A COLLECTION
Of Several
Philosophical Writings
OF
DR. HENRY MORE
Fellow of Christ’s Colledge in Cambridge.
As Namely,
Antidote against Atheism.
Appendix to the Said Antidote.
Enthusiasmus Triumphatus.
Letters to Des-Cartes, &c.
Immortality of the Soul.
Conjectura Cabbalistica.
The second Edition more correct and much enlarged.

Ariftot. Ethic. lib. 10.
Ει δη συνε εμπροσθεν, καὶ τοῦτον μετέχον τον ἀνθρώπον λίγον ἐκεῖνον ἢ τὸν ἄλλον μετέχον ἄλλον, καὶ τὸν ἄλλον μετέχον ἄλλον τότε τοῦτον μετέχον ἄλλον τότε τοῦτον μετέχον ἄλλον τότε τοῦτον μετέχον ἄλλον τότε τοῦτον μετέχον ἄλλον τότε τοῦτον μετέχον ἄλλον τότε τοῦτον μετέχον ἄλλον.

And again ch. 8. and 7.
Ἡ τελεία καθαρσία ἐν διαφόροις οἷς εὐφυηγεῖ, καὶ ὁ δὴ τοῦτον ἄλλον τὸν ἀνθρώπον, ὁς τοῦτον μᾶλλον καθιστᾷ μετέχον ἄλλον, όσον καὶ ἀνθρώπον ἄλλον, ὁς τοῦτον μᾶλλον καθιστᾷ ἄλλον, ὁς τοῦτον μᾶλλον καθιστᾷ ἄλλον.

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THE

PREFACE GENERAL.

1. The Author's Excuse for such Alterations as he has made in this Edition of his Books. 2. The general Scope of this whole Volume. 3. The excellency and necessity of Reason for the maintaining of the truth of Christian Religion. 4. His Apology for interweaving Platonism and Cartesianism so frequently into his Writings. 5. Certain Advertisements for the more profitably perusing his Books. 6. Divine Sagacity a Principle antecedaneous to successful Reason in Contemplations of the highest concernment. 7. The above-aid Principle further illustrated and confirmed out of Aristotle. 8. The Author's Excuse for his omitting in his Antidote, to confute the unceasing reasons some use for the proof of a God. 9. His Excuse for not adding a Treatise of Superstition to that of Enthusiasm. 10. That it can be no offence to the knowing and ingenious, that men have a flyness and jealousy against such Truths as they have not been acquainted with. 11. Certain remarkable things concerning Des-Cartes and his Writings. 12. Certain considerations lay'd together which wholly prevent all imaginable Objections against the Extension of a Spirit. 13. The properties and Offices of the Spirit of Nature further cleared and confirmed. A Conjectary concerning the Conduct of Souls by the Spirit of Nature. 14. That the ancient Judaical Cabala did consist of what we now call Platonism and Cartesianism, made farther probable from the Lineage of the Pythagorick School. 15. Particular considerations out of Pherecydes, Parmenides and Aristotle, that might move one to believe that the whole Pythagorick Philosophy, as well Physical as Metaphysical, was the ancient Wisedome of the Jews. 16. The unhappy disjunction of the Physical part of the Cabala from the Metaphysical in Leucipus, Democritus and Epicurus; with the Authors serious endeavour of re-uniting them again. 17. That what he applies to the Text of Moses in his Philopohick Cabala, he conceives is rational, and is assured that it exquisitely fits the Text, but deliberates further concerning the Truth thereof. 18. The Testimony of several holy Persons that did either plainly assert, or at least had no dislike of, the doctrine of the Souls Praeexistence; Clem. Alexand. Origenes Adamantius Clemens his Scholar, S. Basil and Gregorie Nazianzen, Syenesius Bp of Cyrene, Arnobius, Prudentius, S. Augustine, the Author of the Book of Wisdome, & our blessed Saviour. 19. That there is not the least clashing of Praeexistence with the Derivation of Original sin from Adam. 20. That Mathematical certitude in mere Philosophical Speculations need obliges no mans conscience to make profession of them.
them against the good liking of his Superiors. 21. That if the Philosophy which he has applied to Moses his Text be true, it is a real Restoration of the Mozaick Cabbala.

Reader,

Hat these Writings which thou findest bound up in one volume may appear also to be held together in some common consideration, I thought it not amiss to speak something by way of General Preface to them all. And therefore if thy curiosity be forward to enquire what I have done in these new Editions of my Book, I am ready to inform thee, that I have taken the same liberty in this Intellectual or Theoretical Garden of my own planting that men usually take in their Natural ones: which is, To let, or pluck up, to transplant and inoculate, where and what they please. And therefore if I have raised out some things, (which yet are but very few) and transposed others, and intertangled others, I hope I shall seem injurious to none in ordering and cultivating this Philosophical Plantation of mine according to mine own humour and liking.

2. But these are smaller matters, and scarce any part of what I was going to speak. The great Cement that holds these several Discourses together is one main Design, which they jointly drive at, and which, I think, is confessedly generous and important, namely, The knowledge of God, and therein of true Happines, so far as Reason can cut her way through those darknesse and difficulties he is incumbered with in this life. Which though they be many and great, yet I should believe the sense of my own success if I should pronounce them imponderable; as also, if I were deprived of that sense, should lose many pleasures and enjoyments of mind which I am now conscious to myself of. Amongst which there is none so considerable as that tacit reflexion within my self, what real service may redound to Religion from these my labours. For what greater satisfaction can there be to a rational Spirit than to find himself able to appeal to the strictest Rules of Reason and Philosophy, if these Doctrines of the Existence of God and the Immortality of the Soul be not true? And what greater Establishment to Religion then to discover these two grand Pillars thereof so firm and stable, even upon those very grounds that our own faculties do naturally attent to as true? Which cannot but conciliate much honour and reverence to the Priesthood, and stop the mouths of shallow and profane Wits, that are so prone to look upon every Priest as either a Fool or an Impostour.

3. Nor would I be thought to restrain the Reasonableness of our Religion to these two main points only, as if the rest were not so too. For I conceive Christian Religion rational throughout, and I think I have proved it to be so in my Mystery of Godliness. Which I must confess was the main, if not the only, Scope of my longest and anxious Search into Reason and Philosophy, and without which I had proved but a lazy and remiss enquirer into the nature of things. For to heap up a deal of Reading and Notions and Experiments without some such noble and important Design, had but been, as I phanfed, to make my Mind or Memory a shop of small-wares. But having this so eminent a Scope in my view, and taking up that generous resolution of Marcus
Marcus Cicero, Rationem, quod ea me cunque ducet, sequar; I make account I began then to adorn my Function, and amongst other Priestly Habiliments, in particular to put on the Ἁρονορ or Rationale, the Sacerdotal Breast-plate, which most justly challenges place in that region which is the seat of the Heart; the simplicity and sincerity of that part being the root or well-spring of the foundest and purest Reason. And truly I cannot well imagine what may be the moral account why Aaron’s Robes should be such an express Representation of the Universe (ἅπανως ὁ μεγαλόν τῆς τορπος, as Philo calls it) as in that every Priest should endeavour, according to his opportunity and capacity, to be also as much as he can a Rational man or Philosopher. (For which reason certain Universities were first erected, and are still continued to this very day.) And Philo himself intimates something to this purpose, Βίος εἰς ἅρματα εἰκών τῆς παθῶς ἐκφερά, ημι ἐκ τοιχωμάτων ἡ Εκκλησία παρέχη τότε Βιον ἐκ οὗλον φύσις. That the High Priest continually reflecting upon his attire, which represented the Universe, might be re-minded not to do or speak any thing contrary to the laws thereof, or repugnant to the Rules of eternal Reason, which is that everlast ing High Priest, as Philo elsewhere intimates, Δύο θυσίων τοιανα, ιησοῦ Θεόν ἐν κόσμῳ θεῷ, οὐ μὴν ἀρχιερεῖ τι ἀρχιπρεσβύτης εὐρισκόμεν πρὸς οὐκ εἰκόνα, ὀς δὲ Θεός. Λόγος· τὸ ἐν τῷ θεῷ πάντα, τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τὸν θεόν αἰώνιαν ἀνατιθημένως. That there are two Temples of God: the one the Universe, in which the First-Born of God, the Divine Logos, or eternal Wisedome, is High Priest; the other the Rational Soul, whose Priest is the true man, that is to say the Intellect, (as Plotinus somewhere speaks) and which is the Image of the Divine Logos, as Clements has expressed himself. Εἰκὼν ἅρματος τοῦ θεοῦ. Λόγος. καὶ βαπτίσιμος, ἀναγνώσθη, εἰκὼν δὲ εἰκόνα, ἀναγνώρισθη, ὧν. The Image of God is the Royal and Divine Logos, the impassible Man; but the Image of this Image is the humane Intellect.

So that though the Divine Reason or Logos be that eternal High Priest which in time was to be incarnate, and of which Aaron in his Priestly Robes was but a Type and Figure, yet Man being an Image of him, and every Priest in a more special manner, he is to endeavour the adorning of himself with such accomplishments as are set out by these rich and precious Habiliments of Aaron; amongst which the Rationale had a chief place. For though it belong to that everlast ing Logos alone to be the Maker of the world, and to fill out all parts thereof by his presence, and to be in a manner vitally clad therewith; yet through the Goodness of God it may fall to the share of every Christian Priest, to be invested as it were and adorned with the Knowledge of the Laws and Measures of the Creation, and to take notice of the Reasons of Nature of which the eternal Logos is the Maker and Governor. Which is very consonant to what Philo writes of the Figure of the Rationale or Sacerdotal Breast-plate, which he saith was square, οὖν μὴν ἐξ ῥεχομένης λογος ἑτερος τῆς ἀναπτυξι σβεσθέντας πάντως, ἀπὸ τοῦ ζευγαρίων. Because the reason of Universal Nature and of Man ought to stand firm on all sides, and to be no where vacillant. Which things as they were figured in Aaron, and are fulfilled immensely in Christ, so are they also in their measure to be fulfilled in the Christian Priesthood. For if it were not lawful to offer up the blind or lame under the Law, sure the Priest ought...
to be neither under the Gospel, nor yet the People (so far as is possible) whom he presents to God.

To take away Reason therefore, under what Fanatrick pretends forever, is to disrobe the Priest and despoil him of his Breast-plate, and, which is worst of all, to rob Christianity of that special Prerogative it has above all other Religions in the World, namely, That it dares appeal unto Reason. Which as many as understand the true Interest of our Religion will not fail to stick closely to, the contrary betraying it to the unjust Suspicion of Falshood, and equalizing it to every vain Imputation. For take away Reason, and all Religions are alike true; as the Light being removed, all things are of one colour. Nay, which is worst of all, that Religion which is the truest will seem the falsest in this superinduced Darkness, it so strictly and positively declaring it self to be the only true. Which will not by any means be allowed, nor can any way be discovered in that Region of Midnight, which makes all things look alike.

4. Which serious and weighty considerations lying before me, urged me with all possible care and vigour to search to the very bottom of things, that my heart might not fail me in the day of Tryall. The result of which Investigation is much of it comprized in this present Volume. Wherein as I have gained no small satisfaction to my self in those grand points I have endeavoured to clear, so I am as desirous that nothing that occurs there may occasion the least dissatisfaction to others. And I think it will be impossible any should, if they will be but pleased to take notice of my Design, which is not to Theologize in Philosophy, but to draw an Exoterick Fence or exterior Fortification about Theologie; That making good those Out-works against all the assaults of the confident Atheist, and his Gigantick batteries raised against the belief of the Existence of a God, and of a Reward in the World to come, I might teach him what a man of Vanity and temerity he is, in that he imagines it so feasible a thing, in his unskilful thoughts, to overrun the Holy City and Sanctuary, be being so easily beat off from the walls thereof. And this is the true and genuine meaning of my interweaving of Platonism and Cartesianism so frequently as I do into these writings, I making use of these Hypotheses as invincible Bulwarks against the most cunning and most mischievous efforts of Atheism. For I am certain that, taking the Suppositions which I have called out of these two Philosophies for true, (and let our Adversaries prove them false if they can) there is not any Objection that Atheism can make against the above-named Doctrines, but I can return to it a full and irresistible Answer.

Whence it is not hopeless, but that as we may put many to flight, so the rest may voluntarily surrender themselves as Prisoners, being carried captive by the power of Reason into a true belief of things for the main; and having all hopes of an After-Impunity intercepted by so clear a conviction of the Soul's Immortality, be engaged to turn real Christians in the plainer points thereof, and be willingly detained in the Outward Court, though by reason of the present Weakness of their sight they may not be as yet fit to enter into the more sacred Smoke of the Temple. Wherefore I being so faithfully, and, as I conceive, so usefully taken up in managing these Out-works, as I may so call them, I shall not impute it, no not so much as to over-hasty zeal, but
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but to mere mishap, if I be pelted behind my back by any shots of Obloquie from any unknown servant of the Sanctuary; and presume that if I receive any hurt, that their smart will be the greatest that did it, when they shall consider they have wounded a true and faithful friend, and even then when he was so busily and watchfully employ'd in facing the common Enemy.

5. If any expect or desire any general Instruction or Preparation for the more profitably perusing of thele my Writings, I must profess that I can give none that is peculiar to them, but what will fit all Writings that are writ with Freedom and Reason. And this one Royal Rule I would recommend for all, Not to judge of the truth of any Proposition till we have a settled and determinate apprehension of the terms thereof. Which Law though it be so necessary and indispensible, yet there is none so frequently broken as it: the effect whereof is those many heaps of voluminous writings and inapt Oppositions and Controversies that fill the World, Which were impossible to be, if men had not got an habit of flattering mere words against one another, without taking notice of any determinate sense; and so did fight as it were with so many Hercules clubs made of Phal bore, which causes a great sound, but does no execution towards the ending of disputes. For as no man will ever be so extravagant as to affirm that a Triangle is a Quadrangle, or a Square a Circle, having the distinct Ideas of those Figures in his mind: so it would be as impossible for him to pronounce of any thing else fallly and absurdly, if he had as perfect and settled a notion of the things concerning which he seems to pronounce. But this first and main Principle of wisdom being neglected, it is no wonder that men clash as ridiculously and causelessly as those two Country Clowns, who in their cups had like to have gone to blows, because the one professed himself a Lutheran, the other a Martinist.

I might add also another Advertisement (which will contribute much towards a greater Compendiousness in Controversies) which I think I have hinted upon occasion elsewhere; namely, That what will prove anything will prove nothing. Which if it were thoroughly taken notice of, would not only enable a man to defeat the seeming force of innumerable impertinent assaults; but also keep himself off, if he have any ingenuity in him, from assaulting, or rather disturbing or interrupting, the compofure and silence of another man's mind, by the empty noise of such weak and groundless Arguments; I mean such as will infer or maintain Falshood as well as Truth. For all such Arguments ought to be exploded, especially in Philosophy. And I think if this kind of weapon were once out of fashion, content would soon be at an end, and such a victory follow as all would be gainers by it.

6. But in the third and least place (and which, though it has some considerable influence every where, yet is more peculiarly requisite in perusing writings upon such Subjects as these I treat of) I should commend to them that would successfully philosophize, the belief and endeavour after a certain Principle more noble and inward then Reason itself, and without which Reason will faulter, or at least reach not to mean and frivolous things. I have a sense of something in me while I thus speak, which I must confess is of so strict a nature that I want a name for it, unless I should adventure to term it Divine Sagacity, which is the first Rule of Successful Reason, especially...
ally in matters of great comprehension and moment, and without which a man is as it were in a thick wood, and may make infinite promising attempts, but can find no outlet into the open Champain, where one may freely look about him every way (the θείον και ἄνθρωπον) without the safe conduct of this good Genius.

All Pretenders to Philosophy will indeed be ready to magnifie Reason to the skies, to make it the light of Heaven and the very Oracle of God: but they do not consider that the Oracle of God is not to be heard but in his Holy Temple, that is to say, in a good and holy man, strongly sanctified in Spirit, Soul and Body. For there is a sanctity even of Body and Complexion, which the sensuously-minded do not so much as dream of. Aaron's Rationale, his Λόγος or Oracle of Reason, did it not include in it the Urim and Thummim, Purity and Integrity of the Will and Affections, as well as the Light of the Understanding? Was not that Breast-plate square, not only in reference to the firmness of Ratiocination, as Philo intimates, but also to denote the Evenness and Uprightness of his Spirit that will take upon him to pronounce great Truths, that he must be, as Aristotle somewhere speaks, αὐτὸ ψυχή ἡ γνώσης, and ζῷον* and that not only according to the measure of the City, but of the Sanctuary, not only to a Political degree of virtue, but Cathartical, or rather that which * Plotinus places ὡς ἡ μακάρια ἐν εἰσαγωγῇ, and implies a Soul already purged?

Let a man adorn himself as well as he can with the History of Universal Nature represented by the long Sacerdotal Robe, if this Breast-plate with the Urim and Thummim be wanting to him that thus far would all the Priest, he must of necessity fall so far short of approving himself a sound Philosopher, being at least unable to utter any Oracles himself, and but in a bad capacity of receiving them when they are uttered by another. For if this Divine Sagacity be wanting, by reason of the impurity of a man's Spirit, he can neither hit upon a right sense of things himself, nor easily take it, or rightly pursue it, when he is put upon it by another. Which odd Position of mine though it may make them fret and storm that have made the Contempt of Morality one part of their Philosophy, and may think themselves unwisely dealt with to be pronounced incompetent Judges of such things as they took for granted to be within their own sphere; yet I could not conceal so concerning a Truth, essentially is self being not at all unphilosophical.

7. For is it not the laying of that so universally-appuended Aristotle, 

Κύριος γὰρ παλιά ἐν ημῖν Ὀμον. λόγῳ. αὐτοί θέλον. 

What Plato, say what Chrysostome, what Augustine could have spoke more Heavenly language? Scaliger transported at the view of this Text breaks out into this Encomiastock Interrogation, Quid ais, divine vir? Estne in nobis aliquld divinum quod fit praetantis ipsa ratione? An tibi quoe noti fuerunt ipfi radii Spiritus Sancti? &c. And that we may not think that this το εἰ μήν Ὀμον is any part of our selves, it appears both from what goes before and what follows after that it is the very Deity: For he having made this the Question, τίνη προέρχεται ὧν ἐν τῇ ὑμῖν; What is the Beginning of motion in the Soul? He full Answer follows thus, Ὀμον ὁ πάτερ ἐν τῇ ὑμίν Ὀμον. τί πατεράκτων. κυρία ὡς τοι πατερα. το μήν Ὀμον. 

λόγῳ. αὐτοί θέλον. αὐτοί θέλον. πατεράκτων. τίνη προέρχεται ὧν ὡς τοι πατεράκτων. πατεράκτων.
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It is evident, faith he, that it is, as in the Universe, God himself, and all in him. For it is a certain Numen in us that moves all things in some sort or other: And the Beginning of Reason is not Reason, but something which is better: but what can be better than Science but God? The Argument of the chapter is a Question, whether, of good successes in affairs, whether it be now, in the first, and that is to say, whether it be by Nature, Reason, or by the Procuration of some good Genius, of some sober, sober, they are Aristotle's own words, which I cite the rather, because it is the only place that I know wherein there is such express mention of Demons: Which yet he does not assert here neither; but upon occasion of this subject his mind swelling higher, rose at last to such a pitch as to utter this so much admired Aphorism by Jul. Scaliger, namely, That there is something before and better than Reason, whence Reason itself has its rise.

Which though Aristotle mainly appropriate to external Affairs, I must (and may with equal right) transfer also to the Negotiations of the Mind and the success of pure Speculation: Where the άναλογία, as he calls it, is more likely to be continued, and to prove constant, (by reason of the natural cohesion of Truth within an impolluted Soul) then it is in external transactions. This intellectual success therefore is from the Presence of God, who does (υφέν πας πάντα) move all things in some sort or other, but residing in the undefted Spirit moves it in the most excellent manner, and enucleates it with that Divine Sagacity I spoke of, which is a more inward, more profound, and more comprehensive Presentation of Truth, ever antecedentaneous to that Reason which in Theories of greatest importance approves itself afterwards, upon the exactest examination, to be most solid and perfect in every way, and is truly that wisestone which is peculiarly styled the Gift of God, and hardly compeitable to any but to persons of a pure and unpolluted mind. Of so great concernment is it sincerely to endeavour to be holy and good.

8. This is all that I thought fit to preface in a more general way. I will briefly cast an eye also upon the several parts of this present Volume, if any thing haply occurs that will be requisite for me to either excuse, complete, or any way give light to. As it may be some may conceive it an Omission in my Antidote, in that I have not brought in and confused the lubricous or unreflective Arguments which some use to prove the Existence of a Deity. But I think it may not unbecome one that is faithful to the Cause, not to be over-indulgent in discovering the weakes of such Arguments as are meant for the engendering in mens minds the belief of that Truth which is of so necessary and vast importance for mankind to be persuaded of. For I charitably surmise that the first inventors of these reasons thought them conclusive, or else they would not have made use of them. Whence it will follow, that they may still have their force with those that are but of the same pitch with their first Proposers. And he that guesseth right and goes on his journey will as certainly come to the place he aimes at, as he that perfectly knows the way. I must confess I have been more free in my censure of Des-Cartes his second and third Argument: but there is the less hurt done, they being not so popular, and besides, it was fit to shew my impartialness, because I have with
with that confidence avouchd the solidity of the first. Which the more I considered the more firm I found, nor have to this day met with either man or book that could produce any thing material towards the Confutation of it.

9. What Defect any one may spy in my Treatise of Enthusiasm I cannot so easily prejuge, nor can secure my self from seeming deficient to him that more reftentingly considers the usefulness of that Treatise, in that I have not added another of Superflition. But I have naturally and heedlessly hit upon that judicious advice of the Poet,

Et qua reliquias ineditas poeta relinque.

For I must confess I do not look upon that Subject as any thing politicisable by my hand, it being an argument fitter for Rhetorick then Philosophy. Besides that I never found my mind low or abject enough to sink into any sense or conceit of that Dispensation, experimentally to find what is at the bottom thereof. I must ingenuously confess that I have a natural touch of Enthusiasm in my Complexion, but such as, I think God, was ever governable enough, and I have found at length perfectly subduable. In virture of which victory I know better what is in Enthusiasts than they themselves, and therefore was able to write what I have wrote with life and judgement, and had, I hope, contribute not a little to the peace and quiet of this Kingdome thereby.

But having had such a notion of God from my very youth, as represented him to me as the most noble and excellent Being that can be, it could never enter into my minde that he was either irritable or propissible by the omitting or performing of any mean and insignificant services, such as are neither persetive of humane nature, nor the genuine result of that perfeftion. And therefore I had an early belief that he served God best, that was least envious, worldly or sensual, that delighted most in the common good of the Universe, and had the strongest faith in the bounty and Mercy of God, of which his Son Jesus is the most palpable pledge that he could exhibit to the World. Which constant frame of Spirit made me wholly incapable of the least Tincture of Superflition. For it is the Ignorance of better things that calues those perplexities and conftrurations of minde about matters of least moment.

The End of Religion is humane Happiness and Perfection; and he that serves God as pleasing Him to want any thing of his, instead of honouring him reproaches him, Wherefore Superflition is always accompanied with Ignorance or Hypocrisie. The first, when not knowing what that good and acceptable will of God is, which is to become like unto him (Titus ii. 11) or of a divine original or mode, as Pythagoras taught) they do express their zeal and devotion in such things as neither themselves nor any one else is better for. The second, when the same Trifles are offered up to God, not so much out of ignorance of what is better, as out of a kind of tacit fraud and cunning circumvention, as it were, of God, in making with him, or rather whether be will or no, such an unequal exchange, by which Delusions though they may for a while in some sort pacifie their false hearts and consciences, yet in the mean time they really do but provoke God by these sacrifices of Fools.

This is the summe of what I am able to conceive of this other Disease of Superflition,
Superflition, which is by more collection of Reason, having had no experience therein for the quickening my style or enlarging my thoughts thereupon. But I think I may safely affirm as I have elsewhere, That it is Superflition (if it be not Vain-glory, Interest, or something worse) where men have an over-proportioned zeal for or against such things in Religion as God puts little or no price upon either their performance or omission. Which thing if it were seriously and conscientiously considered, would tend very much to the laying or preventing the usual blusters of Christendome. And there can be no better effect of writing a whole Volume. But I must confess that the success and growth of the Church is an Arcanum that lies more deep in Providence, and rather is a Mystery of life then of external Reason.

Paul may plant and Apollos may water, but God gives the increase.

10. As for the Letters that follow in the next place, themselves speak the occasion of them. I have superadded that to V.C as for other reasons, so chiefly for the begetting a better opinion in such as are not so well acquainted with Des-Cartes and his Writings. For it cannot be but that men of very excellent spirits may labour with prejudice against so worthy an Author by misrepresentation of things. And I must confess that the very venality alone is occasion enough, even to those that are truly ingenuous, to make a band, that which is strange having something of the face of what is hostile. Whence Hoftis and Peregrinus had once the same signification, as Cicero observes. And it is a piece of Rudeness and thoughtlessness in the nature of things and in the perfection of Divine Providence, (who has generally implanted a tenacious abdetion to what has accustomedly been received, that the mind of man might be the safer Receptacle when it lights upon what is best) to conceal that because a Truth is demonstratively evident in it itself, that therefore its Opposite shall immediately surrender the Castle. Which consideration with the ingenuous cannot but secure the continuance of unfeigned civility and respect even to the jealous Suspects or Opposers of new Truths, and make them look upon it as a piece of surprizing Ignorance or Inhumanity to be otherwise affected towards them.

11. What particularly to take notice of in that Letter occurs not to my mind, unless I should applaud the tricksness of my Conjecture concerning Des-Cartes his disorting the true and natural Idea of motion in reference to Galilaeus’s ill hap, who was so rudely handled for his Hypothesis of the Motion of the Earth by a Council of Cardinals. To which that he had an eye is now very evident from several of his * Letters to Marfennius, of which passages I had no knowledge till within these few days, and my Letter it self was writ before this second volume of Des-Cartes his came out. But in the meantime I cannot but observe the inconvenience this external force and fear does to the commonwealth of Learning, and how many innocent and well deserving young Wits have been put upon the Rack, as well as Galilaeus into prison. For his Imprisonment frighted Des-Cartes into such a distorted description of Motion, that no mans Reason could make good sense of it, nor Modesty permit him to pass by any thing Non-sense in so excellent an Author.

My main design in my Letter was to clear Cartesius from that giddy and groundless suspicion of Atheism, which surely could not be taken up by any but the more coarse and vulgar Spirits which I conceive I have done fully, and That it can be no offence to the knowing and ingenuous, these men have a rhemtia and jealousness against such Truths as they have not been acquainted with.
and to the effectual stopping of all such surmises for the future, even in the weakest and most scrupulous skeptics of him. And yet I might have added more even out of his first Volume of Letters, namely, That he did not only believe the existence of God, but also his particular Providence, which he felt and acknowledged in that special impulse and success he had in his Philosophical Studies. Which I left wonder at, he beginning so piously in his youth, and exercising his first style upon that excellent Theme. The fear of the Lord is the beginning of Wisdom, as I was informed by letters from Mr. Clerfels at Paris, when he sent me a Catalogue of what Writings Descartes had left behind him. The notice whereof did not a little please me, it being the very Text upon which myself first common-placed in our College Chapel.

But that which enravishes me the most is, that we both setting out from the same Lifts, though taking several ways, the one travelling in the lower Rode of Democritisme, amidst the thick dust of Atoms and flying particles of Matter, the other tracing it over the high and aery Hills of Platonisme, in that more thin and subtle Region of Immateriality, meet together notwithstanding at last (and certainly not without a Providence) at the same Goal, namely at the Enterance of the holy Bible, dedicating our joint labours to the use and glory of the Christian Church, laying at their feet the most true, as we conceive, and the most approvable Philosophical Interpretation of the three first Chapters of Genesis as ever was yet offered to the World since the loss of the ancient Judaical Cabbala. Which is not a mere strain of Rhetorick of mine, but a free acknowledgement, or rather serious boast, of Descartes himself in a Letter to a certain friend, where he professes that he had found his own Philosophy even to admiration agreeable to the Text of Moses, above all other Interpretations whatsoever. Which I have abundantly made good in the Defense of my Philosophick Cabbala, and above what Descartes could well perform, unless he had light on the same Key with my self.

12. Concerning my Immortality of the Soul, I shall take notice only of these two Difficultations, which, because they seem main ones to some, though they never did so to me, I shall now bring into view. The first of which is this, That I have admitted a kind of Extension in the nature of a Spirit; the second, That I have not admitted perception in the Spirit of Nature. But as touching the first, I can justly apologize for my self, that Necessity has no Law, and that if they consider the demonstrable evidence of these two Conclusions. 1. That there is a substance immaterial really and specifically distinct from Body, 2. and, That there is no real Entity but what is in some sense extended, it will be impossible for them not to conclude as well as we, That a Spirit is in some sort extended also. Wherefore it is an unskilfully-framed complaint that cavils at the Inference without searching into the strength of the Premisses. I do therefore here appeal to any indifferent Reader, whether I have not Mathematically demonstrated the truth of the First both in my Antidote and my Treatise of the Soul's Immortality.

And shall now for his fuller satisfaction demonstrate the Second more punctually, namely, that neither the Soul nor any thing else can be Total in
in toto, and totum in qualibet parte, but that this Assertion (as I once occasion to write to an ingenious friend of mine) is a mere chiming contradiction. Which I proved to him thus: namely, That Totum comprehends all that is of a thing both in a positive sense and (consequently) in a negative, that is to say, If all A be in B, there is nothing left to be in C distant from B. For it is as if one should say, there is nothing of A but what is concluded within B, and yet at the same moment not only something of A, but all A, should be in C also: which is impossible in any singular or individual Essence, and Universals are not Things, but Notions.

To which we may further add, that this Supposition makes that of which it is affirmed as small as the smallest thing conceivable. For if the Total be in every point, it is plain that the amplitude of this Total is no bigger than the point it is in. Which is intolerable applied to the Deity, and ridiculous in every thing else.

Wherefore it being so Mathematically demonstrable that there is that which is properly called Spirit, and that no Being at all can be totally present in distant points or parts of Matter at once, it does unavoidably follow that a Spirit is in some sort extended.

But you will further urge; If Spirit be extended as well as Body, how shall we conceive Perception more compatible to a Spirit than to a Body? To which briefly I answer, that I have already demonstrated that Perception is incompatible to Body, which I challenge any one to doe if he can concerning a Spirit: And demand further of them that phansy a Spirit totally present in every part of Matter, whether they can any better conceive thereby the immediate reason of the power of perception; and ask those that say it is neither as a Mathematical point, nor totally present, nor extended, whether they conceive it anything more capable thereby of that vital Sympathy and Coœctivity that transmits Objects in their exact circumstances to the common Percipient. I dare say, if they will speak what they find, they will not fail to return answer, That they are not at all advantaged for the conceiving of the immediate reason of either simple Perception, or of the above-said vital Sympathy, by any such suppositions.

And therefore in the third place I will take the boldnes to advertise them, that the truth of my 9. Axiom, that declares That some powers and properties are immediate to a Subject, had already fully accomplished my Purpose. For there being other properties in Body that intercepted from it the capacity of perceiving, it was necessarily left to some Substance Incorporated to be the immediate Subject of the power of Perception. For it must be the immediate power of some Subject or other, so far as our Understanding reaches, nor can we find out an adequate cause besides the Subject it self, according to which precisely any thing is perceptive. It is true that we are conscious to our selves that that Being that is perceptive must be very Unitive, and Realion does evidence to us that to be One more then Matter is one (which is one only by juxtaposition of parts) is a necessary requisite of that which is capable of the function of Common-Percipiency, and therefore precedes in nature. But that which is as much one as anything can be without a contradiction, that is to say, so much one that it has immediately of its own nature vital Sympathy and coœctivity of parts, as I may fo speak,
Speak, and perfect Indiscernibleness, does not for all this immediately imply a power of perception residing therein. For I conceive every Spirit may be truly Unitive; but I am not assured that every Spirit has Perception, but rather on the contrary that some have not. Wherefore though every thing that is percipient must be a Spirit, yet every Spirit need not be percipient. Whence Perception must be an immediate power in that Rank of Spirits that are percipient; and therefore it must be an argument of no small expedience or Unskilfulness to ask or expect a reason why it is so.

