and like a trained athlete, who can encounter any number of rich fatburghers, provided that he take them one or two at a time, so shall we be. For our soldiers and guardians will be able to fight twice their number of opponents; and other nations will prefer to fight with us, the strong and hard-bitten dogs, against the fat and helpless sheep. And us they will leave alone.
impunity, and the depth of misfortune, which is being ill-treated without hope of redress.

There is no principle in doing good and being just. If a just man had a ring like that of Gyges the Lydian, he would be as bad as the unjust. For Gyges' ring had the power of making its wearer invisible, and he committed adultery with the king's wife, and by her help slew the king, and reigned in his stead. Now strip off from the unjust man all things that make him unlovely to the world's eyes, and let him stand forth completely and efficiently equipped with his injustice. If he ever fail, imagine him as one capable of restoring his fortunes; let him be considered a just man; let him be master of persuasion, and, if need be, of force. On the other side place the perfectly just man, and, to complete the antithesis, subtract from him even his appearance of justice, for otherwise he will be rewarded according to his appearance, and let him go on unaltered until he die, so that he may be consistently and continuously just. How then will these two fare? The good man will be scourged, fined, tortured, imprisoned, and deserted by every one, will end his days in solitude and misery; whilst the unjust man will be called to rule over his fellow citizens, receive crowns and rewards, will attain to the summit of earthly prosperity, and will have all the means of helping on his poorer friends and of paying duteous sacrifice to the gods. This is the completest indictment against the just life that I know.'

I was about to begin a reply to Glaucon, when his brother Adeimantus chimed in: 'He has not said half enough, Socrates. The apologists of justice tell us that in the after life the good enjoy different senses, e.g. a never-ending intoxication, and that sentenced to pour water for ever through a si
are the rewards and punishments by which the minds of young are incited to virtue. The poets again are hopelessly at sea on the question of justice and morality, for they sing of the beauty of holiness, but they tell us that spells and sacrifices and prayers of all kinds can easily sway the judgments of heaven. And when young men see how injustice prevails, and learn from professors of rhetoric and persuasion how to move the hearts of men, what wonder is it if they turn altogether away from justice, saying to themselves that they can always get rid of their sins by a few sacrifices, when they are coming towards their end. And all this is due to that custom of praising justice for its rewards, and dissuading people from injustice because of its penalties. In your apology, then, for justice, remove the reputation and the accessories that attach to each. Bring both bare before us, and prove to those who will hear you with eager ears that justice is right and good, and injustice wicked and bad.'

I had always felt a regard for Glaucon and Adeimantus, but on this occasion I was especially struck with them, so cleverly had they stated their case, and so earnest were they in their desire to have the question settled. I replied that I feared I was unable to make such a defence of justice as would satisfy them, but I was ready to try. To discover justice in the human soul, let us see if we cannot find justice first in some larger organism, just as if we were unable to read something written in small letters, and were to seek for the same thing written large in another place. Justice perhaps may be 'writ large' in a State, and could then be transferred by analogical argument to the Soul of man. Let us then picture to ourselves the actual birth and growth of a State.
THE ARGUMENT

Now the origin of a State lies, I take it, in the insufficiency of a man's resources. For man needs much, but cannot always satisfy his needs by himself. Therefore this man joins that man to himself in a society to profit by his powers, and an interchange of benefits is made between them. What, then, is man's first need? Food. And the next is that of lodging, and the third that of clothing. We shall require for our city, then, a tiller of the soil, a house-builder, and a weaver, and perhaps, too, a cobbler. Hence four or five at least is the original number of our citizens. The next question is this: Is the husbandman to produce enough corn for himself and no more, or is he to supply the others with corn on the condition that they supply him with the produce of their labour? Is he to make his own clothes and build his own house, besides raising food enough for his consumption? No; we must lay down this principle at once, that each man must share the results of his toil amongst all the citizens, because every man has one art and only one, generally speaking, in which he excels; therefore let him confine himself to this art, and not waste his time and his art by attempting other arts. So there must be a smith to make the husbandman his plough, and a carpenter, and various other mechanicians. And we cannot help feeling the necessity of importing commodities from other places; for each place, like each man, is not self-sufficient, but needs supplementing from the resources of other places. And so we shall have merchants in our State. And, seeing that a seller cannot sit down and waste his time till a buyer may happen to come by who wants his commodity, we must have middle-men, i.e. tradesmen, to form a convenient link between the producer and the consumer. Those of our citizens whose body is more efficient
than their mind will become hired servants, and so
the different inhabitants of our city will grow and
multiply.

'This is our city. Now comes the question, What
manner of life will they live? They will till the ground,
built them houses, make them garments; in summer
working lightly clad, in winter well protected; they
will make them fine loaves and cakes of the wheat and
barley which they grow; they will lie on leaf-couches
and will live pleasantly, drinking their wine and praising
their gods, training their children carefully to avoid
poverty and contention. And, if you please, we will
give them a relish, olives, cheese, figs, and nuts. And
living moderately they will spend a long life, and
bequeath the same happy existence to their children.'
'Tis a city of swine, Socrates, and nothing more nor
less,' said Glaucon. 'You must give them the usual
amenities of life, tables and chairs, and a few delicacies.'
'Ah!' I said, 'you want me to create a luxurious city,
with all its accompaniment of cooks, sweetmeats, sauces,
dancing girls, and doctors. And to keep all this mob
of accessory populace we shall want to cut off a little
piece of our neighbours' land, and they will feel the
same necessity regarding ours, so that at once war is
generated, with its horses, and soldiers, and weapons.
And if war is an art or trade (and I do not see how it
can fail to be so) we must confine our soldiers to their
trade of war, and keep a standing army. Nay, of all
other trades in the city, it will be the most important,
because the duty of the warriors will be to keep intact
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'Education is divided into music and gymnastics. In the music the first step is fiction.' 'I do not understand you,' he said. 'I mean,' said I, 'that as we teach our children by telling them stories, so we must begin the education of our guardians, but with this difference: the tales that our children hear, told by Homer and Hesiod, contain a great deal of noxious fiction, which must be expunged with the greatest care from our system of education. The foul and ridiculous stories about many of the gods are not true, to begin with, and, if they were true, I would not have children's ears defiled with them. What, then, are we to use in their place? you say. And I reply that we are no poets; but in our city there will be poets, and we shall instruct them as to the poetry they are to write, we shall lay down the lines on which they are to work, and if they transgress them, we shall punish the irregularity. God is good, and he must always be represented so: he cannot be the author of evil to any living being; he cannot lie or deceive; he cannot even change, for if he were to change it would be for the better or for the worse. Now he cannot change for the better, because he is the Best; and he would not desire to change for

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"Again, sobriety and temperance are necessary for our young men; and therefore all things intemperate, either in word or in action, must be struck out of our poetry, especially in mentioning gods and heroes. The matter of our poetry having been considered, and rules for its guidance having been laid down, we come next to speak of its manner, or style.¹

"All poetry is either imitative, or narrative, or compounded of both. For instance, the poet of the Iliad begins with invoking the Muse: and then he narrates to us how Chryses came, and besought all the Greeks to give him back his daughter; and then the poet speaks as if he were Chryses himself. And in this latter mode of speaking I call a poet imitative. For he might have gone on with his narrative style, and told us about Chryses' invocation himself, instead of making Chryses speak, as he does. The epic then is of the

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'And we must take care in gymnastic that we do not forget its real object; which is, not to bring the body to its highest development, but to increase the efficiency of the mind.² In this way. Men who spend all their time in gymnastic become subject to roughness and harshness of manner, whilst those who neglect it entirely grow too soft, and milder than is fitting. But a due admixture of the gymnastic element will strengthen the mind for its intellectual labour, and is of the same importance as music, because without it we cannot attain to that intermediate condition between the excess of roughness and the excess of mildness which is the proper frame of mind for our citizens to possess.'

'And who are to be the guardians and rulers?' The

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'And so our community will live, well governed by its guardians, and well defended by its protectors, who will not turn against the sheep they defend like wolves; and all will live in common, not calling this mine and that yours, but, like a great army will be happy and powerful in the loyalty of each individual to the colours. Gold and silver, except the gold and silver of their own natures, they will never touch; for it is avarice that breeds disunion in a city, and it is disunion which is political ruin.

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BOOK IV.

'But supposing some one objected to all this, Socrates,' said Adeimantus, 'that you have made your State and appointed your guardians, and that they turn out to be by no means the happiest and most comfortable people in it, what would you say?' 'I should answer,' I said, 'that the people are not for the guardians, but the guardians for the people, or rather "each man for himself and God for us all." In other words, we do not make the happiness of a particular class our object, but the general welfare. It would be absurd, would it not, to dress up our farmers and potters and shoemakers in fine clothes, and tell them to do as much work as they pleased, and how they pleased? Every man then must do his quantum of due labour, and thus we shall avoid the two extremes of riches and poverty, which are the mainsprings of discontent and sedition.'

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Each of us then having our proper duty and performing it, we shall allow our State to grow and extend so far as is consistent with its unity. And our guardians will attend to many points of detail, such as of preserving the orthodox rules of music and gymnastic, of enforcing proper respect towards elders; but many more must be left to the good sense of our people, and the correct development of our principles of education. And our religious observances of all kinds will of course be settled by the word of the Delphian God.

Our city is now grown, and furnished with all its appliances, and is a living organism. Where, now, are we to look for justice? Let us approach the problem as a mathematical equation in which there are one or more unknown quantities. Every city that is rightly and justly managed, in other words, a good city, must be wise, courageous, temperate, and just. In our equation then, these four are the unknown quantities; and if we can ascertain the first three and eliminate them, the remaining one, justice, will be clear.

First then our city must be wise. And wherein? In the smallest and yet the most important section of itself, viz. in the body of guardians. For if these be truly wise, seeing that on them depends the weal or woe of the State, the rest of the people will be wise also, in so far as they can attain to wisdom. Again, what part of the State must without fail be brave?

The part which defends the rest,' he said. 'So,' said I, it is of the greatest importance that our guardians and defenders be the bravest men in the State.

Shall we take temperance next,' I said, 'or do you prefer to leave it out, and go straight on to find justice?' 'We had better keep to your method,' he said, 'and go on to consider temperance.' 'Well,'
said I, ‘when all the citizens are in agreement as to who should be the rulers, and when they all live in harmony, then I should call them temperate. Just as in the soul of a man there is a better impulse and a worse, and sometimes the better has complete control of the worse; so that concord throughout the State is the temperance of the State.’ And now, Glaucon, for justice. Follow close behind me, and breathe a prayer for success, and peep warily through this dark and tangled thicket. But courage! We must go forward.’ ‘We must,’ said he. And I,—‘Holloa, holloa, Glaucon, what fools we are! Here is the very thing we have been gaping about for, tumbling at our feet.’ ‘Why, what do you mean?’ he said. ‘I mean that when we said every man was to do his own business in the State, and not to be a busybody or a Jack-of-all-trades, that was justice; and that is the unknown quantity, as I was calling it, which we have been speaking of all along. And to meddle with other people’s business is injustice.

‘Now let us transfer this to the individual. In the mind of man there is a three-fold division which corresponds to the division above, of the three virtues necessary to a good guardian. There is the faculty of acquiring knowledge, of feeling spirited with the second, and of feeling sensual desire with the third. And let

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1 It will be seen that in the application of the justice of the State to the human soul, this description of σωφροσύνη is very nearly identical with that of δικαιοσύνη there. Only the different parts of the human soul, here described as βίλτιον and χείρον (481 B.), are there further elaborated into three, viz. λογιστικῶν, ὕμοιοτ打卡, and ἔνθυμομενον. Aristotle’s division in the Politics, Book i. chap. v. αἰ. med. is similar to the present one,—ἐν ταύτη ἕρτῃ ἑστὶν φύσιν τὸ μὲν ἄρχον, τὸ δὲ ἀρχηγεῖον, δὲν ἐτέραν ὀμνὲν εἶναι ἄρτῃ. οὖν τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου.
me premise that a thing can neither do nor be the contrary of itself, in the same part of it, and with regard to the same thing. We have thirst and we have thirst of a particular kind, but we have also sometimes, and together with the thirst, another feeling which holds us back from satisfying that thirst. This other feeling is the contrary of the first and cannot therefore be a manifestation of the same faculty. The faculty which often opposes itself to the sensual desire is the rational or intellectual; and we shall find upon inspection that the spirited or third kind of faculty either ranges itself upon the side of the intellectual or is quenched by the sensual. Then if our individual is to be just, the intellectual faculty must always predominate and govern the other two inferior faculties. For the sensual occupies the greatest extent of the soul and is of an insatiable nature; and the three must be in accord and harmony. It was then a shadow of the real justice which made us lay it down that a mechanic should work at that art with the whole and the best of his powers, and at that art alone for which he is fitted. So a man, generally, must see that each of his three faculties are working according to their proper nature and to their proper end, and if he adjust them harmoniously and combine them into one efficient whole, he will be a just man, and will be practising justice.

'We have now to fix what is injustice—not a difficult task. It is the predominance of the wrong faculty in man's soul, which cannot fail to bring with it disturbance and sedition and trouble. And it follows naturally upon this that justice is profitable and injustice unprofitable.'
I was then going on to speak of the degenerate forms of the Body Politic, when Polemarchus and Adeimantus interrupted me. They refused to allow me to go on until I had set their minds at rest on the troublesome question of the wives and the children of our guardians. 'Well, then,' I said, 'I cannot help believing that we ought to go on the same principle with respect to our women as we did in the case of our men, in other words, that the women should undergo exactly the same training mental and physical, however much you may laugh at the idea of the wrinkled old women in the gymnasium. And I maintain this because there is in my opinion no intrinsic difference between the two natures: only one is weaker than the other, implying a difference of quantity, not of kind. So we must select, as before, those with a prudent mind for our guardian-women, and their chastity will be a protection for those who have to

1 Aristotel's opinion was less liberal than Plato's upon this point. He thought, with the general mind of Greece, that the woman and the slave were naturally and originally inferior to man, and did not contemplate the possibility of their having been gradually deteriorated. See Pol. 1, 2. ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἀβρέν πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ φύσει τὸ μὲν πρεῖττον τὸ δὲ χείριν, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον. Et infra, ὁμοίως μὲν εἰςιν φύσει δοῦλοι. And again of women, chap. ν. init. γὰρ ἀβρέν φύσει τοῦ θῆλεος ἡγεμονικότερον.

2 In his Lady Godiva, 'Then she rode forth, clothed on
mingle with the men in daily life. This is the first of those great difficulties which stand in the way of my theory, and made me hesitate to expound it. And the next is a more serious one, viz., that all the wives and all the children should be common, and none should say, "This is my wife,"..."These are my children." My reason is one which should appeal to you, Glaucon, who are a bird fancier, and take great pains in the selection of your brood-birds and their pairing: you choose, of course, the staunchest and best-conditioned in your yard. Ought not therefore man, who is the noblest animal, to have the greatest care taken of his sexual relations? And the manner in which I should wish it to be managed would be as follows. At certain periods of the year solemn rites and sacrifices should be performed, and marriages should be effected then and there between the finest and strongest men and women. The festival should be looked upon as most holy, and any one disobeying the injunctions of the directing priest should be subject to the severest penalties. And for the ages between which marriages should be effected I place twenty to forty for the women, and thirty to fifty-five for the men. And no illegitimate offspring, or children born at a wrong time, should be brought up, so that all irregularity may be avoided in the matter. These children must be considered as the children of all the fathers, they must call all men who were married before they were born, father, and in the same manner they will speak of all the women as mother, and the children as brother and sister. And I wish to see this community of relationship, because, in such a state of things, each individual will feel, and enjoy or resent, everything affects the state for good or for ill; just as in a body, which is healthy and sound, there...
sympathy and harmony of all feelings. Minor disputes, too, will be prevented by the fear and regard which relationship inspires in a well educated mind. Such a view of relationship dissipates, I think, your former objections about the hard life we were giving our guardians. For this view shows that a man’s proper part in life is to be first well regulated, and afterwards comfortable; and the latter will follow upon the former.

‘Now these children, so born, and brought up in large State nurseries, will be trained to war from their youth, besides their other studies, and ought by all analogy to go to view battles at an early age, mounted upon swift and docile horses to bring them out of possible harm. And in the battles the warrior who acquires himself best shall receive all the usual rewards of a victor, and shall receive the best wife, whomsoever he chooses; so that he may beget others like himself.

‘In war our soldiers must recollect that they are not barbarians nor brutes; and in fighting against a Greek city they should treat their opponents as belonging to the same family as themselves, and not destroy houses nor burn fruit-trees, but only ravage the crop of the year; whilst against barbarians they will proceed as Greeks now, unhappily, treat Greeks.

‘You are avoiding all this time, Socrates,’ said Glaucon, ‘the real pith of the matter, viz., the question, Can such a condition of relationship exist in reality?’ ‘Well,’ I said, ‘I was avoiding it, I confess, and I answer, since you press me to a conclusion, Does the unattainability of anything make the representation of it any the worse, if it is the best representation that human skill can effect?’ ‘No,’ he said, ‘certainly not.’ ‘Well, then,’ I replied, ‘I do not say that such a thing has, or can, or will be brought about, but I do say that if we
can, as we have done, picture it to ourselves, we may place it before the eyes of our mind, and work up towards our ideal in hope and faith.

'A third difficulty I have to put before you, and the greatest of all. Until, kings are philosophers, and philosophers kings, there is no end to the troubles of a state.' Stand by me, Glaucu, or I shall never weather this storm-wave.' 'That will I,' he answered. 'Do you know, then,' said I, 'what it is to be devoted to one subject, such as wine, when a man has a word to say about, and in favour of, all kinds of wine? Or to be very emulous, e.g. when a man will be sub-lieutenant if he cannot be general, rather than not be a commander of some sort; the opposite of the character 'aut Caesar, aut nullus.' I mean; then, by philosopher, the man who is devoted to the acquisition of knowledge, real knowledge, and not merely inquisitive. The more our citizens approach this temperament, the better the state will be. True knowledge in its perfection and entirety, man cannot attain. But he can attain to a kind of knowledge of realities if he has any knowledge at all, because he cannot know nonentities. Hence his knowledge is half way between real knowledge and ignorance, and we must call it opinion. When, then, his opinion about a thing is correct; as far as it goes he is a philosopher and a useful and valuable member of our state.

1 Sir Thomas More proposes a middle course which he judges would be of more value. 'For where as your Plato judgeth that weale publikes shall by thyth means atteyne perfect feliciteit, eyther if philosophers be kynges, or elles ye kynges gene themselues to the studie of Philosophie, how farre I praye you shall commen wealthes then be frome thyth feliciteit, ye Philosophers wyll vouche-saue to enstruct kinges with their good counsell?'

2 Compare the definition of courage in Book IV. 429 B. : εὐναμίς τοιαύτη, ἡ διὰ πάντος σῶσει τὴν περὶ τῶν δεινῶν δόξαν.
BOOK VI.

'We must next spend some time, not as much as I should wish, upon a study of the philosophic nature. I call a philosopher one who can grasp the continuity and coherent existence of things. So in our selection and education of philosophic natures, we must first be sure that they desire to know things which have a real and continuous existence, not those which are subject to flux and decay. Next, their nature must be truth-loving, lie-abhorring. Again, they would be devoted to the pleasures of the mind, and have little taste for sensual pleasures; from which it follows that they will not be ardent seekers of money: for they will despise the pleasures which money buys. They must also be magnanimous, with a disregard of death, gentle and just, fond of learning, with good memories.'

'I can say nothing against the method of your conclusion, Socrates,' said Adeimantus; 'but like a good chess-player you lead your man away little by little until these little diversions mount up to an overwhelming total. In this game of words I cannot beat you; but what I have to say is this, that those men whom we see round us studying philosophy continuously, so far from being the best citizens, turn out the most

1 'The eternal and unchangeable.'—Jowett.
inferior, I will not say the worst. How then can these things be which you maintain?'

'I will try and explain myself in a parable, Adeimantus,' I said. 'Picture to yourself a ship, steered by a helmsman, who in size and strength is vastly superior to the rest of the crew, but short-sighted and deaf and not well acquainted with navigation. And suppose that his crew are always struggling and fighting amongst themselves, and trying to get the helm of the ship into their own hands, either by force or fraud. And that they try to drug the helmsman, and gauge the characters of their fellow-sailors entirely by the consideration, whether they are quick at getting the helm out of the helmsman’s hands, or not. Such a position I imagine does the philosopher occupy in an ordinary state as the helmsman in such a ship as I describe. And the persons you describe as utterly worthless, who—nevertheless affect philosophy, are like those sailors who without any knowledge or practice of navigation try to gain possession of the helm.

'You recollect the different excellences requisite for a nature which is to become truly philosophic: these requisites are very rarely combined in the same person. And we must further inquire into the depreciation and degeneration of these natures. For the principle, corruptio optimi pessima, is unfortunately too true, and the more abilities a man has the worse he will be without training and principle.  

'It is not individual sophists who first corrupt noble

1 We find the same sentiment insisted upon in the Euthydemus, page 281, D, through a number of instances:—'Εν κεφαλαίῳ δ’, ἑφη, ὁ Κλείνια, κινούετει σύμπαντα, κά το πρῶτον ὑφαίνει ἀγαθό εἶναι . . . . ἵππο μὲν αὐτῶν ἕγγεται ἀμαθία, μὲνω κακά εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων, διὸ δυνατότερα ὑπερετεῖν ἡγουμένῳ κυκώ δυντι.
natures, but the applause and the noise and the struggling of the world. In fact, if any young mind were to resist all these influences by its own strength we should be inclined to call it a miracle. For these paid professors are like men who might study the passions and desires of some great brute and know how to humour him, and were to call this study wisdom; having no regard for real wisdom and virtue, but judging everything by the likes and dislikes of the monster. In the same way do these sophists study the tastes and opinions of the vulgar and the many, who from their nature, are incapable of ever knowing realities and unities. So that a young man is sorely let and hindered if he have any tastes for philosophy by the tyrannical action of the world and the sophists; seeing that even if he persist in his natural bent, they will be up in arms against him, straining every nerve to keep out the truth. The result is that those of a noble and philosophic nature are prevented from studying philosophy, whilst inferior and vulgar minds leave their workshops and their trades and go philosophizing; just as if a little baldheaded journeyman were to come into a fortune, get washed and dressed up in fine clothes, and marry his master's daughter. What kind of offspring could be expected from such a union but bastards? and what sort of philosophy can be expected from those vulgar minds we speak of but inferior sophistry and false systems? So those men who would be philosophers, if they could stand against the overwhelming attacks of the world, give up the contest, and content themselves with looking calmly at the worry and bustle, taking care to do their own duty, like a man who stoops down under a wall to let a storm of dust and hail pass over him.

'Now in what sort of a state can a philosopher
have fair play? Not in any that we know of. But
we must have a training and an atmosphere for
our youth the very reverse of that at present ex-
isting. Boys approach philosophy in its most difficult
aspect in the intervals of other studies, and soon throw
it aside for the rest of their lives; with the exception
of a few who continue it quite by the way,¹ and think
a good deal of themselves for continuing it at all. But
we should have the rudiments of philosophy taught at
an earlier age, and we should amplify the training of
the mind whilst it is approaching its greatest develop-
ment. And when bodily strength begins to fail, our
citizens should devote all their mental activity to
philosophy, treating everything else as of secondary
importance. And whether our plan succeed or not, is
not the question, as long as we are persuaded that our
principle is good; in fact, I do not look for very great
opposition from the majority, who, I believe, are usually
traduced, and after all are only misled by ranters and
pseudo-philosophers. This then is the way towards
realising our perfect state; and we must try to make it
clear to the majority that men must be philosophic,
and the philosophers must rule in the State. Nor will
it be impossible for even a single man to bring a whole
city into a condition of obedience to this maxim.

¹Now we said that the philosopher must be fond of
learning and of a keen nature withal, that he must be
physically as well as intellectually able; two requisites
hard to find united in the same person. What then,
is he to make his study and his object? The Ideal
Good; which is above and greater than even Justice
itself. Most men are ignorant as to what is really
good: they pursue that which appears to them to be

¹ πορευόν.
good. Let us try to seek out the nature of this Ideal Good. The sense of seeing requires a medium through which the object of sight is seen, I mean light. And light is generated from the sun. The sight is not the sun, nor is the sun sight, but the one exists by means of the other, and beholds it. Conceive then the Ideal Good as standing in the same relation to the mind and the objects of thought, as the sun stands to the sight and the objects of sight. And as the shining of the sun enables our eyes to see things clearly before us, so that which brings truth and reality illumines the mind and gives rise to actual thought, and perception of the Truth and Reality themselves. They are not the Ideal Good, but partake of its form and its nature. And as the sun is the author of life and growth, although not itself life and growth, so the Ideal Good is the author of real knowledge and real existence, yet superior even to existence itself.

'And to make quite clear the relation between the different grades of knowledge and reality, imagine a line divided into two parts, and again another line divided into two parts, in the same ratio as the other. Let the first line represent the mental sphere, and the second line the sensual. The first section of the first line represents pure thought and its objects, viz. real existences; and the second part represents thought which does not contemplate real existences, but copies of them as nearly as possible like the originals. Take, for instance, those squares and circles and triangles about which mathematicians reason, which are not

1 Cf. 'He was not that light, but was sent to bear witness of that light.'—St. John i., where this same illustration of light is carried out at length.

2 Ideai.
really exact squares and circles, but copies of the real, and useful for practical purposes. The whole line thus divided represents the sphere of thought and knowledge. The first division of the second line, that is of the visible and sensual sphere, is occupied by that faculty which apprehends objects as presented to us in this world of ours. And that faculty is belief. The second represents the sphere of the unreal, the class of copies of the real, like shadows, reflections on the water and so forth. And these are the four grades, in descending order from the really existent.

1 πιστὶς.

2 Plato's geometrical arrangement may be given thus:—

| A   | C | B | D | E |

$AB = \text{\textit{Eπιστήμη}},$ and its objects, νοητά.

\[
\begin{align*}
AC &= \text{Nóôs}, & \text{real existences (\textit{idéai}).} \\
CB &= \text{Διανοα} & \text{conceptions (\textit{e\ddot{t}n}).}
\end{align*}
\]

$DE = \Delta \delta\varepsilon,$ and its objects, things perceptible (\textit{aio\thorn{e}t\thorn{a}}).

\[
\begin{align*}
DF &= \text{Πιστὶς,} & \text{natural objects.} \\
FE &= \text{Εἰκασία,} & \text{copies and shadows.}
\end{align*}
\]
BOOK VII.

'Now picture to yourself,' I said, 'an underground cavern with a long exit to the upper air; and imagine that you see a number of people who ever since they were born have been chained neck and foot, so that they have always sat in the same position with their faces towards the inner wall of the cavern. Behind them, a long way off and above, a large bright fire is kindled, and between the fire and the prisoners runs a road, along which pass continually men carrying different objects; and between the road and the prisoners is a low wall, over which the fire casts their shadows on to the wall of the cavern facing which the prisoners sit. Will not these prisoners, if they can talk to each other, give names to the objects they see in the reflection on the wall? And will they not attribute the voices, if the men speak, to the different shadows?' 'Certainly,' he said. 'So that,' I continued, 'these shadows and echoes of the realities will be taken by the prisoners for realities themselves.

'Next suppose that one of these prisoners is released from his chains and dragged up to the light of day by a rough and difficult path. Surely he will find everything hard to perceive, and will believe the shadows, with which he is better acquainted, to be the realities, and will be blinded by the light, and will hate the man
who dragged him up into it; and, if he is gradually educated and taught to understand and behold realities, he will first and most easily behold images in the water, reflections, and other things not far removed in their nature from his shadows: he will see better by night than by day.

If he ever become completely enlightened he will think himself fortunate in having escaped his dungeon, and he will pity his former fellow-prisoners, and will despise any good things he may have enjoyed as worth nothing in comparison with what he now enjoys. Again, were he to revisit the cave, he would find his eyes unaccustomed to its darkness, and would be looked upon as good for nothing, even if, before, he had been the quickest and the cleverest at perceiving the various shadows. Nay, if he tried to persuade the captives to come up and be enlightened, they would ill-treat him and perhaps kill him.

Transferring all this image to the actual world, I liken men who have gone into the upper air and contemplated the realities of which the captives only see the shadows, I liken them to men who have made an approach to the Ideal Good. Thus, following out the parable, when such men are called back to the world from that contemplation, it is small wonder if they fail, and are jeered, and worsted, in the petty-fogging affairs of ordinary life. A wise man, then, will recollect that there are two ways of making a mistake; as we might say...according to our parable, either from having too much light in the eye or too little. And, in accordance with this view of thought and life, I do not agree with those who talk about "putting" knowledge into people; as if it were not there already, and only needed a proper training and...
proper atmosphere to draw it out. Other powers of the soul may have been acquired and may seem to have their nature akin to the bodily powers, but the power of comprehension seems to have something of a divine and original nature which it never loses, however much it may be dulled.

Therefore our education must make our chosen citizens move towards the contemplation of the Ideal Good and the Really Existent; and, remembering that they are for the people and not the people for them, they must be content to go amongst them and lead them towards that light and knowledge which they themselves have acquired.

And for this education, or drawing round of the mind towards light and knowledge, our former methods of gymnastic and music will not suffice. Let us take some general science, such as arithmetic or calculation, and see if they must be experts in it. First let me premise that all objects of perception and thought are either excitative or non-excitative, i.e. either they suggest something else, or they do not. For instance, finger. That does not suggest any other fact. But first finger, or long finger, suggest respectively second finger, short finger, and so on. The perception therefore of length, or priority, is the same as that of shortness, or duality; and is, as we might say, a double sense. But the actual vision only sees one object, and may therefore be called a single sense. Now the science of number is essentially excitative: we are continually seeing objects which the sight takes in as one, and the same, whilst the mind teaches us to look upon them as one and

1 v. 8. Book IV. ἤτη. οὐ μὴν πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες τὴν πόλιν οἰκίσομεν, ἢτως ἐν τῷ ήμῖν ἔθνος ἦσαν διαφέροντως εὐθαμον, ἀλλ’ ἢτως ὃ τι μᾶλτα διὰ τῇ πόλις.
as many at the same time. Therefore the science
of number, being excitative of thought, appears to be
necessary for our further developed education. And
they will not treat the science in a trafficking way,
but will investigate the properties of pure number.

Our citizens will find this science of great use also
in warfare; geometry too will be good for the same
purpose, which they must study, if we find that it
also conduces to the knowledge of the Ideal Good and
real existence. Now the objection that geometry is
only useful when applied practically is absurd; for then
it is knowledge applied to things that come and go, that
are made and perish. Whilst our study of geometry
will be primarily directed to the knowledge of that
which is eternal and not perishable. Therefore let us
teach our citizens geometry. After geometry shall we
take astronomy, i.e. solids in motion? Or ought we
not rather to pass to solids first, i.e. bodies of cubic
content? The fact is that the science of three dimen-
sions is so little understood and practised that we must
say we will have it taught if our city will; and so we
pass on to astronomy. By astronomy I do not mean
lying on your back and staring upwards to the heavens,
or lying on your face and staring downwards. I under-
stand that science which teaches us about real existence
in the study of the heavenly bodies, and draws the
intelligence upwards in an intellectual, not a physical,
sense. The student of philosophy will study the motions
of stars, sun, and moon, the flight of seasons and years,
as they point to a unity and a coherent design of a
perfect Creator.

'Should we not seek for some science which stands to
our hearing in the same relation as astronomy to seeing?
I mean the science of harmony; not the practice of
worrying and torturing musical instruments, twisting
the head on one side, dragging unwilling notes from
more unwilling strings, and disputing about demi-semi-
tones. But that there is a science of harmony worth
studying for our citizens I am sure.

'All these sciences form but the preface and prelude
to the business of life for our citizens. And this is a law,
viz. that they shall be able to comprehend an account,
and give an account of all that they ought to know.
And Dialectic is the master science which effects this,
and gives the mind the power to free itself from every-
thing sensual, and move straight on through argument
to the actual nature of things and to the Ideal Good.
All the other studies and arts we have mentioned before
merely correspond to the process of accustoming the
released prisoner's eyes to the sight of shadows and
reflections. Even those sciences we have just now
mentioned as indispensable to the education of our
citizens have been treated in an inadequate manner,
and not so as to conduce towards the knowledge of real
existence. For men have been unable to give a rational
account of them and have ignored their first principles.
Dialectic, on the contrary, moves upwards towards first
principles of science, directing the eye of the soul to
the source of true knowledge; and uses these arts,
which we have called sciences in deference to custom,
as props and helps in its progress. It is in fact the
coping stone and perfection of all studies.

'Now we must be very careful in the choice of those
who are to enter upon this highest course of study.
We must be sure that they have a congenial nature
and will take pains and pleasure in the subject. For
intellectual labour which is found only compulsory, and
brings no pleasure to the student, is worth nothing.
They must begin from boyhood to study arithmetic and geometry, but compulsion must be avoided; rather let each mind develop itself in its congenial channel; for in this way we can best judge in what direction we are to employ them. And the quickest in work of all kinds and on critical occasions are to be selected for the higher education; when the gymnastic period, of two or three years, is over. And then we shall distinguish these above their fellows, and begin to teach them the general connection between the different lines of study, and their general bearing upon real knowledge and real existence. At thirty years of age we shall again make a selection from these students, and advance the best to further honours. But we must beware of the free-thinking which dialectic brings with it, and try to prevent the former landmarks from being swept away. Put the case in a parable thus: A child is brought up from his infancy with parents whom he is taught to love and respect, as being his own, when they are not really so; and he is also surrounded with flatterers. If he discover his true relationship, or rather non-relationship, he will lose his respect and love for his supposed parents and pay more attention to his flatterers. So are we brought up to believe this and that honourable and just, until the age of scepticism, i.e. inquiry, comes and asks "What is the just?" "What is honourable?" And then, with the exception of strong and noble minds, men fall back upon the pleasures which have played the part of the flatterer, and fail in their allegiance to justice and honour. To prevent this from being the case in our city, the study of dialectic and the inquiry into the real nature of things will be consummated only late in life; in fact the youths will not be allowed to approach it at all,
except by the study of the preliminary sciences. Let us therefore place five years, or about twice the number of those given up to gymnastic, as the proper time to be allotted for the study of dialectic. After this period they must return to the cave and take their place as instructors in war and other business for, say, fifteen years.

And when they have earned their discharge from the duty of assisting their fellow-citizens in the routine of life, they may at last be admitted to the end and aim of their training, the contemplation of absolute existence, and the pure study of actual knowledge; allowing a short time, turn by turn, for the performance of political duties. And when they die they will go to the islands of the Blest, and will leave an honourable memory of their life and services in the city. All this is not impossible, but it is hard to compass; and our means of facing the difficulty will be to ignore the present generation, and apply ourselves to those who are young enough to receive new ethical impressions.
BOOK VIII.

'Ve have now composed our State, and its different grades of citizens have been discussed, and we have agreed that everything in it which relates to men applies equally to women. But we have been diverging from the original question in these last discussions.' 'Yes,' said Glaucnon, 'you were going to speak of the different modes in which the actual city of the present day is a degeneration from our ideal city. And you said that there were four kinds. What are these?' 'First,' I said, 'there is the Cretan or Laconian, which has the highest reputation, then oligarchy, a state full of evils, next democracy, and lastly that fine régime they call a despotism.' Let us then, with these five kinds of States before us, investigate the characters which severally correspond to them.

'We can omit the just and noble man, who corresponds to our Ideal State, for he has been fully discussed already. Next to him comes the ambitious and emulous man, corresponding to the Cretan State. And then we might pass in review the other characters, corresponding to the other three States, so that when we have studied injustice in its fullest development we may compare it with justice, and make up our minds whether to believe Thrasyvachus or not. And following our former method

\[\textit{r̄p̄av̄is.}\]
we had better first study the several States which correspond to these men, so gaining a clearer understanding of the men themselves.

'Change in a State arises from dissension in the governing part; where the governing part is unanimous no disturbance is possible.' But the origin of the disturbance will lie in a disregard of the proper season of reproduction. This season should properly depend upon a fixed number calculated to an exact result; and if this number be calculated wrongly there will be irregularity in the birth of our children. And this irregularity will show itself as the children grow up and are appointed by selection to posts of difficulty and danger. For they will fail to retain the proper opinion about musical study, about crises, and about moderation, and, according to our fiction, the gold will have become alloyed with silver, bronze, and iron. The inferior part will draw their minds to base gain, while the superior continues to draw them upward towards the proper object of life. Hence they will begin to strive with each other, to appropriate land and houses to their private use, and to enslave those whom they ought to protect against slavery. And such a State lies midway between aristocracy and oligarchy. But there will still be respect for government, the defending portion will

1 Aristotle, *Pol.* v. 10, objects to this statement, on the ground that time changes all things. He also objects that this disregard of proper seasons is not peculiar to the dissolution of the Ἀριστοκρατία. And thirdly, he states that the progress of degeneration does not pass regularly through these five stages, but that often a monarchy will change at once to a democracy, or an oligarchy to a despotism. And another objection is that Plato does not tell us what happens after the despotism. And lastly, that although the forms of oligarchy and democracy are diverse, Socrates treats them as one.
still abstain from other business, and there will be meals in common. Yet there will be a reluctance to appoint the cleverest to govern, because the clever will now have become unprincipled, and men will lean towards the spirited and pugnacious to be their leaders. Greed of gain and of private fortune will spring up, concealment, and eluding of the law, and greater honour will be paid to gymnastic than to music. Next, the man who corresponds to such a state as this. 'He will be something like Glaucon,' said Adeimantus, 'if he is emulous.' 'Perhaps he will,' I said; 'he will also sink a little below the intellectual standard, but will be fond of study, obedient, no orator, rough to slaves, gentle to his peers, and very fond of rule, of praise, of gymnastic, and of hunting; and as he grew up a love of money would develop in him. Such is our timocratic youth. And such men as he is arise in the following way: when a man, nobly born, retires into private life disgusted with the bad state of politics, and pays no attention to the pomps and vanities of the world. Then his wife, finding that she is nobody, as her husband holds no public office, and pays little attention to her for good or for ill, grows discontented. And the servants say to the sons of the family. 'When you grow up you can pay off this man, or you can do all that your father neglects to do.' Such a youth, and one born of such a father, will find himself dragged in different directions by the two inclinations—the philosophical, inherited from his father, prompting him to peace and retirement and the concupiscent, on the other hand, and the spirited, leading him into politics and a life of action; from which conflicting motives he will finally become ambitious, emulous, and high-minded.

'Next after the timocratic or ambitious city will come
the oligarchy. The cause of degeneration here is the "auri sacra fames" in the citizens and their wives. For riches and virtue are like the opposite pans of a balance: as one goes up the other goes down. So our citizens, instead of being praise-loving or virtue-loving, will become money-loying. The rich will monopolise all government and honours, of whatever character they themselves may be, poor men will be ill-treated, and there will be two cities in one, a sure sign of dissolution. In war, for instance, this disunion will appear in the reluctance of the rich to put arms in the hands of the poor, for fear the poor should turn upon them. And tradesmen and farmers will sell their plant, which others will acquire who have no business with it, and thus a useless rabble will be turned loose upon the city, with nothing to do except raise sedition. If you see drones in a hive, you know that there are some bees with stings as well as those without; and in the same way in a city where you see beggars, there are sure to be thieves and cut-purses, sacrilegious and abandoned people. Now in an oligarchical city the beggars are numberless, and by analogy we should expect to find thieves and robbers there also. Next, to speak of the man corresponding to this State. His father has met with the worst misfortune of all kinds in public life; he has been general in a war, has failed, been impeached, fined, imprisoned, banished, or what not. And these misfortunes have quite driven all love of honour and all spirit out of the son's head, who applies himself sedulously to scrape money together. In his soul the conception and covetous element is the honoured and unquestioned lord. He will satisfy those desires which we call necessary, but will not spend his money on the others, for them he will keep in subjection. He has no
culture, and therefore all those drone-like vices are incipient in him, even if repressed; he would defraud a ward, for instance, and take any other opportunity of doing evil with impunity. He would have two natures, therefore, within him, and on the whole the better powers would be masters of the inferior, although not through any virtuous principle, but merely because such a man shuns indulgence as expensive.

After this comes Democracy. And the change from Oligarchy arises through an excess of present advantage, I mean the accumulation of wealth in a few hands. For we have those stinged creatures, the men burdened with debts, and smarting under disgrace and political disabilities, ready to fall upon the rich class, and anxious for revolution. And the rich money-making, money-lending class increase the liabilities of their victims, stinging with their usury and filling the city with drones, i.e. beggars. There is no check on this malady, no law to prevent a man from converting his goods and his means into ready money; whilst the rulers make all they can out of the ruled, and bring up their own families in luxury. When these two classes meet, on the road, in war, at public games, on board ship, the poor man learns that it is not an unmixed advantage after all to be rich; he sees the rich man fat and unwieldy, whilst he himself is wiry and agile; and he consequently despises him as good for nothing. And a very slight occasion will serve to bring these two opposing elements into actual war. Then the poor conquer and make a redistribution of property, and a democracy is formed. How, then, will such a State fare?

First there will be free licence for every man to acquire what he likes and to live as he likes; and the State will be a wonderfully variegated production, such as some
people, women and children, for instance, especially admire. It is the city of all men, for every one can suit his own taste if he comes here; a man can do just what he pleases. If you wish to go to war, your neighbour is not bound to agree with you; if you are prevented from this or that by law, you can set the law aside. Democracy, in fact, means anarchy.

The democratic man is the son of the oligarchic man, whom we have already described as money-making. The son will follow his father in keeping down those desires which are not imperative. By imperative or necessary desires I mean those of which we cannot be rid, which benefit us by being satisfied, such as the desire of eating, whilst those which do us no good and can be repressed by means of training I call unnecessary, of which we may mention a fondness of delicate food for an example. The change from the oligarchic to the democratic nature is as follows: the son was brought up in a frugal manner on the honey which the father accumulated, and afterwards makes the acquaintance of gay and brilliant sparks who have carried the science of pleasure to a wonderful perfection. Then there arises in him a sedition, between the careful oligarchic temper and the pleasure-seeking and prodigal; and sometimes the former is in the ascendant, sometimes the latter. And if certain desires are driven out their place is soon filled up by others, perhaps worse, because in such a man there is nothing, such as intellectual tastes, to fill the void. So the citadel of his soul is won by base pleasures and wrong opinions. These base pursuits drive away honour, and temperance, and propriety, and flaunt anarchy, incontinency, and pride, in their stead. And the man who has thus lost the right opinion treats

1 αἰθωσι θηροὶ καὶ δεινοὶ, carrying on the metaphor.
all pleasures alike, and indulges them indiscriminately. First he spends his time in drinking and playing, then he veers round and drinks nothing but water; sometimes he practises gymnastics and next does nothing at all; again he becomes a politician and jumps up to say the first thing that comes into his head; he is

‘Everything by starts, and nothing long.’

If he sees another engaged in making money, he will make money; if another is going to the war, he will go too. In short, his life and his tastes are universal.

The finest State of all and the finest man now remain, I mean the despotism and the despot. As excess of wealth turned oligarchy into democracy, so excess of liberty turns democracy into despotism. For men, such as we have described in a democratic city, intimidate the rulers and make them do as they wish, and not follow the law strictly: they uphold servile rulers and decry just ones. All relations are disturbed, and reversed, sons usurp their father’s prerogatives, and fathers are afraid of their sons. Strangers usurp the place of the citizens, masters fawn upon their pupils, and pupils have no regard for their masters. Elders throw aside their grave and serious bearing, and ape the lightness and flippancy of youth, and slaves are as free as their purchasers: whilst the very animals are imbued with this spirit of ultra-freedom and strut about pushing people off the pathways. So free must every one be that they disregard all law, and will call no one master. On the principle, then, of reaction, this ultra-freedom

1 Cf. Ar. Nub. 1331, 1332:—

ΣΤ. τὸν πάτερα τύπτεις;
ΦΕ. καποφανῶ γε νὴ Δία
ὡς ἐν δίκη σ' ζυγίζων.
will result in an ultra-slavery, somewhat in the same way that we establish the principle corruptio optimi pessima; although it must be remembered that this surfeit of freedom is not "the best," for it is possible to have too much of a good thing. The change will begin in the persons of those men whom we likened to the drones of the hives, some of them having stings and others stingless, in the oligarchic State; but in the democratic this class will be much stronger. So the strongest of these drones will do all the speaking and working in politics, and the inferior drones will buzz about the tribune and prevent any one from being heard in opposition, except a very few. Then there are the rich on which the drones subsist, and a third class, viz. the mechanics and journeymen, who are always ready to combine if they see an opportunity of plunder. And if the rich try to defend themselves they are called bad citizens and oligarchical, a false accusation which makes them really become so. And the people set up a champion in opposition to them, who is the germ of the despot. And such a man is like to him who once tasted human blood as in the story of Zeus Lyceus in Arcadia, and must become a wolf. For if he once become involved in prosecutions and judicial murder, he will go on from bad to worse, banishing, killing, proclaiming abolition of debt and redistribution of land. Then he is perhaps expelled and re-installed by force, and his hand is against all who helped to drive him out. The next step is that he is obliged to ask the people to give him a body-guard, and when he has obtained this,

1 Cf. Euthydemus, xxv. where the sophist is trying to make Ctesippus advance the contrary proposition; ἐπείδη γὰρ ὁμολόγεις ἄγαθον εἶναι φάρμακον, διὰν δὲν, πίνων ἀνθρώπων, ἄλλο τι τούτο τὸ ἄγαθον ὡς πλείοντον δεῖ πίνειν, et seqq.
the despotism stands forth complete. And the people
do not say of their champion, "How are the mighty
fallen!" but the champion is now a full-blown
despot.

"At first he is mild and gentle, and his measures are
all in the direction of lightening the people's burdens,
but as he goes on he finds it necessary to stir up war
so that he may keep up his character of champion, and
impoverish the people by war-taxes to prevent their
rising against him. And if any of his friends speak
out his mind against these practices he will have to
remove him, and so he will become the enemy of any
magnanimous, prudent, or wealthy man. And as
physicians remove all the evils of the body and en-
courage the development of what is good, the tyrant
will remove all the good and leave the evil. He will
defend himself with foreign mercenaries and with freed
men. Hence we may see the mistake of Euripides and
of poets in general who commend despotisms and demo-
cracies, and encourage people towards them, although
they naturally are well rewarded for their encomiums
by those whom they panegyrize. The despot will
plunder sacred treasure, confiscate the property of those
whom he has exiled, and spend his own inheritance in
riotous living with male and female companions. And
the people that has begotten the despot will have to
keep him, and it will be of no use to them to say that
it is not right for a child when he grows up to be a
burden to his father, and that they did not help him
forward as their champion that he might collect a pack
of idle knaves about him, who devour the citizen's
substance. Nay, he will strike his father and treat him
as a son should not; and the people trying to escape
out of the frying-pan of slavery will fall into the fire
of despotism, which is after all the worst kind of slavery. This, then, is the change from democracy to tyranny.¹

¹ With this simile of the son illtreating the father, may be compared a considerable part of the Clouds of Aristophanes, v. ii. 1321, seqq. In Xenophon, Mem. 1, 2, 49, the charge is noticed against Socrates, as in the passage referred to in the Clouds, that he encouraged the very vices which he condemns here and in Book II. page 378 B.
BOOK IX.

We now come to speak of the despot himself and how he arises. But first I should wish to define more exactly the differences of pleasure. Some of those pleasures which I called unnecessary appear to be distinctly criminal: the desire of them arises very frequently in sleep, when the rational faculty is dormant, and we imagine ourselves doing the worst actions without compunction. Now the more temperate a man's actions are when waking, the more rational will be his dreams. The democratic man, if you remember, was he who had deserted the parsimony of his oligarchic father, and on making acquaintance with dissipated men, and lived a life midway between luxury and miserliness. The son of this democratic man will be brought up between two opposing forces; viz. the advice of his father and of a part of the household, to live a moderate life, and the incitements of others of the household who draw him on to all kinds of pleasures and expenses. If these triumph in the city of his soul, they are like the drone's sting, they kill any honourable and temperate inclinations that may yet survive, and they fill the soul with madness and license. Thence come feastings, revellings, and dissipations of all sorts, which drain his income; and to supply funds for their continuance there
must be loans and embezzlement, and defrauding of his family, perhaps with violence, and his old and dear parents will perhaps be thrown aside and ill treated and disregarded, in the interest of some acquaintance of an hour. And from such crimes it is but a short step to robbery and sacrilege. If there are but a few of such men in a city, they commit crimes of various gravity, and perhaps they become informers, and take and give bribes; but they are a mere trifle compared with the régime of a despot. For he is generated by an excessive number of such men in a city; who put forward the most despotically-minded of them all, and he grinds down his father-city, or, as the Cretan phrase goes, his mother-city under, and by means of his young companions. Such a man is never on terms of friendship and equality with any one, he either flatters and fawns, or else he bullies: he has no honour or magnanimity, he is full of injustice, he is unreliable, and the longer he lives the worse he becomes. So the despot will become a most unhappy man, and will be exactly opposed to the monarch, and the monarchical state will be the best. Therefore let us glance also at the rest of the despotical State, to gain a clear and true notion of the whole growth of a despotism, and specially at the inner and unvarnished life of the despot himself.

To speak of the State first: all that is best in it will lie in the most abject slavery, and similarly in the man's soul, his noblest nature will be in slavery to his worst. And as the despot is a spendthrift and a lustful man, the soul of the despotical man will be continually poverty-stricken and continually craving. Is he not then the most wretched of all men? No. It is the despot himself, the despotical man who comes forward
and lives a public life, who is the most wretched.\(^1\) Let us consider the life of those private individuals who have the greatest external resemblance to the tyrant, viz. those who possess many slaves. Now of these slaves they have no fear, why? Because the whole city is full of free men like themselves, and the union of them all is strength. But imagine a single free man with his whole family and household suddenly transported to a desert place,—where would his safety be? Would he not be obliged to fawn upon his slaves, to free them, to give them all they asked for? Or put a case of this sort. Imagine a man surrounded on all sides by neighbours who would not brook the slightest injury to any of their number, but would inflict the greatest penalties on him if he attempted to harm them. Such a life does the despotical man lead, and in such intimidation does he live, fearing even to show himself outside his house, and living more like a woman than a free man. But his worst lot is to come forward in public, for then he is like a man with an unsound body, which is compelled to fight and strive with other bodies, although most unfit for the task. The despot will be of all men most hateful, wicked, odious, friendless, impious, and will make others as bad as himself. And the different kinds of men will follow in this order of descent, beginning from the monarchical; the timocratic, oligarchic, the democratic and despotical.

'Let us try and gain the same result by a different method; and let us recollect the triple division of the

\(^1\) Socrates is careful to insist upon the difference between the despot and the despotical man. Glaucon is deceived by Socrates' proposal in 557 B. κελέομεν ἐξαγγέλλειν, πῶς ἔχει εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλῆσθαι ὁ τυράννος. But, to discover the condition of the τυράννος, Socrates will pass first through a description of the condition of the τυραννικὸς ἦδωρ.
soul, into rational, spirited and concupiscent. The last
may be renamed and called the money-loving element,
because money is the means by which the sensual
pleasures are gratified, and the second we may call the
praise-loving or strife-loving element, and the first the
knowledge-loving. Now each man in whom one of
these elements predominates will praise the pleasures
proper to that element, and despise those of the other
two. Which then are we to believe? Surely the man
who has the most experience, good sense, and logic. And
the knowledge-loving man will have more experience
than the other two, for he has, or may have, tried the
pleasures which they commend, and found them wanting,
before he went on to the pleasure of studying truth and
real existence. He will also be a more sensible man,
and have greater command of logic, for logic is the
science of gaining knowledge. On all points, then, the
knowledge-loving man is the best judge of what pleasure
really is: next, he who loves praise, and lastly he who
loves money.

'The just man has thus thrown the unjust man twice.'
Let us try a third method. You know that people when
they are in pain look back upon their past condition of
painlessness with a feeling that it was pleasure compared
with their present condition of pain. And when, after
pleasure, there comes a cessation from pleasure, people
imagine the absence of pleasure to be pain. In fact
there is a middle state, neither pleasure nor pain, and
the pleasure or pain of this middle state is only apparent.

1 See again, Ar. Clouds, II. 889, seqq. where the Just and Unjust
cause contend, the latter being victorious.

'For thy (viz. the quiete and upryghte state of the body), yf it
be not letted nor assaulted with no greif, is delectable of itself,
thoughe it be moued with no externall or outwarde pleasure.'
not real. But there are real pleasures, which arise out of no cessation from pain, e.g. the pleasures of smell, which leave no feeling of pain upon their removal. Real pleasure and real pain are not the absence of pain and pleasure respectively, which form most of those states called bodily pleasures, pleasures of anticipation, and so forth. We may parallel this fact by picturing to ourselves something below and something above a fixed point midway between the two. The mid-point seems to be the upper point to the lowest, and the lower point to the upper: whereas it is really midway. And if you put gray beside white it looks black, or if you put it beside black it looks white. Now hunger, thirst, and feelings of this sort, are a sort of emptiness of the body, which their satisfaction fills up, and if you grant that the satisfaction of a void in knowledge and right opinion is more true and real than the satisfaction of a void in man's stomach (inasmuch as knowledge and right opinion partake more of the nature of real existence than the life of the body) it will follow that the pleasure experienced in the satisfaction or filling up of ignorance with knowledge will be a more real thing than that experienced in gratifying bodily desires and emptinesses. Those men, therefore, who know neither virtue nor good sense, wander all their lives about this middle or colourless region, experiencing no true pleasure, and they live the life of brutes, in endless gorging, indulgence, and strife. And their loves, and hates, and wars will all be concerned with shadows, as Stesichorus sings of the image of Helen, about which the Greeks fought at Troy.

'Passing on to analyse the praise-loving or ambitious nature can we not account for it on the same principle? Is there not a void in the soul which is filled and
satisfied, according to the man's nature, by honours and victory and the exercise of spirit? Now in so far as any of the money-loving or praise-loving desires follow science and reason, they obtain true pleasure: what then shall we say of the knowledge-loving part, which makes science and reason its only pursuits? Therefore in man's soul, as long as each part pursues its own pleasures, and as long as the proper relation is preserved between the three parts, and we do not have one interfering with another, the man's life will be harmonious and happy. So the despot, since the worst and most unreal form of pleasure is master within his soul, will live most unhappily, and the kingly man, who gives the pursuit of true pleasure the first place, will live the happiest life possible. Let us try to estimate the gulf between them. The despot is three times removed from the oligarchical man, and the oligarchic man also three times from the kingly man. Hence the despot is thrice three times removed from the kingly or aristocratic man, and from true pleasure and happiness. So, to put it arithmetically, and taking six powers of three, we find that the kingly man is seven hundred and twenty-nine times as happy as the despot.

'Let me ask you now to exercise your imagination once more, thus: A being is composed of three parts, the first, of a sort of hydra, having the heads of all kinds of beasts, wild and tame; the second, a lion; the third, a man. All these different parts are grown together, so that they make one creature. But around them all and including them all there is the external appearance of a man. Now suppose that this man allows the brutal and bestial natures within him to have the upper hand of the human nature, and to quarrel, and to do exactly as the passing mood bids them, whilst the
human part is starved and reduced. Surely one who praises injustice would say that such would be the proper life for this creature to lead: whilst a man who loves justice would advise that the same parts of the hydra be developed and the wild ones suppressed; that the leonine nature be won over to ally itself with the human, and harmony be attained in the whole body of the creature. In such an image as this we might express the history of man's composite nature. When a man commits a crime for the sake of money or does any evil act voluntarily, he is letting loose the bestial nature within him, and when he is cruel and desperate he gives the leonine part of his soul undue prominence. Or again, when he turns fawner and flatterer, he is trying to turn the noble lion within him to an ape. Therefore rule is salutary—the rule of the better; for the better rules for the good of the whole polity. That is the reason of our governing children, and not permitting them to think for themselves, till they by careful training come to years of discretion, because they do not when young understand the superiority of the rational or the inferiority of the sensual. He then that forgets not to keep his inferior nature in subordination to his superior, will gain temperance and justice and sense: he will give honour to study as the means of acquiring this temperament, he will not even make good health and strength his object, if it be incompatible with temperance; nor honours, unless he think that he will be the better for them.' 'Tis an ideal,' said Glaucon. 'Ah!' I said, 'it is an ideal, but one to which he would be always looking.'

1 v.s. 472 and 473, e.g. οὖν οὐλ τὸ γενόμεθα εὑρεῖν ὃς ἐν ἑγγὺς τατά τῶν εἰρημένων πόλεως οἰκήσειν, φάναι ἡμῖν ἔζευρηκέναι ὡς δυνατὰ ταύτα γενέσθαι, καὶ οὐ ἐπιτάττεις.
BOOK X.

'I should wish to say a few more words on the subject of poetry and imitation,—in short, to reject that poetry which partakes of the imitative. When a man makes a bed, or a table, he makes it with regard to a pattern or example. He does not make the pattern, he uses the pattern to guide him. And any man can, in a sense, make everything; for instance if you reflect anything in a mirror, you make it, so to speak, and a painter, when he paints, makes objects in another sense. Now in the case of a bed the pattern is really the original and most really existent bed; for that which the carpenter makes is only this bed or that, and not the universal bed. Hence there are three beds; first, the pattern and original of all, second, the physical specimen, made by the craftsman, thirdly, the copy of this latter, made by the painter. And notice that God, who is the maker of the original, has made it one and universal, whilst the others are indefinite in number.

It is just so with poetry and poetry writers; they are imitators three times removed from the original maker. And consider the question thus also. When you look at a bed from different points, it seems different, but it is really the same. Now painting, and imitative art generally, represent things as they appear, not as they

\[1\] ibid.
are. Now the question arises, are we justified in giving Homer the reputation he enjoys at present in our State, the reputation of knowing all those things about which he sings? for if he and the other poets do not, they are deceivers of those whom they instruct. Surely, if they were well acquainted with those works and objects about which they sing, they would apply their energies to those works themselves and to those objects themselves, in order to leave behind them a substantial and enduring record of their labours.\(^1\) So when the poet speaks about medicine we shall inquire if he ever healed any sick persons, or else ask what right he has to speak on the subject. Has he made any laws, as Lycurgus, given any city a constitution, as Solon, invented anything, as Thales and Anacharsis? No! Then perhaps he was useful during his lifetime in private life; laid down ethical rules, as Pythagoras did, which have formed the law of a sect. Not even this! Both Homer and Hesiod then could hardly have been able to teach men how to be virtuous, or they would never have been allowed to travel about singing their songs with a scanty remuneration. They would have been treated, on the contrary, like Protagoras of Abdera\(^2\) and Prodicus of Ceos, who gained such a hold over those whom they taught, that their pupils never thought of doing the smallest thing without consulting them. Homer therefore, and all the poets, are the imitators not of virtue but of the shadows of virtue. And the painters are the same; for they do

\(^1\) It is curious that Plato should have been so carried away by the favourite antithesis of \(\lambda \dot{\gamma} \omega\) and \(\varepsilon \rho \gamma \alpha\), as not to recognise in writings a more enduring work than the results of physical labour; especially with the writings of Homer and their influence before his eyes.

\(^2\) For these two sophists cf. the dialogue which bears Protagoras' name, 310 A.—316.
not consult with the maker of the things which they imitate, as they ought to do, if they wish to gain a good idea of it, before putting it on the canvas. Now it is granted that this sort of imitation is concerned with things three times removed from reality: things like shadows and reflections which seem different from what they really are, and are perceived by the most superficial of the senses; whilst the rational faculty discovers the true nature of things. Imitation then in painting is far removed from truth and reason, and consequently can be the originator of nothing sound and useful in us.

'Next the imitation of poetry. Poetry represents action, intentional or unintentional, and the consequences of action: it represents men under the influence of complex and distracting thought. Now we know that when a man gives way to violent excitement, he does so under the influence of his sensual nature;¹ when he resists it, he is moved by the law of reason.² And the more a man resists the effects of excitement the more temperate and the better he becomes. What good and temperate man then will care to imitate, especially in the publicity of a theatre, the abandonment of self-restraint, as expressed in the writings of the poets? Will not any wise man think that it is hard enough to keep a check upon his own passions without imitating other people's passions as well, and thereby bringing the mind into a relaxed and excitable condition?³

¹ Πάθος.
² λόγος καὶ νόμος.
³ With this view of theatrical and poetical works should be compared Aristotle's view in Poetic 5, 20. He justifies the exciting properties of tragedy as being a purgative: δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαινοῦσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν.
Notably in the case of pity and fear the wise man will refrain from exciting himself by studying or representing the excitement of others. And he will shun excessive indulgence in laughter for fear of becoming flippant; and generally avoid the fiercer lusts of the flesh. Homer then as a hymn-writer and panegyrist shall be welcome in our State, but otherwise we will have nothing to say to him, although we may allow him to be the best poet and the first tragedian. And before any poet can be admitted he must make a defence of poetry in prose, to prove that it is salutary.'

'After all we have not yet spoken of all the rewards of virtue. It would be an endless task,' he said. 'And why should not our task be endless,' I said, 'in the case of an immortal being?' 'What do you mean?' he said. 'I mean,' said I, 'that our soul is immortal, and I will try to prove it. Every existing thing is liable to corruption, the body has its sicknesses and diseases, plants have their blight, metals rust, and all things go from better to worse. It is some evil which destroys, not a good, nor even a neutral; whilst the good preserves each thing of which it is a good. Injustice, ignorance, intemperance are the corrupters of the soul, just as disease corrupts the body. Bad food and poison do not directly destroy the body; but they produce in it a corruption, which corruption directly destroys it. According to this analogy, then, unless the corruption of the body implant a corruption of soul in the soul, we can never imagine that the soul is destroyed by a foreign evil without any evil of its own. But it does not appear that a bad condition of body can exert any influence of the sort upon the soul. A man is not the more wicked because he dies of a malignant fever. Nor does a life of wickedness make a man mentally
incapable; but rather sharpens his wits. Hence the soul is not destroyed by its own corruption, as the body is; neither is it, of course, destroyed by the corruption of other existences. Therefore it exists for ever, or is immortal. Neither can it grow less if nothing of it is destroyed: nor greater, for that would imply the addition of something mortal. To look at the soul as it exists in the world and human life, is to look at it with all its accretions and disfigurements, like the representations of the sea-god Glaukos, beaten, and bruised, and broken by the waves, with shells, and seaweed, and stones, sticking to his body; and more like a beast than a god. Such is the soul, beset with its thousand ills. We should, on the contrary, try to look to the philosophical history of the soul, its real, its immortal, and its divine nature, raising it out of this sea of troubles and removing all the accretions of the world, and the forms and feelings of human life which cloud and dim its clearness.

'We have not yet spoken of the advantages and rewards of justice. I beg you to give me back the loan you received from me on that point, I mean, my admission, for the sake of the better stating of your case,¹ that a just man may be, and often is, considered to be unjust, and vice versa. Now I think it has been shown that in the first place the gods have no doubt about the just and the unjust. And if so, the gods must give him good fortune whom they know to be just, however much it may appear to be the reverse at the moment. And, in regard of his fellow-man, although the unjust may for the time appear to be carrying everything before him, like those who in a race rush off with the lead, yet, as those runners often run them-

¹ v. s. Book II. init.—367 E.
selves out and come in far behind at the end, so the unjust will be found wanting at the end of his career, and the truth of the proverb 'Honesty is the best policy' will be established. One point yet remains to be settled. What are the rewards of justice and injustice after death? I will try and tell you briefly; no long story of Alcinous, but of a man named Er, a Pamphylian. This man died on the field of battle, and was taken up on the twelfth day to be burnt on the pyre, when he suddenly revived, and told how he had gone in company with many other souls, to a strange place, where there were two rifts in the earth, close together, and other two over against them in the heaven. Between these sat judges, who bade the just take the right-hand path upwards, and the unjust the left-hand and downward path. But him they told to observe carefully; for he was to return to earth, and tell men what things he had seen done there. So he saw the souls departing as I have said through these two rifts, one in earth and the other in heaven; and he saw them rising from the other rift in the earth covered with dirt and dust, and coming down from the rift in the heaven pure and clean. Here in a meadow there was a great meeting;—those from the earthly rift told how they had been wandering for a thousand years in pain, whilst those from the heavenly rift spoke of the transcendent pleasure they had enjoyed. In short, for each offence the penalty was tenfold, and for each good work a tenfold reward likewise. And greater penalties even than these for impiety and murder, and greater rewards in proportion for piety. He heard a question asked about Ardisæus, despot of a Pamphylian city, who had committed foul crimes during his rule. And a soul answered that when Ardisæus, together with other despots and certain private men,
who had committed great crimes, arrived at the entrance of the upper rift, after their thousand years' suffering, there was a bellowing noise from the entrance, signifying that they were still too guilty to be received, and certain savage-looking, fiery-hot figures advanced, seized and bound them, flayed them, and carded them with thorns, proclaiming to all the crimes which had merited such punishment. But those for whom the entrance had no noise, went on in peace and joy, and, after staying for seven days in the meadow, on the eighth they went on their way; and on the fourth day after this they came to a pillar of light, stretching straight along earth and heaven, like a rainbow, very bright and very clear. This they reached after a day's journey; and there they saw the ends of it lashed with cords, forming as it were an undergirdle to the circuit of the heaven. At these ends was the spindle of necessity, the centre of all revolutions, whose shafts and hook are of adamant, and its whorl of composite construction. For it was as if hollow and of great size, with a smaller and similar one fitting in it, and another within this, making eight in all. Their rims are of different breadths, and their lights of different intensity and colour, and their revolutions of different speed. On each of them sits a siren singing in monotone, and the eight sounds produce a harmony. And the three daughters of necessity sit singing to the music of the sirens; Lachesis sings what has been, Clotho what is, and Atropos what is to come. And they turn the spindle one after the other. Now these souls were obliged to proceed towards Lachesis; and a certain one took different lives and lots from Lachesis' lap and stood up and proclaimed aloud, "Thus says Lachesis, daughter of necessity—choose ye what life ye will; ye are responsible; God is free." Then he
threw all the lots down and they chose, with the exception of Er, who was not allowed to choose. And there were lives of all kinds of men and animals. This then was the crisis, this was the difficult moment; and herein was the man fortunate who had studied the philosophy of life, and knew how to refuse the evil and choose the good; avoiding excess in both directions. And all, even the last, if he chose with discretion, might secure a happy and a peaceful life. Now the very first who chose, through his own folly and greed, selected the life of a great despot; and when he discovered what sort of a life he had chosen, he beat his breast, and bewailed not his own folly but the cruelty of fortune and of fate; whereas if he had gone about his choice in a quiet and philosophic spirit, he might not only have lived his earthly life in happiness, but afterwards have gone through the heavenly journey with comfort and pleasure. It was pitiful and sometimes ludicrous to see how the different choices were made, generally in some regard to the former life of each chooser. Orpheus, for instance, would be a swan, not wishing to be born of woman; Thamyris, a nightingale; Telamonian Ajax, a lion; Agamemnon an eagle; Epeios, son of Panopeus, a workwoman; Thersites, a monkey. And last of all there came the soul of Odysseus; and he, for his toils and wanderings that he had undergone, chose rather to live the life of an obscure and humble man than any other. Many souls of animals, too, passed into men, and interchanged with each other. Then they were all led before Lachesis, and a spirit took each of them, and led them to drink of the water of Lethe, after Clotho had assigned their future to each, and Atropos had rendered it inevitable. And the wise drank less than the foolish, who forgot everything. Then they lay down to rest
and at midnight there were thunderings and an earthquake, and they were all shot up different ways to their birth, like shooting stars. But Er was prevented from drinking, and remembered nothing more, till he revived.

'Such, Glaucon, is the story, which if we believe we shall do well, practise justice, believing the soul to be immortal, and at last arrive at that happy road which leads up to heaven, and spend our thousand years of wandering in happiness.'
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΓΛΑΤΚΩΝ, ΠΟΛΕΜΑΡΧΟΣ,
ΘΡΑΣΤΜΑΧΟΣ, ΑΔΕΙΜΑΝΤΟΣ, ΚΕΦΑΛΟΣ.

CAP. I.

Κατέβην χθες εἰς Πειραιᾶ /μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ 327
Ἀρίστωνος/προσευξόμενος τε τῇ θεῷ καὶ ἁμα τήν

Ch. I.—Socrates, walking home
from Piræus, is induced to
drawl at Polemarchus' house.

τῇ θεῷ, sc. the Thracian
Artemis, known as Bendis. So
we have this festival termed τὰ
Βενδίεια: n. ἐντὰ 354 A. Ταῦτα
dὴ σοι, ὡ Σώκρατες, εἰσιν καὶ ὡ
τῶν Βενδίειοις. The temple of
this goddess stood on the pro-
montory Munychia. See Xen.
Hell. 2, 4, 11, where Thrasyl-
bulus is described as posting
himself on Munychia. From
this passage it appears that
there were two temples, one
of the Munychian Artemis and one
of Bendis. ἔπειτα ἐχάρων κατὰ
τὴν εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ ἀμαξίτων
ἀναφέρουσαν. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Φυλῆς...
συνεκπεράθησαν ἐκ τῆς Μούνυ-
χιας. οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως εἰς
τὴν Ἰπποδράμειον ἀγορᾶν ἐλθόντες
πρῶτον μὲν συνεκτάντο, διότε
ἐμπλήσαμεν τὴν οἰκίαν ἢ φέρει πρός
τε τὸ ἱερόν τῆς Μούνυχιας Ἀρτε-
μιδος καὶ τὸ Βενδίδειον. The
question suggests itself, Why
do we find a Thracian goddess
located in the heart of Athens' seaport? Traces of a connexion
between Athens and Thrace
appear in an alliance with
Sitalces, king of the Odrysian
Thracians, made in the time of
Pericles, b.c. 431; the strength
of which may be gauged by the
fact that a Lacedemonian em-
bassage who tried to separate
Sitalces from Athens were de-
livered up to the Athenians by
him. Sitalces' son Sadocus also
became at that time an Athenian
πολέμαρχος ὁ Κεφάλου ἐκέλευσε δραμόντα τὸν


citizen. Thuc. 2, 29. Thucydides gives as the reason for this alliance the desire of the Athenians to gain a post in Thrace from which they could support their efforts in Chalcedonia and conquer Perdiccas; and although he is careful to point out that Teres, father of Sitalces, had nothing to do with Teres of the legend, who was a Thracian and married an Athenian wife, it is probable that this myth was made use of by the Athenians in consummating their alliance with Sitalces.


tὸν ἤρτην..., τίνα τρόπον ποιήσασαί. The object of the dependent sentence is here drawn back from its proper grammatical position, because it is the most prominent thought in the mind of the speaker. So Ar. Nub. 1148—

καὶ μου τὸν υἱὸν, εἰ μεμάθηκε τὸν ἅγιον ἐκεῖνον ἐλφ', ἐν ἀρτίως εἰσῆγαγεν.

et infima ibid. 1186—

οὐ γὰρ, οἷμαι, τὸν νόμον Ἰσαυρίων ὀρθῶς, δὴ τι νοεῖ,

where the subject of the dependent sentence is treated similarly. The idiom is a very frequent one. See below, ὅρας οὖν ἡμᾶς, δοὺς ἐσμέν; and Chap. X. εἰδέναι τὸ δίκαιον, δὴ τι ἐστὶν.

For the sudden transition from the past narrative tense to the simple future we may compare Herod. 2, 121, 9, ὡς, ἐκεῖνων προορῶν, δικαίως βλέψων ἧκως, τεχνόταιο... Also see Xen., Anab. 7, 1, 2, ἐκ τοῦτον δὲ Φαρναβάζους φοβοῦμενοι τὸ στρατέυμα μὴ ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀρχὴν στρατεύσασθαι...ἐδεῖτο — where the primary tense στρατεύσασθαι accompanies the narrative tense ἐδείτο. This example, it may be noticed, also illustrates the use of the subject drawn back from the dependent sentence. Again, Xen. Anab. 7, 1, 4, ἐφ' ὧν ταῦτα ποιήσαν, εἰ ἐντὰ 33, ἐστι δ' ἐν μᾶλλον, εἰς ἄρθρον παρέχειν ἐφ' καὶ σίτα καὶ ποτά.

ημνήθη, the technical term for a religious ceremony involving a procession. See Ar. Acharnians 247.

καὶ μὴν καλὸν γ' ἐστ', δὲ Ἰδίωνε ἑσποτα, κεχαρισμένως σοι τὴν πομην ἐμὲ πέμψαντα καὶ θύσαντα...

where the verb πέμψαν is joined as here with πομην.

ἀπήμεν πρὸς, 'we were going towards'... so below, ὀδικάδε, homewards. It is to be noticed here that Socrates goes through the religious service and festival like any other orthodox citizen, v. Introd.
μον...λαβ...ιμ., ‘taking hold of me by the robe from behind’ —μικτω is added afterwards, defining more exactly the word μον. Verbs, such as λαμβάνομαι, ἀπτομα, ἄρτας, ἔχομαι, ψάω, take genitive of the thing caught hold of, or of the part of the thing. Thus Eur. Cycl. 322—

τένοντος ἀρτας ἄκρον ποδός, et 390, ἐντρ.—
κόι ν λαβοῦμαι τοῦ τυφλώντος ὅμωτα δαλόυ, and Herod. 2, 121, 11, ἐφών ἔχεσθαι. So ἀντιλαμβάνομαι, ἐντρ. Ch. X. ἐπίτ., Ὠρασίμαχος...ἀρμα ἀντιλαμβάνονται τοῦ λόγου.
μετεστράφη...ἡρόμην, distinguishing these tenses.

Πολέμαρχος, said by Muretus to have been brother of Lysias the orator. v. ἐντρ. Ch. II. ἐπίτ.
Νικήρατος. Muretus states that this Niceratus was a general in the Peloponnesian war; but Thucydides, to whom he refers, is silent upon the question.

οὐ διὸ τῆς ποιμῆς, in the same way above ἄτε νῦν πρῶτον ἄγοντες. These particles, joined with a participle, introduce a circumstance which defines more fully, or explains, the principal statement. See below 329 Α, ἀνακατουσίων, ὡς μεγάλων τινῶν ἀπεστηρημένων. It must be distinguished from ὡς in the next sentence, which introduces a supposition, not a fact.

οὐ γὰρ... Fully expressed, the answer would be, ‘You guess rightly, for (γὰρ) we are going homewards.’ See Soph. O. Τ. 432–3—

ΤΕ. οὐκ ἐκδόμην ἔγωγ’ ἄν, εἰ σὺ μὴ ‘κάλεις.
ΟΙ. οὐ γὰρ τί σ᾽ ἔδω μῦρα φωνήσαντι’.

i.e. ‘It was not my fault that I called you, for I knew not,’ &c.

οὐκοῦν, &c. Socrates is ready at once with a characteristic reply to Polemarchus’ dilemma. ‘There is another alternative yet, if we can persuade you to let us go.’ Polemarchus’ threat
is of force, Socrates suggests persuasion.

μὴ ἄκ., ‘if we refused to listen.’ The participle here, as often, is equivalent to a conditional sentence. See ινθ. Ch. V. ιερ. δι εἰσιν οὐκ ἀν πολ- λούς πείσαμι λέγω, i.e. ‘if I were to mention it.’ Also Ch. VI. ιερ. τὸ τινὸς παρακαταθεμένου τι ἁρμαν μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαντῶντι ἀποδίδω, i.e. ‘if he were to ask for it when he was out of his mind.’

οὐδε ἦστε, οὐδὲ indicates surprise. ‘Then you do not really (ἀρα) know?’ This particle ἀρα, although differently accentuated and used at the beginning of the sentence, contains the same implication as ἀρα, ‘after all,’ or ‘then,’ for which see Eur. Med. 1029—

ἀλλες ἄρα ὑμᾶς, ὁ τεχν., ἐξε- θρεψάμην,
et ibid. 1262—

μάθαν ἄρα γένος φίλων ἔτεκες.

λαμπάς, i.e. λαμπαδηφόρα, a contest in which two or more sets of competitors handed on a torch from man to man, the object being to bring the torch first to the goal alight. See Aesch. Ag. 281 seqq.; where the beacon-signals that brought the news of the capture of Troy are compared in an elaborate simile to the λαμπάς, ll. 312–4—

τοιοῦτοι τοις μοι λαμπαδηφόρων νόμοι,

ἀλλος παρ’ ἄλλον διοδοχαῖς πληρομένοι.

υικά δ’ ο πρῶτος καὶ τελευταῖος δραμάν.

The simpler form of the game was for individuals to run the whole course with the torch. Muretus tells us that Prometheus, Hephestus, and Pallas were the first recipients of this sacred celebration; and suggests that it was paid to Artemis under her character of Selene, quoting the epithet ‘nictiluces’ from Horace, Od. 4, 6, 38, and accounting for the introduction of horses by a reference to Ovid’s line, ‘Altaque rotantes Luna regebat equos.’ He also refers most aptly to Plato’s own use of this custom in simile. Laws 776 B. ἐκτρέφοντας παι- δας, καθάπερ λαμπάδα τὸν βίον παραδίδουτας ἄλλοις ἐξ ἄλλων.

πρὸς ἐκπέραν, sub noctem, towards night-fall.
POLITEIAS a'.


CAP. II.

Hμενoυν οικαίει εἰς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου, καί Δυσίαν τε αὐτόθι κατελάβομεν καί Εὐθύδημον, τοῦ τοῦ Πολεμάρχου ἁδελφόν, καί δὴ καί Ῥασύμαχον τῶν πολλῶν τῶν νέων... Added by Polemarchus as an inducement to Socrates, whose conversations with the young were so notorious that he was distinctly forbidden to engage in them. Xen. Mem. 1, 2, 33, τοῖς νεόσις ἀπειπέτην μὴ διαλεγασθαι.

ἀλλὰ μένετε. ἄλλα is the favourite particle employed with an urgent imperative, and may be seen from the following passages to have the force, as it were, of anticipating a possible refusal. See above, 328, ἄλλα περιμένετε. Ar. Acharn. 408. ΔΙ. ἄλλα ἐκκυκλήθην. ET. ἄλλα ἀδύνατον. ΔΙ. ἄλλα δύμως. Eur. Med. 942—

ου δ' ἄλλα σοι κέλευσον αὐτεῖς σαϊς πατρός γυναίκα παίδας τῆνδε μὴ φεύγειν χθόνα.

Ch. II.—Where they find Cephalus, Polemarchus' father, with whom Socrates engages in conversation.

καὶ δὴ καὶ, i.q. et denique: this collocation of particles marks the final and principal point in a series, the particular case to which the others have been the prelude. See Euthyphro fn. καὶ τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον γραφῆς ἀπαλλάξειαι..., καὶ οὐκέτι ὁ σοὶ ἀγνοεῖς ἄνωθεν διάφορως, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βίων ἀμειβομενοὶ βιωσθείμην. See also Rep. Book II. ῆπ. Γλαύκων δει ἄνθρωπος ὑπηγιαζει, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε, i.e. 'always hitherto, but especially on that occasion': an exact illustration of this force. See also Ch. III. B. καὶ ἄλλοις, καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ. Other cases of the phrase, with slightly varied meaning, will be noticed below, 343 B, 361 E. ὃ δὴ itself is usually final or conclusive: see Soph. Antigone, 895, where Antigone, after enumerating the others of her family who have perished by violent deaths, speaks thus of herself—

ἄν λοιπα ἐγὼ καὶ κάκιστα δὴ μακρῷ κάτειμι.

See also Rep. Ch. XII. fn., and Ch. XIV. τοιούτων ὅπως δὴ σοι καὶ ἐμὲ ὑπόλαβε νῦν δὴ ἄποκρινεσθαι, the concluding statement and summing up of Thrasymachus' case.

Ῥασύμαχον. The character of this person the Dialogue will unfold. He is mentioned as a rhetor in Phædrus 261 C, 269
E, and especially 271 A, whilst in 267 D he is termed ‘the mighty Chalcedonian,’ and specially commended for his able treatment of a pathetic theme; but we are tempted to think that Socrates is imposing upon Phaedrus in this latter point, from what we learn of Thrasymachus in the Republic.

\[\text{διὰ χρόνου, see Herod. vi. 118.} \]
\[\text{ἄλλα μεν δὲ ἐτέων ἐκοσι Θη-βαῖοι ἐκοµελαντο.} \]
\[\text{καθήστο δὲ ἐστεφανομένος.} \]

In the same way the Socrates of the Clouds of Aristophanes causes the neophyte Strepsiades to sit down and wear a crown in approaching the Cloud-deities.

\[\text{II. 255. 6—} \]
\[\text{ΣΤ. ἰδον κάθημα.} \]
\[\text{ΣΜ. τοιοῦτοι τοῖν χαβεῖ τὸν στέφανον.} \]
\[\text{προσκεφαλίου καὶ δίφρου.} \]

So Cicero, Ep. Fam. 9, 18, \textit{fim.}
\[\text{‘Sella tibi erit in Iuno: eam pulvinus sequetur.’} \]
\[\text{παρ’ αὐτὸν.} \]

We find a verb with the meaning of sitting used with accusative in Euthydemus 273 B, \(\delta\ \muὲν\ \piαρ\ \tau ὰ\ \muειράκιον\ \ἐκαθῆκτο,\) and 271 B, \(\delta\ \δὲ\ \παρ’\ \ἐμὲ\ \καθῆκεν;\) and in Hom. Od. 4, 51—

\[\text{ἐὲ\ ρα\ βρόνους\ ἔζοντο\ παρ’ \’Ατ-\}
\[\text{ρείδην Μενέλαιον.} \]

The accusative implies that they ‘went towards him and sat down.’ So Herod. 3, 64, \(\omegaς\ \Σμέρνηδις\ ἰζομένους\ εἰς\ τὸν\ βασιλικὸν\ βρόνον\ παῦσει\ τῇ\ κεφαλῇ\ τοῦ\ οὐρανοῦ.\)

\[\text{ἐκεῖνῳ γὰρ... These seats were for those who shared in} \]
\[\text{the sacrificial rites, and afterwards partook of the sacrificial} \]
\[\text{banquet from small tables placed in front of them. The} \]
\[\text{practice of combining a banquet with a sacrifice was most} \]
\[\text{frequent; thus the one is spoken of as the usual accomplishment} \]
\[\text{of the other in Xen. Mem. 2, 3, 11.} \]
\[\text{ἐὶ τινα τῶν γυμνῶν βοῦλου κατεργάσασθαι, ὅποτε θῶι, καλεῖν} \]
\[\text{σε ἐπὶ δείκνυον, τὸ δὲ πυροῖς;} \]
\[\text{also see Od. 1, 144,} \]
\[\text{οἱ μὲν ἐπετα ἐξεις ἔζοντο} \]
\[\text{κατὰ κλισοῦς τα βρόνους τε.} \]
\[\text{And so in 3, 389.} \]

\[\text{θαμίζεις, the general term expressing frequency combined} \]
\[\text{with a participle which specializes the action; whilst φοίταω} \]
\[\text{(ποινὼς ἴσης),} \]
\[\text{used below to express the same meaning as} \]
\[\text{θαμίζεις καταβαίνων, has the} \]
\[\text{further meaning of ‘going.’} \]

ὁμιθεδὲ τε πολλὸν ὅτι ἀνγάς ἠλάων φοιτώσιν.

χρῆν μέντοι, 'but you should.' It is always advisable to look for an adverative meaning in μέντοι; and this is its force in the great majority of cases: see Oh. 1, init. ὅπερ μέντοι ἴπποιν... But in others it is more emphatic than adverative: E.g. 331 D, καὶ μέντοι καὶ παραθίδωμι τῶν λόγων. 375 C, ἀλλὰ μέντοι τοῦτων ὅποτέρον ἀν στηρηται... See note ad Cap. X11. init.

εἰ μὲν...νῦν δὲ. So in Od. 2, 76 and 79—

εἰ ἔτι ὑμεῖς ἐγείρετε, τάχα ἐν ποτε καὶ τίς εἶ, νῦν δὲ μοι ἀπρῆκτους ὅδως ἐμβάλλετε θυμῷ.

Where εἰ κε, 'in that case,' is balanced by νῦν δέ, 'but as matters stand'; as here.

εἰ μὲν γὰρ... If this statement represents an actual reminiscence, we must look upon it as of the greatest importance, bearing witness as it does to the goodwill and confidence of an old man in Socrates. Notice that Cephalus uses ὑμεῖς, and τοίοδε τοῖς νεανίσκων below, his family as well as himself.

κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἡδοναί... Aristotle states the fact which is here implied, Eth. 7, 11, 4, ἐμπαθον τῷ φρονεῖν ἧν ἡδοναί. Plato is careful to show (infra Book III.) that a good mind must exert a good influence over the body, and that the body must not be left to itself to work out its own efficiency. See 408 E, οὗ γὰρ σώματι σῶμα θεραπεύουσιν,—ἀλλὰ ψυχῇ σῶμα. and supra. 403 D, ψυχῇ ἁγαθῇ τῇ αὐτῇ ἀρετῇ σῶμα παρέχειν ὦν ὅλον τε βέλτιστον. And so also Xenophon in the Memorabilia represents Socrates as asserting that bodily efficiency can only be attained by making the body subservient to the mind. Book II. I, 28. εἰ δὲ καὶ σώματι βούλετε δύνατος ἦναι, τῇ γνώμῃ ὅπρετεν ἐπιστεύειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ γυμναστέουν σὺν πάνοις καὶ ἰδρώτι. Conversely, Tennyson in the Princess—

'Since to look on noble forms
Makes noble through the sensuous organism
That which is higher.'
πανυ οἰκεῖον. Καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ’ ἔγω, ὁ Κέφαλε, χαῖρω γε διαλέγομενος τοῖς σφόδρα πρεσβύταις. Δοκεῖ ἐγὼ μοι χρῆναι παρ’ αὐτῶν πυνθάνεσθαι, ὅσπερ τινὰ ὁδὸν προελθῆθοτον ἦν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἵσως δεήσει πορεύεσθαι, ποία τέσσερις ἡμέρα καὶ χαλεπή, ἡ ῥαδία καὶ εὐπόρος καὶ δὴ καὶ σοῦ ἡδέως ἀν πυθόμην, ὅτι σοὶ φαίνεται τοῦτο, ἐπειδῆ ἐνταῦθα ἥδη ἐι δὴ τῆς ἡλικίας ἤδη ἐπὶ γῆρας οὐδέFaulted aces évai oí kal μὴν. μὴν is like μέντοι, and generally implies opposition. But like μέντοι it sometimes has no adversative force. e.g. τις ἔφρα Ch. VII. καὶ μὴν θαν γε πλοῦς, δ’ ναυπηγός. Here καὶ μὴν simply introduces another case similar to that mentioned immediately before, and is accumulative, not adversative. We see this accumulative force again in Book II. 362 D, ἀλλὰ τί μὴν; ἐπον, ‘Why what next?’ or ‘What besides?’ For Ademantus is going to supplement, and not oppose, his brother’s case with a further statement. As a rule its function is to adduce an answer to an objection, or to state a further objection or a further instance that must be taken into account. See Book II. 370 E, καὶ μὴν κενὸς ἄν ἦ διδακωσθος. κενὸς ἀπείσων, and in Book VI. 485 E, καὶ μὴν που καὶ τὸδε ἐκ σκοπεύν, and in Soph. Ant. 1053, 4—

ΚΡ. οὐ βούλομαι τὸν μάντιν ἀντιείναι κακῶς. 

ΤΕ. καὶ μὴν λέγεις, ψευδὴ μὲ θεωπτεῖν λέγων. 

i.e. ‘Ah! but you do insult me.’ Also ἰδιαὶ. συνεργα, 221, καὶ μὴν δ’ χρησμὸς γι’ οὕτως, ‘Well, if they do that at any rate is the penalty.’

χαῖρω γε. Γε is here apolo-

getic or explanatory. ‘I really do take pleasure.’

καὶ δὴ καὶ σοῦ, ‘so that I would gladly hear in your case,’ lit. ‘learn from you.’ Here σοῦ is distinguished by καὶ δὴ καὶ from other cases in general as the special instance which engages the speaker’s interest. See above, Ch. II. init. and Herod. 3, 20, νόμως δὲ καὶ ἀλλοισι χρῆσθαι, καὶ δὴ κατὰ τὴν βασιλείην.

ἐνταῦθα τῆς ἡλικίας εἰ, ‘you are so far advanced upon the road of life.’ For this genitive of distance see Euthyphro 4 B, οὐ γὰρ οἵμαι γε τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος εἶναι ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ πράξαι, ἀλλὰ πάρῳ ποὺ ἧδη σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος. Again Lysides 204 D, πόρῳ ἥδη εἶναι πορευόμενοι τοῦ ἔρωτος. Eu-

thydemus 294 E, οὕτω πόρῳ σοφίας ἦκε. And Xen. Anab. 7, 8, 20, ὅτας δτι μακροτάτην ἠλθο ἡς Δυδιάς.

ἐπὶ γῆρας οὐδή. II. 22, 60, Od. 15, 348, and Herod. 3, 14, 12, ἐστι πυθήσην ἀπικτήτης εἰπὶ γῆρας οὐδή. The first of a long series of quotations from Homeric poems with which Plato has adorned his work, which make us ill-prepared for a condemnation of poets in general (Book II. 377 D, seqq.) and of Homer in particular. (Book X. init.)
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ α΄. 113

30 ποιηταὶ τὸν χαλεπὸν τοῦ βλου ἢ πῶς σὺ αὐτὸ ἑξαγγέλλεις.

CAP. III.

'Εγώ οὖσι· ἐφή, νη τὸν Δία ἐρῶ, δῶ Σώκρατες, φίλον γέ μοι φαίνεται, πολλάκις γὰρ συνερχόμεθα τινες (eis ταύτα παραπλησιὰν ἥλικιαν ἔχοντες) διασώζοντες τὴν παλαιάν παρομίαν· οί οὖν πλείστοι ἡμῶν ὠλοφύρονται ἐννοοῦντες, τὰς ἐν τῇ νεότητι ἡδονὰς ποθοῦντες καὶ ἀναμμηνησκόμενοι περὶ τῇ τάφροδισια καὶ περὶ πότους καὶ εὐώχιας καὶ ἀλλ' ἄττα ἀ τῶν
dokei γάρ μοι, sepp. Cicero has translated thus in his Cato Major de Senectute: 'Volumus sane, nisi molestum est, Cato, tanquam longam aliquam viam confeceiras, quam nobis quoque ingrediendum sit, istuc quo pervenisti, videre, quale sit.' Ch. II. fin. In the next chapter Cicero translates from Plato almost literally this account of the old men who deplore their old age. He then states, in the mouth of Lælius, Socrates' suggestion that perhaps Cephalus' circumstances may be the reason of his happiness which we find in 329 D, together with the tale of Themistocles and the Seriphan. Hesiod uses the metaphor of the road in his description of the good and bad life. Op. et Dies, 285—

τὴν μὲν γὰρ κακότητα καὶ ἱλαδὸν ἔστων ἐλέοσαι

ρηγίδων· λείτα μὲν ὄδος μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει,

τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἱδρώτα θεοὶ προ-

τάρασιν ἔθηκαν

ἀδάνατοι μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὑβρίσιος

οἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν,

καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον ἐπὴν

δ' εἰς ἄκρων ἴκηται

βηδίη δὴ ἐπείτα πέλει, χαλεπὴ

περ ἑώσα.

τοῦ βλου, dependent on τοῦτο, 'this part of your life': v. infr. 367 D. τοῦτο ὁ δὲ αὐτὸ ἐπιλεύεσθαι δικαίοσύνης ἡ ἀντ' ἡ ἀρχ' τῶν ἔχοντα ὄντινοι. Euthyd. 304 A. τούτο μὲν οὖν τοῦ πράγματος. And infra, here, 329 C fin. τὸ τοῦ Zosokleous γινεται. And somewhat similar is Virgil's expression, Æn. I.—

'Tu mihi quodcunque hoc regni...Concilias.'

From these examples it is clear that we should gain a better idea of the idiom by translating 'your life at this time'; and 'justice in this respect,' 'the affair in this aspect,' in the examples respectively: τοῦτο being closely constructed with the substantive. Fortified by these instances, the above explanation may stand against Stallbaum's condemnation of it as 'valde contorta.'

CH. III.—Cephalus' Apologia

Senectutis.

ἄ τῶν τοῦ. ἔχεται, 'which

are connected with such things.'
Lit. 'hang on to,' or 'depend upon'; so, in a physical sense, μεσός δρόνος ἔχεται. τοῦ γῆς, 'about old age.' We find ὑδόρωμα constructed with genitive alone in Od. 4, 104—

τῶν πάντων οὗ τόσον ὑδόρωμα. So Od. 2 init.—

tοῦ δ' ἐκ ἄκρυχεὼν ἀγορήσατο. ἐκ τοῦ σῶτος δή, 'it is on this very point,' or 'for this very reason'; viz. οἰκείων προτ. δή here is more emphatic than conclusive—its usual force; and refers to what precedes. So in Book II. 368 B, Socrates, after congratulating the sons of Ariston on their able defence of injustice, remarks, δοκεῖτε δή μοι δὲ άληθῶς οὐ πεπείθεται. 'You certainly appear to have lacked real conviction.' So in 370 B, ἐκ δὴ τοῖτων.

ἐπεξετάνθη, 'the very same thing would have happened to me.' πάσχω, thus used of something happening to a man, by force of circumstances apart from his control, is common. See 368 B, loc. supr. cit. τὸν γὰρ θεῖον πεπόθατο, 'some divine-afflatus has come to you.' Aristoph. Clouds, 816, τὶ χρήμα πάσχεις, δὲ πάτερ; 'what has come to you?' See infr. Ch. XI. τὶ ἄξιοι παθεῖν; 'What do you think should be done to you?' The idiom lies in the use of the subjective word instead of a neutral or objective one. τὸν δὲ, 'whereas the fact is...' v. supr. not. Ch. II.

καὶ ἄλλος, καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφόκλει, 'Sophocles especially besides other.' For the idiom καὶ ἄλλ. καὶ, see Theocrit. init. ἑδάφῳσα θεοκάτους ἀδιαντικῶς ἄλλα τε δὴ ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τούτων. For καὶ δὴ καὶ v. s. not. Ch. II. Sophocles was born B.C. 495, and died B.C. 405. Recollecting that Socrates' death took place 399 B.C. at the age of about seventy, we see that the philosopher must have had many opportunities of intercourse with the poet.
политейас α’. 115

έφη, ὥ ἀνθρωπε, ἄσμεναίτατα μέντοι αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον, ὥστερ λυπτώνται τινα ἴα 
καὶ ἀγριον δεσπότην ἀποφυγόν. εὖ οὖν μοι καὶ τὸτε ἐδοξεῖν ἐκεῖνος εἰπεῖν καὶ νῦν ὁ ἡμῶν ἒττον. παντάπασι γὰρ τῶν ὑμων ἔτσι ἐν τῷ γῆρᾳ 
πολλῆ ἐιρήνη γίγνεται καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐπειδὰν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι παύσωνται κατατείνουσαι καὶ 
χαλάσωσι, παντάπασι τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται δεσποτῶν ἰ 
πάνω πολλῶν ἐστι καὶ μανομένων ἄπηλλαχθαί.

μέντοι, ‘νάγι, on the other hand,’

δεσπέρ λυπτώντα, &c. See what was said above, Ch. II. D, of the opposition between 

d sensual and intellectual enjoyment; and the passage quoted from Aristotle. Plato mentions 

this below, Book III. 403 A, as being most opposed of all to the 

intelectual exercises. Μείζω 

dε τινα καὶ δεξιέραν ἔχεις εἰπεῖν ἕδοσαν τῆς περὶ τὰ ἄφο 

δισία, &c., as Aristotle in the 

Ethics.

κατατείνουσαι. The physical 

notion of stretching (τείνω) begets a large family of trans-

ferred yet kindred expressions, 

when the verb is compounded with different prepositions, e.g. 

dιαστατείνουσαι, Book VI. 501 

C, ‘with might and main,’ 

(Jowett); ἐνυπτατείνουσαι, ‘in 

earnest,’ 499 Α; ἐνυπτατείνουσαι, 

‘laying great stress upon,’ 

‘seriously,’ 536 C; and again 

πάντα τὰ αὐτῶν εἰς τοῦτο ἐνυπτ 

ανεῖν, ‘concentrating himself enti- 

rally upon this point,’ 591 B; 

and τείνω.simple: ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ 

τείνοντας πάντως, ‘all striving 

towards the same object,’ 

464 D.

μανομένων. So in 403 Α, 
loc. cit. οὐδὲ γε μανικωτέραν. 
(ἥδονήν sc.)

967, the simple verb ἀπάλλασομαι 
means to ‘get one thing in ex-

change for another’:

τῶν δ’ ἐμῶν παιδῶν φυγᾶς 
ψυχῆς ἄν ἀπαλλαξίμεθα

whilst the active verb, ἀπάλλασω, 

is used simply as ‘to take in-

stead of.’ Thus Theognis, 

οὐδὲ τις ἁλλὰκεις κάκιον, τοῦ 

σθλον παρεβάς,-

ἀπαλλάσσω means ‘to rid’; thus 

Eur. Cyc. 371—

κώμων μὲν αὐτὸν τοῦτ’ ἀπα-

λάξαι.

But it has also an intransitive 

meaning ‘to turn out,’ or ‘come 

out from’; Rep. 491 D: τὴν 

ἀριστὴν φύσιν...κάκιον ἀπα-

λάττειν τῆς φαθῆς. Similarly 

παραλάττειν, ‘to change,’ 530 

Β, γίγνεσθαι τὸ ταῦτα ἅλ 

αὐτῶς καὶ οὐδὲν παραλάττειν. 

Hence we can understand the 

meaning of ἀπαλλάσσωμαι, ‘to 

get rid of,’ or ‘to free one’s self 

from,’ as here; it is found again 

in Book III. 406 D, τομῆς 

χρησά 

μενο λαχθαί (sc. νοοματος) 

and 390 Ε, μὲ παραλάττεσθαι 

τῆς μήνιος. Also 465 D, πάντω 

τε ἐκ τοῦτο ἀπαλάξοντας. But 

καταλάθομαι, ‘to make it up 

with,’ τοῖς μὲν καταλαγῇ, 566 

Ε; and διαλάσσομαι, in the 

same sense, 471 Α, καὶ οὐ δια-

λαχτησόμενοι ἄρα διαλάξονται;

1 2
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων πέρι καὶ τῶν γε πρὸς τοὺς οἰκελουσί
μία τὶς αἰτία ἐστίν· οὐ τὸ γῆρας, οὐ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ
ὁ τρόπος τῶν ἀνθρώπων· ἀν μὲν γὰρ κόσμου καὶ
eὐκολοι ὡσι, καὶ τὸ γῆρας μετρίως ἐστὶν ἐπίτονον
εἰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ γῆρας, οὐ Σωκράτης, καὶ νεότης χαλεπὴ
tὸ τοιοῦτο ξυμβαίνει.

CAP. IV.

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀγαθεῖς αὐτοῦ εἰπόντος ταῦτα, βοουλο-
μενος ἐτὶ λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐκίνουν καὶ εἶπον Ὡ Κέφαλε,

‘Then they will dispute on the understanding that they are
going to make it up again some
day?’ The sense of change is
apparent throughout.

μετρίως, ‘not very.’ The
word implies an absence of
excess: see 372 C, μετρίως ὑπο-
τίνοντες; 396 C, μέτριος ἀνήρ;
and 399 C, σωφρόνως τε καὶ
μετρίως πράττοντα. The idea
which it conveys is the key-
ote of a great part of Greek
thought: How to avoid excess
and steer a middle course. So
Theognis–

Μηδὲν ἄγαν ἄσχαλε ταρασσο-
μένων πολιτέων
Κύριε, μέσην δ' ἔρχει τὴν
ὁδὸν ὡσπερ ἑγὼ.
So in Xenophon’s Memorabilia,
2, 1, 11, Aristippus defends
his life of self-indulgence by
termining it as a mean between
command and slavery. εἶναι τίς
μὲν δοκεῖ μέσῃ τοῦτων ὁδὸς, ἣν
πειράματι βαδίζειν, οὔτε δ' ἀρχής,
οὔτε διὰ δουλείας, ἀλλὰ δ' ἐλευ-
θερίας. For another example
see Antigone 67—

tὸ γὰρ
περισσὰ πράσσειν οὐκ ἔχει
νοῦν οὐδένα.

It is interesting to trace how
large a part the idea of excess
and moderation plays in Greek
legend and drama: prosperity in
excess is a direct challenge to
Nemesis; Polycrates must throw
his ring away, but even that
cannot save him; Ὑδίππος is
dashed from the height of suc-
cess to a bitterness worse than
that of death; and Agamemnon,
flushed with victory, falls a
victim to the jealousy which
Heaven ever bears towards the
over-fortunate.

καὶ γῆρας καὶ νεότης... See
Cic. de Sen., Ch. II. ‘Quibus
enim nihil est in ipsis opis ad
bene beateque vivendum, iiis
omnis setas gravis est.’

Ch. IV.—Cephalus’ Opinions
about Age and Money.

ἐκινοῦν. In this word we
have an epitome of Socrates’
method in its objective aspect.
He tells us in another place
that he does not agree with
those who talk about putting
knowledge into people, as though
it were not there before. See
οἴμαι σου τοὺς πολλοὺς, οὔτε γὰρ ἡγεῖσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἢγεῖσθαι σε βαθίως τὸ γῆρας φέρειν οὐ διὰ τὸν τρόπον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πολλὴν οὐσιαν κεκτήσαι τοῖς γάρ πλουσίοις πολλὰ παραμυθία φασιν εἶναι. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφι, λέγεις: οὐ γὰρ ἀποδεχόνται. καὶ λέγουσι μὲν τι, οὐ μέντοι γε ὁσον οἴονται, ἀλλὰ τὸ τού Θεµιστοκλέους εὖ ἔχει, ὅς τῷ Σεριφίῳ λοιδοροµένῳ καὶ λέγοντι, οτι οὔ δι austerity πολλὰ διὰ τὴν πόλιν εὐδοκιµοῖ ἀπεκρίνατο, οτι οὔτε 330

Book VII. 518 C, φαεί δὲ ποὺ οὔκ ἐνύσθη ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐνστηµῆσι σφεῖς ἐντιθέναι. Ηε believed that knowledge, or at least the capacity for knowledge, was in all men, and only needed κίνησις, or µαλευσις, to use his own metaphor, to bring it out. We shall see below, Ch. V. C, how Socrates tries to draw Cephalus into a discussion about justice by means of promoting a dilemma; how again in Chaps. VI. and VII. he encourages Polemarchus to try and solve the difficulties in Simonides' definition of justice by placing them before him; how he is careful to say, after the detection of the flaw in the definition, 'We, then, shall dispute it, µαχούµεθα ἀρα κοµῇ, ἐγὼ τε κει σῦ... and, in fact, to impress the person with whom he is conversing that it is his duty to do all he can to help in the discussion. Therefore Xenophon's word for Socrates' teaching of virtue in the Memorabilia is προτρέπειν, not διδάσκειν. See 1, 7, ιητ. επισκεψόµεθα δὲ, εἰ καὶ ἀλαφονειας ἀποτρέπων τοὺς ἑµοῦντας ἀφητῆ ἐπιµελείσθαι προτρέπειν, and again Book II. ιητ. ἐδοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τοιαύτα λέγων προτρέπειν τούς ἑµοῦντας ἀδεικὴ ἐγκράτειαν. That is, to incite men to teach themselves how to practise virtue. Also see Book II. Ch. V. ιητ.

ἡγεῖσθαι σε βαθίως τὸ γῆρας φέρειν... Cicero's rendering: 'Tibi propter opes et copias et dignitatem tuam tolerabiliorem senectutem videri.'

λέγουσι μὲν τι, 'there is something in what they say.' We have another meaning of λέγω, inef. Ch. XII. 6αθιν οὐ λέγει, 'I understood what you mean,' and XIII. πιν., το τού κρείττονον ξυµφέρων ἔλεγεν ὡς γατον το κρείττονα αὐτῷ ξυµφέρειν. For the sense here, see Euthyd. 305 E, Δοκούσι σοι τι, ν Σώκρατες, λέγειν; Aristotle, Eth. 7, 13, 3, ὅδε τὸν τροχιζόµενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχήµαν µεγάλας περιπλοκότα εὐδαµῶν φάσκοτε εἶναι, εἴον ἕλγαθα, οὗδεν λέγουσιν. Xen. Mem. 2, 1, 12, εὶ µέντοι µηδὲ δι' αὐθρώτων, λοις ἂν τι λέγοις.

το τού Θεµιστοκλέους, v.s. 329 C, το τού Σωφοκλέους γίγνεται. Herodotus tells the tale of a man named Timodemus of Aphidna, and places his birthplace in Belbina, a little island north-west of Seriphus.—8, 12, 5.
οὖτ' ἂν ἐπιεικῆς πάντων τι...

In the same manner Aristotle claims for the good man a portion of the world's goods if he is to be really happy; Eth. 1, 5, 6, ἐνδέχεσθαι ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν...κακοταθείν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα: τὸν δ' οὖτως, κἀκεῖναι οὐδέποτε ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ εἰσείναι: and in 7, 13, 3 quoted above; and again προσδείκται ὁ εὐδαιμῶν τῶν ἐν τῷ σωματί ἄγαθῶν.

ἐπεκτῆσαν, notice force of ἐπι.

καὶ ἑπεκτ.... ‘Acquired! do you ask?’ The usual way of expressing surprise or contempt, viz. to join the pronominal ποιός to a word used by the last speaker. So Aristoph. Ach. 61, 2—

ΚΗΡ. οἱ πρέσβεις οἱ παῦρα βασιλεῖσ.

ΔΙ. ποιοῦ βασιλεῖσ;

ο. γ. ‘King indeed!’

et infr. 109. Also see Euthydemos 291 Α. Υ. τοι νόησιν ἔτσι γάρ Κτῆσιππος ἦν ο λοιπόν εἰπένι; ΚΡ. Ποιοῦ Κτῆσιππος;

πάππος τε καὶ ὁμώνυμος. The usual practice was for grandfather and grandson to bear the same name. Thus we hear of a young Sophocles, b.c. 401, a tragic poet, who was son of Iophon, and grandson of Sophocles. Sometimes, however, this nomenclature missed a generation: thus we have in Alcibiades’ family—

Clinias
Alcibiades
Axiochus
Clinias.

ἐγὼ δὲ ἄγατός, not ‘I love,’ but ‘I am content.’ So in 435 D, οὐκοῦν ἄγατητον; ἕφη. ‘Can we not rest content with these instances?’ and again, 472 B, ἡ ἄγατητον, ἐν τι ἐγγύτατα ἀντίς ἤ; ‘Or shall we be satisfied if it be the nearest possible?’ We find amo used similarly in Juv. 7, 9,
At si Pieria quadrans tibi
nullus in arca.

Ostendetur, ames nomen vic-
tumque Machæra,

‘You would have to content
yourself with...’ The expres-
sion is an optimistic one, as
though anything that has to
be acquiesced in became not
merely tolerable, but pleasant.

oi de κτησ. διπλή... Sir
Thomas More in his Utopia ex-
presses this fact thus, ‘And
verily it is naturally given to
all men to esteme their own
inventions best.’ Aristotle, Eth.
4, 1, 20, πάντες ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον
tα αὐτῶν ἔργα, διότε οἱ γονεῖς
καὶ οἱ ποιηταί. Again 9, 7, 7,
ἐτι δὲ τὰ ἐπιπόνοσ γεγομένα
πάντες μᾶλλον στέργουσιν, οὖν
καὶ τὰ χρήματα οἱ κτησα-
μενοι τῶν παραλαβόντων. Also
sec. 4 gives the psychological
reason for it, according to Ari-
stotle’s system. ‘Ἐνεργεῖ ὁ δὲ
παίσσας τὸ ἔργον ἐστὶν οὕτως’ στέρ-
γει δὴ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ
eίναι. This passage seems to
be a reproduction of Plato’s
words. Lord Beaconsfield, in
his psychological romance of
Contarini Fleming, states the
same fact with regard to the
acquisition of knowledge:—

‘The idea that is gained with
an effort affords far greater
satisfaction than that which is
acquired with dangerous facility.
We dwell with more fondness
on the perfume of the flower
which we ourselves have tended,
than on the odor of that which
we cull with carelessness and
cast away without remorse.’

Pt. II. Ch. I.

cal κατὰ τὴν χρείαν, ‘as well
as in regard of its use.’ See
above, καὶ ἄλλοις καὶ Σοφοκλεί,
329 B, ‘Sophocles in particular,
as well as others.’ Aristotle, in
speaking of friendship, remarks
that the friendships of the old
are dictated by what is advan-
tageous, which so entirely ab-
sorbs their attention that they
are sometimes unpleasant. See
Eth. 8, 3, 4, οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἢδον οἱ
τηλικοῦτοι διάκρειν, ἂλλὰ τὸ
ὡρέλιμον...ἐνιότερο γὰρ οὐδὲ εἰσὶν
hdl | as here χαλεποί. And again
Eth. 8, 6, 1, ἐν δὲ τοίς στρυφνοῖς
καὶ πρεσβυτίκοις ἠττον γίνεται ἡ
φίλα, διὸν δυσκολάτεροι εἰσι
καὶ ἠττον τοῖς ὁμιλίαις χαλικυ-
ωσιν.
CAP. V.

D  Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ μοι ἐτί τοσόνδε εἰπτε· τί μέγιστον οἰεὶ ἀγαθον ἀπολελαυκέναι τοῦ πολλὴν οὐσίαν κεκτήσατε; ὁ, ἡ δ' δὲς ἵσως οὐκ ἄν πολλοὺς πείσαιμι λέγων. εὐ γὰρ ἵσθι, ἔφη, ὁ Σάκρατες, ὡς, ἕπειδάν τις ἔγνυς ἥ τοῦ οἴσθαι τελευτήσει, εἰσέρχεται αὐτῷ δέος καὶ φροντίς περὶ ὅν ἐμπροσθεν οὐκ εἰσήγη, οὐ τῇ γὰρ λεγόμενοι μῦθοι περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἀιδοὺ, ὡς τὸν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσαντα δεῖ ἐκεῖ διδόναι δίκην, καταγελαμμένοι τέως, τότε δὴ

Ch. V. — Wealth is a good thing, but a good conscience is better.

λέγων, ὑ. ὁ. ὑ. ἀκοβοῦντας. Ch. I.

teleuthtsein, this word is at once elliptical (telentan bin) and euphemistic. ‘To finish life’ avoids the use of an unlucky word, and is inspired by the same feeling which prompts the use of oi katao, or plures, to express the dead; see Antigone 75—

ἐκεὶ πλεῖον χρόνος ὅν δεὶ μ’ ἀρέσκειν τοῖς κατώ τῶν ἐνθάδε,

and, again, substitutes ἐκεῖ (see below) for Hades. Thus in B, ἐκείνα ἐκεῖσε ἀπείνει: and so in Book VI. 498 C, τὴν ἐκείνα μοιραν. In Book III. we find a remarkable acknowledgment of the use of euphemism, in the case of the word εὖθεια. 400 E, εὐθείαν, οὐχ ἡν αὐτοῖν ἐδοσαν ὑποκορίζομενοι καλοῦμεν ὡς εὐθείαν, ἀλλὰ... A similar use of εὐδαλμῶν is found in 422 E, εὐδαλμῶν εἰ, ἡν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς οἰεί...

‘You are much to be envied, if you suppose…’; cf. χρηστος, 531 B, τοὺς χρηστοὺς λέγεις τοὺς ταῖς χρηδαῖς πράγματα παρέχοντας, ‘those fine people.’ In this last instance, as also in Plato’s use of χαρίες, κομψά, γενναῖος, euphemism becomes sarcasm.

catagelamemoi teos pythoi. We shall have more to say about the μῦθοι farther on: at present let it be remarked that Cephalus takes it for granted that national legend and belief incur ridicule amongst all but the old. Reference should also be made to Book III. init. where Socrates asks the question—‘Can we expect a man to be brave and despise death who is afraid of Hades as of a place full of horrors?’ τὰς Ἀιδοὺ ἡγομένων εἶναι τε καὶ δειείς εἶναι οἶς τινὰς θανάτου ἄδει ἔστειται καὶ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις αἰρήσεσθαι πρὸ ἡττης τε καὶ δουλείας θανάτου; Socrates’ answer to the difficulty is, to compel all who speak or write of the after life to sing the praises of Hades as of a place full of enjoyment and reunion with friends.
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ

Πίνδαρος. Socrates quotes Pindar in Book II. 365 B, and refers to him in Book III. 408 C. Plato, as it has been mentioned, conceived, at any rate in Socrates' person, a violent antipathy for poets; but their words are continually on his lips. In this dialogue alone he quotes Homer in more than twenty places, Hesiod in seven, Ἀeschylus in six, Pindar in three, besides Orpheus, Museus, Archilochus, Euripides, Sophocles, Phocylides, and Simonides. And this antipathy is rather a result of rigidly working out the principles of specialization than an expression of Plato's own feeling upon the subject. But poets are accused by him of traducing the gods and the after life; in the philosophical system of the later books they are found to be imitators, and are therefore condemned, as being removed from treating of realities; and in Book X. Plato works himself up to such a pitch of indignation against their presuming to write about any subjects of which they have not a technical knowledge that he arraigns Homer and Hesiod at his dialectical bar, and bids them answer for themselves if they wish to be barely tolerated.

γλυκεία οἱ... Fr. 233.

πολύστροφον, 'full of expedients.' The mind of man is ever ready through hope to make fresh endeavours. This word is
in effect the same with that which is applied to Odysseus:

"Ανάφα μοι ἐνεκεῖ, Μοῦσα, πολύτροτον."

Inserted, inserted between participle and infinitive, shows that the action expressed by the infinitive must be preceded by that expressed by the participle: that they express, in fact, a compound but indivisible thought. Thus, ‘For money contributes to a large extent in helping a man to depart to Hades without owing anything to heaven or his fellow-man.’ See Xen. Anab. 7, 1, 4. δὲ Ἀναξιός ἐκέλευσεν αὐτὸν ἐνδιαβάλλει ἐπειτα ὅτως ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. (Where notice what precedes—Xenophon told Anaxibius that he wished to depart.) ‘But Anaxibius commanded him not to go away until he had crossed over,’ or ‘without crossing over.’

θαυμαστῶς ὥσ. Similarly ἐνθα 350 ὁ, μετὰ ἰδρώτος θαυμαστοῦ δίσου. The participle δεινοτα here is loosely constructed, and added rather as an afterthought. It should properly be qualified with a negative, and would fall thus into the sentence: ‘Money makes it possible for a man to depart to Hades without fear, as not owing,’ &c. In Greek it is very frequent to find that when once the sentence has taken a negative phase, as in the present case (μηδὲ ἐξαπατήσαι), very little care is taken to separate strictly the rest of it into its affirmative and negative parts. In this sentence the second μηδὲ belongs solely to the participle ὀφειλον, and has nothing to do with the main verb ἀπιέναι, whereas μηδὲ in the former clause qualifies ἐξαπατήσαι, the principal verb.

τὴν δικαιοσύνην. Cephalus has said that a life lived well and justly is the best passport to the other world. Socrates insists upon this point, viz. the difficulty of living a life justly, and, as is usual with him, demands a definition. ἀποδιδόναι τι. This may seem too special a case to be included in a wide definition such as that of justice; but it is to be
remembered that deposits on trust with friends were of the most frequent occurrence and of the greatest necessity in ancient times, from the absence of public funds, scarcity of reliable banks (τραπέζαι), and the few opportunities of safe investment; and, in the case of Greece, from the precarious status of many commonwealths. We have many references in Greek and Roman literature to this practice. In Herodotus 6, 86, we have the tale of Glaucus of Sparta, which turns upon the religious obligation of good faith in deposits: τὰ ἡμίσεα πάσης τῆς οὐσίας ἔχουσι σάλποντα, θέσαι παρὰ σε, εἴ τις εξεπισταμένος ἂν μοι κειμένα ἔσται παρὰ σοι σο Listening, &c. And the moral of the tale is thus expressed: οὗτος ἄγαθος, μηδὲ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ παραδόχης ἄλλο γε, ἤ ἀπατεώσων ἀποδιδόνα. See also Juv. xiii. 174—

Nullane perjuri capitís, fraudîaque nefandæ
Pœna erit?...
Spartano cuidam respondit
Pythia vates;
Haud impunitum quondam
fore, quod dubitaret
Deposítum retinere.'

Thus Pompey is made the custodian of one of the copies of Ptolemy's will when the treasury could not find room for them:

'Quum propter publicas occupatiónes (in σέραιο) poni non potuisse, apud Pompéium sunt depositæ.' Cés. B. C. 3, 10, 8.

In Quintilian, Institut. Or. an accused man, it is suggested, may explain the presence of an article seized in his house by asserting that it is 'deposita res'; 5, 13, 49: 'Cum res furtiva in domo deprehensa sit, dicat necesse est reus, aut sit ignoranti illatam, aut depositam apud se...'. And again ibid. 7, 2, 50, the distinction is drawn between 'credita' and 'deposita,' from which the latter appear to have been the more important. 'Crediti et depositi dūe sunt questiones, sed nonnunquam junctae.' In Thuc. 2, 72, Archidamus the Spartan uses the word παρακατάθηκην to describe the way in which the Plateans' city and property should be treated under the Spartans' care. ἐπειδὴ δὲ (πόλεμος) παρελθή, ἀποδόςαμεν ὑμῖν ἄν ἔν παραλάβωμεν, μεχρὶ δὲ τούδε ἔξομεν παρακατά

θῆκην. And in Xen. Hellen. 6, 1, 2, we read of Polydamas, a Thessalian, whose reputation for probity was so great that he was entrusted with the acropolis and the revenue of the Pharsalians in time of a political struggle. οὗτος ἴδοικεν καλὸς τὸ κάδωρ δεῖ ναι δοθέντα καὶ σταυρονάντας τοῖς Φάρσαλιοι παρακατέθηκον αὐτῷ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, καὶ τὰ προσδόθων ἐπέτρεψαν. See also the use of δυστύμβολος in Xenophon, Mem. 2, 6, 3; and note ad ξυμβόλων, ἕντρα Ch. VII.

'Εϊ τις λάβοι παρά φίλου ἀνδρός...

Cicero has translated this passage in De Officiis 3, 25, 95: 'Deposita non semper red
denda; si gladium quis apud te sana mente deposuerit, repetat insaniens, reddere peccatum sit...'
οὔτε χρῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποδίδοναι, οὔτε δίκαιος ἢ εἶπ
ὁ ἀποδίδοις, οὔδ᾽ αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα πάντα
Deβέλων τάλθη λέγειν. Ἔρθως, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐκ
ἀρα οὕτως ὄρος ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνης, ἀλήθει τε λέγειν
καὶ ἢ ἀν λάβῃ τις ἀποδίδοναι. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἔφη,
ὡς Ὀκρατεῖς, ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Πολέμαρχος, ἐκτέρ γε τι
χρῆ Σιμώνιδης πείθεσθαι. Καὶ κατάρτι, ἔφη ὁ Κέφαλος,
καὶ παραδίδωμι τὴν λόγον; δει γάρ με ἡδὴ τῶν

οὗτος χρῆ is balanced by οὗτε δίκαιος ἢ εἶπ, whilst οὕτω αὐτῷ, &c. is supplementary to ὁ ἀποδίδοις; 'nor again one who made a point of (ἐθέλων) telling him everything.'

καὶ μέντοι. See above note ad Cap. I. In this place there does not appear to be any adversative sense in μέντοι. Rather some phrase such as 'and now' or 'and really,' would express the meaning of Cephalus' remark. If we look below, 339 C, we find the question ὃ καὶ πείθεσθαι μέντοι τοῖς ἄρχουσι δίκαιον φῆς εἶναι; 'Do you not maintain justice to be, in fact, obedience to governors?' In this passage the whole point of the question bears upon the obedience, which Thrasybulus calls justice; because the obedience of the ruled is found sometimes to be against the interest of the rulers. Hence the word πείθεσθαι is emphasized by καὶ (καὶ is often purely emphatic), and the whole sentence by μέντοι: and the latter is adversative only in so far as it qualifies the opening sentence of an argument. The word is also found subjoined to ἄλλα, which fact confirms this supposition, that it is not always purely adversative: v. ἐνφρ. 614 B, ἄλλα οὐ μέντοι σοι, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ,

'Αλκίνου γε ἀπόλογον ἔρω. And below here, Ch. vi. inip. ἄλλα μέντοι. For καὶ emphatic see Hom. Od. II. 107, 8—

ἄλλα δὲ τετρατον ἠλθεν ετος καὶ ἐπίλυθον ἄραι,

καὶ τότε δη τις ξειτε γυναικῶν, ἢ ὀφα βδην.

et ἐνφρ. 244—5—

ἀργαλέων δὲ

ἀνδράς καὶ πλεόνεσι μαχησάσθαι περὶ δαίτι.

And see below here, Ch. X—

καὶ δ' Ὑπασύμαχος πολλάκις μὲν καὶ διαλεγομένων ἡμῶν ... and note.

With Cephalus' departure the first phase of the Dialogue comes to an end, which we may call the descriptive and uncritical. The lines of an argument have been indeed laid down, but Cephalus has declined to have anything to do with the argument: he is the representative of old Athens, orthodox in his religion and undisturbed by scepticism. He has to contemplate his own approaching dissolution, not a dissolution and reconstruction of social systems; and he leaves it to the younger men to justify beliefs by argument, while declining to enter upon the task himself.
ΠΟΔΙΤΕΙΑΣ α’.

ιερῶν ἐπιμεληθήναι. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφην ἑγώ, ὁ Πολέμαρχος τῶν γε σῶν κληρονόμος; Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ’ ὁς γελάσας καὶ ἀμα ἦε πρὸς τὰ ἰερὰ.

CAP. VI.

Δέγε δὴ, εἶπον ἑγώ, σὺ ὁ τοῦ λόγου κληρονόμος, τὶ ἔφης τὸν Σίμωνίδην λέγοντα ὁρθῶς λέγειν περὶ δικαιοσύνης; Ὅτι, ἦ δ’ ὁς, τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀποδίδοναι δίκαιον ἐστὶ τούτῳ λέγων δοκεῖ ἐμοίγε ἐκλαῖγε καλῶς λέγειν. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ’ ἑγώ, Σίμωνίδη γε οὐ

Ch. VI.—Simonides’ definition means that we ought to give every man his deserts.

τὶ ἔφης τὸν Σίμ. The principal verb here is really λέγοντα. ‘What do you maintain that Simonides said, when you say that he gave a true account of justice?’ But through a desire to give a more lengthened and connected form to the sentence, the sense is, as it were, suspended in the participle λέγοντα, and only brought to a conclusion at λέγειν; whereas it should have stopped at λέγοντα, and ὁρθῶς λέγειν should have been cast into a fresh dependent clause. See Ch. VI. init. A similar construction, subordinating the principal verb into a participle, is found in 462 A. τὶ ποτὲ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἔχομεν, οὐ δεῖ στοχασάμενον τὸν νομοβέτην τιθέναι τοὺς νόμους; where the sense is, ‘What is the best object at which our lawgiver ought to aim when he makes his laws?’ But the aiming, although the important word is subordinated grammatically to the conclusive, yet really weaker word, τιθέναι, already implied in νομοβέτην. See also Xen. Mem. 1, 2, 34. Πάτερον τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην σὺν τοῖς ὁρθῶς λεγομένοις εἶναι νομίζοντες, ἦ σὺν τοῖς μὴ ὁρθῶς, ἀπέχεσθαι κελεύετε αὐτής; i.e. ‘Do you think dialectic is on the side of that which is rightly, or wrongly spoken, that you bid me renounce it?’ Again, Xen. Anab. 7, 7, 8. καὶ οὐχ ὅτως διὰ τοῦτο καὶ εὗ πολισμάς ἀνθ’ ἐν εὕασις ἐξίους ἥμας ἀποτελεῖσθαι, ἄλλ’, &c. ‘And so far from having the grace to make us presents and repay us for benefits received, when you send us away...’ Plat. Euthyd. 289 C. ἅρ’ ἐστιν αὐτή, ἦν ἦδει κεκτημένους ἥμας εὐδαμόνας εἶναι; ‘Was this the art which we ought to have learnt, if we wanted to be happy?’ Eur. Cyc. 123, 4— ὲς εἴπειν ἄν κολίκα βουλολομην μιαν, πάτων Κυκλόπων ἀντιδοὺς Βοσκῆματα. i.e. ‘I would give all the Cyclops’ flocks, if I could drain a single cup.’ And similarly ibid. ll. 431, 453, and Rep.
πλατώνος

ῥάδιον ἀπιστεῖν σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνήρ τοῦτο μέντοι; ὦ τί ποτε λέγει, σὺ μέν, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ἵσως γυμνόσκεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἄγνωστο. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐ τούτω λέγει, ὅτερ ἀρτὶ ἐλέγομεν, τὸ τινὸς παρακαταθέμενον ἢ νυν οὐ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῦντι ἀποδιδόναι καλτοὶ γε ὁφειλόμενον ποῦ ἐστὶ τοῦτο; ὦ παρακατέθετο; ἢ γὰρ; Να. Ἀποδοτέον δὲ γε οὐδ’ ὑπωστοικτὸν τότε, ὅποτε τις μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῖ. Ἀληθῆ, ἢ δ’ ὡς. Ἀλλο δὴ τι ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὅς ἐσθική, λέγει Σιμώνιδης τὸ ὁφειλόμενα δικαίων εἰναι ἀποδιδόναι. Ἀλλο μέντοι νῦν Δί, ἐφ’ τοῖς γὰρ φίλοις

471 C. δοκεῖσ ounĭποτε μυθή-

στειαὶ δὲ ἐν τῷ πρὸ ἀπο-

σάμενος πάντα τοῖντα εἴρηκα.

In the present passage Polemar-

chus' answer shows what is the

real sense of the question, for

he tells us what Simonides

said.

σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος. So Her-

odotus calls Solon a σοφοτῆς,

1, 29. Solon, like Simonides,

embodied his wise saying in

verse: Stalbl. quotes Cicero de

Nat. Deor. 1, 22. Simonides

don solum poeta suavis, sed etiam cetero quin doctus sapiens-

que traditur. θεῖος, 'partaking

of the divine nature.' The soul

of man was regarded by Plato

as being in some degree divine.

See Book III. fin. (416 E),

ειπεῖν αὕτως δι’ θείον παρὰ θεῶν
dei ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐχουσί; as Cicero

says in De Offic. iii. 2, 44:

'Mentem suam, qua nihil homini
dedit deusipse divinum.' Plato

again, in speaking of the tem-

pitations of youth, attributes all

good resolutions and resistance

of evil to the same element;

see Book VI. 492 E. οὗτο γὰρ

γλυκεται. . . . ἀλλιών ἕνος πρὸς

ἀρετῆν παρὰ τὴν τούτων παῖδείαν

πεπαιδευμένων, ἀνθρώπειος, ἢ

ἐταίρε; θεῖον μέντοι κατά τὴν

παρομίαν ἐξαιρώμεν λόγου· εὖ

γὰρ χρὴ εἰδέναι, ὅ τι περ ἀν σωθῇ

. . . . θεοῦ μοίραν αὐτῷ σώσαι

λέγων οὐ κακῶς ἔρεις. See also

500 D. θεῖο δὴ καὶ κοσμίῳ δὲ

γε φιλόσοφοι διμιῶν κόσμος τε

καὶ θεῖος εἰς τὸ δύνατον ἀνθρώπῳ

γλυκεται. In legend we have a

gradually descending scale of
divinity from Zeus, through the

Olympian deities, the inferior

gods of heaven such as the

Hours, Hebe, Ganymede; then
gods of the earth, Dryads,

Naiads, and of the sea, Nereids;

and so on to demi-gods as

Heracles, and Sarpedon; whilst

finally such personages as Ἀσκ-

λαπίου, though mortal, obtain a

partial divinity from their asso-
ciation with gods. Such a system

Plato would explain by the pre-
sence to a greater or a less degree

of that which he calls τὸ θεῖον.

For this question see also 518

E, 546 B, 589 D, 590 D, ἐχουσίς

ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ θεῖον ἐχουσίων, where it

is equivalent to that part of the

soul called λογιστικόν.

δικαίων εἶναι, 'that justice

consists in..."
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ α'.

οὔτει ὀφείλειν τοὺς φίλους ἀγαθῶν μὲν τί δρᾶν/κακῶν δὲ μηδέν; Μανθάνω, ἵν ὁ ἐγὼ ὅτι οὐ τὰ ὀφειλ-
όμενα ἀποδίδωσιν, δὲ ἂν τῷ χρυσίον ἀποδῷ παρακα-

ταθεμένῳ, ἕως ἂν ἀπόδοσις καὶ ἡ λήψις βλαβερὰ
γεννηται, φίλοι δὲ ὀσίν ὃ τε ἀπολαμβάνων καὶ ὁ ἀποδίδοντι ὑμᾶς ὀυτῶν λέγειν φής τῶν Σιμωνίδην; Πάνω
μὲν οὖν. Τί δὲ; τοῖς ἔχθροις ἀποδοτέον, ὃ τι ἀν τύχῃ ὀφειλόμενον; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, ὃ γε ὀφει-
λεται αὐτοῖς; ὀφειλεῖται δὲ γε, οἶμαι, παρὰ γε τοῦ
ἔχθρου τῷ ἔχθρῳ, ὅπερ καὶ προσήκει, κακὸν τι.

CAP. VII.

Ἡνίξατο ἃρα, ἵν ὁ ἐγώ, ὡς έοικεν, ὁ Σιμωνίδης C
ποιητικῶς τὸ δίκαιον ὃ εἴη. διενοεῖτο μὲν γάρ, ὡς

τὰ ὀφειλόμενα. At present the
difficulty of justifying this de-


inition lies in the double mean-
ing of ὀφείλω. ὀφειλόμενον


means 'that which is owed.'


Anything therefore which is


'owed' ought to be given back.


But the word has also a moral


signification, viz. 'that which


is due' to any one. Hence in


the present sentence τὰ ὀφειλ-


όμενα is elevated to the mean-


ing 'that which is due to a man,'


not merely 'that which is owed


him.'


tοῖς ἔχθροις. Notice here


Socrates' adroitness. By an


apparently unimportant sugges-
tion he starts the wide question,


'How should we act towards


enemies?' Upon this slight


suggestion hangs the greater


part of the rest of this book.


And Polemarchus is drawn


into the discussion irresistibly;


thinking, as he does, that he


has an answer ready for the
difficulty.


CH. VII.— We find that justice


is doing good to friends and


harm to foes. But apparently


there are but few occasions on


which justice can be employed.


In this chapter Socrates draws


on Polemarchus to give a cer-
tain definition of justice, and a


further description of it; and


then proceeds to demolish the


definition and stultify the de-


scription by proofs which are
drawn from physical facts, i.e.


by analogy. These proofs are


in themselves insufficient and


unsatisfactory; it is not fair
to condemn an ethical system


because it does not fall in ana-


logically with the system of
doctoring, of cooking, and of


cobbling. But Socrates' friends


are too ignorant of the use of
words to doubt his proofs or impugn his method. And Socrates, in his conclusion, viz. that the definition of justice is unsound, is correct, although he arrives at the conclusion unfairly.

τίσιν οὖν τί... ‘What then does the art of healing give which is due and right, and to whom, that it is called the art of healing?’ Here, as above, Ch. VI. init., we have the principal verb in the participle, and the unimportant word ‘called’ thrown into its place. The question is not ‘What is the art of healing called?’ but, ‘What does it give, and to whom, to deserve the name?’

ti de oiei. oun stands at the beginning of the sentence to intimate at once that it is hypothetical; as in Antigone, 466—

... οὐ... eis, τὸν δὲ εἰμὶ μητρὸς θανὼν’ ἢ λιπτὼν ἱππό

... and so in Book II. 378 A. τά...
Τὸ τοὺς φίλους ἄρα εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐξήροις κακῶς
dικαιοσύνην λέγει; | Δοκεῖ μοι. | Τίς οὖν δυνατῶτατος
κάμνοντας φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐξήροις κακῶς πρὸς
νόσον καὶ ὦγλειαν; | Ἡματόσ. | Τίς δὲ πλέοντας πρὸς Ε
τὸν τῆς θαλάττης κινδύνου; | Κυβερνήτης. | Τὶ δὲ ὁ
dίκαιος; | ἐν τινὶ πράξει καὶ πρὸς τὶ ἔργον δυνατῶ-
tatος φίλους ὥφελεῖν καὶ ἐξήροις βλάπτειν; | Ἐν
τῷ προσπολεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμμαχεῖν, ἔμουγε δοκεῖ. |
ἐξεύ μὴ κάμνουσι γε μὴν, ὁ φίλε Πολέμαρχε, ἱατρὸς
ἀχριστός. | Ἀληθὴ. | Καὶ μὴ πλεοῦσι δὴ κυβερνήτης.
Ναι. | Ἀρα καὶ τοῖς μὴ πολεμοῦσιν ὁ δίκαιος ἀχρι-
στός; | Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο. | Χρήσιμον ἄρα καὶ
ἐν εἰρήνῃ δικαιοσύνῃ; | Χρήσιμοι. | Καὶ γὰρ γεωργία: 333

τὸ τοὺς φίλους ἄρα... The
first definition, ἀληθῆ τε λέγειν
cali καὶ ἄν λάβῃ τις ἀποδίδειν,
having been found insufficient,
a second is stated in these
words.

τὶ δὲ ὁ δίκαιος; The fallacy
is involved here of confusing a
contract with an ethical ques-
tion. The physician and pilot
are men of business, and perform
certain duties to the best of their
abilities for money; whilst a
just man is one whose actions,
as being just, are at once an
object and end in themselves.
The objective benefit of just
conduct lies more in the ex-
ample and encouragement it
affords to others.

ἐν τῷ προσπολεμεῖν... Polemarchus
falls into the trap prepared
for him, and tries to find
some ‘business’ which a just
man practises, some profession
of which he makes a study;
thereby getting involved in the
difficulty explained above.

ἄρα καὶ τοῖς μὴ πολεμοῦσιν... This
inference is perfectly lo-
gical if a just man be described
in the terms of Polemarchus’
definition. For if we state that
a just man is one who benefits
his friends, and then limit the
benefits to acting as a champion
and ally (προσπολεμεῖν καὶ ἐμ-
μαχεῖν); it follows that if there
are no disputes going on, the
just man’s province or profes-
sion does not enter into con-
sideration at all.

χρήσιμον ἄρα καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ...
Polemarchus, by agreeing to
this, repudiates his former read-
ing of his definition, ἐν τῷ
προσπολεμεῖν καὶ ἐμμαχεῖν. He
is thus forced to find some
‘produce’ of justice, because
Socrates continues to insist
upon the analogy of the arts
and manufactures, whose func-
tion is to produce some thing
or some condition of things.
Socrates, or Plato, was well
aware of what we call the
relation of things. In Book
IV. 438 B we find the words
ὅσα γε ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα ὅσα εἶναι σοι,
‘All those things of such a
nature as to have a relation to some thing.’ These words are the introduction to a disquisition upon quality and relation. Now Socrates knew that justice was concerned not with things but with the relations between things; and from the passage in Book IV. it appears that he is using this form of ἐλεγχος or disproof here only because it suits the mind of his hearer and gets rid of the bad definition.

ξυμβόλαια. Here Polemarchus is nearer to the function of justice—the model and rule for covenants and transactions. For the word compare 486 C, δό κόσμος...έαθ' δήν αν δυσζύμβολος ἡ ἄλκοις γένοτα, where δυσζ... is ‘covenant-breaker’; and 424 D, έκ δέ τούτων εἰς τὰ πρὸς ἀληθεύουσα ξυμβόλαια μείζων ἐκβαίνει; and 554 C, Ἄρ’ οὖν ὁ τούτῳ δὴν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις ξυμβολαίοις τοιοῦτοι...κατέχει ἔπιθυμημα; So in Xen. Mem. 2, 6, 3, δυσζύμβολος ἐστι, καὶ λαμβάνων μὲν ἥδετα, ἀποδιδόνα δὲ ὁ βούλεται; et infra. 5, ενθρόνιος τε καὶ εὐχύμβολος ὅτι τυχαίναι.

πεττάων. ‘Πεσοῦε ἴναι πεττοὶ non sunt tali, sed calculi; ἀτστραγαλοί tali sunt; at pessōi ψῆφοι τινες, ut constat ex Polluce libr. ix. Ludi sunt valde inter se dissimiles. Male itaque Marsilius, ‘in differendis taliis’; tali non differuntur sed jaciuntur. At pessōi disponuntur in lineis, deinède movens.’—Muretus.

The game is mentioned again in Book C, 487 B: θ' ἐπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πεττευμένων δεινῶν οἱ μὲ τελευτώτας ἀποκλείονται καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν δ' τι φέρουσιν, οὕτω καὶ οὐκ ἀποκλείσθαν ὑπὸ πεττεύασι αἰ τούτης τινὸς έτέρας οὐκ ἐν ψῆφωι ἀλλ' ἐν λόγοις, ι. e. the skilful dialectician ‘checkmates’ his opponent. The game is mentioned also in Euripides, Medea 68. Here again Polemarchus is taken through a number of special pursuits, each aiming at a direct result; and is naturally unable to discover any limited class of objects upon which justice exercises its functions. Generally speaking we might summarize the fallacy here by saying that justice regards the mode in which a thing is done, or, as above, the relation of those concerned in it, rather than the action itself and its results.
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ α’.

κοινωνός τού οίκοδομικού; {Ούδαμως. Ἀλλ’
δὴ κοινωνίαν ὁ δίκαιος ἀμείλουν κοινωνός τοῦ κιθαρι-
στικοῦ, ὡσπερ ὁ κιθαριστικός τοῦ δίκαιου εἰς κρου-
μάτων; {Εἰς ἀργυρίου, ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ. Πλὴν γ’ ἵσως,
ὡς Πολέμαρχε, πρὸς τὸ χρήσθαι ἀργυρίῳ, ὅταν δὴν
ἀργυρίου κοινῇ πρίασθαι ἢ ἀποδῦσθαι ὑπὸν’ τότε θέ
δε, ὡς ἑγὼ οἴμαι, ὁ ἵππικος’ ἡ γάρ; Φαίνεται. Καὶ
μὴν ὅταν γε πλούον, ὁ ναυπηγὸς ἢ ὁ κυβερνήτης.

Εἰσικεν. Ὡς ὅταν τι δὴν ἀργυρίῳ ἡ χρυσά ὁ κυβερνήτης
χρήσθαι, ὁ δίκαιος χρησίμωτερος τῶν ἄλλων; Ὁταν
παρακαταθέσαι καὶ σῶν εἰναι, ὡς Ἑκάτρες. Ὁ ὄκοιος
λέγει, ὅταν μηδὲν δὴν αὐτῷ χρήσθαι ἄλλα κείσαι;
Πάνυ γε. Ὡς ὅταν ἀρά ἀρχηστον ὡς ἀργυρίου, τότε

eis ἀργυρίου. Polemarchus
thus driven into a corner falls
back upon that case, mentioned
above (see note ad Cap. V.
ἀναφοράντα τι where the services
of another are required to guard
a deposit, a case of very frequent
occurrence, but entirely inadequate
for purposes of definition.
καὶ μὴν. v. s. note ad Cap. II.
tί δὲν... χρήσθαι. This verb
takes accusative of the purpose
or object, and dative of the
means employed. See Ar. Ach.
arnians 935, τί χρήσται τοι’
αὐτῷ; and Nubes 22, τί ἐχρή-
σάμην; Equit. 1183, καὶ τὶ
τοῦτοι χρήσαμεν τοῖς ἐντέροις;
Plat. Euthyd. 287 C, οὐκ ἔχω
ὁ τί χρήσαμοι τοῖς λόγοις; Xen.
Anab. 7, 2, 31, Ξενοφών ἔπικα
Σειθυν ὧ τὶ δέοντο χρῆσαι τῇ
στρατῷ. And so here ἒνεσα,
ὁταν μηδὲν δὲν αὐτῷ χρῆσαι.

ἀλλὰ κείσαι. Notice the in-
stantaneous change of ἄργυριον
here from object to subject.
See Homer, Il. I, 218—
ἀς κε θεοὶς ἐπιστεϊθηται, μᾶλα
τ’ ἐκλυν αὐτοῦ.

Here the subject, ἂς, never
reaches its verb, but is changed
into an object, αὐτῶ, before its
own construction is complete.
Such abruptness is characteristic
of the Greek language, and seldom
finds a place in Latin;
for where it does occur we shall
probably be right in attributing
it to the influence of Greek
literature; e.g. Virg. Æn. 5,
773—
‘Tres Eryci vitulos, et Tem-
pestatibus aignum
Caedere deinde jubet, solvique
ex ordine funem.’
Again ibid. iii. 60—
‘Omnibus idem animus, scele-
rata excedere terra,
Linqui pollutum hospitium,
et dare classibus Austros.’
And vii. 468—
‘Jubet arma parari
Tutari Italiam, detrudere fin-
ibus hostem.’
But in these passages the change
of subject lessens the abrupt-
ness of the change of construction.
Δχρήσιμος ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἡ δικαιοσύνη: Κινδυνεύει. Καὶ
ὅταν δὴ δρέπανον δὲν φυλάττειν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη χρη-
σιμος καὶ κοινὴ καὶ ἰδία. ὅταν δὲ χρήσθαι, ἡ ἄμπε-
λαυργηκή; Φάλνεται. Φήσεις δὲ καὶ ἀσθίδα καὶ
λύραν ὅταν δὲν φυλάττειν καὶ μηδὲν χρήσθαι, χρη-
σιμον εἶναι τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ὅταν δὲ χρήσθαι, τὴν
ὀπλιτικὴν καὶ τὴν μονοκικήν; Ἀνάγκη. Καὶ περὶ
tάλαλα δὴ πάντα ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐκάστου ἐν μὲν χρήσει
ἀχρηστὸς, ἐν δὲ ἀχρηστίᾳ χρῆσιμος; Κινδυνεύει.

CAP. VIII.

Ε ὡς ἄν οὖν, ὦ φίλε, παντὸς τῶν σπουδαίων εἰς ἡ
diκαιοσύνης, εἰ πρὸς τὰ ἀχρηστὰ χρῆσιμον ὅν τυγχα-
νει. τόδε δὲ σκεψάμεθα. ἂρ’ οὖχ ὁ πατάξαι δεινό-
tatoς ἐν μάχῃ εἰτὲ πυκτικῇ εἰτὲ τινὶ καὶ ἄλλης, οὕτως
καὶ φυλάξασθαι; Πάνω γε. ἂρ’ οὖν καὶ νόσον

teil τάλαλα δὴ πάντα. δὴ is here conclusive, as it is in com-
bination with καὶ δὴ καὶ, see above Ch. II. init. but with καὶ
alone, καὶ δὴ τεθνας, ‘Well
then they are dead’; i.e. suppose
them dead, Eur. Med. 386, καὶ δὴ
λέγω σοι, Soph. Ant. 245, δὴ
assents. See 361 E, note.

Ch. VIII.—But we may make
a mistake between friend and
foe. Therefore justice would be
better defined as benefiting our
real friends and harming our:
real enemies.

ἀρ’ οὖν καὶ νόσον, &c. The
original reading here of most
of the MSS. is φυλάξασθαι καὶ
λαθεῖν, οὕτως δεινότατος καὶ ἐμ-
ποιήσαι. Muretus was for remov-
ing καὶ λαθεῖν altogether, as
‘absurdum planeque obscurum,
although the latter epithet
hardly implies a reason for
removing the words. Bekker,
from a MS., substituted καὶ μὴ
παθεῖν, in which he was followed
by Stallbaum; a substitution
which cuts the knot rather than
unties it. Faesi’s defence of
the vulgate is mainly agreed
to by Boeckh, Wiegand, and
apparently at one time by C. F.
Hermann, from whose recension
the text is taken; it is as
follows, ‘cavere sibi a morbo
morbumque fallere (aut devitare,
ae latere ne te capiat).’ Stall-
baum, from whose note the
above facts are taken, points
out with justice that the notion
of λαθεῖν, secrecy, is required
in the latter part of the sentence,
for we have below the good
custodian of the camp represented as δεινός κλέφαι, and again in the conclusion of the whole matter the just man, i.e. the good custodian, turns out to be a good thief. λαθεῖν then must be transferred to the latter part of the sentence. And the best codices remove καὶ altogether from between δεινότατος and ἐμποιήσας. Thus far for destructive criticism. But it is evident that the construction of the words καὶ λαθεῖν οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμποιήσας conveys no meaning at all. And the fault in the sentence is also evident; viz. the want of a participle to combine with λαθεῖν. If we are right in our destruction of the vulgate, there can be no doubt about the meaning which this latter clause should convey; viz. (‘The man who is clever at protecting himself from disease) is the very man who is cleverest at secretly inflicting it upon others.’ Stallbaum whilst acknowledging this requirement of the text, retains the reading which involves this want of construction; although he has satisfied himself, ‘sinse ullā dubitatione,’ that we should write ἐμποιήσας for ἐμποιήσας. The conjecture is very happy, involves the smallest possible alteration of the text, and may very fitly stand until challenged by a better.

δὲ γὰρ ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, v. s. note ad Cap. VII. εἰ τι δὲ ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς εἰρημένοις.
καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι... See Od. 19, 395. (Avtolukos)—
Μητρὸς ἐγὼ πάτερ’ ἔσθαλν διὶ ἀνδρώπουν ἐκέκαστο
Κλεπτοσύνη θ’ ἄρκει τε.
It is but fair to the poet to quote the lines which follow—
θεῶς δὲ οἱ αὐτὸς ἔθεκεν Ἐρμῆς τῷ γαρ κεχαρισμένα μὴρια καὶ εἰν
‘Ἀρμὸν ἥδ’ ἔρφων.
In this conclusion of Socrates we have an expression of that hostility which Plato felt towards poets who represented the gods as immoral. We cannot palliate the fact that fraud and deception commanded admiration in the Homeric age, provided success followed their employment. But we must couple with this fact another, viz. that this deception was directed against foes, and that a semi-barbarous age compelled recourse
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

Β σεως προς μητρός πάππον Αὐτόλυκον ἀγαπᾷ τε καὶ φησιν αὐτὸν πάντας ἀνθρώπους κεκάσθαι κλεπτοσύνης θ' ὁρκῷ τε. ἔοικεν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ κατὰ σὲ καὶ καθ' ὁμήρων καὶ κατὰ Συμωνιδὴν κλεπτική τις εἶναι, ἔπ' ὄφελεῖα μεντοι τῶν φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ βλάβη τῶν ἔχθρων; οὐχ οὖτως ἐλεγεῖς; Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δ', ἔφη, ἀλλ' οὐκέτι οὐδα ἐγώγε ο τι ἔλεγον τοῦτο μέντοι ἐμοῦγε δοκεῖ ἐτι, ὄφελεῖν μὲν τῶν φίλων ἡ δικαιοσύνη, βλάπτειν δὲ τῶν ἔχθρων. Φίλους δὲ Κλέγεις εἶναι πότερον τοὺς δοκούντας ἐκάστῳ χρηστοὺς εἶναι, ἢ τοὺς ὄντας, καὶ μη δοκῶσι καὶ ἔχθροις ὑπαύτως; Εἰκός μὲν, ἔφη, οὐς ἂν τις ἤγγιζε χρηστοὺς, φιλεῖν, οὗς δὲ ἄν πονηρους, μισεῖν. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ἀμαρτάνουσιν οἱ ἀνθρώποι περὶ τοῦτο, ὡστε
to many shameful acts, the prime object of which was self-preservation on the part of the perpetrator.

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δ', ἔφη, &c. Socrates' method, here exhibited at length, is described lower down by Thrasymachus thus: 'He will take care not to answer himself, but make the other person answer, then seize his words, and so confute them.' 337 E. This charge is true, for Socrates' method as above described was eliminative, viz. to discover the true by getting rid of the false or the vague. In this part of the Dialogue he is destroying popular ideas of justice, which are vague and insufficient: hence he draws Polemarchus on to give his ideas full expression and convince him of their insufficiency. In 348 B Socrates gives a reason for his method. He says, 'It is no use for us to make orations and each sum up the points in his favour, because, in such a case, we shall need a jury to decide; whereas if we pursue the system of question and answer, we shall be barristers and jurymen at one and the same time.' In Book VI. Adeimantus, as it has been mentioned above, compares Socrates' method to that of a good chess-player, whose opponent does not understand the gist of his moves, but suddenly finds himself, at the end of the game, in a predicament.

πότερον τοὺς δοκούντας... The same distinction is drawn lower down, Ch. XIII., in the argument with Thrasymachus, between that which is, and that which is thought to be, to the advantage of the stronger. So Madame de Sévigné calls attention to this distinction, beginning one of her letters: 'Comment-vous portez-vous? Comment croyez-vous vous porter?' &c.

οὐχ ἀμαρτάνουσιν... See Ch.


ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ α'.

δικείν αυτοίς πολλοὺς μὲν χρηστούς εἶναι μὴ ὤντας, πολλοὺς δὲ τούναντίον; Ἂμαρτάνουσιν. Τούτοις ἀρα οἱ μὲν ἄγαθοι ἔχοντο, οἱ δὲ κακοὶ φίλοι; Πάνυ γε. Ἀλλ' ὁμος δίκαιον τότε τούτοις, τοὺς μὲν πονηροὺς ὧφελείν, τοὺς δὲ ἄγαθους βλάπτειν. Φαινείται. Ἀλλ' μὴν οἱ γε ἄγαθοι δίκαιοι τε καὶ οἴοι μὴ ἀδικείν.

Ἀληθῆ. Κατὰ δὲ τὸν σὸν λόγον τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας δίκαιον κακῶς ποιεῖν. Μηδαμῶς, ἕφη, ὁ Ἄλκατρας. πονηρὸς γὰρ ἐστιν εἰναι ὁ λόγος. Τοὺς δὲ δίκους ἀρα, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, δίκαιον βλάπτειν, τοὺς δὲ δικαίους ὧφελείν. Οὔτος ἐκείνου καλλίους φαίνεται.

Πολλοὺς ἀρα, ὁ Πολέμαρχος, ἐξεμβηκείται, ὅσοι διημαρτηκαίτις τῶν ἀνθρώπων, δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς μὲν φίλους βλάπτειν; πονηρὸι γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσὶν τοὺς δ' ἔχοντας ἐφ' ὧφελείν ἀγαθὸν γάρ καὶ οὕτως ἐρούμεν αὐτὸ τούναντίον ἡ τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἐφάμεν λέγειν. Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη, οὕτως ἐξεμβαίνει. Ἀλλὰ μεταβὰμεθα: κινδυνεύομεν γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὸν φίλον καὶ ἐχθρὸν θέσθαι. Πῶς θέμενοι, ὁ Πολέμαρχος; Ἰὸν δοκοῦντα χρηστον, τοῦτον φίλον εἶναι. Νῦν δὲ πώς; ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, μεταβῶμεθα; Τὸν δοκοῦντά τε, ἢ δ' ὅσ, καὶ τὸν ὄντα χρηστὸν

XIII. Πότερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοι εἰσίν οἱ ἄρχοντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεις ἐκάσταις ἢ οἷς τι καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν;

τότε, 'in that case,' as we had above, Ch. III., νῦν δε, 'whilst as facts are'; and in Ch. II. εἰ μὲν...νῦν δὲ.