Nor can we give any account of that vital Oneness in every Spirit consisting in Sympathy and Coaction of parts, unless we should allege that it is very fit, seeing the nature of a Spirit is opposite to that of Matter, that the first and most immediate consequences of their natures should be opposite also; and that therefore, it being here acknowledged that Matter is stupid, or destitute of vital Sympathy and Coaction, Spirit must be vital, and endued with such like properties: or that, as Matter, which has not that Essential Unity consisting in Indiscernibleness of parts, is also devoid of this vital Oneness; so Spirit, which has this Essential Unity, should consequently be endued with the vital. But this is not altogether according to the severity of the manner of reasoning which I affect; though the argument be in no wise contemptible if we consider the immediate Opposition of the two species, and that it is but the first degree and most immediate emergency of Vitality which we contend for in the comparison.

But I did not care to stand upon such kind of ratiocinations, being well assured that I had already done my business in merely demonstrating that what I assert to belong to Spirit was incompossible to Matter or Body, and that therefore Spirit must be necessarily acknowledged both to be, and to be also the Subject of such powers and properties, namely, of vital Sympathy and Coaction of parts, and, which is the flower of all, of the Faculty of Perception. And who can question but that they are rightly lodged?

For I think there is none but will acknowledge that there is generally in all men either a confused presage, or more determinate Notion, that that which has this power of Sympathy and Perception is the most subtle and unitive thing that is. Now I dare appeal to any one, if he can conceive any thing more subtle or more unitive than the Essential Notion of a Spirit, as it is immediately counter-distinguishing to Matter. For can there be any thing more one than what is utterly indiscernible into parts? or more subtle than what is not only penetrative of Matter, but also of itself, or of things of its own kind? For Spirit will penetrate Spirit, though Matter cannot Matter. Wherefore there being no altema in a Spirit neither to its own kind nor to any thing else, it is evident that it is the most subtle thing that is, and that therefore the communication of vital Impresses (and all impresses here are vital, though not all Perceptions, nor any of them Motions) is not made by the jogging or crowding of parts, but by Spiritual Sympathy, which is more loose and free from those restrictions that are in the Mechanical laws of Matter.

Of which the natural Conjectury is, That to resolve a Phenomenon into Sympathy, is not always to take Sanctoral in the Asylum of Fools. For it is the Result of very subtle and operose Demonstration to come to the certain knowledge of the existence of Spiritual Beings; which once granted, their nature
nature is such that it is impossible but that any one should confess that they are
the proper Subjects of Sympathy and Perception. And therefore to conclude
that to be by Sympathy that we can demonstrate not to be by mere Mechanical
Powers, is not to shelter a man self in the common Refuge of Ignorance,
but to tell the proximate and immediate cause of a Phænomenon, which is
to philosophize to the height.

Briefly therefore to conclude: I having demonstrated with evidence no
left then Mathematical. That there are Substances incorporeal, and that all
Substance is in some sense extentional, because there is no Substance but is,
or at least may be, essentially present to Matter; it will necessarily follow from
hence, That Incorporeal Substance is in some sort extended; and conse-
quently, that a Soul or Spirit is capable of no other Unity or Oneness: then
what consists in Indiscerniblity and in vital Coactivity and Sympathy of
parts; and that therefore, finally, the resolution of such Phænomena as we
experience in our selves, or observe in other things, which exceed the mere
Mechanical laws of Matter, into this Vital Oneness, which consists in
Coactivity and Sympathy of parts, is no vain Tautologie, or the mere
saying a thing is so because it is so, but a distinct Indication of the proper
and immediate cause thereof. All which things lay'd together, and seri-
ously considered, will easily prevent whatever objections any one might
otherwise imagine against the Extension of a Spirit.

13. The second Dissatisfaction is touching the Spirit of Nature, in that I
have not allowed it the Power of Perception. That there is a Spirit of Nature,
that is to say, a substance incorporeal that does interest itself in the bringing
about some more general Phænomena in the World, I think I have demon-
strated so evidently that nothing can be more evident in Philosophy. Nor can
a man doubt, but that it is an Universal Principle, if he consider the nature of
God and the Divine Fecundity, and the use of this Spirit wherever there is
Matter manageable to some serviceable end for the good of the whole Cre-
ation; besides those Testimonies of its Omnipresence, if I may so speak, it
doing the same things at vast Distances, As for example, It remands down a
stone toward the Center of the Earth as well when the Earth is in Aries as in
Libra, keeps the Waters from swelling out of the Moon, curbs the matter
of the Sun into roundness of figure, which would otherwise be oblong,
refrains the crusty parts of a Star from flying apiece into the circumambient
Aether, carries along those large Regions of looser Particles of the third
Element, together with the Comets, in their peregrinations from Vortex to
Vortex, everywhere directs the magnetick Atoms in their right Rede; be-
sides all the Plastick services it does both in Plants and Animals.

This therefore being a mute copy of the eternal Word (that is, of that
Divine Wisedome that is entirely everywhere) is in every part naturally
appointed to doe all the best services that Matter is capable of; according to
such or such modifications, and according to that Platform of which it is the
Transcript, I mean according to the Comprehension and Purpose of those
Ideas of things which are in the eternal Intellect of God. Whence it is plain,
That there need be no other Angels, or Seminal Forms, then this one, which
virtually contains all everywhere, and is therefore rightly styled
The Universal Spirit of Nature: As also, that this Spirit need not be per-
ceptive

The Properties
and Offices of
the Spirit of
Nature further
 cleared and
confirmed.
ceptive it self, it being the natural Transcript of that which is knowing or perceptive, and is the lowest Substantial Activity from the all-wise God, containing in it certain general Modes and Laws of Nature for the good of the Universe. But the Eye of particular Providence is not therein. Else why does a tyle fall upon the head of him that passeth by in the streets, goe he to either Play or Sermon? And how come those bungles in monstrous productions, or those inept and self-shattering Attempts of this Spirit in certain experiments about the finding out a Vacuum? as I have particularly noted in my Antidote. Wherefore neither Omnipotency nor Omnisciency affs in such cases, but this imperceptive Spirit of Nature. Whose Imperceptiveness is no more Obstacle to her natural and plasti cal Operations, then the Soul’s having no actual Idea of a thing aforesaid is an hinderance of her occasional perceptions, as I have already intimated in my * Preface to my Treatise of the Soul’s Immortality.

Which things well considered and allow’d, that Special Office of this Spirit of Nature in conducting of Souls in their State of Silence, to actualy prepared Matter, and so to raise Animals into Life, will eaily be conceived as becoming an employment as any of the rest, and not at all more difficult. For how much harder is it to apprehend that the Spirit of Nature may direct or carry down a silent Soul, then a dead stone, to their fit and natural abodes? For the liveless Spirit and the dead stone are alike easy to be taken hold upon, the Spirit of Nature penetrating them both alike, and body slipping up and down so eaily in this Spirit of the World, as that it cannot be imagined that any Mechanical power, but that only which is truly called Sympathetical, must be the Ty e where any hold is taken. Which Ty e catches and lets goe, for the direction and transmission of things to their proper places in the several parts of the World for the good of the Whole, according to that E ssential Law which is the Form and Being of this Spirit of Nature, the last Ideal or Omniform Efflux from God. Nor is it, as I have already said, any thing more marvelous that a liveless soul should by this imperceptive Spirit of Nature be carried away and conducted to duly-prepared Matter, then that a dead Stone or the fentlest Magnetick Particles should be guided thereby. For that whereby the Soul is caught so fast by its particular Body is not the perceptive part thereof, but the plasti ck or natural, else in a pet she might eaily leave the body without either hanging, drowning or flabis. Why then may not a Spirit, that has subtler fingers then the finest Matter, I mean the Spirit of Nature, lay hold on that imperceptive part of the Soul, or on the Soul itself, in the state of Silence or Imperception, and by the sympathy and coactivity of its own Essence carry her away to such services as either her self had deserved or the Universe required? All which things though I will not assert as true, yet I dare pronounce them as intelligible as the Union of the Soul with the Body, which experience makes us understand whether we will or no.

14. As for my Conjectura Cabbalistica, I have no new thing to take notice of there, unless what I have added there of anew, which is the Appendix to the Defence of my Philosophick Cabballa. Wherein I think I have cleared that Cabballa of all imaginable Objections of any moment, and amongst other things have plainly proved that not only Platonism, but that
which now deserves to be called Cartesianism, for Des-Cartes his so happily recovering of it again into view, was part of the ancient Judaical Cabbala, it being part of Pythagoras his Philosophy which he had (as is abundantly testified out of ancient Writers) from the Jews. I omitted to set down the succession of the Pythagorick School, which yet had not been impertinent to our scope; and therefore I will here make a supply out of Diogenes Laërtius, who reckons the Descent thus; Pherecydes, Pythagoras, Telauges, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno Eleates, Leucippus, Democritus, and then many others, amongst whom were Nauciphanes and Naucydes, and the last of all Epicurus.

This School was called the Italick School; the first of which succession, Pherecydes, is said to have got certain secret Writings from the Phoenicians or Hebrews, as I have already observed out of Hesychius: nor need here repeat those ample Testimonies that prove that Pythagoras, the immediate successor of Pherecydes, had his Philosophy from the Jews; nor how that the Cabbala was kept entire in him and in some of his successors, that is to say, The Physical or Mechanical part was not disfigured from the Theological or Metaphysical, the body from the soul, as it seems to have happened in Leucippus and Democritus, and finally to have grown cadaverous and of an ill favour in Epicurus, and in as many as have insisted in his steps to this very day.

15. But in the mean time I cannot but note that this succession of that School is no small confirmation both that Pythagoras his Philosophy was the ancient Wisdom of the Jews, and especially that the Atomical or Mechanical Philosophy (such, in a manner, and so much as I have applied to Moses his Text) was also part of that Wisdom. It is needless here to repeat what I have already noted to make for the discovering that Pythagorisme had relation to the Text of Moses. But besides what I have observed from Pherecydes his mentioning of Ophioneus as the Ring-leader of the Apostate Spirits, the beginning of a Book of his, which Laërtius recites, methinks looks like a broken reflexion upon the Beginning of Genesis. "Zoi ῥηματικα διορθουσε ο ετωντος του φυσικου του γης, εξωθουσεν απο της της μακρο ζωης αθανασίας."

Of which the easy English is this, God and Time (I suppose he means Duration) and the Ground were eternally: But the Ground upon God's adorning it was called Earth. Which latter in all likelihood was a glance at the third day's work. But the former part, that affirms the Ground eternal, reflects upon the first. For this το ρημα, which I have translated the Ground, is Hyle, which Plotinus calls κακαζωον, and κακαζωον, the Ground or Foundation, and the ancient Nature; Hyle or the Possibility of the external Creation being eternal, which notwithstanding is but a kind of Non-Entity, and yet the lowest Basis of Actual Being. According to which sense is Parmenides also to be understood (the fifth in this Italick succession) in his making the two first Principles Fire and Earth, as appears out of Aristotle, "Δύο πας αρχας τῆς κατοικίας, θεία ἡ κακαζωον, ἡ δὲ απερινή ἡ μνήμη τῆς ζωῆς, τῆς ἐκ τοῦ παντοτήτος, τῆς θείας τοῦ παντοτήτος, ἐκ τοῦ χρώματος τοῦ χρώματος.

Where the learned Stagirite is utterly out in his gloss, as if Parmenides meant by this Fire and Earth nothing but heat and cold, and so made two Accidents the first principles of all things. But by the bye he has lent
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unto us very useful light, in that he witnessed of Parmenides that he ranked the Earth in the order of Non-entities. For hereby it is manifest that he spoke Symbolically, and underfoot thereby the same that Phercydes did by Ψωβ, the ancient Hyle. For who would say that this Physical Earth, which is the most gross and palpable Entity in the World, is in the Rank of Non-entities more than Fire or Air or the like? But Aristotle (though he speak excellent things sometimes) does very often without any victory triumph and trample upon the opinions of the ancient Philosophers, by reason of his ignorance of what Clemens Alexandrinus so expressly infers us in, ὃν ὄφεις ἅν ἱερά, ἀνήθος ἤ πιλευφαίας Εὐρυκοῦς καὶ ἑαυτῆς. That their manner of Philosophy was Mofaical and Symbolical. And it being so evident that Earth signifies symbolically with Parmenides, there can be no question but Fire signifies so too, and that it is no other then ὤν or Ωινας, Ἁθέν, and answers in signification to Light or Heaven mentioned in the first Day's Creation, Which is Parmenides his Platific or

* Demiurgical Principle (which Fire cannot be) as the Earth the Material. Such Indications as these have I * produced to prove that the Pythagorick Philosophy has reference to Moses his Text.

And that that Philosophy which Pythagoras had from the Jews was not merely Metaphysical, but also Physical or * Mechanical, and of such a nature as the Cartesian, not only the Motion of the Earth, which is the famed opinion of Pythagoras, and which implies a Vortex about the Sun, but also the confessed Atomical Philosophy of Lecippus, Democritus and Epicurus, who are of the Italick line, does more fully evince: Though what they speak of the Vortices are either corrupt notions of that School then decaying, or but brokenly and confusedly set down by the Historian, And yet something I have culled out in the life of Parmenides, that is so perfectly agreeable to the Cartesian Philosophy that nothing can be more, and is indeed the very heart and marrow of it, and in a manner comprehends or takes hold of all. Which is thus expressed by the Interpreter of Laërtius; * Solem ipsum frigidum effe & calidum: which is a monstrous saying of Parmenides, unless the meaning be only this, Solem effe vel candentem vel extinctum, alluding to ☼ ☼ ☼ ☼. Nor can that be true that goes immediately before, that men were generated out of the Sun, but as it is extinct and becomes an Earth or Planet. And Des-Cartes his Philosophy defines thus far, That this Earth out of which man at first was made is of such a nature as if it had been once a Sun, nor dare I define any further.

The unhappy disjunction of the Physical part of the Caballa from the Metaphysical in Lecippus, Democritus and Epicurus, with the Authors serious endeavours of re-unioning them again.

16. It is therefore very evident to me that the ancient Pythagorick or Judaeick Caballa did consist of what we now call Platonisme and Cartesifanine, the latter being as it were the Body, the other the Soul of that Philosophy; the unhappy disjunction of which has been a great evil to both: The Metaphysicians growing vain in spinning out needlefs and useles Subtleties and ridiculous falfites, concerning immaterial Beings, for want of some other easier Objeft to exercise their Reason upon; and the Atomicall Philosophers becoming over-creulds of the powers of Matter, nay, I may say, too too impious and impenant in exploring the belief of Immaterial Beings, in contemning the Rules and Maximes of Vertue and Morality, and in shamefely obtruding upon the World their Mechanical Surnifes for necessary Demonstra-
 Demonstrations, when they were indeed down-right Falsities and Impossibilities. And therefore I do not a little please my self in that I have made some progress towards the refuscitating that ancient and venerable Wifedom again to life, and the bringing together, as it were, of the Soul and Body of Moes, fitly investin him or cloathing him with the Covering of his own most sacred Text. Which though it seemed something an hardy Exploit, and not much unlike the raising from the dead the dislimb'd Hippolyus; yet the consideration of the fate of Acclupius could not deterre me from so glorious an Enterprise; but my free professing it to have been rather a Design then an Achievement gave me no small assurance, that I was safe enough sheltered from any Thunder-clap of either mid-directed Zeal or glowing Envy.

17. But yet that I may not dissemble what cannot be conceal'd, that of Platonisme and Carlefanism which I have applied to Moes his Text, is in it self, as I conceive, very rational. And I must further adde, what I dare not conceal nor dissemble, it being for the Interes and Safety of Religion for me openly and earnestly to profess it, namely, That what I have applied is exquitely and unexceptionably fitted to the Text, from the beginning to the end, as I have made good in the Defence of that Cabbala, and in the Appendix thereto. Which is not a voluntary Bofit of mine, but a serious profession of the truth, extorted from me out of the great sense I have of that service it does to the Dignity and Authority of the Church. For being persuaded in my own judgement that what I have applied is very consonant to the faculties of humane Understanding, and considering also how far that Philosophy has already got firm in Christendome, and how easily those victories are gained which prove the pleasure and satisfaction of the conquerd (and such is Truth to the Soul of Man) as also how hugely disadvantageous it would be to Religion and Theologie to seem to be left so far behind, or to appear to be so opposite to that, which I foresaw might probably become the common Philosophy of the learned, therefore to prevent all contempt and cavil against the Sacredness of Christianity, as holding any thing against the solid truths of approved Reason and Philosophy, I thought it necessary, and an indispensable duty of that Faithfulness I owe to the Christian Church, publickly to declare, That, if any one presume that he has found such points of Cartesianism or Platonism as I have applied to the Moesick letter to be really true upon through examination, I dare confidently pronounce to him, that if they be so, these truths were ever lodg'd in the Text of Moes, and that no Philosopher has any the least pretence to magnifie himself against Religion and the Church of God, wherein such rich Theories have been ever treasur'd up, though men have not had, for these many Ages, the leisure or opportunity of unlocking them till now. Which consideration, I think, is of main importance for the stopping the mouths of Atheistical Wits, and conciliating unseakeable Honour and Reverence to Religion and the Church in those who are knowing and ingenuous.

Thus much therefore I must and ought to avouch, That what I have applied is exquitely fit and applicable to the Text of Moes, and I hope without the breach of Modesty may also add that it is rational; but it must be the result of a longer deliberation with my self to avouch it is true. For
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I must confess, though I find myself to have got a Key in my hand, whose structure and make is exquisitely fitted to every ward in the lock of this Mosaic Treasury, and which turns easily, locks and unlocks, and I view within, as I conceive, inestimable riches of Knowledge: yet I dare not believe mine own eyes, nor conclude whether it be real Vision or a Dream, not knowing whether this be undoubtedly that ancient golden Key of the Cabbala, or one made of baser alloy. And truly a man's Zealously may well be the more encreased, in that it opens immediately upon those two dazzling Paradoxes of the Motion of the Earth and the Præexistence of the Soul, which is enough to make the hardeist beholder to step back and to strike him into a sudden amazement, in which I confess I stand to this very day. At which Timidity of mine none can justly wonder that considers how the ancient Fathers were of the Globosity of the Earth and the Inhabitation thereof the Antipodes: which was indeed the opinion of Pythagoras of old, but the certain knowledge of these later Ages.

18. Besides, I must ingenuously confess, I know nothing more nor better to be alleged for the Motion of the Earth and other principal points of Carteianism, than what I have comprised in my Letter to V. C. nor any thing more conclusive of the Præexistence of the Soul then what I have produced in my Treatise of her Immortality; which I brought into view (as also whatsoever else any one shall conceive in my Writings in any measure to deviate from the common Tract,) to enlarge the Object of more accurate Judgments; which confesses very much to a right decision of what is true. Nor did any thing offer it self to my mind that seemed worth the adding concerning that latter Subject of Præexistence, unless (besides my shewing that it was the opinion of all Philosophers that held the Soul immortal, and more particularly of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, Authorous appointed us by the very Statutes of our University, which is enough to make the Opinion creditable,) I had taken also notice how innocent and inoffensive that doctrine was in the more pure and intemperate Ages of the Church.

For I find Clemens Alexandrinus in several places describing it without the least intimation of any dislike thereof, as in the first of his Stromata's, where writing of the Barbarians (whose wisdome he seems to prefer before the Greeks, haply in the favour of the Hebrews) he speaks thus, Διαλοι δε εισαι εις τον αριστοτελειον τιμησεως τισ εις αυτων νομοδινως πι ι δια αυτα, λυς, θεος Ιεροσολυμων, Ιουδας απαστησω, ιδα Πλατωνα, καθιλικου της τιμησεως πουταμηναυδεις εις τιβετ θυρανθεις, και εις αναλαβομεν ο δε εις γενευ καινω ανωνυμων μελανειν ίαναληαμβανοι, καιδεμοτας ος αι αιτησεον γεων, αι νομις ιε ον ιε, αι φιλοσοφιαν εκφυγειν, i.e. It is plain that the Barbarians did in a special manner honour their Law-givers and Instructers, calling them Gods. For they conceive, with Plato, that certain good Souls leaving their celestial mansions did endure the coming into this Tartarus, and resuming bodies did partake of all the miseries that attend Generation, as having committed to them the care of mankind, to whom they gave Laws and preached Philosophy. Which opinion he is so far from exploring, that he premises in general, before he falls into this Discourse of the Philosophy of the Nations, this admirable comparison: That as the parts of the Universe, though they disagree one from
from another, yet have a peculiar consonancy and agreement to the whole World; yea, in & Barzab. and in the Evangelic Philosophy, in which it is impossible to separate. Or the Proofs of the true Philosophy, yet have not yet been understood. Therefore, the Barbarous and Greek Philosophy have made the eternal Truth a kind of deception of the Theologe of the Logos that abides for ever, into dispersed parts. But he that puts together what is thus dispersed and brings them under one perfect consideration, know assuredly that this man shall flee to the bottom of Truth. Which I was the more willing to rehearse, I seeming to myself to have attempted some such performance as this in my fitting together the scattered Wisdom of the Ancients into one Mofaick Cabbala.

Again in the third Book, where he disputes against the Marcionites, he cites several sayings out of Plato, that either refer to or directly over the Preexistence of the Soul. As that out of his Phaedo, That it is  ὁ θεός ἀληθινὸς λογός, ὣς ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ ἑσμέν τοῖς ὁμοίωσιν. That it is a Traditional Areamum, that we men in this life are as it were kept in a prison. And he entitles also Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato at once to this same saying, θεὸς ἐν ὁμοίωσιν ἑσμέν, ὣς ἐστὶν ὁ ἀληθινὸς λογός. But that this is most fully to the purpose which he citers out of Philo, that the body of the Pythagorean, ἐν παλαιοὶς ἑσμέν ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθινὸς λογός, ὣς ἐν τῷ παλαιῷ ἑσμέν ὁ καθάρτης ἐν παλαιῷ ἑσμέν ὁ καθάρτης ἐν παλαιῷ ἑσμέν. The ancient Divines and Prophets (he means, I suppose, especially those of the Jews,) witnesses that the Soul is joynd to this earthly body in a way of punishment, and that so far forth as she is in this body, she is, as it were, buried. Against which Platonical Opinions Clemens shows not the least dis gust, but only blames Marcion for his abusing them to his absurd doctrine of the unlawfulness of Marriage, and complains that he did ungratefully and unskilfully take occasion from Plato of hatching his own strange and perverse Opinions.

And after in the same Book, though he do zealously oppose Julius Cæsarianus for speaking against those hidden parts of God's own making, in both Male and Female, yet when he mentions his holding the Preexistence of the Soul, ἡ ἐκ τῆς θεότητος, he, ὃς ἐστιν ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ ἑσμέν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ ἑσμέν. This noble Spirit, (faith he, meaning Cæsarianus) does something more expressly Platonize, in saying, That the Soul, a divine Efficence and from above, by being effeminated, descends hither into generation and corruption. And again in the same page, when he has produced Cæsarianus his Opinion concerning the Coats of skins God is said to cloath our first Parents with after their fall, ἡ ἐκ τῆς θεότητος ἐστιν ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ ἑσμέν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ ἑσμέν. He passes it over only with this dilatory Promise or Threatening (call it which you will) that he will shew that Cæsarianus was deceived, when he had prepared and perfected his Treatise of the Generation of man, but declines to pronounce it an error for the present; and if he ever wrote any such Treatise, it is manifest that he did not handle those skins so confidently that they were transmitted entire to that excellent Disciple of his Origenes Adamantius, that Miracle of the Christian World, if that Description of his life and worth be true.
The Preface general.

true which we find in Eusebius. For certainly (to say nothing of his stupendous parts and abilities, which his greatest Adversaries will not deny) it will be very hard to example so sincere and zealous an adhesion to the cause of Christ, even to the contempt of death and desire of Martyrdom. Which was no inconsiderate exertion of a juvenile fervour in him, but a permanent faithfulness and fortitude of Spirit, it being usual with that holy man to assist and encourage all the Martyrs, as well those unknown to him as of his acquaintance, openly to accompany them to their execution; friendly embracing them, and administering to them all the comfort he could, to his frequent hazard of being stoned by the incensed multitude.

It will seem a less matter to take notice of his assiduous reading and meditating on the holy Scripture day and night, and his wholly neglecting the world for the pleasure of divine contemplation and the service of the Church of Christ. his excessive Charity to the indigent, his frequent Fastings and Layings on the ground, his undergoing cold and nakedness, his going bare-foot on the hard stones, his abstinence from wine and singular Temperance in all the pleasures of Nature. Whose great example of an Ascetick life gain'd many disciples to the Church, and bred up and furnished out many undaunted Champions of the Christian Faith, who willingly laid down their lives for the love of the Lord Jesus. Such out of Origen's School were Plutarchus, the two Sereni, Heraclides, Heron, Rhais, and Basilides who receiv'd the Crown of Martyrdom through the intercession of that illustrious Virgin-Martyr Potamiana. What direfull calamities Origen himself also underwent in the Decian Persecution, what Fetters and Torments of Body, what Castings into Prisons and Dungeons, what stretching and racking of limbs, what torrens of fire and burnings, are to be read in the records of the Ecclesiastic History.

These and such like Instances as these will make good the Integrity and Holiness of this Venerable Father. But I must confess I should be loath to be bound to answer for the truth of all those Opinions that are imputed to him. As, for his making the Sun, Moon and Stars living and intelligent creatures: which shews that he was a better Divine then Naturalist. His affirming that the power of God is finite, and that he made only so many things as did not imply a Contradiction to be managed by his Providence. Which Error (if it was Origen's) certainly was intended for an Apology for God's not making the World infinite, and shews that the Reverend Father had a greater solicitude for the Sovereign goodness of God then for his Power. His making the punishment of the Devils and of the Damned not eternal: which yet Jacobus Merlinus quits him of by the Testimony of at least ten several Citations out of his Writings. His saying, That the bodies of men at the Resurrection will be raised in an Orbicular figure: which is expressly against what * Methodius declares concerning Origen, namely, that his opinion was, That every one at the Resurrection should appear exactly in his own particular Form or Shape, as is rightly observed in the Letter of Revelation, whoever was the Author thereof; for I profess I know not who is, much less am I the Author of it my self, as some have groundlessly imagined. His ascerting * That the Soul of our Saviour was the same that was in Adam: which yet is impossible for him ever to assert, he

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so expressly declaring that the Soul of the Messiah never sinned. And lastly, to omit several others, his transmitting the Souls of men into the bodies of brutes: which I question not, and could easily prove, to be falsely fathered as well upon Pythagoras as Origen. But some pious followers of both did affix these unhandsome and ridiculous Appendages, thinking every vain addition to be an improvement of those pure doctrines which were anciently delivered to the world. And such was Præexistence in the Church of the Jews, where no such Fooleries were mixed with it. And if it be so continued amongst the Origenists, certainly it would never have fallen under public censure: though I dare not lay the blame solely upon them, their malevolent Adversaries taking liberty enough to charge Origen with such things as had no ground at all of report. Such was that formal story of his casting incense on the Altar of an Idol, being put to his choice whether he would yield to that or to the abuse of his body by an Æthiopian. Which is nothing but a * mere Romance—built upon the greatness of Origen's name and verses. Whole repute though it may seem much blinmished by that public censure in the fifth General Council; yet he that considers that the particulars of his condemnation were wholly removed out of the Records of that Council by the same power that first occasion'd his censure, may easily find what will repair Origen's credit in a great measure without any detriment to the Authority of that grand convention: For it was their Wrong, not their Fault, that they were misinformed.

S. Basil also and Gregory Nazianzen, that they were no enemies to the opinion of the Soul's Præexistence, but rather favourers thereof, appears out of the great esteem they had of Origen, and particularly out of that present that Nazianzen made unto Theodorus Tyaneus, of a Book of Exclusions out of Origen's Writings, compiled by himself and S. Basil, which is styled Οριγένειος: Φιλοσοφία, wherein are several passages that plainly imply or directly affirm the Præexistence of the Soul.

The next open Assertor of the Soul's Præexistence is Synesius Bishop of Cyrene, who in a Letter to his brother does seriously profess that he cannot accept of that honourable employment offered him, without the liberty of enjoying, Nay I may say of professing, certain opinions of his, which had been a long time rooted in him upon duly-considered reasons, in the head of which he names this of the Præexistence of the Soul. * "Αφιέρω τὸν υπολογιστὴν ἐν ζωή τοῦ ἅγιου νομοθέτου, In good earnest, faith he, I shall never content that the Soul is of later existence then Body or Matter: and declares so aperatively, that he gives directions to his brother to divulge the Letter to the Scholastics, as he calls them, that so it might be communicated to that reverend Father that offered him the Employment. Which freedome notwithstanding in professing the Opinion was not barred to his Preferment.

To these you may add the authority also of two Latin Fathers, Arnobius and Prudentius. The former of whom writes thus expressly concerning this point, * "Nonne Deo omnes debemus hoc ipsum primum quod fumus, quod esse homines dicimur, quod ab eo vel misit, vel lapsi exagitast, hujus in corporis vinculis continemur? The other thus, in his Hymnus in Exequis Defunterorum,
The PREFACE general.

Pater, ecce, fidelibus ampli
Via lucida jam Paradisi:
Licet & nemus illud adire
Hominis quod ademerat anguis,
Ilic, precor, optime Doctore,
Famulam tibi praepice mentem
Genitali in fede facrari,
Quam liquerat exul & errans.

Which last verse answers exactly to that expression of Synesius in his Hymns, where he calls his Soul quodis a'mis, for quitting Heaven and wandering into this lower World.

S. Augustine also speaks very favourably of this opinion in his de * Libero arbitrio, where he writes thus, Uturum ante confortium hujus corporis alii quadam vitam xixerit animus, magna quaestio est, magna secrete-
tum. And then in * another place of the same Treatise, speaking again of the Soul's preexistence, he tells us freely and ingeniously, Si de Deo aliud fenferimus quam eft, intentio nostra non in beatitate sed in vanitatem compellat. De creatura vero liquid alter quam fele habet fen-
nerimus, dummodo non id pro cognito percepto que teneamus, nullum periculum. And in a third place, in his diufcufion of that Fourfold Quare, namely, Whether the Souls be propagated, created, sent from God out of some hidden Repository where they did praexi, or fell hither of their own accord, Aut nondum ita quaetio, fiate he, à divinorum librorum Catholicis tractatoribus pro merito lux obscuritatis & perplexitatis evoluta arque illufrata eft; aut, fi jam factum eft, nondum in manus nostras eju modo literar persuerunt. Whence, methinks, it is very plain that the præmial Ages of the Church had no ill conceit of the opinion of the Soul's Præex-
istence.

Which may further be evinced by the Book of Wisdom, where the Præxistence of the Soul is as conspicuous as the Sun in the firmament, in these words: For I was a witty child and of a good spirit; yea rather being good I came into a body undeftiled, of which there can be no fene without the Soul's praexi, and a further pledge of the certainty of this inter-
pretation is that most rational conjecture of them that conclude Philo the Jew to be the Author of this Book, with whom there is no opinion more fami-
iliar then that of Præxistence, besides other footsteps of his impression, as that especially concerning Aaron's robe, where he fain, That the whole World was in the long garment, and the Majesty of God upon the Dia-
deme of his head. Which answers exquisitely to what I have produced out of him for the explaining those Sibylline verses I cite in my * Appendix to the Defence of my Philofophick Cabbala. Wherefore the Church in those primitive times so well approving of this Book of Wisdom, it argues the inoffenfiveness of that opinion clearly discoverable therein.

And lastly, from that queftion put to our Saviour himself by his disciples, (Matter, who did fin, this man or his Parents, that he was born blind?) and his not at all chafizing them, nor shewing the leaft dislike of this suppo-
Sition of Præxistence, vulgarly known then to the Jews, and plainly im-
plied
plied in the question; I say, a man may fetch a demonstration from hence, That there is no hurt in the Opinion, no poison nor danger therein, else assuredly our Saviour, having so fit an opportunity, would not have omitted the discovery thereof.

19. And that there is not the least evil or slightest collision or clashing in this Hypothesis with the ordinary and literal sense of the Scripture and universally-acknowledged Canon of Faith, I am as certain as that the clear Aire will not exclude the light of the Sun, but both be comprised in the same space. That which is seems most repugnant to is the derivation of Original sin from Adam. But they that assert the Praeexistence of the Soul do not understand the mystery aright, if they suppose not all Souls that came according to natural Order into these Terrestrial Tenements to be in the state of silence first. Which makes them in a manner as if they were not before, and the whole scene of things evidently to begin from Adam. Whose Soul God incorporating into such a Paradisical body as did naturally charm his mind into as full a possibility of not falling, as the usual orthodox Theologie supposes Adam to have been in, and designing the same advantage, if he had flourished, to be derived upon his Posterity; it is plainly manifest from hence, that his fall was the cause of that which we now call Original sin, that is to say, of that over-proportioned Proneness and almost irrefistible Proclivity to what is evil: So far is this Hypothesis of Praeexistence from clashing with the derivation of Original sin from Adam.