πονηρὸς...ὁ λόγος, v. s. note αδ εἰ μὲν τι δὲι ἀκολούθειν...

Ch. VII. The use of πονηρός implies a sort of maliciousness or perversity in the argument, just as Euthyphro complains to Socrates that the words will keep coming round again to the same point from which they started. Euthyphro, II B. Ἀλλ',

ὁ Ἀλκατρας, οὐκ ἔχων ἔγωγε διότι σοι εἰκὼ δ λοῦν περιερχεται γάρ πως ἡμὶν δεὶ δ ἀν προβάμεθα, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν διότι τὸν ἰδρυσάμεθα αὐτό.

δοσί διημαρτήκασι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Stallb. compares Phædr. 257 D, τὸν ἑαυτόν συνεχῶν διαμαρτάνεις, which sets any doubt about this passage at rest. Heindorf, on the Phædrus, had already compared this passage of the Republic.

τὸν δοκοῦντα τε, &c. 'By distinguishing the apparently and the really good friend.'


335 φίλον τόν δε δοκοῦντα μέν, οντα δε μη, δοκεῖν ἀλλὰ μη· εἶναι φίλον· καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ δε ἡ αὐτή θέσης.

Φίλος μὲν δὴ, ως ἔσοκε, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ὁ ἄγαθος ἐσται, ἐχθρός δὲ ὁ πονηρός. Ναὶ.(Κελεύεις δὴ ἡμᾶς προσθεῖναι τῷ δικαίῳ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες δίκαιον εἶναι τὸν μὲν φίλον εὖ ποιεῖν, τὸν δὲ ἐχθρὸν κακῶς· νῦν πρὸς τούτῳ ὃδε λέγειν, ὧτι ἐστὶ δίκαιον τὸν μὲν φίλον ἄγαθὸν δοντα εὐ ποιεῖν, τὸν δὲ ἐχθρὸν κακῶν δοντα βλάπτειν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, Βούτως αὖ μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

CAP. IX.

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"Εστιν ἃρα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, δικαίων ἄνδρος βλάπτειν καὶ οὐκιόν ἄνδροτων· Καὶ πάνυ γε, ἐφη, τοὺς γε πονηροὺς τε καὶ ἐχθροὺς δεῖ βλάπτειν. Βλαπτόμενοι δ' ὑποί βελτίως ἢ χειρός γίγνονται; Ἡχειρώς.

Ἀρα εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν ἀρετήν, ἢ εἰς τὴν τῶν ὑπτων; Εἰς τὴν τῶν ὑπτων. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ κύνες βλαπτόμενοι χειρός γίγνονται εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν.

Φίλος μὲν δὴ...κελεύεις δή... 'You conclude then that the good man,' &c., and 'Finally you would have us add...'

προσθέειν τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ... A curious ellipse. We must supply πλέον, not ἀλλ', for at first the statement was unqualified. The notion of comparison, or greater extent, is implied in the preposition πρὸς. So μᾶλλον is omitted, II, i, ii7—

βούτως εὖ

γεγένα τὸν σὸν ἡμεναι, ἢ ἄπο-

λέσθαι.

Lysias 171, 5, ζητοῦσι κερδα-

νειν ἢ ἡμᾶς πείθειν.

νῦν πρὸς τούτῳ δδε λέγειν...

Xenophon, Mem. 2, 3, 14, 80

far depreciates the character of Socrates as to make him lay down this rule of retaliation himself. καὶ μὴν πλεῖστον γε δοκεῖ ἄνηρ ἐπαλνου ἄξιον εἰναι, δε

ἀν φθαρν τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους κακῶς ποιῶν τους δὲ φίλους εὐρηγετῶν, showing thereby how far below Plato's was his knowl-

dedge of Socrates.

CH. IX.—But good men do no harm to any one.

ἀρα εἰς τὴν... This qualification restricts the injury to the proper nature of the sufferer; and shows that it is the most telling and deleterious possible.
In the time of the cruelties of the Thirty, Socrates spoke out against ill-treatment of our fellow man thus: ἔτι δὲ θανατωτότερον (sc. than the herdsman ill-treating his flock with impunity) εἰς τὸν προστάτην γεννεών πόλεως, καὶ ποιῶν τοὺς πολίτας ἐλάττους καὶ κελέτους, μὴ ἀδικήσεται. 

ἀλλ’ ἡ δικαιοσύνη. It must be noticed above that the question is not ‘Is it right that any one should harm another?’ but ‘Is it right that a just man should harm any one?’ Then δικαιοσύνη is adroitly introduced as that human ἀρετὴ upon which any harm done will take effect; thus bringing about the telling conclusion that for a just man to harm another is an unnatural action, and, in fact, a moral impossibility. Looking back upon this piece of reasoning, it must be impugned, upon logical grounds, as again merely resting on analogy. But to consider the argument broadly: first let us grant that Socrates by βλάπτω means the physical equivalent of ἀδικώ. Then we must translate βλάπτω by ‘hurt wantonly,’ not merely ‘hurt’; because if we strike a horse or a dog it may be for his good, and instead of depreciating his ‘powers’ (ἀρετῆ) improve them. Then, if by βλάπτω he means ‘to treat wantonly,’ we shall thoroughly agree with Socrates that all creatures treated thus have their powers diverted towards resentment and retaliation, instead of keeping them concentrated upon useful and healthy action. So we speak of ‘vice’ in horses (to carry out Socrates’ illustration), which is often the result of wanton ill-treatment. And so in the moral sphere. If a person is wantonly injured (ἀδικεῖται), the injury not only breeds in him a desire to be revenged upon the perpetrator, but lowers his general sense of justice, by making him think worse of his fellow-man.

ἀμοῦσως. This word means here ‘unmusical’ or ‘uneducated,’ devoid of μουσική. In Book III. 411 D, the result of practising gymnastic to the exclusion of music is said to render a man μισόλαγος καὶ ἀμοῦσως, i.e. ‘opposed to intellectual exercise,’ and ἀμοῦσως is ‘un-intellectual.’ A third sense arises from this meaning, the positive sense of ‘vulgar,’ or ‘wanting taste,’ which appears in the word ἀμοῦσια; v. i. i. i. 403 C. ὕψων ἀμοῦσιας καὶ ἀπειροκαλίας ὑφίστανται. So Aulusius ad Symmachum: ‘Dein cogitans mecum non illud Catullianum, “Cui dono lepidum et novum libellum!” sed ἀμοῦσωτερον
et verius; “Cui dono illepidum, rudem libellum?”. 

ἐργον, ‘function,’ or, more objectively, ‘use.’ We have three divisions of things possessing ἔργα in the Republic.

i. Abstractions, as in the present passage, ‘The function or property of heat.’

ii. The arts, ν. ἱστρ. 346 D. καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πάντα (τέχναι) οὕτω τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκάστῳ ἐργῷ ἐργάζεται καὶ ὡφελεῖ ἑκείνῳ ἐφ᾽ ὧ τέτακται...

iii. Individuals, ἱστρ. 352 E. καὶ μοι λέγει δοκεῖ τί σοι εἶναι ἵππου ἔργον.

The definition of ἔργον is to be found in the context of the last passage quoted: “Ἀρ’ οὖν τούτῳ ἀν θείᾳ καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου δυνοῦν ἔργον, ὦ ἂν ἡ μόνη ἑκείνῳ ποῖη τις ἡ ἄστα; This principle forms the groundwork of the State which is to be created; thus Book V. 453 B. αὐτὸ γὰρ ἐν δραχῇ τῆς κατοικίας, ἢν φιλέτε πόλιν, ὁμολογεῖτε δεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκαστὸν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ πρᾶττειν. The expression κατὰ φύσιν must be noticed; it covers the case of individuals; because to do uncongenial work, however well, is not strictly an ἔργον. Aristotle describes the ἔργον of man as that, in the exercise of which lies a man’s well-being physical and moral: αὐλητὴ καὶ ἄγαλματοποιωρ καὶ πάντι τεχνητή, καὶ διὸς ἄν ἐστιν ἔργον τι καὶ πρέξιν, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ ἄλγαν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ. He then defines it more distinctly as, ὡς πρακτική τίς τούτων ἔχουσα, or finally, ψυχῆς ἐνεργεία κατὰ λόγον.—Nic. Eth. 1, 7, 10—14. Ἐργον in short is exercise of faculties.

ο δὲ γε δίκαιως ἀγαθός. ‘And the just man I suppose comes under the head of “good”?’

 νοεῖ, ‘means,’ ‘signifies,’ see Euthydemos, 287 D, where an eristic quibble is set up on the expression νοεῖ τὸ ρῆμα, ‘the word means.’
δικαίον ἀνδρός, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις οὐφέλειαν, οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς ὁ ταύτα εἰπὼν· οὐ γὰρ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγεν (οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ δίκαιον οὐδένα ἡμῖν ἔφανη ὃν βλάπτειν.) Συγχωρῶ, ἢ δ' ὃς, ἢ Μαχούμεθα ἄρα, ἢ δ' ἐγώ, κοινῆ ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ ἕαν τίς αὐτὸ φῆ ἡ Σιμωνίδη ἡ Βιάντα ἡ Πιττακὸν εἰρηκέναι ἢ τιν' ἄλλον τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακραίων ἀνδρῶν. 'Εγὼν οὖν, ἐφτη, ἐστοιμός εἰμι κοινωνεῖν τῆς μάχης. Ἄλλ' οὖσθα, ἢ δ' ἐγώ, οὔ μοι 336 δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ῥήμα τὸ φάναι δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς μὲν φίλους οὐφέλειν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς, βλάπτειν; Τίνος; ἐφη. Οἶμαι αὐτὸ Περιάνδρου εἶναι ἢ Περδίκκου ἢ Ξέρβου ἢ Ἰσμηνίου τοῦ Θηβαίου ἢ τινὸς ἄλλου μέγα οἰκείου δύνασθαι πλουσίον ἀνδρός. Ἀληθέστατα, ἐφη, λέγεις. Ἔλεν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ ἐπείδη δὲ οὐδὲ τούτο ἐφανε ἢ δικαίοσύνη ὅν οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον, τί ἄν ἄλλο τις αὐτὸ φαίνει εἶναι.

οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ... δίκαιον... ὅν, predicate; οὐδένα, object. οὐδαμοῦ, 'in the case of no man.'

ἐγὼ τε καὶ σύ. Perhaps the best example of this identification of his companion with himself in the discovery of truth is found in Book IV. 432, where Socrates has started with the discovery of temperance, wisdom and courage, and proceeds to find justice by eliminating the other three. 'Now, Glaucôn, like hunters, we must surround the thicket, and beware lest the object of our search escape us. Be zealous then and look carefully, and tell me if you see it first,' &c. For this expression of uncompromising hostility against false morals, see his opinion, not less uncompromising, on religious beliefs, Book II. 380 B. κακῶν δὲ αὐτῶν φάναι θεόν τινι γλυνεσθαι ἄγαθον ἄτα.

διαμαχητέων παντὶ τρόπῳ μῆτε τινά λέγειν ταύτα ἐν τῇ αὐτοῖ ἐπολεῖ, μῆτε τινὰ ἅκολευν.

οἶμαι αὐτὸ Περιάνδρου... Plato's contempt for this maxim may be gauged by the fact that he attributes it to tyrants: for whom he had the liveliest detestation. See Argument of the Dialogue, Books IX., X. For Periander, tyrant of Corinth, see Herod. 3, 48, segg.; and 8, 137, segg. for Perdiccas, tyrant of Macedonia. For Ismenius of Thebes, see Xen. Hell. 3, 5, i.

οὐδὲ... ἡ δικαιοσύνη... οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον. Similarly Plato distinguishes between δ τυραννος and τυραννος in Book IX. See Argument, and note, p. 90. δικαιοσύνη is the General or Ἴδεα, under which τὸ δίκαιον, i.e. individual cases of justice, are included.
Καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος πολλάκις μὲν καὶ διαλέγομένων ἡμῶν μεταξὺ ὄρμα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου, ἔπειτα ὑπὸ τῶν παρακαθημένων διεκολύετο βουλομένων διακοῦσαι τὸν λόγον ὡς δὲ διεπαυσάμεθα καὶ ἐγὼ ταῦτα ἐπον, οὐκέτι ἴσως Ἰησοῦν ἢγεν, ἀλλὰ συστρέφας ἐαυτὸν ὥσπερ θηρίον ἢκεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ὡς

Ch. X.—Thrasymachus interposes violently; and asks why they do not discuss the question seriously.

καὶ διάλεγ. καὶ emphatic, 'even whilst we had been talking,' as in 582 B. μάλλον δὲ καὶ προθυμούμενον οὐ βάδιον (γε-νόσθαι). 'On the contrary, it is a hard matter even for one who is jealous.' The particle is employed in a similar way above, Ch. III. καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ δὴ καὶ ζωοκλεῖ; but it is more emphatic here, the coordinate clause being introduced merely by δὲ (ὡς δὲ διεπαυσάμεθα), much weaker than καὶ δὴ καὶ which introduces the second clause of the example above. See Ch. V. not. ad καὶ μέντοι.

ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. See not. c. i. ad μον...αληθινὸς τοῦ ἰματίου. Ἀντὶ here, as in similar verbs, ἀντέχομαι, e.g. implies that the object caught hold of is entirely distinct and separate from the person who catches hold of it: and communicates the idea of aggression in the present passage. See Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 618, Obs. 1, 3rd ed. 'As a general rule the compounds of ἀντὶ take a dative, as conveying a notion of hostility.'

ἔπειτα, the middle point of the sequence, introduced by μέν and concluding with δὲ.

διακοῦσαι. Note force of δι, 'hear it out.'

θηρίον. We see here a reference to a hunt, from which Socrates draws many similes and metaphors; v. infr. Book IV. 432, quoted above: κυνηγέτας θάμοιν περίστασαί. Euthyphro 13α, et passim. Socrates arrives at the conclusion how to combine courage and gentleness in the warriors of his city, by a reference to the fact that those traits coexist in hounds. Book II. 375 C. For συστρέφας we may compare the metaphor ἐφεις τὸν λέωντα, infr. Ch. XV., where Thrasymachus is the λέων. Another word involving a metaphor from the sphere of hunting is ἄγριαιν, 'to behave like a wild beast.' See infr. ἄγριαιν-νεσθαι; and Book VI. 501 Ε. ἔτι οὖν ἄγριαινοι λεγόντων ἡμῶν... From this metaphor another is drawn, viz. the process of 'taming' a person, as in Book II. Ch. II. init. Thrasymachus is said to have been 'tamed' by Socrates: this metaphor is of the most frequent occurrence, as will be noticed there.
διαρπασόμενος. καὶ ἐγώ τε καὶ ὁ Πολέμαρχος δεί-
σαντες διεπτοῆθημεν' ὁ δ' εἰς τὸ μέσον φθεγξάμενος
Τίς, ἔφη, ἢ μᾶς πάλαι φλυαρία ἔχει, ὁ Σώκρατες; οὐ
καὶ τί εὑρίζεσθε πρὸς ἀλλήλους ύποκατακλινό-
μενοι ύμῖν αὐτοῖς; ἄλλ' εἰπερ ὡς ἀληθῶς βουλεῖ
εἰδέναι τὸ δίκαιον ὅ τι ἐστί, μη μονὸν ἑρώτα μηδὲ
φιλοτιμοῦ ἐλέγχων, ἐπειδὰν τὶς τι ἀποκρίνεται,
ἐγνωκὼς τούτο, ὅτι ὅριον ἐρωτῶν ἢ ἀποκρίνεσθαι,
ἄλλα καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπόκριναι καὶ εἰπέ, τι φής εἶναι τὸ

eis μέσον φθεγξ. So Herod.
3, 62, προσγέφωε στὰς ἐς μέσον
tα ἑπταλείμανα. And v. s. ποτ. άρνησις
ad Cap. II. ἐκαταζέμεθα...παρ'
αὐτόν.

ὕμιν αὐτοῖς, reflexive for reci-
procal 'each other.' For see
below ὑποκατακλίνεσθαι ἀλλή-
λοις. The word ὑποκατακλι
means 'retiring in turn,' and
expresses the motions of a pair
of dancers, to whom Thrasymus
chus derisively likens Socrates
and Polemarchus. Such dancers
were ordinarily employed to
amuse guests at a banquet from
Homeric times. See Hom. II.
18, 605; Od. 4, 15. In Od.
8, 378, we have the equivalent
of ὑποκατακλι.

Ἀρχείον δὴ ἐπείτα ποτὶ
χθόνι πολυνθοτήρη
ταρφέ' ἀμειβομένῳ
where ἀμειβομένῳ exactly ex-
presses the alternate advance
and retirement of the two per-
formers. Although Thrasymus-
chus compares Socrates to a
public juggler, it will be seen
in the course of his conversation
that he is very anxious to ex-
hibit his own rhetorical powers.
Thus ιν. Thes. 338 Α, ὁ Ἐρασ-
μάχος φανερὸς ἡν ἐπιθυμῶν εἰπεῖν,
ἐν ντικακισθεὶσιν.

μηδὲ φιλόι, ἐλέγχ. &c. 'And
do not be anxious to distinguish
yourself in disproving every-
thing that a person says.' ἐπειδὰν
&c. must be taken closely with
ἐλέγχων.

ἄλλα καὶ αὐτὸς ἀποκρ. This
is exactly what Socrates could
not be brought to do; he dis-
claimed all knowledge, which
relieved him from the onus of
construction, and persisted in
showing the incorrectness of po-
pular beliefs, theories, language,
and morality. In many cases
we may believe that he had
actually no settled account to
give at once of the large ques-
tions which he used to discuss,
and that he really derived in-
struction and assistance from
demolishing the mistaken no-
tions of other people. It has
been pointed out in the Intro-
duction that, as this Dialogue
proceeds, Socrates is induced to
launch out into construction;
but it is at the urgent request of
Glaucon and Adeimantus,
who in Book II. init. evince
a feeling of perplexity at the pro-
sperity of the wicked, and a sin-
cere desire to hear of a solution
to the troublesome paradox,
that the gods are good and the wicked
are prosperous. But Thrasymus-
chus asks, and asks in vain.
δικαίον· καὶ ὅπως μοι μὴ ἐρεῖσ, ὅτι τὸ δέον ἐστὶν ἡμᾶς· ἐτὶ τὸ ἀφελέμον μὴ· ὅτι τὸ λυσιτελοῦν μὴ· ὅτι τὸ κερδάλεον μὴ· ὅτι τὸ χυμιφέρου, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς μοι καὶ ἀκριβῶς λέγε· ὅτι ήν ἑνὸς ὁγον Ῥοτείδεικτο νόμον, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς μοι καὶ ἀκριβῶς λέγε· ὅτι ἑνὸς ἑφαρμοί· καὶ ἐγὼ ἰκοῦσας ἐξεπλάγην· καὶ προσβλέπων· καὶ ἴκοῦσας εἰσαγαγεῖν· καὶ προσβλέπων· αὐτῶν· ἐφαρμοί· ἑτερῖς· ἐφαρμοί· ἵππευς· ἵππευς· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.

ἔρχετο ἐξαγριαίνεσθαι, προσβέβλεψα· αὐτῶν· πρότεροι.· ὡς· αὐτῶς· ὅτι· ἤγερ· ἵππευς· ἵππευς· ἵππευς· ἵππευς.

Σο 480, ὑπερ.· ἄλλα· ὅπως· ἀνὴρ· ἰσος.· Μενο. 77 Α.:· ἄλλα· ὅπως· μὴ· ὅβι· ὅσοι· τῇ· ἄνω· ἤγερ· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.· ἵππευς.
ποίων τοὺς πολίτας ἔλαττος καὶ
χείρων, μὴ αἰσχύνεται, μηδὲ
οὔτε κακός εἶναι προστάτης τῆς
πόλεως. And ἵστρ. Ch. VII. fin.
ἀπατεών δὲ ἐκδείει οὐ μικρὸν μὲν,
εἰ τις ἀργύριον ἢ σκεῦος παρὰ τοῦ
πειθα λαβὼν ἀποτεροῦσα, πολὺ
dὲ μεγίστον, δοτὶ μηθεῦσι άξιους
όν ἐξηπαθήσει, πείθων ὡς ἰκανὸς
εἶσ τῆς πόλεως ἡγεῖσθαι. And
again, Book 2, 4, 2, καὶ γὰρ
οἰκίας καὶ ἀγροὺς καὶ ἀνδράποδα
καὶ βοσκῆματα καὶ σκεύη κτωμέ-
νους τε ἐπιμελῶς ὅραν ἔφη, καὶ
tὰ δυτα σωζέσ τε πειρωμένους φίλον
dὲ, ὃ μέγιστον ἀγάθῳ εἶναι φασιν
ὅραν ἔφη τοὺς πολλοὺς οὕτε ἐκεῖνο
κτήσονται φροντίζοντας, οὕτε ἐκεῖνο
οἱ δυτεὶς ἀντοῖς σώζονται.
ἐπειθ', 'in that case,' 'in
such a case as that.' This
particle generally emphasizes
the connexion of one sentence
with another in a sequence, see
above this Ch. ἵστρ. ἐπειτα ὧν
tῶν... But, as here, it some-
times stands more as a powerful
demonstrative, although still
retaining the sequential force
in part. This sequential force
is logical rather than temporal,
as Conington points out when
he compares the use of preterea
with ἔστιν. Virg. Ἀen. 1, 49—

'Et quisquam numen Junonis
adorat
Preterea?'

And cf. Od. 2, 275—

εἰ δ' οὗ κείνου γ' ἐστι νόμος καὶ
Πηνελοπεῖης,
οὐ σὲγ' ἔστιν ἔστιν τελευ-
τήσει καὶ μενοινάς.

Δεινῶν. Δείνος by itself bears
the secondary sense of 'clever,'
which it gains through the no-
tion that great cleverness strikes
awe into those who witness it.
Thus 'wonderfully clever' would
more nearly express the exact
meaning. In his description of
a chariot race in the Electra,
Sophocles, with the complacency
of one who praises his audience,
speaks thus:—

γνώς δ' οὗς Ἀθηνῶν δείνος
ἡμοστράφως
ἐξω παραστὰ κανωκωθεῖ...
Καὶ δὲ ἀκούσας ἀνεκάγχασέ τε μᾶλα σαρδάνιον καὶ εἶπεν Ὡ Ηράκλεις, ἔφη, αὐτῇ κείνῃ ἡ εἰωθυνία εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους, καὶ ταῦτ’ ἐγὼ ἤδη τε καὶ τούτως προΐλεγον, ὅτι σὺ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐθελήσοις, εἰρωνεύσοι δὲ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσοις ἡ ἀποκρινοῖο, εἰ τίς τί σε ἔρωτα. Σοφίς γὰρ εἶ, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ὁ Θρασύμαχε εὖ οὖν ἤδησθα ὅτι, εἰ τινὰ ἔρωτο ὅτι δὲ στὶ τὰ δώδεκα, καὶ ἔρωμενοι προεῖπος αὐτῷ ὅπως μοι, ὁ ἀνθρώπε, μὴ ἔρεις, ὅτι ἐστὶ τὰ δώδεκα διὸς εἶ δὲ μηδ’ ὑπὸ τρίς τέτταρα μηδ’ ὅτι ἔξακι δύο μηδ’ ὅτι τετράκις τρία’ ὅσ όύκ ἄποδέξομαι σου, εἰδ’ τοιαῦτα

Ch. XI.—Thrasymachus knows what justice is, but wishes to be paid before he will share his knowledge.

ἀνεκάγχασ. σαρδάν. Cf. Virg. Eclogue 7, 41—
‘Immo ego Sardoniis videar tibi amator herbis,’
and Horace, A. P. 375; from which passages it is evident that Sardinia produced certain acrid herbs; but the connexion of the ‘Sardonic smile’ with the grimace produced by eating these herbs seems not to be warranted. For the construction of this adverbial accusative, see Eur. Alc. 773—

τί σεμνὸν οὔτω καὶ πεφροντικὸς βλέπεις;

And Aristoph. Vesp. 900—

ὁς δὲ καὶ κλέπτον βλέπει.

eἰρωνεία, ‘pretending to know less than one does,’ ‘self-depreciation.’ ὁ εἰρών in Aristotle is described as the converse of the braggart. Thus Nic. Eth.

4, 7, 2. δοκεῖ δὴ ὁ ἀλαζών προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δ’ εἰρών ἀνάπαυν ἀρνείσθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλάσσων ποιεῖν. And so in 2, 7, 12. ἢ δὲ προσποιητικὴ ἢ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μειζόν ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ ἐχὼν αὕτην ἀλαζών, ἢ δ’ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐλάσσων εἰρωνεία καὶ εἰρὼν.

σόφος γὰρ εἶ, ‘(of course you knew this) for you are adroit,’ &c. Socrates implies that Thrasymachus put his question in such a manner as to preclude an answer, so that he might charge Socrates with εἰρωνεία. For the expression ν. ἐνθ. γὰρ εἶ, Ἀκοφοίνης γὰρ εἶ.

ὅπως μοι, ν.σ. Thrasymachus’ own words, which are repeated exactly, to point the ludicrous comparison.

ὁς οὖν ἄποδ. ν.σ. Ch. IV. ἴνν. Ὡ Κέφαλε, οἷοι σου τῶν πολλῶν οὖν ἄποδεξοῦσας’ εἰ ἐνθ. Ch. XIII. μεν. οὖτω τοῦτου ἄπωδεξόμεθα.
We should expect ἂν, but Socrates perhaps wishes to put the case as if it had really passed through Thrasymachus' mind.

μὴ ἀποκρίνομαι. 'Am I not to answer?' Deliberative subjunctive. See Eur. Ion, 758—εἶπομεν ἢ σιγῶμεν; and Med. 1271—

οἶμαι τι δρᾶσο; ποιφύγω μὴτροσ χέρας;
et ἵνα, here οὕτω σε φῶμεν λέγειν; Ch. XIV. ἵνα

ώς δὴ ὁμών. δὴ here is purely emphatic, as below 338 Α.; σὺ γὰρ δὴ φῆς εἰδέναι. And similarly in Od. 2, 271.

ei δὴ τοι σοῦ πατρὸς ἐνέσταται μένος ἢ.;

'If you really have inherited your father's spirit.' See Book VIII. 544 C.: ἡ γενναὶ δὴ τυραννίς.

Ἀλλὰ τι οὖν καὶ οὐ οὕτω ποιήσεις; 'Are you positively going to do so?' A common colloquialism in which the particle ἢ is omitted. Constructed fully the phrase would stand Ἀλλὰ τί ἐστίν ἢ οὕτω, ὃποι...κ.τ.λ. We can see the first stage of the ellipse in such an expression as this:

τί τόδε ἂν εἶποις Ἀλλὰ πλῆν ἄποτῷ πόνους

φύσαι;

Soph. Ant. 646. Also see Euthydemus 276 Α.: Ἀλλὰ τι οὖν οὕτω ἡπιστασθε ταύτα. et inf. here Ch. XV. 342 D. Thrasymachus is evidently dismayed at Socrates refusing to bind himself to the restrictions laid upon him. This kind of sophist required that the conversation should be conducted not merely on certain lines, but even in certain terms, if he were to prove his points. See Euthydemus, Ch. XVI., where a sophist, bearing a certain resemblance to Thrasymachus, although gifted with greater powers of argument, positively refuses to proceed unless Socrates answer precisely in the terms he wishes. Thrasymachus here intends to produce an effect, when he prohibits the use of certain words in the definition, by forcing Socrates to confess that he cannot define justice without them: Socrates parries the assault by calmly hinting that the true definition would require one of them.
ти аξιοὶς παθεῖν, ‘how ought you to be treated?’ i.e. ‘what ought you to have done to you?’
For this use of παθεῖν v.s. not. ad Cap. III. ἐπετάθη.

Ἡδὲς γὰρ εἶ, ‘you are a cool fellow.’ Ἡδὲς in this relation means ‘simple’ or ‘ingenious,’ and is thus euphemistic, and sarcastically used for its opposite e.g. δεινὸς or ὑβριστικὸς: i.e. ‘it is a cool request to ask, without payment.’ Somewhat similarly in Book VII. 527 D. Ηδὲς εἶ, ἢ δὲ εἶ, διὰ τούτου δεῖσι τοὺς πολλοὺς, μη δοκήσῃ ἄχρηστα μαθῆμα προστάτευει.
And so xarèisi Book IX. 602 B. xarèis ἢν εἶ ὅ ἐν τῇ ποιήσει μιμητικὸς.
Where the opposite notion is intended, v.s. Ch. V. not. ad θελευτῆς.

ἀποτίσων ἀργύριον. With this practice of Thrasymachus compare Xenophon's testimony to Socrates' disinterested teaching, ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ πολλοὶ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν καὶ στόχοι καὶ ἐξέστων λαβῶν οὐδένα πάστοτε μισθὸν τῆς ἐκποιήσεως. ἀλλὰ πάσιν ἀφθονίαν ἐνήργησε τῶν ἐκατον, Mem. 1, 2, 60, whilst ἵνα, he seems to describe Thrasymachus himself: τοῖς γὰρ μὴ ἔχουσι χρήματα διδάσκοντο ὡς ἢθελον διαλέγεσθαι.
Plato’s opinion of such sophists may be gathered from Book VI. 493 A.: ἐκεῖτο τῶν μισθοῦσιν τῶν ἰδίων, οὕτω δὲ οὐδεὶς σοφιστὰς καλοῦσιν...κ.τ.λ. where the word μισθοῦσιν bears a bad sense. Other passages in the Memorabilia corroborating Socrates’ refusal to take money for teaching are 1, 6, 11. ὀδένα γὰρ τῆς συνουσίας ἀργύριον πράττει. And supr. § 3. καὶ μὴν χρηματά γε σῶ λαμβάνεις. Socrates speaks thus of those who took money for imparting knowledge, and the signa  ὅ ἐν τῷ βουλμένῳ καλωτασα σοφίστας ὀδένα πάσιν ἀποκαλοῦσιν. And he speaks of the advantage which he enjoys from his practice of taking none, viz. that he can choose whom he will to instruct, and is not at the beck and call of every one; § 5. ἐμοὶ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντι οὐκ ἀνάγκη διαλέγεσθαι ὅ ἐν μὴ   βούλομαι. In the Apology Socrates mentions that his accusers could not bring the charge of money-making against him; 31 C. οὐκ οἶοι τε ἀπαναχυνθῆναι ὡς ἐγώ ποτὲ τινα ἢ ἐφαρίζων μισθὸν ἢ ἔστησα. And so 19 D: οὔκ ἐστιν...ὡς ἐγὼ χρηματα πράττομαι.

ἐπειδὰν μοι γένηται. In the Apology 23 B, Socrates explains his poverty thus: περὶῶν ζητῶ
καὶ ἑρευνᾶ ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, καὶ τῶν ἄστων καὶ τῶν ξενῶν, ἂν τινα οἰωνικὰ σόφων εἶναι· καὶ ὅπο τὰ ἄστις τῆς ἀγχολίας...ἐν πεντά μυρία ἐπὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν. ν. α. also the mention of his charity in the passage from Xen. Mem. 1, 2, 60: πάσιν ἄφθονος ἐπήρκε; which would help to account for it.

Εἴη, ἀργυρίῳ, 'as far as money is concerned.' Cf. Euthyphr. ΗΙ Δ: ἐπεὶ ἐμὺ γι' ἐνεκα ἐμενεν ἀν ταῦτα οὕτως, ἢ ἐπεὶ 'for anything I did to the contrary.' And see Eur. Cyc. 512—κελευσμάτων δ' ἔκατε τυφεόθω κύκλωσ. And so Rep. 582 C. ἐμπειρίαι μὲν ἀρα, εἰτον, ἐνεκα καλλιστα τῶν ἀνδρῶν κρίνει οὕτως.

πάντες γὰρ Σωκράτει. Of this popularity which Socrates evidently enjoys, the Charmides supplies another instance; see τιτί. καὶ μὲ ὅς ἔδων ἑσοντας έκ ἁπροσδιοκήτου, εὖδος πορθώθεν ἠπάξουτο ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν.

αὐτὸς μὲν, &c. A very fair description of Socrates' ordinary method. See Introd. p. 7. ἀπερημένον...ἐν. Stallbaum proposes to omit ἐν, a course which the run of the sentence recommends; for, as the text stands, ei must qualify both οἷσται and ἐν, which it cannot do without awkwardness. Then εἰρημένον will be a case of the neuter absolute participle in the accusative case. For which construction see infr. Book V. 449 C: ὅς ἄρα περὶ γυναικῶν τε καὶ παῖδων πάντι δήλον. Protag. 323 B: ὅς ἀναγαγαῖον ὀδένα μετέχειν αὐτῆς. Also Herod. 11, 129: εἰ, παρεν αὐτῷ βασιλέα γενεσθαί...ἄλλῳ περιέβηκε τὸ κράτος.

ὅτι ἀνδρὸς οὐ φαύλου. u.s. σόφος γὰρ εἶ. ἐμὸι τὲ χαρ. So below, 351 C, where Thrasymachus repeats Socrates' words. Σοι γὰρ, ἐφη χαρίζουμαι, et ibid. τὸ δὲ μοι χάρισαι καὶ λέγε. And in
Eutpontos de mou tauta o te Glaukon kal oí allloi edéonto autov μη ἄλλως ποιεῖν kal o Óraosúmacos fanevós méν ἴν ἐπιθυμῶν εἰπεῖν, ἵν’ εὐδοκιμήσειειν, ἡγούμενος ἔχειν ἀπόκρισιν παγκάλην προσεποιεῖτο δε φιλονεικεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρισόμενον.

Βτελευτῶν δε ξυνεχορήσε στρεπται Αὐτη δη, ἐφι, ἢ Σωκράτους σοφία, αὐτόν μεν μη ἐθελειν διδάσκειν, παρὰ δε τῶν ἄλλων περιουσια μαθαίνει καὶ ποὺν ἐνδὲ χάριν ἀποδιδόναι. Ἡτι μὲν, ἵν δ’ ἄγω, μανθάνω παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀληθῆ εἴπεσ, ὁ Θρασυμαχέ ὅτι δε οὐ με φής χάριν ἐκτίνειν, ψεύδει. ἐκτίνω γὰρ ὅσην δύναμαι. δύναμαι δε ἐπαινεῖν μόνον χρήματα

Euthydemos 274 D. πάνω μὲν ὅν τοῖτον χαρίσασθον καὶ... ἐπιδείξατον.

Ch. XII.—Thrasymachus’ definition of Justice, the Interest of the Stronger.

fanevós ἴν ... εὐδοκιμήσειειν. These expressions prove Thrasymachus to have belonged rather to the rhetorical than the ethical division of sophists. See below, Ch. XVI., where Thrasymachus having stated his views at length wishes to make off without further argument. Protagoras of Abdera, the most famous of all the sophists, was not often in the habit of conversing; he, too, rather employed rhetoric than dialectic. See Prot. 335 A. where he refuses to go upon the principle of short questions and answers, which Socrates avers to be the only kind of discussion he can follow. It is true that earlier in the dialogue Protagoras offers to discuss a question μύδου λέγων, ἢ λόγω διεξελθών. But we can see from the later passage quoted that λόγος with Protagoras and Socrates meant different things. And Socrates believed in the case of Protagoras, as in that of Thrasymachus here, that he had a distinct desire to produce a rhetorical effect. 317 C. ἐκποτενεσα γὰρ βούλεθαι αὐτὸν τῷ τε Προδικῷ καὶ τῷ Ἐπιδίκη ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι (as εὐδοκιμήσειε, here).

ὁ Σωκράτους σοφία, ν.σ. abone ὡς εἰσαύμα εἰσῴηλα Σωκράτους. The article indicates that Socrates had a public reputation for wisdom.

χρήματα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω, ν.σ. νολ. αδ, ἀποτίσον ἄργυρον, Ch. XI. In Xen. Mem. 1, 6, 2, Antiphon asks how it is that philosophy only brings poverty: ὁ Σωκράτες, ἐγώ μὲν ἴναι τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας
γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω. ὡς δὲ προθύμως τούτῳ δρῶ, εάν τις μοι δοκῇ εὐ λέγειν, εὐ εἰσεί αὐτίκα δὴ μάλα, ἐπειδὰν ἀποκρίνη σοίμαι γάρ σε εὐ ἔρειν. 'Ακοντε δὴ, ἦ δ’ οὖσὶν φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ εἰναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἀλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ἐξιμφέρον. ἀλλὰ τι οὐκ ἐπανείσ; ἀλλ’ οὕτω εἰθελίσεις. 'Εὰν μάθω γε πρῶτον, ἔφην, τι λέγεις, νῦν γάρ οὗτος οἶδα. τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος
eudaimonestérous xhrínaíai glyge-
thai, ou dé moi dokeis tánántia tíis
philosophías apolelakínavi: zís
goíν oúthos, ós ou're d'wv dówlos
ou déstátó díswtómenos méneiées.
Aristotle in the Politics, 1, 4,
shows that the philosopher can
be wealthy, if he chooses, by
the story of Thales in Miletus,
who discovered from astronomical
researches that the olive-yield
would be excessive in the
ensuing year, and, by a small de-
posit of earnest-money, secured
a large profit upon it at the
harvest: ἐπειδὴ δ' ὁ καρπὸς ἦκε
πολλῶν ζητομένων ἰμα, καὶ ἐξ-
αιρίνα ἐκμιᾶδῶντα δὴ τρόπον
ἡμώνατο, πολλά χρήματα ἐξιλλέ
αντος ἐπίδειξα, ὃτι βάδιον ἔστι
πλουτεῖν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, ἀν
βοᾶνται.

ἀξὶ δὲ προθύμως τούτῳ δρῶ...
This adroit piece of flattery is
evidently swallowed by Thrasy-
machus, for he proceeds without
more ado to give his definition.
Socrates' words exhibit a phase
of his eirwnea, for he incites
Thrasy machus to speak by an
assumed admiration for the wis-
dom of what he is going to say.
We must suppose that Socrates
veils the sarcasm of his words
beneath an appearance of inno-
cence: otherwise Thrasy machus
would hardly fail to see their
true drift.

τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ἐξιμφέρον.
We have now left behind popu-
lar, and have to treat with
sophistic definition; briefly the
principle is, "Might is Right."
Thrasy machus' line of argument
is as follows. The stronger
make regulations for their own
benefit, and these regulations
are dignified by the term 'laws,'
and justice is obedience to them.
Now the description of that
form of government called
turannês in Aristotle's Politics,
3, 55, corresponds exactly to
Thrasy machus' account of a
state of justice here: ἦ μὲν
γὰρ τυράννις ἐστὶ μοναρχία πρὸς
τὸ ἐξιμφέρον τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος.
And Aristotle calls such a state
a degenerated form or abnormal
growth from a monarchy, which
is described, in contrast to the
turannês, as having regard to the
common interest, not to that of
the ruler; καλεὶν δ' εἰσάμενὰ
τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἀποβλέπουσαν
ἐξιμφέρον βασιλείαν; where it
should be noticed that ἀποβλέ-
pousan means having regard
only, or chiefly, to the public
weal. Here Thrasy machus puts
forward the krei tòw, ἢ. ὁ the
man who is superior in bodily
strength or force of will, but
disregards the claims of the
commonwealth upon him, as
the ruler of the state. Socrates,
on the contrary, gradually un-
folds the principle that all arts
and sciences, and therefore all
governments, ought to be
directed, if they are true arts and governments, towards the amelioration of some objects less strong and less capable than themselves. And therefore he will be found to claim the right to govern for that man who is himself governed by his best nature, arguing from the analogy of such a man's own psychological polity. For when the θεῖον, λογιστικόν, or rational part of man's nature is in the ascendant, and keeps under the spirited and sensual, then such a man's body and mind as a whole will be most healthy and most efficient. See Book IX. 590 D. δούλων αυτῶν (σ. τὸν τυχόντα) φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι εκείνου τοῦ βελτίστου, ἔχοντος εν αὐτῷ τὸ θεῖον ἄρχον, οὐκ ἐκβ. βλαβῆ τῇ τοῦ δούλου οἰκείοις δεῖν ἄρχεσθαι αὐτον, διὸ Θερασύμαχος ἔστω τοὺς ἄρχομενους, αὐτῷ ἄμεινον δὲν πάντι ὑπὸ θείου καὶ φρονίμου ἄρχεσθαι, μᾶλιστα μὲν οἰκείον ἔχοντος εν αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἔσθεν ἐφεστάτος. That Thrasymachus' position is not entirely out of date, the following passages from a modern writer will show. 'All fighting is the dusty conflict of Strengths, each thinking itself the strongest, or in other words the justest: of Mights which do in the long run and for ever will in this just universe in the long run mean Rights.'

Carlyle, Past and Present, Book III. Ch. X; and again in his Life of John Sterling, Pt. III. Ch. I. 'Might and Right, the identity of these two, if a man will understand this God's-universe, and that only he who conforms to the law of it can in the long run have any "Might."'

Πολυνύμας. οὗτος δ' Πολυνύμας ἀπὸ Σκοτούσσῃς ἤ, πάλας Θεσσαλίας, διασημότατος παγκρατιστῆς, ὑπερμεγεθής, ὃς ἐν Πέρσαις παρ' Ἡχω γενόμενος τῷ βασιλεῖ λέοντας ἀνείλε καὶ ὅπλως μένους γυμνὸς κατηγοικότο. Schol.

βδελυρός γαρ εἰ. So above ἡδος γαρ εἰ, σώφος γαρ εἰ.

ταύτῃ ὑπολ. This answer it must be observed, is a confession that the definition is assailable, i.e. is imperfect. ὑπό implies stealth on Socrates' part, in an underhand way, as we say; so ὑποκάθημα, to lie in ambush, ὑποστέλλω, to prevaricate. But the word is also used merely 'to interrupt,' without any further notion; see below, Ch. XIII. ad med. ἕφι δ' Κλεῖστοφών ὑπολαβῶν. In the present passage we may translate ὑπ. ταύτ. 'twist into that sense,' with the additional notion of stealth. In Euthyd. 295 B, the word means simply 'to understand.' ὑπολαμβάνεις γαρ δέηνο τι ο λέγω;
τῶν πολέων αἱ μὲν... Plato is fond of this triple division, which occurs again in his analysis of μέλος (λόγος, ἀρμονία, μοθώμ) of justice itself (σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σοφία) of the city (χρηματιστικὸ, ἐπικουρικῶν, φυλακικῶν); of the soul (θυμοιδές, φιλομαθές, φιλοχρήστων); and of the main difficulties to be encountered in founding the ideal State, Book V.; and of things desirable, Book II. init. But in Book VIII. (conf. Book IV. fin.) we have four varieties of the State, degenerations from the Ideal, viz. the Timocratic, Oligarchic, Democratic, and Despotick; the first of which Socrates limits to such constitutions as those of Crete and Sparta. In his accusation of Ctesiphon Eschines divides all states into three kinds. οἶο γὰρ ἔστω, καὶ Ἀθηναίοι, ὅτι τρεῖς εἰσὶν πολιτείαι παρὰ πάσιν ἀνδρόποις τυραννις καὶ διληγαρχία και δημοκρατία. And he goes on to say that the former two are managed merely according to the fancies of the rulers, but the democracy by established law. διοικοῦνται δὲ αἱ μὲν τυραννίδες καὶ διληγαρχία τοῖς τροποῖς τῶν ἐφεστηκότων, αἱ δὲ πόλεις αἱ δημοκρατούμεναι τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς κειμένοις. Ἀσχ. in Ctes. ad init.

τίθεται δὲ γε... Thrasymachus is correct in this statement as long as the selfish and unjust have the reins of government. But in Book IX. 590 D (ὁμ. not. ad τὸ τοῦ κράτους ἔξωφρον) Socrates shows that the best men, i.e. those in whose souls the λογιστικόν or rational element is master, ought to be masters of all the rest; because as the λογιστικῶν, by restraining the lusts and passions produces the best possible condition of the body, when it is master, then the good man will not indulge himself when he is master in the state, but will set himself to make the whole body politic as healthy and efficient as possible. Therefore it is that he says in Book V. 473 D, that, until kings are philosophers and philosophers kings, the best state cannot be; for by philosopher he means λογιστικόν, i.e. one in whom the intellectual dominates the sensual, v. Introd. p. 19. In short, the good man or philosopher is unselfish, and has regard for the well-being of the whole state, rather than for his own. Such is Socrates' answer in effect to this position of Thrasymachus.
de ἀπέφηναν τοῦτο δίκαιον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις εἶναι,
τὸ σφίσι ξυμφέρον, καὶ τὸν τούτον ἐκβαίνοντα
κολάζουσιν ὡς παρανομοῦντα τε καὶ ἀδικοῦντα.
τούτῳ οὖν ἐστὶν, ὃ δὲλτις, ὃ λέγω ἐν ἀπάσαις
339 ταῖς πόλεσι ταύτων εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ τῆς καθεστη-
κυλιάς ἀρχής ξυμφέρον αὐτή δὲ που κρατεῖ, ὡστε
ξυμβαίνει τῷ ὅρθῳ λογιζομένῳ πανταχοῦ εἶναι τὸ
αὐτὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον. Νῦν, ἦν
δ' ἐγώ, ἐμαθῶν δ' λεγεις· εἰ δ' ἀληθὲς ἢ μὴ, πειρά-
σομαι μαθεῖν. τὸ ξυμφέρον μὲν οὖν, ὃ Ἐρασύμαχε,
καὶ σὺ ἀπεκρίνω δίκαιον εἶναι· καὶ τοῦ ἔμου 
γόρευες δόπως μὴ τοῦτο ἀποκρινοῖμην πρόσεστι 
δὲ τῇ αὐτὸθι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος. Συμκρά 
τοῦτο δίκαιον εἶραι, &c. So Sir Thomas More in his Utopia,
Book II. of the religions in Utopia. 'Besides this the riche
men not only by private fraud
but also by common lawes, do
every day pluck and snatch
away from the poor some part of
their daily living. So where it seemed before unjuste to
recompense with unkindnesse
their paynes that have been
beneficial to the publique weale,
now they have to this their
wrong and unjuste dealinge
given the name of justice, yea
and that by force of a law.'
See Xen. Mem. 1, 2, 41, where
the question is asked, τί ἐστι
νόμος; and the conclusion is:
πάκτα, δει ἄν τὸ κράτον τής
πόλεως βουλευτάμενον τὸ 
θνείν γρήγορας, νόμος καλεῖται.
And it is there shown that
spoliation and oppression is
often dignified by the term
law. See also Arist. Pol. 3, 6.
ἀλλ' ἄρα τοὺς ἐλάττους δίκαιον
δρέχει καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους; ἀν
οὖν κἀκεῖνοι ταῦτα ποιῶσι, καὶ
dιαρραζῶσι καὶ τὰ κτήματα ἐφαι-
ρόντες τοῦ πλῆθους, τούτῳ ἐστὶ
δίκαιον;
πειράσομαι μαθεῖν. Socrates
is really anxious to arrive at
a refutation of Thrasymachus'
account of justice; therefore he
passes over, with a bare mention,
The objection that Thrasymachus
has employed a word in his
definition which he had for-
bidden Socrates to use; v. s.
336, D. And he likewise passes
over Thrasymachus' reply, that
he added to this word the
qualification τοῦ κρείττορος. His
desire is expressed in 346 A in
the words ἵνα τί καὶ περαινοεῖν,
'let us get to some conclusion
or other'; and so below here he
uses the imperative verbal, δη
tούτο σκέψετον, εἰ δὴ λέγεις,
δὴ λοιπον.
αὐτὸθι, 'in this (latter) place,'
'in your later definition.'
συμκρά γε ἰσως, 'a slight
qualification, I suppose.' ἰσως
sarcastically.
προσθήκη. Οὔτω δῆλον οὐδεὶς μεγάλη ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν τούτο σκεπτέον εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, δῆλον. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ξυμφέρον γέ τι εἶναι καὶ ἐγώ ὀμολογῶ τὸ δί- καιον, σὺ δὲ προστίθησι καὶ αὐτὸ φῆς εἶναι τε τοῦ κρείττονος, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ, σκεπτέον δή. Σκόπει, ἐφη.

CAP. XIII.

Ταῦτ' ἔσται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καὶ μοι εἰπέ· οὐ καὶ πείθεσθαι μέντοι τοῖς ἁρχοντις δίκαιον φῆς εἶναι; Ἐγὼ γαρ. Πότερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοι εἰσίν οἱ ἁρχοντες εὖν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐκάσταις ἢ οἷοι τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν; Πάντως που, ἐφη, οἷοι τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν. Οὐκοῦν ἐπιχειροῦστε νόμους τιθέναι τοὺς μὲν ὀρθῶς τιθέασι, τοὺς δὲ τινας οὐκ ὀρθῶς; Οἴμαι ἔγωγε. Τὸ δὲ

οὔτω δῆλον... 'It may be an important one for all I know.' οὔτως, 'not even,' implying that it may very well be an important addition.

ξυμφέρον γέ τι...ἀμαλογώ. The first piece of positive statement which Socrates has admitted in this argument. He allows justice to be 'advantageous.' ξυμ- φέρον τι is not more than a quality of justice. It is no definition, but merely one of the aspects of justice.

σκεπτέον δή. We have had three statements to which this is the conclusion; δή being the particle which marks the final stage of an argument. v.s. not. ad peri tálλα, Ch. VII. and Ch. II. ini. kal δή καὶ.

CH. XIII.—But often, Thrasymachus, the Stronger make laws, in their ignorance, to their own disadvantage; and is that

οὔ καὶ πείθεσθαι... 'Was it not this very obedience?'... καὶ emphatic as above, Ch. X. ini. μέντοι marks the opening of an objection; as we might say, 'Now was it not this very obedience'; but its adversative sense is not concentrated here upon the particular sentence, and is therefore not so clearly marked as usual. v.s. not. ad Cap. V. καὶ μέντοι.

ἡ οἷοι τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν. The latter alternative is generally that intended to be accepted. v. infr. Ch. XV. 342 B. ἢ ὡς αὐτῆς ὡς ἐλλης, &c. And Ch. XXII. βιν. πότερον ἢ κρείττων πόλις...τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην εἴει ἡ ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς μετὰ δικαιοσύνης; τὸ δὲ ὀρθῶς ἀρα... 'And by rightly we are to understand enactments to their own advan-

tage, are we not?' ἀρα, 'as it seems'; ἀρα, 'as it seems,' with the addition of an emphasized interrogation. v.s. note,
πλάτωνος

ὅρθώς ἀρα τὸ τὰ ἔμφεροντα ἐστὶ τίθεσθαι ἕαυτοῖς, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅρθώς ἀξύμφορα; ἡ πῶς λέγεις; Οὔτως. "Α δὲ ἀν θῶνται, ποιιτέου τοῖς ἀρχομένοις, καὶ τούτῳ ἐστὶ τὸ δίκαιον; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐ μόνον ἄρα δίκαιον ἐστι κατὰ τῶν σοῦ λόγων τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ἔμφερον ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούναντιν τὸ μὴ ἔμφερον. Τὶ λέγεις σὺ; ἐφη. "Α σὺ λέγεις, ἔμοι γὰρ σκοτώμεν δὲ βέλτιον. οὐχ ὠμολογηται τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοῖς ἀρχομένοις προστάττοντας ποιεῖν ἄττα ἐνίοτε διαμαρτάνειν τοῦ ἕαυτος βελτίστου, ἢ δὲ ἄν προστάττωσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες, δίκαιον εἶναι τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ποιεῖν; ταῦτ' ὦν ὠμολογηται; ἐνίαυ ἐγώ, ἐφη. Οἶου τοίνυν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ ἀξύμφορα ποιεῖν τοῖς ἄρχονσι τε καὶ κρείττοσι δίκαιον εἶναι ὠμολογήσοται σοι, ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἄρχοντες ἄκοντες κακὰ αὐτοῖς προστάττοσι, τοῖς δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι φῆς ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ἢ ἐκεῖνοι προσέ-

Page 108. It is noticeable how very careful Socrates is to define all his terms with strictness: the reason being that he has to deal with a sophist who would think nothing of obstructing the argument by a mere logomachy, whilst Socrates is anxious to get to a conclusion.

ἀ δὲ ἀν θῶνται. The subjunctive is used to express the indefinite nature of the law-making, which depends merely upon the will and present feeling of the legislators; as Ἀeschines expresses it, τοῖς τρόποις τῶν ἐφεστηκότων. v.s. not, ad τῶν πολίων αἰ μέν.

τὶ λέγεις σὺ; Thrasymachus is taken by surprise; he does not see to the end of Socrates' argument at present. This argument has been employed before in Polemarchus' case. See supr. Ch. VIII. ad med., where Socrates points out that a person may injure a friend through believing him to be an enemy, just as here he is about to show that legislators may harm themselves through legislation intended for their own benefit.

τοῖς δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι φῆς. If we punctuate as in the text it would seem better to read φῆς, and look upon this clause as not dependent upon ὅταν in the preceding one, but added as an after thought, repeating one of the premises. Stalib. places only a comma at προσέταξων, but the question ἄρα τότε, &c., cannot follow in the same sentence as the imperative οἶον.
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ α’.

ταξιν ἀρα τότε, ὃ σοφώτατε Θρασύμαχε, οὐκ ἀναγκαίον συμβαίνειν αὐτὸ οὕτωσι, δίκαιον εἶναι ποιεῖν· τούτων δὲ οὐ λέγεις; τὸ γὰρ τοῦ κρείττονος ἀξύμφορον δήποτε προστάττεται τοῖς ἤττοσι ποιεῖν. Ναὶ μὴ Δὲ, ἐφη, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὃ 340 Πολέμαρχος, σαφῆστατὰ γε. Ἐὰν σὺ γ’, ἐφη, αὐτῶ παραπομπής, ὁ Κλειτοφῶν ὑπολαβὼν. Καὶ τι, ἐφη, δεῖται παραπομπῷ; αὐτῶ γὰρ Θρασύμαχος ὀμολογεῖ τοὺς μὲν ἄρχοντας ἐνίοτε ἑαυτοῖς κακὰ προστάτειν, τοῖς δὲ ἄρχομένοις δίκαιον εἶναι ταὐτὰ ποιεῖν. Τὸ γὰρ τὰ κελεύμενα ποιεῖν, ὃ Πολέ-

μαρχεῖ, ὑπὸ τῶν ἄρχοντων δίκαιον εἶναι ἔθετο Θρασύμαχος. Καῖ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ὁ Κλει-

τοφῶν, ἕμφερον δίκαιον εἶναι ἔθετο. ταὐτὰ δὲ ἑ

ἄμφοτερα θέμενος ὀμολογήσεν αὕ ἑνίοτε τοὺς κρεί-

τους τὰ αὐτοῖς ἄξυμφορα κελεύειν τοὺς ἤττους τε καὶ ἄρχομένους ποιεῖν. ἐκ δὲ τούτων τῶν ὀμολογημένων οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ἕμϕερον δίκαιον ἄν εἰη ἢ τὸ μὴ ἕμϕερον. Ἀλλ’, ἐφη ὁ Κλειτοφῶν, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ἕμϕερον ἔλεγεν ἢ ἤγοιτο ὁ κρείττων αὐτῷ ἕμϕερεν; τοῦτο ποιητέον εἶναι τῷ ἤττων, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτο ἐτίθετο. Ἀλλ’ οὐχ οὕτως, ἢ δ’ ὃς ὁ Πολέμαρχος,

υπολαβὼν. ν.8. νόλ. αὐ ταύτῃ ύπολ. Σαρ. XII. med. This is a piece of raillery on Cleito-

phon’s part; Polemarchus chim-

ing in as though there were an end of the discussion to which he himself has contributed

nothing.

τὸ τοῦ κρείττ. ἔλεγεν... ἔλεγεν here is ‘meant,’ not ‘said’; for if it were the latter, the sense would require ἔλεγα before ἡ. And Polemarchus is quite right in the point of fact, viz. that Thrasymachus did not say so. And, thirdly, λέγειν is used in the same sense, XIV. init.; and in Ch. XV. ποτέρας λέγει τῶν ἄρχοντά τε, &c. For another sense of λέγω see Ch. IV. note, with which compare Cicero, Cato Major, vi. 16. ‘Nihil igitur afferunt, qui in re gerenda versari seseectum negant,’ i.e. ‘they say nothing to the point.’

τοῦτο ποιητέον, &c. ‘This he meant was to be done by the inferior, and he meant to define (ἐτίθετο) justice thus.'
Σέλεγετο. Οὐδέν, ἡν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ Πολέμαρχε, διαφέρει, ἀλλ' εἰ νῦν οὕτω λέγει Θρασύμαχος, οὕτως αὐτοῦ ἀποδεχόμεθα.

Καὶ μοι εἰπέ, ὁ Θρασύμαχε· τούτῳ ἡν δ' ἐβούλου λέγειν τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον δοκοῦν εἶναι τῷ κρείττον, ἕαν τε ξυμφέρη ἕαν τε μὴ; οὕτω σε φῶμεν λέγειν; Ἡκιστὰ γ', ἐφη· ἀλλὰ κρείττῳ με οἰει καλεῖν τον ἐξαμαρτάνοντα, ὅταν ἐξαμαρτάνη; Ἔγωγε, εἶπον, φῶμην σε τούτῳ λέγειν, ὅτε τοὺς ἀρ- χοντας ὁμολόγεις οὐκ ἀναμαρτήτους εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνειν. Συναφάντης γὰρ εἰ, ἐφη, ὁ

ἀποδεχόμεθα αὐτοῦ, ν.σ. ποι. ad Cap. XI. ὅσ συν ἀποδέχομαι σου. And see Parmenides, 128 Ε. ἀλλ' ἀποδέχομαι...καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ὡς λέγεις ἐχεῖν. We can render here 'Let us take him so,' i.e. 'So let us understand him.' During this discussion Thrasymachus has been at a loss for an answer, and is elaborating a reply, when Cleitophon, who seems to lean rather to Thrasymachus' side, saves him from immediate confusion by the different reading of his defini-

Ch. XIV.—Thrasymachus shows that one who legislates against his advantage cannot be termed the Stronger when he does so.

φῶμεν. For this subjunctive v.σ. ποι. ad μὴ ἀποκρίνωμαι, 337 B.

κρείττῳ με οἰει... 'Do you think I call a man who makes a mistake the Stronger when he makes a mistake?' This delicate distinction can be upheld in theory; but in practical legislation the result does not arise from the intention of the legislator, but from the actual legislation. It is to no purpose to uphold, as Thrasymachus does, that cases of bad legislation are to be left out of the question; because it is the sum total of all upon which the estimate of a man's powers is founded. It has been said, 'the best general is he who makes fewest mistakes'; as Thrasymachus would phrase it, 'who is oftenest a general'; but we can see in such a case that, regarding the total result, the office and the man are inseparable.

Συναφάντης. Below, Ch. XV. init. we have Socrates' reading of this expression. οἰει με ν because οἴει ἐπιβουλήτης ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κακουρ-
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ α'.

Σώκρατες, ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπειδ' αὐτίκα λατρον καλεῖς σὺ τὸν ἐξαμαρτάνουτα περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὁ ἐξαμαρτάνει; ἡ λογιστικόν, δὲ ἂν ἐν λογισμῷ ἀμαρτάνῃ, τότε ὅταν ἀμαρτάνῃ, κατὰ ταὐτὴν τὴν ἀμαρτίαν; ἀλλ', οἶμαι, λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως, ὅτι ὁ ἱατρὸς ἐξήμαρτε καὶ ὁ λογιστής ἐξῆμαρτε καὶ ὁ γραμματιστής: τὸ δ', οἶμαι, ἕκαστος τούτων; καθ' ὅσον τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὁ προσαγορεύομεν αὐτόν, οὐδέποτε ἀμαρτάνει· ὡστε κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβὴ λόγον, ἔπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ἀκριβολογεῖ, οὗδεις τῶν δημουργῶν ἀμαρτάνει. ἐπιλπούσῃς γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ὁ ἀμαρτάνων ἀμαρτάνει, ἐν δ' οὐκ ἔστι δημουργός· ὡστε δημουργὸς ἢ σοφὸς ἢ ἄρχων οὗδεις ἀμαρτάνει τότε ὅταν ἄρχων ἢ, ἀλλὰ πᾶς ἢ ἂν εἰποί, ὅτι ὁ ἱατρὸς ἠμαρτε καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ἠμαρτε. τοιοῦτον οὖν δὴ σοι καὶ ἐμὲ ὑπόλαβε νῦν δὴ ἀποκρίνεσθαι· τὸ δὲ ἀκριβεστατον ἐκεῖνο τυγχάνει ὅν, τὸν ἄρχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἄρχων ἐστί, μὴ ἀμαρτάνειν, μὴ ἀμαρτάναι—341 νοντα δὲ τὸ αὐτῶ βέλτιστον τίθεσθαι, τούτο δὲ

gούντα σε ἐρέσθαι ὡς ἵρμων; ἦς ἐπιβούλης is the point wherein lies the συκοφάντα: 'making a false representation on purpose.' So Demosthenes accuses Ἀσχι

nes of συκοφάντα, in that Ἀσχί

nes accused him of receiving commendation from Ctesiphon when in office and for the mere discharge of the duties of his office, whilst, Demosthenes implies, Ἀσχί

nes knew very well that the commendation was elicited by the gift of certain moneys, separate and distinct from the official accounts. See Dem. de Cor. 264, Reiske. οὕτως συκοφάντων, ὅτι ἐπὶ τῷ θεωρικῷ τότε ἂν ἐπέδωκα τὰ ῥήματα, ἐπήρεσεν αὐτὸν, φησιν, ὑπεύθυνον δυνα. Οὐ περὶ τούτων γε οὐδενδ', ἂν ὑπεύθυνος ἦν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' οἷς ἐπέδωκα, ὁ συκοφάντα.

αὐτίκα. 'Ne longe abeam ut statim exemplum afferam'; Stalib. 'Do you call a phy-

sician, now,...'

λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι. Cf. Euthy-

demus, 304 E. οὕτως γὰρ πως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὅντιμοι. λέγω here is 'to say,' not 'to mean.' ῥήματ is added to make this clear; but should be omitted in translation, and λέγομεν emph-

asized. 'We say the physician has made a mistake, whereas he cannot make a mistake as a physician.' ἀλλὰ here may be translated as 'yet'; and so below, ἀλλὰ τὰς γὰρ ἂν εἰποί, 'yet it would be commonly said.'
τῷ ἀρχομένῳ ποιητέον. ὡστε, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, δίκαιον λέγω τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ποιεῖν συμφέρον.

CAP. XV.

Εἶνε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὁ Ὀρασύμαχος δοκῶ σοι συκοφαντέω; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οἶει γὰρ με ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κακουργοῦντά σε ἐρέσθαι ὡς ἥρόμην; Ἐν μὲν οὖν οἶδα, ἔφη καὶ οὐδὲν γέ σοι. Β’ πλέον ἔσται; οὗτε γὰρ ἂν με λάθοις κακουργῶν, οὔτε μὴ λαθῶν βιάσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ δύναι. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιχειρήσαμι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὁ μακάριε. ἀλλ’ ἦνα μὴ αὕτ’ ἡμῖν τοιοῦτον ἐγγένηται, διόρισαι, ποτέρως λέγεις τόν ἀρχοντά τε καὶ τὸν κρείττονα, τὸν ὅσῳ ἔτοις εἰπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ, δι’ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, οὐ τὸ νεφέρον κρείττονος ἄντος δίκαιον ἔσται τῷ ἦττοι ποιεῖν. Τὸν τῷ ἀκριβεστάτῳ, ἔφη, λόγῳ.

Ch. XV.—But, Thrasymachus, all the arts and sciences have regard to the interest of those to whom they minister, to the interest, that is, of the Weaker.

Socrates shifts his line of confutation here: he does not prove the fallacy of Thrasymachus’ point, that the legislator, as a legislator, cannot err. And he refrains for this reason. He is about to employ Thrasymachus’ own words on this point to confute him farther on. See Ch. XVII. 345 C, where Thrasymachus is shown to have first demanded that the shepherd, or ruler, be considered only and entirely as a shepherd, or ruler; and afterwards to have employed the term shepherd, or ruler, as one who keeps sheep, or rules a people, for his own profit.

οὐδὲν γέ σοι πλέον ἔσται. ‘It will be no advantage to you.’ See Euthydemus, 288 E: οὐδὲν πλέον, οὐδ’ εἴ ἄνευ πραγμάτων καὶ τοῦ ὁρίου τήν γῆν τὸ πᾶν ἡμῖν χρύσον γένοιτο. And see below here, Ch. XXI.; also in Ch. XVI. we have the converse phrase: δίκαιος ἀνὴρ ἄθικον πανταχοῦ ἔλαττον ἔχει. οὔτε μὴ λαθῶν, &c. ‘Nor, if you are detected [lit. fail to escape notice], will you be able to force me in the argument.’ There is an alternative between the employment of fraud and force, as in Book II. 3. λέγειν τε ἰκανόν διὰ πρὸς τὸ πεπεθεῖν..., καὶ βιάσασθαι δόσα δὲν βιας δέσται. δν. Keeping the same meaning of ἔλεγες as above in λέγεις, δν must refer to τὸν, not to λόγῳ.
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ α' 159

άρχοντα ὄντα: πρὸς ταύτα κακούργηει καὶ συκο-
φάντει, εἰ τι δύνασαι οὐδέν σου παρίεμαι ἄλλ’
οὐ μὴ οὕς τ’ ἤς. Οἶει γὰρ ἂν με, ἐἶπον, οὕτως
μανῆναι, ὡστε ξυρεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖν λέοντα καὶ συκο-
φαυτεῖν ᾩρασύμαχον; Νῦν γούν, ἐφη, ἐπεχείρησας,
οὐδὲν ἄν καὶ ταύτα. "Αδην, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, τῶν τοιοῦτων.
ἄλλ’ εἰπὲ μοι· ὁ τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ ἱατρός, δὲν ἄρτι
ἐλεγες, πότερον χρηματιστής ἐστιν ἡ τῶν καμὼντων
θεραπευτῆς; καὶ λέγε τὸν τῷ ὄντι ἱατρὸν ὄντα.
Τῶν καμὼντων ἐφη, θεραπευτῆς. Τί δὲ κυβερνή-

οὐδὲν σου παρίεμαι, ’Ι do not try to get anything conceded by
you.’ Prof. Campbell supplies two instances of this use from
the Laws, 742 B, ἱδιωτὴ δὲ ἂν ἄρα ποτὲ ἀνάγκη τις γίγνηται
ἀποδημεῖν, παρέμενος μὲν τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀποδημεῖτο. And below
951 A.

διότε ξυρεῖν... πορομία ἐπὶ
tῶν καθ ἑαυτῶν τι ἡ ἄδονα
tοιεῖν ἐπιχειροῦντων λεγομένη.
Schol.

νῦν γούν, &c. ‘At any rate
you made the attempt just now,
and failed for all that.’ We
find the expression καὶ ταῦτα
thrown in without regard to the
construction, with this meaning
of ‘besides’ or ‘and yet’; e.g.
Xen. Anab. 2, 4, 15. Μένωνα
dὲ σὺν ἐξήτει, καὶ ταῦτα παρ’
Αρισταίῳ δὲ τὸν Μένωνος ξένου.
See also Rep. Book IV. τίνι.
Ναλ, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, καὶ ταῦτα γε
ἐκποίητοι. Also Euthydemus,
288 A. καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἑαυ-
ταστής οὕτης (τέχνης) εἰς ἀκρι-
βείαν λόγων. ἰηθ. 299 D. Οὐκ-
οῦν καὶ χρυσὸν ἁγάδον; Πάνω,
καὶ ταῦτα γε πολλ’, ἐφη. Simi-
larly καὶ τάδε; Soph. O. T.
819—

καὶ τάδ’ οὕτως ἄλλος ἦν

ἡ 'γων 'π' ἐμαυτῇ τάδε' ἡρας
ὁ προστιθεῖς.
In this example τάδε has been
explained as an accusativus pen-
dens, in the others ταύτα is
rather an accusative of respect,
or adverbial accusative.

πότερον χρηματιστής... At
this point Socrates begins to
introduce the consideration that
a physician, as a physician, has
no regard for money, i.e. for his
own interests, and that, by ana-
logy of the arts, a ruler must,
as a ruler, have regard to the
interests of the ruled. Hence
the injunction, λέγε τὸν τῷ ὅτι
ἱατρὸν ὄντα. His next point is
that the arts, in so far as they
require anything, require it in
order to render them more
efficient, that they may be per-
fect in themselves (τέλεαι), and
self-sufficient (αὐταρκεῖς); where-
as both that with which, and
that upon which, they are exer-
cised, require their assistance,
and perhaps the assistance of
much else besides. Governing,
therefore, being an art, looks
to the benefit of the governed,
and in itself should be self-
sufficient, and should not require
recompense from the governed.


But every art (ἐκαστὴ τῶν τεχνῶν) is sufficient in itself, requires no external aid, and only aims at being as perfect as possible by enlarging its sphere of action.

πῶς τούτο ἐρωτᾶς; ‘What do you refer to?’ or ‘How am I to understand your question?’

The question is worded in such a manner that it does not convey a definite meaning to Thrasymachus.

εἰ μὲ ἔρωτ... Socrates’ fondness for the dialectical method causes him to cast even his illustration in the form of question and answer.

ἐξάρκει. The corresponding adjective is αὐταρκῆς, self-sufficient, that which has not to depend upon external resources and external aid. The origin of justice itself is said (Book II. 358 E) by Glaucon to lie in the fact that some men, being naturally unable to defend themselves, combine together to bring about an arrangement which shall insure their not being ill-
POLITEIAΣ a'. 161

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν προσδείται. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ τέχνη ἐστὶν ἡ ἰατρικὴ νῦν εὐρημένη, ὅτι σῶμα ἐστὶν πονηρὸν καὶ οὐκ ἔξαρκει αὐτῷ τοιοῦτοι εἶναι. τοῦτο οὖν ὅπως ἐκτορίζῃ τὰ εὐμφέροντα, ἐπὶ τούτῳ παρεσκευάσθη ἡ τέχνη. ἡ ὀρθός σοι δοκῶ, ἐφη, ἀν εἰπεῖν οὖτω λέγων, ἢ οὐ; Ὅρθως, ἐφη. Τι δὲ δὴ; 342 αὕτη ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐστὶ πονηρά, ἡ ἀλλή τις τέχνη ἐστ᾽;

• ὁ τι προσδείται τινος ἀρετῆς, ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμοὶ ὄψεως καὶ ὁμη ἄκοις καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶς δεὶ τινὸς

In other words, they are not αὐτάρκεις, they require external assistance. Aristotle follows in Plato’s steps thus:

...πολιτικῶν δικαιων. τούτο δ᾽ ἔστιν ἐπὶ κοινωνίαν βιου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν. Eth. Nic. 5, 6, 4. Again in Book II, the origin of the city itself is said to lie in men being not αὐτάρκεις, but requiring each other’s assistance in daily life. Γίγνεται τοῖνοι πόλεως ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἔκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεχ. Aristotle places happiness in the same category that Plato places the arts here, because whilst all things else in human life have regard to happiness as their aim, happiness itself is αὐτάρκης, or self-sufficient. See Nic. Eth. I, 7, 6: τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐτάρκης εἶναι δοκεῖ. Similarly in the Republic, Book III, 387 D, the noble man (ἐπιεικὴς ἀνὴρ) who has no fear of death is αὐτάρκης: ὁ τοιοῦτος μᾶλλον αὐτοῦ ἀὐτῷ αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ εὖ ἐν καὶ διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἡκιστα ἄτερον προσδείται. But not entirely so; see Ch. IV. οὕτ᾽ ἐν ὧν ἐπιεικῆς πάντε ἡ ἤδιν γῆρας μετὰ πενια ἐνεγχο. Similarly Aristotle in the passage quoted allows that even his perfect human character stands in need of a few relations and friends, and therefore in Books 10, 7, 4, he speaks of perfect αὐτάρκεια as having rather a mental than a social and physical import. ἦ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ' ἀν εὖ; τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ξύν ἀναγκαῖον καὶ σόφος καὶ δικαίος καὶ οἰ λοιπὸ δένται. ἡ ὀρθῶς...ἐπείν οὖτω λέγων. v.s. Ch. VI. ἐπὶ. τὶ φῆς τῶν Σιμωνίδην λέγοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν περὶ δικαιοσύνης;

αὕτη ἡ ἰατρικὴ... Here the original question is repeated, ἀρ' οὖν καὶ ἐκάστῃ τῶν τεχνῶν... Thrasymachus having been enlightened.

ἐσθ' ὃ τι προσδείται. See ἐνίφ. 346 D: ἐσθ' ὃτι ὑπελείται. ὁ δημοιρόγος ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης; And Ch. XXIII. ἐπὶ.: ἐσθ' ὃτι ἐν ἄλλο τινος ὁ ὀφθαλμος. This particle δὴ combines very readily with such words as ἐσθ', οὖτα, δῆλον, to emphasize either a statement or a question. Σοι ἐστιν Ἰνα, ἐστιν οὖ, οὐκ ἐστιν ὕπος, οὐκ οὖδε ὑπο. ἐσθ' αὐτῶς, 'over and above them.' The force of ἐστὶ here must not be overlooked. The meaning is that on account of the sight and hearing (διὰ ταῦτα)
there is a further consideration, viz., the art which attends to the eye and ear, autē then refers to the eye and ear; whilst τῆς το ἔ. &c. below will mean "an art which looks out and provides that which is to the advantage (of the eye and ear) for these purposes," viz., sight and hearing (εἰς ταῦτα).

καὶ τοῦτο ἦσιν ἀπέραντον, 'and does this go on for ever?' 'ad infinitum?'

ἡ αὐτή αὐτῆ... The latter alternative, as usual in these longer dilemmas, is intended to be accepted. v.s. Ch. XIII. init.: πώτερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοι εἰσὶν οἱ ἄρχοντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἔκδασις ἡ οἷον τι καὶ ἄμαρτεν. And see Meno. 72 B. ἀρα τοῦτο φθινοτάτα καὶ παντοδαπάς αὐτάς εἶναι, τῷ μελίτας εἶναι; ἡ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἄλω δὲ τῷ;

οὔτε αὐτῆς... 'Not only is the art independent of other arts, but it is also independent of assistance from itself.' This proposition is not true in its latter clause. An art, as practised upon its objects, does not gain assistance from other arts directly; although indirectly many arts contribute to the improvement of one, e.g., microscopy to surgery. See Sir John Lubbock's address to the British Association at York, 1881: 'One very marked feature in modern discovery was the manner in which distinct branches of science had thrown, and were throwing, light on one another.' But an art does gain assistance from itself, i.e. it improves by experience, the continual treatment of new cases suggests improvements,—vires acquirit eundo. And, to transfer this to Plato's instance, an old doctor is, broadly speaking, better than a young one. This loose point, although of no account here, will be found to create a difficulty later on, in Book III., where Socrates is speaking of the physicians in his State. In that passage (409 bś.) he slurs over the fact that experience of disease makes the best physician, with the barbarous conclusion that where a person is of a bad constitution, ἀναθηματικὰς ἔκδοσιν.