Nay I will add further, that what is said in Scripture of the first and second Adam cannot so well be understood as upon the Hypothesis of Praeexistence, and of an antecedent lapse of Souls in another state. For I desire any one to consider without prejudice, what so good meaning there can be of those words of S. Paul, where he saith that Adam was the figure of him that was to come, that is to say, of Christ, as that the office of Adam was preludious to and Typical of the office of Christ. Which would be very dilute, if it was only in this, that he was a publick person as he was, but had not in any sense incumbent upon him the care of the Redemption of the Sons of men. Wherefore the office of Adam was to transmit that wholesome and Paradisical complexion of body to his Seed, (in such sort as our ordinary Theologie determines thereof) and thereby to be, as it were, the Saviour and Redeemer of his posterity from the ill effects of that former lapse they had fallen into; whence he was exquisitely the figure of him that was to come. But this earthly Adam failing in his office, the Heavenly was surrogated in his room, who is * able to face to the utmost. Which Hypothesis in my mind makes S. Paul and this part of the Mystery of our Religion wonderfully easy and intelligible.

These and such like things as these may be alleged in the behalf of that ancient point of Platonisme, The Praeexistence of the Soul.

20. But for mine own part, though I were as certain of the truth of Platonisme and Cartesianisme in all these points of them which I have applied to the Text of Moses in my Philosophick Cabbala as I am of any Mathematical Demonstration, yet I do not find my self bound in conscience to profess my opinion therein any further then is with the good liking or permission of

That there is not the least clashing of Praeexistence with the Derivation of Original sin from Adam.
my Superiors. For though those Theories were so certain to me, yet I am as certain that Mathematical certitude is itself is not absolute, and that God alone is infallible.

But that I may not seem injurious to myself, nor give scandal unto others by this so free profession, I am necessitated to add, That the Confidence of every holy and sincere Christian is as strictly bound up in matters of Religion plainly and expressly determined by the infallible Oracles of God, as it is free in Philosophical Speculations: And that though, out of love to his own ease, or in a reverential regard to the Authority of the Church, which undoubtedly every ingenuous spirit is sensible of, he may have a great desire to say, profess and doe as they would have him; yet in cases of this kind, where anything is expected contrary to the plain and express sense of those Divine Writings, he cannot but find himself straitened here, and will certainly be constrained to the Admonition, to the Decrees, to the Veto, and to the Prohibition, (as the Lacedaemonians are said to have done, though upon a religious mistake:) or rather he will use that short, but weighty, apologie of the Apostle, Πενθερογενεῖι βείος μάλλον ἡ ἀσφαλτίστοις, That God is to be obeyed rather than men.

These are the Adamantine Laws and Tyes of Religion, against which no man can repine but he must repine against the Being of a God, or against his indissoluble Right of being served in the first place, and of binding our confidences to believe and our tongues to profess what truths he has in a miraculous manner communicated to the World upon those Terms. He that denies me before men, him will I deny before my Father which is in Heaven.

But in Philosophical Theories, such as the Preexistence of the Soul, the Motion of the Earth, and the like, where God has not required our profession, nor our Eternal Interest is concerned, nor that which dictates is infallible, though we should conceive to our selves a Mathematical assurance of the Conclusions, yet I must profess, as I said before, that I do not see that any one is conscientiously bound to averre them against the Authority of the Church under which he lives, if they should at any time dislike them, but that he may with a safe conscience compromise with his Superiors, and use their language and phrasen concerning such things. For if it was a Vertue in that holy and venerable Law-giver Moles, with such prudence and paternal sweetness to condescend to the Capacity of the Vulgar, as to describe the Creation of the World according to the Appearance of things to them, certainly it cannot be a Vice in us, in humble submission and reverence to the Governours of the Church, (let our private judgment be what it will) to receive their definitive modes and phrases of speech in those things where God has not tied us to the contrary.

21. But if Time, that brings on all great things pompously and by degrees, shall at last so universally discover that to be found Philosophy which I have adventured to apply to the Mofaic Text, as that it will pass as currently and inoffensively as the doctrine of Antipodes does now, which once seemed so monstrous and extravagant to the Christian World; Approbation will hardly be able to keep a mean, but the Theoremes being allowed for true, will be also necessarily acknowledged most lovely and glorious. 5

That if the Philosophy which he has applied to the Mofaic Text be true, it is a real Restorac- sion of the Mofaic Cultu- bas.
rious; nor will there be then wanting, I hope, who on our behalf will appeal to the Jews whether it be not a real Restauration of the Mosaic Cabbala, and whether we so devoutly worship the incarnate Logos for nought, the blessing of sound Reason and a sagacious Spirit being so conspicuously found amongst the Christians, the affectionate Adorers of the Lord Jesus.
AN ANTIDOTE AGAINST ATHEISM:
OR,
An Appeal to the Natural Faculties of the Mind of Man, Whether there be not a God.

By HENRY MORE, D.D.

The third Edition corrected and enlarged:
WITH
AN APPENDIX thereunto annexed.

Trismegist.
Ἡ μεγάλη νόσος ἢ ἐφοβος ἢ ἀθεότης.

Aristot.
Οἱ ἀνθρώποι χρῆς ἢ ἀληθῆς πεποιθοῦσιν ἡγεμόνας, ἢ τὰ πλεῖον τῆς κανόνων ἢ ἀλήθειας.

LONDON,
Printed by James Flether, for William Morden Book-seller in Cambridge, MDC LXII.
TO
THE RIGHT HONORABLE,
The Lady
ANNE,
Viscountess
CONWAY and KILULTA.

Madam,

THE high opinion, or rather certain knowledge, I have of your singular Wit and Vertues, has emboldened, or, to speak more properly, commanded me to make choice of none other then your self for a Patroness of this present Treatise. For besides that I doe your Ladyship that Right, as also this present Age and succeeding Posterity, as to be a witness to the World of such eminent Accomplishments and transcendent Worth; so I do not a little please myself, while I finde myself assured in my own conceit, that Cebes his mysterious and judicious Piece of Morality hung up in the Temple of Saturn, (which was done in way of Divine Honour to the Wisdome of the Deity) was not more safely and suitably placed, then this carefull Draught of Naturall Theology or Metaphysicks, which I have dedicated to so Noble, so Wise and so Pious a Personage. And for my own part, it seems to me as reall a point of Re-

A 2

ligious
Religious Worship to honour the Vertuous, as to relieve the Necessitous, which Christianity terms no less then a Sacrifice. Nor is there anything here of Hyperbolism nor high-flown Language; it being agreed upon by all sides, by Prophets, Apostles, and ancient Philosophers, that holy and good Men are the Temples of the Living God. And verily the Residence of Divinity is so conspicuous in that Heroicall Pulchritude of your noble Person, that Plato, if he were alive again, might finde his timorous Supposition brought into absolute Act, and to the enrafishment of his amazed Soul might behold Vertue become visible to his outward sight. And truly, Madame, I must confess that so Divine a Constitution as this wants no Preservative, being both devoid and incapable of Infection; and that if the rest of the World had attain'd but to the least Degree of this sound Complexion and generous frame of Minde, nay if they were but brought to an equilibrious Indifference, and, as they say, stood but Neutrals, that is, If as many as are supposed to have no love of God, nor any knowledge or experience of the Divine Life, did not out of a base ignorant fear irreconcilably hate him; assuredly this Antidote of mine would either prove needless and superfluous, or, if Occasion ever called for it, a most certain Cure. For this Truth of the Existence of God being as clearly demonstrable as any Theorem in Mathematicks, it would not fail of winning as firm and as universal Assent, did not the fear of a sad Afterclap pervert mens Under-
The Epistle Dedicatory.

Understandings, and Prejudice and Interest pretend uncertainty and obscurity in so plain a matter. But considering the state of things as they are, I cannot but pronounce, that there is more necessity of this my Antidote then I could wish there were. But if there were less or none at all, yet the pleasure that may be reaped in perusal of this Treatise (even by such as by an holy Faith and divine Sense are ever held fast in a full assent to the Conclusion I drive at) will sufficiently compensate the pains in the penning thereof. For as the best Eyes, and most able to behold the pure Light, do not unwillingly turn their backs of the Sun, to view his refracted Beauty in the delightful colours of the Rainbow; so the most livery possest of the Divine Image, cannot but take contentment and pleasure in observing the glorious Wisdom and Goodness of God, so fairly drawn out and skilfully variegated in the sundry Objects of external Nature. Which delight though it redound to all, yet not so much to any as to those that are of a more Philosophical and Contemplative Constitution; and therefore, Madam, most of all to Yourself, whose Genius I know to be so speculative, and Wit so penetrant, that in the knowledge of things as well Natural as Divine you have not onely out-gone all of your own Sex, but even of that other also, whose ages have not given them over-much the start of you. And assuredly your Ladyships Wisdom and Judgment can never be highly enough commended, that makes the best use that may be of those ample Fortunes.
The Epistle Dedicatory.

Fortunes that Divine Providence has bestowed upon you. For the best result of Riches, I mean in reference to our selves, is, that finding our selves already well provided for, we may be fully Masters of our own time: and the best improvement of this time is the Contemplation of God and Nature; wherein if these present Labours of mine may prove so grateful unto you and serviceable as I have been bold to presage, next to the winning of Souls from Atheism, it is the sweetest fruit they can ever yield to

Your Ladiships humbly-devoted

Servant,

HENRY MORE.
THE PREFACE.

1. The Author's Apologie for writing this Treatise, there being so many already on the same Subject. 2. That what he has wrote are the proper Emanations of his own Minde, and may have their peculiar serviceableness for men of the like Genius. 3. That he affekts not Rhetorick, nor Philologie, nor the pompous numerosity of more popular Arguments, but solid and unresistible Reason in a perspicuous Method. 4. That he has undeniably demonstrated the Existence of God, this one Postulate being but admitted, That our Faculties are true. 5. His peculiar Management of the first Argument of Des-Cartes: 6. And the Reasons of his Rejection of the rest. 7. His caution and choiceness in the managing such Arguments as are fetched from the more general Phenomena of Nature: 8. As also in those from Animals. 9. His careful choice in such Histories as tend to the proving of Spirits. 10. His assurance of that kind of Argument. 11. The reason of his declining the recital of the miraculous Stories of Holy Writ. 12. His studied Condescension and compliance with the Atheist to win him from his Atheism.

Reader,

By what inducements I was drawn to publish this present Treatise, notwithstanding the Numerosity of the Writings of this kind, I had rather leave to thine own quick-sightedness to spy out, then be put upon so much immodesty my self as to speak any thing that may seem to give it any precellency above what is already extant in the world about the same matter. Onely I may say thus much, that I did on purpose abstain from reading any Treatises concerning this Subject, that I might the more undisturbedly write the easie Emanations of mine own Mind, and not be carried off from what should naturally fall from my self, by possessing my thoughts by the inventions of others.

2. I have writ therefore after no Copy but the eternal Characters of the Minde of Man, and the known Phenomena of A 4 Nature.
Nature. And all men consulting with these that endeavour to write sense, though it be not done alike by all men, it could not happen but I should touch upon the same Heads that others have that have wrote before me: who though they may merit very high commendation for their learned achievements; yet I hope my endeavours have been such, that though they care not to be corrollars or partners in their praise & credit, yet I do not distrust but they will doe their share towards that publick good that such performances usually pretend to aim at.

For that which did embolden me to publish this present Treatise was not, as I laid before, because I flatter'd my self in a Conceit that it was gayer or more plausible than what is already in the hands of men; but that it was of a different fort, and has its peculiar serviceableness and advantages apart and distinct from others; whose proper preeminences it may aloof off admire, but dare not in any wise compare with. So that there is no Tautology committed in recommending what I have written to the publick view, nor any lessening the labours of others by thus offering the fruit of mine own. For considering there are such several complexions and tempers of men in the world, I do not distrust but that, as what others have done has been very acceptable and profitable to many, so this of mine may be well relish'd of some or other, and so seem not to have been writ in vain.

3. For though I cannot promise my Reader that I shall entertain him with so much winning Rhetorick and pleafant Philo-

And though I cannot furnish him with that copious va-

For I appeal to any man, whether the proposal of such as will easily admit of evasions (though they have this peculiar advantage, that they make for greater pomp, and at first sight seem more formidable for their multitude) does not embolden the
The Preface.

4. Wherefore I have endeavoured to insist upon such alone as are not only true in themselves, but are unavoidable to my Adversary, unless he will cast down his shield, for sake the free use of the natural Faculties of his Mind, and profess himself a mere puzzled Sceptick. But if he will with us but admit of this one Postulate or Hypothesis, That our Faculties are true; though I have spoke modestly in the Discourse it self, yet I think I may here, without vanity or boasting, freely profess, that I have no less then demonstrated That there is a God: and by how much more any man shall seriously endeavour to resist the strength of my Arguments, that by so much the more strong he shall find them; (as he that presses his weak finger against a wall of Marble) and that they can appear flight to none but those that carelessly and slightly consider them. For I borrowed them not from Books, but fetch'd them from the very nature of the thing it self, and indelible Ideas of the Soul of Man.

5. And I found, that keeping my self within so narrow a compass as not to affect any Reasonings but such as had very clear affinity and close connexion with the Subject in hand, I naturally hit upon whatever was material to my purpose; and so contenting my self with my own, receiv'd nothing from the great store and riches of others. And what I might easily remember of others, I could not let pass, if in my own judgement it was obnoxious to evaition. For I intended not to impose upon the Atheist, but really to convince him. And therefore Des-Cartes, whose Mechanical wit I can never highly enough admire, might be no Master of Metaphysicks to me. Whence it is that I make use but of his first Argument only, if I may not rather call it the School's, or mine own. For I think I have manag'd it in such sort, and every way so propt it and strengthened it, that I may challenge in it as much interest as any.

6. But
6. But as for his following Reasons, that suppose the *Objective Reality of the Idea of God does exceed the efficiency of the Mind of man, and that the Mind of man, were it not from another, would have conferr’d all that perfection upon itself that it has the Idea of, and, lastly, that it having no power to conserve itself, and the present and future time having no dependence one of another, that it is continually reproducing, that is, conserving, by some higher Cause, which must be God; these grounds I say, being so easily evaded by the Atheist, I durst not trust to them, unless I had the Author’s wit to defend them, who was handsomely able to make good any thing. But they seem to me to be liable to such evasions as I can give no stop to.

For the Mind of man, as the Atheist will readily reply, may be able of itself to frame such an actual Idea of God as is there disputed of, which Idea will be but the present modification of her, as other Notions are, and an effect of her essence and power, and that power a radical property of her essence. So that there is no excess of an Effect above the efficiency of the Cause, though we look no further then the Mind itself; for she frames this Notion of God as naturally and as much without the help of an higher Cause, as she does any thing else whatsoever.

And as for the Mind’s contributing those perfections on her self she has an Idea of; if she had been of her self, the Atheist will say, it implies a contradiction, and supposes that a thing before it exists may consult about the advantages of its own existence. But if the Mind be of it self, it is what it finds it self to be, and can be no otherwise.

And therefore, lastly, if the Mind finde it self to exist, it can no more destroy it self than produce it self; nor needs any thing to continue its Being, provided that there be nothing in Nature that can act against it and destroy it; for whatever is, continues so to be, unless there be some Cause to change it.

7. So likewise from those Arguments I fetch’d from external Nature, as well as in these from the innate properties of the
the Mind of Man, my careful choice made very large defal-
kations; insisting rather upon such things as might be other-
wise, and yet are far better as they are, then upon such as were
necessary, and could not be otherwise. As for example, When
I consider'd the distance of the Sun, I did not conceive that his
not being plac'd so low as the Moon, or so high as the fixed
Stars, was any great argument of Providence, because it might
be reply'd, that it was necessary it should be betwixt those two
distances, else the Earth had not been habitable, and so man-
kinde might have waited for a Being, till the agitation of the
Matter had wrought things into a more tolerable fitness or po-
ture for their production.

Nor simply is the annual Motion of the Sun, or rather of
the Earth, any argument of Divine Providence, but as neces-
fary as a piece of wood's being carried down the Stream, or
straws about a whirl-pool. But the Laws of her Motion are
such that they very manifestly convince us of a Providence;
and therefore I was fain to let go the former, and insist more
largely upon the latter.

Nor thought I it fit to Rhetoricate in proposing the great
variety of things, and precellency of one above another; but
to press close upon the design and subordination of one thing
to another; shewing that, whereas the rude motions of the
Matter (a thousand to one) might have cast it otherwise, yet
the productions of things are such as our own Reason cannot
but approve to be best, or as we our selves would have design'd
them.

8. And so in the consideration of Animals, I do not so much
urge my Reasons from their diversity and subsistence, (though
the framing of Matter into the bare subsistence of an Animal is
an Effect of no less Cause then what has some skill and coun-
sel;) but what I drive at is, the exquisite contrivance of their
parts, and that their structure is far more perfect then will
merely serve for their bare existence and continuance in the
world: which is an undeniable Demonstration that they are
the effects of Wisdom, not the results of Fortune or fer-
mented Matter.

9. Lastly,
9. Lastly, when I descend to the History of things miraculous and above the ordinary course of Nature, for the proving that there are Spirits, that the Atheist thereby may the easier be induced to believe there is a God; I am so cautious and circumspect, that I make use of no Narrations that either the avarice of the Priest, or the credulity and fancifulness of the Melancholists may render suspected.

10. Nor could I abstain from that Subject, it being so pertinent unto my purpose; though I am well aware how ridiculous a thing it seems to those I have to deal with. But their confident ignorance shall never daunt me out of countenance with my well-grounded knowledge: for I have been no careless Inquirer into these things, and from my Childishhood to this very day have had more Reasons to believe the Existence of God and a Divine Providence, than is reasonable for me to make particular profession of.

11. In this History of things Miraculous or Supernatural, I might have recited those notable Prodigies that happened after the Birth, in the Life, and at the Death of Christ: as the Star that led the Wise men to the young Infant; Voices from Heaven testifying Christ to be the Son of God; and, lastly, that miraculous Eclipse of the Sun, made, not by interposition of the Moon (for she was then opposite to him) but by the interposition or total involution, if you will, of those scummy spots that ever more or less are spread upon his face, but now overflowed him with such thickness, and so universally, that day-light was suddenly intercepted from the astonished eyes of the Inhabitants of the Earth. To which direful Symptoms though the Sun hath been in some measure at several times obnoxious, yet that those latent Causes should so suddenly step out and surprise him, and so enormously at the Passion of the Messias, he whose Mind is not more prodigiously darkned then the Sun was then Eclips'd, cannot but at first sight acknowledge it a special designment of Providence.

But I did not insist upon any Sacred History, partly, because it is so well and so ordinarily known, that it seemed
less needful, but mainly, because I know the Atheist will boggle more at whatever is fetch'd from establish'd Religion, and fly away from it, like a wild Colt in a Pasture at the sight of a bridle or an halter, sniffing up the aire, and smelling a plot afar off, as he foolishly fancies.

12. But that he might not be flie of me, I have conform'd my self as near his own Garb as I might, without partaking of his folly or wickedness; and have appear'd in the plain shape of a mere Naturalift my self, that I might, if it were possible, win him off from down-right Atheisme.

For he that will lend his hand to help another fallen into a ditch, must himself, though not fall, yet stoop and incline his body; and he that converses with a Barbarian, must discourse to him in his own language: so he that would gain upon the more weak and sunk minds of sensual mortals, is to accommodate himself to their capacity, who, like the Bat and Owle, can see no where so well as in the shady glimmerings of their own Twilight.
AN ANTIDOTE AGAINST ATHEISM

CHAP. I.

1. That the Proneness of these Ages of the World to winde themselves from under the awe of Superstition makes the attempt seasonable of endeavouring to steer them off from Atheisme. 2. That they that adhere to Religion in a mere superstitious and accustomary way, if that they once fail, easily turn Atheists. 3. The usefulness of this present Treatise even to them that are seriously Religious.

The grand Truth which we are now to beimployed about and to prove, is, That there is a God: And I made choice of this Subject as very seasonable for the Times we are in, and are coming on, wherein Divine Providence more universally loofening the minds of men from the awe and tyranny of mere accustomary Superstition, and permitting a freer pereusal of matters of Religion then in former Ages, the Tempter would take advantage, where he may, to carry men captive out of one dark prison into another, out of Superstition into Atheism it self.

2. Which is a thing feasible enough for him to bring about in such men as have adhered to Religion in a mere externall way, either for fashion fake, or in a blinde obedience to the Authority of a Church. For when this externall frame of Godliness shall break about their ears, they being really at the bottome devoid of the true fear and love of God, and destitute of a more free and unprejudic’d use of their Faculties, by reason of the sinfulness and corruption of their natures, it will be an easy thing to allure them to an affent to that which seems to much for their present Interest; and so being imboldened by the tottering and falling of what they took for the chief Structure of Religion before, they will gladly in their conceit cast down also the very Object of that Religious Worship after it, and conclude that there is as well no God as no Religion; that is, they have a mind there should be none, that they may be free from all wringings...
wringings of Conscience, trouble of correcting their Lives, and fear of being accountable before that great Tribunal.

3. Wherefore for the reclaiming of these, if it were possible, at least for the succouring and extricating of those in whom a greater measure of the love of God doth dwell, (who may probably by some darkening cloud of Melancholy, or some more then ordinary importunity of the Tempter, be dissettled and intangled in their thoughts concerning this weighthy matter;) I held it fit to bestow mine endeavours upon this so usefull and seasonable an enterprize, as to demonstrate That there is a God.

CHAP. II.

1. That there is nothing so demonstrable, that the Mind of man can rationally conclude that it is impossible to be otherwise. 2. That the Soul of man may give full Assent to that which notwithstanding may possibly be otherwise, made good by several Examples. 3. A like Example of Disent. 4. The Reasons why he has so sedulously made good this point. 5. That the Atheist has no advantage from the Author's free confession, that his Arguments are not so convictive but that they leave a possibility of the thing being otherwise.

1. But when I speak of demonstrating there is a God, I would not be suspected of so much vanity and ostentation, as to be thought I mean to bring no Arguments but such as are so convictive, that a mans Understanding shall be forced to confess that it is impossible to be otherwise then I have concluded. For, for mine own part, I am prone to believe that there is nothing at all to be so demonstrated. For it is possible that Mathematical evidence it fell may be but a confant undiscoverable Delusion, which our nature is necessarily and perpetually obnoxious unto, and that either fatally or fortuitously there has been in the world time out of minde such a Being as we call Man, whose essentiel Property it is to be then most of all mistaken, when he conceives a thing most evidently true. And why may not this be as well as any thing else, if you will have all things fatall or casuall without a God? For there can be no curb to this wilde conceit, but by the supposing that we our selves exist from some higher Principle that is absolutely Good and Wise, which is all one as to acknowledge That there is a God.

2. Wherefore when I say that I will demonstrate That there is a God, I do not promise that I will always produce such Arguments, that the Reader shall acknowledge so strong, as he shall be forced to confess that it is utterly unpossible that it should be otherwise: but they shall be such as shall deserve full assent, and win full assent from any unprejudic'd mind.

For I conceive that we may give full assent to that which notwithstanding may possibly be otherwise: which I shall illustrate by severall Examples. Suppose two men got to the top of mount Athos, and there viewing
viewing a Stone in the form of an Altar with Ashes on it, and the footsteps of men on those ashes, or some words, if you will, as Optimo Maximo, or vel 360\textdegree}, or the like, written or scrawled out upon the ashes; and one of them should cry out, Afluredly here have been some men here that have done this: but the other more nice then wise should reply, Nay, it may possibly be otherwise; for this stone may have naturally grown into this very shape, and the seeming ashes may be no ashes, that is, no remainders of any fewell burnt there, but some unexplicable and imperceptible motions of the Aire, or other particles of this fluid Matter that is active every where, have wrought some parts of the Matter into the form and nature of ashes, and have frigg’d and play’d about so, that they have also figured those intelligible Characters in the same. But would not any body deem it a piece of weakness no less then dotage for the other man one whit to recede from his former apprehension, but as fully as ever to agree with what he pronounced first, notwithstanding this bare possibility of being otherwise:

So of Anchors that have been dug up, either in plain fields or mountainous places, as also the Roman Urnes with ashes and inscriptions, as Severianus, Fal. Linus, and the like, or Roman Coins with the effigies and names of the Caesars on them, or that which is more ordinary, the Sculls of men in every Church-yard, with the right figure, and all those necessary perforations for the passing of the vessells, besides those conspicuous hollows for the eyes and rows of teeth, the Os Styloides, Ethoeides, and what not: if a man will lay of them, that the Motion of the particles of the Matter, or some hidden Spermatick power has gendered these both Anchors, Urnes, Coins, and Sculls in the ground, he doth but pronounce that which humane Reason must admit as possible: Nor can any man ever so demonstrate that those Coins, Anchors and Urnes were once the Artifice of men, or that this or that Scull was once a part of a living man, that he shall force an acknowledgment that it is impossible that it should be otherwise. But yet I do not think that any man, without doing manifest violence to his Faculties, can at all suspend his affent, but freely and fully agree that this or that Scull was once a part of a living man, and that these Anchors, Urnes and Coins, were certainly once made by humane artifice, notwithstanding the possibility of being otherwise.

3. And what I have laid of Assent is also true in Dissent. For the Mind of man, not craz’d nor prejudic’d, will fully and unreconcilably disagree, by its own naturall fagacity, where notwithstanding the thing that it doth thus resolvedly and undoubtedly reject, no wit of man can prove impossible to be true. As if we should make such a Fiction as this; that Archimedes with the same individuall body that he had when the Souldiers flew him, is now safely intent upon his Geometrical Figures under ground, at the Center of the Earth, farre from the noife and din of this world, that might disturb his Meditations, or distract him in his curious delineations he makes with his Rod upon the dust; which no man living can prove impossible: Yet if any man does not as unreconcilably dissent from such a Fable as this as from any Falshood imaginable, assuredly that man is next door to madness or dotage, or does enormous violence to the free use of his Faculties.
Wherefore it is manifest that there may be a very firm and unwavering Assent or Dissent, whenas yet the thing we thus assent to may be possibly otherwise, or that which we thus dissent from cannot be proved impossible to be true.

4. Which point I have thus long and thus variously spurned my self in, for making the better impression upon my Reader, it being of no small use and consequence, as well for the advertising of him that the Arguments which I shall produce, though I do not bestow that ostentative term of Demonstration upon them, yet they may be as effectual for winning a firm and unshaken assent as if they were in the strictest notion such; as also to re-mind him, that if they be so strong, and so patly fitted and suitable with the Faculties of mans Mind, that he has nothing to reply, but only that for all this it may possibly be otherwise, that he should give a free and full Assent to the Conclusion: and if he do not, that he is to suspect himself rather of some diatempiter, prejudice, or weakness, then the Arguments of want of strength.

5. But if the Atheist shall contrariwise pervert my candour and fair dealing, and phrase it that he has got some advantage upon my free confession, that the Arguments that I shall use are not so convictive but that they leave a possibility of the thing being otherwise; let him but compute his supposed gains, by adding the limitation of this possibility, (vix, that it is no more possible, then that the clearest Mathematical evidence may be false, (which is impossible, if our Faculties be true) or in the second place, then that the Roman Urnes and Coins above mentioned may prove to be the works of Nature, not the Artifice of man; which our Faculties admit to be so little probable, that it is impossible for them not fully to assent to the contrary:) and when he has cast up his account, it will be evident that it can be nothing but his grosse ignorance in this kind of Arithmetick that shall embolden him to write himself down gainer, and not me.

CHAP. III.

1. That we are first to have a settled notion What God is, before we go about to demonstrate That he is. 2. The Definition of God. 3. That there is an Idea of a Being absolutely perfect in our Minds, whether the Atheist will allow it to be the Idea of God or not. 4. That it is no prejudice to the Naturality of this Idea, that it may be framed from some occasions from without.

And now having premis'd thus much, I shall come on nearer to my present designe. In prosecution whereof it will be requisite for me, first to define What God is, before I proceed to demonstration That he is. For it is obvious for Man's Reason to finde Arguments for the impossibility, possibility, probability, or necessity of the Existence of a thing, from the explication of the Essence thereof.
And now I am come hither, I demand of any Atheist that denies there is a God, or of any that doubts whether there be one or no, what Idea or Notion they frame of that they deny or doubt of. If they will prove nice and squeamish, and profess they can frame no Notion of any such thing, I would gladly ask them, why they will then deny or doubt of they know not what. For it is necessary that he that would rationally doubt or deny a thing, should have some settled Notion of the thing he doubts or denies. But if they profess that this is the very ground of their denying or doubting whether there be a God, because they can frame no Notion of him, I shall forthwith take away that Allegation, by offering them such a Notion as is as proper to God, as any Notion is proper to any thing else in the world.

2. I define God therefore thus, An Essence or Being fully and absolutely Perfect. I say, fully and absolutely Perfect, in counterdistinction to such Perfection as is not fall and absolute, but the Perfection of this or that Species or Kind of finite Beings, suppose of a Lion, Horse, or Tree. But to be fully and absolutely Perfect is to be at least as Perfect as the apprehension of a man can conceive without a contradiction: for what is inconceivable or contradictory, is nothing at all to us, who are not now to wag one Atome beyond our Faculties; but what I have propounded is so far from being beyond our Faculties, that I dare appeal to any Atheist, that hath yet any command of Sense and Reason left in him, if it be not very easy and intelligible at the first sight, and that if there be a God, he is to be deemed of us such as this Idea or Notion feys forth.

3. But if he will fully deny that this is the proper Notion of God, let him enjoy his own humour; this yet remains undeniable, That there is in man an Idea of a Being absolutely and fully Perfect, which we frame out by attributing all conceivable Perfection to it whatsoever that implies no contradiction. And this Notion is natural and essential to the Soul of man, & cannot be walt out, nor conveigh'd away by any force or trick of wit whatsoever, so long as the Mind of man is not craz'd, but hath the ordinary use of her own Faculties.

4. Nor will that prove any thing to the purpose, whenas it shall be alleg'd that this Notion is not so connatural and essential to the Soul, because she framed it from some occasions from without. For all those undeniable Conclusions in Geometry which might be help'd and occasioned from something without, are so natural notwithstanding and Essential to the Soul, that you may as soon unsoul the Soul as divide her from perpetual assent to those Mathematical Truths, supposing no distemper nor violence offered to her Faculties. As for example, she cannot but acknowledge in her self the several distinct Ideas of the five regular Bodies, as also, that it is impossible that there should be any more than five. And this Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect is as distinct and indeleble an Idea in the Soul, as the Idea of the five Regular Bodies, or any other Idea whatsoever.

It remains therefore undeniable, that there is an inseparable Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect ever residing, though not always acting, in the Soul of man.
CHAP. IV.

1. What Notions are more particularly comprized in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect. 2. That the difficulty of framing the conception of a thing ought to be no Argument against the Existence thereof; the nature of corporeal Matter being so perplex'd and intricate, which yet all men acknowledge to exist. 3. That the Idea of a Spirit is as easy a Notion as of any other Substance whatsoever. What powers and properties are contained in the Notion of a Spirit. 4. That Eternity and Infinity, if God were not, would be cast upon something else; so that Atheism cannot free the Mind from such Intricacies. 5. Goodness, Knowledge and Power, Notions of highest Perfection, and therefore necessarily included in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect. 6. As also Necessity, it sounding greater Perfection then Contingency.

1. But now to lay out more particularly the Perfections comprehended in this Notion of a Being absolutely and fully Perfect, I think I may securely nominate these; Self-substantiality, Immateriality, Infinity as well of Duration as Essence, Immensity of Goodness, Omnipotency, and Necessity of Existence. Let this therefore be the Description of a Being absolutely Perfect, That it is a Spirit, Eternall, Infinite in Essence and Goodness, omnipotent, and of itself necessarily existent. All which Attributes being Attributes of the highest Perfection that falls under the apprehension of man, and having no discoverable imperfection interwoven with them, must of necessity be attributed to that which we conceive absolutely and fully Perfect. And if any one will say that this is but to dress up a Notion out of my own fancy, which I would afterwards flily insinuate to be the Notion of a God; I answer, that no man can discourse and reason of any thing without recourse to settled Notions deciphered in his own Mind; and that such an Exception as this implies the most contradictory Absurdities imaginable, to wit, as if a man should reason from something that never entered into his Mind, or that is utterly out of the ken of his own Faculties. But such groundless allegations as these discover nothing but an unwillingness to find themselves able to entertain any conception of God, and a heavy propension to sink down into an utter oblivion of him, and to become as stupid and senseless in Divine things as the very Beasts.

2. But others, it may be, will not look on this Notion as contemptible for the easy compofure thereof out of familiar conceptions which the Mind of man ordinarily figures it self into, but reject it rather out of some unintelligible hard terms in it, such as Spirit, Eternall, and Infinite; for they do profess they can frame no Notion of Spirit, and that any thing should be Eternall or Infinite they do not know how to set their mind in a posture to apprehend, and therefore some would have no such thing as a Spirit in the world.

But if the difficulty of framing a conception of a thing must take away the
the Existence of the thing it self, there will be no such thing as a Body left in the world, and then will all be Spirit, or nothing. For who can frame a more safe a notion of a Body, as to free himself from the entanglements that the Existion thereof will bring along with it? For this extended Matter consists of either indivisible points, or of particles divisible in infinitum. Take which of these two you will, (and you can find no third,) you will be wound into the most notorious Absurdities that may be. For if you say it consists of points, from this position I can necessarily demonstrate, that every Spear or Spire-Steeple, or what long body you will, is as thick as it is long; that the tallest Cedar is not so high as the lowest Mushrome; and that the Moon and the Earth are so near one another, that the thickness of your hand will not goe betwixt that Round and Squares are all one Figure; that Even and Odde Numbers are Equall one with another; and that the clearest Day is as dark as the blackest Night. And if you make choice of the other Member of the Disjuction, your Fancy will be little better at ease; for nothing can be divisible into parts it has not: therefore if a Body be divisible into infinite parts, it has infinite extended parts: and if it has an infinite number of extended parts, it cannot be but a hard mysterie to the Imagination of Man, that infinite extended parts should not amount to one whole infinite Extention. And thus a grain of Mustard-seed would be as well infinitely extended as the whole Matter of the Universe, and a thousandth part of that grain as well as the grain itself. Which things are more unconceivable then any thing in the Notion of a Spirit. Therefore we are not feornfully and contemptuously to reject any Notion, for seeming at first to be clouded and obscur'd with some difficulties and intricacies of conception; that that of whose being we seem most assured, is the most intangled and perplex'd in the conceiving, of any thing that can be propounded to the apprehension of a Man. But here you will reply, that our Senses are struck by so manifest impressions from the Matter, that though the nature of it be difficult to conceive, yet the Existence is palpable to us by what it acts upon us. Why then, all that I desire is this, that when you shall be re-minded of some Actions and operations that arrive to the notice of your Sense or Understanding, which, unless we do violence to our Faculties, we can never attribute to Matter or Body, that then you would not be so nice and averse from the admitting of such a Substance as is called a Spirit, though you fancy some difficulty in the conceiving thereof.

3. But for mine own part, I think the nature of a Spirit is as conceivable and easy to be defined as the nature of any thing else. For as for the very Essence or bare Substance of any thing whatsoever, he is a very Novice in speculation that does not acknowledge that utterly unknowable; but for the Essential and Indispensable Properties, they are as intelligible and explicable in a Spirit as in any other Subject whatever. As for example, I conceive the entire Idea of a Spirit in generall, or at least of all finite created and subordinate Spirits, to consist of these several powers or properties, viz. Self-penetration, Self-motion, Self-contraction and Dilatation, and Indivisibility; and these are those that I reckon more absolute: I will add also what has relation to another, and that is the power of Penetra-
Penetrating, Moving, and Altering the Matter, These Properties and Powers put together make up the Notion and Idea of a Spirit, whereby it is plainly distinguished from a Body, whose parts cannot penetrate one another, is not Self-moveable, nor can contract nor dilate it self, is divisible and separable one part from another; but the parts of a Spirit can be no more separated, though they be dilated, then you can cut off the Rays of the Sun by a pair of Scissors made of pellucid Crystall. And this will serve for the settling of the Notion of a Spirit; the proof of its Existence belongs not unto this place. And out of this Description it is plain that a Spirit is a notion of more Perfection then a Body, and therefore the more fit to be an Attribute of what is absolutely Perfect then a Body is.

4. But now for the other two hard terms of Eternall and Infinite, if any one would excuse himself from assenting to the Notion of a God by reason of the incomprehensibleness of those Attributes, let him consider, that he shall whether he will or no be forced to acknowledge something Eternall, either God or the World, and the Intricacy is alike in either. And though he would shuffle off the trouble of apprehending an Infinite Deity, yet he will never extricate himself out of the intanglements of an Infinite Space, which Notion will stick as closely to his Soul as her power of Imagination.

5. Now that Goodness, Knowledge and Power, which are the three following Attributes, are Attributes of Perfection, if a man consult his own Faculties, it will be undoubtedly concluded, and I know nothing else he can consult with. At least this will be returned as infallibly true: That a Being absolutely Perfect has these, or what supereminently contains these. And that Knowledge or something like it is in God, is manifest, because without Animadversion in some sense or other it is impossible to be Happy. But that a Being should be absolutely Perfect, and yet not Happy, is as impossible. But Knowledge without Goodness is but dry Subtily or mifchievous Craft; and Goodness with Knowledge devoid of Power is but lame and ineffectual. Wherefore whatever is absolutely Perfect, is Infinitely both Good, Wise and Powerful.

6. And lastly, it is more Perfection that all this be Stable, Immutable and Necessary, then Contingent or but Possible. Therefore the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect represents to our minde. That that of which it is the Idea is necessarily to exist: and that which of its own nature doth necessarily exist, must never fail to be. And whether the Atheist will call this absolute Perfect being God or not, it is all one; I lift not to contend about words. But I think any man else at the first sight will say that we have found out the true Idea of God.

CHAP.
An Antidote against Atheism.

CHAP. V.

1. What has occasioned sundry men to conceive that the Soul is Abrafa Tabula. 2. That the Mind of Man is not Abrafa Tabula, but has actual Knowledge of her own, and in what sense she has so. 3. A further illustration of the truth thereof.

And now we have found out this Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect, that the use which we shall hereafter make of it may take the better effect, it will not be amiss, by way of further preparation, briefly to touch upon that notable point in Philosophy, whether the Soul of man be Abrafa Tabula, a Table-book in which nothing is writ, or whether she have some Innate Notions and Ideas in her self. For it is, that she having taken first occasion of thinking from external Objects, it hath so implofed upon some mens judgements, that they have conceited that the Soul has no Knowledge nor Notion, but what is in a Passive way impressed or delineated upon her from the Objects of Sense; they not warily enough distinguishing betwixt extrinsicall Occasions, and the adequate or principal Causes of things.

2. But the Mind of Man more free, and better exercised in the close observations of its own operations and nature, cannot but discover that there is an active and actual Knowledge in a man, of which these outward Objects are rather the re-minders then the first begetters or planters, and when I say actual Knowledge, I do not mean that there is a certain number of Ideas flaring and shining to the Animadverse Faculty, like so many Torches or Stars in the Firmament to our outward Sight, or that there are any Figures that take their distinct places, and are legibly writ there like the Redletters or Astronomical Characters in an Almanack: but I understand thereby an active figacity in the Soul, or quick recollection, as it were, whereby some small businesse being hinted unto her, she runs out prettily into a more clear and larger conception.

3. And I cannot better describe her condition then thus: Suppose a skilful Musician fallen asleep in the field upon the grasse, during which time he shall not so much as dream any thing concerning his Musickal faculty, so that in one sense there is no actual Skill or Notion, nor representation of any thing musickal in him; but his friend sitting by him, that cannot sing at all himself, rinses him and awakes him, and desires him to sing this or the other Song, telling him two or three words of the beginning of the Song, whereupon he presently takes it out of his mouth, and sings the whole Song upon so flight and slender intimation: So the Mind of Man being jogged and awakened by the impulses of outward Objects, is stirred up into a more full and clear conception of what was but imperfectly hinted to her from externall occasions; and this Faculty I venture to call actual Knowledge, in such a sense as the sleeping Musician's skill might be called actual Skill when he thought nothing of it.
CHAP. VI.

1. Sundry Instances arguing actual Knowledge in the Soul: as that she has a more accurate Idea of a Circle and Triangle then Matter can exhibit to her: 2. And that upon one single consideration she assures her self of the Universal Affection of a Triangle. 3. The same argued from the nature of Mathematical and Logical Notions, which come not in by the Senses, as being no Physical affections of the Matter. 4. Because they are produced without any Physical motion upon the Matter: 5. And that contrary kindes may be entirely in one and the same part of Matter at once. 6. That there are certain sure Complex Notions of the Mind for which she was not beholden to Sense.

1. AND that this is the condition of the Soul is discoverable by sundry observations. As for example, Exhibit to the Soul through the outward Senses the figure of a Circle, she acknowledgeth presently this to be one kind of Figure, and can adde forthwith, that if it be perfect, all the lines from one point of it drawn to the Perimeter must be exactly Equal. In like manner shew her a Triangle; she will straightway pronounce, that if that be the right figure it makes toward, the Angles must be clofed in indivisible points. But this accuracy either in the Circle or the Triangle cannot be fet out in any material Subject: therefore it remains that she hath a more full and exquifite knowledge of things in her self then the Matter can lay open before her.

2. Let us caft in a third Instance: Let some body now demonstrate this Triangle described in the Matter to have its three Angles equal to two right ones; Why yes, faith the Soul, this is true, and not only in this particular Triangle, but in all plain Triangles that can possibly be descrif'd in the Matter. And thus, you fee, the Soul fings out the whole Song upon the fift hint, as knowing it very well before.

3. Besides this, there are a multitude of Relative Notions or Ideas in the Mind of Man, as well Mathematical as Logical, which if we prove cannot be the Impresses of any material Object from without, it will necessarily follow that they are from the Soul her self within, and are the natural furniture of humane Understanding. Such as are thefe, Cause, Effeft, Whole and Part, Like and Unlike, and the refl. So Equality and Inequality, Equifite and Analogy, Proportion and Analogy, Symmetry and Asymmetry, and fuch like: all which Relative Ideas I shall easily prove to be no material Impresses from without upon the Soul, but her own active conception proceeding from her self whilst she takes notice of external objects. For that thefe Ideas can make no Impresses upon the outward Senses is plain from hence, because they are no fensive nor Physical affections of the Matter. And how can that that is no Physical affection of the Matter, affeft our corporeal Organs of Sense?

But now that these Relative Ideas, whether Logical or Mathematical, be no Physical affections of the Matter, is manifest from these two Argu-
ments. First, They may be produced when there has been no Physical Motion nor alteration in the Subject to which they belong, nay, indeed, when there hath been nothing at all done to the Subject to which they do accrue. As for example, suppose one side of a Room whitened, the other not touch’d or meddled with, this other has thus become unlike, and hath the Notion of Distimile necessarily belonging to it, although there has nothing at all been done thereunto. So suppose two Pounds of Lead, which therefore are two Equal Pieces of that Metall, cut away half from one of them, the other Pound, nothing at all being done unto it, has lost its Notion of Equal, and hath acquired a new one of Double unto the other. Nor is it to any purpose to answer, That though there was nothing done to this Pound of Lead, yet there was to the other, for that does not at all enervate the Reason, but shews that the Notion of Sub-double, which accrued to that Lead which had half cut away, is but our Mode of conceiving, as well as the other, and not any Physical affection that strikes the corporeal Organs of the Body, as Hot and Cold, Hard and Soft, White and Black, and the like do. Wherefore the Ideas of Equal and Unequal, Double and Sub-double, Like and Unlike, with the rest, are no external Impresses upon the Senses, but the Souls own active manner of conceiving those things which are discovered by the outward Senses.

5. The Second Argument is, That one and the same part of the Matter is capable at one and the same time wholly and entirely of two contrary Ideas of this kind. As for example, any piece of Matter that is a Middle proportional betwixt two other pieces is Double, suppose, and Sub-double, or Triple and Sub-triple, at once. Which is a manifest sign that these Ideas are no affections of the Matter, and therefore do not affect our Senses; else they would affect the Senses of Beasts, and they might also grow good Geometricians and Arithmeticians. And they not affecting our Senses, it is plain that we have some Ideas that we are not beholding to our Senses for, but are the mere exercitations of the Mind occasionally awakened by the Appulses of the outward Objects; which the outward Senses do no more teach us, then he that awakened the Musician to sing taught him his skill.

6. And now in the third and last place it is manifest, besides these single Ideas I have proved to be in the Mind, that there are also severall complex Notions in the same, such as are these, The Whole is bigger then the Part; If you take Equal from equal, the Remainders are Equal; Every Number is either Even or Odde; which are true to the Soul at the very first proposal, as any one that is in his wits does plainly perceive.
CHAP. VII.

1. The Mind of Man being not unfurnished of Innate Truth, that we are with confidence to attend to her natural and unprejudiced Dictates and Suggestions. 2. That some Notions and Truths are at least naturally and unavoidably assented unto by the Soul, whether she have of her self Actual Knowledge in her or not. 3. And that the Definition of a Being absolutely Perfect is such. 4. And that this absolutely Perfect Being is God, the Creator and Contriver of all things. 5. The certainty and settledness of this Idea.

AND now we see so evidently the Soul is not unfurnished for the dictating of Truth unto us, I demand of any man, why under a pretence that she having nothing of her own, but may be moulded into an assent to any thing, or that she does arbitrarily and fortuitously compose the several Impresses she receives from without, he will be still so fqueamish or timorous as to be afraid to close with his own Faculties, and receive the Naturall Emanations of his own Mind, as faithfully Guides.

2. But if this seem, though it be not, too subtile which I contend for, viz. That the Soul hath actual Knowledge in her self in that sense which I have explained; yet surely this at least will be confess'd to be true, That the nature of the Soul is such, that she will certainly and fully assent to some Conclusions, however she came to the knowledge of them, unless she doe manifest violence to her own Faculties. Which Truths must therefore be concluded not fortuitous or arbitrary, but Natural to the Soul: such as I have already named, as, that Every finite number is either even or odd; If you add equal to equal, the wholes are equal: and such as are not so simple as these, but yet stick as close to the Soul once apprehended, as, that The three Angles in a Triangle are equal to two right ones; That there are just five regular Bodies, neither more nor less, and the like, which we will pronounce necessarily true according to the light of Nature.

3. Wherefore now to re-affume what we have for a while laid aside, the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect above propos'd; it being in such sort set forth that a man cannot rid his Minde of it, but he must needs acknowledge it to be indeed the Idea of such a Being, it will follow, that it is no arbitrary nor fortuitous concept, but necessary, and therefore natural to the Soul at least, if not ever actually there.

Wherefore it is manifest, that we consulting with our own Natural light concerning the Notion of a Being absolutely Perfect, that this Oracle tells us, That it is A Spiritual Subsistence, Eternal, Infinite in Essence and Goodness, Omnipotent, Omniscient, and of itself necessarily existent.

For this Answer is such, that if we understand the sense thereof, we cannot tell how to deny it, and therefore it is true according to the light of Nature.

4. But it is manifest that that which is Self-subsistent, infinitely Good, Omniscient
Omniscient and Omnipotent, is the Root and Original of all things. For Omnipotency signifies a power that can effect any thing that implies no contradiction to be effected; and Creation implies no contradiction: therefore this perfect Being can create all things. But if it found the Matter or other Substances existing aforehand of themselves, this Omnipotency and power of Creation will be in vain, nay, indeed, a full omnipotency will not be in this absolute Omnipotent, which the free and unprejudic'd Faculties of the Minde of man do not admit of, but look upon as a Contradiction. Therefore the natural notion of a Being absolutely Perfect, implies that the same Being is Lord and Maker of all things. And according to Natural Light, that which is thus, is to be adored and worshipped of all that has the knowledge of it, with all humility and thankfulness: and what is this but to be acknowledged to be God?

5. Wherefore I conceive I have sufficiently demonstrated that the Notion or Idea of God is as Natural, necessary and essential to the Soul of Man, as any other Notion or Idea whatsoever, and is no more arbitrary or fictitious than the Notion of a Cube or Tetradecum, or any other of the Regular Bodies in Geometry: which are not devised at our own pleasure (for such Figments and Chimeras are infinite,) but for these it is demonstrable that there can be no more than Five of them; which shews that their Notion is necessary, not an arbitrary complement of what we please.

And thus having fully made good the Notion of God, What he is, I proceed now to the next Point, which is to prove That he is.

CHAP. VIII.

1. That the very Idea of God implies his necessary Existence. 2. That his Existence is not hypothetically necessary, but absolutely, with the occasion noted of that slippery Evasion. 3. That to acknowledge God a Being necessarily Existent according to the true Notion of him, and yet to say he may not Exist, is a plain contradiction. 4. That Necessity is a Logical term, and implies an indissoluble connexion between Subject and Predicate, whence again this Axiome is necessarily and eternally true, God doth exist. 5. A further Demonstration of his Existence from the incomparableness of Contingency or Impossibility to his Nature or Idea. 6. That necessary Self-existence belongs either to God, or to Matter, or to both. 7. The great Incongruities that follow the admission of the Self-existence of Matter. 8. An Answer to an Evasion. 9. That a number of Self-essentiated Deities plainly takes away the Being of the true God. 10. The only undeniable Demonstration of the Unity of the Godhead. 11. The absurdity in admitting atheistical Self-existence in the Matter, and denying it in God. 12. That this absurdity cannot be excused from the sensibleness of Matter, sith the Atheist himself is forced to admit such things as fall not under Sense. 13. That it is as foolish a thing
thing to reject the Being of God because he does not immediately fall under the Senses, as it were to reject the Being of Matter because it is so incomprehensible to the Phaen., 14. The factious Humoursomeff of the Atheist in siding with some Faculties of the Soul, and rejecting the rest, though equally competent judges.

1. An D now verily cast my eyes upon the true Idea of God which we have found out, I seem to my self to have struck further into this business then I was aware of. For if this Idea or Notion of God be true, as I have undeniably proved, it is also undeniably true That he doth exist: For this Idea of God being no arbitrary Figment taken up at pleasure, but the necessary and natural Emanation of the Minde of Man, if it signifies to us that the Notion and Nature of God implies in it necessary Existence, as we have shewn it does, unless we will wink against our own natural Light, we are without any further Scruple to acknowledge That God does exist.

2. Nor is it sufficient ground to dilide to the strength of this Argument, because our Phaenys can shuffle in this Abater, viz. That indeed this Idea of God, supposing God did exist, shews us that his Existence is necessary, but it does not shew us that he doth necessarily exist. For he that answerers thus, does not observe out of what prejudice he is enabled to make this Answer, which is this: He being accustomed to fancy the Nature or Notion of every thing else without Existence, and so ever easily separating Essence and Existence in them, here unawares he takes the same liberty, and divides Existence from that Essence to which Existence it self is essential. And that's the witty Fallacy his unwariness has intangled him in.

3. Again, when we contend that the true Idea of God represents him as a Being necessarily existent, and therefore that he does exist; and you to avoid the edge of the Argument reply, If he did at all exist, by this answer you involve your self in a manifest Contradiction. For first, you say, with us, That the Nature of God is such, that in its very Notion it implies its Necessary Existence; and then again you unsay it, by intimating that notwithstanding this true Idea and Notion, God may not exist; and so acknowledge that what is absolutely necessary according to the free Emanation of our Faculties, yet may be otherwise: Which is a palpable Contradiction as much as respects us and our Faculties, and we have nothing more inward and immediate then these to steer our selves by.

4. And to make this yet plainer at last, if not stronger; when we say that the Existence of God is Necessary, we are to take notice that Necessity is a Logical Term, and signifies to firm a Connexion between the Subject and Predicate (as they call them) that it is impossible that they should be dislevered, or should not hold together: and therefore if they be affirm'd one of the other, that they make Axioms Necessarium, an Axiome that is Necessary, or eternally true. Wherefore there being a Necessary Connexion between God and Existence, this Axiome, God does Exist, is an Axiome Necessarily and Eternally true, Which we shall yet more clearly un-
understand, if we compare Necessity and Contingency together. For as 
Contingency signifies not only the Manner of Existence in that which is 
Contingent according to its Idea, but does intimate also a Possibility of 
Actual Existence, so (to make up the true and easy Analogy) Necessity 
does not only signify the Manner of Existence in that which is Necessary, 
but also that it does actually Exist, and could never possibly do otherwise. 
For ἀναγκαίον (necessary) and ἀνάρχον (possible) Necessity of being and Impossibility 
of Not being, are all one with Aristotle and the rest of the Logicians. But the Atheist and the Enthusiast are usually such protest'd Enemies against Logick; the one merely out of Dorange upon outward gross 
Sense, the other in a dear regard to his stiffe and untamed Phanfy, that 
shop of Mysteries and fine things.

5. Thirdly, we may further adde, That whereas we must needs at- 
tribute to the Idea of God either Contingency, Impossibility, or Necessity 
of Actual Existence, (some one of these belonging to every Idea imagi-
nable) and that Contingency is incompatible to an Idea of a Being absolute-
ly Perfect, much more Impossibility, the Idea of God being composed of 
no Notions but such as are possible according to the Light of Nature, to 
which we now appeal, it remains therefore that Necessity of Actual Ex-
istence be unavoidably cast upon the Idea of God, and that therefore God 
does actually Exist.

6. But fourthly and lastly, If this seem more subtile, though it be no 
leffe true for it, I shall now propound that which is fo palpable, that it is 
impossible for any one that has the use of his wits for to deny it. I say 
therefore, that either God, or this corporeall and sensible World must of it 
self necessarily exist. Or thus, Either God, or Matter, or both, do of them-
elves necessarily exist: If both, we have what we would drive at, the 
Existency of God.

7. But yet to acknowledge the necessary Existence of the Matter of it 
self, is not so congruous and fituable to the Light of Nature. For if any 
thing can exist independently of God, all things may: so that not onely the 
omnipotency of God might be in vain, but beside, there would be a let-
ting in from hence of all confusion and disorder imaginable; nay, of some 
grand Devil of equal Power and of as large Command as God himself; 
or, if you will, of six thousand Millions of such monstrous Gigantick Spi-
rts, fraught with various and mischievous Passions, as well as armed 
with immense power, who in anger or humour appearing in huge shapes, 
might take the Planets up in their prodigious Clutches, and pelt one 
another with them as Boyes are wont to doe with snow-balls. And that 
this has not yet happened, will be resolved onely into this, that the hu-
mour has not yet taken them: but the frame of Nature and the gene-
ration of things would be still liable to this ruine and disorder. So dange-
rous a thing it is to flight the natural dependencies and correspondencies 
of our Innate Ideas and Conceptions.

8. Nor is there any Refuge in such a Reply as this, That the full and 
perfect Infinitude of the Power of God is able easily to overmaster these 
six thousand Millions of Monsters, and to stay their hands. For I say that 
six or fewer may equalize the Infinite Power of God. For if any thing 
may
may be Self-essential besides God, why may not a Spirit of just six times less power then God exist of itself? and then six such will equalize him, a seventh will over-power him.

9. But such a rabble of self-essential and divided Deities does not only hazzard the pulling the world in pieces, but plainly takes away the Existence of the true God. For if there be any Power or Perfection whatsoever which has its original from any other then God, it manifestly demonstrates that God is not God, that is, is not a Being absolutely and fully Perfect, because we see some Power in the world that is not his, that is, that is not from him. But what is fully and wholly from him is very truly and properly his, as the thought of my minde is rather my mind’s then my thought’s.

10. And this is the onely way that I know to demonstrate that it is impossible that there should be any more then one true God in the world: For if we did admit another beside him, this other must be also self-originated; and so neither of them would be God. For the Idea of God swallows up into itself all Power and Perfection conceivable, and therefore necessarily implies that whatever hath any Being derives it from him.

11. But if you say the Matter does only exist, and not God, then this Matter does necessarily exist of itself, and so we give that Attribute unto the Matter which our Natural Light taught us to be contain’d in the essential conception of no other thing besides God. Wherefore to deny that of God which is so necessarily comprehended in the true Idea of him, and to acknowledge it in that in whose Idea it is not at all contain’d, (for necessary Existence is not contain’d in the Idea of any thing but of a Being absolutely Perfect) is to pronounce contrary to our Natural Light, and to doe manifest violence to our Faculties.

12. Nor can this be excused by saying that the Corporeal Matter is palpable and sensible unto us, but God is not, and therefore we pronounce confidently that it is, though God be not, and also that it is necessary of itself, eth that which is without the help of another, must necessarily be, and eternally.

For I demand of you then, ifth you professe your selves to believe nothing but Sense, how could Sense ever help you to that Truth you acknowledged last, viz. That that which exists without the help of another is necessary and eternal? For necessity and Eternity are no sensible Qualities, and therefore are not the Objects of any Sense, and I have already very plentifully proved, that there is other Knowledge and perception in the Soul besides that of Sense. Wherefore it is very unreasonable, when we have other Faculties of Knowledge besides the Senses, that we should consult with the Senses alone about matters of Knowledge, and exclude those Faculties that penetrate beyond Sense. A thing that the professe’d Atheists themselves will not doe when they are in the humor of Philosphising, for their Principle of Atomes is a business that does not fall under Sense, as Lucretius at large confesseth.

13. But now seeing it is so manifest that the Soul of man has other Cognositive Faculties besides that of Sense, (which I have clearly above demonstrated)
monstrated) it is as incongruous to deny there is a God, because God is not an Object fitted to the Senses, as it were to deny there is Matter or a Body, because that Body or Matter, in the imaginative Notion thereof, lies so unevenly and troublesomly in our Phantasy and Reason.

In the contemplation whereof our Understanding discovereth such contradictory incoherencies, that were it not that the Notion is sustain'd by the confident dictates of Sense, Reason appealing to those more crafty Representations of Phantasy, would by her shrewd Dilemmas be able to argue it quite out of the world. But our Reason being well aware that corporeal Matter is the proper Object of the Sensitive Faculty, she gives full belief to the information of Sense in her own sphere, flighting the puzzling objections of perplexed Phantasy, and freely admits the existence of Matter, notwithstanding the intanglements of Imagination; as she does also the existence of God, from the contemplation of his Idea in our Soul, notwithstanding the silence of the Senses therein.

14. For indeed it were an unexecuable piece of folly and madness in a man, wherein he has Cognositive Faculties reaching to the knowledge of God, and has a certain and unalterable Idea of God in his Soul, which he can by no device wipe out, as well as he has the knowledge of Sense that reaches to the discovery of the Matter; to give necessary Self-existence to the Matter, no Faculty at all informing him so; and to take necessary Existence from God, though the natural Notion of God in the Soul inform him to the contrary; and oney upon this pretence, because God does not immediately fall under the Knowledge of the Senses: thus partially siding with one kind of Faculty only of the Soul, and proscribing all the rest. Which is as humourously and foolishly done, as if a man should make a faction amongst the Senses themselves, and resolve to believe nothing to be but what he could see with his Eyes, and so confidently pronounce that there is no such thing as the Element of Air, nor Winds, nor Musick, nor Thunder. And the reason, forsooth, must be, because he can see none of these things with his Eyes, and that's the sole Sense that he intends to believe.
CHAP. IX.

3. The Existence of God argued from the Final cause of the implantation of the Idea of God in the Soul. 2. An Evasion of the Argument, by supposing all things to be such as they are, by Chance. 3. That the Evasion is either impossible, or but barely possible, and therefore of no weight. 4. That we are not to attend to what is simply possible, but to what our Natural Faculties determine. 5. He urges therefore again the Final cause of the indeleble Idea or Image of God in the Soul, illustrating the force thereof from a Similitude. 6. That supposing God did exist, he would have dealt no otherwise with us for the making himself known unto us then we are de facto dealt with; which therefore again argues that He doth exist.

1. And hitherto I have argued from the naturall Notion or Idea of God as it respects that of which it is the Idea or Notion. I shall now try what advantage may be made of it from the respect it bears unto our Souls, the Subject thereof, wherein it does reside.

I demand therefore, who put this Indeleble Character of God upon our Souls? why, and to what purpose is it there?

2. Nor do not think to shuffle me off by saying, We must take things as we finde them, and not inquire of the final Caufe of any thing: for things are necessarilie as they are of themselves, whose guidance and contrivance is from no Principle of Wildome or Counsel, but every Sub stance is now and ever was of what nature and capacity it is found, having its Original from none other then it self; and all those changes and varieties we see in the World are but the result of an Eternal Scuffle of coordinate Caufes, bearing up as well as they can, to continue themselves in the present state they ever are; and acting and being acted upon by others, these varieties of things appear in the world, but every particular Substance with the Effentia] Properties thereof is self-originated, and independent of any other.

3. For to this I answer, That the very best that can be made of all this is but thus much, That it is merely and barely possible, nay, if we consult our own Faculties, and the Idea of God, utterly impossible: but admit it possible, this bare possibility is so lax, so weak and so undeterminate a consideration, that it ought to have no power to move the Mind this way or that way that has any tolerable use of her own Reason, more then the faint breathings of the loose Air have to shake a Mountain of brasse. For if bare possibility may at all intangle our assent or dissent in things, we cannot fully misbelieve the abfurdest Fable in Aesop or Ovid, or the most ridiculous Figments that can be imagin'd, as suppose that Ears of Corn in the field hear the whistling of the wind and chirping of the Birds: that the stones in the street are grinded with pain when the Caris goe over them: that the Heliotrope eyes the Sun, and really sees him, as well as turns round about with him: that the Pulp of the Walnut, as bearing the signature of the Brain, is indued with Imagination and Reason. I say, no
no man can fully mis-believe any of these fooleries, if bare possibility may have the least power of turning the Scales this way or that way. For none of these, nor a thousand more such like as these, imply a perfect and palpable Contradiction, and therefore will put in for their right of being deemed possible.

4. But we are not to attend to what is simply possible, but to what our Natural Faculties do direct and determine us to. As for example, Suppose the question were, whether the Stones in the street have sense or no; we are not to leave the point as indifferent, or that may be held either way, because it is possible, and implies no palpable Contradiction, that they may have sense, and that a painfull sense too: but we are to consult with our Natural Faculties, and see whither they propend; and they do plainly determine the controversy, by telling us that what has sense and is capable of pain ought to have also progressive Motion, to be able to avoid what is hurtfull and painfull, and we see it is so in all Beings that have any considerable share of Sense. And Aristotle, who was no doter on a Deity, yet frequently does assume this Principle,  

And if we were travelling in a desolate Wilderness, where we could discover neither Man nor Houfe, and should meet with Herds of Cattel or Flocks of Sheep upon whose bodies there were branded certain Marks or Letters, we should without any hesitancy conclude that these have all been under the hand of some man or other that has set his name upon them. And verily when we see writ in our Souls in such legible Characters the Name, or rather the Nature and Idea, of God, why should we be so slow and backward from making the like reasonable inference? Assuredly, he whose Character is signed upon our Souls has been here, and has thus marked us, that we and all may know to whom we belong, That it is he that has made us, and not we our selves; that we are his people, and the sheep of his Pasture. And it is evident that from the Idea of God, which includes Omnipotency in it, that we can be made from none other then he, as I have * before demonstrated. And therefore there was no better way then by feeling us with this Image to make us acknowledge our selves to be his, and to doe that Worship and Adoration to him that is due to our mighty Maker and Creator, that is, to our God.

Wherefore things complying thus naturally and easily together, according to the free Suggestons of our Natural Faculties, it is as perverse and forced a businesse to suspend assent, as to doubt whether those Roman Urnes and Coins I spoke of, digg'd out of the Earth, be the works of Nature, or the Artifice of Men.

* See the foregoing Chap. Sect. 7,8,9.
6. But if we cannot yet for all this give free assent to this Position, That God doth exist, let us at least have the Patience a while to suppose it. I demand therefore, supposing God did exist, What can the Mind of Man imagine that this God should do better or more effectually for the making himself known to such a Creature as Man, indued with such and such Faculties, then we finde really already done? For God being a Spirit and Infinite, cannot ever make himself known Necessary & Adequate by any appearance to our outward Senses. For if he should manifest himself in any outward figures or shapes, portending either love or wrath, terror or protection, our Faculties could not assure us that this were God, but some particular Genius, good or bad: and besides, such dazzling and affrightfull externall forces are neither becoming the Divine Nature, nor suitable with the Condition of the Soul of Man, whose better Faculties and more free God meddles with, does not force nor amaze us by a more course and oppressing power upon our weak and brutish Senses. What remains therefore but that he should manifest himself to our Inward Man? And what way imaginable is more fit then the indeleable Impression of the Idea of himself, which is (not Divine life and sense, for that's an higher prize laid up for them that can win it, but) a natural representation of the Godhead, and a Notion of his Essence, whereby the Soul of Man could no otherwise conceive of him then as an Eternall Spirit, Infinite in Goodness, Omnipotent, Omniscient, and Necessarily of himself Existent? But this as I have fully proved, we finde de facto done in us. Wherefore we being every way dealt with as if there were a God Existent, and no Faculty discovering any thing to the contrary, what should hinder us from the concluding that he does really exist?