οὔτε γὰρ πονηρία... i.e. in the principles of science there is nothing of evil effect. They are immutable and beneficial; for by the knowledge of them we can work according, and not in opposition, to nature. But in the person who applies them, and in the recipient of their application, there is πονηρία, or fault. An art is the exercise of
οὐδεμιὰ οὐδεμιᾶ τέχνη πάρεστιν, οὐδὲ προσήκει τέχνη ἄλλη τὸ ξυμφέρον ζητεῖν ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὐ τέχνη ἐστίν, αὐτή δὲ ἀβλαβὴς καὶ ἀκέραιος ἐστιν ὅρθη οὐσία, ἑωσπερ ἂν ἢ ἐκάστη ἀκριβὴς ὅλη ἢπερ ἐστὶ; καὶ σκόπει ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως ἑχεί; Οὗτος, ἐφη, φιλοται. Ὅνικ ἄρα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ιατρικὴ ἰατρικὴ τὸ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ ἄλλα σώματι. Ναὶ, ἐφη. Οὐδὲ ἱστικὴ ἱστικὴ ἄλλ' ἱστοὺς. οὐδὲ ἄλλη τέχνη οὐδεμιὰ ἑαυτῇ, οὐδὲ γὰρ προσδεῖται, ἄλλ' ἐκεῖνο οὗ τέχνη ἐστίν. Φιλοται, ἐφη, οὕτως. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὃ Θερασύμαχε, ἀρχοῦσι γε αἱ τέχναι καὶ

human faculty according to system, and whilst exercised thus (ὁρθαί οὐσία) an art is beneficial. In this passage it must be borne in mind that Socrates is speaking 'strictly,' i.e. when speaking of an art he speaks of those principles which in their nature are unerring; and does not regard the art in the slightest degree as remunerative to him who practises it.

οὕτως ἐφη, φιλοται. Thrasy machus is beginning to see the gist of Socrates' argument, and uses the qualitative word φι λοται.

ἀρχοῦσι γε... 'are in command of, and are stronger than...'. On this analogy, cleverly brought home to the ears of his audience by the use of ἀρχω and κρατέω, rests Socrates’ conclusion, that justice is the interest of the weaker, and not of the stronger. The analogy may be borne out thus: the principles of medicine and the ruler of a State alike dictate to the people what they are to do and what they are not to do as subjects, respectively, of medicine and law. The principles of medicine and of law are alike intrusted to experts whose duty it is to legislate, for prevention and cure, against illness and crime. A citizen who is a good member of the commonwealth, and a person who has need of medicine, must, as a condition of benefit, accept the constitution and the principles of medicine. But it is easy to see that the analogy cannot be borne out entirely. If we put the case that a person disobeys his doctor, who is the worse? The patient. Whereas if a citizen be guilty of treason he may throw the State into confusion and ruin the ruler. The particle μήν is used to introduce a fresh link in the chain of argument, and also indicates the point at which this argument begins to show in marked opposition to Thrasy machus’ words, that rulers rule for their own benefit; just as in XXI. 3fin. a similar stage of an argument we have ἄλλα μήν ἰαματίας, &c. For Socrates here brings the arts under the category of rulers. ‘And yet, Thrasy machus [i.e. for all that you said before], the arts are rulers.’ Ρε is to save
κρατοῦσιν ἐκεῖνον, οὔτε ἐστὶ τέχναι. Συνεχώρησεν ἐνταῦθα καὶ μάλα μόνης. Οὐκ ἀρα ἐπιστήμη γε οὐδεμία τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδὲ ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ ἦττονος τε καὶ ἀρχομένου ύπὸ ἑαυτῆς. Ξυνωμολόγησε μὲν καὶ ταῦτα τελευτῶν, ἐπεχείρει δὲ περὶ αὐτὰ μάχεσθαι ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὠμολόγησεν, Ἀλλο τι οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, οὐδὲ ιατρὸς οὐδεὶς, καὶ οἴσον ιατρὸς, τὸ τὸ ιατρῷ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδὲ ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ κάμυντι; ὠμολόγηται γὰρ ὁ ἀκριβῆς ιατρὸς σωμάτων εἰναι ἄρχων ἀλλ' οὐ χρηματιστής. ἢ οὖν ὠμολόγηται; Ξυνέφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ κυβερνήτης ὁ ἀκριβῆς ναυτῶν εἰναι ἄρχων ἐάλλ' οὐ ναύτης; Ὑμολόγηται. Οὐκ ἀρα τ' οὖν του- οὐτος κυβερνήτης τε καὶ ἄρχων τὸ τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ξυμφέρον σκέψεται τε καὶ προστάξει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ναύτῃ τε καὶ ἁρχομένων. Ξυνέφησε μόνης. Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ὁ Ὄρασυμαχε, οὐδ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ ἁρχῇ, καθ' ὀσον ἁρχών ἄστι, τὸ αὐτῷ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδὲ ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ἁρχομένῳ καὶ οὗ ἄν αὐτὸς δημιουργῇ, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο βλέπων καὶ τὸ ἐκείνῳ ξυμφέρον καὶ πρέπον καὶ λέγει ἀ λέγει καὶ ποιεῖ ὃ ποιεῖ ἀπαντᾶ.
περιειστήκει, ο Θρασύμαχος αντί τοῦ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, Εἰτέ μοι, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, τίθη ο{i} σε ἐστιν; Τί δὲ; ἦν δ’ ἐγώ οὐκ ἀποκρίνεσθαι χρὴν μᾶλλον ἡ τουαῦτα ἐρωτάν; "Οτι τοι σε, ἔφη, κορυξόντα περιορά καὶ οὐκ ἀπομύττει δεόμενον, ὃς γε αὐτή οὐδὲ πρόβατα οὐδὲ ποιμένα γιγνόσκεις. "Οτι δὴ τί μάλιστα; ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. "Οτι οἷς ποιμένας ἡ τοὺς βουκόλους

περιειστήκει, περιέρχουσα, used in Euthyphro, 11, B, C, of an argument coming round to the same point, instead of to a conclusion, as here. περιέρχεται γὰρ πως ἡμῖν ἔνοχος ἐν προβάσει. And so περιέναι, ἵδια. Here, as noticed above in Ch. VII., the argument is invested with a quasi-personality.

τυτικὴ σοι ἔστιν; Thrasymachus is evidently enraged at his discomfiture. The scene is very similar to that in Euthydemus, 287 B, where Socrates has got the better of two sophists; whereupon the less discreet of the two remarks: εἶτε ὁ Σώκρατες, ὡς ὁ Κρόνος, ἢτε, &c. ἢ. 'Are you such a dotard, &c.?' So below, ὁ εὐθύδοτατος Σώκρατες.

αὐτῇ, 'for her,' ἢ. 'because she neglects to tell you.' An example of the pure 'Ethic Dative.' This Ethic Dative is merely an extreme case of the ordinary use of the dative: which is to express reference to a person or thing other than the subject, but affected indirectly by, or having some relation to, the action of the main verb. Examples of this general sense of the dative are:—

αὐτὰρ ὁ τοῖς ἀφελέτῳ νόστιμον ἦμαρ.—Hom. Od. 1, 9.

'Oscula libavit natae.'

Virg. Æn. 1, 256.

κελεσάραι δὲ νυσοὶ καθελομεν ἴστιν πάντα.

Hom. Od. 9, 149.

'Multis ille bonus flebilis occidit.'

Hor. Od. I. 24, 9.

The above datives fall in grammars under different heads; but they all agree in this fundamental character, that they express some person or thing more or less directly connected with the main action. In these examples the connection is close: often we can render by 'of,' as though the case were a genitive. Subjoined are some examples of the Ethic Dative, where it will be noticed that the connection between the person or thing in the dative, and the subject, is more remote, is rather mental than physical, as in the above examples:—

'Non Beroe vobis! non hec Rhoeia, matres, Est Doryclij conjux.'

Virg. Æn. 5, 646.

οὐκ ἄρθρει ὃμι σε ἔστιν;


κλήτη νῦν μοι, πλεύρα θεῖς ἐπὶ χορόν.


идеин ἀλλα τε δὴ μυθολογῶς, θαμμαστα καὶ ἵππων.—Rep. Book II. 359 D.

μάλιστα, 'particularly,' 'in what special point?'
Βτὸ τῶν προβάτων ἢ τὸ τῶν βοῶν ἀγαθῶν σκοπεῖν καὶ παχύνειν αὐτούς καὶ θεραπεύειν πρὸς ἅλλο τι βλέποντας ἢ τὸ τῶν δεσποτῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὸ αὐτών καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀρχοντας, οὐ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀρχοντας, ἄλλως πως ἤγει διανοεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχομένους ἢ ὁσπερ ἀν τις πρὸς πρόβατα διατεθεῖ, καὶ ἄλλο τι σκοπεῖν αὐτοὺς διὰ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας ἢ τούτο ὑθεν αὐτοὶ ὀφελήσονται. καὶ οὕτω πόρρω εἰ περὶ τε τοῦ δίκαιου καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδίκου τε καὶ ἀδίκιας, ὡστε ἄγνοεῖς, ὅτι ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἄγαθον τῷ ὠντι,
he would say, 'in the mouths of the people, we must understand the profit of the rulers and the injury of the ruled.'

οἰκεία βλάβη. v.s. the passage quoted from Sir Thomas More's Utopia in Ch. XII. 338 E. The passage proceeds thus:—

'Therefore when I consider and way in my mind all these common welthses, which now a dayses anywhere do flourish, so God helpe me, I can perceave nothing but a certein conspiracy of riche men procuring their owne commodities under the name of the commen wealth.'

ἡ δὲ ἄδικα τούτων, καὶ ἄρχει... Thrasymachus does not tell us who are the perpetrators of injustice; but, as injustice is stated to be the exercise of rule over the just (ἄρχει τῶν δικαίων), we are obliged to conclude that it is the rulers who are the ἄδικοι and exercise this δικραία. We are confirmed in this conclusion by a reference to Book III. 409, loc. supr. cit., where the just man, it is allowed, is often the victim of the unjust; just as in the Gospel it is said that the children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of light. δίδῃ καὶ εὐθείας (as εὐθυκίων here) νέοι δότες οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς φαίνονται καὶ εὐθείας ἡμᾶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἄδικων. Therefore Thrasymachus' position comes to this: Rulers manage the people for their own profit: the law-abiding people consider obedience to the rulers to be justice. Still it remains that the rule of the Rulers is, in all cases, an unjust one. It is evident from this that Thrasymachus allows in the background the existence of a very different justice from the justice of his definition; otherwise, why does he acknowledge that the Rulers rule unjustly? We shall see what use Socrates makes of this inconsistency in the sequel. Aristotle treats of a similar case in Eth. Nic. 5, 6, where, describing πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, he also defines injustice: τούτῳ δ' έστι τὸ πλέον αὐτῷ νέμειν τῶν ἀπλῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἀπλῶν κακῶν. Διὸ οὐκ έξαιρεῖν καθορισμὸν ἄρχειν ἀλλὰ αὐν λόγων. δίκαιος ἄνθρωπον πανταχοῦ ἔλαττον ἔχει, v.s. p.t. αὔτόν γε σοι πλέον έσται, Ch. XV. init. In Arist. Eth. Nic. 5, 9, 9, the just man is described as denying himself, as permitting or conniving at the advantage of others, ὁ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆς ἔλαττωτικὸς ἔστιν. And above;
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ξυμβολαίοις, ὅπου ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος τῷ τοιούτῳ κοινωνήσῃ, οὔδαμον ἂν εὐρός ἐν τῇ διαλύσει τῆς κοινονίας πλέον ἔχοντα τὸν δίκαιον τοῦ ἀδίκου ἀλλ’ ἐλαττοῦν· ἐπείτα ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὅταν τέ τινες εἰσφοραὶ ὄσιν, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἀπὸ τῶν ἱσών πλέον εἰσφέρει, ὁ ἔλαττον, ὅταν τε λήψεις, ὁ μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δὲ πολλὰ κερδαίνει. καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἀρχὴν τινα ἀρχὴ ἑκάτερος,

πλέον ἐπέρρω ἢ αὐτῷ νέμει. For this position see Book II. Chaps. I.–IX., where it is drawn out at much greater length, and illustrated with much greater force by Glaucon and Adeimantus. See also Aristophanes, Clouds, where the Δίκαιος Λόγος and the Ἀδίκος Λόγος measure swords, ll. 889–1104. And with regard to the special question, ἐπείτα ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, of the just man and the unjust in office, see Socrates’ conversation with Aristippus in Mem. Xenophonis, Book II. Ch. I. And also Antiphon’s opinion of Socrates’ refusal to take money for teaching; ἰδιὰ. Book I. 6, 12. Δίκαιος μὲν οὖν ἂν εἶν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐξεπατάς ἐπὶ πλευρᾷς, σφόν δὲ οὐκ ἂν, μηθέοις γε εἴριν ἐπιστάμενος. Here σφόν οὐκ... is the equivalent of εὐθυκῶν and εὐθείως in the passages of the Republic. And see also the passage from Arist. Ethics quoted above, πλέον αὐτῷ νέμειν.

ξυμβολαίοις. v.b. not. ad Cap. VII.

εἰσφοραί, an extraordinary tax, raised upon property, to meet urgent occasions. Thus when Mytilene was besieged, B.C. 428, by Paches, an εἰσφορά was imposed. προσδέμενοι δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι χρημάτων ἐς τὴν πολιορκίαν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐσενέγκοντες τότε πρῶτον εἰσφορὰν διακόσια, εἴσεπεμψαν καὶ ἐπὶ τούς εὐμμάχους, &c. The term for the imperial requisition was φόρος, and afterwards σύνταξις, see Dem. de Cor. 305, Reiske.

ἀπὸ τῶν ἱσών, ‘upon an equal assessment or amount of property.’ ἀπὸ implies ‘calculating from.’

λήψεις. An illustration of this practice, i.e. of gratis distribution to the citizens when any extraordinary revenue accrued, is found in Herod. VII. 144, where it is proposed that the produce of the Laurian silver should be applied thus: ἐμελλὼν λαξευθαὶ ἄρχην ἐκαστὸς ἐκαστὸς διὰ δραχμᾶς. Themistocles however diverted the money to the building of a fleet. Similarly in Roman history, when Attalus Philometor, king of Pergamus, bequeathed his property to Rome, Tiberius Gracchus proposed to apply it to the stocking of those farms which poor farmers had obtained through his agrarian laws, instead of merely distributing it to all the citizens.

ὅταν ἀρχὴν τινα... For this third point compare Xen. Mem. II. 1, 8. καὶ γὰρ πάνω μοι δοκεῖ ἄφρονος ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι τὸ, μεγάλου ὄντος τοῦ ἐαυτῷ τὰ δεόντα παρασκευάζειν, μὴ ἁρκεῖν τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ προσαναθέσαι τὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, δὲν δεόντως
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τὸ μὲν δικαίω υπάρχει, καὶ εἰ μηδεμία ἄλλη ξημα, τά νε οἰκεία δὲ ἀμέλειαν μοιχηρότερος ἔχειν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ δημοσίου μηδὲν ὠφελείσθαι διὰ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τούτους ἀπέχθεσθαι τοῖς τε οἰκείοις καὶ τοῖς γνωρίμοις, ὅταν μηδὲν θέλη αὐτοῖς ὑπηρετεῖν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον· τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ πάντα τοῦτων τὰναντία υπάρχει. λέγω γὰρ οὖν οὐνὶ δὴ ἐξεγον, τὸν μεγάλα δυνάμενον πλεονεκτεῖν. τούτον οὖν σκόπει, εἴπερ 344 βούλει κρίνειν, ὅσο μᾶλλον ἡμιφέρει ἠδὰ αὐτῷ ἀδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸ δίκαιον. πάντων δὲ ῥάστα μαθή-

πορίζειν, καὶ ἣντι μὲν τολλά ὅν βούλεται ἐξελίπειν τῷς δὲ πόλεως προσέτατα, ἐὰν μὴ πάντα, δια ἡ πόλις βούλεται καταπάτη, τούτων δικήν ὑπέχειν, τούτῳ πάσῃ ὁ πολλῆς ἄρρητον ἔστιν; σοὶ in Herod. I, 97, the just man Deioces, who is always appointed arbiter of disputes, finds that his own affairs go to ruin whilst he is rectifying others’. οὐ γὰρ οἱ λαοί τέκνοις, τῶν ἄνω ξημεληκότα, τοῖς πέλας δ' ήμέρης δικάζειν. Aristotle (Eth. 5, 66) gives the reason for the just man’s poverty in office, by stating the principle on which he acts: οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ ἀδικίας ἀγαθοῦ αὐτῶ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτῶν ἀνάλογον ἔστιν. And he coincides with Plato in his opinion of their different behaviour in office when he says, ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα διεῖ. 5, 1, 16. Thrasyymachus adds that it is the fault of the judge’s ἐφθέια if he cannot make his livelihood and something to spare out of his dispensation of justice.

μοιχηρότερος ἔχειν. We should be inclined at first sight to make τά οἰκεία the subject of μοιχ. ἔχειν, but when we come to the balancing clauses, εἰ δὲ... ὠφελείσθαι, and πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀπέχθεσθαι, we see that the sentence will be more perfect if ‘the just man’ be made the subject of μοιχ. ἔχειν as well as of ὠφελείσθαι. The use of μοιχηρός διακεῖσθαι in Gorgias, 504 E, may be noticed in support of this construction; and τά γε οἰκεία will then be accusativus respectū pendens. For the termination of μοιχ. Stallb. addsuce a number of similar words, ἐνδεικτέρως, ἀγριοτέρως, μαλακτέρως, &c. And for this use of the absolute comparative, see Euthyphro ini., τι νέοτερον; Herod. VI. 46. τείχος ἵσχυροτερον περιβαλλόμενον.

ἀπέχθεσθαι. Transl. ‘to be an object of hatred to,’ thus bringing out the force of the dative, the case of the person indirectly concerned; v.s. not. ad aitp, and see infr. Ch. XXIII. ἢ μὴ τοῦτο ἀπέχθωμαι. To render, ‘by his relations and acquaintances,’ is not accurate, although unavoidable in such a phrase as, ἐμοὶ πέτραται τοβρόγ. ἢ τὸ δίκαιον, sc. εἶναι ἡμιφέρει τῷ δικαλῷ, Stallb. The expression is awkward and more abrupt.
σει, ἐδώ ἐπὶ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν ἡλθος, ή τῶν μὲν ἀδικήσαντα εὐδαιμονέστατον ποιει, τοὺς δὲ ἀδικηθέντας καὶ ἀδικήσαι οὖσα ἄν ἐθέλοντας ἄθλιωτάτους. ἔστι δὲ τούτο τυραννίς, ἦν οὐ κατὰ σμικρὸν ταλλότρια καὶ λάθρα καὶ βία ἀφαιρεῖται, καὶ οἰρά καὶ ὀσια καὶ ἱδια καὶ δημόσια, ἀλλὰ ξυλοβληθήσῃ. ὃν ἐφ’ ἐκάστῳ μέρει ὅταν τις ἀδικήσας μὴ λάθη, ζημιούται τε καὶ ὀνείδη ἔχει τὰ μέγιστα· καὶ γάρ ἰερόσυλοι καὶ ἀνδραποδίσται καὶ τοιχωρίχοι καὶ ἀποστερηταὶ καὶ κλέπται οἱ κατὰ μέρη ἀδικοῦντες τῶν τοιούτων κακουργημάτων καλοῦνται· ἔπει-

than we should expect to find. Bremius conjectured τὸ before ἄδικον, which would improve the reading; but some of the MSS. omit τὸ altogether.

τὴν τελεωτ. ἀδικίαν. ν. ἓ 348 D: οἱ γε τελεῶς οἱοὶ τε ἀδικεῖν. And infr. in this Ch. τὴν δὲν ἀδικίαν ἰδικοκτά. 351 B: τελεωτάτα οὗσα ἄδικος. 352 C: κομιδῇ διντεῖς ἄδικοι. 360 E: τέλεων ἐκάτερον εἰς τὸ ἔκαστον ἐπιθέων τίθημεν. Et ididi. infr. ἐστάτη ἄδικια, τῷ τελεῶς ἀδικφ. And so ἡμιοχήθηροι, 352 C, and οἱ κατὰ μέρη ἀδικοῦντες, infr. here.

ἔστι δὲ τούτο τυραννίς. See Arist. Eth. 5, 6, 5. Αἱδ οὐκ ἐδώεσκεν ἄρχειν ἀνθρωπὸν ἀλλὰ λόγον, διὸ ἐναυτῷ τούτῳ ποιεῖ καὶ γίνεται τύραννος. Lec. supr. cit.: et infr. § 7. Μισθὸς διὰ τις δοτέος...διὸ δὲ μὴ ἱκανά τὰ τοιαύτα, οὐδὲ γίνονται τύραννοι. For the genesis of the τύραννος, see Book VIII. fin. IX. innd. Thrasymachus' account of the despot here agrees substantially with that of Socrates in Book VIII.

ἱερὰ καὶ διόσια. ἱερὰ = Latin sacer; διόσιον = fas. See Liddell and Scott ad ἱερος, 2. For ξυλοβληθήσῃ v.s. Ch. IX.: ἦ καὶ ξυλοβληθήσῃ ἄρετῇ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κακοὶς; (sc. ποιοῦσι).

καὶ γὰρ ἰερόσυλοι, &c. Cf. the tale of Alexander and the robber, which has been related thus.

A certain pirate who made great havoc among the shipping of the Mediterranean Sea was taken prisoner by the Macedonian soldiers and brought before Alexander, who asked by what right he committed his robberies. "I am a robber by the same right that you are a conqueror," was the reply; "the only difference between us is, that I have but a few men, and can do but little mischief, while you have a large army and can do a great deal."

τῶν τοιούτων κακ. Causal genitive: it is used very frequently in Greek, and appears in many forms. E.g. with adjective alone, ἢ δυσταλάμα τῶν ἐμῶν παιδιμάτων. Or with verbs of wondering, see infr. 426 D. τούς...προθυμουμένους οὐκ ἄγασαι τῆς ἄνδρεις. Also with such verbs as εὐδαιμονίζω, μακαρίζω, ἀλβίζω.
Ταύτα εἰπὼν ὁ Ὀρασύμαχος ἐν νῷ εἶχεν ἀπιέναι, ὅσπερ Βαλανεὺς ἦμὼν καταντλήσας κατὰ τῶν ὤτων

Ἀνδραπ. δοῦλ. ἄνδραποδίζομαι is the more odious word of the
two, and expresses the act of depriving a man of his liberty;
hence it means sometimes to
kidnap; δοῦλος, to hold in
subjection. So in Book V. 469
Β, we find the former used when
the question is discussed—Shall
Greeks enslave Greeks in war?
Πρῶτον μὲν ἄνδραποδίζομοι πέρι,
δοκεὶ δίκαιον "Ελλήνας Ἐλληνίδας
πόλεις ἄνδραποδίζεσθαι. Whilst
farther on we find δοῦλος and
dουλεία used to describe the state of
slavery.
οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἄδικα ἄλλα
tὸ πάσχειν. In his elaboration
of Thrasymachus’ case in Book
II., Glaucon shows that what is
called justice arises from this
fact, that men give up wrong
dealing, not from principle, but
because they prefer to free them-
selves from the danger of being
ill-treated by others. ἃτε ἐπει-
δὰν ἄλληλους ἄδικωσ᾽ τε καὶ
ἄδικωνται καὶ ἀμφιτέρων γεουν-
tαι, τοῖσ μὴ δυσαμένοι τὸ μὲν
ἐκφεύγειν τὸ δὲ αἱρεῖν δοκεῖ
νυστελεῖν ἐξυπάθειαν ἄλληλοις μὴν
ἀδίκεισθαι. ἕκαστοι...

'because they are
afraid of.'

Ἰσχυρότερον...ἄδικα. Thrasy-
machus here no longer conceals
his true position, but clearly
states that what is justice to
the ruled is injustice in the
hands of the ruler; an inconsis-
tency which cannot be supported
by the terms of any definition.

CH. XVII.—Socrates entreats
Thrasymachus to abide by his
words.

ὅσπερ Βαλανεὺς... Socrates,
as it has been mentioned above,
had the greatest objection to
long speeches, and always stipulated for the method of question and answer in discussion. See Protag. 334 D. He justified this claim on the ground that he had a bad memory (a phase of the ειρωνεία), thus: loc. cit. ἐν δυναμώνεον τὸν θυγάτερον τις ἔν ἀνθρώπου. In Ch. XXII. init. Thrasymachus, when defeated in argument, refuses to be convinced, and expresses his intention either of giving his opinion in a speech, or of saying 'yes' and 'no,' just as Socrates desires—in other words, of not attempting to argue the question. He there states that he knows Socrates will accuse him of making an harangue (θηταγο-ρείν) if he deliver himself as he desires, and yet declines to argue point by point. For καταντλέω, see 536 B, φιλοσοφία ἐτελεῖ γέλωτα καταντλήσομεν; where also the object is in the genitive.

οὐ μὴν εἴσασάν γε, 'but the rest by no means permitted him to escape.' γε implies the complete refusal of the others to let Thrasymachus off, being attached to εἴσασαν, in order to negative the bare idea of their doing so.

οἷον ἐμβαλῶν...εἰχεί. Here, as noticed above, page 128, the principal verb is cast into the participle, for purposes of grammatical construction; as we had above, οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἔδικα...φοβοῦμεν οὐνείδισκον. 'They are not afraid of doing but of suffering harm, that they reproach,' &c. We may recall Virgil, Æn. 1, 141—

"Clauso ventorum carcere regnet.

i.e. 'Let him shut up his prison before he play the king.' For ἐμβαλῶν v. infir. ἢ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν χέρων ἐνθ' τὸν λ'γον;

ἡ σμικρὸν οἶει...ἀλλ' οὐ... For the sentiment, v.s. not. ad ei μὲν χρυσόν ἐξητούμεν, Ch. X. And infir. 352 C, οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος δ' λόγου ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δυντικά τρόπον χρῆν. Similarly 358 E, περὶ γὰρ τίνος ἄν μᾶλλον πολλάκις τις κοιτὶ έχον καλοὶ λέγων καὶ ἀκούων; (sc. δικαιοσύνης). Again 367 D, οὐδὲ οὐκ ἄν (sc. bear to hear the ordinary talk about justice) εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύεις, διὸτι πάντα τὸν
οὐ βιοῦ διαγωγῆν, ἢ ἀν διαγόμενος ἐκαστὸς ἢμῶν λυσιτελεστάτην ὡσὶν ἡφί; Ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Ὀρασύμαχος, τοῦτο ἄλλως ἔχειν; ἢ Εὐκας, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ἦτοι ἢμῶν γε οὐδέν κηδεσθαι, οὐδὲ τι φροντίζειν εἰτε χειρὸν εἰτε βέλτιον βιοσόμεθα ἀγνοοῦντες ὅ ὑφ’ ἑιδέναι. ἀλλ’, ὃ γ’ αθέ, προθυμοῦ καὶ ἢμῶν ἐνδείξα-σθαί οὖτοι κακῶς σοι κέλεσται, ὅ τι ἂν ἢμᾶς τοσοῦτο 345

βιῶν οὐδέν ἄλλο σκοτῶν διελ-
λυθαὶ ἡ τοῦτο. Καὶ στις ἀρισ-
τράτης ἐκ τοῦ τυφλοῦ, ἐκ τοῦ ἡμερί-νων ἰδίων, ὡς ἐκ τοῦ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς
τοῦ ἡμέραν ἐπιλείχε. Καὶ τοῦτο ἢ
tο κακὸν. Καὶ τοῦτο εἶπε συναρμολο-
γοῦσα συναρμολογοῦσα τοῦτο καὶ τοῦτο
τοῦτο κακῶς καὶ τοῦτο καλός. Καὶ τοῦτο
τοῦτο κακῶς καὶ τοῦτο καλός. Καὶ τοῦτο
τοῦτο κακῶς καὶ τοῦτο καλός.

These passages are very valuable, because they preserve the leading point of Socrates' moral system—'Put everything after living your life uprightly,'—just as in Book X. intit. He puts truth before persons, ἄλλ’ οὐ γὰρ πρὸ γε τῆς ἀλήθειας τιμητέως ἀνήρ, and they prove to us what we are liable to forget sometimes amid the raillery of the dialogue, that Socrates was always in earnest. See Introd. § 7. Aristotle speaks similarly in Eth. Nic. 2, 21: Ἑπεὶ οὖν ἡ παροῦσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρεῖ ἑνεκά ἐστιν (οὐ γὰρ ἢ εἰδέμεν τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα, ἄλλ’ ἵνα ἀγαθὸν γενόμεθα), &c. The expression ἄλλ’ οὐ is to be noticed, where in English we should say 'and not.' See Book II. 379 D: τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄλλ’ ἑταί ἢτζεν τά ἄτια, ἄλλ’ οὐ τῶν θεῶν. So in Book VI. 500 A: ἐν ὁλίγος τοῖς ἡγοῦμαι, ἄλλ’ οὐκ ἐν τῷ

v. Euthyphro ἰδία, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βλέπω ὅτι ἀμείον βιοσοφῆν

προθυμοῦ. A favourite term

with Plato in a similar context. So Euthyphro II. Ε, αὐτὸς σοι ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμαι δεῖξα, where ἐξουσιώσωμα

to receive information; as in Xen. Anab. 7, 2, 24: ἐδεδομένος μου ἐξουσιώσεως διαβαίνει τὸ στρατεύμα. See also Laches 186 A: προθυμούμενοι αὐτῶν δ’ τι ἁρπάσας γενέσθαι τὰς φυχας. And for the spirit in which the remark is proffered see Meno. 71 D: ἔστω καὶ μὴ φθονησής, τί φής ἁρπάσας εἶναι;

κέλεσται. Something similar in Virgil's—

'Haud illi stabunt Aenea parvo Hospitia, ' (En. 10, 494); the difference being that stare is used of the expense, κείμαι of the gain.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ἀντας εὐεργετήσης. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ σοι λέγω τὸ γ' ἔμοι, ὅτι οὐ πείθομαι οὐδ' οἴμαι ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης κερδαλεώτερον εἶναι, οὐδ' ἕαν ἐὰν τις αὐτὴν καὶ μὴ διακωλύῃ πράττειν ἃ βούλεται· ἀλλ', ὃ 'γαθέ, ἔστω μὲν ἄδικος, δυνάσθω δὲ ἄδικεῖν ἢ τῷ λανθάνειν ἢ τῷ διαμάχεσθαι, ὅμως ἐμὲ γε οὐ πείθει ὃς ἐστὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης κερδαλεώτερον. ταῦτ' οὖν καὶ ἑτέρος

Βίοσας τις ἡμῶν πέτονθεν, οὐ μόνος ἐγώ. πείσων οὖν, ὃ μακάρτε, ἰκανῶς ἡμᾶς, ὅτι οὐκ ὁρθῶς βουλεύομεθα δικαιοσύνην ἀδικίας περὶ πλείονος ποιούμενοι. Καὶ πῶς, ἐϑη, σὲ πείσω; εἰ γὰρ οἱς νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον μὴ πέπεισαν, τί σοι ἐτι ποιήσω; ἢ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν φέρον ἐνθὼ τὸν λόγον; Μὰ Δί', ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, μὴ σὺ γε' ἄλλα πρῶτον μὲν, ἢ ἄν εἴπης, ἐμμενε τούτοις, ἢ ἔαν μετατιθῇ, φανερῶς μετατίθεσο καὶ ἡμᾶς μὴ ἕξαπάτα.

Γ' νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶς, ὃ Θρασύμαχε, ἔτι γὰρ τὰ ἐμπροσθέν ἐπισκεψάμεθα, ὅτι τὸν ὅς ἀληθῶς ἰατρὸν τὸ πρῶτον ὄριζόμενος τὸν ὃς ἀληθῶς ποιεῖ ὅψιν ὁ ἐν

For this sense of κεῖμαι, to be stored up, see Ch. VII. ad fin. μηδὲν αὐτῷ (sc. ἀργυρῷ) χρησθαι ἀλλὰ κεῖσθαι.

τὸ γ' ἔμον, v.s. τὸ τοῦ Σωφρόκλους, Ch. III.

ὃ τῷ λανθάνειν ἢ τῷ διαμ. v. ἱστ. Book II. Ch. IV.: λέγειν τε ἰκανῷ διότι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν, εἰὼ τι μηνύηται τῶν ἀδικημάτων, καὶ βιείαται διὰ τι βίας δένται. The unjust man is described as fully provided against all emergencies, by fraud or force, as in this passage.

πέτονθεν, 'has occurred to some one else,' v.s. not. ad page 114. ἐπιτόνθῃ.

ὅτι τὸν ὃς ἀληθῶς ποιεῖ, &c. See the beginning of Ch. XVI. where Thrasymachus, in transferring his metaphor from a physician to a shepherd, forgot or repudiated his former distinction between the physician speaking roughly, and the physician purely as a physician; and proceeded to assert that the shepherd has his own ultimate profit always in view rather than the good of the sheep. Socrates points out that if the shepherd is to be understood rigorously as a shepherd (ἄρπιθώς), he has regard only to the well-being of the sheep, and not of himself. See Sir Thomas More's Utopia, p. 61, ed. Arber, in imitation of this passage: 'Therefore the kyngge ought to take more care for the wealthe of his people, then for his owne wealthe, euene as the office and dewtie of a shephearde is, in that he is a shepperde, to feede his shepe rather then himself.'
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ α'.

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υστερον ἀκριβῶς φυλάξαι, ἀλλὰ πιαίνειν οἰει αὐτοῦν τὰ πρόβατα, καθ’ ὅσον ποιμὴν ἔστιν, οὐ πρὸς τὸ τῶν προβάτων βέλτιστον βλέποντα, ἀλλ’ ὁσπερ δαιτυμόνα τινὰ καὶ μέλλοντα ἐστιάσεσθαι πρὸς τὴν εὐωχίαν, ἣ αὖ πρὸς τὸ ἀποδόσθαι, ὁσπερ χρηματιστήν ἀλλ’ οὐ ποιμένα. τῇ δὲ ποιμενικῇ οὐ δήπου θὰ ἀλλοι του μέλει ἦ, ἐφ’ ὃ τέτακται, ὅπως τούτῳ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐκπορεύει· ἔπει τὰ γε αὐτῆς, ὡστ’ εἶναι βελτίστη, ἰκανῶς δήπου ἐκπερισταί, ἔως γ’ ἀν μηδὲν ἐνδὴ τοῦ ποιμενικῆς εἶναι· οὕτω δὲ φίλην ἐγγυε νῦν ὅτ’ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἡμῖν ὀμολογεῖν, πᾶσαν ἄρχην, καθ’ ὅσον ἄρχη, μηδὲν ἄλλῳ τὸ βέλτιστον σκοπεῖσθαι ἢ ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἄρχομένῳ τε καὶ θεραπευομένῳ, ἐν τε πολιτικῇ καὶ ἰδιωτικῇ ἄρχῃ. σοὶ δὲ τοὺς ἀρχοντας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, τοὺς ἀληθῶς ἀρχοντας, ἑκόντας οἰεὶ ἄρχειν; Μὰ Δί’ οὖκ, ἐφη, ἀλλ’ εὖ ὀίδα.

τῇ δὲ ποιμεν. οὐ δήποι ἀλλοι μέλει. We find this verb used personally in Hom. Od. 9, 20—

ἐλεύθερος Δαρειάδης δε πάσιν δόλουσιν

αὐθεντοσι μέλων.

So δοκεῖν is found, and ὕστη, as well as δοκεῖ and ὕστη. See Book II. 368 B: δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι ἀδύνατος εἶναι. And

Meno. 72 Α: πολλὴ γε τινὶ εὐτυχὶς ἱοκα κεχρησκεθα.

ἔως γ’ ἂν ὑπῆκα... See above, Ch. XV., the question at which Thrasymachus stumbled: ἀρ’ οὖν καὶ ἐκάστῃ τῶν τεχνῶν ἐστὶν τῇ ἐμφύρεων ἄλλο ἢ δι’ τῆς μάλιστα τελείων εἶναι;

οὕτω δὲ φιλήν... νῦν δὴ, ‘just now.’ Socrates calls Thrasymachus’ attention to the inconsistency of making the ruler, as a ruler, have regard to his own interest. He then puts a question involving the word ἄρχειν, which he and Thrasymachus understand in different ways, thus; Thrasymachus’ idea of ἄρχῃ is the discharge of certain duties as a necessary condition of obtaining money, power, and opportunity to further one’s influence by judicious distribution of places; whilst Socrates looks upon it as an arduous and responsible labour, in which self must be ignored, and all the powers of the mind strained to their utmost, in providing for the welfare of the public. On these different acceptations of the term ἄρχῃ turns the next part of the discussion.
Τί δὲ; ἂν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ Ὀρασύμαχε, τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἔννοεις ὅτι οὐδεὶς έθελεί ἄρχειν ἵκών, ἄλλα μισθὸν αὐτοῦς, ὡς οὐχὶ αὐτοῦς ὅφελεῖν ἐμομεν-νην ἐκ τοῦ ἄρχειν ἄλλα τοῖς ἄρχομένοις; ἐπεὶ τοσάνδε εἰπὲ οὐχὶ ἐκάστην μέντοι φαμέν ἐκάστοτε τῶν τεχνῶν τούτων ἔτεραν εἶναι, τῷ ἔτεραν τὴν δύνα-μιν ἔχειν; καὶ, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα τι καὶ περαινομεν. Ἁλλὰ τούτῳ, ἐφη, ἔτερα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὦφελειαν ἐκάστη ἰδίαιν τίνα ἥμιν παρέχε-ται, ἀλλ’ οὗ κοινῆν, οἶον ἱατρικὴ μὲν ἤγλειαν, κυβερ-
νητική δὲ σωτηρίαν ἐν τῷ πλείν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτως; Πάνυ γε. Οὔκοιν καὶ μυσθωτική μυσθόν; αὕτη γὰρ αὕτης ἢ δύναμις ἢ τὴν ἰατρικήν σὺ καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν τὴν αὕτην καλεῖς; ἢ ἐάνπερ βούλη ἄκριβως διορίζειν, ὅσπερ ὑπέθου, οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον, ἐὰν τὶς κυβερνων ὑγιῆς γύγνηται διὰ τὸ ξυμφέρειν αὐτῷ πλείν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, ἕνεκα τούτου καλεῖς μᾶλλον αὕτην ἰατρικήν; Οὐ δήτα, ἐφη. Οὔδε γ', οἴμαι, τὴν μυσθωτικὴν, εὰν ὑγιαινῇ τις μυσθαρνών. Οὐ δήτα. Τί δέ; τὴν ἰατρικὴν μυσθαρνητικὴν, εὰν ἰόμενος τις μυσθαρνή; Οὐκ, ἐφη. Οὔκοιν τὴν γε κ. ὧφελειαν ἑκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἰδίαν ὁμολογήσαμεν εἶναι; Ἐστο, ἐφη. Ἡντινα ἄρα ὧφελειαν κοινῇ ὧφελούνται πάντες οἱ δημομυγοῦν, δῆλον δτι κοινῇ

ἡ ἐάνπερ βούλη ἄκριβως διορί-
ζειν. Τὴν ἀλληράτην ὑποτικὴν τὸν ἀνθρώπον 
καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν τὴν ἀυτὴν καλεῖς; ἢ ἐάν 
περὶν διά τὸν ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ, ἐν 
τὸν καλεῖς μᾶλλον ἀυτὴν ἰατρικὴν; Οὐ 
δήτα, ἐφη. Οὐδεὶς γ', οἴμαι, τὴν 
μυσθωτικὴν, εὰν ὑγιαινῇ τις μυσθαρνῶν. 
Οὐ δήτα. Τί δέ; τὴν ἰατρικὴν μυσθαρνητικὴν, εὰν 
ἰόμενος τις μυσθαρνή; Οὐκ, ἐφη. Οὔκοιν τὴν γε 
ὁφελείαν ἑκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἱδίαν ὀμολογήσαμεν 
εἶναι; Ἐστο, ἐφη. Ἡντινα ἄρα ὧφελειαν κοινῇ 
ὁφελοῦνται πάντες οἱ δημομυγοῦν, δῆλον ὑπὶ κοινῇ

Οὐ δήτα, 'of course not.' Prof. 
Paley terms δῆτα an adverbial 
expansion of δή. Δή, as has 
been noticed above, is culmina-
tive or final, and also emphatic; 
and often thus combined with 
お互い. So ἄντρος. Ch. XXII. ἰδιτ. 
δοκεῖν...πράξαι ἄν τι δύνασθαι, 
εἰ δώκοιν; Οὐ δήτα. See also 
Sophocles, Ed. Τυρ. 754, 5—
ΟΙ. ἢ καὶ δοῦμισθενε τυχάναι 
ταύν παρὼν;

Οὐ δήτα;
We have here a crude version of the fact that all human labour can be productive. The only way of justifying the use of the word τέχνη is to say that there is an art in knowing what article is demanded, in order that the labour may meet a want and be profitable to the labourer. But Socrates does not mean this, he is only arguing upon analogy; and he chooses to term the practice of getting paid for duties, professional or mechanical, an art, because it suits his disproof of Thrasymachus' statements.

έαν δὲ μὴ μισθὸς... We must not overlook the importance of this clause, although stated conditionally. ‘But what if a man gets no pay for his labour —what then? Does he get any benefit from the art itself?’ ‘No,’ Socrates would go on, ‘it is to the person for whom he works that all benefit accrues from the art itself and not to the labourer; for he may spend his labour on that which is not wanted at once, and then he gets no return.’ In contrast to this Socrates then puts the converse, ‘Does he do no good, then, if he work without pay?’ And Socrates’ answer is that he must benefit some one by productive labour; although he may not be necessarily remunerated for it. In brief, it is impossible to work without doing good, but it is possible to work without gaining money.
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ α’.

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ἡττονος δύνοτος σκοπούσα, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος. διὰ δὴ ταῦτα ἔγογε, ὃ φίλε Ἡρασύμαχε, καὶ ἀρτι ἐλεγον μηδένα ἐθέλειν ἐκόντα ἄρχειν καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια κακὰ μεταχειρίζονται ἀνορθοῦντα, ἀλλὰ μισθόν αἰτεῖν, ὅτι ὁ μέλλων καλῶς τῇ τέχνῃ πράξειν οὐδὲ- 347 ποτε αὐτῷ τὸ βέλτιστον πράττει οὐδ’ ἐπιτάττει κατ’ τὴν τέχνην ἐπιτάττων, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἄρχομενῳ δὲν ἡ ἕνεκα, ὡς ἔοικε, μισθόν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μέλλουσιν θεθησεῖν ἄρχειν, ἢ ἀργύριον ἢ ζημιάν, εἰάν μὴ ἄρχῃ.

did δὴ ταῦτα. δὴ marks the conclusion.

τὰ ἀλλότρια κακὰ... See Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 8: ἀφρόνοις ἀνθράκων εἶναι τὸ, μεγάλου δύνας τοῦ ἐαυτῷ τὰ δεόντα παρασκευάζειν, μὴ ἄρκειν τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ προσαναθέσθαι τὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις.

ὁ μέλλων... ‘the man who is to do his duty in his art.’ When μέλλω is used thus in the participle or with ei, the principal verb in the sentence expresses a necessary condition without which the action expressed by the verb following μέλλων cannot be realized. We should therefore gain a clearer rendering if we put the statement negatively, ‘A man cannot do his duty in his art, unless he loses sight of his own interests,’ or ‘if a man is to do his duty in his art, he must lose sight of his interests.’ μέλλω then has the force of a certain future, ‘to be sure to’... So in 520 D the phrase of μέλλοντες ἄρχειν is applied to men who are said to be unwilling to take office, but who, nevertheless do take it; where it may be construed ‘those who must take office.’ And in this Book, Ch. XXI.; τῶς γὰρ ὃς μέλλει... ἔσκειν: ‘How can he fail to be like...?’ And here ἵνα: τοῖς μέλλουσιν θεθῆσειν ἄρχειν, ‘Those who are to be induced to take office.’ And in Book II. Ch. I.: τῷ μέλλοντι μακαρῷ ἔσθαι. Also id. Ch. IV.: λανδανέτω, εἰ μέλλει σφόδρα ἄδικος εἶναι. This meaning is in curious contrast to another use ‘to be going to do a thing (and never do it)’; ‘to linger,’ ‘hesitate.’ See Soph. O. C. 1627, 8—

ὁ oὗτος oὗτος, Οἰδίποις, τί μέλλομεν χωρεῖν; πάλαι δὴ τ’ ἀπὸ σοῦ βραδύνεται.

From which latter sense we have μελλητής (cunctator) in Ar. Eth. Nic. 4, 3, 27.
ζημιάν. See Ar. Eth. 5, 6, 6, loc. sup. cit.
CAP. XIX.

Πῶς τούτο λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες; ἐφη ὁ Γλαύκων, τοὺς μὲν γὰρ δύο μισθοῦς γεγυνώσκω. τὴν δὲ ξημίαν ἤντινα λέγεις καὶ ὡς ἐν μισθοῦ μέρει εἰρηκας, οὐ ξυνήκα. Τὸν τῶν βελτίστων ἄρα μισθόν, ἐφην, οὐ ξυνεῖς, δι᾽ ὅν ἀρχουσιν οἱ ἐπεικείστατοι, ὅταν ἐθέλον- σιν ἄρχειν. ἢ οὐκ οἴσθα, ὅτι τὸ φιλότιμον τε καὶ φιλ- λάργυρον εἶναι οἰνείδος λέγεται τε καὶ ἔστιν; Ἔγωγε, ἐφη. Διὰ ταῦτα τοιοῦν, ἢν δὲ ἐγώ, οὕτω χρημάτων ένεκα ἐθέλουσιν ἄρχειν οἱ ἄγαθοι οὐτε τιμής οὕτε γὰρ φανερῶς πραττόμενοι τῆς ἄρχης ἐνεκα μισθοῦν

Ch. XIX.—Men who love money and fame are ready to take office: the best men only do so when pressed. But next I do not agree with Thrasymachus, that the just life is less profitable than the unjust.

οὐ ξυνήκα. Glauccon does not contemplate a repugnance to taking office; Socrates himself below confesses that the reverse is the case, διὰτερ νυν τὸ ἀρχεῖν (περιμάχητων). Aristotle in Eth. Nic. draws out this character of a just man who is actuated by no self-interest, because he is in lack of nothing (οὐδενὸς προσδειται); he is βασιλεὺς, the true monarch, and stands in contrast to τύραννοι.

τὸ φιλότ. καὶ τὸ φιλάργυρ. With this threefold division of the self-sufficient, the praise-loving, and the money-loving characters, compare Book IX. 581 A. Ἀρ’ ὅν καὶ τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς...καλ- ούντες φιλοχρήματον καὶ φιλοκερδὲς ὃρθως ἄν καλοίμεν;...Τί δὲ; τὸ θυμοεἰδῆς...ἐι φιλόνεικον αὐτὸ καὶ φιλότιμον προσαγо-
At the completion of his system of education for the philosophers-kings (Book VII. 520), Plato shows how unwillingly they will take office, preferring much the life of calm speculation to that of political business. As ev' anagkaios autov ekastos elai to arkein, tolvan ton vun en ekasth polei arxontan.

perimakhtov. See again loc. cit. ouk dnav, ouv vun ai polllai

vid skiaamatovn to trds allh-

lous kal stasidatovn per to

arkein oikouvnta, ou megav

tiv os anagwvo otnas.

anvnav aigwnav. In the passage quoted, 520 D Book VII., Plato adds that that city is the best where men are least anxious
to govern. ev' polles h kiosta

pradoxo arxein ou melllontes

arxein, tautoi arwta kal kata-
saisasanta anagwe okeivnht.

entaidha, 'there,' i.e. 'in that
city.'

ou pefuke ... skopeseiav. So

Soph. Antigone 79—

to de

beta polityn dnav etfwn ame-

xanos.

And instr. here, Ch. XXIII ;
panta poiesh, kaper pefuke

eragaseiav.

' h allov wfeleiv pragmaata

exein. The fondness for a con-
tinuous participial construction

is allowed here to interfere with

the exactness of the antithesis,

which would have required

wfeleiv.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

Εἴγογε οὐδαμὴ συγχωρῶ Ὄρασμάξω, ὥς τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ἁμφέρον ἀλλὰ τούτο μὲν δὴ καὶ εἰσαύθις σκεφτόμεθα: πολὺ δὲ μοι δοκεῖ μεῖζον εἶναι, ὃ νῦν λέγει Ὄρασμαξος, τὸν τοῦ ἀδίκου βίον φάσκων εἶναι κρείττω ή τὸν τοῦ δίκαιου. σὺ οὖν πότερον, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὥ Γλαυκών, αἱρεὶ καὶ ποτέρως ἀληθεστέρως δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι; Τὸν τοῦ δίκαιου ἔγογε, ἐφη, λυσιτελέστερον βίον εἶναι. Ἦκουσας, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσα ἄρτι Ὅρασμαξος ἀγαθὰ διήλθε τῷ τοῦ ἀδίκου; Ἦκουσα, ἐφη, ἄλλα ὅπειθομαι. Βούλει οὖν αὐτὸν πείθωμεν, ἀν δυνώμεθα τῇ ἐξευρείν, ὥς οὖκ ἀληθή λέγει; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ βούλομαι; ἢ δ' ὅς ἂν μὲν τολμῆτι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἀντικατατελνantes λέγομεν αὐτῷ λόγον παρὰ λόγον, ὅσα αὐτὸν ἀγαθὰ ἔχει τὸ

τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ εἰσαύθις σκ. Thrasymachus is here reduced to silence, but not convinced.

τὸν τοῦ δίκαιου ἔγογε... Although Glaucon is ready to state his conviction to this effect, we find in Book II. that he is sorely troubled by the misfortunes of the just and the prosperity of the wicked. See Ch. V. 361 E: ὁ δίκαιος μαστίγωσται, στρεβλοῦσται, ἐπ. (τὸν ἄδικον) πρῶτον μὲν ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἔπειτα γαμεῖν ὑπὸδεν ἄν ὁμοληται, ἐπ.

dληθεστέρως, ὅσο μοχθηροτέρως, Ch. XVI. and infr. Book II. Ch. V. ἄγουκοτέρως.

Ἦκουσα. In Book II. ini. Glaucon confesses that he has doubts about the question, for the superiority of injustice has been so dinned into his ears by Thrasymachus and others. ἀπορῶ μὲν τοῖς διαστραβηκμένοις τὰ ὅτα ἴκονον Ὅρασμάξου καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων.

πείθειν, 'convince.' So Book II. ini.: πότερον ἕμας βούλει δοκεῖν πείθειν ἡ ὅσ ἀληθῶς πείσαι;

ἀν μὲν τολμῆτι... v.s. not. ad Cap. XII. ini. This arrangement is disliked by Socrates in the interest of his method. We know that he disliked long speeches, from the way in which he speaks of Thrasymachus' oration, sup. Ch. XVII., and from Protagoras 335; and, if he can induce Thrasymachus to argue the question, he is sure of the victory. For the word ἀντικατατ. Stallb. comp. Phaedr. 257 C: ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ ἐθελήσῃ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἄλλον (λόγον) ἀντιπαρέτειναι.

ἀντὶψ, Ὅρασμάξῳ.

ὁδ. This particle always has reference to a fresh case whether of like nature, or not, with that which precedes; v. infr. Ch. XXIV. ad med.: τί δ' ἂν τῷ χνῶ; The statement then, of the advantages of justice is looked upon as a rejoinder to
POLITEIAΣ a. 183

dikaiοn εἶναι, καὶ αὔθις οὖτος, καὶ ἄλλον ἰμεῖς,
ἀριθμεῖν δεησει τάγαθα καὶ μετρεῖν, ὡσα ἐκάτεροι ἐν
ἐκατέρφι λέγομεν, καὶ ἡ ἄκικαστον τινὸν τῶν δια.
κρινούντων δεησόμεθα: ἀν δὲ ὡστερ ἄρτι ἀνομολο-
γούμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους σκοπῶμεν, ἀμα αὐτοὶ τε
δικασταλ καὶ ῥήτορες ἐσόμεθα. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
Ποτέρως οὖν σοι, ἤν δ' ἔγω, ἀρέσκει; Ὀὔτως, ἔφη.

CAP. XX.

'Ἰθι δὴ, ᾗν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς Ὁρασύμαχε, ἀπόκριναι ἦμῖν
ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὴν τελέαν ἅδικιάν τελέας οὕσης δικαιο-
σύνης λυστελεστέραν φῆς εἶναι; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ
φημὶ, ἔφη, καὶ δὲ ἓ, εἴρηκα. Φέρε δὴ τὸ τοιόνδε
περὶ αὐτῶν πῶς λέγεις; τὸ μὲν ποὺ ἀρετὴν αὐτοῖν

Thrasymachus' statement already made, that injustice is
the better.

ἐκατέρφι, ής λόγῳ.
ἀνομολογούμενοι, 'allowing,'
or 'making concessions.'

CH. XX.—Justice then with you,
Thrasymachus, is wretched and
evil, whilst injustice is noble and
good. But your just man only
tries to get the better of the
unjust, whilst your unjust man
tries to get the better of both
unjust and just.

τὴν τελέαν ἅδικιάν... ν. § 344
Δ: ἐπὶ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἅδικιάν
خلاف. 'The ideal of injustice,'
in contrast to mere acts of
felony, τοῦ τὰ βαλανία ἀποεμ-
νοῦντα, ἰνθ. Hence the defi-
nite article is used.

φέρε δὴ τὸ τοιόνδε περὶ αὐτῶν
πῶς λέγεις; 'Come then, what
would you say to such a question
as this about them?' The drift
of this part of the argument is
clear, if we look to the middle
of the chapter, where Socrates
says that he believes Thrasy-
machus to be in earnest. He
is merely taking Thrasymachus
categorically over the ground of
his assertion—on which it rests;
his wishes to have Thrasyma-
chos' position well defined before
he proceeds to attack it. It is
with this intent that he couches
his questions in such a form as
to draw from Thrasymachus
downright and emphatic an-
swers. Thus he says, when
he has elicited the statement
that one is ἀρετή and the other
κακία, 'I suppose justice is
ἀρετή and injustice κακία;' on
purpose to draw from Thrasys-
machus an indignant disclaimer.
καλεῖς, τὸ δὲ κακίαν; Πῶς γὰρ οὗ; Οὔλοιν τὴν μὲν δικαιοσύνην ἄρετὴν, τὴν δὲ ἄδικιαν κακίαν; Εἰκός γ' ἐφή, ὃ ἡδιστε, ἑπειδὴ καὶ λέγω ἄδικιαν μὲν λυσιτελεῖν, δικαιοσύνην δ' ὦ. Ἀλλὰ τὶ μὴν; Τούγαντον, ἦ δ' ὦς. Ἡ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κακίαν; Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ πάνυ γενναίαν εὐθείαν. Τὴν ἄδικιαν ἁρα κακοθείαν καλεῖς; Οὔκ, ἀλλ' εὐβουλίαν, ἐφή. Ἡ καὶ φρόνιμοί σοι, ὁ Ὀρασύμαχε, δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἄδικοι; Ο' γε τελέως, ἐφῆ, οἰοί τε ἄδικεῖν, πολείς τε καὶ ἔθνη δυνάμενοι ἀνθρώπων ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦς ποιεῖσθαι: σὺ δὲ οἷς μὲ ἑσως τοὺς τὰ βαλάντια ἀποτελέσματα λέγειν. λυσιτελεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ' ὦς, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐάντερ λανθάνῃ' ἐστι δὲ οὐκ ἄξια Ελόγου, ἀλλ' ἂ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον. Τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφην, οὐκ ἀγνοῶ τι βούλει λέγειν· ἀλλὰ τόδε ἑθαύμασα, εἰ ἐν ἄρετής καὶ σοφίας τίθης μέρει τὴν ἄδικιαν, τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην ἐν τοῖς ἑναντιοῖς. Ἀλλὰ πάνυ οὖντω τίθημι. Τούτῳ, ἤν δ' ἐγώ, ἥδη στερεώτερον, ὁ ἐταῖρε,

ἡδιστε. Not merely colloquial, as Horace's 'quid agis, dulcissumum rerum,' but with the sarcastic vein noticed on ἥδες γὰρ εἰ, Ch. XI. The words virtue and vice for ἄρετῆ and κακία are altogether inadequate; there is a further notion in ἄρετή of health and vigour.

τοῦνατιον...οὐκ, ἀλλα... It is evident that Thrasymachus is now talking very much at random; he states that his view is the converse (τοῦνατιον) of Socrates' but has to qualify this statement considerably.

πάνυ γενν. εὐθείας, 'an admirable simplicity,' or 'most ingenuous folly.' So below, ἄστειος is coupled with εὐθῆς.

κακοθείας. A passing pun of Socrates'; εὐθεία, goodness or mildness of disposition, comes afterwards to mean foolishness euphemistically; see p. 120, note. Socrates pretends to conclude that, ἄδικα being the contrary of δικαιοσύνη, the former is κακοθεία. But εὐθεία in its ordinary, that is, its derived sense of folly, is not the contrary or correlative of κακοθεία, which means viciousness. Hence Socrates is merely jesting for the moment.

ἐν ἄρετῆς ... μέρει, v.s. Ch. XIX.; ἐν μισθῶν μέρει εἰρήκας.

ἀλλὰ πάνυ... v.s. Ch. I.; ἀλλὰ περιμενοῦμεν.

τούτῳ στερεώτερον. This is said to beguile Thrasymachus. Socrates has no difficulty in refuting such a suicidal position as that taken up here. It is a much more difficult task, and one which he has to meet in
POLITEIAS a.

και οὐκέτι ῥάδιον ἔχειν ο τι τις εἰπὲ, 
στελεῖν μὲν τὴν ἄδικαν ἑτέρα, καὶ καὶ κεντρὸν ἣ 
αισχρὸν αὐτὸ ὠμολογεῖεν εἶναι, ὃσπερ ἐαυτὸν εἰ 
eἰχομεν ἂν τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ νομιζόμενα λέγοντες 
τὸν ἐπὶ δῆλος εἰ ὅτι φήσεις αὐτὸ καὶ καλὸν καὶ 
ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι καὶ τὰλλα αὐτῷ πάντα προσθῆκες, 
ἣς τῶν δεκαίων προσετίθεμεν, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ ἐν 349 
ἀρετὴ αὐτὸ καὶ σοφία ἐτολμήσας θείναι. Ἀληθεσ- 
tata, ἐφή, μαντέυει. Ἀλλ' οὐ μέντοι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, 
ἀποκυντέου γε τὸ λόγῳ ἐπεξεύθειν σκοποῦμεν, 
ἐως ἂν σε ὑπολαμβάνω λέγειν ἄπερ διανοεῖ. ἔμοι 
γὰρ δοκεῖς σὺ, ὃ Ὀρασύμαχε, ἀτεχνῶς τὸν ὑπὸ 
σκόπτειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δοκώννα περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας λέγειν. 
Τὸ δὲ σοι, ἐφή, τούτῳ διαφέρει, εἴτε μοι δοκεῖ εἴτε μὴ, 
ἀλλ' οὖ τὸν λόγου ἂνγχεις; Οὐδὲν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ τὸ 
τὸ δὲ μοι πειρᾶ ἐπὶ πρὸς τούτους ἀποκρίνασθαι: ὃ 
δικαιος τὸν δικαίου δοκεῖ τι σοι ἂν ἔθελεν πλέον

Book II., to prove that 'honesty is the best policy,' against the facts marshalled by Glauc and Adeimantus. It will be seen that Socrates does not attempt the solution of that difficulty there; he begins to form his state, and only in Book IX., does he come back to settle finally the thorny question, of which the present position of Thrasybulus is but a shadow or a caricature, see Book IX. 588: Ἕλεν δὴ, εἰπὼν ἐπειδὴ ἐν- 
tαῦτα λόγον γεγονόμεν, ἀναλήμ- 
ωμεν τὰ πρῶτα λεχθέντα, δὲ τὸ 
δεῦρο ἰκομέν. ἢν δὲ ποι λεγόμενον 
λυσιτελεῖν ἀδικεῖν τὸν τελεσι 
ἀδικο, δοξαζόμενο δὲ δικαίω 
Νῦν δὴ, ἔφην, αὐτῷ διαλέγωμεν, 
ἐπειδή διαμολογησάμεθα τὸ 
τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὸ δικαίου πράττειν 
ἂν ἔκατερον ἔχει δύναμιν. 
ἐν ἀρέτῃ, ἢ.ε. ἐν ἀρετῆς μέ-

See above, Chap. XIX. niv.

dia新车. dia新车 is Plato's word for the faculty by which 
human knowledge is obtained; 
distinguished on the one side 
from νοῦς, that which grasps 
real existence, and on the other 
from δόξα, opinion, and πίστις, belief. But this strict sense 
is not to be attached here to 
dia新车; for in the next sentence 
we find τὰ δοκοῦτα used to 
express that which dia新车 ex-
presses here—what you really 
think,' 'your real opinion.' And 
in Book II. Ch. III. niv. ποιῶν 
diaνοιὰ is simply to imagine, 
picture to oneself in the 
thoughts.

πλέον ἔχειν. This phrase is 
employed rather with the inten-
tion of confuting Thrasybulus' 
position, than in order to convey
a consistent meaning in all the
different cases where it is applied.
We can understand the unjust
man 'taking advantage' (com-
pare οὐδὲν γέ σοι πλέον ἔσται,
Ch. XV.) or 'getting the better
of,' his own kind and the just
also. But we do not understand
Socrates' statement that the just
man would try to take advantage
of the unjust; unless we admit
that, for the sake of the present
argument, Socrates sinks his
own opinion about 'doing good
to friends and harm to foes,' as
Xenophon represents him in
Mem. 2, 3, 14: καὶ μὴν πλείστων
γε δοκεῖ ἄνθρωποι ξύσι εἶναι,
ὁ δὲ φθινὴ τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους
κακῶς ποιῶν, τοὺς δὲ φίλους
ἐφεργαστῶν. Again, accepting
this explanation, we come to
a further difficulty; viz. how to
understand the phrase, when,
in Ch. XXI., it is applied to
the arts of music, doctoring, &c.
It seems probable, as Messrs.
Davies and Vaughan in their
translation of the Republic sup-
pose, that there is here a play
upon words. πλέον ἔχειν means
(as noticed above) 'to get or
take advantage of;' but, in its
application to the arts, this
sense of the phrase must be
passed over for another—such
as 'to know more about,' 'to
be more at home with.' Now
this sense also implies that the
man who 'knows more about'
music or physic 'has the ad-
vantage over' one who knows
less; and it is in this sense that
we must understand Socrates,
if we are to follow him in his
disproof. The analogy of the
arts cannot conduct us here to
a conclusion in ethics any more
than in Ch. XV., where see
note on ἄρχουσι γε. The whole
train of argument is forced, and
the disproof must be held to
depend entirely upon this equi-
vogue inherent in the expression
πλέον ἔχειν. The translators
above mentioned have been
happy in their mode of convey-
ing the sense of the Greek to
English readers. Thus they
render πλέον ἔχειν, 'to go be-
yond,' in most places where it
occurs; but reserve to them-
selves the privilege of substitut-
ing 'have the advantage of,'
'do or say more,' (πλεῖον ἀρεισθαι
... ἐπὶ πρᾶξεως ἢ λέγειν) in other
places which seem to gain in
clearness as they lose in con-
sistency of translation.

ἄστείος... καὶ εὐθέως. Hen-
diadys, conveying the same
meaning as γενναλα εὐθεία.
ἀστείος is used like ἱδος, χαρίς,
γενναίος, χρηστός, sarcastically
here. Its first meaning is 'fine,'
comptus, or latus; it is found
in Πρᾶξ. τῶν Ἀποστ. Μοσῆς ἢν
ἄστειον τῷ Θεῷ. E. V. 'exceeding
fair.' See also Arist. Nub.
where the explanation is being
given that geometry measures
out the whole earth, and Strep-
siades, understanding it to mean
allotments, replies—

ἀστείον λέγεις.

Τὸ γὰρ σοφισμα δημοτικόν καὶ
χρήσιμον.

We find it used again in this
sarcastic sense in Book V. 452
C: ἐξῆν τοῖς τῶν ἄστείων πάντα
tαύτα κατωθείν. 'The wits of
the day had the opportunity
ΠΟΛΕΤΕΙΑΣ α'. 187

ἀν πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ ἡγοῖτο δίκαιον εἶναι, ἢ οὐκ ἀν ἡγοῖτο δίκαιον; 'Ηγοῖτ' ἂν, ἢ δ' ὦς, καὶ ἰξιοὶ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο. Ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦ μὲν δίκαιον μὴ ἰξιοὶ πλέον ἔχειν μηδὲ ζ βούλεται ὁ δίκαιος, τοῦ δὲ ἄδικου; Ἀλλ' οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει. Τί δὲ δὴ ὁ ἄδικος; ἄρα ἰξιοὶ τοῦ δίκαιου πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ τῆς δίκαιας πράξεως; Πῶς γὰρ οὖκ; ἔφη, ὡς γε πάντων πλέον ἔχειν ἰξιοὶ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄδικον ἀνθρώπον τε καὶ πράξεως ὁ ἄδικος πλεονεκτήσει καὶ ἀμιλλήσεται ὡς ἀπάντων πλείστον αὐτὸς λάβῃ; Ἐστι τάῦτα.

CAP. XXI.

"Ωδε δὴ λέγωμεν, ἔφην' ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐ πλεονεκτεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος τοῦ τε ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ ἀνομοίου. Ἀριστα, ἔφη, εἰρήκας.

"Εστι δὲ γε, ἔφην, φρονίμος τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς ὁ ἄδικος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐδέτερα. Καὶ τοῦτ,' ἔφη, εὐ. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἐοικε τῷ φρονίμῳ καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὁ ὁδκοῦν καὶ ἐοικε. This chain in the argument is inserted with a definite object. It has been mentioned above that the argument is one of analogy; and the first conclusion comes out therefore in the establishment of a resemblance,—a resemblance between the just man and him who is wise and good; see infra 350 B. Socrates, foreseeing the nature of his conclusion, provides against its indefinite workman, but only of the unpractised. And such an artificer is good and wise; therefore an unjust man is wicked and foolish.
character by gaining Thrasymachus' agreement to the proposition: 'A man is of the same kind as those whom he resembles'; a position in itself neither correct nor definite, but necessary for confounding Thrasymachus.

πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει... ἐσκέναι, 'how can he help being like?' v.s. not. αδ ὁ μέλλων, Ch. XVIII. μέλλω has here the sense of 'sure to be,' whilst in Thrasymachus' next remark we have an entirely different meaning, partaking of that sense of delay or hesitation which, it has been noticed, μέλλω also possesses. τι μέλλει, then, is like τι μὴν; 'what further stay is there,' or, colloquially, 'Well, what then?'

πότερον φρόνιμον... Here there is a double deception. First the fallacy of two questions; for, be it observed, Socrates asks which is wise and which foolish, before he has asked if they are respectively wise and foolish. And secondly the word φρόνιμος is used in its broad sense, although there is no certainty that a man who is μονικός is also φρόνιμος. This latter fallacy appears later on more than once, see 350 B: ὃ δ’ ἐπιστήμην σοφός; ὃ δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθός. But Thrasymachus, as it has been stated, is more of a deceiver than a dialectician, and has not the ability to find these flaws in Socrates' argument. In fact we can quite imagine that Socrates is caricaturing argument in the present passage. In his next suggestion Socrates seems to feel the necessity for qualifying these conclusions, and adds to the statement that 'the wise man is a good man' the limitation, 'in so far as he is wise'; but it is a solitary piece of accuracy in an otherwise loose argument.
Ἀνδρὸς ἢ πράγματος; Οὐ δήτα. Μὴ ἰατρικοῦ δὲ; Ναι. Περὶ πάσης δὲ ὤρα ἐπιστήμης τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης, εἰ τις σοι δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμων ὁστισοῦν πλεῖον ἢ ἐθέλειν αἱρεῖσθαι ἡ ὅσα ἄλλοι ἐπιστήμων ἢ πράττειν ἢ λέγειν, καὶ οὐ ταῦτα τῷ ὀμοίῳ ἐαυτῷ εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν πράξειν. Ἄλλα ἵσως, ἐφη, ἀνάγκη τούτῳ γε ὀυτως ἔχειν. Τι δὲ ὁ ἀνεπιστήμων; οὐχὶ ὀμοίως μὲν ἐπιστῆμονος πλεονεκτήσειν ἢν, ὀμοίως δὲ ἀνεπιστήμονος; Ἰσως. ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμων σοφὸς; Φημὶ. ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθὸς; Φημὶ. ὁ ἀρα ἀγαθὸς τε καὶ σοφὸς τοῦ μὲν ὀμοίου οὐκ ἐθελήσει πλεονεκτεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου τε καὶ ἐναντίου. Ἔοικεν, ἐφη. ὁ δὲ κακὸς τε καὶ ἀμαθὴς τοῦ τε ὀμοίου καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου. Φαίνεται. οὐκοῦν, ὁ Θρασύμαχος, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ὁ ἄδικος ἥμιν τοῦ ἀνομοίου τε καὶ ὀμοίου πλεονεκτεῖ; ἢ οὐχ ὀυτως ἔλεγες; Ἐγὼγε, ἐφη. ὁ δὲ γε δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὀμοίου οὗ πλεονεκτήσει, τοῦ δὲ ὀμοίου; Ναι. Ἔοικεν ἀρα, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος τῷ σοφῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀμαθεί. Κινδυνεύει. Ἄλλα μὴν ὀμολογοῦμεν,
spar. xxii.

'O 'Oraúmacos ómologhse mèn pânta taúta, 
Dòuχ òς ēgō vûn ðadíos lēgō, ãlλ' élkómenos kai 
môgis, metà ãdrotos thàumastou ðosou, ãte kai ðêrous 
ðontos' tòte kai éidou ēgō, pròterou dè oûto, Òra-
súmacon èruthriônta. èpeidh' dè ouû diwmologhshá-
mebra tîn dikaiosúñh ãretîn eînai kai sofìan, tîn 
dè ãdikian kakian te kai ãmâthian, Êlev, õn õ' ēgō, 
toûto mèn õmûn oûto keîshô, èfamên dè ðî kai 
ìsychrôn eînai tîn ãdikian' õ ou méumhshai, ã Òra-
súmache; Mèmnhmai, èfith' ãlλ' èmounh ouûde õ
vûn légeièn ãrêskêi, kai èxh perî auîtôn légein. eî ouû 
Èlêgoumi, eû ouû õtî diñhgorîenân me ðáishe' õ ouû

Âra ãnàpèfantai. Ergo evasit. See Book V. 464 B: tòv ìgyà-
ton àpà ãgàðh' tû pûleî auîthi 
êmûn péfantaî h koinhnia tôîs 
èpikôdous tôû te pâidôn kai tôû 
gnûmàîôn.

Ch. xxii.—There is yet an-
other point, Thrasymachus; you 
said that the unjust was more 
efficient than the just. Shall we 
 settle it? Just as you please, 
he said.

Thàumastou ðosou, v.s. Ch. V.: 
eû ouû légei thàumastôs õs 
ßôðhâ. 
ãte kai ðêrous. ãte it has 
been seen, Ch. i., introduces 
an accompanying fact; ãte õûn
ἐὰν μὲ εἰπεῖν ὡς βούλομαι, ἢ, εἰ βούλει ἐρωτᾶν, ἐρώτα· ἐγὼ δὲ σοι, ὁσπερ ταῖς γραυσὶ ταῖς τούς μύθους λεγούσαι, εἶν εἵρῳ καὶ κατανεύσομαι καὶ ἀνανεύσομαι. Μηδαμῶς, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, παρά γε τὴν σαυτοῦ δόξαν. "Ωστε σοι, ἔφη, ἄρεσκειν, ἐπειδήτερον οὖκ ἔας λέγειν. καίτοι τί ἄλλῳ βούλει; Οὐδὲν μὰ Δία, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ἀλλ' εἰπερ τούτῳ ποιήσεις, ποίει· ἐγὼ δὲ ἐρωτήσω. Ἐρώτα δή. Τούτῳ τοῖνυν ἐρωτῶ, ὡσπερ ἄρτο, ἵνα καὶ ἔξεσι διασκεψώμεθα τὸν λόγον, ὅποιόν τι τινος τὸν διηγάνειν δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν. ἐλέχθη γάρ που, ὅτι καὶ δυνατότερον καὶ ἐκχυρότερον εἶν ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης· νῦν δὲ γ', ἔφην, εἰπερ σοφία τε καὶ ἄρετή ἐστι δικαιοσύνη, ῥαδίως, οἴμαι, φανήσεται καὶ ἐκχυρότερον ἀδικίας, ἐπειδήτερον ἐστὶν ἠμαθία ἡ ἀδικία. οὐδεὶς δὲν ἔτι τούτο ἄγνοισειν. ἀλλ' ὅστι οὕτως ἀπλῶς, ὃ Θρασύμαχε, ἔγαγε ἔπιθυμῳ, ἀλλὰ τῇδε τῷ σκέψασαι· πόλιν φαίης ἄν ἀδικον εἶναι καὶ ἀλλὰς πόλεις ἐπιχειρεῖν δουλοῦσαι Β ἀδίκως καὶ καταδουλοῦσαι, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ύφ' ἑαυτῇ ἔχειν δουλωσαμένην; Πῶς γὰρ οὕκ; ἔφη καὶ τούτο γε ἡ ἀρίστη μάλιστα ποιήσει καὶ τελεωτατα ὁοσα ἀδικος. Μανθάνω, ἔφην, ὅτι σος οὕτος ἢν ὁ λόγος; ἀλλὰ τὸδε περὶ αὐτοῦ σκοπῶ· πότερον ἢ

ἐρώτα δη, 'ask then,' u.i. Book II. 361 E: καὶ δὴ κἀν, and note.

σοφία τι καὶ ἄρετῇ, predicate.

ἐπὶ, sc. after the proof that justice is wise and good, and injustice foolish and bad.

οὕτι οὕτως ἀπλῶς, 'by no means in this sweeping manner.' ἀπλῶς means 'generally' or 'broadly.' τὸ ἀπλῶς καλὸν, Arist. Eth. 5, 9, 9, is 'the absolute good.' So above here in Ch. VI. πότερα τὴν ἄλθειαν δικαιοσύνην φήσομεν εἶναι ἀπλῶς;

i.e. 'without qualification.' Socrates does not wish here to employ the general conclusion that justice is good and wise and injustice wicked and foolish, in order to prove the strength of the former and the weakness of the latter; he is going back to prior considerations, expressed in the proverb, 'Union is Strength,' which he proceeds to develop.

tελεωτατα ὀσα ἀδικος, u.s. Ch. XVI. τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν, and note.
κρείττων γιγνομενὴ πόλις πόλεως ἀνευ δικαιοσύνης τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἔξει, ἢ ἀνάγκη αὐτῇ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης; Εἰ μὲν, ἐφη, ὡς σὺ ἀρτὶ ἔλεγες ἔξει, ἡ δικαιοσύνη σοφία, μετὰ δικαιοσύνης· ἐι δὲ ὡς ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, μετὰ ἀδίκιας. Πάνυ ἄγαμαι, ἢν δ' ἔγω, ὁ Θρασύμαχος, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπινεύεις μόνον καὶ ἄνανεύεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποκρίνει πάνυ καλῶς. Σοι γάρ, ἐφη; χαρίζομαι.

CAP. XXIII.

Εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τόδε μοι χάρισαι καὶ λέγει· δοκεῖς ἂν ἡ πόλις ἡ στρατόπεδον ἡ ληστας ἡ κλέπτας ἡ ἀλλο τι ἔθνος, ὅσα κοινὴ ἐπὶ τι ἐρχεται ἀδίκως, πράξει αὐ τι δύνασθαι, εἰ ἀδικοὶ εἰν ἀλλήλους; Οὐ δήτα, ἡ δ' ὅς. Τι δ' εἰ μὴ ἀδικοὶ; εἰ μᾶλλον; Πάνυ γε. Στάσεις γὰρ ποι, ὁ Θρασύμαχος, ἡ γε

ἡ ἀνάγκη αὐτῆ, ν.σ. νοὲ. Ch. XIII.: ἢ οὐλ τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν; χαρίζομαι. So above, ὅστε σοι ἀρέσκειν, and also ἵνη. καὶ τόδε μοι χάρισαι καὶ λέγει. And in Ch. XI. ἐτ. ἢ μοι τε χαρίζουν ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς.

CH. XXIII.—In every relation of life injustice, by breeding hatred and discord, brings weakness; but justice, concord and strength. Again, the just man will be happier than the unjust.

In this chapter Thrasymachus does not attempt to argue, but carries out his stated intention, κατανεύσομαι καὶ ἀνανεύσομαι. δοκεῖς. This use is not uncommon. We find also a construction intermediate between this and the ordinary impersonal sense. See Book II. 368 B, δοκῶ γὰρ μοι ἀδύνατο εἶναι.

ου δήτα, ν. ἵνη. E: ἢ σοῦ σῦ τῷ ἀν ἄλλῳ ἵδοις ἤ ὀφθαλμοῖς; Οὐ δήτα. And supra. Ch. XVIII.

στάσεις. Stasis was the bête noire of Greek politicians; for the constitution was not often in such stable equilibrium that it could defy the attacks of a single determined and pertinacious citizen. The Republic, being a political dialogue (as well as an ethical), abounds in references to Stasis. Thus when describing the contest between the sensual and rational elements of the soul, we have the simile of a stasis: διστερ δυνων στασιαζόντων ἔμμαχοι το λόγῳ γιγνόμενον τὸν θυμὸν, Book IV. 440 B; et infra. 442 B, of the sensual nature again, ἄρχειν ἐπιχειρήσῃ ἃν οὗ προσήκον. AGAIN 459 E, ἡ ἀγέλα τῶν φιλάκων δτι μάλιστα στασιαζο- τος ἔσται. It is especially con-
demned in Book V. 462 B: "Exomene odo ti mezeron kakon polyei he ekinein 6 in auton (palian) diaste kal poiy pollassa asti maia; The community of wives and children, and property, will remove all occasions of stasis from the guardians of the Ideal State, 464 E: dea ge dia xeremataon he paidwon he xuggeneon ktiouin antherwpon stasiaxoun. And if the guardians of the State are not subject to stasis, the rest of the State will fall into stasis neither with the guardians nor amongst themselves. totoon ma ev deautois ma stasiaxounton oudein deinon ma pote he allaki polis pros totoon he pros allh- lousoi dixostathh. In 470 B, we have stasis defined and distinguished from war. evi men odo tis tou oikeion exhor stasis keklyntai, evi de tis tou allagrisin polerous. Change in a State arises from stasis in the governing body, Book VIII. 545 D: passa politexia metaballei ex autou tou exontos tas arxhas, ouden en autou totof stasis exegennetai. A city composed of very rich and very poor men is two cities, and must come to nought. To ma ma anall duo anagkai einai tin touiathn polin tin men penhtwn, tin de ploussian, oikounantas en to autof, aei ekphouleountas allhlosis, 551 D. There is no stasis in the philosopher's soul. Tis philosofh 6ra exomene asta- sas tis psuchis kai ma stasiaxou- tis; 586 E. This point has been illustrated at length, not only because the passages quoted will be found to bear upon the present chapter, but because in this principle, that concord is inherent in justice and discord in injustice, we have the keynote of the whole Dialogue of the Republic. In agreement with this fact we find the definition of justice, as finally discovered in Book IV. 433 A: eva ekastou en deoi epitheuein tov peri tiv polin eis de auton he phusis epitheustathtepo pefukwn eis. 'Each unit of the State should concentrate himself upon that for which nature has best fitted him.' Or, in a brief: definition, oibedem, ta autou prattesin kai ma polupragmounin dikaiosynh esti, 'Justice is doing your own business and not meddling.' Therefore in the present passage, although Socrates does not pretend to arrive at definition (see the last words of this book, 80te mou ynei geyonein ev tou dieilogyu meidh eideinai), he is still preparing his own and his audience's thoughts for the line he afterwards takes; viz. that justice must be found in the due discharge of one's proper duties. We have noticed above a similar preasse of a theory to come, in the case of the three-fold division of rulers into those who love money, praise, and duty; ch. XIX. iniit. And we shall perhaps view in their truest light these correspondences between the earlier and later books of the Republic, if we consider that Plato in the composition of his work first approached those questions only tentatively and incompletely which he afterwards bent his full powers to solve.
Η δὲ δὲν, ἵνα σοι μὴ διαφέρωμαι. Ἀλλ᾽ εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὡ ἀριστε. τόδε δὲ μοι λέγει ἄρα εἰ τούτῳ ἔργον ἄδικιάς, μίσος ἐμποιεῖν ὅπου ἂν ἐνή, οὐ καὶ ἐν ἐλευθερίας τε καὶ δούλως ἐγγυνομένη μισεῖν ποιήσει ἐάλληλοις καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ ἀδύνατος εἶναι κοινῆ μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων πράττειν; Πάνω γε. Τι δὲ; ἄν εἰ δοὺν ἐγγένεται, οὐ διοίκουσι καὶ μισήσουσι καὶ ἔχθροι ἐσονται ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις; Ἐσ- ὑνται, ἕφη. Ἐὰν δὲ δὴ, ὦ θαυμάσιῳ, ἐν ἐν ἐγγένεται ἄδικια, μῶν μὴ ἀπολεῖ τὴν αὐτῆς δύναμιν, ἥ σοδὲν ἦττον ἦξει; Μηδὲν ἦττον ἢκέτω, ἕφη. Οὐκοῦν τοιάνδε τινὰ φαίνεται ἐχοῦσα τὴν δύναμιν, οἷον, ὃ ἄν ἐγγένεται, εἰτε πόλει τινὶ εἰτε γένει εἰτε στρατο- πέδῳ εἰτε ἄλλῳ στροφοῖ, πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν πράττειν μεθ᾽ αὐτοῦ διὰ τὸ στασιάζειν καὶ διαφέρομεν, ἐτι δ᾽ ἔχθρον εἶναι ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τῷ ἕναντι παντὶ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ; οὐχ οὐτως; Πάνω γε. Καὶ εἰν ἐν ἐν δὴ, οἷοι, ἐνωῦνα ταῦτα πάντα τοῦσει, ἀπερ πέφυκεν ἐργάζεσθαι πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτοῦ πράττειν ποιήσει στασιάζοντα καὶ νῦχ ὀμονοιῶντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ, ἐπειτα ἔχθρον καὶ ἔργον ἄδικας, v.s. Ch. IX. βερμόθετος ἔργον, et infr. Ch. XXIV. ὀφθαλμῶν ἔργον.

καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις. This is added with a distinct purpose; see below 352 A, Ἀρκαιοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ θεοὶ;

ἐν ἐν, v.s. passage quoted from 586 E; note on στάσεις.

μῶν μὴ...ἐξεί. The nom. to ἀπολεῖ is ἄδικα, and also to ἐξεί. οὐδὲν ἦττον is adverbial.

οἶναν, δὲ ἄν ἐγγένεται...ποιεῖν. οἶναν is attracted to the case of δύναμιν; we should expect ὅτι ἂν ποιοῖ. Jelf, Gr. Gr. 823, Obs. 2, οἶνος is for οἶδος τε et ὡστε. So infr. 415 E: τοιαῦτα

(ἐνῶς) οἶας χειμώνος τε στάργεω καὶ θέρμων ἱευάς εἶναι.

μεθ᾽ αὑτοῦ, 'with itself,' i.e. 'with harmony among its individuals'; for notice that the several examples are all collective—city, camp, nation; whilst in the next question we come to the individual, who is none the less susceptible of στάσεις. καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ is again added with the intention of proving the schismatic to be θεοῦ ἔχθρος; see below.

ἐν ἐν δὴ, δὴ final; the case of the individual being the important one, to which the other cases are introductory.
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ α'.

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ἐαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις. ἦ γάρ; Ναι. Δίκαιοι δέ γ' εἰσίν, ὃ φίλε, καὶ οἱ θεοί; 'Εστώσαι, ἔφη. Καὶ θεοῖς ἀρα ἔχρος ἔσται ο ἄδικος, ὃ Ὀρασύμαχε, ο δὲ δίκαιος φίλος. Ἐνώκου τοῦ λόγου, ἔφη, θαρρῶν ὁ γάρ ἐγώ τέ σοι ἐναντίωσομαι, ἕνα μὴ τοῦτο ἀπέχθωμαι. 'Ἰδι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μοι τῆς ἐστίασεως ἀποπληρώσων ἀποκρινόμενος ὀστερ καὶ νῦν. ὅτι μὲν γάρ καὶ σοφώτεροι καὶ ἀμείνους καὶ δυνατώτεροι πράττειν οἱ δίκαιοι φαίνονται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι οὐδὲν πράττειν μετ' ἁλλήλων οἷον τε, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ οὗς φαμεν ἐρρομένως πώποτε τι μετ' ἁλλήλων κοινῇ πράξαι ἄδικους ὑπάτος, τοῦτο οὐ παντᾶ- 

C

πασιν ἄλλησε λέγομεν οὐ γάρ ἂν ἀπελέχοντο ἁλλήλων κομιδῆ δυτε ἄδικοι, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἐνήν τις αὐτοῖς

ἦν καὶ τοῦ λόγου. For this word ὅποιον Ch. III. ἔπει, περὶ τε ταὐρωδία καὶ περὶ τοῦτοι καὶ ἑωξιάς. And Ch. XVII. C: ἄρακεν δαιμόνα τινα καὶ μελ- λοντα ἐστιάσεσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἑωξιάν. And see a similar expression of Thrasymachus' below Ch. XXIV.: Ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ἔφη, ὃ Ζώκρατες, εἰστιάσω ἐν τοῖς Βερθίδειος, 'Let this be your banquet.' So we may translate here 'Feast yourself upon the argument.' And finally we have immediately below, τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς ἐστίασεως.

ὅτι μὲν γὰρ, ἦν. This introduction of the sentence is taken up again after a long parenthesis (ἀλλὰ δὴ ... ἁδοναι) in the words: ταῦτα μὲν ὅτι ὦτως ἔχει.

οὐσ φαμεν, ἦν. The construction here is entirely changed. We should expect at least οὗτοι οὐκ οὕτως ἔχουσιν, οὐ περὶ τοῦτον οὐκ ἀληθεύομεν; but the personal pronoun is neglected altogether, and the whole clause dismissed by a demonstrative, τούτο. Somewhat similar is Electra Sophoclis, 1364—

τοὺς γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ ἄγοι σοι πολλαὶ κυκλούνται νῦκτες ἡ-

μέρας τ' ἔσαι

αἰ ταῦτα σοι δείξουσιν, Ἦλεκ-

τρα, σαφῆ.

Where the substitution of a neuter pronoun, to express the substance of that which has preceded, occurs; but the construction approaches nearer than the present to a regular one.

κομιδῇ δυτε ἄδικοι, opposed to ἡμμοχθερεῖν ὄντες. For this expression and τελέως ἄδικοι, v.s. ποι. αὐτὴ τῆς τελεωτάτην ἄθικαν, Ch. XVI.

δῆλον ὅτι ἐνήν τις αὐτοῖς δι-

καισίαν. See Xen. Mem. 3, 9, 5: τά τε γάρ δικαια καὶ πάντα δόσα ἄρετὴ πράττεται, καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι καὶ οὕτ' ἂν τοὺς ταῦτα εἰδότας ἄλλο ἀντὶ τοῦτον οὖδέν προελεύσθαι, οὕτε τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους δύνασθαι πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ, ἦν ἐγχειρῶν, ἀμαρ-

τάνειν.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

δικαιοσύνη, η αυτούς ἐποίει μήτω καὶ ἀλλήλους γε καὶ ἐφ' οὐς ἔσαν ἀμα ἀδικεῖν, δ' ἦν ἐπραξαν ἀἐπραξαν, ὄρμησαν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἄδικαι ἤμιμοι—

θηροὶ ὄντες, ἐπεὶ ο' γε παμπόνηροι καὶ τελέως ἀδικοὶ τελέως εἰσὶ καὶ πράττειν ἀδύνατοι: ταῦτα μὲν ὁν ντὶ οὖντως ἔχει, μαυθάνω, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς σοὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπίθεον. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἁμεινον ζῶσιν οἱ δίκαιοι τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ εὐδαίμονέστεροι εἰσιν, ὅπερ τὸ ὑστερον προύθεμεθα σκέψασθαι, σκέπτεσθαι. φαίνοντας μὲν ὁν καὶ νῦν, ὡς γε μοι δοκεῖ, εἰ δ' ἐιρήκαμεν' ὃμως δ' ἔτι βέλτιον σκέπτεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπίτυχους δ' λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄντως τρόπων χρῆ ἔχει. Σκόπει δ' ἐφή. Σκοπῶ, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ καὶ μοι λέγε: δοκεῖ τι σοι εἶναι ἵππου ἔργον; Ἔμοιγε. Ἄρ' ἦσον τοῦτο ἄν θεῖας καὶ ἱπποῦ καὶ ἄλλου ὅτου ὄντων

φαίνονται μὲν ὁν νῦν...δομὸς δ' ἐτι βέλτιον σκέπτεσθαι. So above, Ch. XXII.: ἀλλ' οὔτι οὖντως ἀπλῶς, δ' ὑπαστάσασθ' ἐγώνε ἐπιθν, ἄλλα τὰ τα ς σκέψασθαι.

οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπίτυχους. ἐπιτυχάραν, to light upon, or happen. ὁ ἐπιτυχῶν, 'a chance comer; τὸ ἐπίτυχον, 'anything that happens,' 'this or that.' So in Book II., Socrates will not permit the children in his State to hear any kind of fiction from any kind of person. Ἄρ' ὁν διὸς παρῆςομεν τοὺς ἐπιτυχάρας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιτυχαντων μῆκος πλασθέντας ἄκουειν τῶν παιδας; (Ch. XVII). See also Book VII. 539 D: καὶ μή ὡς νῦν τοὺς καὶ οὔδεν προσήκον ἔρχεται ἐκ' αὐτὸ. For the sentiment v.s. 344 E: ἦ σμικρὸν οἴει ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγμα διαρίκεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ βιοῦ διαγωτῆν... οὔτε τι φροντίζειν εἶτε χείρον εἶτε βέλτιον βιωσόμεθα; and notae.

Ἀρ' ὁν τούτο ἄν θεῖας, ἦσον τούτο ἄν θεῖας, &c. 'Would you not then call the function of a horse, or of anything else, that which we do only with horses or best with horses?' In Book III. 406 E, it is implied that without the ἔργον it is no use for a man to live: ἦν τι αὐτῷ ἔργον, δ' εἰ μη πράττοι, οὐκ εὐνοουσελεῖν ἔχει. And in Book V. 453 B, when the question has been asked, are not women different from men? and answered in the affirmative, the inference is that they should have a different ἔργον. οὐκοῦν ἀλλ' καὶ ἔργον ἐκατέρῳ προσήκει προστάτειν τὸ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν. ἔργον then, as meant by Plato, is action of some kind, the agent or instrument being that which is naturally fitted to perform it; v.s. Ch. IX.: θερµότητος ἔργον, and note. And for the rest of the doctrine of το ἔργον see Ch. XXIV. and note.
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ α'.

ёγην, δ' ἂν ἦ μόνῳ ἑκείνῳ ποιή τις ἢ ἄριστα; Οὐ μανθάνω, ἐφη. 'Ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐσθ' ὅτω ἂν ἄλλοι ἰδοὺς ἢ ὀφθαλμοὺς; Οὐ δῆτα. Τί δέ; ἄκουσαι ἄλλῳ ἢ ὃσίν; Ὁδαμώς. Οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἂν ταύτα τούτων φαμέν ἔργα εἶναι; Πάνω γε. Τί δέ; μαχαίρα ἂν 353 ἀμπέλου κλῆμα ἀπότεμοι καὶ σμίλη καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; 'Αλλ' οὐδενὶ ὅ' ἂν, οἶμαι, οὕτω καλῶς, ὡς δραπάνῳ τῷ ἑπτά τούτῳ ἔργασθέντι. 'Αληθής. 'Ἀρ' οὖν οὐ τούτω τούτω ἔργον θέσομεν; Ἡσόμεν μὲν οὖν.

CAP. XXIV.

Νῦν δή, οἶμαι, ἄμεινον ἂν μάθοις δ' ἄρτι ἡρώτων πυθαγόρευν, εἰ οὐ τούτῳ ἐκάστου εἶν ἔργον, δ' ἂν ἦ μόνῳ τι ἡ κάλλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεργάζεται. 'Αλλ', ἐφη, μανθάνω τε καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τούτῳ ἐκάστου πράγματος ἔργον εἶναι. Εἰνεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ' οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄρετῆ Β

ἔσθ' ἐσθ', ν.χ. Ch. XV. ἔσθ' δτι προδεικταί.

Ch. XXIV.—Finally, everything has a function which it is enabled to discharge by means of its own proper virtue. The virtue of the soul is justice; hence a just man lives the best, the most useful, and the happiest life.

νῦν δή, 'by this time,' sc. 'after this explanation'; ν. infr. ἔχε δή, τὸ δή.

δ' ἂν ἦ μόνῳ τι. τι, subject; δ', object; μόνον and κάλλιστα qualify ἀρετῆ.

ἀρετῆ. The word here has the widest signification of which it is capable; and, as noted above, is not adequately translated by 'virtue'; 'excellence' expresses this general sense better. With Plato the physical aspect of ἀρετῆ is more pronounced; it expresses first an efficiency of bodily organs which is rather congenital than acquired; and, afterwards, moral excellence, which also Plato thought was inherent in man. It is true that according to the dialogue of the Meno, Plato thought that moral ἀρετῆ was a science (ἐπιστήμην), and admitted of being taught (διδασκαλία); but he also believed that the rudiments of it and the aptitude for it existed already in man. Similarly Socrates in Mem. Xen. 2, 6, 39, speaks of the
moral excellences, not being formed, but increased by study and practice: δοκε ὃν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀρετῆς λέγονται, ἀποκατεμετάμεθα ὑφήμες τάσας μαθεῖσθαι τε καὶ μελέτη αὐξανομένας. And for Plato's belief in the existence of ἀρετῆς in man, see Rep. Book IV. 444 E: Ἀρετὴ μὲν ἄρα, ὅσ ἐνικε, ἄγιοιτα τε τὸς ἄντι καὶ κάλλος καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς, (i.e. its normal and natural state) καὶ δὲ νόσος τε καὶ αἰσχος καὶ ἀνθένεια. Aristotle (Eth. 2, 6, 2) follows partly in Plato's footsteps: πάσα ἀρετή, ὁυ ἂν ἄρετη, αὐτὸ τε ἐν ἔχουν ἀποτελεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ ἐν ἀποδίδοις, όλον ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῆ τὸν τε ὀφθαλμὸν σκοποῦσαν ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῆ εὐ ἀρέμεν.

'Aristotle's own. For he looks upon ἀρετῆς of man as something acquired by habit (ἐξίσ); see ibid. Ch. I. 2: ἐξ οὗ δὴν οὐδεμιά τῶν ἰδίων ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται, 'No ethical excellence is congenital'; the contrary of Plato's belief quoted above from Rep. Book IV.'

ἔπει τὰ αὐτὰ, 'the same illustration'.

ἐξ ἔδη, 'now mark.' ἐν emphatic; intimating an important step, and a new point of departure in the argument. So, ὅτι δὴ, μετὰ ταύτα τὸ δὲ σκέψασαι.

τυφλότητα γὰρ, ἄκου. Thrasy- machus is too assentient here: in his willingness to agree to all that Socrates says, he says too much. Socrates is not concerned with the actual excellence or vice of this or that subject of illustration; he does not wish to stop over that, hence he disregards the suggestion and dismisses it with a mere acknowledgment.
τοῦτό γε λεγείς. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτα στερόμενα τῆς αὐτῶν ἁρετῆς κακῶς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἀπεργάσεται; Πάνω γε. Τίθεμεν οὖν καὶ τᾶλα πάντα εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ. 'Ἰθι δὴ, μετὰ ταῦτα δὸς σκέψαι: ψυχῆς ἔστι τι ἔργον, ὅ ἄλλῳ τῶν δυντῶν οὐδὲν ἐν ἔντροπος, οὐδὲν τὸ τοιοῦτο ἐν τῇ ἐπιμελείσθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν καὶ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ἐστὶν ὅτι ἄλλῳ ἐν ἡ ψυχῇ δικαῖος ἄν αὐτὰ ἀποδούμεν καὶ φαίμεν ἵδια ἐκεῖνης εἰναι; Οὔτε δὲν ἄλλῳ. 'Τι δ' αὖ τὸ ἔργον τῆς ψυχῆς φήσομεν ἔργον εἶναι; Μάλιστά γ', ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἁρετήν φαμέν τινα ψυχῆς εἶναι; Φαμέν. 'Αρ' οὖν ποτέ, ὁ Ἡρασί-Ε μαχε, ψυχῆ τα αὐτῆς ἔργα ἐν ἀπεργάσεται στερομένη τῆς οἰκείας ἁρετῆς, ἢ ἀδύνατον; ᾧ ἀδύνατον. Ἀνάγκη ἀρᾳ κακῆς ἡ ψυχῆς κακῶς ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἐπιμελείσθαι, τῇ δὲ ἀγαθῇ πάντα ταῦτα εὐ τράττειν. Ἀνάγκη. Οὐκοῦν ἁρετήν γε ἔστω ἐμπαρθήσαμεν ψυχῆς εἶναι δικαιοσύνην, κακίαν δὲ ἀδικίαν; Ἐμπαρθήσαμεν γὰρ. Ἡ μὲν ἀρᾳ δικαία ψυχῆ καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἄνήρ εὐ βιώσεται, κακῶς δὲ ὁ ἄθλος. Φαίνεται, ἐφη, κατὰ τὸν 354 σοῦ λόγον. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γε εὐ ἔργων μακάριος τε καὶ

τὸ ἐπιμελείσθαι ... ἔστιν ὅτι ἄλλῳ ἡ ψυχή δικαίως, &c. See Xen. Mem. 1, 2, 53: τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξελθοντος ἐν ἡ μόνη γίνεται φύσις. τὶ δ' αὖ τὸ ὑπ' ὧν. See Aristotle Eth. 1, 7, 12: ἀνθρώπου θεία τις ἐν ἔργον τι. τι οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἐν εἰς; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπ' ὧν κοινῷ εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυσικῖς. Aristotle thus demands a fuller definition of the ψυχῆς ἄργον than ἔργον alone; and he finds it in (ὑπ' ὧν) πρακτικῇ τις τοῦ λόγου ἔστω. Οὐκοῦν ἁρετήν γε συμειωθησάμεν ... Socrates refers to the conclusion (Ch. X XI. fin.): ὁ μὲν ἄρᾳ δικαίος ὑμῶν ἀνατέφαντα δὲν ἀγάθος τε καὶ σοφὸς, ὁ δὲ ἄθλος ἀμαθῆς τε καὶ κακός. But there is in this question a fallacy. The word ἁρετή, on which the whole discussion turns, has not been definitely employed in the former conclusions. It has only been employed in the present chapter in the general sense of excellence of any particular person or thing. Now it is suddenly introduced, with the limited sense of human virtue, to clinch the argument that a virtuous life is the best.
ευδαίμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ τάναντια. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἄρα ευδαίμων, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος ἀθλιός. Ἐστώσαν, ἐφι. 'Αλλὰ μὴν ἀθλιόν γε εἶναι οὐ λυσιτελεῖ, ευδαίμονα δέ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Οὐδέποτε ἄρα, ὃ μακάριε Θρασύμαχε, λυσιτελέστερον ἄδικα δικαιοσύνης. Ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ἐφι, ὃ Σῶκρατες, εἰστιάσθω, ἐν τοῖς Βενδιδελοῖς. 'Τούτο σοῦ γε, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ Θρασύμαχε, ἐπειδὴ μοι πρᾶος ἐγένον καὶ χαλεπαίνων ἐπαινῶ.

Βοῦ μέντοι καλῶς γε εἰστίαμαι δι' ἐμαυτόν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ σὲ ἀλλ' ὦσπερ οἱ λύχνοι τοῦ οἰκί σαραφερομένου ἀπογεύονται ἄρταξοντες, πρὶν τοῦ προτέρου μετρίως ἀπολαῦσαι, καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ οὖτο, πρὶν δ' τὸ πρῶ-

Bendidelos, u.s. Ch. I. init. note.

πρᾶος ἐγένον καὶ χαλεπαίνων ἐπ. This word is suggested by the simile of the wild beast, in which Thrasymachus was introduced, Ch. Χ.: συστρέψας ἐαυτὸν ὦσπερ θηρίον ἤκειν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ὡς διαρκασόμενος; et infra. idem. ὅπο τοῦ λόγου ἡρχετο ἀγριαινεθαι. Xenophon employs the verb with regard to a person in Mem. 2, 3, 16; ἀλλ' ἄγχειρε ὁν ἄνδρα καταπραθεὶν. See also Book VI. 501 C for a similar expression, πολιτείων ἄγοραφος, δι' ἐν ἐκείνοι ἐχαλεπαινο ὅτι τὰς πάλεις αὐτῶ παρεδόμενε, καὶ τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ νῦν ἀκούστες πραθώντας; And in Book IV. when speaking of the γενναίος, Socrates says: ὃν λήγει τῶν γενναίων, πρὶν ἄν ἡ διαφραγματίζῃ ἡ τελευτησί ἡ οὐσία κόνων ὑπὸ νους ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ παρ' αὐτῷ ἀνακλησεῖ πραθήσει; Similarly the word ἡμερος is applied to that part of the soul called the λογιστικόν, whilst the sensual is described as το θηριο-

init. The former also is said to soothe the third element of the soul, τὸ θυμοεἶδες πράθησι. In Book II. Ch. II., the simile is further elaborated, q.v.

δὲ ἐμαυτὸν... 'through my own fault, not through yours'; i.e. ὅπο σοῦ γε σὺρῃ. Socrates hints that he has thoroughly enjoyed that part of the entertainment which Thrasymachus has supplied; that he has enjoyed a light meal and a quaint, not a hearty one.

τοῦ αἰεὶ παραφερομένου. V. i. Book II. Ch. III.: αὐτὺ ἀεὶ οὔτω ἔμβαλεν, 'from time to time.'

ἄρταξοντες. See Arist. Nub. where Socrates tells the neophyte to 'catch up' any scrap of wisdom he may throw him.

ἄγε νῦν, δεῖν, ὅταν τι προβαί-

λωμαί σοφὸν

περὶ τῶν μετεώρων, εὐθέως ὑφαρτᾶσι;

τρὶν τοῦ προτ. μετρ. ἀπολαῦσαι,

'Before they have had a fair taste of the first.' For metrīan u.s. p. 116.
τον ἐσκοποῦμεν εὑρεῖν, τὸ δίκαιον ὁ τί ποτ’ ἐστὶν, ἀφέμενος ἐκεῖνον ὁμοίας ἐπὶ τὸ σκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἰτε κακία ἐστὶ καὶ ἀμαθία εἰτε σοφία καὶ ἁρετή, καὶ ἐμπεσόντος αὐτὸς τὸν λόγον, ὅτι λυσίτελεστερον ἡ ἀδικία τῆς δικαιοσύνης, οὐκ ἀπεσχόμην τὸ μή οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἐλθεῖν ἀπ’ ἐκεῖνον, ἀμετέ μοι νυνὶ γέγονεν ἐκ τοῦ διαλόγου μηδὲν εἰδέναι· ὅποτε γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον μή οἶδα ὃ ἐστί, σχολὴ εἴσομαι εἰτε ἁρετή τις οὕσα τυγχάνει εἰτε καὶ οὐ, καὶ πότερον ὃ ἔχων αὐτὸ οὐκ εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαίμων.

τὸ δίκαιον ὃ τί ποτ’ ἐστὶν, cf. Ἀσκ. Ἀγ. 162: Ζεὺς ὃστις ποτ’ ἐστίν, implying ignorance of the real nature of Zeus, as here of justice.

σχολὴ εἴσομαι, ‘it will be long before I know,’ ‘I shall take a long time to find out’; v.i. Book III. 394 E: Σχολὴ ἀρα ἐπιτηθεῦσαι γέ τι ἡμα τῶν ἀξίων λόγον ἐπιτηθευμάτων καὶ πολλὰ μηςεται, ‘He will be very far from,’ &c.
BOOK II.

CAP. I.

357 'Εγώ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα εἰπὼν ὄμην λόγου ἀπηλλά-χθαι· τὸ δ' ἦν ἄρα, ὡς ἔσκις, προοίμιον. ὁ γὰρ

Ch. I.—I thought we had here come to a conclusion, but it was only the prologue after all. For Glaucon would have me attempt an account of justice.

The first book, as Socrates says here, is a preface or prelude; it intimates, as we have noticed in one or two passages, what is to be the matter of the whole dialogue; it shows how far astray even those men who profess to have a coherent system of ethics, wander from the real facts. It smooths the way for a fresh and a more satisfactory system in two ways, viz. by removing error, and by suggesting possible solutions to different ethical difficulties; and this last confession of Socrates that he knows nothing about justice, separates the inquiry from all prejudice. And, finally, Socrates is thus placed in the position of director of the discussion, as the man who can remove fallacy and point the way, if he decline to lead it, towards truth and justice. The first five chapters are devoted to Glaucon's statement of the case for injustice and the unjust life; the next four to a like statement, or an elaboration of the same, by Adeimantus. Then at last Socrates takes up his parable and speaks his mind. He proceeds to the construction of a State, in which, so he expects, the counterpart of justice in man may be found. For the State is made 'not of stone or wood, but of men, of living flesh and blood.' And the construction of the State, and the education required in it, occupy the rest of this second book.

λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι, v.s. note page 115.

ἄρα, note p. 108.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ β'. 203

Гλαυκών ἄει τε ἀνδρείότατος ὁν τυχχάνει πρὸς ἄπαντα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε τοῦ Ὄρασυμάχου τήν ἀπόρρησιν οὐκ ἀπεδέξατο, ἂλλ' ἐφη Ὁ Ἐκραταῖος, πότερον ἡμᾶς βούλει δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς πείσαι, Β ὅτι παντὶ τρόπῳ ἄμεινὸν ἐστὶ δίκαιον εἶναι ἢ ἄδικον; Ὅσ' ἀληθῶς, εἴπον, ἔγωγ' ἄν ἐλοίμην, εἴ ἐπ' ἐμοὶ εἴη. Οὐ τοινῦν, ἐφη, ποιεῖς δ' βούλει. λέγε γάρ μοι' ἀρά σοι δοκεῖ τοιόνδε τι εἶναι ἁγαθόν, δ' ἐξαίμηθ' ἄν ἔχειν οὐ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐφιέμενοι, ἂλλ' αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα ἀσπαζόμενοι; οἷον τὸ χαίρειν καὶ αἱ

Γλαυκῶν. For other traits in this character see Book I. Ch. XI. where he generously offers on behalf of all to contribute for Socrates: ἂλλ' ἔνεκα ἀργυροῦ, δ' Ὄρασυμαχε, λέγε: τάντας γὰρ ἡμῖν Ἐκρατεῖ εἰσολογεῖν. He is outspoken and confesses his ignorance with a laugh in Book III. 398 C: καὶ δ' Γλαυκῶν ἐπιγελᾶσας, ἔγω τοίνυν, δ' Ἐκραταῖος, κινδυνεῦον ἐκτὸς τῶν πάντων εἶναι. In the same Book 402 E, we are almost surprised to find him advancing the enlightened suggestion, that bodily defects do not obscure the loveliness of a fair mind: εἰ μεντοὶ τι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ὑπομείνειν ἀν ὅστ' ἠθέλειν ἀσπα-ζέσθαι. In Book VIII. 348 E his brother Adeimantus calls him combative: οἴμαι μὲν, ἐφη δ' Ἀδείμαντος, ἔγως τι αὐτῶν Γλαύκωνον τουτοῦ τελείων ἔνεκα γε φιλοσοφικὰς. He is ἐρατικὸς, 474 D: ἀλλ' ἐπον, ἐπεπεν, δ' Γλαύκων, λέγει δ' λέγεις' ἂν δ' ἐρατικὸς, &c. He is very earnest over the dialogue. Book V. 450 C: μέτρων δὲ γ', ἐφη, δ' Ἐκραταῖος, δ' Γλαύκων, τοιούτων λόγων ἀκούειν δὲ ποῖος τοῖς ἔχουσιν. Yet we are disappointed in Book VI. 508 B, to find that he supposes ἴδον' to be the source of knowledge and truth: οὗ γὰρ δῆσον σοὶ γε ἴδον' ἀυτὸ λέγεις.

del te...καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε, ν.8. Book I.: ἦδη ἐντετυχηκα καὶ ἄλλος καὶ δὴ καὶ Σωφκλεῖ, &c.; pp. 109 and 112. ἀπεδέξατο. See Book I. Ch. IV. ἱτι. 'Αληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις' οὗ γὰρ ἀρδεύχοντα ποιεῖ. And here ἱντ. 568 B: δ' πρὸς θαυμάσασθ' λέγεις φιλήν ἀρδεύχον, οὐκ ἀρδεύθασθ' μου.

ὁς ἀληθῶς ἔγως' ἀν ἐλοίμην. This declaration follows with consistency upon his opinion, delivered in Book I. Ch. XXIII., about the importance of the question before them: οὗ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐνυχυρόντος ὁ λόγος, ἀλλά περὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ τρόπου χρή ἔργ. οἵ εἶπ' ἐμοὶ εἴη is spoken in Socrates' usual tone of self-depreciation, just as ἱντ. Ch. X. he says of himself, ήμεις οὐ δεινοὶ. See Book I. Ch. XI. ἱτι.: αὕτη ἐκεῖνη ἡ εἰσορεία ἐρωτεία Ἐκραταῖον. So below here he says, ἀλλ' ἐγώ τίς, ὡς ἐφίκε, δυσμάθης. And in Meno 71 C: οὗ πάντω εἰμὶ μὴν ἡμῶν, &c. &c. Μενών. Here also in 368 B: δοκῶ γὰρ μοι ἀδύνατος εἶναι. καὶ αἱ ἴδοναι, &c. The con-
Ηδοναί δοσιν ἀβλαβείς καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τὸν ἐπειτὰ χρό
νον διὰ ταῦτα γίγνεται ἄλλο ἢ χαίρειν ἔχοντα.

Τὸ δὲ; ὃ αὐτὸ τε αὐτοῦ χάριν ἀγαπῶμεν καὶ τῶν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ γιγομένων; οἶνον αὖ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ ὅραν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν τὰ γὰρ τοιαύτα ποὺ δ’ ἀμφότερα ἁσπαζο-
μεθα. Ναὶ, εἴπον. Τρίτον δὲ ὀρᾶς τε, ἐφη, εἰδὸς ἀγαθοῦ, ἐν φ’ τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ κάμυντα ἰατρεύ-
εσθαι καὶ ἰατρεύσεως τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμὸς; ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπίπονα φαίμεν ἂν, ὥφελεῖν ἰδ’ ἡμᾶς, καὶ
Δ αὐτὰ μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἐνεκα οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμεθα ἔχειν, τῶν
δὲ μισθῶν τε χάριν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὖν γίγνεται ἂπ’
αὐτῶν. Ἐστὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἐφη, καὶ τούτο τρίτον.

ἀλλὰ τί δή; Ἐν ποίῳ, ἐφη, τούτων τὴν δικαιοσύνην

358 τίθης; Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ,
δὲ καὶ δ’ αὐτὸ καὶ διὰ τὰ γυγνόμενα ἂπ’ αὐτοῦ ἀγα-
πητέον τῷ μέλλοντι μακαρίῳ ἔσσεθαί. Οὐ τοῖνυν
dοκεῖ, ἐφη, τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐπὶπόνου εἰδοὺς,

struction in the middle of this sentence passes easily from a relative to a demonstrative: instead of διὰ ταῦτα where it stands, the continuation of the regular construction would re-
quire δι’ αὐτοῦ διὰ τὰ γυγνόμενα ἂπ’ αὐτοῦ ἀγα-
πητέον τῷ μέλλοντι μακαρίῳ ἔσσεθαί. Οὐ τοῖνυν
dοκεῖ ἐφη, τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐπίπονου εἰδοὺς,
where he says that no one has ever praised justice or blamed injustice for themselves, but only for the rewards and reputation that each brings. ovdels ὑπὸτε ἐφεξέν ἀκνίαν ὑπ’ ἐπι- νέσε δικαιοσύνην ἄλλως ή δόξας ὑπ’ ἄλλως καὶ ὄρειας ὑπ’ ἄλλως γινομένας.

CH. II.—He would therefore first state a case in full for injustice, as it appears to thrive. Justice arises from a contract between the many weak and the few strong, that there be no ill-treatment at all.

ὁστερ ὁφις κηληθήναι, τ.δ. νοθ. αὐτὸς ἑγέρευν καὶ χαλεπαλῶν ἐπιάσω, Book I. Ch. XXIV. The word expresses the effect of the Seirens' song in Xen. Mem. 2, 6, 31: ἀλλὰ τάσι πόρρωθεν ἐπίδον, πάντας φασιν ὑπομένειν, καὶ ἀκούοντας αὐτῶν κηλεύονται. In Phaedrus 267 C, Thrasymachus is represented as doing that which he here suffers himself: ὁργίασε τε ἅδ πολλοῖς ἄμα δεινὸς ἄνθρ γέγονε, καὶ τάλιν ἐργαθεῖν εἰς ἀργυρίων κηλεύον ὡς ἐφη. In Rep. X. 601 the word is used of the charm of poetry, which makes the poet seem to understand all the subjects on which he touches: ὄντω φόειν αὐτὸ ταῦτα μεγάλην τινα κήλησιν ἐχει. Compare the expression ἡμερῶν λόγον, Book VIII. 554 D. τ’ ἦσαν ἐκάτερον. Above, Book I. βιβ., Socrates has confessed διποτε γαρ τὸ δικαίον μὴ οἴδα 6 ἔστi...

ἐπανανέσουσαι ... λόγον. So ἐγκακαμαζόμενον, infr.; expressions used as if the λόγος were an actually existing being;
καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἑρῶ δικαιοσύνην οἶνον εἶναι φασὶ καὶ ὦθεν γεγονέναι: δεύτερον δὲ ὅτι πάντες αὐτὸ ὁ ἐπιτη-
δεύοντες ἁκούτες ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἄλλοι ὡς ἀγαθῶν τρίτον δὲ ὅτι εἰκότως αὐτὸ δρῶσι-
πολὺ γάρ ἁμείνων ἁρα τοῦ ἁδίκου ἢ τοῦ δικαίου βίος, ὡς λέγουσιν. ἔπει ἔμοιγε, ὡς Ὀκρατεῖς, οὕτω
dοκεῖ σὺς τοῦ ἀποροῦ τοῦ διατεθρυλμένου τα ὕπτα, ἁκούων Ὑραμαμάχου καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων, τὸν δὲ ὑπὲρ
τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγου, ὡς ἁμείνων ἁδικίας, οὕτως
tω ἁκήκοα ὡς βούλομαι βούλομαι δὲ αὐτῷ καθʼ αὐτὸ ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ἁκούσαι. μάλιστα δὲ οἴμαι ἃν
σοῦ πυθέσθαι διὸ κατατείνας ἑρῶ τὸν ἁδικὸν βίον ἔπαινὼν, εἰπὼν δὲ ἐνδεξομαι σοι, ὅτι τρόπον αὐτοῦ
βούλομαι καὶ σοῦ ἁκούεις ἁδικίαν μὲν ἑγόντος,
dικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπαινοῦντος. ἀλλʼ ὁρὰ, εἰ σοι βου-
λομένῳ δὲ λέγω. Πάντων μάλιστα, ἢν δʼ ἐγὼ περὶ
Ἐγὼ τίνος ἄν μᾶλλον πολλάκις τις νοῦν ἔχων χαίροι
λέγων καὶ ἁκούων; Κάλλιστα, ἐφι, λέγεις: καὶ ὁ
πρῶτον ἐφὴν ἐρεῖν, περὶ τοῦτον ἁκοῦε, τὶ οἶνον τε καὶ ὦθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη. πεφυκέναι γὰρ ὅστι πο

hence the expressions, ἧνε οὗ τοῦ
λόγου, τὸ τοῦ ἄγαθον ἤχοι, Book V. 462 A. See also not. pp. 108, 132, 135.
ἐρῶ δικ. οἶνον εἶναι φασιν, v.s.
not. p. 106.
πρῶτον...δεύτερον...τρίτον, v.s.
Ch. I. not. ad τρίτον.
διατεθρ. τὰ ζητα, v.s. Book I.
Ch. XVII. init.: ἣμῶν κατα-
τλθᾶσας τῶν ἄθροις καὶ πολὺ
tὸν λόγον. And Book III.
411 A: ὅταν μὲν τίς οὐμοικὶ
ταρέχῃ καταλείψαν καὶ καταχείν
τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τῶν ὁτῶν ὅσπερ
dιὰ χώνης, κ.τ.λ.
ἀκούων Ὑραμαμάχου...καὶ λόγον
...οὐδὲν ἄνθικα. Notice the
accusative of the thing and
genitive of the persons.
πλέον δὲ κακῷ, ‘but that suffering harm is more of an evil than the doing it is a good.’ The construction here is compound. By the omission of πλέον...ἡ we should have the simple sense, ‘but that suffering harm exceeds, as an evil, doing harm as a good.’ Thus πλέον is inserted pleonastically; and if it were to be kept, the comparative word ὑπερβάλλειν would have to be removed in favour of some neutral expression such as εἰλαῖον —πλέον δὲ κακόν εἵλατο τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἡ ἀγαθόν τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

ζυγάδεσθαι ἀλλήλοις, i.e. the origin of justice lies in a social contract. To this view, which Glauccon propounds, the view taken of justice by Hobbes, the English philosopher (1588–1679), has a certain resemblance. He considered that, naturally all men are equal, and all have an equal right to everything; but that, in virtue of their possessing reason, they recognise ‘Laws of Nature’ as he terms them. The first or fundamental Law of Nature according to Hobbes is this: ‘That every man ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use, all helps and advantages of Warre.’ The second ‘Law of Nature’ grows out of this one: ‘That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre forth as for Peace, and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.’ ‘Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.’ This surrendering of right corresponds to the surrendering of the power of doing harm, which Glauccon speaks of here, and the object is the same, self-preservation and self-protection. Glauccon’s justice is nothing more than this compromise; but Hobbes’ justice is something more. This second Law of Nature makes it possible for the Contract to come into existence. ‘Right is laid aside either by renouncing or transferring.’ ‘The mutual transfer of Right, is that which men call Contract.’ And a contract extending over a period of time Hobbes calls a Covenant. ‘Before the names of Just and Unjust can have place, there must be some coercive Power to compel men equally to the performance of their Covenants, by the terror of some Punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their Covenant.’ It will be seen that, in this description of the germs of justice, Hobbes’ account agrees partly with Glauccon’s.
He agrees with him that men will violate their covenants if they can do so without suffering. But he does not agree with him precisely as to the restraining power. Plato makes Glauccon here affirm that it is the fear of being treated themselves unjustly at another time, which restrains men from acting unjustly, and thereby gives rise to Justice; which, in effect, is the belief of Hobbes also; but Hobbes continues thus to explain what he means by that 'terrour of Punishment.' 'Such power there is none before the erection of a Commonwealth... And therefore where there is no Own, that is, no Propriety, there is no Injustice; and where there is no coercive power erected, that is where there is no Commonwealth, there is no Propriety; all men having Right to all things. Therefore, where there is no Commonwealth, there is nothing Unjust. So that the nature of Justice consisteth in keeping of valid Covenants; but the validity of Covenants begins not but with the Constitution of a Civill Power, sufficient to compel men to keep them.' Hobbes therefore thought with Socrates (Ch. X.) that Justice must be sought for in the State. It is not, as Glauccon here is urging, a crude bargain between men in a savage state; but it is the result of an attempt to gain security, which can only exist in a civil polity. And thus Hobbes enunciates a Third Law of Nature: 'That men performe their Covenants made.' 'And in this Law of Nature consisteth the Fountain and Original of Justice.' 'And the definition of Injustice is no other than the not Performance of Covenant.' Therefore, taking a general view of Hobbes' scheme of justice, we see that it is arrived at by three steps, these three Laws of Nature:—

i. Man as a reasonable being makes peace his object.

ii. To ensure peace he surrenders certain of his natural rights.

iii. He must abide consistently by this surrender, i.e. by his Covenants.

Finally, to this description of the evolution of law from a state of barbarism may be added a similar account of the origin of chivalry; which is thus summarized: 'The exaltation of woman, and the extravagant homage paid to her sex, by the masters of the gay saber, were among the instinctive efforts of a semi-barbarous society to protect itself from its own ferocity.' See the Nineteenth Century, November 1881: A New Love Poet; by Lord Lytton.

ἀριστου ὄντος ἔλα ἀδικῶν...

In Book III. 405 C. Socrates holds up such a person as the worst type of man possible in a state. Ἡ δοκεῖ σοι, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ,
to the άδικον, είναι τούτο διατηρείται τότε καθότι τό δήμος και τό άλλο τούτον ἀμφοτέρων ἀγαπάται τόσο ὡς ἁγαθόν, καὶ τόν δυνάμενον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν καὶ ὡς ἄληθώς ἄνδρα οὐδ' ἄν ἐν ποτὲ ξυνθέσθαι τό μήτε άδικεῖν μήτε άδικεῖσθαι: μαίνεσθαι γὰρ ἂν.

In Aristotle Clouds the άδικος λόγος sums up the advantages of Injustice, II. 1071 seqq.; and, as in the case of the character referred to in Rep. Book III., it is said that to practise injustice with impunity requires a ready tongue. See Arist. Nub. 1073: "ὑπόκλασις δύνατον γὰρ εἶ λέγειν. The use made of rhetorical education to elude the law, brought a bad name upon those who learnt and those who taught. The sophists, we know, lay under a social stigma, for evidence of which see Protagoras, 311 C-E (καὶ ὃς εἶτεν ἄρνηται). And the teachers of rhetoric were included under the σοφισταί. See note on πειθόν διδάσκαλος, Ch. VIII.

τὸ δὲ δικαίον ἐν μέσῳ. For this favourite image of a virtue or anything desirable lying as a mean between two points, see note p. 116. Aristotle has followed it out completely in his account of the different virtues. Thus courage is the mean between rashness and cowardice, liberality between extravagance and parsimony; see Ethics 2, 7. And of justice itself, Book V. 5, 17: "διὰλογοί διὰ δικαιορργία μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ άδικεῖν καὶ άδικεῖσθαι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεῖον ἔχειν τὸ δὲ ἑλκτόν ἐστιν. But not in the same way as the others; for injustice is at once excess and defect, justice being the mean.

ἀγαπάσθαι, see p. 118, note; 'to put up with,' or 'accept.' That which is put up with is often introduced by the conditional εἰ. Thus Demosthenes de Cor. 301 (Reiske): ἀλλ' ἀγαπητὸν εἶναι, εἰ μὴν παραλέιπων τις Δ. εἰ πράξεις. And so here Book VI. 496 E. ἀγαπᾷ εἰ τοῦ καθαρὸς ἀδικίας τὸ γαλαξίων ἔργων τῶν τε ἐνθάδε βλούμεια, κ.τ.λ. Book V. 471 B: ἢ ἀγαθὸσμεν, εὰν δἰ ἡγούσθα τῇ αὐτῆς ἢ; Book IV. 435 C: οὐκ οὖν ἀγαπητὸν; ἐφ. Similarly στέργω in Dem. de Cor. 249: εἰ δὲ φησιν οὕτως, δειξάτω, κἀγὼ στέργω καὶ σιωπήσομαι. Aeschines cont. Ctes. 20 (ed. Simcox): ἀλλ' οὖν ἀγαθοίν, εάν τις παρ' αὐτῶι μή ἀδικῇ.
"\textit{Ch. III.—If the just man had the power of doing evil without being detected, he would be as bad as the unjust, as in the tale of Gyges.}

\textit{αὐτῷ, οὐ. δικαιοσύνην.}
\textit{εἰ τοιοῦτο ποιήσαμεν διανοία. Similarly εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν \thetaε\sigmaσαμέ\thα λόγος, ἵν ῞ρ. Ch. Χ. And τῷ λόγῳ εξ ἀρχής ποιήσαμεν πόλιν, Ch. ΧΙ. init.}

\textit{ἐπακολουθήσαμεν ... βούληται ...ἐξει, u.s. not. p. 106.}
\textit{νόμῳ δὲ βιά παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ Ἰσού τιμήν. See Aristotel. Eth. 10, 9: \περὶ ταῦτα δὲ λε- μεθ’ ἄν νόμον καὶ δίκαιος δὲ περὶ πάντα τῶν βιων. οἱ γὰρ πολλοί ἀνάγκη μᾶλλον ἢ λόγος πειθα- ρχοῦσι καὶ ζημιαὶ ἢ τῷ καλῷ. Et ἵν ῞ρ. 12: ὡς νόμος ἀναγκασ- τικὴν ἐχει δύναμιν. And the majority of mankind, so Ari-}

\textit{totile thinks, do not pursue what is good unless they are com-}
\textit{pelled; see supr. § 4: \δὸ γὰρ \περὶ καταναλωσαί \ιδιοὶ πειθαρχεῖν ἄλλα φόβα, \οὐ\' ἀπέκεχεσαν \τὸν πάθον διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἄλλα διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας. τάδει γὰρ \ζωντες τὸς \οἰκείος θέως διάκοιται καὶ δι' \ἀν- αυτὴν ἐσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ τός \ἄντικειμενα λυτὰς, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ \ὡς θήρως θέσως \οὐδὲ \ἐννοιαν ἔχουσιν, 

\textit{Γύγγ. An older and a different version of the story is}
\textit{related in Herod. I. 8–15; whilst in Cicero de Off. we have a}
\textit{short summary of Plato's account, see 3, 9, 38: Hinc ille Gyges inducitur a Platone, &c. The account here is thrown into}
\textit{the infinitive narration, as in the story of Er in Book X. p. 614, seqq.}
προγόνῳ γενέσθαι. εἰναι μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ποιμένα τὸν ὑπηρετοῦντα παρὰ πίνοντες Λυδίας ἄρχοντες, ὁμοῦ δὲ πολλοῦ γενομένου καὶ σεισμοῦ ῥαγήναι τι τῆς γῆς καὶ γενέσθαι χάσμα κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἥ ἐνεμεν ἵδοντα δὲ καὶ θαυμάσαντα καταβίναι, καὶ ἰδεῖν ἄλλα τε δὴ μυθολογούσι θαυμαστά καὶ ἰππον χαλκοῦν κοῖλον, θυρίδας ἔχοντα, καθ' ὅς ἐγκύπταντα ἰδεῖν ἑνότα νεκρόν, ὡς φαίνεσθαι, μεῖζὸν ἡ κατ' ἄνθρωπον, τούτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν ἔχειν ούδεν, περὶ δὲ τῇ χειρὶ χρυσοῦν ἐπὶ δακτύλιον, δὴ περιελόμενον ἐκβίναι. συλλόγου δὲ γενομένου τοῖς ποιμέσιν εἰσόδοτος, ἵνα εὐγγέλλοιεν κατὰ μήνα τῷ βασιλεί τὰ περὶ τὰ ποιμα, ἀφικέ- σθαι καὶ ἐκείνον ἔχοντα τὸν δακτύλιον. καθήμενον οὖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τυχεῖν τὴν σφενδόνην τοῦ δακτύλιον περιαγαγόντα πρὸς ὡς καὶ τὸ εἰσό τῆς χειρὸς τούτου δὲ γενομένου ἀφανῆ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι 860 τοῖς παρακαθημένοις, καὶ διαλέγεσθαι ὡς περὶ οἷο- μένου καὶ τὸν θαυμάζειν τε καὶ πάλιν ἐπιψηλα-

**Notes:**
- ἀλλα τὰ δὴ...καὶ, v.s. note p. 114: καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ Σοφικεῖ, 'Sophocles besides others.' For μυθολογοῦν v.s. αὐτῇ, Book 1, Ch. XVI. τίτι.
- μεῖζον ἡ κατ' ἄνθρωπον. Cic. loc. cit. 'corpus magnitudine insitata.'
- δακτύλιον, δὴ περιελόμενον. Rings play an important part in Eastern legend; many tales in the Arabian Nights turn upon rings and their talismanic properties. Compare the story of Polycrates and his ring, Herod. 3, 39, seqq.
- εὐγγέλλοιεν. Hermann notes that the present tense retains its force in the other moods besides the indicative, referring to 'res diutius durans vel sepius repetita.' Whilst Schneider accounts for this present tense, by supposing that the word refers to the passing of accounts at the meeting.

**Cicero loc. cit.:** Quem ut detraxit, ipse induit: tum in pastorum se concilium recepit: ibi quum palam ejus annulo ad palmam converterat, a nullo videbatur, ipse autem omnia videbat; idem rursus videbatur quum in locum annulum inverterat.
- καὶ διαλέγεσθαι, 'and they began to converse about him as though he had gone away.'
- For the sudden change of subject see p. 131 note; and add to the examples quoted Virg. En. X.:— liceat dimittere ab armis Incolumem Ascanium, liceat superesse nepotem.

p 2
φῶντα τὸν δακτύλιον στρέφαι ἐξὸ τῇν σφενδόνῃ, καὶ στρέψαντα φανερὸν γενέσθαι. καὶ τούτο ἐννοή-σαντα ἀποπειράσθαι τοῦ δακτυλίου, εἰ ταύτην ἔχοι τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ αὐτῶν οὗτοι ξυμβαίνειν, στρέφοντε μὲν εἰσὶν τῇν σφενδόνῃ ἄδηλῳ γίγνεσθαι, ἐξὸ δὲ ἰδήλῳ. αἰσθόμενον δὲ εὐθὺς διαπράξασθαι τῶν ἀγγέλων γενέσθαι τῶν παρὰ τὸν βασιλέα ἑλθόντα δὲ καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ μοιχεύσαντα, μετ’ ἐκείνης Ἐπιθέμενον τῷ βασιλεῖ ἀποκτέναι καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν κατασχεῖν. εἰ οὖν δύο τοιοῦτο δακτυλίῳ γενοιόθην, καὶ τὸν μὲν ὁ δίκαιος περιθεῖτο, τὸν δὲ ὁ ἄδικος, οὐδὲις ἦν γένοιτο, ὥς δοξεῖν, οὗτος ἀδαμάντινος, ὃς ἀν μείνειν ἐν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τολμήσειν ἀπέχε-σθαι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων καὶ μὴ ἀπτεθσθαί, ἐξὸν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἰδεῖς ὁ τι βουλοῦτο λαμβάνειν, καὶ ᾿Εἰς ὡς ὁ ὅπλα πιγγίζεσθαι ὅσῳ βουλοῦτο, καὶ ἀποκτισθοῦναι καὶ ἐκ δεσμῶν λυσθεὶς ὑστερᾶς βουλοῦτο, καὶ τάλα πράττειν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴσοθεν ὄντα. οὗτος δὲ δρῶν οὕδειν ἄν διάφορον τοῦ

diαπράξασθαι, 'to manage.' In Book IV. 440 C. the word means 'to carry out to the end.' οὐ λήγει τῶν γεγενημάτων, πρὶν ἃ δὲ διαπράξαται ἀν διελεύ- 

τήσθησαι, In Xenophon Anab. 7. 

3, 16, 'to effect': Παραλλούς 

τίνας, οἱ παρῆσαν φιλῶς διαπρα- 

ξόμενοι πρὸς Μῆδοκον, In Od. ii. 213, 'to accomplish'— 

ὁ κειμένοις κάθει κέλευθον. 

And so in Herod. iii. 61, 4: 

ὅς οὖσιν ἄντας διαπράξει. 

διὰ δοξεῖν. Ast inserted ἄν, 

but against MS. authority. 

Matthiae held that the preceding 

ἄν qualifies this clause. For 

ἀδαμάντιος Stahl. compares 

Book X. 619 A: ἀδαμάντιος 

ὃς δὲ ταύτην τὴν δόξαν ἔχοντα 

eἰς 'Αἴδου λέγαι. 

tολμῆσειν, 'bring himself 

to abstain.' τολμᾶω, like ἥλαμ, 

is 'to have the heart to...'

See Medea Euripid. 1325— 

ὥστε τεκνισὶ σοιών ἐμβαλεῖν 

ἐξόριστην τεκνωσα. 

And so ἐντ. ibid. 1339— 

οὐκ ἔστιν ἢτις τοιῦτο 'ἐπὶ ἔλλη- 

νις γνωρίζει 

ἐτην ποτέν. 

For τολμᾶω see Book IX. 576 

Α: πάντα σχῆμα τολμῶντε 

ποιεῖν ὡς ὁμοίως. 

διὰ δοξαὶ. For this absolute 

accusative v.s. note page 147; 

also ἔχομεν cont. Ctes. ιο, 

(ed. Simcox): εἰ φανεροῦν δ' 

αὐτὸς ἁπατή, ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ πολεί, 

τινὶ δὲ καὶ εἰ τῷ αὐτῷ ἔναυτῷ.
Τὴν δὲ κρίσιν αὐτῆς τοῦ βίου πέρι ᾧν λέγομεν, ἐὰν διαστησάμεθα τὸν τε δικαιότατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον.

διαστησάμεθα τὸν τε δικαιότατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον.

ὡς οὐκ ἄγαθον ἴδια ὄντος. It is not clear if ἴδια is to be taken as equivalent to ἀδέλφης; 'Justice is not a good in itself,' or 'with regard to the individual.' The latter seems preferable, if we take into account ἴδια in the following sentence.

ἄληθες οἴόμενοι. This is spoken merely in the character of advocate for injustice which Glaucon has assumed. The question is this, 'Is injustice more profitable (λυσιτελεῖν) ?' But Glaucon does not even believe that it is; v.s. Ch. II: πολὺ γὰρ ἀσέιναν ἄρα ὁ τοῦ ἀδικοῦ ἢ τοῦ δικαίου θεοῦ, ὡς λέγοντες ἐπεὶ ἐμικρύσατος ἢ ἔκαθαν, οὕτω δοκεῖ οὕτως.

ἐπιλαβόμενοι. For verbs of this kind v.s. note p. 107.

ἀνοπτότατος, v.s. Book I. ἀστεῖος καὶ εὐθύς, Ch. XX. and note.

διὰ τοῦ τοῦ ἄδει. φόβον. So Horace Sat. I, 3, 111—

Jura inventa metu injusti fateare necessè est,

Tempora si fastosque velis
evolvere mundi.

Ch. IV.—Let us now place before us the unjust man, fully equipped with injustice, even appearing by his cleverness, to be just; and on the other side the just man who, on his part, fails to seem just.

ἐὰν διαστ. τοῦ τε δικ. καὶ τοῦ ἄδθ. See Arist. Nub. 889-1104. διαστ. means to discriminate, to set before oneself separately;
τον, οἷοι τ’ ἐσόμεθα κρίναι ὅρθως· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐ. τὸς οὖν δὴ ἡ διάστασις; ἦδε τ’ ἀθανατοὶ μὴτε τοῦ ἀδικοῦ ἀπ’ τῆς ἀδικίας, μὴτε τοῦ δικαίου ἀπ’ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀλλὰ τέλεον ἐκάτερον εἰς τὸ ἐαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα τιθῶμεν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὁ ἀδικὸς ῥηστεροὶ οἱ δεινοὶ δημιουργοὶ ποιεῖτο· οἴον κυβερνή- 

της ἀκρος ἢ ἱατρὸς τὰ τέ ἀδύνατα ἐν τῇ τεχνῇ καὶ 

361 τὰ δυνατὰ διασθάνεται, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐπιχειρεῖ, τὰ 

δὲ ἐὰ, ἔτι δὲ ἐὰν ἄρα τῇ σφαλῇ, ἰκανὸς ἐπανορθοῦσ-

θαι: οὐτώ καὶ ὁ ἀδικὸς ἐπιχειρῶν ὅρθως τοῖς ἀδική-

μασι λαθανέτω, εἰ μέλλει σφόδρα ἀδικὸς εἰναι· τὸν ἁλισκόμενον δὲ φαύλον ἡγητέον· ἐσχάτη γὰρ ἁδικία 

δοκεῖν δικαίων εἶναι μὴ ἀντα. δοτέων οὖν τῷ τελέως 

ἀδικίᾳ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἁδικίαν, καὶ οὐκ ἁφαρητεύου, 

ἀλλ’ ἐστεόν τὰ μέγιστα ἁδικοῦντα τὴν μεγίστην 

Β’ οὖν αὐτῷ παρεσκευασκέναι εἰς δικαιοσύνην, καὶ 

εάν ἂρα σφάλληται τι, ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δυνατῷ εἰναι, 

λέγειν τε ἰκανῷ ὑντι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν, εάν τι μηνύσται 

τῶν ἁδικημάτων, καὶ βιάσασθαι σος ἂν βίας δέχεται.

this is necessary because, as Glaucon shows below, the just is often mistaken for the unjust, and vice versa.

μηδὲν ἀφαιρῶμεν μὴτε τοῦ ἀδίκου. As a rule this verb takes an accusative of the thing, and dative of the person, or a double accusative; but the present construction is found again in Xen. Hell. iii. 1, 7: φρετλαίνειν τερμαῖον ὑπόνομον ἄρτυνεν, ὡς ἀφαιρόμενος τὸ δώρον αὐτῶν.

τέλεον, v.i. τῷ τελέως ἁδίκες, and supr. τὴν τελεωτὰτην ἁδικίαν, Ch. XVI. and note.

δεινοι δέης, ‘adepts in their craft’; v.i. ἡμείς οὖ δεινοὶ, Ch. X.


tὸν ἁλισκόμενον. With this expression, and ἐὰν ἄρα τῇ σφαλῇ, compare Ar. Nub. loc. cit. 1079—

μωιχός γὰρ ἂν ὑπὸ τοῖχος ἀλοῦς, 

ταῦτ’ ἀντερεῖσ πρὸς αὐτὸν, 

ὡς οὔδεν ἠδίκηκας.

λέγειν τε ἰκανῷ ὑντι. This is the means employed by the "Ἀδικοὶ Λόγος of the Clouds to insure success in roguery; v. loc. cit. 1072—

ὑμαρτεῖς, ἡμαρτεῖς, ἐμοῖχευσας 

τι, κατ’ ἐλκοθες, 

ὑπόλαμας ἄδυνατος γὰρ εἰ 

λέγειν’ ἐμοὶ δ’ ὁμιλῶν, &c. 

βίας, v.s. 341 B: οὕτε γὰρ 

ἄν με λάθος κακοργών, οὕτε μὴ 

λαθῶν βιάσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ δίκαιο.

And 345 A, of the unjust man, as here: ἐστο μὲν ἁδικός, δι.
Διά τε ἀνδρείαν καὶ ῥώμην καὶ διὰ παρασκευὴν φιλων καὶ οὐσίας. τοῦτον δὲ τοιούτον θέντες τῶν δίκαιων παρ’ αὐτὸν ἵστωμεν τῷ λόγῳ, ἀνδρὰ ἀπλοὺν καὶ γενναίον, κατ’ Ἀιαχύλον οὐ δοκεῖν ἂλλ’ εἰναι ἀγαθὸν ἐθέλοντα. ἀφαιρετέον δὴ τὸ δοκεῖν. ἐι γὰρ δόξει δίκαιος εἶναι, ἔσονται αὐτῷ τιμαί καὶ δωρεάλ δοκοῦντες τοιούτω εἶναι· ἄδηλον οὖν, εἰτε τοῦ δικαίου εἰτε τῶν δωρεῶν τε καὶ τιμῶν ἕνεκα τοιούτω τινα· γυμνωτέοις δὴ πάντων πλὴν δικαιοσύνης, καὶ ποιητέοις ἐναντίως διακείμενος τῷ προτέρῳ μηδὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν δόξαν

νάσθω δὲ δικείν ἢ τῷ λαθάνειν ἢ τῇ διαμάχεσθαι.

παρασκευὴν φιλων. See Exchines contra Ctes. I, I: τὴν μὲν παρασκευὴν ὄρατε, τὸ ἄθη

μαίον, καὶ τὴν παράταξιν, διὰ γεγένηται. And compare the use of the word παράκλησις,
Dem. de Cor. 69 (Arnold): οἱ μὲν ἐκ παρακλήσεως συγκαθη-

μένοι.

ἀπλούν, in the first sense, i.e. simplex, 'open' or 'single-

hearted.' In Book III of this singleness of mind in the

guardian of the city precludes him from imitation (i.e. description

in art) of anything not entirely in accord with his own

nature. See 395 C: τοὺς φύλα-


κας...δεὶν εἶναι δημιουργοῦς ἑλευ-

θερίας πάνω ἀκρίβεις καὶ μηδὲν

ἀλλὸ ἐπιτηδεύειν ὑπὸ μή ἐς τοῦτο ἑλεῖ, οὐδὲν δὴ δέοι ἄν

αὐτοῦς ἀλλὸ πράττειν αὐτὲ ἀνείσχεται, ἐὰν δὲ μιμῶναι,

ἐμπείρηται τὰ τοῦτο προστίθοντα εὑάν ἐκ παθῶν, ἀνθρείους, σά-

φρονάς, δείσους, ἐλευθερούς. Similarly Cicero speaks of the single

heart which must be a first condition of friendship, 'Sim-

plicem præteres...eligi par est...

Neque enim fidum potest esse multiplex ingenium et tortuo-

sum.'—Lælius xviii. 65. And Juvenal Sat. iii. grounds his

antipathy against the Greeks on the fact that they can assume

any character and play any rôle. See il. 74 seqq.—

Ede quid illum

Esse putes quem vis hominem

secum attulit ad nos:

Grammaticus, rhetor, geomet-

tres, pictor, aliptes,

Angur, schænobates, medicus,

magus: omnia novit.

...Natio comœda est. Rides :

majore cachinno

Concûtitur; flet, si lacrimas

conseptam amici.

...Non sumus ergo pares :

melior, qui semper et omni

Nocte dieque postes alienum

sumere vultum.

κατ’ Ἀιαχύλον. See Sept. c.

Theb. 592—

οὐ γὰρ ἰδέων ἀριστος, ἂλλ’

εἶναι θέλει,

βαθείαν ἄλκα διὰ φρενὸς καρ-

τομέων,

ἄφ’ ἡς τὰ κεδρα βλαστάνει

βουλεύματα.

And v. infr. Ch. V. ad med.

where the lines are quoted.

ἄδηλον οὖν, sc. ἀν εἶν.
εκέτω τὴν μεγίστην ἀδικίας, ἵνα η βεβασανισμένος
eis δικαιοσύνην τῷ μὴ τέγγεσθαι ὑπὸ κακοδοξίας
d καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτῆς γιγνομένων ἀλλ' ἕτο ἀμετάτοτος
μέχρι θανάτου, δοκόω μὲν εἰναι ἀδικοὶ διὰ βίου, ὅν
dὲ δίκαιος, ἵν' ἀμφότεροι εἰς τὸ ἐσχάτον ἐληλυθότες,
ὁ μὲν δικαιοσύνης, ὁ δὲ ἀδικίας, κρίνωνται ὁπότερος
αὐτῶν εὐδαιμονέστερος.

CAP. V.

Βασίλει, ἵν' δ' ἐγώ, ὁ φίλε Γλαύκων, ὡς ἐρρωμένος
ἐκάτερον ὁσπερ ἀνδριάντα εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐκκαθάρισις

bebetaasanismenos. 'Ut quasi ad
Lydium lapidem exploratus sit
illis erga justitiam amor, quod
neque insania molliatur atque
insectat, neque iis quae eam
constitui solent.—Muretus.

eudaimonesteteros. Aristotle
speaks strongly against the
theory that virtue made a man
perfectly happy in spite of
circumstances. Thus Ëth. 1,
5, 6: δοκεῖ γάρ ἐνδεχεσθαι καὶ
cαθεδεῖν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἢ
ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ πρός
touto kakopathein kai atychiein
ta megista; tis δ' owtō zonta
outheis an eudaimonisei. And
7, 13, 3: oii de ton trochizomenon
kal ton duxuyias megalaiv peri-
pitpontai eudaimona phakontes
einai, ean h agathos, h ekontes h
ekontes outhein legousin.

CH. V.—The purely just man
will be fined, imprisoned, tor-
tured; the perfectly unjust will
live prosperous and die honoured.

hosper andriaanta. A favourite
simile with Athenian writers;
who had the works of Myron,

Polycleitus, Phidias, and many
others before their eyes. See
Book IV. 420 C: μῶν μὲν οὖν,
ὡς οἰκῆθη, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν (πᾶλιν)
πλάττομεν οὐκ ἀπολαβόντες,
ἀλλὰς ἐν αὐτῇ τοιοῦτος τινὰς
τιθέντες, ἀλλ' ἔδνθα αὐτίκα δὲ
τὸν ἐναντίον σκέψειμα. Ὁσπερ
οὖν ἐν ἦμᾶς ἀνδριάντας γράφον-
tas prosepelóan tis εὔσεβεί λέγων,
k.t.l. See also Book VI. 500
D: 'An othin tis, etinon, αὐτή
ἀνάγκη γένηται καὶ κεῖ ὅρα μελε-
thēsai εἰς ἀνθρώποις ἐκαὶ ἴδιω
καὶ δημοσίᾳ τίθεναι καὶ μη μόνον
ζωτων πλάττειν, k.t.l., where
the metaphor of the painter
accompanies it. Again, Book
VII. 540 C: Παγκάλως, ἔφη,
tous ἄρχοντας, ὁ ἔξωκρητης,
hosper andriantoioi, ἀπεργα-
sai. We find a reference again
to the art in Xen. Mem 2, 6,
6: tois μὲν ἀνδριαντοιοι, ἔφη,
dokimazomou, o tois λόγοις
auteis tekumairomou, alla ἐν
αν ὁρφίν τούς πρόσθεν ἀνδριάντα
kalw eiragiasmon touto πιθ-
teoumen kal tous loiptous et
poleseiv. Again, Demosthenes
accuses Eochines of demanding
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ β'. 217
tου ἀνδροῖν. Ὁς μάλιστ', ἔφη, δύναμαι. ὅντων δὲ
tοιοῦτων, οὐδὲν ἔτι, ὡς ἐγφαμαι, χαλεπῶν ἐπεξελθεῖν
tῷ λόγῳ, οἷος έκάτερον βίος ἐπιμένει. λεκτέον οὖν Ἕ
καὶ δὴ κἂν ἀγροικότερας λέγηται, μὴ ἐμὲ οὗν λέγειν,
ὡς Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας πρὸ δικαιοσύνης
ἀδικίαν. ἐροῦσι δὲ τάδε, ὅτι οὗτο διακείμενος ὁ
dικαίος μαστιγώσεται, στρεβλώσεται, δεδήσεται, ἐκ-
καυθήσεται τῷ φθαλμῷ, τελευτῶν πάντα κακὰ παθῶν
ἀνασκευασθῆσεται, καὶ γυνώσεται, ὅτι οὗκ εἶναι
dικαίον ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν δὲι ἐθέλειν τὸ δὲ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου
kal δὴ καν. kal δὴ kal here is
not culminating as noticed pp.
109, 112. We have rather to
emphasise kal δὴ: 'Well then,
granted that it be spoken.' Kal
dὴ is expressive of assent, either
to a thought—
kal δὴ τεθύσω τίς με δέξεται
or to a command—
ΚΡ. οὐκοῦν ἐρεῖς ποι', εἰτ'
ἀπαλαξθῆς ἄπει;
ΦΥ. καὶ δὴ λέγω σοι.—Soph.
Ant. 244.
So here kal δὴ is assentient to
the thought which Glaucon
takes for granted will be in
Socrates' mind: 'And if you
say that my words are rather
unpolished,' &c. The assentient
force of δὴ is very noticeable in
δῆτα; see Book I. Ch. IX.:
ξυμβολάμα δὴ λέγει τὰ κοινωνή-
ματα, ἢ τι ἄλλο; κοινωνήματα
dῆτα, i.e. 'Certainly covenants.'
ἐκκαυθήσεται τῷ φθαλμῷ. See
Dem. de Cor. 246: τὸν ὕψαλμον
ἐκκεκομμένον, τὴν κλεῖν κατε-
γώτα, τὴν χείρα, τὸ σκέλος
πεπρωμένον.
πολὺ δὴ ἄρα, for ἄρα in this
sense v.s. 346 C, and note
on ὑπέλειαν: also Book I.
335 E, where it has been found
πολὺ ἦν ἄρα ὀρθότερον λέγειν κατὰ τοῦ ἀδίκου. τῷ δὲ γὰρ φήσουσι τὸν ἀδίκου, ἀτε ἐπιτηδεύοντα πράγμα ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον καὶ οὐ πρὸς δόξαν ξῶντα, οὐ δοκεῖν ἀδίκου ἀλλ’ εἶναι ἐθέλειν,

βαθείαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρποῦμεν, εὖ ἦς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα,

πρῶτον μὲν ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ εἶναι, ἐπειτα γαμεῖν ὁπόθεν ἄν βουληταί, ἐκδιδόναι εἰς οἷς ἄν βουληταί, ἕμμβαλλειν, κοινωνεῖν οἷς ἄν ἐθέλη, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ὄφελεῖσθαι κερδαίωντα τῷ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν τὸ ἀδικεῖν εἰς ἄγωνας τοῖνυν ἰόντα καὶ ἵδια καὶ δημοσὶα περιγύγνεσθαι καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν ἔχθρων, πλεονεκτοῦντα δὲ πλοῦτειν καὶ τοὺς τε φίλους εὐ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἔχθροὺς βλάπτειν, καὶ ὁ θεοὶς θυσίας καὶ ἀνάθηματα ἱκανῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρε-

that a definition cannot be rightly ascribed to Simonides: μαχούμεθα άρα, ἣν δ’ ἐγώ...ἐάν τις φῆ, κ.τ.λ. For τὸ τοῦ Ἀλς. see τὸ τοῦ Σωφροκλέους γίγνεται, Book I. 329 C; and τὸ τῶν παιζόντων, Book IV. 422 E. For the imperfect indicative we may recall Horace’s—

‘Ornare pulvinar deorum
Tempus erat dapibus sodales.’
Od. 1, 37, 2.
And Virg. Ecl. 1, 80—

‘Hic tamen hanc mecum pote
teras requiescere noctem.’
where see Conington.

τῷ δὲ γὰρ, ἢς τὸ ἄθικτον man’s conduct is consistently unjust, and, inasmuch as he realise good things from it, there is an element of consistency or reality in it.