CHAP. X.

1 Several other Affections or Properties in the Soul of Man that argue the Being of God. 2. As Natural Conscience. 3. A pious Hope or Confidence of success in affairs upon dealing righteously with the World, 4. An Answer to an Objection, That some men are quite devoid of these Divine senses. 5. That the Universality of Religious Worship argues the Knowledge of the Existence of God to be from the Light of Nature. 6. An Answer to an Objection, viz. That this general acknowledgment of a God amongst the Nations may be but an Universal Tradition. 7. Another Objection answered, viz. That what is universally received by all Nations may notwithstanding be false. 8. An Objection taken from the general falseness and perverseness of the Religions of the Nations. The first Answer thereto by way of Apologie. 9. The second Answer, supposing the Religions of the Nations as depraved as you please. 10. A further Objection from the long continuance of those false Religions, and the hopelesness of ever getting out of them, with a brief Answer thereto.

1. Hitherto we have argued for the Existency of the Godhead from the natural Idea of God, inseparably and immutably residing in the Soul of Man. There are also other Arguments may be drawn from what
what we may observe to stick very close to mans Nature; and such is Natural remorse of Conscience, and a fear and disturbance from the committing of such things as notwithstanding are not punishable by men; as also a Natural hope of being prosperous and successful in doing those things which are conceived by us to be good and righteous; and lastly, Religious Veneration, or Divine worship: all which are fruits unforcedly and easily growing out of the Nature of man; and if we rightly know the meaning of them, they all intimate That there is a God.

2. And first, of Natural Conscience it is plain, that it is a Fear and Confusion of Minde arising from the presage of some mischief that may befall a man beside the ordinary course of Nature, or the usual occurrences of affairs, because he has done thus or thus. Not that what is supernatural or absolutely extraordinary must needs fall upon him, but that at least the ordinary calamities and misfortunes which are in the world will be directed and levelled at him some time or other, because he hath done this or that Evil against his Conscience. And men do naturally in some heavy Adversity, mighty Tempest on the Sea, or dreadful Thunder on the Land (though these be but from Natural Causes) reflect upon themselves and their actions, and so are invaded with fear, or are unterrified, accordingly as they condemn or acquit themselves in their own Consciences. And from this supposal is that magnificent Expression of the Poet concerning the Just man,

Nec fulminantis magna Fvovis manus,
That he is not afraid of the darting down of Thunder and Lightning from Heaven. But this Fear, that one should be struck rather than the rest; or at this time rather then another time, because a man has done thus or thus, is a natural acknowledgement that those things are guided and directed from some discerning Principle, which is all one as to confess That there is a God. Nor is it material that some allege, that Mariners curse and swear the lowest when the Storm is the greatest; for it is because the usual fears of such dangers hath made them lose the sense of the danger, not the sense of a God.

3. It is also very natural for a man that follows honestly the dictates of his own Conscience, to be full of good Hopes, and much at ease, and secure that all things at home and abroad will go successfully with him, though his actions or sincere motions of his Minde act nothing upon Nature or the course of the world to change them any way; wherefore it implies that there is a Superintendent Principle over Nature and the material frame of the world, that looks to it so, that nothing shall come to pass but what is consistent with the good and welfare of honest and conscientious men. And if it does not happen to them according to their expectations in this world, it does naturally bring in a belief of a world to come.

4. Nor does it at all enervate the strength of this Argument, that some men have lost the sense and difference betwixt Good and Evil, if there be any so fully degenerate; but let us suppose it, this is a monster, and, I suspect, of his own making. But this is no more prejudice to what I aim at, who argue from the Natural constitution of a Man the Existency of
of a God, then if, because Democritis put out his Eyes, some are born blind, others drink out their Eyes and cannot see, that therefore you should conclude that there is neither Light nor Colours: for if there were, then every one would see them; but Democritis and some others do not see them. But the reason is plain, there hath been force done to their Natural Faculties, and they have put out their Sight.

Wherefore I conclude from natural Conscience in a man, that puts him upon Hope and Fear of Good and Evil from what he does or omits, though those actions and omissions doe nothing to the change of the course of Nature or the affairs of the world, that there is an Intelligent Principle over universal Nature that takes notice of the Actions of men, that is, that there is a God, for else this Natural Faculty would be false and vain.

5. Now for Adoration or Religious Worship, it is as universal as mankind, there being no Nation under the cope of Heaven that does not doe Divine worship to something or other, and in it to God, as they conceive; wherefore according to the ordinary natural light that is in all men, there is a God.

6. Nor can the force of this Argument be avoided, by saying it is but an universal Tradition that has been time out of mind spread among the Nations of the world: For if it were so (which yet cannot at all be proved) in that it is universally received, it is manifest that it is according to the light of Nature to acknowledge there is a God; for that which all men admit as true, though upon the proposal of another, is undoubtedly to be termed true according to the light of Nature. As many hundreds of Geometrical Demonstrations, that were first the inventions of some one man, have passed undeniable through all Ages and places for true according to the light of Nature, with them that were but Learners, not Inventors of them. And it is sufficient to make a thing true according to the light of Nature, that no man upon a perception of what is propounded and the Reasons of it (if it be not clear at the first sight, and need Reasons to back it) will ever flink to acknowledge it for a Truth. And therefore if there were any Nations that were destitute of the knowledge of a God, as they may be, it is likely, of the Rudiments of Geometry; so long as they will admit of the knowledge of one as well as of the other, upon due and fit proposal, the acknowledgement of a God is as well to be paid to be according to the light of Nature, as the knowledge of Geometry which they thus receive.

7. But if it be here objected, That a thing may be universally received of all Nations, and yet be so farre from being true according to the light of Nature, that it is not true at all, as for example, that the Sun moves about the Earth, and that the Earth stands still as the fixed Center of the world, which the best of Astronomers & the profoundest of Philosophers pronounce to be false; I answer, that in some sense it does stand still, if you understand by motion the translation of a Body out of the vicinity of other Bodies. But suppose it did not stand still, this comes not home to our Cafe; for this is but the just victory of Reason over the general prejudice of Sense; and every one will acknowledge that Reason may correct the
the Impreflions of Sense, otherwise we should, with *Epicurus and Lucre-
tius, admit the Sun and Moon to be no wider then a Sieve, and the bodies
of the Stars to be no bigger then the ordinary flame of a Cande. There-
fore you fee here is a claffing of the Faculties one againft another, and the
Ironger carries it. But there is no Faculty that can be pretended to claff
with the judgment of Reason and natural Sagacity, that fo easily either
concludes or pretends that there is a God: wherefore that may well goe
for a Truth according to the light of Nature that is universally receiv'd of
men, be it by what Faculty it will they receive it, no other Faculty appear-
ing that can evidence to the contrary. And such is the universal acknow-
ledgment that there is a God.

8. Nor is it much more material to reply, That though there be in-
deed a Religious Worship exercifed in all Nations upon the face of the
Earth, yet they worship many of them but flocks and stones, or some par-
ticular piece of Nature, the Sun, Moon, or Stars. For I anfwer that, first,
it is very hard to prove that they worship any Image or Statue without
reference to some Spirit at leaft, if not to the Omnipotent God. So that
we fhall hence at leaft win thus much, That there are in the Universe some
more subtile and Inmaterial Substances that take notice of the affairs of
men; and this is as ill to a flow Atheift as to believe that there is a
God.

And for that Adoration some of them doe to the Sun and Moon, I cannot
believe they doe it to them under the notion of mere Inanimate Bodies,
but they take them to be the habitation of some Intellectual Beings, as
the verfe does plainly intimate to us,

'Ἡλιός ὢν τοιτεροφιθον το τετακώντας τος ηλιος τιτεκνιοις,
The Sun that hears and sees all things: and this is very near the true No-
tion of a God.

9. But be this universal Religious Worship what it will, as absurd as
you pleafe to fancy it, yet it will not fail to reach very far for the proving of
a Deity. For there are no natural Faculties in things that have not
their Object in the world; as there is meat as well as mouths, sounds as
wells as hearing, colours as well as fight, dangers as well as fear, and the
like. So there ought in like manner to be a God as well as a natural pro-
penlion in men to Religious Worship, God alone being the proper Object
thereof.

Nor does it abate the Strength of the Argument, that this so deeply-
radiated Property of Religion in man that cannot be loft, does so ineptly
and ridiculofly difplay it itllef in Mankind.

For as the plying of a Dog's feet in his sleep, as if there were fome
game before him, and the butting of a young Lamb before he has yet ei-
ther horns or enemies to encounter, would not be in nature, were there
not fuch a thing as a Hare to be courfed, or an horned Enemy to be en-
countered with horns: fo there would not be fo universal an exercife of
Religious Worship in the world, though it be done never fo ineptly and
foolishly, were there not really a due Object of this Worship, and a capaci-
city in Man for the right performance thereof; which could not be un-
les there were a God.
But the truth is, Man's Soul, in this drunken drowsy condition she is in, has fallen asleep in the Body, and like one in a dream talks to the bed-posts, embraces her pillow instead of her friend, falls down before Statues in stead of adoring the Eternal and Invisible God, prays to flocks and stones in stead of speaking to him that by his Word created all things.

10. I but you will reply, that a young Lamb has at length both his weapon and Enemy to encounter, and the dreaming Dog did once and may again pursue some real game; and so he that talks in his sleep did once confer with men awake, and may do so once again: but whole Nations for many succeffions of Ages have been very stupid Idolaters, and do so continue to this day. But I answer, that this rather informs us of another great Mystery, then at all enervates the present Argument, or obscures the grand Truth we strive for. For this does plainly inculcate thus much, That Mankind is in a laps'd condition, like one fallen down in the fit of an Epilepsie, whose limbs by force of the convulsion are moved very incomposedly and illavour'dly, but we know that he that does for the present move the members of his body so rudely and fortuitously, did before command the use of his Muscles in a decent exercise of his proaffive faculty, and that when the fit is over he will doe so again.

This therefore rather implies that these poor barbarous Souls had once the true knowledge of God and of his Worship, and by some hidden Providence may be recover'd into it again, then that this propension to Religious Worship, that so conspicuously appears in them, should be utterly in vain: as it would be both in them and in all men else, if there were no God.

CHAP. XI.

1. A concerning Enquiry touching the Essence of the Soul of Man. 2. That the Soul is not a mere Modification of the Body, the Body being incapable of such Operations as are usually attributed to the Soul, as Spontaneous Motion, Animadversion, Memory, Reafon. 3. That the Spirits are uncapable of Memory, and consequently of Reason, Animadversion, and of Moving the Body. 4. That the Brain cannot be the Principle of spontaneous Motion, having neither Muscles nor Sense. 5. That Phaury, Reason and Animadversion is feated neither in any Part, nor any particular part of the Brain, nor is all the Brain figured into this or that Conception, nor every Particle thereof. 6. That the Figuration of one part of the Brain is not reflected to the rest, demonstrated from the Site of things. 7. That the Brain has no Sense, further demonstrated from Anatomical Experiments. 8. How ridiculously the Operations of the Soul are attributed to the Conarion. 9. The Conclusion, That the Impetus of Spontaneous Motion is neither from the Animal Spirits nor the Brain. 10. That the Soul is not any Corporeal Sub stance distinct from the Animal.
mal Spirits and the Body; 11. And therefore is a Substance Incorpo-
real. 12. The discovery of the Essence of the Soul, of what great use-
fulness for the easier conceiving the nature of God. 13. And how there
may be an Eternal Mind that has both Understanding and power of Mo-
ving the Matter of the Univers

1. WE have done with all those more obvious Faculties in the Soul
of Man that naturally tend to the discovery of the Existence
of a God. Let us briefly, before we loose from our selves and launch out
into the vast Ocean of the Externall Phenomena of Nature, consider the
Essence of the Soul her self, what it is, whether a mere Modification of the
Body, or Substance distinct therefrom; and then whether Corporeal or
Incorporeal. For upon the clearing of this point we may haply be con-
vinced that there is a Spiritual Substance really distinct from the Matter;
which who does acknowledge, will be easier induced to believe there
is a God.

2. First therefore, if we say that the Soul is a mere Modification of the
Body, the Soul then is but one universal Faculty of the Body, or a many
Faculties put together, and those Operations which are usually attribu-
ted unto the Soul, must of necessity be attributed unto the Body. I de-
mand therefore, to what in the Body will you attribute Spontaneous Mo-
tion? I understand thereby, A power in our selves of moving or hold-
ing still most of the parts of our Body, as our hand, suppofe, or little
finger. If you will say that it is nothing but the immision of the Spirits
into such and such Muscles, I would gladly know what does immis these
Spirits, and direct them so curiously. Is it themselves, or the Brain, or
that particular piece of the Brain they call the Conarion or Pine-kernel?
Whatever it be, that which does thus immis them and direct them must
have Animadversion, and the fame that has Animadversion has Memory
also and Reason. Now I would know whether the Spirits themselves be
capable of Animadversion, Memory and Reason; for it indeed seems alto-
gether impossible. For these Animal Spirits are nothing else but matter
very thin and liquid, whose nature consists in this, that all the particles of
it be in Motion, and being loose from one another, friddle and play up and
down according to the measure and manner of agitation in them.

3. Therefore now demand, which of the particles in thefe so many
loosely moving one from another has Animadversion in it? If you say
that they all put together have, I appeal to him that thus answers, how
likely it is that that should have Animadversion that is so utterly un-
capable of Memory, and consequently of Reason. For it is as impossible to
conceive Memory compatible to such a Subject, as it is how to write
Characters in the water or in the wind.

4. If you say the Brain immis and directs these Spirits, how can that so
freely and spontaneously move itself or another that has no Muscles?
Besides, Anatomists tell us, that though the Brain be the instrument of
sense, yet it has no sense at all of itself; how then can that that has no
sense direct thus spontaneously and arbitrarily the Animal Spirits into
any part of the Body? an act that plainly requires determinate sense and

perception.
perception. But let the **Anatomists** conclude what they will, I think I shall little less then demonstrate that the **Brains have no sense**. For the same thing in us that has **Sense** has likewise **Animadversion**; and that which has **Animadversion** in us, has also a Faculty of **free and arbitrarious Phantasy** and of **Reason**.

5. Let us now consider the nature of the **Brain**, and see how competitive those Operations and Powers are to such a **Subject**. Verily if we take a right view of this laxe pithe or marrow in man's head, neither our **Sense** nor **Understanding** can discover any thing more in this Substance that can pretend to such noble Operations as **free Imagination** and the sagacious collections of **Reason**, then we can discern in a Cake of **Sewet** or a Bowl of **Curds**. For this loofe Pulp that is thus wrap't up within our **Cranium** is but a spongy and porous Body, and pervious not only to the Animal Spirits, but affo to more groffe juice and Liquor; else it could not well be nourished, at least it could not be so soft and moistened by Drunkenness and excess, as to make the **Understanding** inept and fottifh in its Operations.

Wherefore I now demand, in this soft substance which we call the **Brain**, whose softnes implies that it is in some measure liquid, and liqui-dity implies a severall **Motion** of loofned parts, in what part or parcel thereof does **Phantasy**, **Reason** and **Animadversion** ly: In this laxe confi-quence that lies like a **Net** all on heaps in the water, I demand in what knot, loop or interval thereof does this Faculty of **free Phantasy** and active **Reason** reside: I believe you will be ashamed to assign me any one in particular.

And if you will say in all together, you must say that the whole **Brain** is figured into this or that representation, which would cancell **Memory**, and take away all capacity of there being any distinct Notes and places for the several **Species** of things there reprefented.

But if you will say there is in every Part of the **Brain** this power of **Animadversion** and **Phantasy**, you are to remember that the **Brain** is in some measure a **liquid Body**, and we must enquire how these loofe parts under-stand an others several **Animadversions** and **Notions**: And if they could (which is yet very inconceivable) yet if they could from hence doe any thing toward the **Immission** and **Direction** of the Animal Spirits into this or that part of the body, we must consider that they must doe it (upon the knowing one another minds,) as it were by a joynt continen-tione strength; as when many men at once, the word being given, lift or tug together for the moving of some so maffe a body that the single strength of one could not deal with. But this is to make the several particles of the **Brain** so many individual persons; a fitter object for Laughter then the least measure of Belief.

6. Besides, how come these many **Animadversions** to seem but one to us, our Mind being thefe, as is suppos'd? Or rather why, if the figuration of one part of the **Brain** be communicated to all the rest, does not the same Object seem situated both behind us and before us, above and beneath, on the right hand and on the left, and every way as the Impress of the Object is reflected against all the parts of the **Brains**? But there ap-
purring to us but one Animal Spirit, as but one set of things, it is a sufficient Argument that there is but one; or if there be many, that they are not mutually communicated from the parts one to another, and that therefore there can be no such joint endeavour toward one designe: whence it is manifest that the Brains cannot immix nor direct these Animal Spirits into what part of the Body they please.

Moreover, that the Brain has no Sense, and therefore cannot impress spontaneously any motion on the Animal Spirits, it is no flight Argument, in that some being dissected have been found without Brains; and Fontaneus tells us of a Boy at Amsterdam that had nothing but limpid water in his head in stead of Brains; and the Brains generally are easily dissolvable into a watery consistence; which agrees with what I intimated before. Now I appeal to any free Judge, how likely these liquid particles are to approve themselves of that nature and power as to be able, by erecting and knitting themselves together for a moment of time, to bear themselves so as with one joint contention of strength to cause an arbitrarious ablegation of the Spirits into this or that determinate part of the Body. But the absurdity of this I have sufficiently insinuated already.

Lastly, the Nerves, I mean the marrow of them, which is of the selfsame substance with the Brain, have no Sense, as is demonstrable from a Cataplesis or Catochus. But I will not accumulate Arguments in a matter so palpable.

As for that little sprunt piece of the Brain which they call the Cornion, that this should be the very substance whose natural faculty it is to move it self, and by its motions and nods to determinate the course of the Spirits into this or that part of the Body, seems to me no less foolish and fabulous then the story of him that could change the wind as he pleased, by setting his cap on this or that side of his head.

If you heard but the magnificent stories that are told of this little lurking Muschrome, how it does not only hear and see, but imagines, reasons, commands the whole fabrick of the body more dexterously then an Indian boy does an Elephant, what an acute Logician, subtle Geometer, prudent Statesman, skilfull Physician, and profound Philosopher he is, and then afterward by dissection you discover this worker of Miracles to be nothing but a poor silly contemptible Knob or Protuberance, consisting of a thin Membrane containing a little pulpos Matter, much of the same nature with the rest of the Brain;

Speetatum admissi nisi teneatis amici?

would you not sooner laugh at it then go about to confute it? And truly I may the better laugh at it now, having already confuted it in what I have afore argued concerning the rest of the Brain.

9. I shall therefore make bold to conclude, that the impress of Spontaneous Motion is neither from the Animal Spirits nor from the Brain, and therefore that those Operations that are usually attributed unto the Soul are really incompatible to any part of the Body; and therefore that the Soul is not a mere Modification of the Body, but a Substance distinct therefrom.

10. Now we are to enquire whether this Substance distinct from what
ordinarily we call the Body, be also it self a Corporeal Substance, or whether it be Incorporeal. If you say that it is a Corporeal Substance, you can understand no other then Matter more subtile and tenuous then the Animal Spirits themselves, mingled with them and dispersed through the vessels and porosities of the Body; for there can be no penetration of Dimensions. But I need no new Arguments to confute this fond conceit, for what I said of the Animal Spirits before, is applicable with all ease and facility to this present case. And let it be sufficient that I advertifie you so much, and so be excused from the repeating of the same things over again.

11. It remains therefore that we conclude, That that which impresses Spontaneous Motion upon the Body, or more immediately upon the Animal Spirits, that which imagines, remembers and reasons, is an Immaterial Substance distinct from the Body, which uses the Animal Spirits and the Brains for instruments in such and such Operations. And thus we have found a Spirit in a proper Notion and signification that has apparently these Faculties in it, it can both understand, and move Corporeal Matter.

12. And now the prize that we have wonne will prove for our design of very great Consequence: For it is obvious here to observe, that the Soul of man is as it were αριθμ Θεόω, a compendious Statue of the Deity; her Substance is a solid Effigies of God. And therefore as with ease we consider the Substance and Motion of the vast Heavens on a little Sphere or Globe, so we may with like facility contemplate the nature of the Almighty in this little medall of God, the Soul of Man, enlarging to infinity what we observe in our selves when we transferre it unto God; as we do imagine those Circles which we view on the Globe to be vastly bigger while we fancy them as described in the Heavens.

13. Wherefore we being assured of this, That there is a Spiritual Substance in our selves in which both these Properties do reside, viz. of Understanding, and of moving Corporeal Matter; let us but enlarge our minds so as to conceive as well we can of a Spiritual Substance that is able to move and actuate all Matter whatsoever never so farre extended, and after what way and manner soever it please, and that it has not the Knowledge only of this or that particular thing, but a distinct and plenary Cognoscence of all things; and we have indeed a very competent apprehension of the Nature of the Eternall and Invisible God, who, like the Soul of Man, does not indeed fall under Sense, but does every where operate so, that his presence is easily to be gathered from what is discovered by our outward Senses.
AN ANTIDOTE AGAINST ATHEISM.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

I. That the more general Phænomena of External Nature argue the Being of a God. 2. That if Matter be self-moving, it cannot work it self into these Phænomena. 3. Much less if it rest of it self. 4. That though it were partly self-moving, partly self-reposing, yet it could not produce either Sun or Stars of that figure they are. 5. That the Laws of the Motion of the Earth are not casual or fortuitous. 6. That there is a Divine Providence that does at least approve, if not direct, all the Motions of the Matter, with a Reason why she permits the Effects of the mere Mechanical motion of the Matter to goe as far as they can.

I. The last thing I insisted upon was the Specifick nature of the Soul of Man, how it is an Immaterial Substance indued with these two eminent Properties, of Understanding, and Power of moving Corpo-real Matter. Which truth I cleared, to the intent that when we shall discover such motions and contrivances in the largely-extended Matter of the World as imply Wisdom and Providence, we may the easilier come off to the acknowledgment of that Eternal Spiritual Essence that has fram'd Heaven and Earth, and is the Author and maker of all visible and invisible Beings.

Wherefore we being now so well furnish'd for the voyage, I would have my Atheist to take Shipping with me, and loosing from this particular Speculation of our own inward Nature, to lanch out into that vast Ocean, as I said, of the External Phænomena of Universal Nature, or walk

D 4 with
with me a while on the wide Theatre of this Outward World, and diligently to attend to those many and most manifest marks and signs that I shall point him to in this outward frame of things, that naturally signifie unto us That there is a God.

And now, first, to begin with what is most general, I say that the Phenomena of Day and Night, Winter and Summer, Spring-time and Fall, that the manner of rising and setting of the Sun, Moon and Stars, that all these signs and tokens unto us that there is a God, that is, that things are so framed, that they naturally imply a Principle of Wisdom and Counsel in the Author of them. And if there be such an Author of external Nature, there is a God.

2. But here it will be reply'd, that mere Motion of the Universal Matter will at last necessarily grind it self into those more rude and general Delineations of Nature that are observed in the Circuits of the Sun, Moon and Stars, and the general conseqences of them. But if the Mind of man was so bold as to conceive any such thing, let him examine his Faculties what they naturally conceive of the Motion of Matter. And verily the great Matter of this Mechanical Hypothesis does not suppose or admit of any Specificall difference in this Universal Matter, out of which this outward frame of the World should arise. Neither do I think that any man else will easily imagine but that all the Matter of the World is of one kind for its very Substance or Essence.

Now therefore I demand concerning this universal uniform Matter, whether naturally Motion or Rest belongs unto it. If Motion, it being acknowledged uniform, it must be alike moved in every part or particle imaginable of it. For this Motion being natural and essential to the Matter, is alike every where in it, and therefore has loosened every Atome of it to the utmost capacity; so that every particle is alike, and moved alike. And therefore there being no prevalency at all in any one Atome above another in bignesse or Motion, it is manifest that this universal Matter, to whom Motion is so essential and intrinsical, will be in effectual for the producing of any Variety of appearances in Nature, and so no Suns, nor Stars, nor Earths, nor Vortices can ever arise out of this infinitely-thin and still Matter, which must thus eternally remain unperceptible to any of our Senses, were our Senses ten thousand millions of times more subtle then they are: Indeed there could not be any such thing as either Man or Sense in the world. But we see this Matter shews it self to us in abundance of varieties of appearance; therefore there must be another Principle besides the Matter, to order the Motion of it so as may make these varieties to appear: And what will that prove but a God?

3. But if you'll say that Motion is not of the nature of Matter (as indeed it is very hard to conceive it, the Matter supposed homogeneal) but that it is inert and stupid of itself, then it must be moved from some other, and thus of necessity we shall be cast upon a God, or at least a Spiritual Substance actuating the Matter; which the Atheists are as much afraid of, as children are of Spirits, or themselves of a God.

4. But men that are much degenerate know not the natural Emanations of their own Minds, but think of all things confusedly, and therefore,
fore, it may be, will not stick to affirm, that either the parts of the Matter are *specifically different*, or though they be not, yet some are *moveable* of themselves, others inclinable to *rest*, and were ever so; for it happened so to be, though there be no reason for it in the thing it self: which is to wound our Faculties, with so wide a gap, that after this they will let in any thing, and take away all pretence to any principles of Knowledge.

But to scuffle & combat with them in their own dark Cavens, let the *universal Matter* be a heterogeneous Chaos of confusion, variously moved and as it happens; I say, there is no likelihood that this mad *Motion* would ever amount to so wise a Contrivance as is discernible even in the general Delineations of Nature: nay, it will not amount to a Natural appearance of what we see, and what is conceived most easy thus to come to pass, to wit, a round Sun, Moon, and Earth. For it is shrewdly to be suspected, if there were no Superintendent over the Motions of those *earthcall Whirl-pools*, which the French Philosophy supposes, that the form of the Sun and the rest of the Stars would be oblong, not round, because the Matter recedes all along the *Axis of a Parabola*, as well as from the Centre; and therefore naturally the Space that is left for the finest and subtlest Element of all, of which the Sun and Stars are to consist, will be long, not round. Wherefore this round Figure we see them in must proceed from some higher Principle than the mere Agitation of the Matter: but whether simply *Spermatical*, or *Sensitive* also and *Intellectual*, I'll leave to the disquisition of others, who are more at leisure to meddle with such curiosities.

5. The Business that lies me in hand to make good is this, That taking that for granted which these great Naturalists would have allowed, to wit, *That the Earth moves about the Sun*; I say, the Laws of its Motion are such, that if they had been imposed on her by humane reason and counsel, they would have been no other then they are. So that appealing to our own Faculties, we are to confess that the motion of the Sun and Stars, or of the Earth, as our Naturalists would have it, is from a knowing Principle, or at least hath passed the Approbation and Allowance of such a Principle.

For as *Art* takes what *Nature* will afford for her purpose, and makes up the rest her self: so the *Eternal Mind* (that put the *universal Matter* upon Motion, as I conceive most reasonable, or if the Matter be confusedly mov'd of its self, as the Atheist willfully contends) this *Eternal Mind*, I say, takes the easie and natural results of this general Impetus of *Motion*, where they are for his purpose; where they are not, he rectifies and compleats them.

6. And verily it is far more suitable to Reason, that God making the Matter of that nature, that it can by mere *Motion* produce something, that it should go on so far as that single advantage could naturally carry it; that so the Wit of man, whom God hath made to contemplate the *Phenomena* of Nature, may have a more fit object to exercise it self upon. For thus is the Understanding of Man very highly gratified, when the works of God and their manner of production are made intelligible unto him by a natural deduction of one thing from another; which would not
not have been, if God had on purpose avoided what the Matter upon
Motion naturally afforded, and cancelled the Laws thereof in every thing.
Besides, to have altered or added any thing further, where there was no
need, had been to multiply Entities to no purpose.

Thus it is therefore with Divine Providence, what that one single Im-
pref of Motion upon the Universal Matter will afford that is useful and
good, it doth allow and take in, what it might have miscarried in or
could not amount to, it directs or supplies. As in little pieces of wood
naturally bow’d like a Man’s Elbow, the Carver doth not unbow it, but
carves an hand at the one end of it, and shapes it into the compleat figure
of a Man’s Arm.

That therefore I contend for is this, That be the Matter moved
how it will, the Appearances of things are such as do manifestly intimate
that they are either appointed all of them, or at least approved, by an
Universal Principle of Wisdom and Counsel.

C H A P. II.

1. The perpetual Parallelisme of the Axis of the Earth a manifest argument
of Divine Providence. 2. The great Inconveniences, if the posture of
this parallel Axis were Perpendicular to the Plane of the Ecliptick:
3. Or Co-incident with the said Plane. 4. The excellent advantages of
that Inclining posture it hath, and what a manifest Demonstration it is
of Providence. 5. The same Argument urged from the Ptolemaical
Hypothesis. 6. A further consideration of the Axis of the Earth, and
of the Moon’s crossing the Equinoctial Line. 7. A Demonstration
from the Phænomenon of Gravity, that there is a Principle distinct
from Matter. 8. That neither the Aire, nor any more Subtle Matter in
the Aire, have any Knowledge or free Agency in them. 9. A notable
Demonstration from the Sucker of the Aire-Pump’s drawing up so great a
weight, that there is a Substance distinct from Matter in the World.
10. That this Phænomenon cannot be salvo’d by the Elaftick power of the
Aire, demonstrated from the Phenomenon itself. 11. An Evansion
produced and answered. 12. Another Evansion anticipated. 13. That
this peremptory force of Nature against the first Laves of Mechanical
motion and against that of Gravity, is a palpable pledge, that where things
fall out sily, there is the same Immaterial Guide, though there be not the
same Sensibility of force on the Matter. 14. The ridiculous Sophistry of
the Athief, arguing from some petty effects of the mere Motion of Matter
that there is no higher Principle, plainly discovered and justly derided.
15. Providence concluded from the Laves of Day and Night, Winter
and Summer, &c.

1. Now therefore to admit the Motion of the Earth, and to talk with
the Naturalists in their own Dialect, I demand, Whether it be
better to have the Axis of the Earth steady, and perpetually parallel with
its
its self; or to have it carelessly tumble this way and that way as it happens; or at least very variously and intricately. And you cannot but answer me, That it is better to have it steady and parallel; for in this lies the necessary Foundation of the Art of Navigation and Dialling. For that steady stream of Particles which is supposed to keep the Axis of the Earth parallel to it self, affords the Mariner both his Cynosura and his Compass; the Load-stone and the Load-star depend both on this; and Dialling could not be at all without it. But both of these Arts are pleasant, and the one especially of mighty importance to mankind: For thus there is an orderly measuring of Time for our affairs at home, and an opportunity of traffic abroad with the most remote Nations of the world, and so there is a mutual supply of the several commodities of all Countries, besides the inlarging of our Understanding by so ample Experience we get of both men and things. Wherefore if we were rationally to consult, Whether the Axis of the Earth is to be held steady and parallel to it self, or to be left at random; we would conclude, That it ought to be steady. And so we find it de fato, though the Earth move floating in the liquid Heavens. So that appealing to our own Faculties, we are to affirm, That the constant direction of the Axis of the Earth was established by a Principle of Wisdom and Counsel, or at least approved of it.

2. Again, there being several Postures of this steady direction of the Axis of the Earth, viz. either Perpendicular to a Plane going through the Centre of the Sun, or Co-incident, or Inclining; I demand, which of all these Reason and Knowledge would make choice of. Not of a Perpendicular posture: for both the pleasant variety and great conveniency of Summer and Winter, Spring-time and Harvest, would be lost; and for want of accession of the Sun, these parts of the Earth that bring forth fruit now and are habitable, would be in an incapacity of ever bringing forth any, and consequently could entertain no Inhabitants; and those parts that the full heat of the Sun could reach, he plying them alwayes alike, without any annual recelvance or intermission, would at last grow tired and exhausted. And besides, consulting with our own Faculties we observe, that an orderly vicissitude of things is most pleasant unto us, and doth much more gratifie the Contemplative property in Man.

3. And now in the second place, nor would Reason make choice of a Co-incident position of the Axis of the Earth. For if the Axis thus lay in a Plane that goes through the Centre of the Sun, the Ecliptick would, like a Colure or one of the Meridians, pass through the Poles of the Earth, which would put the Inhabitants of the world into a pitiful condition: For they that scape best in the Temperate Zone, would be acclay'd with very tedious long nights, no less than fourty daies long; and they that now have their night never above four and twenty hours, as Friesland, Ieland, the further parts of Ruffia and Norway, would be deprived of the Sun above a hundred and thirty daies together; our selves in England, and the rest of the same Clime, would be closed up in darkness no less then an hundred or eighty continual daies, and so proportionally of the rest both in and out of the Temperate Zones. And as for Summer and Winter,
Winter, though those vicissitudes would be, yet it could not but cause very raging Diseases to have the Sun stay so long describing his little Circles near the Poles, and lying so hot upon the Inhabitants that had been in so long extremity of Darkness and Cold before.

4. It remains therefore, that the posture of the Axis of the Earth be Inclining, not Co-incident, nor Perpendicular to the forenamed Plane. And verily it is not only Inclining, but in a fit proportion, that there can be no fitter excogitated to make it to the utmost capacity as well pleasant as habitable. For though the course of the Sun be curbed within the compass of the Tropicks, and so makes those parts very hot; yet the constant gales of wind from the East (to say nothing of the nature and fit length of their nights) make the Torrid Zone not onely habitable, but pleasant.

Now this best posture which our Reason would make choice of, we see really establis'd in Nature; and therefore, if we be not perverse and wilfull, we are to infer, that it was establish'd by a Principle that hath in it Knowledge and Counsel, not from a blind fortuitous jumbling of the parts of the Matter one against another, especially having found before in our selves a Knowing Spiritual Subsauce, that is also able to move and alter the Matter. Wherefore, I say, we should more naturally conclude, That there is some such Universal Knowing Principle, that hath power to move & direct the Matter of the Universe; then to fancy that a confused jumbling of the Parts thereof should contrive themselves into such a condition, as if they had in them Reason and Counsel, and could direct themselves. But this directing Principle, what could it be but God?

5. But to speak the same thing more briefly, and yet more intelligibly, to those that are onely acquainted with the Ptolemaical Hypothesis: I say, that being it might have hapned, that the annual course of the Sun should have been through the Poles of the world, and that the Axis of the Heavens might have been very troublesome and disorderly moveable, from whence all those inconveniences would arise which I have before mentioned, and yet they are not, but are so ordered as our own Reason must approve of: as being it is natural for a man to conceive, that they are really ordered by a Principle of Reason and Counsel, that is, that they are made by an All-wise and All-powerful God.

6. I will onely adde one or two observables more, concerning the Axis of the Earth and the course of the Moon, and so I will pass to other things.

It cannot but be acknowledged, that if the Axis of the Earth were perpendicular to the Plane of the Sun's Eclip décembre, that her Motion would be more easie & natural; and yet, for the conveniences afore-mentioned, we see it is made to stand in an inclining posture: So in all likelihood it would be more easie and natural for that Hand-maid of the Earth, the Moon, to finish her monethly courses in the Equinoctiel Line; but we see, like the Sun, she crosses it, and expatiates some degrees farther then the Sun himself, that her exalted light might be more comfortable to thofe that live very much North, in their long nights.

Wherefore I conclude, That though it were possible that the confused
fused agitation of the parts of the Matter might make a round hard heap like the Earth, and more thin and liquid bodies like the Astr and Sun, and that the Earth may swim in this liquid Astr, like a rosted Apple in a great bowl of Wine, and be carried about like straws or grafs cast upon a Whirlpool, ye that its Motion and Posture would be so directed and attemper’d, as we our selves, that have Reason upon due consideration would have it to be, and yet not to be from that which is Knowing, and in some sense Reasonable, is to our Faculties, if they discern any thing at all, as abonous and absurd as any thing can be. For when it had been easier to have been otherwife, why should it be thus, if some Superintendent Cause did not oversee and direct the Motions of the Matter, allowing nothing therein but what our Reason will confefs to be to very good purpofe?

7. And that the foregoing Phenomena are not by chance or luck, but directed and effectted by the abovefaid Superintendency, will be more evincingly confirmed, if we adde the consideration of two other Phenomen in Nature, which are very plain and simple, but even violently crofs to the mere Mechanical powers of Matter. The one is that of Gravity, or the Descent of heavy bodies toward the Earth, the other what they ordinarily call Fuga Vaci: wherein I fhall bring fuch an infance out of that noble and ingenious Gentleman’s Experiments of his Aire-pump, as will plainly demonstrate there must be fome Immortal Being that exercises its directive Activity on the Matter of the World. But firft I fhall recurre, and give a touch upon the nature of Gravity.

That, upon fupposition the Earth runs round in four and twenty hours, it will violently fling off fuch things as lye upon it, (unles there be fome other Substance qffinct from Matter that resifts the Mechanical powers thereof,) I have clearly and copiously demonfrated in my Treatife of the Immortality of the Soule. And if we confider more particularly what a strong tug a maffie Bullet, suppose of lead or brafs, muft needs give (according to that prime Mechanical law of Motion perfifting in a right Line) to recede from the superficies of the Earth, the Bullet being in fo swift a motion as would dispatch fome fifteen miles in one minute of an hour; it muft needs appear that a wonderfull power is required to curf it, regulate it, or remand it back to the Earth, and keep it there notwithstanding the strong reluctane of that firft Mechanical Law of Matter that would urge it to recede. Whereby is manifested not only the marvellous power of Unity and Indifcerpibillity in the Spirit of Nature, but that there is a peremptory, and even forcible, execution of an All-comprehenfive and Eternal Counsel for the ordering and the guiding of the Motion of the Matter in the Univerfe to what is for the bet. And this Phenomenon of Gravity is of fo good and necessary consequence, that there could be neither Earth nor Inhabitants without it, in this State that things are.

For the Aire, whether a man will be fo delirous as to phancy it all en-dued with perception and liberty of will to refift as it pleafes, or to be inter-ferped with fome subtler Matter fo qualified, which they muft ridicu-loufly make either a dijjoyned or elfe fpongy and perforated Deity; all
the resistance that this laxe and disunited Element could make, call it Natural or Divine, (for words have no force) could no more keep down the above-said Bullet from receding from the Earth, than an army of the smallest Flies stop a Cannon-bullet flying in the Aire, let them reft it as stoutly as they can. So plain a Demonstration is this Phenomenon of Gravity, that there is a Spirit of Nature, which is the Vicarious power of God upon the Motion of the Matter of the Universe.

8. And that neither the Aire it self has any such Power, Knowledge and liberty of will, nor that there are any such Divine particles interspersed in the Aire that have, in my opinion is plainly manifest from the second & thirty second Experiments of the abovementied Treatise of that Learned * Gentleman. For wheres in the first of those Experiments, the Brave Key or Stopple of the Cover of the Receiver, after the Receiver is emptied well of Aire, is with much difficulty lifted up, and in the other, if you apply a tapering Valve of brafs to the lower branch of the Stop-cock of the Receiver well emptied of Aire, as before, and turn the Key of the Stop-cocK, the external Aire beating like a forcible stream upon the Valve to get in ther, will suddenly both shut the Valve, and keep it shut so strongly, that it will bear up with it a ten-pound weight (which are evident arguments of an earneft endeavour in Nature to fill the Receiver again with Aire, as it was naturally before, though this motion whereby it attempts so strongly to get in, does more accurately exclude it out;) it is apparent from hence that neither the Aire it self, nor any more subtle and Divine Matter (which is more strongly congregated together in the Receiver upon the pumping out of the Aire) has any freedome of will, nor any knowledge or perception to doe any thing, they being so puzzel’d and acting so fondly and preposterously in their endeavours to re-plenish the Receiver again with Aire.

For if the external Aire and that subtle Matter in the Receiver had been knowing and free Agents, there would have been that Correspondence betwixt them, that the Exeriour Aire would have suspended or withdrawn its pressure without, and the subtle and Divine Matter within would have directed its motion against the Stopple and Valve to let in the Aire, according to the intention of Nature. Or if nothing but that subtle body be free and knowing, that alone by mutual Correspondence (that in the Aire without bearing off the pressure of the outward Aire against the Receiver, & that part within bearing against the Valve or Stopple) would let in the Aire, according to the earneft and serious purpose of Nature. But their acting being so clear contrary to the End designed, and their attempts so inept, (whenas yet the thing were easily done, if there were Knowledge and free Agency in either the Aire or any other more subtle Matter) it is a Demonstration that the Impetus of Motion in all Matter is blinde and necessarie, and that there is no Matter at all that is free and knowing, but moves and acts of it self (if undirected by some other Immateriale Principle) according to the mere Mechanical laws of Motion.

9. According to which that notable * Phenomenon, which now at last I come to, cannot be brought to pafs, namely, That the Sucker of the Aire—

*See Mr. Boyle’s New Experiments Physical-Mechanical, Exp. 12.
CHAP. II. An Antidote against Atheism.

Aire-pump, the Cylinder being well emptied of Aire, should draw up above an hundred pound weight, moving up as it were of its own accord.

For, as the ingenious Experimenter has observed in his third Experiment, this forcible endeavours of the subingression of the Aire is not from the pressure of the ambient Aire as strengthened by the accession of the Aire sucked out, because then he that manages the Pump would find the restistance of the Aire increased as the Sucker is drawn down lower, which yet is not observed. To which we may add in reason, that the Aire being nothing but a thin body or Congeries of small particles in perpetual motion, what is pumped out will naturally spread out into such distances as it may move more freely in, that is, into those spaces where the Aire is more thin; so that, as it were in a moment, all the Aire becomes of one and the same consistency. And therefore any new pressure (upon the account of the Aire nearest to the Pump becoming more thick) cannot come into compute in this case.

To. The most plausible Mechanical Solution therefore that can be given of this Phenomenon is that Hypothesis which the excellent Author himself has made use of, and which will agree universally to the Aire though in its own natural temper: namely, that there is an Elastic power in the Aire, whether you explain it the Cartesian way, by the playing and whirling of every particle thereof, whereby they attempt to possess a larger space; or whether there be such a compression of the particles as there is in the hair of a lock of wooll, which will expand itself upon the receding of what bore too strongly against it.

But let this Elastic power consist in this or in what else it will, though the Solution look at first sight very hopefull and promising, yet I must confess (but with submission to better judgments) that the Effect that is attributed to the Hypothesis in this Experiment, seems to me a Demonstration against the Hypothesis itself. For this Elastic power, according to the Experiment, has no less force of pressure than an hundred pound weight or more: which pressure (as in all flexible bodies that have a Spring-power in them) is perpetual and every where in the Aire, if it be there at all. And therefore any Cylinder of Aire in the same height from the ground, and of the same diameter with that of the Sucker of the Pump, will press as forcibly as an hundred pound weight.

Now suppose a Lump of Butter in a pair of wooden scales having the same diameter with the Sucker of the Aire-pump: it is manifest that this Butter will be pressed with the force of the pressure of two hundred pound weight, a Cylinder of Aire from beneath and another from above pressing with the force of an hundred pound weight apiece. This would necessarily follow if there were this Elastic power in the Aire. But the Butter is not pressed at all, as appears in that no serose humour is squeezed out of it; nor is it at all flatted or spread out by any such compression, although it have the force of two hundred pound weight pressing it, according to this Hypothesis of the Elastic power of the Aire.

11. Nor can I excogitate any Evagination against this Demonstration, unless it be that the Spring of the Aire pressing against the sides of the Butter as well as the bottom and top, keeps it from flattening. But it is easily
easily answered, That yet it cannot keep it from squeezing on all sides, and pressing out the milky and serose humour in the Butter, if there were any such pressure, as is supposed. To which you may further add, That the Lump of Butter being reduced to the figure, suppose, of a round Trencher, whose edge should fall short of the Area of the two sides an hundred or two hundred times, and then placed between two thin light Trenchers broad enough for the purpose, and hung free in the Aire with strings, as in a Scale, so that the force of pressure from above and beneath shall exceed that against the round edge of the Butter an hundred or two hundred times; yet the Butter will not for all this be pressed closer by the Spring of the Aire, nor have any more effect upon it then it had before: when notwithstanding it is so soft and yielding, that a very small force of our hands will press it betwixt the two Trenchers.

12. Which yet is not; because our strength is superadded to the force of the Spring of the Aire: For the excess of the force of the Spring of the Aire against the sides of the Trenchers above that which is against the round edge of the Butter, is far greater; then the addition of the force of our pressing hand added to the force of the Aire-spring against the sides of the Trencher, and yet there was no new effect.

And moreover where this Aire-spring does not reach, namely, within the sides of a pail filled with water, in which you may put a lump of Butter, the Butter will then as easily yield to the pressure of your hand as in the Aire it self. So that it is irrefragably evident, that there is no such Spring of the Aire as some learned men have supposed, much less so strong as to matter an hundred pound weight, as it is conceived to doe in this notable Experiment of the Aire-pump.

13. But as the Phenomenon of Gravity is quite cross and contrary to the very first Mechanick laws of Motion, which yet is an Universal law of Terrestrial bodies, put upon them by that which is not onely not Terrestrial, but Immaterial: So likewise this ascending of the Sucker of the Aire-pump with above an hundred pound weight at it, is as cross and violent a breach of that Universal Law of Gravity, and so forcible, that it is apparent, that there is a Principle transcending the nature and power of Matter that does umpire and rule all, that directs the Motion of every part and parcel of Matter backwards and forwards and contrary waies, in pursuance of such General designs as are best for the Whole. And no less good then the living and breathing of Animals is aimed at in this so industriously and peremptorily keeping the parts of the Aire together, as is well observed by this vertuous and judicious Authour, upon his 41 Experiment.

Wherefore it being so manifest, that there is a Principle in the World that does tug so stoutly and resolutely against the Mechanick laws of Matter, and that so forcibly resists or nulls one common Law of Nature for the more seasonable exercise of another; this, I say, is a very sure pledge to us, that when things are fitly done, though not with this seeming violence and peremptoriness, yet they are the Effects of the same Immaterial Principle, (call it the Spirit of Nature or what you will) which is the Vicarious Power of God upon this great Automaton, the World.

14. But
14. But because so many bullets joggled together in a man's hat will settle to such a determinate figure, or because the frost and the wind will draw upon doors and glass-windows pretty uncouth streaks like feathers, and other fooleries, which are to no use or purpose, to infer thence, that all the contrivances that are in nature, even the frame of the bodies both of men and beasts, are from no other principle but the jumbling together of the matter, and so because that this doth naturally effect something, that it is the cause of all things, seems to me to be a reasoning in the same mood and figure with that wise market-mans, who going down a hill, and carrying his cheeses under his arms, one of them falling and trundling down the hill very fast, let the other goe after it, appointing them all to meet him at his house at Gotham, not doubting but they beginning so hopefully, would be able to make good the whole journey: or like another of the same town, who perceiving that his iron trevet he had bought had three feet, and could stand, expected also that it should walk too, and fave him the labour of the carriage. So our profound atheisfs and epicureans, according to the same pitch of wisdom, do not stick to infer, because this confused motion of the parts of the matter may amount to a rude delineation of hard and soft, rigid and fluid, and the like, that therefore it will goe on further, and reach to the disposing of the matter in such order as doth naturally imply a principle that some way or other contains in it exact wisdom and counsel. A position more befeeming the wise-men above mentioned, then any one that hath the least command of his natural wit and faculties.

15. Wherefore we having sufficiently detected the ridiculous folly of this present sophism, let us, attending heedfully to the natural emanations of unprejudiced reason, conclude, that the rising and setting of the lights of heaven, the vicissitude of day and night, winter and summer, being so ordered and guided as if they had been settled by exquisite consultation and by clearest knowledge, that therefore that which did thus ordain them is a knowing principle, able to move, alter and guide the matter according to his own will and pleasure; that is to say, there is a god. And verily I do not at all doubt but that I shall evidently trace the visible footsteps of this divine counsel and providence, even in all things discoverable in the world. But I will pass through them as lightly and briefly as I can.

Chap. III.

1. That there is nothing in nature but what passeth the approbation of a knowing principle. 2. The great usefulness of hills and mountains. 3. The condition of man in order and respect to the rest of the creation. 4. The designed usefulness of quarries of stone, timber-wood, metals and minerals. 5. How upon these depend the glory and magnificence both
both of Peace and Warre: 6. As also the defense of Men against Beasts.

1. LET us therefore swiftly course over the Valleys and Mountains, found the depth of the Sea, range the Woods and Forests, dig into the Entrails of the Earth, and let the Atheist tell me which of all these places are silent, and say nothing of a God. Those that are most dumb will at least compromise with the rest, that all things are by the guidance and determination, (let the Matter move as it will) or at least by the allowance and approbation, of a Knowing Principle. As a Mason that makes a wall, sometimes meets with a Stone that wants no cutting, and so approving of it, he places it in his work: and a piece of Timber may happen to be crack'd in the very place where the Carpenter would cleave it, and he need not close it first, that he may cleave it afterward. Wherefore if the mere Motion of the Matter can doe any rude general thing of good consequence, let it stand as allowable: But we shall find out also those things which do so manifestly favour of Design and Counsel, that we cannot naturally withhold our assent, but must say There is a God.

2. And now let us betake our selves to the search, and see if all things be not so as our Reason would desire them. And to begin at the Top first, even those rudely-scattered Mountains, that seem but to many Wens and unnatural Protuberancies upon the face of the Earth, if you consider but of what consequence they are, thus reconciled you may deem them ornaments as well as useful.

For these are Nature's Stillatories, in whose hollow Caverns the ascending vapours are congealed to that universal Aqua vitae, that good fresh-water, the liquor of life, that sustains all the living Creatures in the world, being carried along in all parts of the Earth in the winding Channels of Brookes and Rivers. Geography would make it good by a large induction. I will only instance in three or four; Ana and Tagus run from Sierra Molina in Spain, Rhenum, Padus and Rhodanus from the Alps, Tanais from the Riphean, Garumna from the Pyrenean Mountains, Achelous from Pindus, Hebrus from Rhodope, Tigria from Niphates, Orontes from Libanus, and Ephrates from the Mountains of Armenia, and so in the rest. But I will not insist upon this; I will now betake my self to what doth more forcibly declare an Eye of Providence directing and determining, as well as approving of, the results of the supposed agitation of the parts of the Matter.

3. And that you may the better feel the strength of my Argument, let us first briefly consider the Nature of Man, what Faculties he hath, and in what order he is in respect of the rest of the Creatures. And, indeed, though his Body be but weak and disarmed, yet his inward abilities of Reason and Artificial contrivance is admirable. He is much given to Contemplation, and the viewing of this Theatre of the world, to traffic and commerce with foreign Nations, to the building of Houses and Ships, to the making curious instruments of Silver, Brass or Steel, and the like: in a word, he is the flower and chief of all the products of Nature upon
upon this Globe of the Earth. Now if I can shew, that there are designs laid even in the lowest and vilest products of Nature that respect Man the highest of all, you cannot deny but that there is an Eye of Providence that respecteth all things, and passeth very swiftly from the Top to the Bottom, disposing all things wisely.

4. I therefore now demand, Man being of this nature that he is, whether these noble Faculties of his would not be lost and frustrate, were there not Materials to exercise them on. And in the second place, I desire to know, whether the rude confused Agitation of the particles of the Matter do certainly produce any such Materials fit for Man to exercise his skill on, or no: that is to say, whether there were any Necessity that could infallibly produce Quarries of Stone in the Earth, which are the chief Materials of all the Magnificent Structures of building in the world, and the fame of Iron and Steel, without which there had been no use of these Stones; and then of Sea-Coal and other necessary Fuel, fit for the working or melting of these Metalls; and also of Timber-Trees, for all might have been as well brush-wood and shrubs, and then assuredly there had been no such convenient Shipping, whatever had become of other buildings: and so of the Load-Stone, that great help to Navigation, whether it might not have lain so low in the Earth as never to have been reached by the Industry of Man; and the same may be said also of other Stones and Metalls, that they being heaviest, might have lain lowest. Affuredly the agitated Matter, unless there were some special over-powering guidance over it, might as well have over-flipt these necessary useful things as hit upon them: But if there had not been such a Creature as Man, these very things themselves had been useless, for none of the brute Beasts make use of such Commodities. Wherefore unless a man will doe enormous violence to his Faculties, he must conclude, that there is a contrivance of Providence and Counsel in all those things, which reacheth from the beginning, to the end, and orders all things sweetly: and that Providence foreseeing what a kind of Creature the would make Man, provided him with materials from whence he might be able to adorn his present Age, and furnish History with the Records of egregious exploits both of Art and Valour.

5. But without the provision of the forenamed Materials, the Glory and Pomp both of War and Peace had been lost. For men in stead of those magnificent Buildings which are seen in the world, could have had no better kind of dwellings then a bigger fort of Bee-hives or Birds-nests, made of contemptible Sticks, and straws, and dirty mortar. And in stead of the usual pomp and bravery of War, wherein is heard the solemn sound of the hoarse Trumpet, the courageous bearing of the Drum, the neighing and prancing of the Horses, clattering of Armour, and the terrible thunder of Cannons, to say nothing of the glittering of the Sword and Spear, the waving and fluttering of displayed Colours, the gallantry of Charges upon their well-managed Steeds, and the like: I say, had it not been for the forenamed provision of Iron, Steel and Brass, and such like necessary Materials, in stead of all this glory and solemnity there had been nothing but howlings and shoutings of poor naked men, belabouring
one another with snag’d sticks, or dully falling together by the ears at Fifti-cuffs.

6. Besides this, Beasts being naturally armed, and men naturally unarmed with any thing else their Reason, and Reason being ineffectual having no materials to work upon; it is plain, that that which made Men, Beasts and Metals, knew what it did, and did not forget it self in leaving Man destitute of natural Armature, having provided Materials, and giving him wit and abilities to arm himself, and so to be able to make his party good against the most fierce and stoutest of all living Creatures whatsoever; nay indeed, left him unarmed on purpose, that he might arm himself, and exercise his natural wit and industry.

**C H A P. IV.**

1. **Distinction of Land and Sea not without a Providence.** 2. **As also the Consequence of the Sea-Water that it can bear Ships.** 3. **The great convenience and pleasure of Navigation.** 4. **The admirable train of fit Provisions in Nature for the gratifying the Wit of man in so concerning a Curiosity.**

1. Having thus passed over the Hills, and through the Woods & hollow Entrails of the Earth, let us now view the wide Sea also, and see whether that do not inform us that there is a God; that is, whether things be not there in such sort as a rational Principle would either order or approve, whenas yet notwithstanding they might have been otherwise. And now we are come to view those Campos natantes, as Lucretius calls them, that vast Champain of Water, the Ocean; I demand first, Whether it might not have been wider then it is, even so large as to overspread the face of the whole Earth, and so to have taken away the habitation of Men and Beasts. For the wet particles might have easily ever mingled with the dry, and so all had either been Sea or Quag-mire.

2. And then again, though this distinction of Land and Sea be made, Whether this watry Element might not have fallen out to be of so thin a consistency as that it would not bear Shipping; for it is so far from impossibility, as there be de facto in Nature such waters, as the River Silas, for example, in India. And the waters of Borythines are so thin and light, that they are said to swim upon the top of the Stream of the River Hypanis. And we know there is some kind of wood so heavy that it will sink in any ordinary kind of water.

I appeal therefore to any mans Reason, whether it be not better that there should be a distinction of Land and Sea, then that all should be mire or water; and whether it be not better that the Timber-trees afford wood so light that it swim on the water, or the water be so heavy that it will bear up the wood, then the contrary. That therefore which might have been otherwise, and yet is settled according to our own hearts will, who...
are knowing and rational Creatures, ought to be deemed by us as esta-
blished by Counsel and Reason.

3. And the closer we look into the business, we shall discern more evi-
dent foot-steps of Providence in it: For the two main properties of Man
being Contemplation, and Sociableness or love of Converse, there could
nothing so highly gratifie his nature as power of Navigation, whereby
he riding on the back of the waves of the Sea, views the wonders of the
Deep, and by reason of the glimnes of that Element, is able in a compe-
tent time to prove the truth of those sagacious suggestions of his own
Mind, that is, whether the Earth be every way round, and whether there
be any Antipodes, and the like; and by cutting the Aequinoctial line,
decides that controversy of the habitableness of the Torrid Zone, or ra-
ther wipes out that blot that lay upon Divine Providence, as if so great a
share of the world had been lost by reason of unfitness for Habitation.

Besides, the falling upon strange Coasts, and discovering men of so great
a diversity of manners from our selves, cannot but be a thing of infinite
pleasure and advantage, to the enlargement of our thoughts from what
we observe in their Conversation, Parts and Policy. Add unto this the
fundry Rarities of Nature, and Commodities proper to several Countrys,
which they that stay at home enjoy by the Travels of those that goe
abroad, and they that travel grow rich for their adventure.

4. Now therefore Navigation being of so great consequence to the
delight and convenience of humane life, and there being both wit and cou-
rage in man to attempt the Seas, were he but fitted with right Materials
and other advantages requisite: when we see there is so pat a provision
made for him to this purpose in large Timber, for the building of his
Ship; in a thick Sea-water, sufficient to bear the Ship's burthen; in the
Magnet or Load-stone, for his Compass; in the steady and parallel dire-
tion of the Axis of the Earth, for his Cynofura; and then observing his
natural wit and courage to make use of them, and how that ingenite desire
of knowledge and converse, and of the improving of his own parts and
happiness, stir him up to so notable a design; we cannot but conclude
from such a train of Causes so fitly and congruously complying together,
That it was really the counsel of an Universal and Eternal Mind, that
hath the overseeing and guidance of the whole frame of Nature, that
laid together these Causes so carefully and wisely; that is, we cannot
but conclude That there is a God.

And if we have got so fat foot-hold already in this Truth by the con-
sideration of such Phanomena in the world that seem more rude and gen-
eral, what will the contemplation of the more particular and more
polished pieces of Nature afford in Vegetables, Animals, and the Body of
Man?
CHAP. V.

1. That the Form and Beauty, Seed and Signature of Plants are Arguments of a Providence. 2. That though the mere motion of the Matter might produce certain Meteors, as Hail, Snow, Ice, &c. yet it will not follow that the same is the adequate cause of Animals and Plants. 3. That it were no great botch nor gap in Nature, if some more rude Phænomena were acknowledged the Results of the mere Mechanical Motion of Matter. 4. That the Forme and Beauty of Flowers and Plants are from an higher Principle. 5. That there is such a thing as Beauty, and that it is the Object of our Intellectual Faculties. 6. From whence it follows, that the beautiful Formes and Figures of Plants and Animals are from an Intellectual Principle.

1. Hitherto we have onely considered the more rude and careless strokes and delineations of Divine Providence in the world, set out in those more large Phænomena of Day and Night, Winter and Summer, Land and Sea, Rivers, Mountains, Metalls, and the like; we now come to a clofer view of God and Nature in Vegetables, Animals, and Man.

And first of Vegetables, where I shall touch only these four heads, their Form and Beauty, their Seed, their Signatures, and their great Use as well for Medicine as Sustenance. And that we may the better understand the advantage we have in this clofer Contemplation of the works of Nature, we are in the first place to take notice of the condition of that Substance which we call Matter, how fluid and slippery and undeterminate it is of itself; or if it be hard, how unfit it is to be chang'd into any thing else. And therefore all things rot into a moisture before any thing can be generated of them, as we often see the wax before we set on the Seal.

2. Now therefore, unless we will be so foolish, as because the uniform motion of the Aire, or some more subtile corporeal Element, may so equally compress or bear against the parts of a little vaporous moisture, as to form it into round drops (as some say it doth in the Dew and other Experiments) and therefore because this more rude and general Motion can doe something, conclude that it does all things; we must in all Reason confess that there is an Eternal Mind, in virtue whereof the Matter is thus usefully formed and changed.

But mere rude and undirected Motion, because naturally it will have some kind of Refults, that therefore it will reach to such as plainly imply a wise contrivance of Counsel, is so ridiculous a Sophism, as I have already intimated, that it is more fit to impose upon the inconfiderate Souls of Fools and Children, then upon men of mature Reason and well exercis'd in Philosophy. Admit that Rain and Snow and Wind and Hail and Ice, and such like Meteors, may be the products of Heat and Cold, or of the Motion and Rest of certain small particles of the Matter; yet that the useful
useful and beautiful contrivance of the branches, flowers and fruits of plants should be so too (to say nothing yet of the bodies of birds, fishes, beasts and men) is as ridiculous and supine a collection, as to infer that, because mere heat and cold does soften and harden wax, and puts it into some shape or other, that therefore this mere heat and cold, or motion and rest, without any art and direction, made the silver seal too, and grave upon it to curiously some coat of arms, or the shape of some birds or beasts, as an eagle, a lion, and the like. Nay, indeed, this inference is more tolerable far than the other, these effects of art being more facile and less noble then those others of nature.

3. Nor is it any botch or gap at all in the works of nature, that some particular phenomena be but the easy effects of such general motion communicated unto the matter from god, others the effects of more curious contrivance, or of the divine art or reason (for such are the λόγοι ορθογραφίκαι, the *Rationes Seminales*) incorporated in the matter, especially the matter itself being in some sort vital; else it would not continue the motion that it is put upon, when it is occasionally this or the other way moved: and besides, the nature of god being the most perfect fulness of life, that is possibly conceivable, it is very congruous that this outmost and remotest shadow of himself be some way, though but obscurely, vital. Wherefore things falling off by degrees from the highest perfection, it will be no uneven or unproportionable step, if descending from the top of this outward creation, man, in whom there is a principle of more fine and reflexive reason, which hangs on, though not in that manner, in the more perfect kind of brute, as sensible, loth to be curbed within too narrow compass, lays hold upon some kinds of plants, as in those sundry sorts of zoophyta, but in the rest there are no further foot-steps discovered of an animadversive form abiding in them, though there be the effects of an inadvertent form (λόγος ορθογραφίκος) of materialized or incorporated art or seminal reason: I lay, it is no uneven jot, to pass from the more faint and obscure examples of spermalical life to the more considerable effects of general motion in minerals, metals, and sundry meteor, whose easy and rude shapes may have no need of any principle of life, or spermalical form distinct from the rest or motion of the particles of the matter.

4. But there is that curiositie of form and beauty in the more noble kind of plants, bearing such a futableness and harmony with the more refined sense and sagacity of the soul of man, that he cannot chuse (his intellectual touch being so sweetly gratified by what it apprehends in such like objects) but acknowledge that some hidden cause, much akin to his own nature, that is intellectual, is the contriver and perfecter of these so pleasant spectacles in the world.

5. Nor is it at all to the purpose to object, that this business of beauty and comeliness of proportion is but a conceit, because some men acknowledge no such thing, and all things are alike handsome to them, who yet notwithstanding have the use of their eyes as well as other folks. For, I say, this rather makes for what we aim, that pulchritude is conveyed indeed by the outward senses unto the soul, but a more intellectual
Intellectual Faculty is that which relishes it; as a Geometrical Scheme is let in by the Eyes, but the Demonstration is discern'd by Reason. And therefore it is more rational to affirm, that some Intellectual Principle was the Author of this Pulchritude of things, then that they should be thus fashioned without the help of that Principle. And to say that there is no such thing as Pulchritude, because some mens Souls are so dull and stupid that they relish all Objects alike in that respect; is as absurd and groundless, as to conclude there is no such thing as Reason and Demonstration, because a natural Fool cannot reach unto it. But that there is such a thing as Beauty, and that it is acknowledged by the whole generations of men to be in Trees, Flowers and Fruits, the adorning and beautifying of Buildings in all Ages is an ample and undeniable Testimony. For what is more ordinary with them then the taking in Flowers and Fruitage for the garnishing of their work? Besides, I appeal to any man that is not sunk into so forlorn a pitch of Degeneracy, that he is as stupid to these things as the bafelt of Beasts, whether, for example, a rightly-cut Tetrahedron, Cube or Icosahedron have no more pulchritude in them, then any rude broken stone lying in the field or high-ways; or to name other solid Figures, which though they be not Regular, properly so called, yet have a settled Idea and Nature, as a Cone, Spheor or Cylinder, whether the sight of these do not gratifie the minds of men more, and pretend to more elegance of shape, then those rude cuttings or chippings of freestone that fall from the Mafon's hands, and serve for nothing but to fill up the middle of the Wall, and so to be hid from the Eyes of Man for their ugliness. And it is observable, that if Nature shape any thing near this Geometrical accuracy, that we take notice of it with much content and pleasure: as if it be but exactly round (as there are abundance of such stones found betwixt two hills in Cuba, an Island of America) or ordinarily Quingangular, or have the sides but Parallel, though the Angles be unequal, as is seen in some little stones, and in a kind of Alabaster found here in England; these stones, I say, gratifie our sight, as having a nearer cognition with the Soul of Man, that is Rational and Intellectual, and therefore is well pleased when it meets with any outward Object that fits and agrees with those congenite Ideas her own nature is furnished with. For Symmetry, Equality and Correspondency of parts, is the discernment of Reason, not the Object of Sense, as I have heretofore proved.