ἐχόμενον, lit. ‘attaching it
self to’; e.s. notā p. 107, and infr. here πολλὰ ἄγαθα τουτῶν ἐχόμενα, Ch. VI. ad med.

ξυμβάλλειν, κοινωνεῖν, u.s. Book I. 333 A: ξυμβάλλει δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα; And infr. Ch. XI. where money is de
scribed as νόμερα ξύμβολον τής ἄλλαγῆς ἔνεκα.

touς τε φίλους εὐ ποιεῖν καὶ
touς ἔχθρο βλάπτειν, see Meno. 71 E, where the ἀρετή of a man includes this practice, when he is in office: πρῶτον μὲν εἰ
βούλει ἄνδρος ἄρετην, ἔβλεψιν, ὅτι ἀδετὴ ἐστὶν ἄνδρος ἄρετη, Ικανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὐ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ’ ἔχθροὺς κακῶς.

ἀναθήματα. Any dedicated offering: see Herod. 5, 60, this inscription on a tripod, Σκαῖος

πυγμαχεῖν μὲ ἐκηβόλῳ Ἀπόλ
λωνι νίκτας ἄνθεικε τεν περι
καλλῆς ἀγάλμα—in the temple of Ismenian Apollo at Thebes. Again, upon a chariot and four horses of bronze, on the left hand
CAP. VI.

Ταύτ' εἰπόντος τοῦ Πλαύκωνος, ἐγὼ μὲν ἐν νῷ διέχον τι λέγειν πρὸς ταύτα, ὦ δὲ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἀδείμαντος. Οὐ τί ποιεῖ, ἐφι, ὦ Σώκρατε, ἵκανως

whose morality Adeimantus disparages, Ch. VI. infr. bears witness also to the omniscience of Heaven. See Op. et Dies. 247:

ἐγγὺς γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἐστὶν

ἀδέναιοι φράζονται δοιοι σκο-λιήσι δίκηροι

ἀλήλους τρίβοντι θεῶν ὅπων οὐκ ἀλέγοντες.

τρὶς γὰρ μύριοι εἰσὶν ἐπὶ θεοί ποιλοκτητήρι

ἀδέναιοι Ζηνὸς φίλακες θυητῶν ἀνθρώπων.

θεοφιλέστερον, in opposition to Socrates’ position that the unjust is θεοῖς ἐχθρός. Book I. Ch. XXIII. 352 B.

CH. VI.—Herewith Adeimantus struck in: ‘Neither should we leave out the case for justice: fathers commend justice to their children, not for its own sake, but for its rewards; and poets likewise.’


tαῦτ' εἰτ. With these opening words compare Book I. Ch. XVII. init. Ταύτ' εἰπόν ὁ Ὑπαρχόμαχος ἐν νῷ εἶχεν ἄπιναι.
εἰρήσθαι περὶ τοῦ λόγου; Ἀλλὰ τί μήν; εἰποῦσιν. Αὐτό, ἢ δ’ ὅσο, οὐκ εἰρήσθαι ὁ μάλιστα ἔδει ῥηθῆναι. Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, τὸ λεγόμενον, ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρεῖν, ὥστε καὶ σύ, εἰ τι οὐδὲ ἐλλείπει, ἐπάμωνε. καίτοι εἰμὲ γε ἱκανὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τούτου ῥηθέντα καταπαλαίσαι καὶ ἀδύνατον ποιῆσαι βοηθεῖν δικαιοσύνη. Εἰ καὶ ὅσον, Οὐδέν, ἐφη, λέγεις, ἀλλ’ ἐτι καὶ τάδε ἄκουε; δεί γὰρ διελθεῖν ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίονς λόγους ὁ οὐκ ἐλπεῖν, οὐ δικαιοσύνην μὲν ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἀδίκιαν δὲ ψέγουσιν, ἵνα σαφέστερον δ’ οἱ δοκεῖ βούλεσθαι Γλαύκων, λέγουσι δὲ ποι ἐπαινοῦσιν τατεῖ 363 ταπεινοίς καὶ πάντες οἱ τιμῶν κηδόμενοι, ὡς χρῆ δικαίων εἶναι, οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες

τὸ λεγόμενον, 'as the proverb goes.' The phrase occurs again in Book VI. 492 C, ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ τῶν νεῶν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τίνα οἱ καρδίαν ὑσχεῖν. So τὸ τῶν παιζόντων, 'as they say in the game.' ἐκάστη γὰρ αὐτῶν πόλεως εἰσὶ παμπολλά, ἀλλ’ οὐ πόλις, τὸ τῶν παιζόντων. Book IV. 422 E. Also Euthydemus 380. Θαρρῶν διώκει καὶ ἀσκει, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τούτῳ, αὐτὸς καὶ τὰ παιδία, ἢ. Ch. XIX. 381. ἀλλ’ ἀτεχνῶς τὸ λεγόμενον δὲ Δίδι Κόρινθος γίγνεται; also Chaps. XX., XXIV. The expression stands in apposition to the proverb it recalls, and some verb such as γίγνεται is understood, as we had above, τὸ τῶν ζευγαλίων γίγνεται, Book I. Ch. III. οὐκοῦν, ἢ.ε. 'Is it not as we should expect?' 'Naturally,' as in Book I. Ch. V. 390. where there is also a reference to relationship, οὐκοῦν, ἐφην ἐγώ, δ Πολέμαρχος τῶν γε σῶν κληρονόμος, 'Should we not expect it, Polemarchus being your heir?'

ἐμὲ γέ, εἰρωνικῶς, 'poor me.' κατακαλαίσαι, a favourite metaphor; more generally, in Book IX. 583 B, δις νευκηκὼς ὁ δίκαιος τῶν ἁδικῶν, τὸ δὲ τρίτων ὀλυμπικώς τῷ σωτηρί τε καὶ τῷ Ὀλυμπίῳ Δίτης κ.τ.λ. And below, οἰδ. with this metaphor, κατοί τοῦτον ἐν εἰς μέγιστόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον τῶν πτώματων. Similarly in the contest between the Ἀδηστοῖς, the 'Ἀδηστός says:— ἐξισχεῖς. οὐδὲν γάρ σε μέσον ἔχω λαβὼν ἄφυκτον, l. 1045. οὐδὲν λέγεις, Οδηγεῖτο means that he takes Socrates' denial as merely eirwvnela. For he proceeds to make the task of explanation harder than ever, ὁ μεν ταῦτα ὁ, βούλεσθαι, 'to mean.' Lat. velle dicere. πάντες οἱ τιμῶν κηδ. 'all kinds of guardians.' οὐκ αὐτὸ δικ. ἐπ., 'not praising the thing itself, justice.' Aedimantus is here taking up Glaucon's original point; viz. that some things are desirable
in themselves, others for their effects, and others for both. Supr. Ch. I. ἢρα σοι δοκεῖ τολοῦθεν τί εἶναι ἄγαθον, ὃ δὲ εἰσίνει ἄν ἐξέχειν ὧν τῶν ἀποδασμῶν ἔθειμοι, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα ἀρκακόμενοι; cf. Juv. Sat. X. 141.

Quis enim virtutem amplexcitur ipsam

Premia si tollas.

γέγονται... ἀρχαὶ τε, &c. The schema Pindaricum; where the plural substantive is masculine or feminine; but the word ὅσαπερ here helps out the irregularity. See Æsch. Sept. c. Theb. 49,

Ἀντιθείας δ' ἰερὸν Τύμαλον

τελάται

Ζήσον ἀμφιβαλὲον δούλον Ἐλλάδι.

And see Book V. inftr. 462 E extr. έστι μὲν τοῦ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀλλαῖς πόλεσιν ἄρχοντες τε καὶ δῆμοι. Jelf, Gr. Gr., 386, notices that this schema amongst Attic writers is chiefly limited to the verb ἐστι, ἦ, at the beginning of a sentence.

έι ἐπέλεω δὲ... 'And these people carry out this principle, the advantage of a good reputation, still further.' τὰ τῶν δοξῶν is something like τὸ τῶν παιδότων quoted above. The expression is indefinite in both cases, because it is as short and elliptical as possible. And it is shortened thus because there can be no doubt in the mind of the hearer as to the reference in both cases, τὸ τῶν παιδότων means 'the (saying) of people who play a game.' τὰ τῶν δοξῶν means 'the (advantage) of (gaining) reputation.' τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους, 'the (case, or circumstances, of) Sophocles.' Supr. Ch. III. The article, in short, is used thus indefinitely with the purpose of suggesting to the hearer some known fact about the substantive which depends on it as genitive. See Ch. II. Book I., fín. note τοῦτο... τοῦ βίον.

ὁ γενναῖος Ἡσ. Spoken sarcastically: in the same spirit that Thrasymachus uses the expression γενναῖα εὕθεια, Ch. XX. Book I. 'Ingenuous' is the sense meant to be conveyed. Translate, 'as our good Hesiod and Homer say.' For Hesiod's theology, v. Intro. p. 25, 26; and Ch. V. here, note on ἑρατεία τοῦ δικαίου. And, for another charge against Homer's morality, p. 133.

Τὰς δρύς, &c., see Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 230. Τοῖς φέρει μὲν γαῖα πολύν βίον. ἥρει δὲ δρύς Ἀκρη μὲν τὸ φέρει βάλλων, μέσῃ δὲ μελίσσας. Εἰρυτόκοι δ' ἄνεις μαλλοῖς καταβεβρίθασι.
ΠΛΑΤΟΝΟΣ

άκρας μέν τε φέρεις βαλάνους, νέσσας δὲ μελίσσας
εἰροπόκοι δ' ὅιες, φησίν, μαλλοῖς καταβεβρίασι,
καὶ ἄλλα δὴ τολλὰ ἁγαθὰ τοῦτων ἐχόμενα: παρα-
πλήσια δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐτερος: ὡστε τεν γὰρ φησιν

ἡ βασιλῆς ἀμύμονος, ὡστε θεοῦδης
εὐδικλᾶς ἀνέχροι, φέρρης δὲ γαῖα μέλαινα
πυρῶν καὶ κριθᾶς, βριθῆς δὲ δένδρεα καρπῶ,
τίκη δ' ἐμπεδὰ μῆλα, θάλασσα δὲ παρέχῃ ἱχθὺς.

Μουσαίος δὲ τούτων νεανικότερα τῶγαθὰ καὶ ὁ νῖός
αὐτοῦ παρὰ θεῶν διδόασι τοῖς δικαίοις· εἰς "Αἰδοὺ
tοῦτων ἔχ., 'connected with,'
'through to these,' and so 'like
these.' A similar sense is found
in the case of εἶναι with genitive, Book IV. 438 B. ὥστε γὰρ ἐστὶ
tοιαίτα σι οἶεν τον, 'All things
that bear a relation to some-
thing.' For ἔχομαι see above
πρᾶγμα ἀληθεὰς ἐχόμενον. The
subject and object of ἔχομαι used
thus represent consecutive mem-
bers of a sequence. See Xen.
Anab. I, 8, 4. Κλέαρχος μὲν τὰ
δέξωμεν, Πρόξενους δὲ ἐχόμενοι, οἵ
δὲ ἄλλοι μετὰ τούτων. Cf. ἐφεξῆς,
ἔπισχέρω.

ἡ βασιλῆς, &c. Hom. Od.
XIX. 109.

Μουσαίος. According to
Herodotus (VII. 6) he was a
tear. ἔχοντες ὁμομάρτιον, ἀνδρὰ θεών, χρησμολόγων τε
καὶ διαθέτων χρησμῶν τῶν Μου-
σαίων. Η χρησμολ ἦν of
sufficient importance to make
tampering with them criminal:
τίθ. ἐξηλάσθη γὰρ ὅτι ἶππαρ-
χὸν τοῦ Πειστράτου ὁ ὁμομά-
ρίτος ἰπ Αθηναίων, ἐπὶ αὐτοφάρῳ
ἀλοῦς ὑπὲρ Δάνου τοῦ Ἐρμιονίου
ἐμποίεις ἢ τα Μουσαίων χρησμῶν,
ὅσα αἱ ἑπι Δάνου ἐπικείμεναι νήσοι
ἀφαιρεῖτο κατὰ τῆς θαλάσσης.

He is said to have foretold the
particulars of the battle of
Salamis; id. 8, 96. ὡστε
ἀποτύπωα τὸν χρησμὸν, τὸν τε
ἄλλον πάντα τὸν περὶ τῆς ναυμα-
χῆς τἀυτής εἰρημένον Βακίδι καὶ
Μουσαίῳ, κ.τ.λ. He is mentioned
in the same capacity with Baccis
again in 9, 43. ταῦτα μὲν κα
παραπλήσια τοῦτοι ἄλλα Μου-
σαίον ἔχοντα οἶδα ἐσ Πέρος.
Plato in the Ion 536, speaks of
him as possessing with Homer
and Orpheus poetic inspiration
and occult influence upon other
poets and rhapsodes. οἱ μὲν
ἐξ Ὠρφεώς, οἱ δὲ ἐκ Μουσαίου
(ἐρημένου εἰσὶ), οἱ δὲ τολλοὶ
ἐξ Ὁμήρου κατέχονται τε καὶ
ἔχονται. Μουσεῖον, according to
Plato's system of theology, see
above p. 126, note on σοφὸς καὶ
θεῖος, was one of those men in
whom τὸθεῖον was present to a
great extent. See id. 533 D.
ἐστι γὰρ τούτῳ τῇχυν μὲν ὅμως ὁν
παρὰ σοι περὶ Ὡμήρου εὐθέλειον
ὁ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, θεία δὲ δένυμις.
Again 534 D. οὐκ ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ
τὰ καλὰ ταῦτα τοιάματα, οὐδὲ
ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ θεία καὶ θεῖον.
Compare also πάν ὑπὸ τινὸς
πεπόθατε in the Republic, II.
χρόνου τῶν ὅσιων κατασκευάζοντες ἐστεφανωμένους. D
ποιοῦσι τὸν ἀπαντά χρόνον ἣδη διάγειν μεθύοντας,
ἡγησάμενοι κάλλιστον ἀρετῆς μισθὸν μέθην αἰώνιον
οἱ δὲ ἔτι τούτων μακροτέρους ἀποτείνουσι μισθοὺς
παρὰ θεῶν παῖδας γὰρ παῖδων φασὶ καὶ γένος
κατοπισθεὶς λείπεται τοῦ ὅσιον καὶ εὐδόκουν. ταῦτα
δὲ καὶ ἄλλα τοιοῦτα ἐγκαμμάζουσι δίκαιοσύνην τοὺς
ἀνασολούς αὐτὸ καὶ ἀδίκους εἰς τηλὸν τινα κατορφύ-

Ch. X. Ἰνι. He is included by Protagoras among the first σοφισταὶ or 'Wise men', who veiled their true profession under that of poetry, or sooth-saying, or gymnastic, or music; Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, having the reputation of poets, Museus and Orpheus of soothsayers. Prot. 316 D. φοβουμένου τὸ ἐπαχθές αὐτῆς (σκ τὸ σοφιστὰς καλεῖθα) πρόσχημα ποιεῖται καὶ προκαλεῖται τοὺς μὲν ποιητὰς, οἷον ὁμηρόν τε καὶ Ἡσιόδον καὶ Σιμώνιδην, τοὺς τε αὖ τελεταί τε καὶ χρησμοδίας, τοὺς δὲφατε οΡφεᾶ καὶ Μουσαίον. His son Eumolpus, migrating from Thrace to Attica, founded the Eleusinian mysteries: hence the sacred family of Eumolpidae. V. Ἰν. Ch. VIII. βιβλίων δὴ ἡμαῖν παρέχονται Μουσαίοι καὶ Ὀρφεῖς.

καθότως δὲ ἐστεφανωμένος, and note.

μεθήν αἰώνιον. This view of the after life is evidently a survival from barbaric times. Μεθή is emphatically prescribed in the account of the στέψιν under which the φάλακες are to live; see Book III. 403 E. A connection between old Greek and Scandinavian mythology is apparent here; for in Valhalla the Valkyries or attendant nymphae are said to serve warriors after their death with cups of mead and ale; and thus the promise used to be made to a warrior: 'You shall quaff beer out of the skulls of your enemies.'

μακροτέρους ἀτοῖς. A common phrase to express a lengthy speech. Eurip. Med. 1351 — μακάρων ἐν ἐξέτεινα τοῖσιν ἐναντία

λόγοις. Åsch. Ag. 916: μακάρων γὰρ ἐξέτεινας.

τοὺς δὲ ἀνασολοὺς αὐτὸ. To answer this travesty of the rewards of virtue and vice, Socrates at the end of the whole Dialogue tells a tale in which fearful punishments and great enjoyment are meted out to the bad and good respectively. This
ποινὴν ἐν "Αἰδοὺ καὶ κοσκίνῳ ὧδερ ἀναγκάζουσιν Ἐφέρειν, ἢτι τε ξοντάς εἰς κακᾶς δόξας ἄγοντες, ἀπερ Γλαύκων περὶ τῶν δικαίων δοξαζομένων δὲ ἄδικων διήλθε τιμωρήματα, ταῦτα περὶ τῶν ἄδικων λέγον- 

σιν, ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν. ὦ μὲν οὖν ἐπαυνος καὶ ὁ

ψόγος οὕτος ἐκατέρων.

CAP. VII.

Πρὸς δὲ τούτων σκεψαι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο αὐθεντικὸς λόγον περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἄδικαις ἱδία υπὸ λεγόμενων καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν. πάντες γὰρ ἐν ἑνὸς στόματος ὑμνοῦσιν, ὡς καλὸν μὲν ἡ σωφροσύνη τε tale of Er the Pamphylian (see Argument Book Χ.) did not represent Socrates' belief regarding a future existence; and is merely popular. His general audience, for whose sake the tale is told, could hardly understand, much less appreciate his ideal of existence, viz.: ἀνακλινάντες τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐγήν εἰς αὐτῷ ἀποβλέπει τὸ πάσι φῶς παρέχον, sc. ἰδίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ: 'To lift the eye of the soul up to the contemplation of the Real Good.' Book VII. 540 A.

ἀγοντες, 'representing them as coming to an evil reputation.' Like κατορεύοντως above, 'submerge them' i.e. 'represent them as submerged.' It is a brachylogy of expression, where the first and prominent subject of the sentence is constituted subject also to an action which does not really belong to it. In Soph. Π. Ed. Τυρ. 742, we have the expression used of an old man—

χρυσάων ἐπὶ λευκάκθες κάρα, an action where the person is not properly an agent. And id. 480——

τὰ μεσόμφαλα γῆς ἀπονοσφίζων μαντεῖαι.

i.e. 'going away from,' but literally, 'separating.' In the same way Virg. Εn. 7. 173——

'Hic primos attollere fasces

Regibus omen erat.' Where the kings are said 'to raise,' when properly they should be said 'to have raised for them.' Other examples in Virgil are, 'dare classibus Austros,' 'seram dedit per membra quietem'; and see below here Ch. XVI. παιδεύομεν τοὺς ἄνδρας.

ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν, i.e. 'they have none better to speak of.'

Ch. VII.—The poets too one and all describe virtus as toilsome, and vice as pleasant, whilst soothsayers offer to purge men from crime with a few prayers.

ὑμνοῦσι, 'harp on this'; see Book VIII. 549 E: ἄλλα δὴ δοσα καὶ οὐα φιλοῦσιν αἱ γυναῖκες
POLITEIAS β.

καὶ δικαιωσύνη, χαλεπὸν μὲντοι καὶ ἐπίπονον ἀκο- λασία δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἥδυ μὲν καὶ εὐπτετές κτήσασθαι, δόξη δὲ μόνον καὶ νόμῳ αἰσχρόν. Λυσιτελέστερα δὲ τῶν δικαίων τὰ ἄδικα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος λέγουσι, καὶ πονηροὶς πλουσίους καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἐχοντας εὐδαιμονιζέν καὶ τιμῶν εὐχερῶς ἔθελοντι δημοσίᾳ τε καὶ ἰδίᾳ, τοὺς δὲ ἀτιμάζει καὶ ὑπερορᾶν, οἳ ἂν τὴν ἀσθενεία τε καὶ πένητες ὁσιῶν, ὀμολογοῦντες αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους εἶναι τῶν ἐτέρων. τούτων δὲ πάντων οἱ περὶ θεῶν τε λόγοι καὶ ἀρετῆς θαυμασιώτατοι λέγονται, ὡς ἄρα καὶ θεοὶ πολλοὶς μὲν ἁγαθοῖς δυστυ- χίας τε καὶ βίον κακῶν ἐνειμαν, τοῖς δὲ ἐναντίοις ἐναντίαν μοῦραν. ἀγύρται δὲ καὶ μάντεις ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας ἵντες πεἰθοῦσιν ὡς ἐστὶ παρά

περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὄμειν. And

Deberant olim tenues mi-
grasse Quiritae.'

And for the admiration and
influence which wealth brings
with it, Sat. VII. 124, seqq.

δυστυχίας. At the end of this Book it is
argued that God cannot be the
author of evil to any one; 379
C: οὐκ ἄρα πάντων γε αἴτιον τὸ
ἀγαθὸν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εἰ ἐχόντων
αἴτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄναλοι πολλοὺς μὲν ἁγαθοὺς δυστυχίας.

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σφίσι δύναμις ἐκ θεῶν ποριζομένη θυσίας τε καὶ
C ἐπῳδαῖς, εἰτε τι ἀδικημά τοῦ γέγονεν αὐτοῦ ἢ προ-
γόνων, ἀκείσθαι μεθ᾽ ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἑορτῶν, εάν τέ
τινα ἐχθρὸν πημῆναι ἔθελη, μετὰ σμικρῶν δαπανῶν
ὁμοίως δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ βλάψει, ἐπαγωγαίς τισὶ καὶ
καταδέσμοις τοὺς θεούς, ὡς φασί, πείδοντες σφισιν
ὑπηρετεῖν. τοῦτοις δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς λόγοις μάρτυρας
ποιητάς ἐπάγονται, οἱ μὲν κακίας πέρι εὐπετείας
dιδόντες,

ὡς τὴν μὲν κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστων ἐλέσθαι

D ῥηίδιως· λείη μὲν ὀδὸς, μάλα δ᾽ ἐγγύθη ναιεί
tῆς δ᾽ ἀρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν
καὶ τῖνα ὀδὸν μακράν τε καὶ ἀνάντη· οἱ δὲ τῆς τῶν
θεῶν ὑπ᾽ ἀνθρώπων παραγωγῆς τὸν ὁμηροῦ μαρτύ-
ρονταί, οὗτοι καὶ ἐκεῖνοι εἶπε

λιστοὶ δὲ [στρεπτοῦ] τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοῖ,
καὶ τοὺς μὲν θυσίας καὶ εὐχώλαις ἄγαναις

ἐπῳδαῖς. These were also used
to keep off disease; Eurip.
Hippol. 478—
elóv δ᾽ ἐπῳδαὶ καὶ λόγοι
θελετήριοι
φανήσεται δὲ τὴς δὲ φάρμακον
νόσου.

δωμίας δίκαιοι δίκαιοι ταις οἰον ἡ πολεμιούν,
ἔπαγωγαίς τισὶ καὶ καταθ. In
Aristoph. Nub. 749 we have
a caricature of this witchcraft—
γυναίκα φάρμακα ἐπὶ πρόμενος
θεταλήν,
καθέλομι νῷταρ τὴν σελή-
νυν...

As in Horace Epod. 17, 5—
Refixa cælo devocare sidera.

And again, Epod. 5, 45—
Quæ sidera excantata voce

Thessala

Lunamque cælo deripit.
Virg. Ecl. 8, 69—
Carmina vel cælo possunt
deducere Lunam.

And Plato in the Gorgias 513:
τὰς τὴν σελήνην καθαρόντας,
tὰς θεταλίδας.

ὡς τὴν μὲν, &c. Hesiod.

Mem. 2, 1, 22 in the choice
of Hercules. & Ἡδρόκλεις, ὡς
χαλεπῆ καὶ μάκραν ὀδὸν ἐπὶ τὰς
eὐφροσύνας ἤ γυνῆ σοι ἀκτη
διηγεῖται. Ἐπι συν. ἦν ἱδρῶτα
here: εἰ δὲ καὶ τῷ σάματι βοηθεῖ
δυνατῆς εἶναι, τῇ γυνῇ ὑποτε-
τειν ἐδιαστὸν τὸ σῶμα καὶ γνωσι-
τειν ἐνν πῶν καὶ ἱδρῶτι.

λιστοῖ, &c. Hom. II. ix.

497
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ β'.

λοιβῇ τε κνίσῃ τε παρατρωπῶς ἁνθρωποὶ λυσόμενοι, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβηθῇ καὶ ἀμάρτῃ. Ἐ

βιβλων δὲ ὁμαδον παρέχονται Μουσαίοι καὶ Ὀρ-φέως, Σελήνης τε καὶ Μουσῶν ἐγγόνων, ὡς φασί, καθ’ ὅς θυπολογοῦσιν, πειθούντες οὐ μόνον ἰδιώτας ἀλλὰ καὶ τόλεις, ὡς ἁρὰ λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικημάτων διὰ θυσίων καὶ παιδιᾶς ἥδονων εἰσὶ μὲν ἐτυ ξῶσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ὡς δὴ τελετὰς καὶ 365 λούσιν, αἱ τῶν ἐκεὶ κακῶν ἀπολύσουσιν ἡμᾶς, μὴ θύσαντας δὲ δεινὰ περιμένει.

CAP. VIII.

Ταῦτα πάντα, ἐφθ., ὥς φίλε Σώκρατες, τοιαύτα καὶ τοσαύτα λεγόμενα ἀρετῆς πέρι καὶ ἱκανίας, ὡς ἀνθρωποί καὶ θεοὶ περὶ αὐτὰ ἔχουσιν τιμῆς, τὰ οἰόμεθα ἀκουόσας νέων ψυχὰς ποιεῖν, ὅσοι εὑρεῖς καὶ τῶν ἐκεί κακῶν. See p. 120 supr., and Ch. V. B, ἐκείσε ἀπίησαν, τὴν ἐκεί μοίραν.

Ch. VIII.—What wonder if young men, then, make this perfect injustice their object? It is no easy task, but all things perfect are difficult to realize; and if we prosper in wickedness we can appease the gods with sacrifice.

τὰ ἐκείνα ἔχουσιν τμῆς, τὰ οἰόμεθα ἀκουόσας νέων ψυχὰς. A similar case is put below, Book VI. 492, δεκτ. εἰς, εἰς, εὐγναθικομένου ἀθρόου οἱ πολλοί εἰς ἐκκλησίας ἢ εἰς δικαστήρια ἢ θεατρα ἢ στρατώτεθα ἢ τινα ἄλλον κοινὸν πλῆθος ξύλων ἢ μελανοί ή πολλαῖς διαθεμένοι, τὰ δὲ ἐπαινόσιν, ὑπερβάλλονται ἐκάτερα, καὶ ἐκβοῶνται καὶ κρο- τοῦντες, πρὸς δὲ αὐτοὺς αἱ τε πέται καὶ δὸ τότε εἰς ὁ ἤ δὲ διαὶ ἐπηχοῦντες διέλαθον δόμῳς παρέχωσι τοῦ ψόγου καὶ ἐπαίνου, εἴ δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ τοῦ νέου, τῷ λεγόμενον, τίνα οἷς καὶ διαίται ἐσχεῖν; ἢ τολῶν ἂν αὐτῷ καθέλων ιδιωτικῆς ἀνθίζειν, ἢν οὐ κατα- κλουθεῖται ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιοῦτος ψόγου ἢ ἐπάκουν οἰχῆσθαι μήριμμην κατὰ ροῶν ἢ ἂν οὕτως.
ικανολ επὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα οὐσπερ ἐπιπτόμενοι
συλλογίζονται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ποιὸς τις ἂν ὁ ὁ καὶ τῇ
Βπορευθεὶς τὸν βιόν ὡς ἀριστα διέλθοι; λέγοι γὰρ
ἀν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων πρὸς αὐτὸν κατὰ Πίνδαρον
ἐκεῖνο τὸ
πότερον δίκα τείχος υψιον
ἡ σκολιαὶς ἀπάταις

ἀναβᾶς καὶ ἐμαυτόν οὐτῷ περιφράξας διαβωῦ; τὰ
μὲν γὰρ λεγόμενα δικαίῳ μὲν ὄντι μοι, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ
dοκῶ, ὥφελος οὐδὲν φασιν εἶναι, πόνους δὲ καὶ ξημίας
φανερᾶς· ἀδίκω δὲ δόξαν δικαιοσύνης παρασκευασά-

C μένῳ θεσπέσιος βίος λέγεται. οὖκ οὖν, ἐπειδῆ τὸ
dοκεῖν, ὡς δήλοσί μοι οἱ σοφοὶ καὶ τὰν ἀλάδειαν

φερρη, καὶ φήσει τε τὰ αὐτὰ τού-
τος καὶ καὶ αὐχαὶ εἶναι, καὶ
ἐπιπτεύεσιν ἀπερ ἃν οὕτω, καὶ
ἐσεθαι τοιούτων; In this pas-

gage we see that ‘flood’ of words which Socrates has already
complained of in Thrasymachus
(Book I. Ch. κατανυσθασ κατὰ
tῶν ὠτῶν ἀθρόων καὶ πολὺν τῶν
λόγων), and Glaucus has men-
tioned in the beginning of his
speech (διαστεθημένοι τά δετα,
ἀκούων Θρασυμάχου καὶ μυρλῶν
ἄλλων). All such doctrines as
are conveyed through these
means, says Adeimantus are
depraved; and, as might be ex-
pected, the young believe them.
Now it is the young to whom
Socrates principally addresses
himself: Cephalus, as has been
noticed, p. 111, and Polemar-
chus, p. 109, alike hold out the
inducement of converse with
the young to Socrates; and in
the Euthydemus we find Socrates
telling two Sophists what a
strong interest he takes in a
young man Clinias. Later on
in the Republic we find a partial
explanation of this interest.
Apart from other reasons,
Socrates was interested in the
young, because they were most
susceptible to his teaching, and
he hoped to imbue them rather
than the older men with his
beliefs; see Book III. 415 D:
οὐδαμῶς, ἐφι, διὸς γὰρ αὐτὰ
οὕτω δὲ τὰ τούτων νεῖς καὶ οἱ
ἐπείτα οἳ τ’ ἄλλου
ἀνθρώπου οἱ ἄστεροι.

ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ λέγ. οὐσπερ ἐπι-
τόμενον, ‘flitting as it were over
the whole field of words.’ Al-
though the metaphor is different,
the sense of the present passage
reminds us of that in Book I. Ch.
XXIV.: τοῦ δὲ παραφερομένου
ἀπογευόμεναι ἄρταξεται, and see
below Ch. XII. ἡπ.: ἐπιτύνο-
νες.

τῶν βλῶν ὑπὸ ἀριστα διέλθου, v.s.
Book I. 352 Ε: οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ
ἐπιστήμοντος ὁ λόγος ἄλλα περὶ
tοῦ ὄντος τρόπον χρῆς ἐν, and
Note.

τῶν ἀλάδειν βί. Plato is
βιάται καὶ κύριον εὐδαιμονίας, ἐπὶ τοῦτο δὴ τρεπτέων ὅλος· πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα κύκλω περὶ ἐμαυτὸν σκιαγραφίαν ἀρέτῆς περιγραπτέον, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σοφοτάτου Ἀρχιλόχου ἀλώπεκα ἐλκτέον ἐξοπλισθεὶν κερδαλεάν καὶ ποικίλην. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, φησί τις, οὐράδιον ἂν λαυθάνειν κακῶν ὄντα. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδέν εὐπτέτες, φήσομεν, τῶν μεγάλων ἄλλ' ἰμώς, εἰ μέλλομεν εὐδαιμονήσεως, ταύτῃ ἰτέον, ὅς τὰ ἱλην τῶν οὐσιών φέρει. ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λαυθάνειν ἔξωμοσίας τε quoting Simonides: hence the peculiarity of dialect. σκιαγρ. ἀρέτης, see Book VII. 523 B, where the word σκιαγραφία refers to objects drawn in outline, not clearly and sharply presented to the sight: τὰ πόρφυρα, ἐφε' φανόμενα θύλου δελελείς καὶ τὰ ἐσκιαγραφημένα. And in Book X. 602 D, σκιαγραφία is described as deceptive: δὴ ἡ ἡμῶν τῇ παθήματι τῆς φύσεως ἢ σκιαγραφία ἐπιθεμένη γογκτελας οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει; and in Book IX. 583 B, the pleasure of the φόνιμος is said to be the only true pleasure, that of others being shadowy: οὐδὲ παναλήθης ἐστιν ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδῆς πλῆν τῆς τοῦ φονίμου οὐδὲ καθαρὰ, ἀλλ' ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις. σχῆμα means the figure or general outlines of an object; thus it denotes the movement of troops. Book VII. 326 D: δοσα δὴ ἄλλα σχηματίζουσι τὰ στρατώσεια εἰν αὐτάσ τε μάχαις καὶ πορείαις; and in Book VIII. 548 D, we find the word itself explained: αὕτη μὲν ἡ πολιτεία οὕτως γεγονοῦσα καὶ τοιαύτη ήν τις εἰς, ὡς λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας ὁπογράφαντα μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀνεργισάθη, 'in outline, not in detail.'

τὴν δὲ τοῦ σοφ. Fr. 89, τῇ
Κατὰ τίνα οὖν ἔτι λόγον δικαιοσύνην ἄν πρὸ
μεγίστης ἀδικίας αἱροὶμεθ᾽ ἂν; ἢν ἔαν μετ᾽ εὐσχη-
μοσύνης κιβδήλου κτησώμεθα, καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ
παρ᾽ ἄνθρωποις πράξομεν κατὰ νοῦν ἔφοιτός τε καὶ
teleuτήσαντες, ὡς ὁ τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ ἄκρων
λεγόμενος λόγος. ἐκ δὲ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τὴς
μηχανῆς, ὥστε ὁ Ἐνκρατεῖς, δικαιοσύνην τιμᾶν ἐθέλειν, ὡς
κτις δύναμις ὑπάρχῃ ψυχῆς ἡ χρημάτων ἡ σώματος
ἡ γένους, ἀλλὰ μὴ γελάν ἐπαίνουμεν ἅκοιντα;

ai teletal, v. Dem. de Cor. loc. cit.

θεῶν παίδες, i.e. Orpheus, Museus, &c., v.s. not. ad Mous-
saious; and not. ad sôfpos gar kal
atheis, p. 126. Ion 534 E, οἱ δὲ
ποιηταὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλ᾽ ἡ ἐρμηνεῖς τῶν
θεῶν ἐστὶ, κατεχόμεθαι εἰς ὅσον ἂν
ἐκαστὸς κατέχησι.

Ch. IX.—In fine, all who can
commit injustice with impunity
will continue to do so, until those
who praise justice praise it for
itself, not for its rewards. To
you, Socrates, we look for a better
recommendation of Justice.

ἔτι, i.e. ‘after this comparison
of their respective values.’

πράξομεν κατὰ νοῦν, join in
translation.

τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ ἄκρων.

There is a slight touch of sar-
casm discernible here in Adei-
mantus’ words. This expression
is a Hendiadys:—‘many of the
most competent.’

δύναμις, so below, ἄδυνατων
ἂν τὸ δύναμις. This is in agreement
with Glaucou’s original account
of the nature of justice, v.s. Ch.
Π. τοῖς μὴ δύναμεν τὸ μὲν
ἐκφεύγειν τὸ δὲ αἰρεῖν, &c.,
‘Those who have no power’;
whilst those who have power, be
it bodily or mental, direct or
indirect, find injustice to be to
their advantage rather than
justice. Hence we are at present
only listening to Thrasy-machus’
case elaborated,—that Justice is
the Interest of the stronger; for
Thrasy-machus made it clear that
the interest of the stronger was
injustice towards the weaker.
Ch. XVI. Book I.

ἀλλὰ μὴ. ὡς is used, the case
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ β' 233

ός δὴ τοι εἰ τις ἐχει ψευδή μὲν ἀποφήμαι ἡ εἰρήκα-
μεν, ἰκανὸς δὲ ἐγνωκεν ὅτι ἀριστον δικαιοσύνη,
πολλὴν που συγγνώμην ἐχει καὶ οὐκ ὀργίζεται τοῖς
ἀδίκοις, ἀλλ' οἴδεν, ὅτι πλὴν εἰ τις θεία φύσει δυσχε-
ραίων τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἐπιστήμην λαβὼν ἀπέχεται
ἀυτοῦ, τῶν γε ἄλλων οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν δίκαιος, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ
ἀναιδρίας ἢ γῆρως ἢ τινος ἄλλης ἀσθενείας ὁγειεί
tὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἀδυνατῶν αὐτὸ δράν. ὡς δὲ, δῆλον' ὁ
γὰρ πρῶτος τῶν τοιούτων εἰς δύναμιν ἑλθὼν πρῶτος
ἀδικεί, καθ' ὅσον ἂν ὁλῶς ἡ ἑ. καὶ τούτων ἀπάντων
οὐδὲν ἄλλο αἴτιον ἢ ἐκείνο, ὀδευτέρ άπας ὁ λόγος
οὗτος ὀρμήσει καὶ τὸδε καὶ ἐμὸν πρὸς σέ, ὁ Σώκρατες,

being hypothetical. For ἀλλὰ
with the negative, ν. ἑνδ. 379
D., ἀλλ' οὐ τόν θείον.

ἐχει...ἀποφήμαι ν.α. pp. 181
and 190; et ἑνδ. Ch. XI. ἧν
οἱ οἰκοδόμοι (ἐχοιεν) χρῆσαι
ὑποφιγιοι.

ἐρωτον δικ., ν. ἑνδ. Ch. IX.
ἡ μὲν κακόν, ἢδὲ ἐγαθόν ἦστι,
'One is an evil, the other a
good,' ἐρωτον, 'the Best.'

ἰκανὸς ἐγνωκεν...πολλὴν συγ-
γνώμην, Tout comprendre c'est
tout pardonner. The particles
ὡς δὴ τοι, introduce a statement
explaining or corroborating that
preceding, 'At any rate the fact
is...' ὁς here is like ἐπει in
Euthyphro. 9 B. Μανθάνω δὲ
τοι δοκῶ τῶν δικαστῶν δυσμαθέ-
στερος εἶναι, ἐπει ἐκεῖνος ἐγ
785.

'Αλλ' ἐδώθς ἐπιλήθει σοι γ' ἄττ'
ἀν καὶ μάθης·
ἐπει τί νυν πρῶτον εἴδοσθ' ἦ;
λέγε.
Both particles bring in a further
consideration not to be lost sight
of.

πλὴν εἰ τις θεία φύσ., ν.α. ὁπ.
ad σοφὸς καὶ θείος, p. 126. εἶ

γὰρ χρῆ εἰδέναι ὅτι περ ἀν σωθ'
τε καὶ γένηται οἶον δει ἐν τοιαύτῃ
catastázei politeiēn, theou maitραν
αὐτὸ σωσάι ἑλγόν οὐ κακὸς ἑρείς.
Book VI. 492 E. These words
are part of the description men-
tioned above in Ch. VIII. (on
the words τι οἰδίμεθα ἀκούωνας);
where it is shown that a young
man who is exposed to the
ordinary influences of life can-
not fail to be depreciated by
the noise and struggle. Adei-
mantus here, and Socrates in
the passage quoted, are speaking
the same words: it is the same
expression of Plato's belief that
God works by means of and in
man: see Ion 534, where it is
shown that the best poetry is
the direct inspiration of God.

ψέγει τὸ αὖ, ἀδυνατῶν αὐτὸ
δράν, Ch. III. ἐπιε. ἀδυναμία τοῦ
ἀδικεῖν ἑκοτες αὐτὸ (δἰκαιούνην)
ἐκτητεύοντοι.

πρῶτος ἀδικεί, ν.α. Ch. III.
ἐκ' αὐτοφόρῳ οὖν λάβασιν ἐν
τῶν δίκαιον τῷ ἀδίκῳ εἰς ταύταν
τοῦτα διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν.

τόδε, Glaucous, who insisted
upon this point, Ch. II. ad
med.
eiphein, oti ati thamasiie pantwn ymow, osai epainetai phate dikaiosunhs eina, apo tov ete arxhs hrown arxamenoi, osow logoi leleimmenoi, mekhoi tov nyn anbropowv oudeis powpote eiskezen adikian oude epemvasese dikaiosunhn allws idoxas te kai timas kai domega tas apti avton xynomenedai avto d' ekateron te avton dunamei en t' t' ou chontos xynh evon kai laundon theous te kai anbropous oudeis powpote ou't ev poimsei ou't en idios logoies epexelthen ikanov ts' logow, os te men megiston kakon osa ischei xynh ev hrown, notably the choice of Heracles, given at length in Xen. Mem. II. 1, 21, seqq. e.g. 28. ete tov theou theos einaia sou boulieis, therapeutein tovs theous, ete upo fileon idoleis yegapasois, tovs fileous euergetai teon, ete upo tinos poleis ekimonei timathai, tivn pollin ophiletai teon, ete upo tis 'Ellados pasas exois epe' arentha thamaexothei, tivn 'Ellada peiratov eu poiiein.
oudeis powpon epi poimsei. Tho-
ogis, for instance, as it has been noticed in the Introduction, describes justice as kalistov, the Fairest, i.e. he commends it rather for its external than its intrinsic value. This sentiment, the devotion to to kalun, is characteristic of the Greeks who were an emulous people, and to some extent of the Romans also. The Greeks possessed to an extra-
ordinary degree the sense of the beautiful, and they lived very much in public: hence they were prone rather to judge of actions by their effects than by the motives which prompted them. timai, dorioal, stefanoi, the rewards of probity and great deeds, are set forth and insisted upon instead of probity itself. Thus Aristotle, in describing the good man's patience under ad-
dersity, speaks of to kalon, the beauty of the endurance and the decency (euxychmonwos) of his conduct. eu tovzoi dialempe to kalon, upotheia ferei tis evkola olallae kai megala atuxias. Eth. Nic. I, 10, 12, et infra. 13. tivn yap oso aletheos agathon kai ekfriona tasa oumbea tasa toues euxychmonwos fernei. Similarly in 8, XIII. 8, kalon de to evo poiiein. It is the same feeling which prompts the use of the word 'laus' in Virgil's poem for 'noble deeds.' See En. VIII. 273—
Tantarum in munere laudum Cingite fronde comas.
and IX. 252—
Que vobis, que digna, viri, pro laudibus istis
Premia posse rear solvi?
Also I. 461—
Sunt hic etiam sua premia laudi.
Adeimantus's complaint is that the good deed and its intrinsic value is lost sight of in the honour and glory of the reward. idios logos, i.e. pedestri sermone. Stallb. See Ch. VII. ad init. idia te logomeun kai upo poiitai, megiston kakon osa ischei psich.
αὐτῇ, δικαιοσύνη δὲ μέγιστον ἀγαθῶν. εἰ γὰρ οὔτως 367 ἐλέγετο ἐξ ἀρχῆς ύπὸ πάντων ὑμῶν καὶ έκ νέων ἡμᾶς ἐπείθετε, οὐκ ἂν ἀλλήλους ἐφυλάττομεν μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἦν ἐκαστος φύλαξ, δεδιώς μὴ ἀδικῶν τῷ μεγίστῳ κακῷ ξύνοικος ἦ. ταύτα, δὲ Σώκρατες, ἰσος δὲ καὶ έτι τούτων πλεῖον ᾨρασύμαχος τε καὶ ἄλλος ποὺ τις ύπέρ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας λέγοιεν ἃν μεταστρέφοντες αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν, φορτικῶς, ὡς γ᾽ ἂν μοι δοκεῖ ἄλλ᾽ ἐγώ, οὔδεν γὰρ ἃ σε δέομαι ἀποκρύπτεσθαι, σοῦ ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκούσαι τάναντια, ὡς δύναμαι μάλιστα κατατείνας λέγω. μὴ οὖν ἡμῖν μόνον ἐνδείξῃ τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας κρείττουν, ἀλλὰ τὶ ποιοῦσα ἐκατέρα τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτῇ δι᾽ αὐτήν ἢ μὲν κακόν, ἢ δὲ ἀγαθόν ἐστι τὰς δὲ δόξας ἀφαιρεῖ, όσπερ Γλαύκων διεκελεύσατο. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀφαιρήσει ἐκατέρωθεν τὰς ἀλήθεις, τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς προσθήσεις, οὐ τὸ δίκαιον φήσομεν ἐπανεῖν σε, ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, οὔδὲ τὸ ἀδικον εἶναι ψέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, καὶ παρακελεύσθαι τὸ ἀδικον ὦντα λανθάνειν, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν Ὄρασυμαχφ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν, ξυμφέρον τοῦ κρείττους, τὸ δὲ ἀδικον αὐτῷ μὲν ξυμφέρον καὶ εἰν αὐτῇ. So in Book III. 491 C. Ἀχίλλης... ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ νοσήματε δύο ἐναντίων ἀλλήλων, whilst in Book IV. 444 E. as already noticed, virtue is described in the same metaphor as οὐλεία τις.

 φορτικῶς, 'in a vulgar or unappreciative way.' See VII. 528 E. ἐκπλήξεως (μοι) περὶ ἀστρονομίας ὡς φορτικῶς ἐπισκευάσατο, and IX. 581 D. οὐ τὸν μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν χρημάτων ἤδονην φορτικὴν τινα ἴνα ἴησυνία; κατατείνας, v.s.p. 115, note. τὶ ποιοῦσα τὸν ἔχοντα, after the analogy of ἐθ, κακός, ποιεῖν with accusative.

εἰ γὰρ μὴ δ.φ., &c. 'If you do not remove their real characters and give them the credit of false ones,' &c. See above Ch. IV. ad med. οὐκ ἀφαιρετέον (δικήφ) ἂλλ᾽ εἰς τὸ μέγιστον δικαίον τὴν μεγίστην δόξαν αὐτῷ παρεκκευάσατο εἰς δικαιοσύνην... ἀφαιρετέον δὴ τὸ δοκεῖν (δικαίφ). εἰ γὰρ δόξη δίκαιος εἶναι, ἴνα τούτων αὐτῷ τιμῆλ, &c. The unjust man is to have the credit of justice, whilst from the just man is to be taken away even the reputation of the justice which he practises.
λυσιτελοῦν, τῷ δὲ ἦττον ἄξιμφορον. ἔπειδὴ οὖν ὁμολογησας τῶν μεγίστων ἁγαθῶν εἶναι δικαιοσύνην, ἃ τῶν τε ἀποβαινόντων ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἐνεκα ἡξία κεκτήσατε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, οἷον ὁρᾶν, Δἀκούει, φρονεῖν, καὶ ὑγιαίνειν δὴ, καὶ ὥσ’ ἄλλα ἁγαθὰ γόνιμα τῇ αὐτῶν φύσει ἄλλοι οὐ δόξη ἐστὶ, τούτ’ οὖν αὐτὸ ἐπαίνεσον δικαιοσύνης, δ’ αὐτῇ δι’ αὐτὴν τὸν ἔχοντα ὄνισσα καὶ ἁδικία βλάπτει μισθοῦς δὲ καὶ δόξας πάρες ἄλλοις ἐπαίνειν. ὡς ἐγὼ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀνασχοίμην ἄν οὕτως ἐπαινοῦντων δικαιοσύνην καὶ πογύντων ἁδικίαν, δόξας τε περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ μισθοὺς ἐγκωμιαζόντων καὶ λοιποῦντων, σοῦ δὲ οὐκ ἄν, εἰ μὴ σοὶ κελεύεις, διότι πάντα τὸν ἐμαυλόμενα, συρ. Ch. I. ἐπ. εἰ τοὺς τοῦτον τὴν δικαιοσύνην τίθη; Ἔγιν μὲν οἷοι ἐν τῷ καλλότρῳ, δ’ καὶ δ’ αὐτῷ καὶ διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα αὐτῷ ἁγαθητέον.

ἀστῶν. συρ. ἐνεκα.

ὁρᾶν, ἀκούειν, φρονεῖν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν δὴ. It is pleasant to notice here the optimistic tone of Adeimantus’ words—the sense of healthy enjoyment in mere existence. There is no question, ‘Is life worth living?’ Existence itself is a pleasure, as long as health is with us. Τυγιαίνειν concludes the list of blessings, and emphasized as it is by δή, is marked out as the greatest blessing of all. In Book IX. 583 D, we have an analysis of such pleasurable states. "Αρ’ οὖν μνημονεύεις, ἢν τοῦ ἑρω, τούς τῶν καμόντων λόγους, ὀδε λέγωσιν ὅταν καμνασιν, Πολύους, ὡς οδύν ηρα ἐστίν ἢδον τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, ἄλλα σφᾶς ἐλεήθησί, πρὶν κάμνειν, ἢδοντον δ’ν. See also Argument, p. 91.

τοῦτ’ οὖν...δικ., u.s. p. 113, note. ‘Make your commendation then of justice regarding its very nature, viz. that, &c. τούτο δικαιοσύνης, ‘this aspect of justice,’ is here further defined and emphasized by αὐτῷ, which, if we have regard to the use of αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, and αὐτῇ δι’ αὐτῆν, above, will be seen to mean more than ‘itself’ in the present passage: rather the essence or ‘nature.’

καὶ δικαία βλάπτει, loosely constructed co-ordinately with αὐτῇ διναίσαι, because the two thoughts are co-ordinate in the speaker’s mind. See above καὶ ηδονα, κ.τ.λ. Ch. I.

tῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀνασχοίμην... ἐν. See Book VIII. 564 E. οὐκ ἀνεχεται τοῦ ἄλλα λέγοντων, and X. 613 C. Ἀνέβητε ἡρα λέγοντος ἐμοί;

εἰ μὴ σοὶ κελεύεις, the entire confidence which Socrates’ character commanded is here strikingly exemplified. Adeimantus is convinced that to commend justice for its reward
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ β'.

βίον οὔδεν ἄλλο σκοπῶν διελήλυθας ἢ τοῦτο. µὴ Σ
οὖν ἡμῖν ἐνδείξῃ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι δικαιοσύνη
ἀδικίας κρείττον, ἀλλὰ τῷ ποιοῦσα ἐκατέρα τὸν
ἐχοντα αὐτῇ ἰὰ' αὐτῆς, εάν τε λαυθάνη εάν τε µὴ
θεοὺς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ἡ µὲν ἁγαθόν, ἡ δὲ κακὸν
ἔστιν.

CAP. X.

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἄκούσας αἶ ὑδὲ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τε
Πλαύκωνος καὶ τοῦ Ἀδειμάντου ἡγάμην, ἀτὰρ οὖν
καὶ τότε πάνυ γε ἡθην καὶ εἴπον. Οὐ κακῶς εἰς 368
ὕμᾶς, ὃ παῖδες ἐκεῖνον τοῦ ἀνδρός, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν
is a mistake, but if Socrates
choose to do so, he is ready to
hear him, as believing that he
would have something valuable
to say.

πάντα τὸν βλέψον, v.s. Ch. II.
περὶ γὰρ τοὺς ἀν µᾶλλον πολλὰς
tis νοῦν ἔχων χαίρων λέγων
καὶ ἄκοντων. And in Book V.
450 C. µέτρον δὲ γ' ἑφῃ, δὲ Σάκ-
ruptes, ὁ Πλάκων, τοιοῦτον λόγων
ἀκούειν ὅλος ὁ βίος νοῦν ἔχοσιν.
Such are Socrates' own expres-
sions, which bear witness to the
truth of Glaucön's words here.
With this chapter the case for
injustice comes to an end, and
with it the first part of the
Republic. It has been an
elaborate criticism of popular
beliefs and definitions. We
have seen Cephalus decline to
enter upon the question, 'What
is justice'? We have had defi-
nition after definition of justice
tried and found wanting, and
lastly, we have seen the spectacle
of two earnest minds, fully con-
vinced that integrity is the best,
but harassed and wearied with
the commendations of wicked-
ness, demanding of their friend
and teacher a solution of the
paradox which distresses them.
Besides this, the matter of the
dialogue, there has also been no
small preparation for a lengthy
controversy. Side subjects,
bearing on the main question,
have been suggested for future
settlement; methods of argu-
ment have been tested, and
approved, or found wanting;
accuracy in description and
definition has been demanded,
and all is ready for Socrates'
task, the justification of justice.

CH. X.—I said that their able
words had filled me with ad-
miration; I was however unequal
to the task. Then they besought
me again to try. So I said:
Let us take a larger organism
than man, the State, and try
first if we can find justice
there.

καὶ τότε. καὶ emphatic; see
above p. 140.
'ἐλευθείων ἐποιήσεν ὁ Γλαύκων οὖς ἐραστῆς, εὐδοκιμησάντας περὶ τὴν Μεγαροῦ μάχην, εἰτῶν·

παιδεῖς Ἀριστωνος, κλεινοῦ θείον γένος ἀνδρός.

τοῦτό μοι, ὀδίλιο, εὐδοκεῖ ἐγείρειν πάνυ γὰρ θείον πεπόνθητε, εἰ μὴ πέπεισθε ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης ἁμείν

νον εἶναι, οὔτω δυνάμενοι εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ· δοκεῖτε ἃ ἦ τού ἁλλον τοῦ ὑμετέρου τρόπου, ἐπεὶ κατὰ γε αὐτοὺς
toὺς λόγους ἡπίστουν ἃν ὑμῖν ὅσῳ δὲ μᾶλλον πίστεύω, τοσοῦτο μᾶλλον ἀπορώ ὅ τι χρήσωμαι οὔτε
gὰρ ὅπως βοηθῶ ἔχω· δοκῶ γὰρ μοι ἁδύνατο εἶναι· σημείον δὲ μοι, ὦτ ἢ πρὸς Ὀρασύμαχον λέγων ἢμιν

ἀποβαίνειν, ὃς ἁμείνον δικαιοσύνη Ἀδίκιας, οὐκ ἀπεδέξασθε μοι οὔτε ἢν ὅπως μὴ βοηθήσω ἔχω·

dεδοικα γὰρ, μὴ οὖδ' ὅσιον ἢ παραγενόμενον δικαί.

Cousin καθηγορουμένη ἀπαγορεύει καὶ μή βοηθεῖν

θείον, v.s. not. ad Μουσαίοις Ch. VI. ad med., and not. pp. 126, 150. "You have received a divine afflatus." This remark of Socrates must not be taken too seriously; there is a spice of raillery intended. But he goes on to pay them a compliment, which, coming from him, is of the greatest value, for their able statement of the case for injustice. For πεπόνθητε see note p. 114.

ἀπορῶ ὅ τι χρήσωμαι. Elliptical. "I don't know what to do (with the situation)." For this sense v.s p. 131, note. Here the usual dative is omitted, the object of χρήσωμαι being τοῦτοις, or ταύτῃ τῇ πίστει, to be supplied from πίστεω. This omission occurs in Arist. Nub. 439—Νῦν οὖν χρῆσθων ὅ τι βούλονται. Sc. ἐμοὶ.

ὅπως βοηθῶ ἔχω. We have seen ἔχω used above in this sense but with an infinitive; see Ch. IX. ἔχει...ἀπορήναι.

δοκῶ ἁδύνατος, v.s. δήλος εἶ ὅτι φήσεις, Book I. Ch. XX. ad med.; and ἐμοὶ γε δοκῶ Book I. 339 D. So on p. 175 it has been noticed above that μέλω and ἔκωικα are used.

ἀπεδέξασθε. See note p. 122. οὔτ' ἢ... Socrates' devotion to the defence of truth against falsehood is here expressed with words of grand simplicity. Similarly Aristotle, when investigating the nature of moral action, and finding a difficulty in providing for particular acts: ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὅταν τοιοῦτον τοῦ πάροχου λόγου πειρατέον βοηθεῖν.

Eth Nic. 2, 2, 5.

ἀπαγορευεῖν, 'to refuse'; hence 'to give up,' or 'fail';
πολιτείας β'. 239

ἐτί ἔμπνεοντα καὶ δυνάμενον φθεγγεσθαι. κράτιστον οὖν ὅτως ὅπως δύναμαι ἐπικουρεῖν αὐτῷ. ὃ τε οὖν Γλαῖκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδέοντο παντὶ τρόπῳ βοηθῆσαι καὶ μὴ ἀνέυαι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ διερεύνησασθαί τι τέ ἐστιν ἐκάτερον καὶ περὶ τῆς ὥφελείας αὐτοῦν τάληθες ποτέρως ἔχει. εἰπὼν οὖν ὅπερ ἐμοὶ ἔδοξεν, ὅτι Τὸ ζήτημα ἢ ἐπιχειροῦμεν οὐ φαύλου ἀλλ' ὅξι βλέ-
ποντος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινολ, δοκεῖ μοι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, τοιαύτην ποιήσασθαι ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οὐανπερ ἃν εἰ προσέταξε τις γράμ-
ματα σμικρὰ πόρρωθεν ἀναγνώρισεν μὴ πάντων ὅξι βλέπουσιν, ἐπειτὰ τις ἐνενόησεν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ γράμματα ἐστὶ ποι καὶ ἄλλοθι μεῖξι τε καὶ ἐν μεῖξιν, ἔρμαιον ἄν ἐφάνη, οὕμαι, ἐκεῖνα πρῶτον

see Book VIII. 568 D: ὅπως δ' ἂν ἀνείπους ρωσί πρὸς τὸ ἀναίτητον τῶν πολιτείων, μᾶλλον ἀπαγορεύει αὐτῶν ἡ τιμή.

diereuṃhíosasthai. In the discovery of justice the spot where it lies hid is called δυσδιερεύ-
νητός; Book IV. 432 C. For the eagerness of all those present to hear Socrates and to follow the discussion, see Book I. Ch. XI.: πάντες γὰρ ἡμεῖς ξυκρ-
ράτει εἰσοδομεῖν. Ibid. XII. ἢμεῖς οὖν ταῖς Γλαῖκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδέοντο αὐτοῦ μὴ ἀλλος ποιεῖν.

Ch. XVII.: οὔ μὴν εἰσαῦν γε αὐτῶν οἱ παρόντες, ἀλλ' ἥδη ἱκανοὶ ὑπομεῖναι τε καὶ παρασχεῖν τῶν εἰρήμενῶν λόγων.

οὐ φαύλου, ν.ε. Book I. Ch. XXIII.: οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυ-
χόντος δ' λόγος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δυστίμη τρόων χρήν. Εἰ ἤν
inf. here Ch. XV. ἢμεῖς οὖν ἄρα φαύλου πράγμα ἡρώμεθα.

δέ βλέποντος. So in the account of the cave, Book VII. 516 D: γέρα τὸ ἐξήτατα καθ-
ορώντι τὰ παροῦντα.

ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινολ. Not necessarily εἰρωνεῖα; but with Socrates customary self-deprecia-
tion. When this self-depreciation is excessive, and has the direct intention of deceiving an oppo-
nent, it becomes εἰρωνεῖα; v.ś.

εἰ εἰ' ἐμοὶ εἶ, Ch. I. init. ολαντερ ἃν εἰ... For this position of ἄν, repeated below (ἔρμαιον ἄν ἐφάνη), see p. 128 note. The construction is broken off at ολαντερ and a fresh sen-
tence begun.

ἐν μεῖξιν, sc. χρήματι, or τόπῳ, 'in a larger place,' or 'on a larger object.'

ἔρμαιον, 'a piece of good luck.' Hermes was the divinity from whom good fortune came; see II. 14. 491—

tὸν ρα μάλιστα

'Ἐρμεῖας Τρώων ἐφίλει καὶ κτήσιν ἤκαθε.'

For the word ἔρμαιον see Euthy-
demus 273 E: πόθεν τούτῳ τὸ ἔρμαιον εὑρέθην; et id. inf.:

τὶ μεῖξιν ἔρμαιον αὐτοῦ ἄν εὔροιμι ἐν πάντι τῷ ὑπερ;
οὗτος ἔπισκοπεῖν. Οὗτος here is like έπειτα in Book I. Ch. V. ad med.: µηδ' αὐτῆς ὁ δειλοντά ὅ κεκτήσας τινὰς ἢ ἁπαντῶν χρή-

ματα ἐπείτα ἐκείσε αὐτόν. See note ad loc.

ἐστι μὲν ἄνδρος ἐνὸς, ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦ καὶ ἀλης πάλεως. The common possession of certain qualities, habits, and morals is attributed to men and states in Book VIII. 544 E: οἶδ' οὖν, ἢ α' ἔγνω, δι' καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἑστὶ τοσαῦτα ἀνάγκη πρός τιναῖς εἶναι, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ πολιτείαις; ἢ οἴει έκ δρόμων ποθὲν ἢ καὶ Πέτρας τάς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι καὶ οὐχὶ ἐκ τῶν ἦθων τῶν ἐν ταῖς πάλεοις. Also Book VIII. passim, and Book IX.

πρωτόν ἐν ταῖς πάλεοις. With this system Aristotle agrees, Pol. i. 1, when he says, after describing the origin of the πόλις from the οἰκία and κοινή, that the πόλις is in its nature prior to the οἰκία, and κοινή as the whole is prior to its parts: καὶ πρῶτον δὲ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἡ οἰκία καὶ ἔκαστος ἦμῶν ἐστιν τὸ ἱδίον πρῶτον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους. In Xen. Mem. 1, 2, 17 the charge is brought against Socrates: χρήν τὸν ζωκράτην μὴ πρῶτον τὰ πολιτικά διάδεχειν τοὺς συνόντας ἢ σωφρονεῖν, a charge pointed by the fact that Critias and Alcibiades were his pupils. But it is there urged that these two men came to Socrates merely with the object of learning politics; and we know from the rest of Plato’s dialogues that ethical rather than political enquiries commanded Socrates’ attention when dealing with the young. Aristotle again puts political science above ethic in Nic. Eth. 1, 2, 8: εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα ἐστὶν (sc. τὰνθρώπιν άγαθον) ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει, μείζον γε καὶ τελεστὸν τὸ τῆς πάλεως φαύνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σώζειν. ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐν μονῇ, καλλίου δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἄνθιε καὶ πάλεως. ἢ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφεται, πολιτικὴ τίς ὁδὸς. In short, Ethic is a kind of Politic.
CAP. XI.

Γίγνεται τοινύν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, πόλις, ός ἑγόμαι, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἑκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεής: ἢ τίνι οἴει ἄρχην ἄλλην πόλιν.

ei γεγομένην πόλ. θε. λόγ.,
'If we were to see in our argument how a city comes into being,' i.e. 'picture to ourselves.' See infr. Book V. 458 Δ: δοστε οἱ ἄγοι τὴν διανόησιν εἰδώσων ἑπτάδος διὸ ἐκατόν, i.e. 'feed their imagination.' And above here, Ch. III. ιἰνι.: εἰ τὸνδε τοιησαμεν τῇ διανοϊ, 'if we were to put this case before our minds,' Plato describes the city as a sketch, when accomplished; Book VIII. 548 D: ὡς λόγος σχήμα πολιτείας ὑπογράφεται. peraiene. ἵνα τι καὶ περαινεῖν, Book I. Ch. XVIII. ιἰνι.

Ch. XI.—A city arises from man's necessities, which cause him to join with his fellow-man for mutual benefit. And one man must devote himself to one kind of production, not to many.

Γίγνεται τοινυ, et seqq. With this account it will be well to compare Aristotle's history of the origin of a community. He describes a city as a κοινωνία, or clubbing together, directed towards some good: πᾶσαν πόλιν δράμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὖσαν... πᾶσα μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τιμὸς στοχάζονται. It is also that κοινωνία which includes and joins together all other κοινωνίαι: ἡ πᾶσων κυριωτάτη καὶ πᾶσας περιέχουσα ἄλλας. He then proceeds to analyse this κοινωνία by going back, as Plato does here, to the origin of the state: Εἰ δὴ τις ἡ ἄρχης τὰ πράγματα φυσικαί βλέπειν, δοστε ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις, καὶ ἐν τούτοις κάλλος ἄν οὕτως δεισδεικτέοι. Those who cannot exist without each other's help naturally come together: ἀνάγκη δὴ πρῶτον συνώνεσθαι τοὺς ἄνεν ἀλλήλων μη δυναμένους εἶναι. But Aristotle goes farther back than Plato; he finds the first κοινωνία in family relations, man and wife, and man and slave; not between man and man, as Plato does here; and this is the first germ of the state, viz. οἰκία. Ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν δύο κοινωνίων οἰκία
πρώτη. For this he compares Homer’s expression—
θεμιστεύει δέ ἐκαστὸς
Παίδων ἡν ἀλόχων.
He then proceeds from the family to the κοινωνία πλειόνων
οἰκίων, or κάμη; thence from
the κάμη to the κοινωνία πλειόνων
κομῶν, or πόλις. Still Aristotle
agrees on the whole with Plato
in his account of the origin of
a state, viz. that it lies in man’s
need (χρεία) of his fellow-man.
For instance when speaking of
the πόλις he says: γεγομένη
οὖν τοῦ ζήν ἔνεκεν, οὐσὰ δὲ τοῦ
εῦ ζῆν, ‘In its origin existence
is the object, in its complete
state, orderly existence.’ And
in speaking of the former of
these two original relations, viz.
that between master and servant,
he says: πρῶτον δὲ περὶ δεσπότου
καὶ δοῦλου ἐπώμεν, ἵνα τὰ τε
πρὸς ἀναγκαῖαν χρείαν ἱδομένειν,
ὅς ἀναγκαία χρεία, ‘necessities
that must be satisfied.’ And
in agreement with this principle,
a family is said to be more
αὐτάρκης than an individual,
and a city than a family; see
Pol. 2, 1: οἰκία μὲν γὰρ αὐταρ-
κεστέρον ἐγώ, πόλις δ’ οἰκίας.
And, again, a man who wanius
nothing and shares nothing, but
is self-sufficient, cannot, Aris-
totle says, be part of a city at
all: δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνίας,
ἢ μὴν δεομένος δι’ αὐτάρκειαν,
οὐδὲν μέρος πόλεως. For which
see also Herodotus 1, 32, 14:
ὡς δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπον σώμα ἐν ὦδὲν
αὐτάρκης ἄστιν: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει,
ἄλλον δὲ ἐνδέες ἐστι. Whilst
upon this subject of the origin
and growth of the state, it may
be as well to give Aristotle’s
definition of justice, which he
draws from his description of
the state, viz. ‘Justice is the
adjustment (τάξις) of common
relations in the πόλις.’ ἢ γὰρ
διὰ τὴν πολιτικήν κοινωνίας τάξις
ἔστιν. For this, in effect, is
Plato’s view of justice also;
see Rep. IV.: τοῦ τα αὐτοῦ πράτ-
tειν καὶ μὴ πολυπράγμονειν;
433 A. ‘To do one’s own
business and not meddle with
other people’s,’ i.e. ‘To act
in those relations where you are
called to act, and not in those
where you are not.’ Hobbes,
also, points out, as Plato does
here, that physical necessity is
the cause of a commonwealth
coming into being. ‘The finale
Cause, End, or Designe of men,
(who naturally love liberty and
Dominion over others), in the
introduction of that restraint
upon themselves, (in which we
see them live in Common-
wealths), is the foresight of
their own preservation, and of a
more contented life thereby;
that is to say, of getting themselves
out from that miserable condition
of Warre, which is necessarily
consequent (as hath been shewn)
to the naturall passions of men.’
He then shows that covenants
(see note on ξυνθέσθαι ἄλληλοις,
Ch. II.), the outcome of the
first and second Laws of Nature,
are by themselves so liable to
be broken, that a further step
in the same direction is taken
by a multitude of people, not by
a few. This step is to centre
the rights which they have
renounced (see above not. cit.),
in the hands of an individual
or a representative body of
persons, who will enforce their adjustment (τάξις, in Aristotle's words) by the strength of the whole people. 'The only way to erect such a Common Power as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another. ...is to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of Men, that they may reduce all their Wills by plurality of voices, unto one Will.' Hence the following definition of a Commonwealth. 'A Commonwealth is One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude by Mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the Strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common Defence.' 'This is the generation of that great Leviathan, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortall God, our peace and defence.'

For αὐτάρκης v.s. note, p. 118.

Metadidwsoi δῆ, Aristotle again shews that ἡ χρεία is the principle of commerce. Eth. Nic. 5, 13, Ὄτι δὲ ἡ χρεία συνέχει τὸν ἐν τι δυν, δὴλον δὲτι ὅταν μὴ ἐν χρείᾳ ἔστω ἀλλήλων, ὅπως ἀλλάττονται. And again Pol. 2, 1. Ἔξ ὅν δὲδεὶ (πόλιν) ἐν γενέσθαι εἰδεὶ διαφέρει. Διότι τὸ ἑαυτὸν τὸ ἀντικειμένον σώσει τὰς πόλεις, τ. ε. the men composing a city must differ, but by reciprocity they will constitute one and a prosperous city.' And he speaks thus of the principle of exchange in Book I. iii., Ἠστι γὰρ ἡ μεταβλητικα πάντων ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ τὰ μὲν πλείω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττων τῶν ἱκάνων ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους.

τῷ λόγῳ ποιῶμεν, v.s., εἰ τοίονδε ποιήσαμεν διανοίᾳ, quoted above, Ch. III. iii.

τοῦ εἶνα τῇ καὶ ζῇν ἔνεκα, v.s. γνωμομένη τοῦ ζῇν ἔνεκα, quoted above.

πῶς ἡ πόλις ἀρκεῖ, 'How is the city to meet such a demand,' i.iii. 'How will the city be sufficient in itself to make such preparation?' πῶς, 'in what
paraskevnē; ἀλλὰ τι γεωργὸς μὲν εἰς, ὁ δὲ οἰκο-
δόμος, Ἀλλὰς δὲ τις υφάντης; ἢ καὶ σκυτοτόμων
αὐτόσε προσβῆσομεν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα
θεραπευτῆς; Πάνυ γε. Εἰή δ' ἂν ἢ γε ἀναγκαιώτατη
Επόλις ἐκ τεττάρων ἢ πέντε ἄνδρῶν. Φαίνεται: Τὴ
δὴ οὖν; ἕνα ἐκαστὸν τούτων δεῖ τὸ αὐτός ἐργυ
way?' i.e. 'what must be its elements, or constituent parts, if
such a result is to be obtained?'
ἔλλο τι, ν.ο. νο. p. 145.
ἠ γε ἀναγκαιώτατη πόλις. For
Aristotle’s limits of the city, see
Intro, p. 21. His words are
οὕτω γάρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γέ-
νοις ἢ πόλις, οὔτ' ἐκ δέκα
μυριάδων οἴτι πόλις ἐστίν. Ἀναγκ.
'The least possible.' So when
the Athenians were working at
their wall (Thuc. I. 90), they
raised it to the ‘least height
necessary’ for defence before they
informed the Lacedemonians.
ἔστω ἀπομᾶχεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ ἀναγ-
καιώτατον ὕψους. Similarly, of
words, to say the fewest neces-
sary. Demosth. de Cor. 269,
αὐτὰ τάναγκαιώτατα ἐπεὶ περὶ
αὐτῶν. And here insl. Book
VI. 486 E, μὴ τὴν δοκομένην σοι
οὖν ἀναγκαία ἐκάστα διεληλυθήσαι
... Ἀναγκαίωτα μὲν οὖν, ἐφη.
ἕνα ἐκαστὸν τούτων. The
principle of specialization, i.e.
that each man should have 'but
one employment and confine
himself to it, runs through
the whole of this Dialogue, and
is employed to such an extent by
Plato, that Aristotle complains
of it as excessive. Thus in re-
viewing the Republic, he says,
'Ετι δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος, δ φησι τῇ
πόλει δειν ὑπάρχειν, ὡς μὲν εἰρή-
ται νῦν, ἀδύνατον... λέγω δὲ τὸ
μὲν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν πᾶσαν ὡς
ἀριστον ὑπὶ μάλιστα. λαμβάνει γὰρ
ταύτην ὑπάρχειν δ Σωκράτης.
Καίτοι φανερῶν ἐστιν, ὥς προϊ-
ούσα καὶ γενομένη μιὰ μᾶλλον
οὐδὲ πόλις ἐσται τῆς γαρ τῇ
τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν ἢ πόλις... Ὡς
μὲν δὲ ἐκ πλείονοι ἀνθρώπων
ἐστι τῇ πόλις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐς ἐδει
διαφέροντων, οὐ γάρ γίνεται
πόλις ἐς διόνος. And so below,
τὸ λιν ἐνοῦν ἦσεν τὴν πόλιν, ἐν
οὖν ἐστὶν ἀμείουν. And again
φανερῶν, ὡς οὔτε πέρυσι μιὰν
οὐτῶς ἦν τὴν πόλιν, ὡς λέγον-
σι, Pol. 2, 1. This criticism of
Aristotle's arises in a discussion
of the merits of Plato's sugges-
tion that wives and children
should be in common to the
citizens of the state (see Book
V.); the extreme point to which
Plato's communistic tendencies
lead him in the Republic; and
if taken as a criticism of that
point, we must accept it as just.
But, if we see how Plato in
certain other places works out
the principle of specialization, and
employs it in his discovery of
justice, we shall be unable to
agree with Aristotle's complaint.
Thus in Republic IV. 423 B, we
read οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, οὕτως ἂν
ἐίς καὶ κάλλιστος δρος τοῖς ἠμε-
tεροῖς ἥρχομαι, δὴν δὲ τὸ
μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως ποιεῖσθαι καὶ
νίκην ὑπή Δῆν χάρων ἀφορισ-
μένους, τὴν ἄλλην καὶ τὴν ἐν,
tίς, ἐφη, δρος; οὐ γὰρ μὲν, ἦν δ'
ἐγὼ, τόδε μέχρι οὐ δὴ ἥλθεν
ἀναγκαζόμενος εἶναι μιὰ, μέχρι τού-
τος αὔξειν, πέρα δὲ μη. And
below, φυλάττειν ταυτὶ τρόπῳ δεδομένων μήτε χαμαιέως ή τόλης ἄντει οὕτως μήτε μεγάλῃ δικούςα, ἀλλὰ τὶς ἱκανῇ καὶ μίᾳ. And below D, as here, καὶ τοῦς ἄλλους τολῆται, πρὸς ὃ τις πέρυσε, πρὸς τοῦτο ἐν πρὸς ἐν ἑκαστὸν ἔργῳ δεῖ κομίζειν. ἦν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸν ἐπιτηδεύσαν ἑκαστὸς μὴ τολῆλα, ἀλλὰ εἰς γίγνεσθαι, καὶ οὕτω δὲ ἕξωμαι η ἡ τέλεια μίᾳ φύσει, ἀλλὰ μὴ τολῆλα. See also the description of σωφροσύνη in 432 A, ὅτι ἄλης (τόλεως) ἀνεχώρη τάται διὰ πασῶν παρεχομένης εὐμφορίας τοὺς τοῖς ἀφθεντάτους τούτον καὶ τοὺς ἀχροτάτους καὶ τοὺς μέσους. Again, the definition of justice itself is based upon this principle of harmony, or unity, see Book IV. 433 A. ἦν ἑκαστὸν ἐν δεῖ εἰς εἰς τοὺς περὶ τὴν τέλεια εἰς ὑμῶν τὸ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἐπιτηδεύσῃ περισσῶς εἰς... Καὶ μὴν δει νέ εἰ τὸ τὸ αὐτὸν πράττειν καὶ μὴν πολυπραγμονέων δικαιοσύνη εῦπτη. And in Book V. 462 A, ἦκοι οὐν τις μείζον κακὸν τέλει ἢ ἐκεῖνο ὁ ἄν τός διάμορφο καὶ τοῖς πολλαῖς ἄντι μίας; ή μείζον ἄγαθον τοῦ ὁ ἄν ἐξουθενεῖν τοῦ καὶ ποίη μίαν; (The principle involved in these remarks is unimpeachable. But it is rather upon the passage noticed above, which advocates the community of wives and children, that Aristotle founds his objections, and upon the further development of the principle of unity in the later books of the Republic, the system of ἰδέαι, or Single and Primary Forms, which are transcendent, and furnish life and reality to the objects of the world of sense.) Further, in 476 A, Plato strongly insists upon the unity that pervades Nature, the model of the unity which he would introduce into his state: καὶ περὶ δικαίου καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθόν καὶ κακὸν καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν περὶ ὅ αὐτός λόγος, αὐτὸ μὲν ἐν ἑκαστὸν εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀλήθεις κοινών πανταχοῦ φαντασόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἑκαστὸν. Lastly he passes on from this unity of the world of sense (apparently diverse) to the 'Real Good,' or the 'Form of Good,' which supplies their truth to all things that are known, and the capacity of knowing them to the knower; and is, in a word, the Single Source of all that is Real and Good: see Book VI. 508 E. Τοῦτο τοιοῦτό τῷ τήν ἀλήθειαν παρέχει τοῖς γιγνόμενοι καὶ τῶ γιγνόμενοι τῆν δύναμιν ἀποθεόν τῇ τοῦ ἅγαθοῦ ἰδέαι φαθεῖ εἶναι, αὐτῶν δὲ ἐπιστήμης σωσίν καὶ ἀλήθειας. Such in brief is the Platonic unity, which is carried on from the physical to the transcendent world. The remarks quoted from Book IV. respecting the unity of the city itself must commend themselves to our acceptance, whatever we may think of the system of ἰδέαι.
370 τετάρτῳ μέρει τοῦ χρόνου, τὰ δὲ τρία, τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς οἰκίας παρασκευῇ διατρίβειν, τὸ δὲ ἱματίον, τὸ δὲ υποδημάτων, καὶ μὴ ἄλλοις κοινωνοῦντα πράγματα ἔχειν, ἄλλ᾽ αὐτὸν δὲ αὐτὸν τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν; καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος ἔφη Ἀλλ᾽ ἵσως, ὁ Σῶκρατες, οὗτος ὑμῶν ἦ ἱκείνος. Οὐδέν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, μᾶ Δί᾽ ἄτοπον. ἐννοῶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπόντος σοῦ, ὅτι πρὸς τὸν μὲν Ἐφύται ἔκαστοσ ὦ πάνυ ὅμοιοι ἔκαστῳ, ἄλλα διαφέρων τὴν φύσιν, ἄλλος ἐπ᾽ ἄλλου ἔργου πρᾶξιν. ἦ δὲ ὅποιος. Τί δὲ; πότερον κάλλιον πράττοι ἄν τις εἰς ὅν πολλὰς τέχνας ἐργαζόμενος, ἦ ὅταν μίαν εἰς; Ὑς, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, εἰς μίαν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, οἶμαι, καὶ τὸδε ἰδίου, ὡς, εὰν τὸς τινὸς παρὴ ἔργου καιρὸν, διόλλυται. ἰδίου γὰρ. Οὐ γὰρ, οἶμαι, ἐβέλει τὸ πραττόμενον τὴν τοῦ πράττοντος σχολὴν περιμένειν, ἄλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη τοῦ πράττοντα τῷ πραττομένῳ ἐπακολουθεῖν μὴ ἐν παρέργων μέρει.