6. Now therefore it being evident that there is such a thing as Beauty, Symmetry and Comeliness of Proportion (to say nothing of the delightful mixture of Colours) & that this is the proper Object of the Understanding and Reason, (for these things be not taken notice of by the Beasts) I think I may safely infer, That whatever is the first and principal Cause of changing the fluid and undetermined Matter into shapes so comely and symmetrical, as we see in Flowers and Trees, is an Understanding Principle, and knows both the nature of man, and of those Objects he offers to his sight in this outward and visible world. For these things cannot come by chance, or by a multifarious attempt of the parts of the Matter upon themselves; for then it were likely that the Species of things (though some might hit right, yet most) would be main'd and ridicu-
C H A P. VI.

An Antidote against Atheism.

1. Providence argued from the Seeds of Plants. 2. An Objection answered concerning thinking Weeds and poisonous Plants. 3. The Signature of Plants an argument of Providence. 4. Certain Instances of Signatures. 5. An Answer to an Objection concerning such Signatures in Plants as cannot referre to Medicine.

1. I Say therefore, in that every Plant hath its Seed, it is an evident sign of Divine Providence. For it being no necessary Refult of the Motion of the Matter, as the whole contrivance of the Plant indeed is not, and it being of so great consequence that they have Seed for the continuance and propagation of their own Species, and for the gratifying of mans Art also, industry and necessities (for much of Husbandry and Gardening lies in this) it cannot but be an Ad of Counsel to furnish the several kinds of Plants with their Seeds, especially the Earth being of such a nature, that though at first for a while it might bring forth all manner of Plants, (as one will have it also to have brought forth all kinds of Animals) yet at last it would grow so sluggish, that without the advantage of those small compendious Principles of generation, the grains of Seed, it would yield no such births; no more then a Pump grown dry will yield any water, unless you pour a little water into it first, and then for one Bacon-ful you may fetch up to many Soe-fuls.

2. Nor is it material to object, That thinking Weeds and poisonous Plants bear Seed too, as well as the most pleasant and most useful: For even those thinking Weeds and poisonous Plants have their use. For first, the Industry of Man is exercised by them to weed them out where they are hurtful. Which reason if it seem right, let us but consider, that if humane Industry had nothing to conflict and struggle with, the fire of mans Spirit would be half extinguished in the flesh; and then we shall acknowledge that that which I have alledged is not so contemptible nor invalid.
An Antidote against Atheism.

Book II.

But secondly, who knows but it is so with poisonous Plants as vulgarly is phanied concerning Toads and other poisonous Serpents, that they lick the venome from off the Earth: so poisonous Plants may well draw to them all the malign juice and nourishment, that the other may be more pure and defacate, as there are Receptacles in the Body of Man and Emunctories to drain them of superfluous Choler, Melancholy, and the like.

But lastly, it is very well known by them that know any thing in Nature and Physick, that those Herbs that the rude and ignorant would call Weeds are the Materials of very soveraign Medicines; that Aconitum hyemale or Winter-wolfs-bane, that otherwise is rank poison, is reported to prevail mightily against the bitings of Vipers and Scorpions, which Crollius affenteth unto; and that that Plant that bears death in the very name of it, Solanum lethifororwm, prevents death by procuring sleep, if it be rightly apply’d in a Feaver. Nor are those things to be deemed unprofitable whose we know not yet; for all is not to be known at once, that succeeding Ages may ever have something left to gratifie themselves in their own discoveries.

3. We come now to the Signatures of Plants, which seem no less Argument that the highest Original of the works of Nature is some Understanding Principle, then that so careful provision of their Seed. Nay, indeed, this respects us more properly and adequately then the other; and is a certain Key to enter Man into the knowledge and use of the Treasures of Nature. I demand therefore, whether it be not a very easy and genuine inference, from the observing that several Herbs are marked with some mark or sign that intimates their virtue, what they are good for, and there being such a creature as Man in the world that can read and understand these signs and characters; hence to collect that the Author both of Man and them knew the nature of them both: For it is like the Inscriptions upon Apothecaries Boxes, that the Matter of the Shop sets on that the Apprentice may read them; nay, it is better, for here is in Herbs inscribed the very nature and use of them, not the mere name. Nor is there any necessity that all should be thus sign’d, though some be; for the rarity of it is the delight: for otherwise it had been dull and crying, too much harping upon the same string. And besides, Divine Providence would only initiate and enter mankind into the useful knowledge of her Treasures, leaving the rest to employ our industry, that we might not live like idle Loyterers and Truants. For the Theatre of the world is an exercife of Mans wit, not a lazy Polyanthea, or book of Common places. And therefore all things are in some measure obscure and intricate, that the sedulity of that divine Spark, the Soul of Man, may have matter of conquest and triumph, when he has done bravely by a superadventent assistance of his God.

4. But that there be some Plants that bear a very evident Signature of their nature and use, I shall fully make good by these following instances. Captbus Veneris, Polyptrichon or Maiden-hair, the lye in which it is adden or infus’d is good to wash the head, and make the Hair grow in those places that are more thin and bare.
And the decoction of Quinces, which are a downy and hairy fruit, is accounted good for thefetching again Hair that has fallen by the French Pox.

The leaf of Balm, and of Alleluia or Wood-Sorrel, as also the Roots of Anthora, represent the Heart in figure, and are Cardiacal.

Walnuts bear the whole signature of the Head. The outward green Cortex answers to the Pericranium, and a fault made of it is singularly good for wounds in that part; as the kernel is good for the Brains, which it resembles.

Umbilicus Veneris is powerful to provoke Luft, as Dioscorides affirms. As also your several forts of Satyrions, which have the evident resemblance of the genital parts upon them; * Aron especially, and all your Orchis, that they have given names unto from some beasts or other, as Cynorhiz, Orchis Myodes, Tragorchis, and the like. The last whereof, notorious also for its goatish smell, and tufts not unlike the beard of that lecherous Animal, is of all the rest the most powerful Incentive to Luft.

The leaves of Hypericum are very thick prick'd, or pink'd with little holes, and it is a singular good wound-herb, as useful also for de-obstructing the pores of the body.

Scorpioides, Echium, or Scorpion-grass, is like the crooked tail of a Scorpion, and Ophiocordum, or Adder's-tongue, has a very plain and perfect resemblance of the tongue of a Serpent, as also Ophiocordum of the entire head and upper parts of the body; and these are all held very good against Poison, and the biting of Serpents. And generally all such Plants as are speckled with spots like the skins of Vipers or other venomous creatures, are known to be good against the stings or bitings of them, and are powerful Antidotes against Poison.

Thus did Divine Providence by natural Hieroglyphicks read short Physick-Lectures to the rude wit of man, that being a little entred and engaged, he might by his own industry and endeavours search out the root himself; it being very reasonable that other Herbs that had not such Signatures might be very good for Medicinal uses, as well as they that had.

5. But if any here object, that some Herbs have the resemblance of such things as cannot in any likelihood refer to Physick, as Geranium, Cruciatum, Bursa Pastoris, the Bee-Flower, Fly-Orchis, and the like; I say, they answer themselves in the very proposal of their Objection: for this is a sign that they were intended only for ludicrous ornaments of Nature, like the flourishes about a great Letter; that signifies nothing; but are made only to delight the Eye. And 'tis so far from being any inconvenience to our first Progenitors, if this intimation of Signatures did fail, that it cast them with more courage upon attempting the virtue of those that had no such Signatures at all; it being obvious for them to reason thus, Why may not those Herbs have Medicinal virtue in them that have no Signatures, as well as they that have Signatures have no virtue answerable to the signs they bear? which was a further confirmation to them of the former Conclusion; and still a greater provocation of their
dustry, if they at any time light upon Signatures of a contrary effect.

And it was sufficient that those that were of so present and great consequence as to be Antidotes against Poison, (that so quickly would have dispatch'd poor rude and naked Antiquity,) or to help on the small beginnings of the world, by quickning and actuating their phlegmatick Natures to more frequent and effectual Venery (for their long lives shew they were not very fiery) I say, it was sufficient that Herbs of this kind were both so obvious and so legibly sign'd with Characters, that so plainly bewray'd their useful virtues, as is manifest in your Satyrous, Ophiographum, and the like. But I have dwelt too long upon this Theory; we'll betake our selves to what follows, and what is more unexceptionably stringent and forcing.

C H A P. VII.

1. That the Usefulness of Plants argues a Providence, particularly those that afford Timber. 2. As also such Herbs and Plants as serve for Physick for Men and Beasts. 3. Of Plants fit for Food. 4. Of the Colour of Grass and Herbs, and of the Fruits of Trees. 5. The notable provisions in Nature for Husbandry and Tillage, with the universal Usefulness of Hemp and Flaxe. 6. The marvellous Usefulness of the Indian Nut-Tree.

1. We are at length come to the fourth and last consideration of Plants, viz. their Use and Profitableness. We shall say nothing now of those greater Trees that are fit for Timber, and are the requisite Materials for the building of Ships and magnificent Houses, to adorn the Earth, and make the life of Man more splendid and delectable; as also for the erecting of those holy Structures consecrated to Divine Worship. Amongst which we are not to forget that famous Edifice, that glorious Temple at Jerusalem, consecrated to the great God of Heaven and Earth: As indeed it was most fit that He whose Guidance and Providence permitted not the strength of the Earth to spend it self in base gravel and pebbles in stead of Quarries of Stone, nor in briars and bruffhwood in stead of Pines, Cedars and Oaks, that He should at some time or other have the most stately magnificent Temples erected to Him that the wit and industry of Man and the best of those Materials could afford; it being the most futable acknowledgement of thanks for that piece of Providence that can be invented. And it is the very consideration that moved that pious King David to design the building of a Temple to the God of Israel: See now, says he, I dwell in a house of Cedar, but the Ark of God dwelleth within Curtains. But, as I said, I will add nothing concerning these things, being contented with what I have glanced upon heretofore.

2. We will now briefly take notice of the Profitableness of Plants for Physick
Physick and Food, and then pass on to the consideration of Animals. And as for their Medicinal uses, the large Herbals that are every where to be had are so ample Testimonies thereof, that I have said enough in but reminding you of them. That which is most observable here is this, that brute Beasts have some share in their virtue as well as Men. For the Toad being overcharged with the poison of the Spider, as is ordinarily believed, hath recourse to the Plantane leaf: the Wasp, when she is to encounter the Serpent, arms her self with eating of Rue: the Dog, when he is sick at the stomach, knows his cure, falls to his Grass, vomits, and is well: the Swallows make use of Celandine, the Linnet of Euphragia, for the repairing of their sight: and the Asse, when he is oppress'd with Melancholy, eats of the herb Asplenium or Miltwaste, and so cales himself of the swelling of the Spleen. And Virgil reports of the Dictamnum Cretense or Cretian Dittany, that the wild Goats eat it when they are shot with darts or arrows; for that Herb has the virtue to work them out of their body, and to heal up the wound.

—non illa feris incognita Capris
Gramina, cum tergo volucres habet sagitta.

Which things I conceive no obscure indigation of Providence: For they doing that by Instinct and Nature which men, who have free Reason, cannot buracknowledge to be very pertinent and fitting; nay, such that the skilfullest Physician will approve and allow; and these Creatures having no such reason and skill themselves as to turn Physicians; it must needs be concluded, that they are unable to doe these things by virtue of that Principle that contrived them, and made them of that nature they are, and that that Principle therefore must have Skill and Knowledge, that is, that it must be God.

3. We come now to the consideration of Plants as they afford Food both to Man and Beasts. And here we may observe, That as there was a general provision of Water, by setting the Mountains and Hills abroach, from whence through the Spring-heads and continued Rivulets drawn together (that caused afterwards greater Rivers with the long winding distributions of them) all the Creatures of the Earth quench their thirst: so Divine Providence has spread her Table every where, not with a juice-lefs green Carpet, but with succulent Herbage and nourishing Grass, upon which most of the Beasts of the field do feed; and they that feed not on it, feed on those that eat it, and so the generations of them all are continued.

4. But this seeming rather necessary than of choice, I will not insist upon it. For I grant that Counsel most properly is there imply'd, where we discern a variety and possibility of being otherwise, and yet the Best is made choice of. Therefore I will only intimate thus much, That though it were necessary that some such thing as Grass should be, if there were such and such creatures in the world; yet it was not at all necessary that Grass and Herbs should have that Colour which they have; for they might have been red or white, or some such Colour which would have been very offensive and hurtful to our sight. But I will not insist upon these
these things; let us now consider the Fruits of Trees, where I think it will appear very manifestly, that there was one and the same Author both of Man and them, and that assuredly he knew what he did when he made them. For could Apples, and Oranges, and Grapes, and Apricocks, and such like fruit, be intended for Beasts that hold their heads downward, and can scarce look up at them, much less know how to reach them? When we feed our Dogs, we set the dish or trencher on the ground, not on the Table. But you'll say, That at last these fruits will fall down, and then the Beasts may come at them. But one thing is, there are not many that desire them, and so they would not upon the ground before they be spent, or be squander'd away in a moment of time, as it might easily fare with the most precious of Plants, the Vine. But Man, who knows the worth of the Grape, knows to preserve it a long season (for it is both eaten and drunk some years after the vintage) as he does also gather the rest of the Fruits of the Earth, and lays up both for himself and his Cattel. Wherefore it is plainly discoverable, that Man's coming into the world is not a thing of Chance or Necessity, but a Design, as the bringing of worthy Guests to a well-furnish'd Table.

5. And what I have intimat'd concerning the Vine, is as eminently, if not more eminently, observable in the ordinary kinds of Grain, as Wheat and Barley, and the like, which also, like the Vine, are made either Edible or Potable by Man's Art and Industry. But that's not the thing that I care so much to observe. That which I drive at now is this; That Bread-corn, that brings so considerable increase by Tillage and Husbandry, would scarce be at all without it; for that which grows wildly of itself is worth nothing: but it being so wholesome and strengthening a food, that it should yield so plentiful increase, and that this should not be without humane Art and Industry, does plainly intimate that there is a Divine Providence that intended to exercise the wit of Man in Husbandry and Tillage. Which we may the more firmly assure our selves of, if we add unto this the careful provision of Instruments so exactly fitted out for this employment; viz. the laborious Oxe, and the Stout, but easily manageable, Horse; Iron for the plough-share, and Roops for the horse-gears to pull by. And it is very seasonable to take notice of this last, it belonging to this consideration of the Profitableness of Plants. And I appeal to any body that will but take the pains a while to consider of what great use and confluence Cordage is in the affairs of Men, whether it was not a palpable Act of Providence to send out such Plants out of the Earth which would afford it. For we can discover no necessity in Nature that there must needs be such Plants as Hemp and Flax. Wherefore if we will but follow the easy suggetions of free Reason, we must cast it upon Providence, which has provided Mankind of such a Commodity, that no less affairs depend upon them all the Tackling of Ships, their Sails and Cable-roops, and what nor? and so consequently all foreign Traffick, and then the transportation of wood and stone, and other necessary materials for building, or the carriage of them by land in Wains and Carts, besides the ordinary use of Pulleys or other Engines for the lifting up of heavy weights, which the strength of Man without these helps would not easily master;
matter: besides what I hinted before concerning the use of Cordage in Husbandry, in plowing and carrying home the fruits of the Earth. The Uses indeed of the fore-named Plants are so universal, and take place so in every affair of Man, that if it were lawful to be a little merry in so serious a matter, a man might not unaptly apply that verse of the Poet to this so general a commodity,

Omnia sunt homini tenui pendentia filo;

that all the busineses of Men do very much depend upon these little long threads or threads of Hemp and Flax. Or if you will say, that there may some scambling shift be made without them in long chains of Iron, or Sails of Woollen, and the like; yet we seeing our selves provided for infinitely better, are in all reasons to judge it to proceed from no worse a Principle then Divine Providence.

6. I might now reach out to Exotic Plants, such as the Cinnamon-tree, the Balsam-tree, the Tree that bears the Nutmeg involvled with the Mace, as also the famous Indian Nut-tree, which at once almost affords all the Neceffaries of life. For if they cut but the twigs at Evening, there is a plentiful and pleasant Juice comes out, which they receive into Bottles, and drink instead of Wine, and out of which they extract such an Aqua vitae as is very sovereign against all manner of sicknesses. The Branches and Boughs they make their Houses of, and the Body of the Tree, being very spongy within, though hard without, they easily contrive into the frame and use of their Canoes or Boats. The Kernel of the Nut serves them for Bread and Meat, and the Shells for Cups to drink in; and indeed they are not mere empty Cups, for there is found a delicious cooling Milk in them. Besides, there is a kind of Hemp that incloses the Nut, of which they make Roaps and Cables, and of the finest of it Sails for their Ships; and the Leaves are so hard and sharp-pointed, that they easily make Needles or Bodkins of them, for stitching their Sails, and for other necessary purposes. And that Providence may shew her self benign as well as wise, this so notable a Plant is not restrain'd to one Coast of the world, as suppose the East-Indies, but is found also in some parts of Africa, and in all the Islands of the West-Indies, as Hispaniola, Cuba, as also upon the Continent of Carthagen in Panama, Norembega, and several other parts of the New-found world.

But I thought fit not to insist upon these things, but to contain my self within the compass of such Objects as are familiarly and ordinarily before our eyes, that we may the better take occasion from thence to return thanks to him who is the bountiful Author of all the supports of life.
C H A P. VIII.

1. The designed Usefulness of Animals for Man, as in particular of the Dog and the Sheep. 2. As also of the Oxen and other Animals. 3. Of Mams subduing the Creatures to himself. 4. Of those that are as yet untamed. 5. The excellent Usefulness of the Horse. 6. The Usefulness of some Animals that are Enemies to such Animals as are hatefull or noisome to Man.

1. W E are now come to take a view of the nature of Animals:

In the contemplation whereof we shall use much-what the same Method we did in that of Plants, for we shall consider in them also their Beauty, their Birth, their Make and Fabrick of body, and Usefulness to Mankind. And to dispatch this last first: It is wonderful easy and natural to conceive, that as almost all are made in some sort or other for humane uses, so some so notoriously and evidently, that without main violence done to our Faculties we can in no wise deny it. As to instance in those things that are most obvious and familiar: When we see in the solitary fields a Shepherd, his Flock and his Dog, how well they are fitted together; when we knock at a Farmer's door, and the first that answers shall be his vigilant Maffiff, whom from his ufe and office he ordinarily names Keeper; (and I remember, Theophrastus in his character Περί ἀγαπητικῶν, tells us, that his Master when he has let the stranger in, διάλασε· μενός ἔργακτον, taking his Dog by the snout, will relate long stories of his usefulnes and his services he does to the house and them in it; Ὀτράτι ἧδον το χορτιον ἡ ὠμι καὶ τον τοῦτον, This is he that keeps the yard, the house and them within;) lastly, when we view in the open Champain a brace of swift Grey-hounds coursing a good fowt and well-breathed Hare, or a pack of well-tuned Hounds and Huntmen on their horse-backs with pleasure and alacrity purfuing their game, or hear them winding their Horns near a wood fide, fo that the whole wood rings with the Echo of that Musick and cheerful yelping of the eager Dogs; to say nothing of Duck-hunting, of Fox-hunting, of Otter-hunting, and a hundred more such like sports and pastimes, that are all performed by this one kind of Animal: I say, when we confider this so multiformious congruity and fit-ness of things in reference to our selves, how can we withhold from inferring, That that which made both Dogs and Ducks and Hares and Sheep, made them with a reference to us, and knew what it did when it made them? And though it be possible to be otherwise, yet it is highly improbable that the flesh of Sheep should not be defigned for food for men; and that Dogs, that are such a familiar and domestic Creature to Man, amongst other pretty feats that they doe for him, should not be intended to supply the place of a Servitor too, and to take away the bones and scraps, that nothing might be lost. And unlefs we should expect that Nature should make Jenkins and Stockens grow out of the ground, what could she doe better then afford us so fit materials for Cloathing as the Wool.
Wool of the Sheep, there being in Man Wit and Art to make use of it, To lay nothing of the Silk-worm, that seems to come into the world for no other purpose then to furnish man with more costly clothing, and to spin away her very entrails to make him fine without.

2. Again, When we view those large Bodies of Oxen, what can we better conceive them to be, then so many living and walking powdering-Tubs, and that they have animam pro sale, as Philo speaks of Fishes, that their life is but for Salt, to keep them sweet till we shall have need to eat them? Befides, their Hides afford us Leather for Shoes and Boots, as the Skins of other Beasts also serve for other uses. And indeed Man seems to be brought into the world on purpose that the rest of the Creation might be improved to the utmost usefulness and advantage: For were it not better that the Hides of Beasts and their Flesh should be made so considerable use of as to feed and cloath Men, then that they should rot and stink upon the ground, and fall short of so noble an improvement as to be matter for the exercise of the Wit of Man, and to afford him the necessary conveniences of life: For if Man did not make use of them, they would either dye of Age, or be torn apieces by more cruel Matters. Wherefore we plainly see that it is an Act of Reason and Counsel to have made Man, that he might be a Lord over the rest of the Creation, and keep good quarter among them.

3. And being furnished with fit Materials to make himself Weapons, as well as with natural Wit and Valour, he did bid battle to the very fiercest of them, and either chafed them away into solitudes and desarts, or else brought them under his subjection, and gave laws unto them; under which they live more peaceably and are better provided for (or at least might be, if Men were good) then they could be when they were left to the mercy of the Lion, Bear or Tiger. And what if he do occasionally and orderly kill some of them for food: their dispatch is quick, and so less dolorous then the paw of the Bear, or the teeth of the Lion, or tedious Melancholy and sadnesse of old Age, which would first torture them, and then kill them, and let them rot upon the ground stinking and useless.

Befides, all the wit and Philosophy in the world can never demonstrate, that the killing and slaughtering of a Beast is any more then the striking of a Bush where a Bird's Nest is, where you fray away the Bird, and then seize upon the empty Neft. So that if we could pierce to the utmost Catastrophe of things, all might prove but a Tragick-Comedy.

4. But as for those Rebels that have fled into the Mountains and Desarts, they are to us a very pleasant Subject of Natural History; besides, we serve our selves of them as much as is to our purpose: and they are not only for Ornaments of the Univerfe, but a continual Exercise of Mans Wit and Valour when he pleases to encounter. But to expect and wish that there were nothing but such dull tame things in the world that will neither bite nor scratch, is as groundles and childish as to wish there were no Choler in the body, nor Fire in the univerfal compas of Nature.

5. I cannot insist upon the whole result of this war, nor must forget how that generous Animal the Horse had at last the wit to yield himself up, to his own great advantage and ours. And verily he is so fitly made for
for us, that we might justly claim a peculiar right in him above all other Creatures. When we observe his patient service he does us at the Plough, Cart, or under the Pack-saddle, his speed upon the high-way in matters of importance, his docility and desire of glory and praise, and consequently his notable achievements in War, where he will snap the Spears apieces with his teeth, and pull his Riders Enemy out of the Saddle; and then that he might be able to perform all this labour with more ease, that his Hoofs are made to fit for the Art of the Smith and that round armature of Iron he puts upon them; it is a very hard thing not to acknowledge, that this so congruous contrivance of things was really from a Principle of Wisdom and Counsel.

6. There is also another consideration of Animals and their Usefulness, in removing those Evils we are pestered with by reason of the abundance of some other hurtful Animals, such as are Mice and Rats, and the like; and to this end the Cat is very serviceable. And there is in the West-Indies a Beaf in the form of a Bear, which Cardan calls Ursus Formicarius, whose very buniness it is to eat up all the Ants, which some parts of that Quarter of the World are sometimes excessively plagued withall.

We might add also sundry Examples of living creatures that not only bear a singular good affection to Mankind, but are also fierce Enemies to those that are very hurtful and cruel to Man: and such are the Lizard, an Enemy to the Serpent; the Dolphin, to the Crocodile; the Horse, to the Bear; the Elephant, to the Dragon, &c. But I lift not to infist upon these things.

C H A P. IX.

1. The Beauty of several brute Animals. 2. The goodly Stateliness of the Horse. 3. That the Beauty of Animals argues their Creation from an Intellectual Principle. 4. The difference of Sexes a Demonstration of Providence. 5. That this difference is not by Chance. 6. An Objection answered concerning the Eele. 7. Another answered, taken from the consideration of the same careful provision of difference of Sexes in viler Animals. 8. Of Fishes and Birds being Oviparous. 9. Of Birds building their Nests and hatching their Eggs. 10. An Objection answered concerning the Ostrich. 11. That the Homogeneity of that Crystalline liquor which is the immediate Matter of the generation of Animals implies a Substance Immaterial or Incorporeal in Animals thus generated. 12. An Answer to an Elusion of the foregoing Argument.

1. I return now to what I proposed first, the Beauty of living Creatures: which though the coarse-spirited Atheist will not take notice of, as relishing nothing but what is subservient to his Tyranny or Lust; yet I think it undeniable but that there is comely Symmetry and Beautifulness in sundry living Creatures, a tolerable useful Proportion of parts
Chap. IX. An Antidote against Atheism.

parts in all, for neither are all men and women exquisitely handsome, indeed very few, that they that are may raise the greater admiration in the minds of men, and quicken their natural abilities to brave adventures either of Valour or Poetry: But as for the brute Creatures, though some of them be of an hateful aspect, as the Toad, the Swine, and the Rat; yet these are but like Discord in Mufick, to make the succeeding chord go off more pleasantly; as indeed most of those momentary Inconveniences that the life of Man ever and anon meets withall, they do put but a greater edge and vigour upon his Enjoyments.

2. But it is not hard to find very many Creatures that are either excellently beautiful, as the philosopher distinguishes, that are either very goodly things and beautiful, or at least elegant and pretty; as most of your Birds are. But for Stateliness & Majesty, what is comparable to a Horse? whether you look upon him single, with his Mane and his Tail waving in the wind, and hear him coursing and neighing in the pastures; or whether you see him with some gallant Hero on his back, performing gracefully his useful postures, and practising his exploits of War; who can withhold from concluding that a Providence brought these two together, that they seem but one complete Spectacle of Nature which imposed upon the rude people near Thessaly, and gave the occasion of the fabulous Centaurs, as if they had been one living Creature made up of Horse and Man.

3. That which I drive at is this, There being that Goodness in the bodies of Animals, as in the Ox, Grey-hound, and Swine; or that Majesty and Stateliness, as in the Lion, the Horse, the Eagle, and Cock, or that grave Awfulness, as in your best breed of Mastiffs; or Elegancy and Prettiness, as in your lesser Dogs, and most sorts of Birds; all which are several Modes of Beauty, and Beauty being an intellectual Object, as Symmetry and Proportion is (which I proved sufficiently in what I spake concerning the Beauty of Plants:) That which naturally follows from all this is, That the Author or Original of these Creatures which are deemed beautiful, must himself be Intellectual, he having contrived so grateful Objects to the Mind or Intellect of Man.

4. And their Beauty, let us touch upon their Birth or manner of Propagation. And here I appeal to any man, whether the contrivance of Male and Female in living Creatures be not a genuine Effect of Wisdom and Counsel; for it is notoriously obvious that these are made one for the other, and both for the continuation of the Species. For though we should admit, with Cardan and other Naturalists, That the Earth at first brought forth all manner of Animals as well as Plants, and that they might be fastned by the Navel to their common Mother the Earth, as they are now to the Female in the Womb; yet we see the is grown sterile and barren, and her births of Animals are now very inconsiderable. Wherefore what can it be but a Providence, that whiles she did bear the sent out Male and Female, that when her own Prolifik virtue was wasted, yet she might be a dry-Nurse, or an officious Grand-mother, to thousands of generations? And I lay it is Providence, not Chance, nor Necessity, for what is there imaginable in the parts of the Matter, that they
they should necessarily fall into the structure of so much as an Animal, much less into so careful a provision of difference of Sexes for their continual propagation.

5. Nor was it the frequent attempts of the moved Matter that first light on Animals, which perpetually were suddenly extinct for want of the difference of Sexes, but afterward by chance differentiated their Sexes also, from whence their kinds have continued. For what is perpetual is not by chance; and the Births that now are by putrefaction shew that it is perpetual; for the Earth still constantly brings forth Male and Female.

6. Nor is it any thing to the purpose to reply (if you will make so large a skip as to cast your self from the land into the water to dive for Objections) that the Eel, according to Plinie and Aristotle, though it be ἁνθρωπος, an Animal so perfect as to have blood in it, yet that it has no distinction of Sexes: For if it have not, there is good reason for it, that creature arising out of such kind of Matter as will never fail generation; for there will be such like Mud as will serve this end so long as there be Rivers, and longer too, and Rivers will not fail so long as there is a Sea. Wherefore this rather makes for discriminative Providence, that knew afore the nature and course of all things, and made therefore her contrivances accordingly, doing nothing superfluously or in vain.

7. But in other Generations that are more hazardous, though they be sometimes by putrefaction, yet she makes them Male and Female; as 'tis plain in Frogs and Mice. Nor are we to be scandalized at it, that there is such careful provision made for such contemptible Vermine as we conceive them: for this only comes out of pride and ignorance, or a haughty presumption, that because we are encouraged to believe that in some sense all things are made for Man, therefore they are not made at all for themselves. But he that pronounces thus is ignorant of the nature of God, and the knowledge of things. For if a good man be merciful to his beast, then surely a good God is bountiful and benign, and takes pleasure that all his Creatures enjoy themselves that have life and sense, and are capable of any enjoyment. So that the swarms of little Vermine, and of Flies, and innumerable such like diminutive Creatures, we should rather congratulate their coming into Being, then murmur fully and scornfully against their Existence; for they find nourishment in the world, which would be lost if they were not, and are again convenient nourishment themselves to others that prey upon them.

But besides, Life being individuated into such infinite numbers that have their distinct sense and pleasure, and are sufficiently fitted with contentments, those little Souls are in a manner as much considerable for the taking off or carrying away themselves the overflowing benignity of the first Original of all things, as the Ox, the Elephant, or Whale. For it is sense, not bulk, that makes things capable of enjoyments.

Wherefore it was fit that there should be a safe provision made for the propagation and continuance of all the kinds of living Creatures, not only of those that are good, but of those also that we rashly and inconsiderately call evil: For they are at least good to enjoy themselves, and to partake of the bounty of their Creator. But if they grow noisome and trouble-
troublesome to us, we have both power and right to curb them: For there is no question but we are more worth then they, or any of the brute Creatures.

8. But to return to the present point in hand; There are also other manifest footsteps of Providence which the Generation of living Creatures will discover to us; as for Example, the manner of Procreation of Fishes and Birds. For there being that notable difference in Animals, that some of them are Oviparous, others Viviparous, that the whole (as Philo comprehends them by that general term) that Fishes and Birds should be Oviparous, is a plain sign of Counsel and Providence. For though it will be granted that their Species might continue and subsist though they had been Viviparous; yet it would have brought their Individuals to very small numbers.

For as for Fishes, since Grass and Herbs are no fruit of the Sea, it was necessary that they should feed one upon another, and therefore that they should multiply in very great plenty; which they could not have done any thing near to that fulness they now do, if they had been Viviparous, as four-footed Beasts are: But being now Oviparous, and the leffer kinds of them so many at first, and sending forth such infinite numbers of Spawn, their generations are neither extinct nor scanty, but are as plentiful as any Creatures on the Land.

And the reason why Birds are Oviparous and lay Eggs, but do not bring forth their young alive, is, because there might be more plenty of them also, and that neither the Birds of prey, the Serpent nor the Fowler, should frighten their generations too much. For if they had been Viviparous, the burthen of their womb, if they had brought forth any competent number at a time, had been so big and heavy, that their wings would have failed them, and so every body would have had the wit to catch the old one. Or if they brought but one or two at a time, they would have been troubled all the year long with feeding their young, or bearing them in their womb: besides there had been a necessity of too frequent Venery, which had been very prejudicial to their dry carcases. It was very reasonable therefore that Birds should propagate by laying of Eggs.

9. But this is not all the advantage we shall make of this Consideration. I demand further, What is it that makes the Bird to prepare her Nest with that Artifice, to sit upon her Eggs when she has laid them, and to distinguish between these and her useless Excrement? Did she learn it of her Mother before her? or rather does she not doe she knows not what, but yet what ought to be done by the appointment of the most exquisite Knowledge that is? Wherefore something else has knowledge for her, which is the Maker and Contriver of all things, the Omniscient and Omnipotent God.