C' Ανάγκη. Ἑκ δὲ τούτων πλείω τε ἔκαστα γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ράον, ὅταν εἰς ἐν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καιρῷ, σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πράττῃ. Παντά-

ἀλλ. κοιν. πράγματα ἔχειν. See Xen. Mem. 2, 1, 9: ἐγὼ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν Βουλήμενοι πολλαὶ πράγματα ἔχειν αὐτοὶ τε καὶ ἄλλοις παρέχειν, &c.; where the sense is slightly different, 'to be busy'; here it is 'to give one's self trouble.'

φύται ἔκαστος ὦ πάνυ ὅμοιος. So Aristotle, loc. supr. cit.: οὐ γὰρ γίγνεται πάλις ἐξ ὁμοιῶν. v.v. not. ad metadἰδωσι δѣ, and the passage where Aristotle says that men must be different if they are to form a mutually beneficial community.

ἐν παρέργων μέρει. See Book I. not. p. 184. For παρέργον ν. Book VII. 527 C: καὶ γὰρ τὰ παρέργα αὐτοῦ (sc. γεωμετρίας) οὐ συμκρ., i.e. the secondary uses of geometry, besides its value as leading to the acquisition of pure knowledge. And Book VI. 498 Α: μεγάλα ἱγοῦνται, παρέργον οἵμοιοι αὐτὸ δεῖν πράττειν, where the study of philosophy is said to be taken up off hand, as a leisure employment, by most men, if they take it up at all. See also Euthydemus 273 D: παρέργοις αὐτοῖς κρύμεθα.

κατά φύσιν. See what has been said in Book I. of the ἔργον of man, p. 138; and the recurrence of this expression in the passage there quoted from Book V.: δεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἔκαστον ἕνα ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ πράττειν.
πασὶ μὲν οὖν. Πλειόνων δὴ, ὡς Ἀδελμαντε, δεῖ πολιτῶν ἡ τεττάρων ἐπὶ τὰς παρασκευὰς ὁν ἐλέγομεν ὁ γὰρ γεωργὸς, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ αὐτὸς ποιήσεται ἐαντῷ τὸ ἄροτρον, εἰ μέλλει καλὸν εἶναι, οὐδὲ σμινύῃν οὐδὲ τὰλλα ὄργανα ὅσα περὶ γεωργίαν οὐδ' αὐτὸς ὑφοδομοῖς πολλῶν δὲ καὶ τούτῳ δεῖ ὁσαύτως δ' ὑψάντης τε καὶ ὁ σκυτοτόμος. Ἀληθῆ. Τέκτονες δὴ καὶ χαλκῆς καὶ τοιοῦτοι τινες πολλοὶ δημιουργοὶ, κοινοὶ ἤμιν τοῦ πολυχρῶν γεγομένου, συχνὸν αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν πω πάνυ γε μέγα τι εἰη, *οὐδ' εἰ αὐτοῖς θυελλοὺς τε καὶ ποιμένας τοὺς τε ἄλλους νομέας προσθείμεν, ὅπερ οἷς ἔργοι  ἔτε τὸ ἄροιν ἔχοιεν βοῦς, ἔν οἷς τοιοῦτοι πρὸς τὰς ἀγγαλαίς μετὰ τῶν γεωργῶν χρησίμως ὑποξούγιοι, υψάνται δὲ καὶ σκυτοτόμοι δέρμασι τε καὶ ἐρίοις. οὐδὲ γε, ἦ οὖς, σμικρὰ πόλις ἄν εἰη ἔχουσα πάντα ταῦτα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, κατοικίσας γε αὐτήν τὴν πόλιν εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον, οὗ ἐπεισογωγίμων μὴ δεήσεται, σχεδὸν τι ἄδυναν. Ὁ ἄδυναν γὰρ. Προσδεήσει ἄρα ἐτὶ καὶ ἄλλων, οἷς ἄλλης πόλεως αὐτή κομίσουσιν ὄν

ei μέλλει καλὸν εἶναι, 'if it is to be a good one.' See not. Ch. XVIII.

ἔτι τὸ ἄροιν ἔχοιεν βοῦς. Hesiod makes the ox an indispensable part of the most primitive household— οἶκον μὲν πρώτιστα, γυναῖκα τε, βοῦν τ' ἀροτῆρα.

οἱ τε οἰκοδόμοι. Supply ἔχοιεν before χρησίμα.

μετὰ τῶν γεωργῶν. To be joined closely with ἐν τῷς ἄγωγας. 'For their carrying-traffic with the farmers.'

ἀλλὰ μὴν, 'but again.' ἀλλὰ ὀργοῦσας, and μὴν shows that a fresh instance is to be ad-
duced.

προσδέησει ἄρα ἐτὶ καὶ ἄλλων. So Aristotle in Pol. 1, 3, shows that some nations support them-
selves from a single pursuit, e.g. νομαδικοὶ, ἀλιευτικοὶ, θηρευτικοὶ. But those, he adds, who com-
bine them live pleasurably, filling up the life that lacks much; to which conclusion Plato is gradually coming here. οὐ δὲ καὶ μιγυντες ἐν τοῖς, ἡδεῖς χωσίν, προσανακρησίμων τῶν ἐνδείκτατον βλοῦν, ἡ τυγχά

νεὶ ἐλλείπουσιν πρὸς τὸ αὐτάρκης εἶναι.
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dείται. Δεήσει. Καλ μὴν κενὸς ἂν ὦ ὁ διάκονος μηδὲν ἁγὼν ὦν ἐκείνοι δέωνται, παρ’ ὦν ὁν κομίζονται. 371 ὥν ἂν αὐτοῖς χρεία, κενὸς ἀπεισώ. ἡ γὰρ; Δοκεῖ μοι. Δεῖ δὴ τὰ οίκοι μὴ μόνον ἐαυτοῖς ποιεῖν ἱκανά, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁλα καὶ δσα ἐκείνοις ὦν ἄν δέωνται. Δεὶ γὰρ. Πλειόνων δὴ γεωργῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν δεὶ ἡμῖν τῇ πόλει. Πλειόνων γὰρ. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διακόνων ποιον τὸν τε εἰσαξὸντων καὶ ἐξαξὸντων ἐκάστα. οὔτε δὲ εἰσὶν ἐμποροί. ἡ γὰρ; Ναί. Καὶ ἐμπόρου δὴ δεησόμεθα. Πάνω γε. Καὶ ἐὰν μὲν γε κατὰ θάλατταν ἡ ἐμπορία γίγνεται, Βςυχνῶν καὶ ἄλλων προσδεήσεται τῶν ἐπιστημο- νων τῆς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν ἑργασίας. Συχνῶν μεντοι.

καὶ μὴν κενὸς ἂν... 'And again, if the carrier go empty, taking nothing with him of those things which the people want, from whomsoever they are importing their own require- ments, he will have to go away empty.' ἐκείνοι is the people to whom the trader comes; whilst the subject of κομίζονται and αὑτοῖς, refer to the people who sends the trader. The principle is that the trader must come with some import to ex- change for a nation's exports; and therefore production must not be limited by the bare requirements of the country it- self, but there must be a surplus, with which to purchase the exports of other nations. See the passage in Arist. Pol. 1, 3, quoted above, regarding this surplus: ἐστὶ γὰρ ἡ μεταβλη- τικὴ πάντων, ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ τὸ μὲν πλεῖον, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω τῶν ἱκανῶν ἤχειν τοὺς ἄνθρωπους. It will be noticed that Aristotle makes this surplus a natural result, in which he practically agrees with Plato. Et infra regarding the πλήρωσις or 'fill- ing up,' in which all exchange consists: εἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν γὰρ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐταρκείας ἂν. εἰσαξὸντων καὶ ἐξαξὸντων. Arist. loc. cit.: τῷ εἰσαγεθεὶ, καὶ ἐκπέμπει ὡς ἐπελεόνασον. Exportation results from over production.
Τι δὲ δὴ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει; πῶς ἀλλήλους μεταδώσουσιν ὅν ἄν ἐκαστοὶ ἐργάζονται; ὅν δὴ ἔνεκα καὶ κοινωνίαν ποιησάμενοι τόλμην φικίσαμεν. Δὴλον δὴ, ἢ δὲ ὅσ, ὅτι πωλοῦντες καὶ ἄκουμενοι. Ἀγορὰ δὴ ἡμῖν καὶ νόμισμα ξύμβολον τῆς ἄλλαγῆς ἔνεκα γενήσεται ἐκ τούτου. Πάνω μὲν οὖν ἢ: "Ἀν οὖν κομίσας ὁ γεωργὸς εἰς τὴν ἁγορὰν τι δὲν ποτεὶ ἢ τις ἄλλος τῶν δημιουργῶν μὴ εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἴκα τὸς δεομένοις τὰ παρ’ αὐτοῦ ἄλλαξασθαι, ἀργήσει τῆς αὐτοῦ δημιουργίας καθήμενος ἐν ἁγορᾷ; Οὖν δαμᾶς, ἢ δὲ ὅσ, ἀλλ’ εἰσὶν οὗ τοῦτο ὅρωντες ἑαυτοὺς

Ch. XII.—This barter must be made more convenient through a medium of exchange, money, and through middlemen, i.e. retail traders. How then will our citizens live?

ἐν, partitive genitive, from the sense of ‘sharing’ in μεταδώσουσιν. The second ἐν refers also to the results of labour, the several productions, which were to be mutually exchanged and shared.

νόμισμα ξύμβολον τῆς ἄλλης νόμισμα means that which is recognised, anything instituted.


And ξύμβολον has reference to interchange with agreement; see note p. 130. νόμ. ξύμβ. then means, ‘a recognised medium,’ or ‘a common token.’ In Aristotle’s Ethics 5, 5, 11, the reason for using money is thus given: δὲ ἢ ὅπα ἐνὶ τινὶ πάντα μετρεῖσθαι...οὗν δ’ ἐπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονεν κατὰ ἐξουθηκὴν. Where κατὰ εἰ. represents ξύμβολον in Plato’s definition. And again in Pol. 1, 3, 16, the origin of the use of money is explained in accordance with the principle of the origin of society: Πορισθέντος ὅν ἦδη νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκαίας ἄλλαγῆς, κ. τ. λ. Εἰ τυχεῖται ἡ τοῦ νομίσματος ἀκοράσθη χρήσεις οὐ γὰρ εἰδάστακτων ἐκαστοῦ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀναγκαίων. Τὸ πρὸς τᾶς ἄλλας τοιούτων τὸ συνέθετο πρὸς σφάς αὐτοῦ διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν, ὣ τῶν χρησμῶν αὐτὸ δὲν, εἰ χεὶ τὴν χρείαν εὐμεταχείριστον πρὸς τὸ ξίφος, οὗν σιδήρος καὶ ἄργυρος, κ. τ. λ. et ἑπτ. 18: τὸ γὰρ νόμισμα στοιχείον καὶ πέρας τῆς ἄλλαγῆς ἑστιν.

εἰς εἰν οὗ τοῦτο δρῶντες. With reference to the necessity and growth of middlemen or traders, Aristotle (loc. cit.) shows that they are not found in the
primitive community where all exchange is barter, and that ἡ κατηλικὴ is παρὰ φύσιν. Ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τῇ πρώτῃ κοινωνίᾳ (τούτῳ δ’ ἐστὶν οἰκία) φανερῶν ὤτι οὐδὲν ἐστίν ἐγγύς αὐτῆς (ἕκαστας) ἀλλ’ ἤδη πλεονέχω τῆς κοινωνίας ὑπόσι. ἀλλάξασθαι...διαλλάττειν, ‘to take...and give in exchange.’ The difference of voice is noticeable.

οἷ ἄν τὰ μὲν τῆς δια. Aristotle also draws this distinction in Pol. i. 1. And the extreme case of those whom Plato is describing in the text is the δοῦλος, whom Aristotle in a like spirit calls ἔμφυτον ὄργανον, ‘a live machine’; Eth. Nic. 8, 11, 6. It is characteristic of Plato’s broader views, as compared with those of his age, that he makes no mention here of the δοῦλος, in other words he does not consider a slave necessary to a community. Aristotle, on the other hand, considers that superiority of intellect constitutes the relation of slavery at once: Ἀρχαῖον δὲ φύσις καὶ ἀρχεῖον διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ προσφέρει, ἢ ἄρχαῖον φύσις καὶ δεσπότης φύσις τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον τῷ σώματι ταύτης ποιεῖ, ἢ ἀρχεῖον καὶ φύσις δοῦλον. Here it will be noticed that he grounds his principle upon the same distinction as Plato, viz. that between mental and bodily efficiency; but where Plato concludes that some men must be μοσθωτοῖ, Aristotle condemns them to slavery. He commends slavery again in i, ii. thus: τὸ γὰρ ἀρχεῖον καὶ ἀρχεῖσθαι, οὗ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκασάτων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐμφερόντων ἐστὶ καὶ εὖθες ἐκ γενετῆς ἦνα διότι, τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρχεῖα, τὰ δ’ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρχεῖν. 

πλατώνος

ἐπὶ τὴν διακονίαν τάττουσι ταύτην, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀρθῶς οἰκομέναις πόλεσι σχεδόν τι οἱ ἄσθενεστατοὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ ἀρχεῖοι τι ἄλλο ἔργον πράττειν.

d' αὐτοῦ γὰρ δεὶ μένοντας αὐτοὺς περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν τὰ μὲν ἀνεί ἄργυριον ἀλλάξασθαι τοῖς τις δειμένους ἀποδόσθαι, τοὺς δὲ ἀντί αὐτ ἄργυριον διαλλάττειν, ὅσοι τι δέουνται πρίσθαι. Αὕτη ἄρα, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ἢ χρεία κατήλλης ἦμιν γένεσιν ἐμποιεῖ τῇ πόλει. ἢ οὐ κατήλλους καλοῦμεν τοὺς πρὸς ὄνην τε καὶ πρᾶσιν διακονοῦντας ἱδρυμένους· ἐν ἀγορᾷ, τοὺς δὲ πλανήτας ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐμπόρουσι; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Ἑτε δὴ τινες, ὅς ἐγώμαι, εἰς καὶ ἀλλοι διάκονοι, οἱ ἄν τὰ εἰς τῆς διανοίᾳς μὴ πάντα ἀξιοκοινώνητοι ὅσι, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἰσχίῳ ἱκανῆ ἐπὶ τοὺς πόλεις ἔχουσιν; οἱ δὲ πολυντες τῆς ἰσχύος χρειαν, τὴν τιμήν ταύτην μισθόν καλοῦντες, κέκληται, ὅς ἐγώμαι,
μισθωτοι· ἡ γὰρ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Πλήρωμα δὴ πόλεως εἰσίν, ὃς ἐστι, καὶ μισθωτοί. Δοκεῖ μοι. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὃ Ἀδείμαντε, ἦδη ἡμῖν ἠδείηται ἡ πόλις, ὡστ' εἶναι τελέα; Ἱσως. Ποῦ οὖν ἄν ποτὲ ἐν αὐτῇ εἴη ἢ τε δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἁδικία; καὶ τινὶ ἁμα ἐγγενευμένη ὧν ἐσκέμμεθα; Ἕγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, οὐκ ἐννοῶ, ὃ 372 Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ που ἐν αὐτῶν τούτων χρεία τινὶ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλους. Ἀλλ' ἵσως, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, καλῶς λέγεις καὶ σκεπτέων γε καὶ οὖκ ἀποκηνητέων. πρῶτον οὖν σκεψώμεθα, τίνα τρόπον διαιτήσονται οἱ οὕτω παρεσκευασμένοι. Ἀλλο τι ἢ σίτον τε ποιοῦντες καὶ οἶνον καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ ὕποδήματα, καὶ οἰκοδομησάμενοι οἰκίας, θέρους μὲν τὰ πολλὰ γυμνοὶ τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητοι ἐργάσονται, τού δὲ χειμῶνος ἡμφιέσμενοι τε καὶ ὑποδεδεμένοι ἰκανῶς; θρέψονται δὲ ἐκ β μὲν τῶν κριθῶν ἀλφίτα σκευαζόμενοι, ἐκ δὲ τῶν πυρῶν ἀλευρα, τὰ μὲν πέψαντες, τὰ δὲ μάζαντες, μάζας γενναίας καὶ ἄρτους ἐπὶ κάλαμον τῶν παραβαλλόμενοι ἢ φύλλα καθαρά, κατακλινέντες ἐπὶ στιβάδων ἐστρωμένων μίλακι τε καὶ μυρρίναις,

χρεία τινὶ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλους. Aristotle says in Pol. 1, 2 : ὁ δὲ βιος πράξεις, οὐ πολιτίς ἐστι, 'Life is action, not creation,' i.e. 'Our life lies more in our relations with others than in our own several acts themselves.' Adeimantus' suggestion here is prompted by a similar thought. Justice as noticed above (p. 129, note) has to do not so much with persons and things, but with the relations between persons and things, inasmuch as it has to do with the whole of life. And so Aristotle gives the following definition of justice as popularly accepted: Ὄρωμεν δὴ πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἐξίν βου-

λομένους λέγεων δικαιοσύνην, ἀφ' ἥς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαλῶν εἰσι. οὐκ ἀποκηνητέοιν. See below 380 Σ : διαμαχέτεσθαι πάντι τρόπῳ: and above Ch. Χ.: δίδωκα γὰρ μὴ οὔδ᾽ ἐσκόρπισαν διαμαχισθήσεθαι καὶ συγκεκριμένον ἀπαγορεύθησθαι. So in Ch. XV. ἦπει. διομείον ὃς ἀποδείκτεσθαι, διομείον ὃν ἄτυχον παρεληφη. γυμνὸι, 'without the upper garment.' See Hesiod Opp. et Di. 389—

γυμνὸν στείρεσθαι, γυμνὸν τε βοωτείν. Γυμνὸν δ' ἀμέλειν. Which Virgil imitates Geor. i. 299—

Nudus ara, serē nudus.
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eὐωχήσονται αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τὰ παιδία, ἐπιτίνοντες τοῦ οἶνου, ἐστεφανωμένου καὶ ὑμνοῦντες τοὺς θεοὺς, ἣδεως ξυνόντες ἅλληλοις, οὖν ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν

C ποιούμενοι τοὺς παῖδας, εὐλαβοῦμενοι πενίαν ἢ

πόλεμον;

CAP. XIII.

Καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων ὑπολαβῶν, "Ἀνευ ὑψοῦ, ἐφη, ὡς ἐσοικας, ποιεῖς τοὺς ἀνδρας ἐστινωμένους. 'Αληθῆ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. ἐπελαθόμην ὅτι καὶ ὅψον ἐξουσιν ἁλας τε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐλάας καὶ τυρόν, καὶ βολβοῦς καὶ λάχανα, οίᾳ δὴ ἐν ἄγρα ἐψήματα, ἐψήσονται καὶ τραγήματα που παραθήκομεν αὐτοῖς τῶν τε σύκων καὶ ἐρεβίνθων καὶ κυάμων, καὶ μύρτα καὶ

Δφηγοὺς σποδιοῦσι πρὸς τὸ πῦρ, μετρίως ὑποτίνοντες καὶ οὕτω διάγοντες τὸν βίον ἐν εἰρήνῃ μετὰ υγείας,

Εὐωχήσονται. For this word v.s Ch. XXIII., note on εὐωχοῦ. "ἐπιτίνοντες τοῦ οἶνου, "sipping their wine;" opposed to ἐκπίνω, 'to drain.' The force of ἐω is here similar to that in ἐπιπτόμενοι, 'skimming over,' in Ch. VIII. init. i.e. 'superficially;' 'slightly'; cf. the words ἐπιτόλαιος, ἐπιπόλας; and see Book X. 601 A. χρώ-ματι ἢ ἑπιχρωματίζειν. οἶνον, partitive genitive, see Od. iii. 4—

Τοῦ (αἰ. οἶνου) ὁ γέρων κηρήτωρ κεράσατο. The same sense is more definitely given below in the words μετρίως ὑποτίνοντες, Ch. XIII.

ἐστεφανωμένοι καὶ ὑμνοῦντες τοὺς θεοὺς, see Book I. Ch. II. init. where Cephalus is making a sacrifice; καθώστε δὲ ἐστεφανωμένοι, and see note.

Ch. XIII.—Glauccon, interrupting, said that I ought to give them some slight amusements of life. Ah! said I, you mean that, instead of a simple, happy community, I am to form a luxurious and fevered city, full of doctors, cooks, dancing girls, and the rest.

ὑπολαβῶν, v.s. note p. 150. σποδιοῦσι πρὸς τὸ πῦρ, ἅρτι τοῦ εἰς σπόδων ἤγουν εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐσθεσμένην ἐφησοῦν. Schol.

ὑποτίνοντες. Other words in which ὑπὸ has this force are ὑποθημοῦσα; see Book VIII., 548 E, 'rather less intellectual,' ὑπογραφέω, 'to sketch slightly,' ibid. D, i.e. give in outline, v.s. note on σκηνή. ἀστῆς, Ch. VIII.
ὁς εἰκός, γηραιοὶ τελευτῶντες ἄλλον τουσίτιν ψίων
tοὺς ἐκγόνους παραδώσουσιν. καὶ ὥς, Εἰ δὲ ὦν
πόλιν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐφὶ, κατεσκεύαζε, τὶ ἀν αὐτὰς
ἀλλο ἢ ταῦτα ἔχορτας; 'Ἀλλὰ πῶς χρῆ, ἦν δὲ
ἐγώ, ὁ Γλαύκων; "Ἀπερ νομίζεται, ἐφῆ ἐπὶ τε
κλινῶν κατακείσθαι, οἴμαι, τοὺς μέλλοντας μὴ
tαλαιπωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀπὸ τραπέζων διεπεῖν καὶ
ὅφα ἀπερ καὶ οἱ νῦν ἔχουσι καὶ τραγήματα. Ἐἷν,
ἢ ὃς ἐγὼ, μανθάνω οὐ πόλιν, ὃς ἔοικε, σκοποῦμεν
μόνον ὅπως γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τρυφώσαν πόλιν.

παραδώσουσιν, 'bequeathes,'
υ.σ. Ch. V. Book I. παραδίδωμι
μὴν τὸν λόγον...Οὐκών Πολε-
μάρχοι τῶν γε σῶν κληρονόμοις;
ἀπερ νομίζεται, 'the proprieties
of life.' Jowett.
τοὺς μέλλοντας μὴ ταλ., γ.σ.
Book I. Ch. XVIII., and note.
See also nott. pp. 214, 229,
247.
τρυφώσαν πόλιν, 'a city of
indulgence.' See ἤθη Book
III. 399 Ε, καὶ ἓ τὸν κόνα,
ἐπισον, λελήθαμεν γε διακαθαρίο-
νες πόλιν ἢ ώρτε τρυφάν ἐφαμεν
πόλιν. 'It seems that we are
purging the city again which we
said just now was becoming
luxurious.' Again in Book IV.
the two great enemies of a
healthy constitution are said to
be wealth and poverty, the one
as causing luxury and idleness,
and the other crime. 421 Ε,
Extr. πλοῦτος πε, ἢν δὲ ἐγώ,
καὶ πενία, ὃς τοῦ μὲν τρυφῆν καὶ
ἀργιλαν καὶ νεώτερισκον ποιοῦντος,
τοῦ δὲ ἀνελευθεριαν καὶ κακουρ-
γιαν πρὸς τῇ νεώτερισμῷ. Again,
in the investigation of demo-
cracy, the rulers are said to
bring the young men and all
that have to do with them into
dition. ...σφᾶς δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ
τοὺς αὐτῶν δρὸν τρυφώσαν μὲν
tοὺς νέους καὶ ἄρωνοι; 556 Β.
The exact meaning of the word
may be gathered from an ex-
pression in the context of the
last passage quoted:—μαλακοὺς
καρπερεῖν πρὸς ἰδονὰς καὶ κυκλά
καὶ ἄργους. See Ἀσχήνες contr.
Ctes. 20 (Ed. Simcox), οὐκ ἢρα
στεφανοθήσεται ἤ βουλὴ ἢ ἐς
Ἀρείου τάγους; οὐδὲ γὰρ πάρων
αὐτοῖς ἐστίν. οὐκ ἢρα φιλοτι-
μούσται; Πάνω γε, άλλα οὐκ ἀγα-
τώσιν, εἶν τις παρ' αὐτοῖς μη
ἀδική, άλλ' εϊν τις ἔξαραται
κολαζοῦντ' οἴ δε υμετεροὶ βήτορες
τρυφώσαι. 'Are not Areopagites
then able to receive crowns? No,
it is not the custom. Have
they then no ambition? Cer-
tainly, but it is to punish
vigorously any crimes that
come under their jurisdiction.
But the orators who come before
you have no principle,' ἦτος,
they are weak and liable to urge con-
siderations of indulgence and
pity; in Plato's words, μὴ καρ-
τερεῖν. For which sense com-
pare Euthyphro, 11 Ε, μοὶ δοκεῖς
οὐ τρυφάν, used of one who is
not energetic.
Ïσως οὖν οὐδὲ κακῶς ἔχει σκοποῦντες γὰρ καὶ τοιαῦτην τάξιν ἂν κατιδοίμεν τήν τε δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀδικιαν ὅτι ποτὲ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐμφύσαται. ἦ μὲν οὖν ἄληθινή πόλις δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι ἢ διεληλύθαμεν, ὦσπερ ὑγίης τις εἰ δ' αὖ βούλεσθε καὶ φλεγμαίνουσαν πόλιν θεωρήσωμεν, οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ τισών, ὡς δοκεῖ, οὐκ ἐξαρκέσει, οὖν·

373 αὕτη ἡ δίατα, ἀλλὰ κλῖναί τε προσέσονται καὶ τράπεζα καὶ τάλλα σκεῦσι, καὶ ὄνεα δὴ καὶ μῦρα καὶ θυμιάματα καὶ ἑταῖραι καὶ πέμματα, ἕκαστα τούτων παντοδαπὰ καὶ δὴ καὶ ἃ τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγχημεν οὐκέτι τὰ ἀναγκαῖα θετέον, οἰκίας τε καὶ ἰμάτια καὶ ὑποδήματα, ἀλλὰ τήν τε ἑορτάσας κυνητέον καὶ χρυσόν καὶ ἐλέφαντα καὶ πάντα τὰ

Β τοιαῦτα κτητέον. ἡ γὰρ; Ναι, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν μείζονά τε αὐ τήν πόλιν δεῖ ποιεῖν; ἐκείνη γὰρ ἡ ὑγιεινὴ

ἡ μὲν οὖν ἄληθ. Stallb, makes ὦσπερ ὑγίης τις the predicate of εἶναι: but it is open to us to take ἄληθινή; thus ‘the city which we have described seems to be the true one, being as it were healthy.’ ‘Healthy,’ or ‘sound,’ is a favourite metaphorical expression with Plato. It occurs again in conjunction with ἄληθις in Book X. 603 B, where Plato is speaking of the painter’s art, of which, προσωμελεῖ τε καὶ ἑταῖρα καὶ φιλὴ ἑστὶν ἐπ’ οὐδενὶ ὑγίει οὐδ’ ἄληθεί. And in speaking of the middle state, which, compared with pain and pleasure respectively, seems to be pleasure or pain, he says, οὐκ ἑστὶν ἢρ α τούτο ἀλλὰ φαίνεται παρὰ τὸ ἀλγευόν ἢδ’ καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἢδ’ ἀλγευόν τότε ἡ ἡμιχλία, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγίει τούτων τῶν φαντασμάτων πρὸς ἡδονῆς ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ γνησία τις.

οὐκέτι τὰ ἀναγκ. θετ. ‘And we must no longer lay down as the only requirements those that we mentioned at first.’ For ἀναγκά, ‘the least necessary,’ v.s. Ch. XI. ἀναγκαστὰ τῆς πόλεως.

ἱωγραφ. κвл, ‘we shall have to start painting.’ κωνεὼ is ‘to set in motion.’ See Book I. Ch. IV. inil. βουλόμενος ἢτι λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐκλῖνων. It is used of a top in Book IV. 436 D, which is stationary (ἐστηκε) and in motion (κυνεῖται), simultaneously, viz. in respect of axis and circumference. ‘Begin,’ here would not convey the whole meaning; the art of painting is to be ‘set going.’

χρυσόν, κ.τ.λ. governed by κτητέον.

ἀδ v.s. note p. 124; and above in this chapter, εἰ δ’ ἄδ βούλεσθε.
οὐκέτι ἱκανή, ἀλλ’ ἡ δὴ ὅγκου ἐμπληστεία καὶ πλῆθος, ἄοὐκέτι τοῦ ἀναγκαῖον ἐνεκά ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὅλου οὗ τε θηρευταί πάντες, οὗ τε μιμηταί, πολλοὶ μὲν οἳ περὶ τὰ σχῆματα τέ καὶ χρώματα, πολλοὶ δὲ οἳ περὶ μουσικὴν, ποιηταὶ τε καὶ τούτων ὑπηρέται, ῥαψῳδοί, ὑποκριταί, χορευταί, ἐργολάβοι, σκευῶν τε παντοδαπῶν δημιουργοί, τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ τῶν C περὶ τὸν γυναικείον κόσμον. καὶ δὴ καὶ διακόνων πλειόνων δεσομέθα. ἢ οὗ δοκεῖ δεῖσειν παιδαγωγῶν, τιτβῶν, τροφῶν, κομμωτριῶν, κουρέων, καὶ αὖ ὑφοποιῶν τε καὶ μαγείρων; ἐτι δὲ καὶ συβιστῶν προσδεσομέθα. τούτῳ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ πόλει οὐκ ἐνήν ἔδει γὰρ οὔδεν ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ τούτων προσδησεί, δείσει δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βοσκημάτων παμπόλλων, εἰ τις αὐτὰ ἔδευται. ἢ γὰρ; Πῶς γὰρ οὗ; Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰατρῶν ἐν χρείας ἐσόμεθα. D

οἱ τε θηρευταὶ κ.τ.λ. We should be surprised, if we were not aware of Plato’s hostility to poets, to find them thus unceremoniously thrust in among the rabble of the Larger City, as if they were no more than Horace’s Ambubaiarum collegia, pharmacoπολεῖα, Mendicci, mimæ, balatrones, hoc genus omne. See pp. 121, 133, notes. We shall find below (Ch. XVII.) what is the moving cause of this hostility to poets in Plato’s mind. For σχήματα, ‘drawing,’ n.s. note on σκιάγραφος, ἁρετῆς. Ch. VIII. In Book X. 601 A, it is explained that poets are nothing but ‘word-painters,’ and that as painters are nothing but copyists, poets are the same, and have no claim to originality or truth. Thus we can understand why Plato includes them here among the vulgar herd. In the passage referred to we find these same words coupled together. Οὐτω δὴ, οἷμαι, καὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν φήσομεν χρώματ’ ἅττα ἐκάστων τῶν τεχνῶν τοῖς ἀνόμασι καὶ ῥήμασιν ἐπιχρωματίζειν. And for Plato’s opinion of painting see 603 Α, ἡ γραφική καὶ δῶς ἡ μυθητική πόρρω μὲν τῇς ἀληθείας ὑπὸ τὰ αὐτῆς ἔργων ἀπεργάζεται. κοσμοῦ, the general word for a lady’s toilette, mundus muliebris, including many different articles. One of these we know to have been rouge, which Professor Newton tells us has been found in a grave at Athens; it being usual to bury with the dead articles of all kinds which they had used in their lifetime.

ἰατρῶν. Plato’s hatred of doctoring is so strong that, as has been noticed in the Argu-
ment, p. 55, note, he allows it to blind his logic, in replying to Glaucon’s suggestion that the best doctor is he who has had the largest and most varied experience of disease. His suggestion in another place (Book III. 410 A) that, where a man is of a weakly constitution, he had better take his leave of life as soon as possible, has been already noticed. For his general treatment of the question in brief see Argument, p. 54; and Book IV. fin., where he draws an elaborate comparison between illness and wickedness; illness, as he describes it, being a στάσις in the body. Ἡ ἑστὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑγιεῖαν ποιεῖν τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι κατὰ φύσιν καθεστῶν κρατεῖν τε καὶ κρατεῖσθαι ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων, τὸ δὲ νόσου παρὰ φύσιν ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἀρχεσθαι ἄλλο ὑπ’ ἄλλου. And again Book VIII. 556 Ε. σώμα νοσῶν ἰκαρές ἰχθὺς ἐξωθεὶν δεῖναι προσλαβέσθαι πρὸς τὸ κάμνειν, ἀνάλογο ἐδὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἐξοστασίας κυρίατι κυρίωτο... Generally, Plato thought illness almost culpable, because he considered that most diseases arose from indulgence: in which opinion he was not far wrong. Hence his expression above here, φλεγματίνωσα πόλις; and in Book VIII. loc. cit. he shows what an advantage the poor, sun-burnt, yet wiry (λευχός) citizen, possesses in any contest over one who is rich but incapable, through having too much flesh and too little wind.

CH. XIV.—We shall then want to take our neighbour’s land, i.e. we shall go to war; and the warriors must be carefully trained from their youth up.

Aristotle agrees with Plato that war is, in its nature, a form of acquisition, drawing this fact from man’s universal pursuit of wild, and acquisition of tame animals. See Pol. i. 3. διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσις κτητικὴ πως έσται, et proseod. But he considers that the immediate cause of war is the refusal of men who are φύσις δούλοι, to submit. ἡ γὰρ θερευτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς, ἢ δει κρατεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰ θήρια καὶ τῶν ἄνθρωπων δοι κεφαλάν ἀρχεσθαι μὴ θέλοντος, ὅπως φύσις δικαιῶν τούτων ὄντα τῶν πόλεων Sir Thomas More does not follow Plato upon this point, but assigns as the chief cause of war the wanton- ness and pugnacity of princes. Thus, ‘The most part of all princes have more delight in warlike matters and feats of chivalry than in the good feats of peace, and employe muche more study, how by right or by wrong to enlarge their domin-ions, than howe wel and peace-
able to rule and govern that they have alreid.'

'this of the pl. χώρας, with this
genitive compare επιπλουντες
tov ovov, Ch. XII. fin.
ei melhmēn. Υ. έξειν, 'if we
are to have enough'; see Book
I. ch. XVIII. note.

επι χρηματῶν κτ. άπειρον.
Aristotle shows in Pol. 1, 3,
that there are two kinds of
wealth, δ πλούτος δ κατά φύσιν,
which is not the possession of
so much money, but abundance
of those things necessary to a
comfortable life: this he brings
under the province of οἰκονο-
μική; the other is η ιχνηματιστική
with which is closely allied κατη-
λική, money-making by trade.
He then goes on to show that in
οἰκονομική there is a πέρας τέλους,
or 'limitation of wealth, in its
object'; whilst in ιχνηματιστική
there is no πέρας, the object of
money-making being to go on
continually amassing more.
Ουτω καλ τάβης τής ιχνηματισ-
τικής ουκ έστι του τέλους πέρας'
tέλος δε, τοιούτος πλούτος και
χρηματῶν κτήσις. Τῆς οἰκο-
νομικῆς, ου ρνηματιστικῆς, έστι
πέρας. And therefore, he adds,
those fall into error who think
that amassing money is the part
of οἰκονομική,—άδειαι τῆν τοῦ
νομίσματος ούσιαν εἰς άπειρον,
agreeing with Plato in this, viz.
that where there is unlimited
covetousness (εἰς άπειρον τῆς
επιθυμίας ούσις, as here επὶ
χρηματῶν κτήσιν άπειρον) it is
the result of an abnormal state
of a community, not of πλούτος
κατά φύσιν.

αυτὸl οὐχ ἰκανον; The ne-
cessity for a standing army is
here shown, on the continually
recurring principle of specializa-
tion. 'What we do, we must
καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀπαντεῖς ὁμολογήσαμεν καλῶς, ἦνικα ἐπλάττομεν τὴν πόλιν ὁμολογοῦμεν δὲ πολὺ, εἰ μέμνησαι, ἀδύνατον ἐνα πολλὰς καλῶς ἐργάζεσθαι τέχνας. Ἀληθή λέγεις, ἐφη. Τι οὖν; ἢ δ’ ἐγώ; ἢ Β περὶ τῶν πόλεων ἀγωνία οὐ τεχνικὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι; Καὶ μᾶλα, ἐφη. Ἡ οὖν τι σκυτικῆς δεῖ μᾶλλον κήδεσθαι ἡ πολεμικῆς; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἄλλ’ ἂρα τὸν μὲν σκυτοτόμον διεκωλύομεν μήτε γεωργὸν ἐπιχειρείν εἰναι ἂρα μήτε ὑφάντην μήτε οἰκοδόμον, ἵνα δὴ ἡ ἡμῖν τὸ τῆς σκυτικῆς ἐργον καλῶς γένοιτο, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ ἁσαύτως ἐν ἀπεδίδομεν, πρὸς ὃ πεφύκει ἐκαστὸς καὶ ἐφ’ ὃ ἐμελλε τῶν ἄλλων σχολὴν. Σάγων διὰ βίου αὐτὸ ἐργαζόμενος οὐ παρεῖσι τοὺς
do well. We cannot do our business well, unless we attend
to it and to it alone: therefore
each man must choose one profession and no more.’ V.s. Ch.
XI.

τεχνικὴ, ‘an art in itself,’ ‘a
special art’; for which word see
Ar. Pol. I. i. τὸ λίν ὀφέμθα
καὶ περὶ τοῦτων (sc. ἐκ ἐν εὐγ
κεῖται) μᾶλλον, τι τε διαφέρουσιν ἄλληλως, καὶ εἰ τι τεχνικὸν ἐν
dέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ ἐκαστὸν τῶν
μηθέντων, ἢς ἡ ἀντικριστής_ascognition," or ‘special distinction.’
V. infr. Ch. XV. iniit, where
the defence of the city, in
regard of its great importance,
is said to require the greatest
elaboration and study (τέχνης
cal ἐπιμελείας μεγάλης δεήμε
νου).”

τὸν μὲν σκυτ. διεκ. μὴτε
gεωργ. ἐνίχ. εἶναι. Upon this
principle Socrates refuses in Ch.
XVIII. to prescribe what the
poetry of the State is to be, for
he says, we are not poets but
founders of a city: καὶ ἐγὼ
ἐἶπον, ὃ Ἀδελματε, οὐκ ἐσμὲν
ποιταῖ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σοὶ ἐν τῇ
παροντὶ, ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖσται πόλεως.
On the same principle actors in
tragedy do not succeed in
comedy; see Book III. 395 B:
ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τοι ὑποκριταῖ κοιμοφοί
tε καὶ πραγματικοὶ πολέμου
Where Socrates adds that man’s nature
is so atomic, that it is impossible
for him not only to do many
things, but even to imitate
many things, with success: καὶ
ἐνι γε τοῦτων, ὃ Ἀδελματε,
φανεραὶ μοι εἰς σμικρότερα κατα-
κερματίσοθαι ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
φύσις, δὴ τὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι πολλὰ
calῶς μιμοῖσθαι ἡ αὐτὰ ἔκεινα
κατά τοὺς ἂν ἐν δὲ καὶ τὰ μεμεῖα
ἐστὶν ἀφομοιότατα. Cf. the
Latin proverb, ‘Ne sutor ultra
crepidam.’

καὶ τῶν ἂλλ. ἐν ἐκ. See Ch.
XI.: ἔκ δὴ τοῦτον πλεῖον τε
ἐκαστή γίγνεται καὶ καλῶς καὶ
ῥέον, ὅταν εἰς ἐν κατὰ φώσιν καὶ
ἐν καρφὶ σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἁγών
πράττει.

ἀυτῷ. This demonstrative
thrown in to help a long
relatival construction, has al-
ready been noticed in Ch. I.: olen to χαίρειν καὶ αἱ θεοὶ δεισι ἀλλατελεῖς καὶ μηθέν εἰς τὸν ἐπειτα χρόνον διὰ ταῦτα γίγνεται ἄλλο ἡ χαίρειν ἔχοντα.

EMPLLE KAL. ἌΤ. For this sense, expressing an indispensable condition, see above note Ch. XVIII. 'Which he cannot bring to perfection unless he concentrates himself thereupon,' or 'Which he will bring to perfection only if he give all his attention thereto.'

τὰ δὲ δὴ. δὴ recalls the hearer to the point on which this recapitulation bears; 'To come to the point, then, &c.'

ἔσται...ἐν γένοιτο. The former case, that a mechanic could at once become a soldier, is cast into the mood of facts, so that it may stand, in all its glaring absurdity, contrasted with the potentially stated yet truer assertion, that for a man to become even a good chess-player the study of years is requisite. For πεττευτικὸς, ν.σ. p. 130 note.

παρέργῳ χρωμ., sc. τοῦτο; παρ. being predicate. So παραδείγματι χρωμάτων ἐκείνῳ; Book VII. 540 A. Philosophy, Socrates shows, is treated as πάρεργον by most men; Book VI. 498 A: πάρεργον οἰκεμενον αὐτὸ δειν πράστειν. In Book VII. the word bears a slightly different sense, 'the details, or minor aspects, of a study'; 527 C: καὶ γὰρ τὰ πάρεργα αὐτοῦ (γεωμετρίας) οὐ σμικρά. For the predicative sense see also Xen. Mem. i. 2, 56: ἕφη δὲ αὐτὸν ὁ κατηχομενος καὶ τῶν ἐνδοξοτάτων ποιητῶν ἐκλεγόμενον τὰ ποιητάτα, καὶ τούτῳ μαρτυρίους χράμενον, κ.τ.λ.
ΚΑΡ. ΧV.

Ούκοιν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὀσφο, μέγιστον τὸ τῶν φυλάκων ἔργον, τοσοῦτο σχολής τε τῶν ἄλλων πλείστης ἀν εἰη καὶ αὐ. τέχνης τε καὶ ἐπιμελείας μεγίστης δεόμενον. Οἶμαι ἐγώγε, ἢ δ' ὦς. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ φύσεως ἐπιτηδείας εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιτηδεῦμα; Πῶς δ' οὖ; 'Ημετέρου δὴ ἔργον ἄν εἰη, ὡς οἰκεῖν, εἴπερ οἷοι τ' ἐσμέν, ἐκλέξασθαι, τίνες τε καὶ ποιαὶ φύσεις ἐπιτηδείας εἰς πολεως φυλακὴν. 'Ημετέρου μέντοι. Μὰ Δία, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, οὖκ ἄρα φαῦλον πρᾶγμα ἡράμεθα· ὅμως δὲ οὖκ ἀποδειλατέον, ὅσον γ' ἄν δύναμις 375 παρείκη. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἐφη. Οἰεὶ οὖν τι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναίοις σκύλακοις εἰς φυλακὴν νεανίσκον εὐγενοῦς; Τὸ ποῖον λέγεις; Ὅλον ὦξὺν τε ποῦ δεῖ αὐτοῖν ἑκάτερον εἶναι πρὸς αἰσθήσιν καὶ ἐλαφρὸν πρὸς τὸ αἰσθανόμενον διωκάθειν, καὶ ἱσχυρόν αὐ, ἕαν δὲ ἐλοῦτα διαμάχεσθαι. Δεὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἐφη, πάντων τούτων. Καὶ μὴν ἀνδρείον γε, εἴπερ

CH. XV.—The defenders of our state must unite in themselves the two traits of courage and gentleness, lest they turn and illtreat those whom they defend.

téχνης, 'special work,' v.s. Ch. XIV. note on τεχνή.

ἡμετέρον δὴ ἔργον...ἐκλέξασθαι. Arist. Nub. 1594—

οὖν ἔργον, δ' δὲς, λέναι πολλὴν φύσις.


φαῦλον, v.s. Ch. X.: τὸ άχητομα η' ἐπιχειροῦμεν οὐ φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ οὖθε βλέποντος.

ἀποδειλ., v.s. Ch. XII.: οὖκ ἀποκρυφέντων.

παρείκη, 'allow'; not 'fail' or 'submit,' as εἰκω uncompressed.


νεαν. εὐγ., ἵτως φύσεως νεαν. εὐγ.

τὸ ποῖον λέγεις; as in Thrasyl. machus' reply, Book I. Ch. XV.: τῶς τούτο ἐφαρτάς; the sense is, 'in what respect do you mean!' 'what is the bearing of your question?' And again, τῶς τούτο λέγεις, Ch. XIX. Book I. ini.

καὶ μὴν, v.s. p. 112, note.
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ β'.

εὗ μαχεῖται. Πῶς δ' οὐ; Ἄνδρείος δὲ εἶναι ἀρα ἑθελήσει ὁ μὴ θυμοειδὴς εἰτε ὑπος εἰτε κώνῃ ἡ \( \text{Β} \) ἀλλὰ ὁτιοῦν ἥσον; ἢ οὐκ ἐννενόηκας, ὡς ἀμαχόν τε καὶ ἀνίκητον θυμός, οὐ παρόντος ψυχὴ πάσα πρὸς πάντα ἀφοβῶς τε ἑστι καὶ ἀντιτητος; 'Εννενόηκα. 

Γὰ μὲν τοῖνυν τοῦ σώματος οἷον δεῖ τὸν φύλακα εἶναι, δῆλα. Ναί. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, δι᾽ ἥν 

καὶ ὑπερμένως. Καὶ τούτο. Πῶς οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς Γλαύκων, οὐκ ἄγριοι ἄλληλους ἔσονται καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, ὄντες τοιοῦτοι τὰς φύσεις; Μᾶ 

Δία, ἢ δ' οὐ, οὐ ῥαδίως. 'Αλλὰ μέντοι δεῖ γε πρὸς 

μὲν τοὺς οἰκείους πράσεως αὐτοῦ εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς οὐ 

πολεμίους χαλεποὺς· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐ περιμένοντι 

ἄλλους σφᾶς διολέσαι, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ φθόγγοιν αὐτὸ 

ἐθελήσει, ὥ. τιτ. Book ΙV. 

440 C; also in a psychological 

discussion: οἷον ἐθέλει πρὸς 

τοῦτον αὐτοῦ ἐγείρεσθαι ὁ θυμός; 

and Book VI. 504 B: Εὐμαθεῖς 

...οἷον ὧν ὁ ἐθέλοντων ἠμα 

φώσκειν καὶ πιεικοῖν. The cer- 

tainty of a physical effect 

following upon its cause is 

emphasized by the use of the 

word, which properly belongs 

only to the mental sphere. 

ἡ οὖν, nonne. For the nature of 


In the triple division there made 

of the human mind into λογισ- 

τικὸν, δοκιμαίον, καὶ ἐπιθυμη-

τικὸν, the second kind is said 

to range itself most frequently 

upon the side of the first, and 

to unite with it, in case of a 

στάσις, or disagreement between 

reason and desire; and, again, it 

refuses to be aroused, in cases 

where it would be unworthy 

and unreasonable. τίθεσθαι τὰ 

δύσι πρὸς τοῦ λογιστικῶν. 

τὰ μὲν, κ.τ.λ. ν. τοιοῦτοι 

τὰς φύσεις.
δράσαντες. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Τί οὖν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ποιήσωμεν; πόθεν ἀμα πράον καὶ μεγαλόθυμον Ἰθῶς εὐρήσωμεν; ἐναυτία γὰρ ποιομοιεῖται πραεία φύσις. Φαίνεται. Ἀλλὰ μὲντοι τούτων ὀποτέρου ἁν στέρηται, φύλαξ ἀγάθος οὐ μὴ γενηται ταῦτα δὲ ἀδυνάτοις έοικε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ εὐμβαίνει ἀγάθον

Φύλακα ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι. Κινδυνεύει, ἔφη. καὶ ἐγώ ἀπορήσας τε καὶ ἔπισκεψάμενος τὰ ἐμπροσθεν, Δικαίως γε, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ὡς φίλε, ἀπορούμεν ἂς γὰρ προνέμεθα εἰκόνος ἀπελεύθημεν. Πῶς λέγεις; Οὐκ ἐνοχήσαμεν, ὅτι εἰςιν ἀρα φύσεις, οίας ἡμεῖς οὐκ ὕσθημεν, ἔχουσι τὰναντία ταῦτα. Ποῦ δὴ; Ἱδοὶ μὲν ἀν τις καὶ ἐν ἅλλοις ζῴοις, οὐ μεντ’ ἄν

Εὐκίστα ἐν οἷς ήμεῖς παρεβάλλομεν τῷ φύλακι. οἰσθα γὰρ ποι τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν, ὅτι τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ Ἰθῶς, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς συνήθεις τε καὶ γνωρίμους ὡς οἶον τε πραοτάτους εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνώτας τούναντιον. Οἴδα μέντοι. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀρα, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, δυνατόν, καὶ οὐ παρὰ φύσιν ζητοῦμεν τοιούτον εἶναι τὸν φύλακα. Οὐκ ἐοικεν.

in the present passage we may consider that the defenders are, as it were, identified with those whom by their conduct they might ruin, p. 261.

ἐναυτία γὰρ ποιομοιεῖ. See what is said of Socrates’ opinions regarding the θύμας in Book III. note η οὕκ, p. 261.

Δικαίως γε, ὡς φίλε, ἀπ. See Book IV. 432 C, where the search for justice is brought to a crisis, as here the search for the good defender: Ἡ μὴν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, βλακικόν γε ἢμῶν τὸ πάθος.

eikônos ápel., ‘we have stopped short in the illustration we employed,’ ‘we have not fully carried out our illustration.’ Privative genitive.

ἀρα, ‘as it seems,’ ‘as it turns out’; see note p. 108, and above here, Ch. V.

ἐν οἷς, ἐν τούτῳ δ'.
CAP. XVI.

"Αρ' οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἐτί τούτε προσδείσθαι ὁ φυλακικὸς ἐσόμενος, πρὸς τῷ θυμοειδεῖ ἐτί προσγενέσθαι φιλόσοφος τῇ φύσιν; Πῶς δή; ἐφη' οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ. 376 Καὶ τούτο, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τοῖς κυσί κατόψει, δ' ἢν ἄξιον θαυμάσαι τοῦ θηρίου. Τὸ ποίον; 'Ου μὲν ἂν ἤδη ἀγνώτα, χαλεπαίνει, οὐδέν δὲ κακῶν προτεποθῶς. δὲν δ' ἂν γνώριμον, ἀσπάζεται, κἀν μηδὲν πώποτε ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθόν πεπόνθη. ἡ οὕτω τούτῳ ἑθαυμάσας; Οὐ πάνυ, ἐφη, μέχρι τούτου προσέχον τὸν νοῦν ὅτι δὲ ποι δρᾶ ταύτα, δῆλον. 'Αλλὰ μὴν κομψόν γε φαίνεται τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ τῆς φύσεως καὶ

Ch. XVI.—This discrimination is philosophic; so that in addition to being spirited, swift, and courageous, our ideal defender must be also of a philosophic nature.

ὁ φυλακ. ἐσόμενος. ἢο, here is equal to ὁ μέλλων ἔσεθαι.

δ...τού θηρίου. v.s. note p. 113 and supr., here Ch. IX.

κομψόν, like ἀστεῖος, 'fine' or 'splendid,' and very often, like ἀστεῖος, used sarcastically, or in a passage through which runs a vein of humour, as in the present case. For the first use see Book VI. 505 B. τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἠδονῇ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν, τοῖς δὲ κομψοτέροις φράσισι, ἢο. 'finer naturea.' And in Book VII. the study of number as directed to the acquisition of pure knowledge is contrasted with its use in trade (καταχθέναι) as κομψός, 525 D. καὶ μήν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, νῦν καὶ ἐννοῶ ῥήθεντι τοῦ περὶ τῶν λόγιον μαθήματος, ὡς κομψόν ἐστι καὶ πολλαχῇ χρήσιμον ἢ μὴν πρὸς ὁ βουλόμεθα, ἐὰν τοῦ γρωφέειν ἐνεκά τις αὐτῷ ἐπιτηδεύῃ ἄλλα μὴ τοῦ καταχθέν.] Whilst in the humorous description of the democracy (Book VIII. 558 A), in which even the draught animals are so replete with freedom that they push people out of their way in the streets (563), and condemned criminals are suffered to walk about in public unmolested, the demeanour of the latter is termed κομψή. Τι δὲ, ἡ πρασίνη ἐνων τῶν δικασθέντων οὐ κομψή, 'exquisite' (D. and V.), 'charming' (J.). The word means 'lautus,' or 'comptus,' 'neat,' 'smart,' and suggests the further notion 'with an eye to effect.' From this further notion it results that the word specially suits a sarcastic context; because to challenge admiration is also to challenge criticism. Compare note on τῷ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς καὶ for ἀστεῖος, Book I. Ch. XX. Here the word gives a humorous, not a sarcastic tone to the passage.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

Φιλόσοφος. For the first two requisites of the philosophic nature are said, in Book VI, to be memory (μνήμη) and aptitude for gaining knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). It is thus termed because there is discrimination (διακρίνει) and limitation (ὁρίζοντες), which are characteristic of a mind that gains knowledge, and partakes in an elementary degree of the nature of the philosopher, of τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Book VI. init. For another definition of the philosophic mind see Book V. 475 C. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον συνεφαίρεις φήμοις ἐπιτυμφητής εἰναι, οὐ τῆς μὲν, τῆς δ' οὐ, ἄλλη πάσης; ἦτε ἤπερ φιλουμαθὴ καὶ φιλόσοφον, as synonymous.

Φιλόσοφος δ' ήταν. It should be noticed that this conclusion has been reached on analogical grounds, as usual: by an appeal to experience of common objects and common events. Socrates encourages the listener to agree to his larger propositions. See the remarks upon his method, Introd. p. 30. In Book VI, where the philosophic nature is defined, as quoted above, it is also analysed, and like the φύλαξ here, the φιλόσοφος is characterised by several different traits; εἰ μὴ φύσει εἰς μημέναι, εὐμαθῆς, μεγαλοπρεπῆς ἐξαιρετικοῦς, συνοικίστας, ἰδιοποιήματα, ἀνθρώπους, σωφροσύνης; 487 A. The difficulty of combining all kinds of bodily and mental excellences is again insisted upon in the same Book: εὐμαθαῖς καὶ μημέναις καὶ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ δόξας ἐπαισθήσεις, καὶ ἀνθρώπους, καὶ δύναμις ταῖς διανοίγοις οἶοι κοιμάσι μετὰ καὶ διὰ τῆς, καὶ καθωρισθοὶ ἐθέλεις, ἦν, ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὑπὸ δόξησις φέρονται ὡς τοὺς ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸ καθήκον ἐπαισθήσεις. That is, the element of steadiness, which alone can ensure valuable results, is especially hard to find in brilliant natures. Hence the need of education: the mind must be as thoroughly disciplined as the body; οὐκ ἤτοι ταύτων καθωρισθέντων καὶ γυμνασμένων. And again (Book VII. 536 B) Δριμύτητα δεὶ αὐτοῖς πόδα τὰ μαθήματα ὑπάρχειν.
καὶ ταχὺς καὶ ἵσχυρὸς ἤμιν τὴν φύσιν ἔσται ὁ μέλλων καλὸς κἀγαθὸς ἐσεσθαι φύλαξ πόλεως; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἐφι. Ὄποτος μὲν δὴ ἂν οὕτως ὑπάρχον θρέφονται δὲ δὴ ἦμιν οὕτως καὶ παιδευθῶσονται τίνα τρόπον; καὶ ἄρα τι προῦργον ἦμιν ἔστιν αὐτὸ σκοποῦσι πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν, οὕτε ἐνεκα πάντα σκοπούμεν, δικαιοσύνην τε καὶ ἀδικίαν τίνα τρόπον ἐν πόλει γύγνεται; ἵνα μη ἐώς μεν ἰκανὸν λόγον ἢ συχνὸν διεξῆμεν. καὶ ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἀδελφὸς Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφι, ἐγωνε προσδοκῶ προῦργου εἶναι εἰς τούτο ταῦτη τὴν σκέψιν. Μὰ Δία, ἥν δὲ ἐγὼ, ὁ φίλε 'Αδείμαντε, οὐκ ἄρα ἀφετέον, οὐδὲ ἐἰ μακροτέρα τυγχάνει οὖσα. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. 'Ἰθι οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐν μῦθῳ μυθολογούμεν τε καὶ σχολὴν ἄγοντες λόγον παιδεύωμεν τοὺς ἄνδρας. Ἁλλὰ χρῆ.
ϊσως οὖν οὗτε κακῶς ἔχειν σκοποῦντες γὰρ καὶ
tοιαύτην τάχι ἄν κατηδμεν τὴν τε δικαιοσύνην
cαὶ ἄδικιαν ὅποι ποτὲ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐμφύονται. ἦ
μὲν οὖν ἀληθινὴ πόλεις δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι ἢν διεληλύ-
θαμεν, ὡσπερ ύγιῆς τινί εἰ δ' αὖ βουλέσθε καὶ
φλεγμαίνουσαν πόλιν θεορήσωμεν, οὔδὲν ἀποκολύει.
tαῦτα γὰρ δὴ τισιν, ὡς δοκεῖ, οὐκ ἔξαρκέσει, οὐδ']
373 αὕτη ἡ δίαιτα, ἀλλὰ κλῖναί τε προσέσονται καὶ
τράπεζαι καὶ τάλλα σκείη, καὶ ὃσ' ἡ καὶ καὶ μύρα
καὶ θυμιάματα καὶ ἑταῖραι καὶ πέμματα, ἐκαστὰ
tοῦτων παντοδαπάς καὶ δὴ καὶ ἃ τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέ-
γομεν οὐκέτι τὰ ἀναγκαία θετέον, οἰκίας τε καὶ
ἰμάτια καὶ ὑποδήματα, ἀλλὰ τὴν τε ζωγραφίαν
κυνητέον καὶ χρυσὸν καὶ ἑλέφαντα καὶ πάντα τὰ
Β τοιαῦτα κτητέον. ἡ γὰρ; Ναί, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν μει-
ζονά τε αὐτὶ τὴν πόλιν δεῖ ποιεῖν; ἐκείνη γὰρ ἡ ὑγιεινὴ

ἡ μὲν οὖν ἄληθ. Stallb. makes ὡσπερ ύγιῆς τις the predicate of
ἐγώ: but it is open to us to
take ἀληθινή; thus ‘the city
which we have described seems
to be the true one, being as it
were healthy.’ ‘Healthy,’ or
‘sound,’ is a favourite meta-
phorical expression with Plato.
It occurs again in conjunction
with ἀληθίνης in Book X. 603 B,
where Plato is speaking of the
painter’s art, of which he says,
προσαμεῖ τε καὶ ἑταῖρα καὶ φίλη
ἐστίν ἐπ᾽ οὐδεν ύγιείς οὐδ᾽ ἀλη-
θεῖ. And in speaking of the
middle state, which, compared
with pain and pleasure respec-
tively, seems to be pleasure or
pain, he says, οὐκ ἐστὶν ἄρα
τοῦτο ἀλλὰ φαίνεται παρὰ τὸ
ἀλγείνων ἢδον καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἢδον
ἀλγείνων τότε ἡ ἰσορροία, καὶ
οὖν ύμῖς τούτων τῶν φαντασ-
μάτων πρὸς ὡδόνης ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ
γνησία τις.

οὐκέτι τὰ ἀναγκ. θετ. ‘And
we must no longer lay down as
the only requirements those
that we mentioned at first.’ For
ἀναγκαία, ‘the least neces-
sary,’ v.s. Ch. XI. ἀναγκαίοτάτη
πόλις.

ζωγραφ. κιν., ‘we shall have
to start painting,’ κινεῖν is ‘to
set in motion.’ See Book I.
Ch. IV. init. βουλόμενος ἢτι
ἀλέγειν αὐτόν ἐκίνουν. It is used
of a top in Book IV. 436 D,
which is stationary (ἐστηκε) and
in motion (κινεῖται), simulta-
neously, viz. in respect of axis
and circumference. ‘Begin,’
here would not convey the
whole meaning; the art of
painting is to be ‘set going,’
χρυσόν, κ.τ.λ. governed by
κτητέον.

αὖ v.s. note p. 124; and above
in this chapter, εἰ δ' αὖ βου-
λεσθε.
οὐκέτι ἴκανή, ἀλλ' ἡ δὴ ὄγκος ἐμπληστέα καὶ πλῆθος, ἢ οὐκέτι τοῦ ἀναγκαίου ἐνεκά ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, οἶνον οἳ τε θηρευταὶ πάντες, οἳ τε μμηταὶ, πολλοὶ μὲν οἱ περὶ τὰ σχήματα τε καὶ χρώματα, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ περὶ μουσικῆς, ποιηταὶ τε καὶ τοῦτον ὑπηρέται, ραψωδοὶ, ὑποκριταί, χορευταί, ἑργολάβοι, σκευῶν τε παντοδαπῶν δημουργοί, τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ τῶν C περὶ τῶν γυναικεῖων κόσμων, καὶ δὴ καὶ διακόνων πλειώνων δησόμεθα. ἦ οὗ δοκεῖ δεησείν παϊδαγωγῶν, τιτθῶν, τροφῶν, κομμωτριῶν, κουρέων, καὶ αὖ ὄγοπων τε καὶ μαγείρων; ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ συβιωτῶν προσδεσόμεθα τούτῳ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ προτέρα πόλει οὐκ ἐνήν ἔδει γὰρ οὐδέν ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ τούτῳ προσδεσθῆ, δεησεὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βοσκημάτων παμπόλλων, εἰ τις αὐτὰ ἔδεται. ἡ γὰρ; Ἡ Πώς γὰρ οὗ; Ὁμοῦ καὶ ιατρῶν ἐν χρείαις ἐσόμεθα D

οἳ τε θηρευταὶ κ.τ.λ. We should be surprised, if we were not aware of Plato's hostility to poets, to find them thus unceremoniously thrust in among the rabble of the Larger City, as if they were no more than Horace's Ambubaiaurum collegia, pharmacopoea, Mendici, minae, balatrones, hoc genus omne.

See pp. 121, 133, notes. We shall find below (Ch. XVII.) what is the moving cause of this hostility to poets in Plato's mind. For σχήματα, 'drawing,' v.s. note on σκιαγρ. ἄρετης. Ch. VIII. In Book X. 601 A, it is explained that poets are nothing but 'word-painters,' and that as painters are nothing but copyists, poets are the same, and have no claim to originality or truth. Thus we can understand why Plato includes them here among the vulgar herd. In the passage referred to we find these same words coupled together. Οὕτω δὴ, οἷμαι, καὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν φήσομεν χρώματ' ἀπα έκαστῶν τῶν τεχνῶν τοῖς δύναμις καὶ ἡμισίν ἐπιχρωματίζειν. And for Plato's opinion of painting see 603 A, ἡ γραφικὴ καὶ ὅλως ἡ μμητικὴ πόρρῳ μὲν τῆς ἀλήθειας δὲν τὸ αὐτῆς ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται.

κοσμῶν, the general word for a lady's toilette, mundus muliebris, including many different articles. One of these we know to have been rouge, which Professor Newton tells us has been found in a grave at Athens; it being usual to bury with the dead articles of all kinds which they had used in their lifetime.

ἱατρῶν. Plato's hatred of doctoring is so strong that, as has been noticed in the Argu-
πολὺ μᾶλλον οὕτω διαιτώμενοι ἡ ὡς τὸ πρότερον; Πολὺ γε.

CAP. X XIV.

Καὶ ἡ χώρα που ἡ τότε ἱκανὴ τρέφειν τοὺς τότε σμικρὰ δὴ ἐξ ἱκανῆς ἐσται. ἡ πῶς λέγομεν; Οὕτως,

ment, p. 55, note, he allows it to blind his logic, in replying to Glaucos's suggestion that the best doctor is he who has had the largest and most varied experience of disease. His suggestion in another place (Book III. 410 Δ) that, where a man is of a weakly constitution, he had better take his leave of life as soon as possible, has been already noticed. For his general treatment of the question in brief see Argument, p. 54; and Book IV. fin., where he draws an elaborate comparison between illness and wickedness; illness, as he describes it, being a στάσις in the body. "Εστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἠγελαίαν ποιεῖν τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι κατὰ φύσιν καθιστάναι κρατεῖν τε καὶ κρατεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἀλλήλου, τὸ δὲ νόσον παρά φύσιν ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἄλλο ὑπ' ἀλλοῦ. And again Book VIII. 556 Ε. σώμα νοσός δὲ καὶ γραφεῖς ἐξωθεὶς δεῖναι προσλαβεῖσθαι πρὸς τὸ κάμειν, ἐντὸς δὲ καὶ ἀνευ τῶν ἐξω στατικῆς αὐτῷ αὐτῷ... Generally, Plato thought illness almost culpable, because he considered that most diseases arose from indulgence: in which opinion he was not far wrong. Hence his expression above here, φλεγματικὰ πόλιας; and in Book VIII. loc. cit. he shows what an advantage the poor, sun-burnt, yet wiry (ἱσχὺν) citizen, possesses in any contest over one who is rich but incapable, through having too much flesh and too little wind.

CH. XIV.—We shall then want to take our neighbour's land, i.e. we shall go to war; and the warriors must be carefully trained from their youth up.

Aristotle agrees with Plato that war is, in its nature, a form of acquisition, drawing this fact from man's universal pursuit of wild, and acquisition of tame animals. See Pol. i. 3. δι' οὗ καὶ ἡ τολμηκὴ φύσεως κτητικὴ πως ἐσται, et præcedid. But he considers that the immediate cause of war is the refusal of men who are φυσικοὶ δοῦλοι, to submit. ἡ γὰρ θερετικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς, ἦ δὲ χρήσθαι πρὸς τὰ ἁθρία καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόσει περικτίης ἄρχεσθαι μηθελοῦν, ὁσ φύσει δίκαιον τοῦτον ὑπὲρ τῶν πόλεων Sir Thomas More does not follow Plato upon this point, but assigns as the chief cause of war the wantonness and pugnacity of princes. Thus, 'The most part of all princes have more deytry in warlike matters and feats of chivalry than in the good feats of peace, and employe muche more study, how by right or by wrong to enlarge their dominions, than howe wel and peace-
able to rule and govern that they have alredie.'

τῆς τῶν πλ. χώρας, with this genitive compare ἐπιπλοῦντες τοῦ υἱοῦ, Ch. XII. 111.

εἰ μέλλομεν ἵνα ἔξειν, 'if we are to have enough'; see Book I. Ch. XVIII. note.

ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν ἀπείρων. Aristotle shows in Pol. I, 3, that there are two kinds of wealth, ὁ πλοῦτος ὁ κατὰ φύσιν, which is not the possession of so much money, but abundance of those things necessary to a comfortable life: this he brings under the province of οἰκονομική: the other is ἡ χρηματιστική with which is closely allied κατηλυμική, money-making by trade.

He then goes on to show that in οἰκονομική there is a πέρας τέλους, or 'limitation of wealth, in its object'; whilst in χρηματιστική there is no πέρας, the object of money-making being to go on continually amassing more. Οὕτω καὶ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ ἦστι τοῦ τέλους πέρας: τέλος δὲ, ὁ τοιοῦτος πλοῦτος καὶ χρημάτων κτήσις. Τῆς δὲ οἰκονομικῆς, οὐ χρηματιστικῆς, ἦστι πέρας. And therefore, he adds, those fall into error who think that amassing money is the part of οἰκονομικὴ,—ἀξεῖν τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος οὐσίαν εἰς ἄπειρων, agreeing with Plato in this, viz. that where there is unlimited covetousness (εἰς ἄπειρον τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οὐσίας, as here ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτήσιν ἄπειρων) it is the result of an abnormal state of a community, not of πλοῦτος κατὰ φύσιν.

ἀυτὸν οὖν ἰκανόν: The necessity for a standing army is here shown, on the continually recurring principle of specialization. 'What we do, we must
καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀπαντὴς ὁμολογήσαμεν καλῶς, ἢνικα ἐπλάττομεν τὴν πόλιν ὁμολογοῦμεν δὲ που, εἰ μέμνησαι, ἀδύνατον ἐνα πολλάς καλῶς ἑργάζεσθαι τέχνας. 'Ἀληθή λέγεις, ἐφη. Τι οὖν; ἢ δ' ἐγώ; ἢ Β περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀγωνία οὐ τεχνική δοκεῖ εἶναι; Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη. 'Ἡ οὖν τι σκυτικῆς δεῖ μᾶλλον κήδεσθαι ἡ πολεμικῆς; Οὐδαμῶς. 'Αλλ' ἄρα τὸν μὲν σκυτοτόμον διεκολύμεν μῆτε γεωργὸν ἐπιχειρεῖν εἶναι ἀμα μῆτε υφάντην μῆτε οἰκοδόμον, ὅνα δὴ ἡμῖν τὸ τῆς σκυτικῆς ἑργὸν καλῶς γίγνοιτο, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνι ἐκάστορ ὁσαύτως ἐν ἀπεδίδομεν, πρὸς ὁ πεφυκεί ἐκαστὸς καὶ ἐφ' ᾧ ἐμέλλε τῶν ἄλλων σχολὴν αὐγον διὰ βίου αὐτὸ ἐργαζόμενος οὐ παρεῖς τοὺς
do well. We cannot do our business well, unless we attend to it and to it alone: therefore each man must choose one profession and no more.’ Ὁ s. Ch. XI.
tεχνική, ‘an art in itself,’ ‘a special art’; for which word see Ar. Pol. I. i. πόλιν ὁμόθετη καὶ περὶ τούτων (sc. ἐν ἐνυγ- κεῖται) μᾶλλον, τι τε διαφέρουσιν ἄλλης, καὶ εἰ τε τεχνικὸν ἐν- δεχέται λαβείν περὶ ἑκατον τῶν ὁμοιότων, i.e. ‘any character- istic,’ or ‘special distinction.’ Ὁ infr. Ch. XV. init. where the defence of the city, in regard of its great importance, is said to require the greatest elaboration and study (ἐκτενεῖ καὶ ἐνυμελέας μεγαλεῖς δεδεμ- μον).
τὸν μὲν σκυτ. διεκ. μῆτε γεωργ. ἐπιχ. εἶναι. Upon this principle Socrates refuses in Ch. XVIII. to prescribe what the poetry of the State is to be, for he says, we are not poets but founders of a city: καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, ἢ Ἀδελμαντε, οἷκ εἰς ἐμὲν ποιηται ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τῇ παρόντι, ἀλλὰ ὁ οἰκίσκαι πόλεως. On the same principle actors in tragedy do not succeed in comedy; see Book III. 395 B: ἀλλ' οὖν τοι ὑποκριτικοὶ κομμαθοί τε καὶ τραγῳδοὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ. Where Socrates adds that man’s nature is so atomic, that it is impossible for him not only to do many things, but even to imitate many things, with success: καὶ ἐγὼ εἰς τούτων, ἢ Ἀδελμαντε, φανεραίοι μοι εἰς σπακρότερα κατα- κερματίσοις ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις, ὥστε ἀδύνατο εἰναι πολλά καλῶς μεμείχαις ἢ αὕτα ἑκείνα πράττειν ἐν δὴ καὶ τὰ μιμηταὶ ἐστὶν ἄφοιμισματα. Cf. the Latin proverb, ‘Ne sutor ultra crepidam.’
καὶ τῶν ἀλλ. ἐνί. Ἐκ. Σε. Ch. XI.: Ἐκ δὲ τούτων πλεῖον τε ἐκαστὰ γίγνεται καὶ κάλλους καὶ ῥέοιν, ὅταν εἰς ἐν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καρφὶ σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἐγώ, πράττῃ.
ἀπό. This demonstrative thrown in to help a long relativial construction, has al-
καρινός καλός ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὰ δὲ δὴ περὶ τῶν πόλεμων ποτερον οὐ περὶ πλείστον ἐστίν εὖ ἀπεργασθέντα; ἢ οὔτω ῥάδιον, ὡστε καὶ γεωργῶν τις ἀμα πολεμικὸς ἔσται καὶ σκυτοτομῶν καὶ ἄλλην τέχνην ἡμιπον ēργαζόμενος, πεπτευτικὸς δὲ ἡ κυβευτικὸς ἰκανῶς οὐδ' ἀν εἰς γένοιτο μὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐκ παιδὸς ἐπιτηδεύων, ἀλλὰ παρέργῳ χρώμενος; καὶ ἀσπίδα μὲν λαβὼν ἢ τὸ ἄλλο τῶν πολεμικῶν ὄπλων τε καὶ ὀργάνων ἀνθρημέρον ὀπλιτικῆς ἢ τινος ἄλλης μάχης τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἰκανὸς ἔσται ἀγωνιστής, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὀργάνων οὐδὲν οὐδένα δημιουργὸν οὐδὲ ἄθλητην ληφθέν ποιήσει, οὐδ' ἔσται χρῆσιμον τῷ μήτη τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκάστου λαβόντε μῆτε τὴν μελετὴν ἰκανήν παρασχομένῳ; Πολλοῦ γὰρ ἂν, ἢδὲ ὡς, τὰ ὀργανὰ ἂν ἁξία.

ready been noticed in Ch. I.: οἷον τὸ χαλεπὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ἢδοναί δοσαί ἄβλαβεσι κἂν μηδὲν εἰς τὸν ἱππευτὰ χρόνον διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται ἄλλα ἢ χαλεπὸν ἐχοντα. ἐμελλε καλ. ἄπ. For this sense, expressing an indispensable condition, see above note Ch. XVIII. 'Which he cannot bring to perfection unless he concentrate himself there-upon,' or 'Which he will bring to perfection only if he give all his attention thereto.'

τὰ δὲ δὴ δὴ recalls the hearer to the point on which this recapitulation bears; 'To come to the point, then &c.'

ἔσται...ἀν γένοιτο. The former case, that a mechanic could at once become a soldier, is cast into the mood of facts, so that it may stand, in all its glaring absurdity, contrasted with the potentially stated yet truer assertion, that for a man to become even a good chess-player the study of years is requisite. For peptewtikōs, v. e. p. 130 note.

παρέργῳ χρωμ., sc. τοῦτο; παρ. being predicate. So para démumati χρωμένους ἐκεῖνη; Book VII. 540 A. Philosophy, Socrates shows, is treated as ἀπεργον by most men; Book VI. 498 A: παρέργουν ωθομενοι αὐτὸ δεῖν πράττειν. In Book VII. the word bears a slightly different sense, 'the details, or minor aspects, of a study'; 527 C: καὶ γὰρ τὰ παρέργα αὐτοῦ (γεωμετρίας) οὐ σμιρά. For the predicative sense see also Xen. Mem. i. 2, 56: ἐφι δ' αὐτὸν ὁ κατήγορος καὶ τῶν ἐνδοξοτάτων ποιητῶν ἐκλεγόμενον τὰ ποιητότατα, καὶ τοῦτοι μαρτυροῦντε δύο Χρώμενον, κ.τ.λ.
Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ὅσῳ μέγιστον τὸ τῶν φυλάκων ἔργον, τοσοῦτο σχολῆς τε τῶν ἄλλων πλείστης ἂν εἰη καὶ αὖ τέχνης τε καὶ ἑπιμελείας μεγίστης δεό-μενον. Οἴμαι ἔγωγε, ἢ δ’ ὦς. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐ καὶ φύσεως ἑπιτηδείας εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ ἑπιτήδευμα; Πῶς δ’ οὖ; Ἡμέτερου δὴ ἔργον ἄν εἰη, ὡς οὐκεν, εἰπερ οἷοι τ’ ἐσμέν, ἐκλέξασθαι, τίνες τε καὶ πολιει φύσεις ἑπιτηδείας εἰς πολέως φυλακῆς. Ἡμέτερον μέντοι. Μᾶ Δία, ἥν δ’ ἐγώ, οὐκ ἄρα φαύλον πράγμα ἡράμεθα: ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἀποδειλιατέον, ὅσον γ’ ἀν δύναμις 375 παρείκη. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη. Οἰεὶ οὖν τι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, διαφέρειν φύσιν γεναιοῦ σκύλακος εἰς φυλακὴν νεανίσκου εὐγενοῖς; Τὸ ποιὸν λέγεις; Οἶον ὀξὺν τε που δὲι αὐτοῖν ἑκάτερον εἶναι πρὸς αἰσθησιν καὶ ἐλαφρὸν πρὸς τὸ αἰσθανόμενον διωκάθειν, καὶ ἰσχυ- ρὸν αὐ, ἕαν δὲ ἐλοῦτα διαμαχεσθαι. Δεὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, πάντων τούτων. Καὶ μὴν ἄνδρεῖον γε, εἰπερ

Cn. XV.—The defenders of our state must unite in themselves the two traits of courage and gentleness, lest they turn and illtreat those whom they defend.

tέχνης, 'special work,' v.s. Ch. XIV. note on τεχνή.

ἡμέτερον δὴ ἔργον...ἐκλέξασθαι. Arist. Nub. 1594—
σὺν ἔργον, δ’ δάς, έναι πολλὴν φόλγα.


φαύλον, v.s. Ch. X.: τὸ σχῆμα ζ ἐπιχειεροῦμεν οὐ φαύλον, ἀλλὰ δὲν βλέποντος.

ἀποδειλ., v.s. Ch. XII.: οὐκ ἀποκνυτέον.

παρείκη, 'allow'; not 'fail' or 'submit,' as εἰκὼ uncom- pounded.


μεαν. ενγ., i.e. τῆς φύσεως μεαν. ενγ.

τὸ ποίῳ λέγεις; as in Thrasymachus' reply, Book I. Ch. XV.: πῶς τοῦτο ἐρωτᾶ; the sense is, 'in what respect do you mean?' And again, πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, Ch. XIX. Book I. int.
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ β'.

αὐτὸν ἠμαχεῖται. Πῶς δ' οὖ; 'Ἀνδρεῖος δὲ εἶναι ἀρα ἐθελήσει ὁ μὴ θυμοειδὴς εἰτε ὑπ' ὑπὸς εἰτε κύων ἢ ἄλλο ὑπόθυμον ἔσχων; ἢ οὐκ ἑννεόνηκας, ὡς ἁμαχὸν τε καὶ ἁνίκητον θυμὸς, οὐ παρόντος ψυχῆ πάντα πρὸς πάντα ἀφοβῶς τε ἐστὶ καὶ ἁνίκητος; Ἐννεόνηκα. Γά μὲν τοίνυν τοῦ σώματος οἶνων δεὶ τὸν φύλακα εἶναι, δῆλα. Ναὶ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅτι γε θυμοειδῆ. Καὶ τούτο. Πῶς οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ Γλαύκων, οὐκ ἄγριως ἀλλήλους ἔσονται καὶ τὸν ἄλλον πολίταις, ὅντες τοίοτοι τὰς φύσεις; Μά Δία, ἢ δ' ὅση, οὐ ραδίως. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι δεὶ γε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς οἰκείους πράσος αὐτοὺς εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους χαλέπους εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ περιμενοῦσιν ἄλλους σφάς διολέσαι, ἄλλ' αὐτοῖ φθέγονται αὐτὸν

ἐπιλήσει, ὑ. ἐπὶ. Book IV. 440 C; also in a psychological discussion: οὐκ ἐθέλει πρὸς τοῦτον αὐτὸν ἐγείρεσθαι ὁ θυμὸς; and Book VI. 504 B: Εὐμαθεῖς...οἷον ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἀμα φόσεαν καὶ πιανικόν. The certainty of a physical effect following upon its cause is emphasized by the use of the word, which properly belongs only to the mental sphere.

ἡ οὖν, nonne. For the nature of θυμός v. Book IV. loc. cit. In the triple division there made of the human mind into λογιστικὸν, θυμοειδὲς, and ἐπιθυμητικὸν, the second kind is said to range itself most frequently upon the side of the first, and to unite with it, in case of a στάσις, or disagreement between reason and desire; and, again, it refuses to be aroused, in cases where it would be unworthy and unreasonable. τίθεναι τά δπλα πρὸς τὸν λογιστικὸν.

τὰ μὲν, κ.τ.λ. ν.η. τοιοῦτοι τὰς φύσεις.
δράσαντες. Ἄληθή, ἑφη. Τι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιήσωμεν; πόθεν ἀμα πράον καὶ μεγαλόθυμον ἱθος εὐρήσωμεν; ἐναντία γάρ ποι θυμοειδεῖ πραεία φύσις. Φαίνεται. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι τούτων ὅποτέρου ἀν στέρηται, φύλαξ ἀγαθός οὐ μὴ γενηται ταῦτα δὲ ἀδυνάτοις έοικε, καὶ οὐτω δὴ ξυμβαίνει αγαθὸν

Φύλακα ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι. Κινδυνεύει, ἑφη. καὶ ἐγῶ ἀπορήσας τε καὶ ἐπισκεψάμενος τὰ ἐμπροσθεν, Δικαίως γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ φίλε, ἀποροῦμεν ἢς γὰρ προθέμεθα εἰκόνος ἀπελεύθημεν. Πῶς λέγεις; Οὐκ ἐνοῇςαμεν, ὅτι εἰσίν ἀρα φύσεις, οὐς ἥμεις οὐκ φήθημεν, ἔχουσα τάναντια ταῦτα. Ποῦ δὴ; Ἡδοὶ μὲν ἂν τις καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ζώοις, οὐ μέντ' ἂν

Εἶκιστα ἐν δ' ἥμεις παρεβάλλομεν τῷ φύλακι. οἴσα ἔγρ ποι τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν, ὅτι τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἱθος, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς συνῆθεις τε καὶ γνωρίμους ὡς οἶον τε πρατότους εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνώτας τούναντίον. Οἱδα μέντοι. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δυνατόν, καὶ οὐ παρὰ φύσιν ξητοῦμεν τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸν φύλακα. Οὐκ έοικεν.

in the present passage we may consider that the defenders are, as it were, identified with those whom by their conduct they might ruin, p. 261.

ἐναντία γάρ που θυμοειδ. See what is said of Socrates' opinions regarding the θύμας in Book III. note ἢ οὐκ, p. 261.

dικαίως γε, ὃ φίλε, ἀπ. See Book IV. 432 C, where the search for justice is brought to a crisis, as here the search for the good defender: Ἡ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, βλακικόν γε ήμῶν τὸ πάθος.

eἰκόνος ἀπελ., 'we have stopped short in the illustration we employed,' 'we have not fully carried out our illustration.' Prative genitive.

ἀρα, 'as it seems,' 'as it turns out'; see note p. 108, and above here, Ch. V.

ἐν δ', ἐν τούτω δ.
CAP. XVI.

"Αρ' οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἐτι τούδε προσδείεσθαι ὁ φυλακικὸς ἐσόμενος, πρὸς τῷ θυμοειδεῖ ἐτι προσγενέσθαι φιλόσοφος τὴν φύσιν; Πῶς δή; ἐφη οὐ γὰρ ἐνιοῦ. 376 Καὶ τούτο, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τοῖς κυσί κατόψιε, δι καὶ ἀξίων θαυμάσας τοῦ θερίου. Τὸ τοῖον; "Ον μὲν ἄν ἵδῃ ἄγνωτα, χαλεπαίνει, οὐδὲν δὲ κακὸν προφητῶς. ὃν δὲ ἂν γνώριμον, ἀσπάζεται, κἀκεῖθεν πώποτε ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὸν πεπόνθη. ἦ οὖτω τούτω ἐθαύμασας; Οὐ πάνυ, ἐφη, μέχρι τούτου προσέσχον τὸν νοῦν ὅτι δὲ ποὺ δρότα ταῦτα, δῆλον. Ἀλλὰ μὴν κομψὸν γε φαίνεται τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ τῆς φύσεως καὶ

Ch. XVI.—This discrimination is philosophic: so that in addition to being spirited, swift, and courageous, our ideal defender must be also of a philosophic nature.

φυλακικὸς ἐσόμενος. ἐσ. here is equal to δ. μέλλων ἐσεπάθαι.

τοῦ θηρίου. v.s. note p. 113 and supr., here Ch. IX.

κομψόν, like ἄστειος, 'fine' or 'splendid,' and very often, like ἄστειος, used sarcastically, or in a passage through which runs a vein of humour, as in the present case. For the first use see Book VI. 505 Β. τοῖς μὲν παλαιῖς ἥδοις δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ κομψοτέροις φρόνησις, ἦ. e. 'finer natures.' And in Book VII. the study of number as directed to the acquisition of pure knowledge is contrasted with its use in trade (καπηλεύων) as κομψόν, 525 Β. καὶ μὴν, ἢν ἡγών, νῦν καὶ ἐννοώ ῥήθησον τοῦ περὶ τοῦς λογισμοὺς μαθήματος, ἐς κομψόν ἐστὶ καὶ πολλάχι χρῆσιμον ἤμιν πρὸς

δ. Βουλόμεθα, ἦν τοῦ γνωρίζειν ἕνεκά τις αὐτὸ ἐκπτενεύῃ ἄλλα μὴ τοῦ καπηλευεῖν. Whilst in the humorous description of the democracy (Book VIII. 558 Α), in which even the draught animals are so replete with freedom that they push people out of their way in the streets (563), and condemned criminals are suffered to walk about in public unmolested, the demeanour of the latter is termed κομψή. Τι δὲ, ἢ πρᾶξις ἐνοῦ τῶν δικασθέντων οὐ κομψή, 'exquisite' (D. and V.), 'charming' (J.). The word means 'lautus,' or 'comptus,' 'neat,' 'smart,' and suggests the further notion 'with an eye to effect.' From this further notion it results that the word specially suits a sarcastic context; because to challenge admiration is also to challenge criticism. Compare note on πο τοῦ ἐν τοίησι; and for ἄστειος, Book I. Ch. XX. Here the word gives a humorous, not a sarcastic tone to the passage.
filosophos. For the first two requisites of the philosophic nature are said, in Book VI, to be memory (μνήμην) and aptitude for gaining knowledge (ἐπιστήμην). It is thus termed because there is discrimination (διακρίνει) and limitation (διαχωρισμον), which are characteristic of a mind that gains knowledge, and partakes in an elementary degree of the nature of the philosopher, ôi tòv déi nò tòtta òσαντωs ἔχοντος δυνάμενον ἐφαπτεσθαι. Book VI. Ínti. For another definition of the philosophic mind see Book V. 475 C. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῷ φιλόσοφῳ σφιᾶς φόρομεν ἐπιθυμητῆν ἔλαι, οὐ τῆς μὲν, τῆς δ’ οὖ, ἄλλα πάσης; εἶ διή ϕιλομαθῆ καὶ φιλόσοφον, ἀσ συνονυμίων. ϕιλόσοφος δ’; It should be noticed that this conclusion has been reached on analogical grounds, as usual: by an appeal to experience of common objects and common events Socrates encourages the listener to agree to his larger propositions. See the remarks upon his method, Introd. p. 30. In Book VI, where the philosophic nature is defined, as quoted above, it is also analysed, and like the ϕιλαξ here, the ϕιλόσοφos is characterised by several different traits; εἰ μὴ ϕύσει εἰς μὴν, εὑμαθής, μεγαλοπρεπὴς εὐχαρις, ϕίλος τε καὶ ἐπιγεγρήσας ἀληθείας, δικαιοσύνης, ἄνδρειας, ὑστεροσύνης; 487 A. The difficulty of combining all kinds of bodily and mental excellences is again insisted upon in the same Book: εὑμαθεῖσα καὶ μὴν ὁμορφα καὶ ἀγχῖτοι καὶ ὁξικεῖ καὶ δεα ἀλλα τοῦτοι ἐπετεί οἶκο ὅτι οὐκ ἔθελον ομοί φύσει καὶ νεανικοὶ τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τάς ἄνθρωπος οἱ κοσμίας μετὰ ἰσχύς καὶ βεβαιότητος ἐθέλειν ζῆν, ἀλλ’ αἱ τολμοῦντο ὅτι δεικτὴς φέρονται ὧτι δὲν ἀν κεισοι καὶ τὸ βέβαιον ἔπειν αὐτῶν ἐξελέγχεται. That is, the element of steadiness, which alone can ensure valuable results, is especially hard to find in brilliant natures. Hence the need of education: the mind must be as thoroughly disciplined as the body; οὐκ ἤττον μακαμόντω ποτητον η γυμναζομένην. And again (Book VII. 536 B) Δριμύτητα δὲ αὐτοίς πολε τὰ μαθηματα υπάρχει.
καὶ ταχὺς καὶ ἴσχυρὸς ἦμιν τὴν φύσιν ἔσται ὁ μέλ-
λων καλὸς κἀγαθὸς ἔσεσθαι φύλαξ πόλεως; Παρά-
pασι μὲν οὖν, ἐφι. Ὁτόσο μὲν δὴ ἂν οὕτως ὑπάρχων
θρέψονται δὲ δὴ ἦμιν οὕτως καὶ παιδευθήσονται τίνα
τρόπον; καὶ ἀρὰ τι προύργου ἦμιν ἔστιν αὐτὸ σκο-
νοῦσι πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν, οὔπερ ἑνεκά πάντα σκοποῦ-
μεν, δικαιοσύνην τε καὶ ἀδικίαιν τίνα τρόπον ἐν πόλει
γίγνεται; ἔνα μὴ ἐὼ μὲν ἢκανον λόγον ἢ συχνὸν
dιεξίωμεν. καὶ ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἄδελφος Πάνι
μὲν οὖν, ἐφι, ἔγινε προσδοκῶ προύργου εἶναι εἰς
τὸ τοῦτο ταῦτῃ τὴν σκέψιν. Μὰ Δία, ἦν δὲ ἐγὼ, ὁ
φίλε 'Αδείμαντε, οὐκ ἂρα ἀφετέον, οὐδὲ εἰ μακρο-
τέρα τυγχάνει οὐσα. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Ἐθι οὖν, ὡσπερ
ἐν μύθῳ μυθολογοῦντες τε καὶ σχολὴν ἄγοντες λόγῳ
παιδεύωμεν τοὺς ἄνδρας. Ἐλλὰ χρή.
Τὸς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; ἢ χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν βελτίω τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου εὐρημένης; ἔστι δὲ που ἢ

Ch. XVII.—Education is divided into music and gymnastic; and narration is a part of music, and in narration we must begin with fiction, avoiding however those legends that attribute immorality to the gods.

We here enter upon the first system of education, viz. that destined to train up a class of efficient soldiers whose military ardour is tempered with patriotic tenderness. The education comprises two branches, music, i.e. intellectual labour, and gymnastic, exercise of the body. In another place Socrates explains that it is necessary to employ these two exercises, because if a man give all his time to his body, he becomes ἁμοῦνος, vulgar, or incapable of appreciating things intellectual, whilst if he confine himself to mental work he becomes softer than is fit and unnerved in the presence of danger. The account of this first education continues from the present chapter to the end of Book III., after which the question is discussed, how the guardians will manage the city, and justice is discovered. But then the ἀποφθέγμα arises, Until kings are philosophers and philosophers kings, the city will never be governed aright; and this results in the question, What is a philosopher? To answer this question a second, esoteric, system of education is required, much more elaborate, and much more searching than that before us, treating of all the sciences as they bear upon each other and upon their source, Real Knowledge, which is to human knowledge as the sun's light to the human eye.

Aristotle recognises the necessity for education, in order to curb individual peculiarities, and to make the welfare of the state an object of serious interest; and thus he agrees with Plato in the principle that the general object of education is to steady the mind. V. s. note on φιλόσοφος δὴ, p. 264, and the words quoted μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ βεβαιότητος ἐθέλειν ζῆν. Aristotle's words are, ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας παδεῦναι καὶ τοὺς παιδείς καὶ τὰς γυναίκας, εἴπερ τι διαφέρει, πρὸς τὸ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι σπουδαίον, καὶ τοὺς παιδείς εἶναι σπουδαίους καὶ τὰς γυναίκας σπουδαίους. Again in the Ethics 10, 9, Aristotle speaks of the necessity, not merely of education in letters for children when growing up, but also of a training in morals as soon as they are capable of understanding, a training which corresponds to the inculcation of principle through μυθοῖς which Plato here advocates for the very young. Δὲι δὴ τὸ ἰδίον προμάρτυρειν πας οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργων τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραίνον τὸ αἰσχρὸν. ἐκ νέου δ' ἀγωγῆς ἀρθῆς τυχεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιοῦτοι
μὲν ἐπὶ σῶμασι γυμναστική, ἢ δ’ ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική. Ἡστι γάρ. Ἀρ όν όυ μουσικῆ πρότερον ἀρξόμεθα παιδεύοντες ἡ γυμναστική; Πῶς δ’ οὖ; Μουσικὴς δ’ εἰπὼν τίθης λόγους, ή οὖ; Ἡγουμε. Δόγων δὲ διττῶν εἰδός, τὸ μὲν ἄληθες, ψεῦδος δ’ ἐτερον; Ναλ. 377 Παιδευτέον δ’ ἐν ἀμφοτέρους, πρότερον δ’ ἐν τοῖς ψευδέσιν; Οὐ μανθάνω, ἐφη, πῶς λέγεις. Οὐ μανθάνεις; ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὁτι πρῶτον τοῖς παιδίοις μύθους λέγομεν; τούτο δὲ που ὡς τὸ δῶλον εἰπεῖν ψεῦδος, ἐνι δὲ καὶ ἄλθη; πρότερον δὲ μύθους πρὸς τὰ παιδία ἡ γυμνασίους χρώμεθα. Ἡστι ταῦτα. Τοῦτο δὴ ἐλεγον, ὅτι μουσικῆς πρότερον ἀπτέον ἡ γυμναστικής. Ὅρθως, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν οἶσθ’ ὅτι ἄρχῃ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ νέω καὶ ἀπιλῳ ὀτρούν; μᾶλιστα γὰρ δὴ τότε πλάττεται καὶ ἐνδύεται τύπος, ὅν ἂν τις βοηθηται ἐνσημάναισθαι ἑκάστῳ, Κομιδή

Aristotle Eth. i. viii. 23, where the necessity for strict definition follows upon this principle: στονδαστέον διὸς ὁρισθῶι καλῶς μεγάλην γαρ ἔχουσι βοτήν πρὸς τὰ ἐκόμενα. Δοκεί γαρ πλεῖοι ἢ ήμισι πάντοις εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή. Cf. Hesiod’s proverb, Opp. et Di. 40, νῆσιοι, οὐδὲ ἔσωσι ὅσον πλέον ἠμισι παντός.

ἐνσημάναισθαι, to stamp, to impress; cf. the words παράσημος, ἐπισημος. For the metaphor, cf. Theat. 191 C, Θεσ δὴ μοι λόγου ἐνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ήμισι ἐνοῦ κηρίνω ἐκμαγεῖον. Cf. also the word πλάττετιν below here. And Aristotle speaks again of the importance of training from the earliest age in Eth. 2, 1, 8, οὐ μικρῶν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ ὄντως ἢ ὀβτως εὕθως ἐκ νέων ἐθέλεθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολον, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν, see preceding note.
μὲν οὖν. Ἄρ' οὖν ράδιως οὗτω παρῆσομεν τοὺς ἐπιτυχόντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων μύθους πλασθέντας ἀκούειν τοὺς παίδας καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐναντίας δόξας ἐκεῖναις ὑπὲρ ἰδεῶν τελεωθόσων, ἑχειν οἰκεῖον ἑπιστατητέον τοῖς μυθοποιοῖς, καὶ ὅμως μὲν ἁν καλὸν ποιῆσαιν, ἐγκρίνειν, ὑν ᾧ ἄν μὴ, ἀποκρίνειν τοὺς ἡγκρίνειν τεῖσομεν τῶν τροφοῦ τε καὶ μητέρας λέγειν τοῖς παισί καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τοῖς μύθοις πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σῶματα ταῖς χερσίν, ὅπερ ἐν νῦν λέγοντι τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐκβλητέον. Ποίον δὴ; ἐφη. Ἐν τοῖς μεῖζοις, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, μύθοις οὑσάμεθα καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. ἰδιὰ γὰρ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τύπον εἶναι καὶ ταύτων δύνασθαι τοὺς τε μείζους καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. ὦν δὲ οἰεῖ; Ἐγὼγ', ἐφη ἀλλ' ὥσ τούτων ὑπαίτερων οὐκ ἐνιοῦν οὐδὲ τοὺς μεῖζους τίνας λέγεις. ὅδε Ἡσίοδος τε, εἶπον, καὶ Ὁμήρος ἤμιθν ἔλεγητο καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι
ποιητά. Ούτω γάρ ποιοι μύθων τοίς ἀνθρώποις 
ψευδεῖς συντιθέντες ἔλεγον τε καὶ λέγουσιν. Ποίους 
δή, ἢ δ' ὄσι, καὶ τί αὐτῶν μεμφόμενοι λέγεις; "Ὅπερ, 
ἡν δ' ἐγώ, χρῆ καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα μέμφεσθαι, 
ἀλλως τε καὶ εάν τις μὴ καλῶς ψευδηταί. Τί τούτο; Ἡ 
"Οταν εἰκάζῃ τις κακῶς τῷ λόγῳ περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ 
ήρων οἷοι εἰσίν, ὅπερ γραφεῖς μηδὲν ἐοικότα 
γράφων οἷς ἂν ὁμοία θυμίζῃ γράφαι. Καὶ γὰρ,

ὡς πλείον ἐφεδράναυτο θεῶν
ἀθεμόστα ἔργα,
κλέπτειν μοιχεῖν τε καὶ
ἀλλήλους ἀπατεῖν.

For the connection between the
Eleatic Xenophanes and Plato's
philosophy, see infra. Ch. XX.
Xenophanes acutely presents
the necessity, and, at the same
time, the absurdity of anthro-
morphism in religion thus—

'Αλλ' εἶτεν χείρας γ' εἶχον
βόες ἢ λέοντες
ἡ γράφαι χείρισει καὶ ἔργα
τελείων ἄπερ ἄνδρες
καὶ καὶ θεῶν ἰδέας ἐγραφὼν καὶ
ἀνάμετ' ἐποίουν
τοιαύτθ' οίον περ καύτω δέμες
εἴχον ὄμοιον,
Ὑποκέ μὲν Θ' Ὑποκεῖοι, βόες δε τέ
βουθαν ὁμοία
τί αὐτῶν μεμφόμενοι λέγεις.

The objection to Homer and to
poets in general, as it has been
noticed above, is that they are
imitators thrice removed from
realities, that, instead of studying
arts, they write about arts
of which they practically know
nothing, and that therefore
what they have to say upon
them is worth nothing. See
Book X. 598 E, extr. ἡ ἐπισκέψασθαι,
póteron μημηταῖς
tōtōs οὕτως ἐντυχόντες ἐξατα-
πημαι καὶ τά ἔργα αὐτῶν δρώντες
οὐκ ἀληθίνως τριτά ἀνέχοντα
tov δυντος καὶ ράδια ποιείν μη

εἰδώτι τ' ἂν ἄλληθειν. φαντάγματα
γάρ ἂλλ' οὐκ ὑπατα ποιοῦσιν.

μὴ καλῶς ψευδηται, 'if any
one of them write debased
fiction.' Ψευδός, fiction, is of
the highest value as a moral
instrument. Aristotle considers
poetry to be more philosophic
than history, because it deals in
fiction ὁαν γένοιτο in con-
trast to fact (οα ἐγένοτο). See
Poet. IX. 1451 b, quoted on p. 10.
This καλῶς ψευδός is opposed to
the ὄς ἀληθῶς ψευδός (infra.
382 A) or 'lie with intent to
deceive,' or 'lie in the soul';
the object of the καλῶς ψευδός
being not to deceive but to
instruct. Hence it is described
also as the 'lie in words' (τ' γε
ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μίμημα), and con-
trasted with the 'lie in the
soul' (ἡ ψυχή περι τα δυντα
ψεύδεσθαι), 382 B. Compare
also the Laws 663 E, where the
legislator, it is suggested, may
invent fictions, to point the
moral for the young. Νομοθέ-
tης δὲ οὖ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος,
eί καὶ μῇ τούτῳ ὧν οὕτως ἔχον,
εἶπεν τι καὶ ἄλλο ἑπόλμησεν ἄν
ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ ψεύδεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς
νέους, ἔστοι θ' τι τούτου ψευδός
αὐτοτέλεστερον ἀν ἐφεύσατο ποτε;
ὅπερ γραφεῖς μηδὲν, κ.τ.λ.

This simile, introduced here
merely as an illustration, is
worked out at length in Book X.
έφη, ὅρθως ἔχει τά γε τοιαύτα μέμφεσθαι. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγομεν καὶ ποία; Πρώτον μὲν, ήν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ μέγιστον καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψευδός ὁ εἰπὼν οὗ καλῶς ἐψεύσατο, ὡς Οὐρανός τε εἰργάσατο ἀφην δρᾶσαι αὐτῶν Ἡσίοδος, δὲ τε αὐ Κρόνος ὡς 378 ἑτυμωρήσατο αὐτῶν τα δὲ δὴ τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ νιέος, οὐδ' ἂν εἰ ἦν ἄληθή, ἠθικὸς δὲν ῥάδιος οὖτω λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἀφρονάς τε καὶ νέους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλιστα μὲν σιγάσθαι, εἰ δὲ ἀνώγηκη τις ἦν λέγειν, δ' ἀπορρήτων ἀκούειν ὡς ὀλγιστός, θυσα—

598 C, seqq. in order to prove the poet an imitator of an imitator. The painter, it is there maintained, is a deceived because he represents not the nature, but the appearance of objects, οἷον ὁ ζωγράφος, φαμέν, ως ωραφήσει ἡμῖν σκυτότων, τέκτων, τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργοὺς, περὶ οὐδενὸς τούτων ἐπαλών τῶν τεχνῶν, ἀλλ' ἄμα παῖδας τε καὶ ἀφρονάς ἀνθρώπους ἐξαπατᾷ ἂν. In that passage it is not false representation, as here, that is complained of; but representation, however accurate, of appearances, is disparaged: in the present passage, the painter is considered as drawing upon his imagination, not even upon appearances.

ὡς Οὐρανός τε εἰργ. Theogon. 154 and 179.

...τῶν μὲν (sockopt) δηκω τις πρώτα γένοιτο, πάντας ἀποκρύπτεσκε, καὶ εἰς φῶς οὐκ ἄνεςκε Γαῖς ἐν κευματί, κακῷ δ' ἐτέρπετο ἔργῳ

Οὐρανός.

τα δὲ δὴ τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργα. καὶ παθ. See Enthyrhr. 5 E, τοῦτον (sockopt, Δία) ὁμολογοῦσι τὸν αὐτοῦ πάτερα δήσαι, δι᾽ τούτων ἰσοῦς κατεπτινον οὐκ ἐν δικρά σέσιν γε αὖ τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα ἐκτεμεῖν δι᾽ ἔτερα τοιαύτα, καὶ συμμ. 904—

τώ ἄργα δήκας οἴσαις δ' Ζεὺς οὐκ ἀπόλλον τόν πατέρ' αὐτοῦ

δήσαι;

For the question of mythology see Intro. p. 24.

ἀφρονας καὶ νέους, as in the passage quoted from Book X. παῖδας τε καὶ ἀφρόνους ἀνθρώπους ἐξαπατᾷ ἂν.

μᾶλιστα μὲν σιγάσθαι, εἰ δὲ... 'to keep silence if possible, and failing that, &c.' For this expression see Book V. 461 C, μάλιστα μὲν μηδ' εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν κύμα, μηδ' γ' ἐν, ἔν γεγένηται, ἐν δὲ τί βιάσθηται, οἴων τιθέναι. 473 B, μᾶλιστα μὲν ἔνδει, εἰ δὲ μη, δυοῖν. Also Book VIII. 564 C, μᾶλιστα μὲν διε τε ηγεμόνων, ἐν δὲ ἐγείρθαινα, κ.τ.λ. Demosthenes de Cor. 317, μᾶλιστα μὲν μη ἔχειν ταῖς ἐν τῇ φωτεί, εἰ δ' ἄρ' ἀνάγκη, κ.τ.λ. Also in poetry, Soph. Antigone, 327—

'Αλλ' εὐφρεύηε μὲν μᾶλιστ'- εὰν δὲ τοι ἀνυφῆ τε καὶ ηγεμ., κ.τ.λ.

δι' ἀπορρήτων, cf. 460 C, ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἄδηλῳ κατακρύψουσι.
The comedy of the Clouds was first acted B.C. 423, and for the second time B.C. 421; hence it is probable, as stated in the Introd. p. 13, that this, among other passages in Plato's works, has direct reference to that comedy which traduces Socrates so cruelly.

ὡς θεοὶ θεοῖς τολ. Plato here is probably thinking of the disputes of the gods over the Trojan war. See Il. i. 531-568; iv. 422, seqq. and especially ν. 846, seqq. where Pallas with Diomed attacks Ares and drives him wounded to Olympus.

Λαέστο δὲ μάστιγα καὶ ἥνια Πάλλας Ἄθηνη.

Αὐτὴν ἐν Ἀρηὶ πρῶτῃ ἰχεὶ μάρωνχας ἰπποὺς.

πολλοῦ δεὶ. Like οὐδ' ὅτι, δῆλον ὅτι, πώς οἶχε, πώς δοκεῖς, and many others, this has passed into a merely adverbal expression.
θηδὼν τε καὶ ἡμῶν πρὸς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους αὐτῶν ἀλλ' εἰ πως μέλλομεν πείσειν, ὡς οὐδεὶς πώποτε πολίτης ἐτέρως ἐτέρῳ ἀπίστηκεν οὐδ' ἐστὶ Δτούτο δεινών, τοιαύτα μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰ παιδία εὐθύς καὶ γέρους καὶ γραυσί καὶ πρεσβύτεροι γυνομένους, καὶ ταῖς ποιητάς ἐγγὺς ταύτων ἀναγκαστέοι λαγε- ποιεῖν. "Ἡρας δὲ δεσμούς ὑπὸ νιέος καὶ Ἑραίστου πρύσεις ὑπὸ πατρὸς, μέλλοντας τῇ μητρὶ τυπτομένη

γέρους, sc. μυθολογητέον, to be supplied from the preceding sentence. For the whole of this passage see Euthyphro 6 B: Καὶ πόλεμον ἢγεῖ δὲ εἵνα τῷ ὧν εἶναι τῷ ὧν ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς πρὸς ἄλλη- λους, καὶ ἔχρος γε θεῖας καὶ μάχας καὶ ἡ ἡ τοιαύτα πολλά oia λέγεται τε ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγάθων γραφέως τὰ τῇ ἡ ἡ τοιαύτα καταπεποίκι-

ται.

"Ἡρας δεσμοὺς ὑπὸ νιέοις, κ.τ.λ. In ll. i. 588, Hephæstus recalls to his mother how he was thrown out of heaven by Zeus, when striving to help her, ἀλεξέμενε μεμάωται. And for the actual binding of Hera by Zeus, see ll. xv. 18—

"Ἡ οὐ μέμυ, ὅτε τ' ἐκρέμι οὐδεν, εἴ δὲ ποιοῖς

Ἀκμοίκαι ἡμα δύο, πρὶ πέραν 

deer αὐχάμο 

Χρώτεν, ἄθρη 

Ats ingeniously clears up the expression here, δεσμ. ὑπὸ νιέος: by pointing out that Hephæstus made the chains to confine Hera at Zeus' bidding, although willing himself to conolve at her escape.

"Ἡφαίστου βίφεις. II. i. 590—

"Ἡ Ἡθ γαρ μὲ καὶ ἔλλοιτ ἀλεξέ-

μενεὶ μεμαίω 

βίφε, ποδὸς τεταγών, ἀπὸ βηλοῦ 

θεστελοιον.

Compare Euthyphro 6 B.
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ β'.

ἀμύνειν, καὶ θεομαχίας ὅσας Ὀμήρος πεποίηκεν οὐ παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, οὔτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιη-
μέναις οὔτε ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν. ὁ γὰρ νέος οὐχ οἶδος τε
κρίνειν ὅ τι τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὁ μῆ, ἀλλ' ἃ ἄν τηλικοῦ-
τος ὁ λάβη ἐν τῷ ὅς δόξαις, δυσέκινητα τε καὶ ἀμε-
τάστατα φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι. ὃν δὴ ἱσως ἑνεκα περὶ
παντὸς ποιητέου, ἃ πρῶτα ἄκουον, ὃ τι κάλλιστα
μεμοθολογεμένα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἄκουειν.

ὑπονολαί, 'allegory.' This appears from Plutarch 2, 19 E:
ταῖς πάλαι μὲν ὑπονολαί, ἀλλη-
γορίας δὲ νῦν λεγομέναις; Stallb.
So Horace professes to regard
the Homeric poems in Ep. i.
2—

Qui (Homerus) quid sit pul-
chrum, quid turpe, quid
utile, quid non,
Planius ac melius Chrysippo
et Crantore dixit...
Rursus quid virtus et quid
sapientia possit
Utilè proposuit nobis exemplar
Ulisen.
δυσέκινητα, cf. Hor. Od. 3,
5, 28—

Neque amissos colores
Lana referit medicata fuco:
Nec vera virtus, quem semel
excidit,
Curat reponi deterioribus.
And a similar moral is expressed
by a different metaphor in Ep.
1, 2, 67—

Nunc adhibe puro
Pectore verba puer; nunc te
melioribus offer.
Quo semel est imbusta recens,
servabit odorem
Testa diu.
i.e. the young, as Plato demands
here, must be subject to good
influence from their first years.

In Book IV. 429 D this meta-
phor, as we have seen in other
cases, is expanded and detailed.
The legislator, it is there said,
must imbue the defenders of
the state with courage, as with
a dye that cannot be washed
out. Οὐκοςον ὅσα, ἥν δ' ἐγὼ,
ὅτι οἱ βαφεῖς, ἐπειδὲν βουληθῶσι
βάψαι ἡρὰ δοστ' ἐναὶ ἀλοφρά,
πρῶτον μὲν...Λευκόν, ἐπειτὰ προσ-
παρασκευάζουσιν οἶκ οἶκη
παρα-
σκευὴς ὑπερτερούσας, ὅπως ἅπεται
ὅτι μάλιστα τὸ ἄνθος, καὶ οὕτω
ὑπὲρ βάττουσι. Καὶ δ' μὲν ἄν
τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ βαφθῇ, δεσποτῶν
γίγνεται τὸ βαφθέν, καὶ ἡ πλάσις
οὕτ' ἄνευ ῥυματῶν οὔτε μετὰ
ῤυματῶν δίνεται αὐτῶν τὸ ἀνθὸς
ἀφαιρεῖται. ἄκο μὲν, ὅσθα
οἶα δὴ γίγνεται, ἐὰν τέ τις ἄλλα
χρώματα βάστη ἐδὲ τε καὶ ταὐτὰ
μὴ προσβεβεβοῦσα. Ὁδ' ἐπέ,
ὅτι ἐκπλετοὶ καὶ γελοῖοι.
Τοι-
οῦτον τοῖνυν, ἥν δ' ἐγὼ, ὑπόλαβε
κατὰ δύναμιν ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ἡμᾶς,
ὅτε ἐξελεγομέθα τοὺς στρατιώτας
καὶ ἑπαεδευόμενοι μωσυκὴ καὶ ἐγ-
μαστικὴ. Μηδὲν οὖν ἄλλο
μηχανάσθη τ' ὅτως ἡμῖν ὅτι
κάλλιστα τοὺς νῦνοις πεισθῆντες
δἐξιότῳ ὑσσερ βαφθῇ, ἵνα δεσ-
ποτοῖς αὐτῶν ἡ δύξα γίγνετο,
κ.τ.λ.
CAP. XVIII.

'Εχει γὰρ, ἐφη, λόγον. ἀλλ’ εἰ τις αὐ καὶ ταῦτα ἔρωτική ἤμας, ταῦτα ἀπ’ αὐτὰ καὶ τίνες οἱ μῦθοι, τίνας ἀν φαίμεν; καὶ ἐγώ εἴπον 'Ὤ 'Αδελμαντε, οὐκ 379 ἐσμὲν ποιητικά ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλ’ οἰκίσται πόλεως. οἰκισταὶ δὲ τοὺς μὲν τύπους προσήκει εἰδέναι, ἐν οἷς δὲι μυθολογεῖν τοὺς ποιητάς, παρ’ οὓς ἐὰν ποιῶσιν οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον, οὐ μὴν αὐτοῖς γε ποιητέον μῦθοις. Ὄρθως, ἐφη ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ δὴ τούτο, οἱ τύποι περὶ θεολογίας τίναι ἀν εἰεῖν; Τοιοὶδε ποὺ τίνες, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ ὀδος τυχανέει ὁ θεὸς ὃν, ἀεὶ δὴπο ἀποδοτέον, ἕαν τέ τις αὐτὸν ἐν ἐπεσε ποιῇ ἕαν τέ ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ. Δεὶ γὰρ. Οὐκούν ἀγαθὸς γε Ἡθεὸς τῷ ὑντὶ τε καὶ λεκτέον οὔτως; Τί μὴν; 'Αλλὰ

Ch. XVIII.—We are not poets ourselves, but legislators; we proceed therefore only to lay down the lines upon which the poets must compose.

Plato’s attitude towards poets in this Book is merely critical; he gives his opinion as to what they should say and what they should not say; and he disparages their general tone. But he reserves for Book X. his complete and most exhaustive indictment against them. He treats them here only as they stand in relation to theology, and as regards the effect of their writings upon the children in the State; v.s. note p. 121.

typos, cf. Book III. 403 D: καλὰ ήθη ψυχῆ ἐνοῦτα καὶ ἐν τῷ εἴδει δομολογοῦντα ἐκεῖνος, τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοντα τύπου. And again in Book VI. 491 D it is used as equivalent to τῷ καθ’ ἵλου, the general, as opposed to individual instances: κεί γὰρ τὸν τύπον δὲν λέγω...Δαμοῦ τοῖς ὠλον αὐτοῦ ὤρθος, κ.τ.λ. And similarly to this present use in Book III. 414 Α: ᾧ ἐν τῷ ποιῆ μὴ δὲκρίβειας.

οἱ τυπ. περὶ θεολογίας. For this question see Introd. pp. 13-15, 24-29. It has been already shown in Book I. Ch. IX. that good men do no harm (βλάπτειν) to any person, (see note p. 137, ἀλλ’ ἡ δικαιοσύνη): Οὐκ ἢρα τοῦ δικαίου βλάπτειν ἐγὼν ὀπτε φίλον ὀπτ’ ἄλλον διδένα. And hence it would follow à fortiori that God does not harm anyone. But Socrates reviews rapidly the steps of the argument which proved in Book I. that it was unnatural for anything good to do anything bad.
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ β'.

μην οὔδέν γε τῶν ἀγαθῶν βλαβερὸν.
μοι δοκεῖ. Ἄρ' οὖν' ὁ μὴ βλαβερὸν, βλαπτεῖν οὖν
damōs. 'Ο δὲ μη βλάπτει, κακὸν τι ποιεῖ; Οὔδε
tούτο. 'Ο δὲ γε μηδὲν κακὸν ποιεῖ, οὔδ' ἂν τινος εἰη
κακὸν αἰτιον; Πῶς γὰρ; Τι δέ; ὥφελιμον τὸ
ἀγαθὸν; Ναί. Αἰτιον ἄρα εὐπραγίας; Ναί. Οὐκ
ἄρα πάντων γε αἰτιον τὸ ἀγαθὸν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὖ
ἐχόντων αἰτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον. Παντελῶς
γ', ἐφη. Οὐδ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός,
πάντων ἂν εἰη αἰτιος, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' ὁλίγων
μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἰτίοις, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναῖτιοι:
πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τάγαθα τῶν κακῶν ἢμῖν καὶ
tῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὔδένα ἄλλον αἰτιατέον, τῶν δὲ
κακῶν ἄλλ' ἀττα δεὶ ξητεῖν τὰ αἰτία, ἄλλ' οὖ τὸν
θεόν. Ἀληθέστατα, ἐφη, δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν. Οὐκ

Αἰτιον ἄρα εὐπραγίας. See Hom. Od. xx. 532—
Οὐ τοι ἀθετᾷ ποιεῖν ἐκτάτο δεξίος
ὑρνυς.

τῶν μὲν εὖ ἐχ. Xenophon,
in the Memorabilia I, 3, 2, bears
witness to this belief of Socra-
tes: Καὶ εὐχετο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς
θεοὺς ἀπλῶς τάγαθα διδώναι, ὡς
τὸς θεοῦ κάλλιστ' εἴδεναι οὕτω
ἀγαθὸν ἐστι. For his belief in
God's direct care of man, see
Menl 1, 4, 10, seqq.

πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τάγαθα.
Perhaps the most pessimistic
statement that can be found in
the Republic. We find a trace
of the same feeling in Book IV.
442 A, where the lowest part
of man's nature is said to be
the most extensive and exact-
ting: τοῦ ἐπισυμποιοῦ, ὁ δὲ
πλείον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἐκάστῳ
ἔστι καὶ χρήματων φύσει ἀπλησ-
tυτατον. And see Book VI.
491 A and 495 B, where he
complains of the scarcity of
natures susceptible of higher
training. But these are isolated
passages; through the whole of
the Republic there breathes a
hopeful spirit, if not of con-
summation, at any rate of
amelioration; see Intro. p. 18
seqq., on the question whether
Plato thought such a state could
be realized, and his favourable
opinion of the common mass of
mankind, in Book VI. 499 Ε:
'Ω μακάριε, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, μὴ πᾶν
οὕτω τῶν πολλῶν κατηγορεῖ,
ἄλλοια τοι δεδομέν ἐξουσι, κ.τ.λ.
See also Ch. IX. note on ὅραν
ἀκούνειν.

τῶν δὲ κακῶν...οὐ τὸν θεόν,
Hesiod gives utterance to the
opposite opinion in 'Εργ. 47—
ἀλλ' Ζεὺς ἔκρυψε, χολωδό-
μενος φρεσιν ἦσιν,
ἔτην μὲν ἐξαπάτησε Προμηθεὺς
ἀγκυλομήτης.
τούνεκ' ἀρ' ἀνθρώποιοι ἐμη-
σατο κήθεα λυγρά.
For ἀλλ' οὐ, v.s. p. 173.

T 2
τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐπειδὴ κακῶν δὲ αἰτίων φάναι θεὸν τινι γύρευσθαι ἄγαθὸν θυτα, διαμαχέτεον παντὶ τρόπῳ μήτε τινὰ λέγειν ταύτα ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει, εἰ μέλλεις εὐνομήσεσθαι, μήτε τινὰ ἀκούειν, μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον, μήτε ἐν μέτρῳ μήτε ἄνευ μέτρου μυθο- λογοῦντα, ὡς οὔτε δόσια ἄν λεγόμενα, εἰ λέγοιτο, οὔτε ξύμφορα ἄδικον οὔτε σύμφωνα αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς. Σύμψηφος σοι εἰμί, ἐφη, τούτου τοῦ νόμου, καὶ μοι Ἀρέσκει. Οὔτος μὲν τοίνυν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, εἰς ἀν εἰς τῶν περὶ θεοὺς νόμων τε καὶ τύπων, ἐν δ' δεήσει τούς λέγοντας λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ποιοῦντας ποιεῖν, μὴ πάντων αἰτίων τὸν θεόν ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄγαθῶν. Καὶ Δμάλ', ἐφη, ἀπόχρη. Τί δὲ δή ὁ δεύτερος οἴδε; ἀρα γόνητα τὸν θεόν οἰεί εἰναι καὶ οἶον ἔξ ἐπίβουλης φαντάζεσθαι ἄλλοτε ἐν ἀλλαις ἰδέαις, τοτὲ μὲν αὐτὸν

διαμαχέτεον. See Book I. Ch. XV. where Thrasymachus is obliged to assest to Socrates' proof but 'struggles' against agreeing to the several steps of the Argument, Συμψηφος σοι εἰμί, ἐφη, τούτου τοῦ νόμου, καὶ μοι Ἀρέσκει. See also Book I. 335 E, μαχούμεθα, ἡρα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἢν τις φιλήσιν, θεοῦ τε καὶ τύπων, ἐν δ' δεήσει τούς λέγοντας λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ποιοῦντας ποιεῖν, μὴ πάντων αἰτίων τὸν θεόν ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄγαθῶν. Καὶ Δμάλ', ἐφη, ἀπόχρη. Τί δὲ δή ὁ δεύτερος οἴδε; ἀρα γόνητα τὸν θεόν οἰεί εἰναι καὶ οἶον ἔξ ἐπίβουλης φαντάζεσθαι ἄλλοτε ἐν ἀλλαις ἰδέαις, τοτὲ μὲν αὐτὸν

Σύμψηφος. See Ἀσχ. Ἀγ. 1353—καγώ τοιοῦτον γνῶματος κοινωνός δὲν νηφίζομαι τι δράν. ἐν δ' δεήσει, κ. τ. λ. See Book I. Ch. XV. where the ruler is proved to have regard only to the interest of the interest of the ruled in all his words and actions, καὶ πρὸς ἑκείνων βλέπουκαν καὶ τὸ ἑκείων ξυμφέρον καὶ πρέπον καὶ λέγει καὶ λέγει καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ ἀκαντα. γόνητα. In Book III. 413 A, men are said to lose their 'right opinions' not intentionally, but by force or 'bewitchment,' οὐ καὶ οὐ ἤγει, ἐφην ἐγώ, τῶν μὲν ἄγαθων ἀκουοίσι στέρεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους...κλαπεῖτε ἢ γοητευ-θέντες ἢ βιασθέντες; καὶ ἠφ. B, all things that deceive are said to bewitch, ἢσικε γὰρ γοητευεῖν πάντα δόσα ἄκατα. Σee below here also Ch. XX. ἕξαπα-τώντες καὶ γοητευόντες.
γιγνόμενον καὶ ἄλλαττον τὸ αὐτὸν εἴδος εἰς πολλὰς μορφὰς, τοτὲ δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀπατῶντα καὶ ποιοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ τοιαῦτα δοκεῖν, ἢ ἀπλοῦν τε εἶναι καὶ πάντων ἥκιστα τῆς ἐαυτοῦ ἰδέας ἐκβαίνειν; Ὄυκ ἔχω, ἔφη,

ἀπλοῦν τε εἶναι. In this assertion of the Unity and simplicity of God, we trace the effect of Eleatic philosophy as interpreted by Xenophanes (c. 650). This philosopher attacked Homer and Hesiod in much the same way as Plato does here. See Diog. Laert. ix. 18, Ἐγράφε δὲ καὶ ἔντοσι καὶ ἐλεγείας καὶ λάμβουσ κατ’ Ἡσιόδου καὶ Ὄμηρου, ἐπικότων αυτῶν τὰ περὶ θεῶν εἰρήμενα, for which see also Ch. XVII. note on Ἡσιόδος τε καὶ Ὅμ. His words regarding the Unity and nature of God are as follows,

Εἰς θεὸς ἐν τῇ θεωσί καὶ ἀνθρώπους μείγετος,
οὐ τί δέμας θυτησίν ὄμοιος οὐδὲ νόμη.

This passage supplies us with further evidence of the connection between Xenophanes and Plato mentioned on p. 3. Compare also Ar. Eth. 7, 14, 8, who is speaking of human fondness for change: he there explains it by the fact that human nature is not ἀπλῆ: but, he adds, God inasmuch as He is perfect is unchangeable, ὅπερ ἀν ὅ ὀθέν ἡδον τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπλῆν ἡμῶν εἰναι τὴν φύσιν... Διὸ δὲ θεὸς ἀν ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀπλῆν χαρῆ καὶ ήδονὴν. This Unity of the divine nature is again touched upon in Book X. 397 C, where Socrates is explaining his theory of Ideas or Original Essences (see Argument, p. 95). He there supposes that all things upon the earth of the same kind have a single original or prototype in heaven, made or emanating from God, and he implies that it is in accordance with God’s single nature that the prototype should be single, ὅ μὲν δὴ θεὸς, εἶτε οὐκ ἐβούλετο, εἰτε τις ἄναγκη ἐστὶν μὴ πλεον ἢ μιαν ἐν τῇ φύσει ἀπεργάσασθαι αὐτῶν κλησίν, οὕτως ἐποίησε μιαν µιαν αὐτήν ἐκεῖνην ὁ ἐστὶ κλησί. And ἰσφ. ταύτα δὲ εἰδός ὁ θεὸς (sc. that there must always be one simple original of any number of individual objects), βουλόμενος εἶναι ὑπάρχειν κλησίν ποιητῆς ὅτους οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ μὴ κλησίς τινός µηδὲ κλησίσοις τις, µιαν φύσει αὐτήν ἔφουσιν.

οὐκ ἔχω, ἔφη. This challenge on behalf of monotheism comes upon Adeimantus with a startling effect. To a Greek, who saw a divinity in every stream and grove, and even in every tree, the monothetic conception of God would be at once repugnant and hardly intelligible. Socrates’ belief, as far as we can formulate it, beside the limitations in the present book, included the doctrine of τὸ θεῖον, or the communication of God’s spirit to mankind. See notes, pp. 126, 150. Hence, although no polytheist, he believed in the present and pervading character of the Divine Nature throughout the universe. In advocating monotheism Plato follows strictly upon Xenophanes’ belief concerning God, εἰ δ’ ἐστὶν ὁ θεὸς ἀπάντων κράτιστων, ἕνα φησὶν αὐτῶν προσῆκεν εἶναι εἰ γὰρ δύο ἢ πλεοὶ εἶνεν, οὐκ ἄν ἐτι κράτιστον καὶ βέλτιστον αὐτῶν
νῦν γε οὕτως εἰπεῖν. Τί δὲ τὸδε; οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ τι ἐξιστατο τῆς αὐτοῦ ἰδέας, ἢ αὐτὸ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ Εὐμέθιστασθαι ἢ ὑπ’ ἄλλου; Ἀνάγκη. Οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ μὲν ἄλλου τὰ ἄριστα ἔχοντα ἥκιστα ἄλλοιοῦται τε καὶ κινεῖται; οἶνον σῶμα ὑπὸ σιτῶν τε καὶ πο. ὄν καὶ πόνων, καὶ πᾶν φυτὸν ὑπὸ εἰλήσεων τε καὶ ἀνέ-381 μον καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων; οὐ τὸ ὑγείστατον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον ἥκιστα ἄλλοιοῦται; Πῶς δ’ οὐ; Ψυχὴν δὲ οὐ τὴν ἀνδρειοτάτην καὶ φρονιμωτάτην ἥκιστ’ ἄν τι ἔξωθεν πάθος ταράξειε τε καὶ ἄλλοιο-σειεν; Να. Καὶ μὴν που καὶ τά γε ἐξώθητα πάντα σκεύη τε καὶ οἰκοδομήματα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τά ευ εἰργασμένα καὶ εὐ ἔχοντα ὑπὸ χρόνου τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων ἥκιστα ἄλλοιοῦται. „Εστι δὴ

Βταῦτα. Πάν δὴ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον ἢ φύσει ἢ τέχνῃ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ἐλαξίστην μεταβολὴν ὑπ’ ἄλλου ἐν-δέχεται. „Εοικεν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ θεὸς γε καὶ τα τοῦ θεοῦ πάντη ἄριστα ἔχει. Πῶς δ’ οὐ; Ταύτῃ μὲν δὴ ἥκιστα ἂν πολλὰς μορφὰς ἔσχοι ὁ θεὸς. „ Hepiστα δῆτα

CAP. XX.

Ἀλλ’ ἄρα αὐτὸς αὐτὸν μεταβάλλων ἂν καὶ ἄλλοιοῖ; Δῆλον, ἐφ’ ὅτι, εἴπερ ἄλλοιοῦται. Πότερον οὖν ἐπὶ

ἕναι πάντων. Arist. de Xen. Zen. et Gorg. 3. παθημάτων...πίθος, the objective use of these words is curious. As a rule the word πάσχω and its derivatives apply only to the subject, but here we have it, by the use of ὑπ’ constituted an agent.

ἐνδέχεται, ‘admits of.’ This word in Attic writers is generally neuter, and equivalent to ‘it is possible.’ See 501 C, Book VI. ἄνθρωπεια ἡθῆ, els δουν ἐνδέχεται, θεοφιλή ποιησιαν, but its use with accusative is not uncommon.

„ Ηκιστα δῆτα, v.s. not. p. 177.

CH. XX.—He cannot change for the better: he would not change for the worse.

ἀλλ’ ἄρα, ‘but some one will say that’ &c. For ἄρα and ἄρα
τὸ βέλτιόν τε καὶ κάλλιον μεταβάλλει ἐαυτὸν ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ αὐχίνον ἐαυτοῦ; Ἀνάγκη, ἐφη, ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, εἶπερ ἄλλουούται: οὐ γάρ ποιν ἐνδει γέσφωσομεν τὸν θεὸν κάλλους ἢ ἀρετῆς εἶναι. Ὅρθοτατα, ἥν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις· καὶ οὐτως ἔχοντο δοκεὶ ἃν τίς σοι, ὁ Ἀδείμαντε, ἕκων αὐτῶν χεῖρον ποιεῖν ὁπροῦν ἢ θεῶν ἢ ἀνθρώπων; Ἀδύνατον, ἐφη. Ἀδύνατον ἁρα, ἐφην, καὶ θεῶ ἐθέλειν αὐτῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ', ὡς ἐοικε, κάλλιστος καὶ ἀριστος ὁν εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἐκαστὸς αὐτῶν μένει αἰ ἁπλως ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ μορφῇ. Ἅπασα, ἐφη, ἀνάγκη ἐμουγε δοκεῖ. Μηδεῖς ἁρα, ἥν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ ἀριστε, λεγέτω ἡμῖν τῶν ποιητῶν, ὡς

θεοὶ ξείνωσιν ἑοικότες ἄλλοπαραγιν
παντοῖοι τελεθονες ἐπιστραφώσι πόλης

μηδὲ Πρωτέως καὶ Θέτιδος καταψυνέσθωθ μηδείς,
μηδ' ἐν τραγῳδίαις μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιημασιν

introducing another's words or opinions see above p. 225, and below here, ὡς ἁρα θεὸν των περιέχονται.

χεῖρων ἐαυτ. a mode of expression not at all unusual, see below Book VII. 526, σίμως εἰς γν τὸ δὲτεροι αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν γλυκοσθαί πάντες ἐπιδιδασιν. So the superlative is used: Χεν. Μεμ. I, 2, 46. Εἴδε σοι, ὁ Περίκλεες, τὸν συνεγενόμην, ὅτε δευτεροι σαντο ταῦτα ἁθα. χεῖρω ποιεῖν. This is in accordance with Xenophanes' teaching of the nature of the gods. See Arist. Rhet. ii. 23: Χενοφάνης ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὄμοις ἀσέβοισιν οἱ γενέσθαι φάσκοντες τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀποθανεῖν λέγουσιν ἀμφότεροι γὰρ συμβαίνει μη εἶναι τοὺς θεοὺς ποτε. And he also gives the reason for this belief among men—

ἀλλὰ βροτοι δοκεοῦσι θεοὺς
γεγενησθαι
tὸν σφετερὴν τ' ἄλοχῃν ἔχειν
φωνὴν τε δὲμας τε.

And the principle of the immutability of the divine nature is thus expressed by him: Τὸ δὲ τοιούτον ἄν ἐν, δι' ἄν τὸν θεὸν ἐλείναι λέγει, οὔτε κινεῖσθαι οὔτε κινητόν εἶναι. ...οὔτε γὰρ ἄν εἰς αὐτὸ ἐτεροι οὔτε ἕκειν εἰς ἄλλο ἔλθειν. — Arist. de Xenoph., ο. 3.

μένει δὲι ἁπλ. ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ μορφ. Fancibly expressed by Xenophanes thus: Ἄθιόν δ' ὑπά τ' ἄλλον καὶ ἐνα καὶ σφαιροειδή.

θεοὶ ξεινοσιν, κ. τ. λ. Οδυσ. xvii. 485.

Πρωτέως, see Euthyphro 15 D: οὐκ ἄφετον εἰ, δέσπερ ο Ἐυθυφρ. τριν ἀν εἰσή. Euthydemus 288 B: τὸν Πρωτέα
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εἰσαγέτω "Ἡραν ἠλλοιωμένην ὡς ἱέρειαν ἀγεί-

ρουσαν

Ίναχος Ἀργείου ποταμοῦ παισίν βιοδάρους·

Εκαὶ ἀλλὰ τοιαύτα πολλὰ μὴ ἦμιν ψευδεσθωσαν;

μηδ' αὖ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀναπειθόμεναι αἱ μητέρες τὰ

παιδία ἐκδειματούντων, λέγονσαι τοὺς μύθους κακῶς,

ὡς ἄρα θεοὶ τίνες περιέχονται νύκτωρ πολλοῖς ξένοις

καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἰνδυλλόμενοι, ἵνα μὴ ἄμα μὲν εἰς

θεοὺς βλασφημῶσιν, ἀμα δὲ τοὺς παιδὰς ἀπεργά-

ζωνταί δειλοτέρους. Μὴ γὰρ, ἐφῆ. Ἀλλ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀυτοί μὲν οἱ θεοὶ εἰσὶν οὐλοὶ μὴ μεταβάλλειν,

ἡμῖν δὲ ποιοῦσι δοκεῖν σφᾶς παντοδαποῖς φαίνεσθαι,

382 ἔξαπατῶντες καὶ γοητεύοντες; Ἱσως, ἐφῆ. Τί δὲ;

ὁ δ' ἐγώ. ψευδεσθαι θέος ζηθεῖ θεὸν ἰν ἡ λόγῳ ἡ ἐργῷ

φάντασμα προτείνων; Οὔκ οἶδα, ἦ δ' ὡς. Οὔκ οἶοθα,

ὡς ὃ ἐγὼ, ὅτι τὸ γε ὡς ἄληθῶς ψεῦδος, εἰ οἶνον τε

τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, πάντες θεοὶ τε καὶ ἀνθρωποὶ μισοῦσιν;

Πῶς, ἐφῆ, λέγεις; Οὔτως, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ὅτι τῷ κυριω-

τάτῳ που ἐαυτῶν ψευδεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὰ κυριώτατα

μμείσθον τὸν Ἀλγύπτιον σοφιστὴν
gοητεύοντες ἡμᾶς.

ὡς λεπ. ἄγελος. Ruhnken points
out that ἄγελω here is 'mending-
cando colligere' ; he supposes
the poet to be Sophocles, and
the verse to be taken from the
Inachus, a satyric play. Stallb.
thinks with Valcknaar that it
more likely belongs to Euriptides
or Ἑσίχυλος.

δειλοτέρους, sc. τοῦ δεόντος.
For an absolute comparative v.s.
μακροτέρα, Ch. XVI. and note.

ἳσως. This reply is not to
be wondered at, if we recollect
the character attributed to
Hermes; see the description
of Autolycus in Book I. Ch.
VIII. and note.

τὸ γε ὡς ἄληθῶς ψεῦδος, con-
trasted with the ψεῦδος τὸ ἐν
λόγοις; v.s. μὴ καλῶς ψευδηται,
Ch. XVII. and note. Aristotle
implies the existence of the
'good lie' in Eth. 4, 7, 6: καθ' αὐτὸν δὲ τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος
φαίλον καὶ ψεῦτον, i.e. there
are cases in which it may be
justifiable. And see also Book
V. of the Republic 459 D: πρὸς τὸ δὲ, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, συχνῷ τῷ
ψευδεὶ καὶ ἀπατῇ κινδυνεύει ἦμῖν
dεςεων χρῆσαι τοὺς ἀρχοντας
ἐπὶ ἄφελε τῶν ἀρχομένων.

τῷ κυριώτατῳ. See Ar. Eth.
9, 8, 6: χαρίζεται ἑαυτῷ τῷ

κυριώτατῳ. And in Book x. 7,
8, he speaks of νοῦς as τὸ θείον
and κύριον in man: Εἰ δὴ θείον
οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ἐθέλει, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα φοβεῖται ἐκεῖ αὐτὸ κεκτῆσθαι. Οὐδὲ νῦν πω, ἢ δ' ὡς, μανθάνω. Οἱ γὰρ τί με, ἐφη, σεμνὸν λέγειν ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω, ὅτι Β τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ψεύδεσθαι τὲ καὶ ψεύδεσθαι καὶ ἀμαθῆ εἶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔχειν τὲ καὶ κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος πάντες ἤκιστα ἄν δέξιαντο καὶ μισοῦσι μάλιστα αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ. Πολὺ γε, ἐφη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅρθοτατά γ' ἂν, δ' νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, τοῦτο ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος καλοῖτο, ἢ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἄγνοια ἢ τοῦ ἐφευσ-μένου. ἐπεὶ τὸ γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μίμημα τι τού ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐστὶ παθήματος καὶ ὑστεροῦ γεγονός εἰδωλον, οὐ πάνιν ἄκρατον ψεῦδος· ἢ οὐχ οὕτως; Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

CAP. XXI.

Τὸ μὲν δὴ τῷ ὄντι ψεῦδος οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων μισεῖται. Δοκεῖ μοι. Τί δὲ δή;

ὅ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τὸν θείον πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον...εἴ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὑγκῷ μικρὸν ἔστι δυνάμει καὶ τιμῶσι τολύ μᾶλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει. Δόξει καὶ δὲν καὶ έκαστὸς τοῦτο, εἰπερ τὸ κόριον καὶ άμεινον. ἦ τοι ἰδεῖ τιν τὴν κατὰ τὸν νόμον πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς πρῶτον, εἰς τὴν κατανόησιν καὶ τὴν ἀναγνώρισιν, ὅτι τὸ τιν οὕτως καὶ τοῦτο, εἰς τὸν τέλειον τῆς τοῦτος ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ τινος τελείου τοῦτος. τοιαύτα ἐν πάντωσιν μεταφραστὰν. ἑκατόν, τὸ πολλάκια πρὸς τοῖς θεοῖς, εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τὸν νόμον πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς πρῶτον, εἰς τὸν τέλειον τοῦτον καὶ τὸ τινος τελείου τοῦτον. τοιαύτα ἐν πάντωσιν μεταφραστὰν.
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tο ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος πότε καὶ τῷ χρῆσιμον, ὡστε μὴ ἄξιον εἶναι μίσους; ἀρ' οὗ πρὸς τε τοὺς πολεμίους, καὶ τῶν καλομένων φίλων οἵ ἄν διὰ μανίαν ἢ τινὰ δάνοιαν κακὸν τι ἐπιχειρῶσι πράττεν, τότε ἀποτροπὴς ἔνεκα ὡς φάρμακον χρῆσιμον γίγνεται; καὶ εἶν αἰς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν ταῖς μυθολογίαις διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι, ὅπερ τάληθ' ἔχει περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν, ἀφομοιοῦντες τῷ ἄληθεί το ψεῦδος ὑ τι μάλιστα οὕτω χρῆσιμον ποιοῦμεν; Καὶ μάλα, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὕτως ἔχει. Κατὰ τί δὴ οὕν τοῦτων τῷ θεῷ τῷ ψεῦδος χρῆσιμον; πότερον διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὰ παλαιὰ ἀφομοιῶν ἄν ψεῦδοιτο; Γελοιοῖον μὲντ' ἀν εἴη, ἐφη. Ποιητὴς μὲν ἄρα ψευδὴς ἐν θεῷ οὐκ ἕνι. Οὐ μον δοκεῖ. 'Ἀλλὰ δεδώκες τοὺς Ἐξήθρονας ψεῦδοιτο; Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. 'Ἀλλὰ δι' οἶκείων

πότε καὶ τῷ, see Argument p. 56. And compare Book III. 389 B where, in recapitulation of these remarks, it is stated that falsehood must, like strong medicine, be used sparingly, and only by experts; and that the truth must be jealously guarded: Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἄληθείαν γε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιητέων εἰ γὰρ ὰρθὰς ἐλέγομεν ἀρτί, καὶ τῷ ὅτι θεοί μὲν ἀξιωτὸν ψεῦδος, ἀνθρώποις δὲ χρῆσιμον ὡς ἐν φάρμακον εἶδει, ἡμῶν, δὴ γε τῷ τοῦτον ἱστοῖς διότεσι, ἰδιω- ταῖς δὲ οὕχ ἀπέτευ. Therefore the rulers may speak falsely in behalf of the city, but for a citizen to speak falsely to the rulers, is a worse fault than if a patient lied concerning his bodily condition to a doctor, or a sailor about the steering to his captain.

tῶν καλ. φίλων, sc. πρὸς τού- τους τῶν καλ. φιλ.; or the genitive may be merely described as partitive.

καὶ εἶν αἰς, κ.τ.λ. 'And in the case of those tales of myth- ology, which we were speaking of just now, because we cannot be sure of the exact truth in antiquity, we shall try to make fiction profitable by assimilating it as far as possible to truth,' i.e. 'In telling tales about gods and heroes (ψεῦδος) we shall not lose sight of the principles of rectitude (ἄληθεία). So in Book III. loc. cit. where Socrates is trying to find a means of preserving the right adjustment of classes in the state, he says: τίς ἄν οὖν ἡμῖν μηχανὴ γένοιτο τῶν ψευδῶν τῶν ἐν δεόντι γεγο- μένων;

Γελοίοιον μὲντ' ἀν. See Book III. 404 Ε: γελοίοιον γὰρ, ἢ δ' ὅς, τὸν γε φιλακα φιλακός δείσαν.

ποιητῆς μὲν ἄρα ψ. The speaker for the moment is regarding the divine nature as comprehending all others, the poet, philosopher, &c.
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ β'.

άνοιαν ἡ μανίαν; Ἀλλ' οὔδείς, ἐφι, τῶν ἀνοήτων καὶ
μαινομένων θεοφιλῆς. Οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν οὐ ἔνεκα ἄν
θεὸς ψευδότο. Οἶκ ἔστιν. Πάντη ἄρα ὑψευδές τὸ
δαμόνιόν τε καὶ τὸ θείον. Πανταπασὶ μὲν οὖν, ἐφι.
Κομιδῇ ἄρα ὁ θεὸς ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθὲς ἐν τε ἐργῷ,
καὶ οὔτε αὐτοὺς μεθίσταται οὔτε ἄλλους ἐξωπατᾶ, οὔτε
κατὰ λόγους οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπάς, οὔθ' ὑπάρ
οὔτ' ὄναρ. Οὕτως, ἐφι, ἔμουγε καὶ αὐτῷ φαίνεται 383
σοῦ λέγοντος. Συγχωρεῖς ἄρα, ἐφεν, τούτων δεύτερων
τύπων εἶναι, ἐν ὧν δὲι περὶ θεῶν καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν,
ὁς μήτε αὐτοὺς γόητας ὅντας τῷ μεταβάλλειν ἑαυτοὺς
μήτε ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς παράγειν ἐν λόγῳ ἢ ἐν ἐργῷ;
Συγχωρῶ. Πολλά ἄρα Ὀμήρου ἐπανούντες ἄλλα
tούτο οὐκ ἐπαινεσόμεθα, τήν τοῦ ἐνυπνίου πομπῆς

ἀλλ' οὔδεις, κ.τ.λ. Cf. the
proverb, 'Quem Deus vult per-
dere prius demeat.'

Κομιδῇ ἀπλ., ν. Β. Book I.
Ch. XXIII., κομιδῇ ὄντες ἄξι-
κοι.

οὔθ' ὑπάρ οὔτ' ὄναρ, 'a sign
either when we are awake or
when we are asleep.' In the
later Books of the Dialogue
these two words are again em-
ployed together in contrast, but
ὑπάρ there means 'a reality';
see Book IX. 576 B: 'Εστι δὲ
ποι(δό κάκιστος) οἶον ὑπάρ διήλ-
θομεν, ὡς ἐν ὑπάρ τοιώτον ἦ.
And in Book V. 476 C the two
are defined: ὁ ὑπάρ τοῦτον (sc.
τοῦ ὄναρ) ἀρά οὐ τόδε ἔστιν,
εὰν τε ἐν ὑπνῷ τις εάν τ' ἐγγραφός
τὸ δρομὸν τῷ μὴ ὑμοῖον ἀλλ' αὐτῷ
糇γίται εἶναι δ' ἔοικεν,
Τί δὲ ὁ τάναστία τούτων ἤγομενός τε τι
αὐτῷ καλῶν καὶ δυνάμενος καθόραν
καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα
ἤγομενος, ὑπάρ ἢ ὄναρ αὖ καὶ
ὀντὸς δοκεῖ σοι ζῇ;
Καὶ μᾶλα, ἐφι, ὑπαρ.
Β ὑπὸ Δίως τὸ Ἁγαμέμνονος ὦν Ἀισχύλου, ὅταν φη ἡ Θέτις τὸν Ἀττίλλον ἐν τοῖς αὐτῆς γάμοις ἔδωκα

ἐνδατείσθαι τὰς ἔδωκα εὑρίσκοντα,
νόσων τῷ ἀπείρως καὶ μακραῖνος βίους.
ξύμπαντά τ' εἰπὸν θεοφιλεῖς ἐμὰς τύχας
παῖδων ἐπευφήμησεν, εὐθύμων ἐμέ.
καγώ τὸ Φοῖβον θείου ἄνευδες στόμα
ἡπικοῦν εἶναι, μαντικὴ ἔρουν τέχνη.
ὁ δ', αὐτῶς ὑμνῶν, αὐτῶς ἐν θοινή παρών,
αὐτὸς τὰ, εἰπών, αὐτὸς ἔστιν ὁ κτανών
τὸν παιδὰ τὸν ἑμῶν.

ὅταν τις τοιαῦτα λέγῃ περὶ θεῶν, χαλεπανοῦμεν τε
καὶ χορὸν οὐ δώσομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς διδασκάλους ἐάσομεν
ἐπὶ παιδεία χρήσθαι τῶν νέων, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ
φύλακες θεοσέβεις τε καὶ θείοι γίγνεσθαι, καθ' ὅσον
ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ πλείστων οἴον τε. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη,
ἔγγυε τοὺς τύπους τούτους συγχωρῶ καὶ ὧς νόμοις
ἀν χρῆμην.

ii. 8: Βάσκ', θεί, οὐλε ὑνειρη. Εἰ ιν. 35—
δ' ἀρα φωνήσας ἀπεβησεν,
τὸν δ' ἔλειπ' αὐτοῦ
τὰ φρονέμουτ' ἀνα θυμον ἢ β' οὐ
τελέεσθαι ἔμελλον,
φη γὰρ δ' ἐγ' αἴρησεν Πριμόμου
πόλιν ἡματε κείνῃ,
νῆπιος, οὐδὲ τὰ ἡδη ἢ ρα Ζεὺς
μήδετε ἔργα.
ἐνδατείσθαι. Φτ. 266. ἐνδατ.
quod proprae significat dividere,
nunc per partes celebrare, quo
sensu item positum videtur apud
Sophoclem, O. T. 205—
βέλεα θέλοις ἀν αὔματ' ἐνδα-
τείσθαι.—Stallb.
ἔδος ... ἔμας. The passage
passes from an indirect to a
direct quotation. We should
have expected αὕτης instead of
ἐάς, but ἐάς is probably metri
gratia to preserve the run of the
line.

χορὸν οὐ δώσομεν. A poet
who desired to exhibit a play,
applied to the Ἀρχων βασιλεῖς
if the play were to be repre-
sented at the Lenaea in the
month Gamelion, or to the
Ἀρχων, if at the Πεννυσία ἐν
ἄστει in Elaphebolion. If the
play were approved, a chorus
and actors were assigned to the
poet; whom he trained and
supervised for the performance.

εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν, ἢ ἐὰν we
intend that our protectors,’ &c.
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