And though you may reply, that the Hatching of their Eggs is necessary, else their generations would cease; yet I answer, that all the Circumstances and Curiosities of Brooding them are not necessary: for they might have made shift on the ground in the Gras, and not made themselves such curious and safe Nests in Bushes and Trees. Besides, if all
things were left to Chance, it is far easier to conceive that there should have been no such things as Birds, then that the blind Matter should ever have stumbled on such lucky Instincts as they that seem but barely necessary.

10. But you'll object, that the Offrich lays Eggs and hatches them not, so that these things are rather by Chance then Providence. But this rather argues a more exquisite discerning Providence, then is any Argument against it. For the heat of the ground (like those Ewes in Egypt Diodorus speaks of) whereon the lays them, proves effectual for the production of her young. So Nature eyes not the Female to this tedious service where it is needless and useless; as in Fishes also, who when they have spawn'd, are discharg'd of any further trouble: which is a most manifest discovery of a very curious and watchfull Eye of Providence, which suffers nothing to be done ineptly and in vain.

11. I will only make one advantage more of this Speculation of the Birth of Animals, and then pass on to what remains. It is observed by those that are more attentive watchers of the works of Nature, that the factus is framed out of some homogeneal liquor or moisture, in which there is no variety of parts of Matter to be contrived into bones and flesh: but as in an Egg for Example, about the third day the Hen has fate on it, in that part where Nature begins to set upon her work of efformation, all is turned into a Crystalline liquid Substances about her; as also several Insects are bred of little drops of dew; so in all Generations besides it is supposed by them, that Nature does as it were wipe clean the Table-book first, and then pourtray upon it what she pleaseth. And if this be her course, to corrupt the subject Matter into as perfect Privation of Form as the may, that is, to make it as homogeneal as the can, but liquid and pliable to her Art and Skill; it is to me very highly probable, if not necessary, that there should be something besides this fluid Matter that must change it, alter and guide it into that wise contrivance of parts that afterwards we find it. For how should the parts of this liquid Matter ever come into this exquisite Fabric of themselves? And this may convince any Atheist, that there is a Substance besides corporeal Matter, which he is as loath to admit of as that there is a God.

For there being nothing else in Nature but Substantia or Modus, this power of contriving the liquid Matter into such order and shape as it is being incompatible to the liquid Matter it self, it must be the Modus of some other Substance latent in the fluid Matter, and really distinguishable from it, which is either the Soul, or some seminal Form or Archex, as the Chymist calls it; and they are all alike indifferent to me at this time, aiming here onely at a Substance besides the Matter, that thence the Atheist may be the more easily brought off to the acknowledgement of the Existence of a God.

12. Nor can the force of this Argument be eluded, by saying the Matter is touched and infected by the life of the Female whilse she bore the Egg, or that her Phanfic gets down into her womb.

For what life or phanfic has the Earth, which, as they say, gendred at first all Animals, some still: and what similitude is there betwixt a Bee and
and an ox, or a Wasp and an Horse, that those insects should arise out of the putrefied bodies of these creatures? It is but some rude and general congruity of vital preparation that lets this Archeus on work rather than another: As mere Choler engages the Phanes to dream of firing of Guns and fighting of Armies; Sanguine figures the imagination into the representation of fair Women and beautiful Children; Phlegm transforms her into Water and Fishes: and the shadowy Melancholy intangles her in collusion with old Hags and Hobgoblins, and frights her with dead mens faces in the dark. But I have dwelt on this subject longer than I intended.

CHAP. X.

1. That the Fabric of the Bodies of Animals argues a Deity: as namely the number and situation of their Eyes and Ears; 2. As also of their Legs. 3. The Armature of Beasts, and their use thereof. 4. Of the general structure of Birds and Fishes. 5. The admirable Fabric of the Mole. 6. Cardan's rapture upon the consideration thereof. 7. Of the Hare and Grey-hound. 8. Of the structure of the body of the Camel.

I Come now to the last consideration of Animals, the outward shape and Fabric of their bodies; which when I have shew'd you that they might have been otherwise, and yet are made according to the most exquisite pitch of reason that the wit of Man can conceive of, it will naturally follow that they were really made by Wisdom and Providence, and consequently that there is a God. And I demand first in general, concerning all those creatures that have eyes and ears, whether they might not have had only one eye and one ear apiece; and to make the supposition more tolerable, had the eye on the one side the head, and the ear on the other; or the ear on the crown of the head, and the eye in the forehead: for they might have lived and subsisted though they had been no better provided for then thus. But it is evident that their having two eyes and two ears, so placed as they are, is more safe, more tightly, and more useful. Therefore that being made so constantly choice of which our own reason deemeth best, we are to infer, that that choice proceeded from reason and counsel.

2. Again, I desire to know why there be no three-footed beasts, (when I speak thus, I do not mean monsters, but a constant species or kind of animals) for such a creature as that would make a limping shift to live as well as they that have four. Or why have not some beasts more than four feet, suppose six, and the two middlemost shorter than the rest, hanging like the two legs of a man a horse-back by the horse-fides? For it is no harder a thing for nature to make such frames of bodies than others that are more elegant and useful. But the works of nature being neither useless nor inept, she must either be wise her self, or be guided by some higher
higher Principle of Knowledge: As that Man that does nothing foolishly all the days of his life, is either wise himself, or consults with them that are so.

3. And then again for the Armature of Beasts, who taught them the use of their Weapons? The Lion will not kick with his Feet, but he will strike such a stroke with his Tail, that he will break the back of his Encourterer with it. The Horse will not use his Tail, unless against the buffie flyes, but kicks with his Feet with that force, that he lays his Enemy on the ground. The Bull and Ram know the use of their Horns as well as the Horse of his Hoofs. So the Bee and Serpent know their Stings, and the Bear the use of his Paw. Which things they know merely by natural instinct, as the Male knows the use of the Female. For they gather not this skill by observation and experience, but the frame of their nature carries them to it; as it is manifest in young Lambs that will butt before they have Horns. Therefore it is some higher Providence that has made them of this nature they are. And this is evident also in Birds that will flutter with their wings when there is but a little Down upon them, and they as yet utterly unuseful for flying.

4. And now I have fallen upon the mention of this kind of Creature, let me make my advantage of that general structure observable in them: The form of their Heads being narrow and sharp, that they may the better cut the Aire in their swift flight; and the Spreading of their Tails parallel to the Horizon, for the better bearing up their Body; for they might have been perpendicular, as the Tails of Fishes in the water. Nor is it any thing that the Owl has so broad a face, for her flight was not to be so swift nor so frequent.

And as for Fishes, to say nothing how handomly their Gills supply the place of Lungs, and are replenish’d with the like plenty of Veins and Arteries, that their blood may be cool’d by the Water, as it is in the Lungs of other Animals by the Aire, we will take notice of more easie and vulgar considerations. The bladder of wind found in their Bodies, who can say it is convey’d thither by chance, but that it is contriv’d for their more easie swimming as also the manner of their Fins, which consist of a number of gristly bones long and slender like pins and needles, and a kind of a skin betwixt, which is for the more exactness, and makes them thin and flat like Oars. Which perfect artifice and accuracy might have been omitted, and yet they have made a shift to move up & down in the water.

But I have fallen upon a Subject that is infinite and inexhaustible; therefore, that I be not too tedious, I will confine my self to some few Observations in ordinary Beasts and Birds, (that which is most known and obvious being most of all to our purpose) and then I shall come to the contemplation of Man.

5. And indeed what is more obvious and ordinary then a Mole? and yet what more palpable Argument of Providence then she? The members of her body are so exactly fitted to her nature and manner of life. For her dwelling being under ground, where nothing is to be seen, Nature has so obscurely fitted her with Eyes, that Naturalists can scarce agree whether she have any Sight at all or no. But for amends, what she
is capable of for her defence and warning of danger, she has very eminently conferred upon her; for she is exceeding quick of hearing. And then her short Tail and short Legs, but broad Fore-feet armed with sharp Claws, we see by the event to what purpose they are, she so swiftly working her self under ground, and making her way so fast in the Earth, as they that behold it cannot but admire it. Her Legs therefore are short, that she need dig no more then will serve the mere thickness of her Body; and her Fore-feet are broad, that she may scoop away much Earth at a time; and little or no Tail she has, because she courtes it not on the ground, like the Rat or Mouse, of whose kindred she is, but lives under the Earth, and is fain to dig her self a dwelling there: And she making her way through so thick an Element, which will not yield easily, as the Aire or the Water, it had been dangerous to have drawn so long a train behind her; for her Enemy might fall upon her Reer, and fetch her out before she had compleated, or had got full possession of her works.

6. Cardan is so much taken with this Contemplation, that though I find him often stagerring, yet here he does very fully and firmly profess that the contrivance of all things is from Wisdom and Counsel: his words are so generous and significant, that I hold them worth the transcribing. *Palam est igitur, Naturam in cunctis sollicitum mirum in modum suisse, nec obiter, sed ex sententia omnia praedita; hominesque, quibus hoc beneficium Deus largitum est, ut Caustam rerum primam inventant, participes esse illius præmum Naturam; neque alterius esse generis Naturam, qua hac consti- tuit, ab illorum mente qui Caustam corum cur ita facta sint plenè assidue posuerunt.* Thus forcibly has the due contemplation of Nature carried him beyond Nature and himself, and made him write like a Man rapt'd into a Divine Ecstasy.

7. But there are as manifest foot-steps of Divine Providence in other Creatures as in the Mole: as for Example, the Hare, whose temper and frame of body are plainly fitted on purpose for her condition.

For why is she made so full of Fear and Vigilance, ever rearing up and listening whilst she is feeding? and why is she so exceeding swift of foot, and has her Eyes so prominent, and placed so that she can see better behind her then before? but that her flight is her only safety; and it was needful for her perpetually to eye her pursuing enemy, against whom she durst never stand at the Bay, having nothing but her long soft limber Ears to defend her. Wherefore he that made the Hare, made the Dog also, and guarded her with these Properties from her eager foe, that she might not be too easie a booty for him, and so never be able to have her fell, or afford the Spectator any considerable pastime. And that the Hare might not alwaies get away from the Grey-hound, see how exquisitely his shape is fitted for the Course; For the narrowness and slenderness of his parts are made for speed; and that seeming impertinent long Appendix of his body, his Tail, is made for more nimble turning.

8. There are other Animals also whose particular fabric of Body does manifestly appear the Effect of Providence and Counsel, though Naturalists cannot agree whether it be in the behalf of the Beast thus framed,
or of Man. And such is that Creature which, though it be Exotic, yet is ordinarily known by the name of a Camel: For why are those bunches on his back, but that they may be in stead of a Pack-faddle to receive the burthen? and why has he four knees, and his hinder Legs bending inwards, as also a Protruberancy under his Breast to lean on, but that, being a tall Creature, he might with ease kneel down, and so might the more gainly be loaden?

But Cardan will by no means have this the design of Nature, but that this frame of the Camel's body is thus made for his own convenience: For he being a Creature that lives and seeks his food in waste and dry Deserts, those bunches he would have Receptacles of redundant moisture, from whence the rest of his body is to be supply'd in a hard and tedious time of drought; and that his Legs being very long, he ought to have knees behind and a knot beneath, to rest his weary limbs in the wilderness, by sitting or kneeling in that posture he does; for he could not so conveniently lie along, as the Horse, or Ass, or other Creatures. But I should not determine this to either alone, but take in both Causes, and acknowledge thereina richer design of Providence, that by this Frame and Artifice has gratify'd both the Camel and his Master.

CHAP. XI.

1. Some general Observables concerning Birds. 2. Of the Cock. 3. Of the Turkey-Cock. 4. Of the Swan, Hern, and other Water-fowl. 5. Of the γαμφώνυξα και άλοκελόρα, and of the peculiarity of Sight in Birds of prey. 6. The Description of the Bird of Paradise according to Cardan. 7. The suffrages of Scaliger, Hernandes and Nierembergius. 8. Aldrovandus his Objections against her feeding on the dew only, with what they might probably answer thereto. 9. His Objections against her manner of Incubiture, with the like Answer. 10. What Properties they are all five agreed on. 11. In what Pighafetta and Clusius dissent from them all, with the Author's conditional inclination to their judgment. 12. The main Remarkables in the story of the Bird of Paradise. 13. A supply from ordinary and known Examples as convivial or more convivial of a discerning Providence.

We pass on now to the consideration of Fowls or Birds. Where omitting the more general Properties, of having two Ventricles, and picking up stones to convey them into their second Ventricle, the Gizzern, (which provision and instinct is a supply for the want of teeth,) as also their having no Paps as Beasts have, their young ones being nourish'd so long in the Shell, that they are presently fit to be fed by the mouthes of the old ones, and unfit to suck by reason of the shape and hardness of their Bills: (which Observations plainly signifie that Nature does nothing ineptly and foolishly, and that therefore there is a Providence)
An Antidote against Atheism.

I shall content myself in taking notice only of the outward frame of some few kinds of this Creature that familiarly come into our sight, such as the Cock, the Duck, the Swan, and the like.

2. I demand therefore concerning the Cock, why he has Spurs at all; or having them, how they come to be so fittingly placed. For he might have had none, or so misplaced that they had been utterly useless, and so his courage and pleasure in fighting had been to no purpose. Nor are his Comb and his Wattles in vain, for they are an Ornament becoming his Martial Spirit; yea an Armature too, for the tugging of those often excuses the more useful parts of his Head from harm. Thus fittingly does Nature gratify all Creatures with accommodations suitable to their temper, and nothing is in vain.

3. Nor are we to cavil at the red pugger’d attire of the Turkey, and the long Excrecence that hangs down over his Bill, when he swells with pride and anger: for it may be a Receptacle for his heated blood, that has such free recourse to his Head; or he may please himself in it, as the rude Indians, whose Jewels hang dangling at their Noses. And if the Bird be pleasurable, we are not to be displeased, being always mindful that Creatures are made to enjoy themselves as well as to serve us; and it is a gross piece of Ignorance and Rutherford to think otherwise.

4. Now for Swans & Ducks, and such like Birds of the Water, it is obvious to take notice how well they are fitted for that manner of life. For those that swim, their Feet are framed for it like a pair of Oars, their Claws being connected with a pretty broad Membrane; and their Necks are long, that they may dive deep enough into the water. As also the Neck of the Hen, and such like Fowl who live of Fishes, and are fain to frequent their Element, who walk on long stilts also like the people that dwell in the Marshes; but their Claws have no such Membranes, for they had been but a hindrance to those kind of Birds that only wade in the water, and do not swim.

Aristotle is witty, in comparing the long necks of these Water-fowls to an Angle-Red, and their long Bills to the Line and Hook. And adds also another observable concerning their long Legs, that their Tails are therefore the shorter: though I do not much admire his reason, who makes them so for want of matter that was spent upon the Legs. But the reason is, because they are Birds less volacious; and besides, the posture of their long Legs cast backwards while they fly, supplies the office of a larger opporungus, and so they are helps to their flying, whereas otherwise they would be a trouble and hindrance. Wherefore, as I said, their Tails are so short, not because the Matter was spent upon their Legs, but because their Legs supply the office of the Tail, according to that excellent Aphorism of Aristotele, uti μετέπρον εἰν εἰτε μακάω, φυσι: nöte, Nature does nothing vainly and superficially.

Which is the reason Fishes have no Legs, though they have Fins; and that the Torpedo has no Fins at the sides of his round body, but only at the sides of his Tail, the breadth and flatness of his body serving him in stead of fore-fins to swim with. But this speculation of the Water-fowls has engaged me amongst the Fishes further then I intended.
5. I shall return, and make a short stay with the Birds; those Martial ones, I mean, and Birds of Prey. In which the Philosopher has observed shortens of Neck as fittest for strength; and that none of the γαμ.φόινος, or Birds with crooked claws, have long Necks, or plain and straight Beaks, but crooked; and that all carnivorous Birds that are forced to hunt for their prey, are such. Γαμ.φόινος δ το ωρυφάκαν: χρισμῦν ὡς ἄρεν το ὀρατέν ἐν τονοντι. τηδ η προφιν αναγκαίον απ ᾿ἐωον ποριζεών. And therefore their crooked Talons are fit to hold fast the live prey that otherwise would wriggle from them, and their crooked Beaks to tear their tough flesh, (as it were with a sharp hook) that with a plain Beak would not so easily be riven in pieces. But the Bills of Geese and Ducks are quite of another form, but fit for rooting in the ground or mud, or shearing of herbs and grafs, and such easie manner of feeding.

That also is ingeniously observed of Aristotle concerning the γαμ.φόινος, that their Bodies are but small in comparison of their Wings, their greatest succour lying in them if they were assaulted: But that more heavy Birds are otherwise provided for defence, namely either by Spurs that grow on their Legs, or by the strength and sharpness of some single cley in their Foot; as I have observed in the Caffoware or Eme. But he gives it for a Maxime, That the same Birds are never γαμ.φόινος and κάμαξοφόινος, never have crooked claws and Spurs together. For the Armature of Spurs is fit only for such Birds as fight on the ground; but the crook-claw'd Birds are scarce well provided to tread upon it. And therefore none of the heavy-bodied Fowl have crooked Talons.

But the greatest observabe in Nature concerning these Birds of Prey is the strangeness of their Sight. For by a peculiar frame of their Eye they are enabled to spy their booty from aloft in the Aire, and fee beet at that distance, scarce fee at all near at hand. So they are both the Archer and Shaft, taking aim afar off, and then shooting themselves directly upon the desired Mark, they seize upon the prey having hit it. The works of Providence are infinite: I will close all with the description of that strange Bird of Paradise, for the strangenes has made it notorious.

6. There is a Bird that falls down out of the Aire dead, and is found sometimes in the Molucco Islands, that has no Feet at all. The bignefs of her Body and Bill, as likewise the form of them, is much what as a Swallow's; but the spreading out of her Wings and Tail has no les compafs than an Eagle's. She lives and breeds in the Aire, comes not near the Earth but for her burial; for the largefnes and lightnes of her Wings and Tail sustain her without latitude. And the laying of her Eggs and brooding of her young is upon the back of the Male, which is made hollow, as also the breast of the Female, for the more easie incubation. Also two strings like two Shoe-makers ends come from the hinder parts of the Male, wherewith it is conceived that he is falted clofe to the Female while she hatches her Egges on the hollow of his back. The Dew of Heaven is appointed her for food, her Region being too far removed from the approach of Flies and such like Insects.

This is the entire story and Philosophy of this miraculous Bird in Cardan, who professest himself to have seen it no les then thrice, and to have
have describ'd it accordingly. The Contrivances whereof, if the Matter were certainly true, are as evident Arguments of a Divine Providence, as that Copper-Ring; with the Greek * Incription upon it, was an undeniable monument of the Artifice and finger of man.

7. But that the reproach of over-much credulity may not lye upon Cardan alone, Scaliger, who lay at catch with him to take him tripping wherever he could, cavils not with anything in the whole Narration but the bigness of the wings and littlenes of the Body; which he undertakes to correct from one of his own which was sent him by Ortesanus from Java. Nay he confirms what his Antagonist has wrote, partly by History, and partly by Reason; affirming that himself in his own Garden found two little birds with membraneous wings utterly devoid of Legs, their form was near to that of a Bat's. Nor is he deter'd from the belief of the perpetual flying of the Mancudia, by the gaping of the feathers of her wings, (which seem thereby less fit to sustain her body) but further makes the narration probable by what he has observed in Kites hovering in the Aire, as he faith, for a whole hour together without any flapping of their wings or changing place. And he has found also how she may sleep in the Aire from the Example of Fishes, which he has seen sleeping in the water without sinking themselves to the bottome, and without changing place, but lying stock still, pinnulis tantam nec scio quid motu- ncale meditantes, only wagging a little their fins, as heedlessly and unconcernedly as Horfé's while they are asleep wag their ears, to displace the flies that fit upon them. Wherefore Scaliger admitting that the Mancudia is perpetually on the wing in the Aire, he must of necessity admit also that manner of Incubation that Cardan describes; else how could their generations continue?

Franciscus Hernandes affirms the fame with Cardan expressly in every thing: as also * Eusebius Nierembergiius, who is so taken with the story of this Bird, that he could not abstain from celebrating her miraculous properties in a short but elegant copie of Verfes; and does after, though confidently opposed, assert the main matter again in Profe.

8. Such are the Suffrages of Cardan, Scaliger, Hernandes, and Nierembergiius. But Aldrovandus rejects that Fable of her feeding on the dew of Heaven, and of her Incubiture on the back of the Male, with much scorn and indignation. And as for the former, his reasons are no waies conte- mptible, he alleging that Dew is near the Earth, and not at all times of the year, nor unlefs in clear daies, and that only in the Morning, and that the perpetual flying of the Bird must needs exhaust her spirits; lastly, that Dew is a body not perfectly-enough mixt, or heterogeneal enough for food, nor the hard Bill of the Bird made for such easy ues as sipping this soft moisture.

To which I know not what Cardan and the rest would answer, unlefs this, That they mean by Dew the more moister moisture of the Aire, which as it may not be alike every where, so these Birds may be fitted with a natural sagacity to finde it out where it is: That there is Dew in this same day and night (as well as in the morning) and in all season of the year; and therefore a constant supply of moisture and spirits to their
their perpetual flying, which they more copiously imbibe by reason of their exercise: That the thicker parts of this moisture stick and convert into Flesh, and that the lightness of their feathers is so great, that their pains in sustaining themselves are not overmuch: That what is homogeneal & simple to our sight, is fit enough to be the rudiments of Generation (all Animals being generated of a kind of clear Crystaline liquor) and that therefore it may be also of Nutrition: That Orpive and Sea-House-leek are nourished and grow being hung in the Aire, and that Duck-need has its root no deeper then near the upper parts of the Water: and lastly, That the Bills of these Birds are for their better flying, by cutting the way, and for better ornament; for the rectifying also and composing of their feathers, while they swim in the Aire with as much ease as Swans do in the Rivers.

9. To his great impatience against their manner of Incubation they would haply return this Answer; That the way is not ridiculous, but, it may be, rather neceffary, from what Aldrovandus himself not onely acknowledges, but contends for, namely, that they have no Feet at all. For hence it is manifest that they cannot light on the ground, nor any where rest on their bellies and be able to get on wing again; because they cannot creep out of holes of rocks, as Swifts and such like short-footed Birds can, they having no Feet at all to creep with. Besides, as Aristotle well argues concerning the long Legs of certain Water-Fowl, that they were made so long because they were to wade in the water and catch Fish, adding that excellent Aphorism, Τὸ γὰρ ὄρνιτα πρὸς τοὺς ἐφυρὸν ἠ φυσις ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ οὔ τοὺς ἐφυρὸν πρὸς τὰ ὄρνιτα (so may we rationally conclude, will they say, that as the long Legs of these Water-Fowl imply a design of their hunting the Water, so want of Legs in thee Manucodiata's argue they are never to come down to the Earth, because they can neither stand there, nor goe, nor get off again. And if they never come on the Earth or any other resting-place, where can their Eggs be lay'd or hatched but on the back of the Male? Besides that Cardan pleases himself with that Antiphonie in Nature, that as the Ostrich being a Bird, yet never flies in the Aire; so this Bird of Paradife should always be in the Aire, and never rest upon the Earth. And as for Aldrovandus his presumption from the five several Manucodiata's that he had seen, and in which he could observe no such figuration of parts as imply'd a fitness for such a manner of Incubation, Cardan will answer, my self has seen three and Scaliger one, who both agree against you.

10. However, you see that both Cardan, Aldrovandus and the rest do joyntly agree in allowing the Manucodiata no feet, as also in furnishing her with two strings hanging at the hinder parts of her body, which Aldrovandus will have to be in the Female as well as the Male, though Cardan's experience reached not so farre.

11. But Pighafetta and Clusius will easily end this grand controversy betwixt Cardan and Aldrovandus, if it be true which they report; and if they speak of the same kind of Birds of Paradife. For they both affirm that they have Feet a palme long, and that with all confidence imaginable, But
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But Nierembergius on the contrary affirms, that one that was an eye-witness, and that had taken up one of these Birds newly dead, told him that it had no Feet at all. Johnson also gives his suffrage with Nierembergius in this, though with Aldrovandus he rejects the manner of their Incubation.

But unless they can raise themselves from the ground by the stiffness of some of the feathers of their Wings, or rather by virtue of those nervous strings which they may have a power to stiffen when they are alive, by transfixing spirits into them, and make them serve as well in stead of Legs to raise them from the ground, as to hang upon the boughs of Trees by, (a slight thing being able to raise or hold up their light feathery bodies in the Air, as a small twig will us in the Water;) I should rather incline to the testimony of Pighafetta and Clusius then to the judgment of the reft, and believe those Mariners that told him, that the Legs are pulled off by them that take them, and exenterate them and drie them in the Sun, for either their private use or sale.

Which Conclusion would the best fave the credit of Aristotle who long since has fo peremptorily pronounced, "Οὐ ἄριστον ὑπὸ ν οὐ δίνειν, ὅπερ προνάσπεται ἡ ὀνήμων, ὅταν αὐτήν ἑαυτήν μετακινεῖν, ὅταν ταῦτα ταῦτα θέλειν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἢ τὰ χρυσάνθεμα καὶ τὰ χρυσαπρόσωπα των πελαγών," That there is not any Bird that only flies, as the Fish only swims.

12. But thus our Bird of Paradife is quite flown and vanished into a Figment or Fable. But if any one will condole the loss of so convincing an Argument for a Providence that fits one thing to another, I must take the freedom to tell him, that unless he be a greater admirer of Novelty then a Searcher into the indiflusible consequences of things, I shall supply his Meditations with what of this nature is as strongly conclusive, and re-mind him that it will be his own reproach if he cannot fly as clear an inference from an ordinary Truth, as from either an Uncertainty or a Fiction. And in this regard the bringing this doubtful narration into play may not juftly seem to no purpose, it carrying so serious and calligerous a piece of pleafantry with it.

The Manucodiata's living on the Dew is no part of the Convinciveness of a Providence in this Story: But the being so excellently-well provided of Wings and Feathers, tant a levitas is supplementa exornata, (as Nierembergius speaks) being so well furnished with all the advantages for lightness, that it seems harder for her to sink down (as he conceits) then to be born up in the Air; that a Bird thus fitted for that Region should have no Legs to stand on the Earth, this would be a considerable indication of a discriminative Providence that on purpose avoids all uselessness and superfluities.

The other Remarkable, and it is a notorious one, is the Cavity on the back of the Male and in the breast of the Female, for Incubation.

And the third and laft, the ufe of those strings, as Cardan supposes, for the better keeping them together in this Incubiture.

If these considerations of this strange Story strike so strongly upon thee as to convince thee of a Providence, think it humour and not judgment, if what I put in lieu of them, and is but ordinary, have not the fame force with thee.

13. For
13. For is not the Filda's wanting Feet, (as we observed before) the being sufficienly supply'd with Fins in to thick an Element as the Water, as great an Argument for a Providence, as to light a Bird's wanting Feet in that thinner Element of the Aire, the extreme lightness of her furniture being appropriation the the thinnes of that Element: And is not the same Providence seen, and that as conspicuously, in allotting but very short Legs to those Birds that are called Apodes (both in Plinie and Aristotle,) upon whom she has bestow'd such large and strong Wings, and a power of flying so long and swift, as in giving no Legs at all to the Manucodiata, who has still a greater power of Wing and lightness of body.

And as for the Cavities on the back of the Male and in the breast of the Female, is that design of Nature any more certain and plain then in the Genital parts of Male and Female in all kind of Animals? What greater Argument of Counsel and Purpose of fitting one thing for another can there be then that? And if we should make a more inward search into the contrivances of these parts in an ordinary Hen, and consider how or by what force an Egg of so great growth and bigness is transmitted from the Ovarium through the Infundibulum into the processus of the uterus, (the Membranes being so thin and the passage so very small to fee to,) the Principle of that Motion cannot be thought the then Divine. And if you would compare the protruberant Paps or Teats in the females of Beasts with that Cavity in the Breast of the Mancodiata, whether of them think you is the plainer pledge of a knowing and designing Providence?

And lastly, for the Strings that are conceived to hold together the Male and Female in their Incubiture, what a toy is it, if compared with those invisible links and ties that engage ordinary Birds to sit upon their Eggs, they having no visible allurement to such a tedious service?

CHAP. XII.

1. That there is not ampler Testimony of Providence then the structure of man's Body. 2. The safeness of the fabric of the Eyes. 3. Their exquisite fittedness to their use. 4. The superadded advantage of Muscles to the Eye. 5. The admirable contrivance of Muscles in the whole Body. 6. The fabric of the Heart and of the Veins. 7. Of the Teeth and of the Joints, of the Arms and Legs. 8. Of the hinder parts of the Body, and Head, Vertebrae, Nails, Bones, &c. 9. That there is proportionably the same evidence of Providence in the Anatomie of all Bodies as in that of Man. 10. The fitness of them that are not convinced from these Considerations. 11. Of the Passions in Man, and particularly that of Devotion. 12. Of the Passions of Animals, and their Usefulness to themselves; 13. As also to Man. The ridiculous Antipathie of the Ape to the Snail. 14. How ince and frastaneous a Passion Religion would be in Man, if there were neither God nor Spirit in the
BUT we needed not to have rambled so far out into the works of
Nature, to seek out Arguments to prove a God, we being so plentifully furnish'd with that at home which we took the pains to seek for abroad. For there can be no more ample testimony of a God and Providence then the frame and structure of our own Bodies. The admirable Artificer whereof Galen, though a mere Naturalist, was so taken with, that he could not but adjudge the honour of a Hymn to the wise Creator of it. The contrivance of the whole and every particular is so evident an argument of exquisitely skill in the Maker, that if I should pursue all that suits to my purpose it would amount to an entire Volume. I shall therefore only hint at some few things, leaving the rest to be supply'd by Anatomists: And I think there is no man that has any skill in that Art, but will confess, the more diligently and accurately the Frame of our Body is examined, it is found the more exquisitely conformable to our Reason, Judgement and Defire. So that supposing the same matter that our Bodies are made of, if it had been in our own power to have made our selves, we should have fram'd our selves no otherwise then we are.

2. To instance in some particular. As in our Eyes, the number, the situation, the fabric of them is such that we can excogitate nothing to be added thereto, or to be altered, either for their Beauty, Safety or Usefulness. But as for their Beauty, I will leave it rather to the delicate wit and pen of Poets and amorous persons, then venture upon so tender and nice a Subject with my severer style: I will only note how safely they are guarded, and fitly framed out for the use they are intended. The brow and the Nole saves them from harder strokes: but such a curious part as the Eye being necessarily liable to mischief from smaller matters, the sweat of the Forehead is fenced off by those two wreaths of hair which we call the Eye-brows, and the Eye-lids are fill'd with little stiff bristles, as with Palsadoes, against the assault of Flies and Gnats, and such like bold Animalcula. Besides, the upper-lid presently claps down, and is as good a fence as a Portcullis against the importunity of the Enemy: which is done also every night, whether there be any present assault or no; as if Nature kept garrison in this Acropolis of Man's body, the Head, and look'd that such laws should be duly observ'd as were mottf' for his safety.

3. And now for the Use of the Eye, which is Sight, it is evident that this Organ is so exquisitely framed for that purpose, that not the least curiosity can be added. For, first, the Humour and Tunicles are purely Transparent, to let in Light and Colours unsoul'd and unsophisticated by any inward tincture. And then again, the parts of the Eye are made Convex, that there might be a direction of many rayes coming from one point
point of the Object unto one point answerable in the bottom of the Eye; to which purpose the Crystalline Humour is of great moment, and without which the light would be very obscure and weak. Thirdly, the Tunica Uvea has a Muscular power, and can dilate and contract that round hole in it which is called the Pupil of the Eye, for the better moderating the transmission of light. Fourthly, the inside of the Uvea is black'd like the walls of a Tennis-court, that the rays falling upon the Retina, may not, by being rebounded thence upon the Uvea, be returned from the Uvea upon the Retina again; for such a repercussion would make the sight more confused. Fifthly, the Tunica Arachnoidea, which envelops the Crystalline Humour, by virtue of its Processus Ciliaries can thrust forward or draw back that precious useful part of the Eye, as the nearest or distance of the Object shall require. Sixthly & lastly, the Tunica Retina is white, for the better and more true reception of the species of things, (as they ordinarily call them,) as a white Paper is fittest to receive those Images in a dark room. If the wit of Man had been to contrive this Organ for himself, what could he have possibly excogitated more accurate? Therefore to think that mere Motion of the Matter, or any other blind Cause, could have hit so punctually, (for Creatures might have subsisted without this accurate provision,) is to be either mad or fottish.

4. And the Eye is already so perfect, that I believe the Reason of Man would have easily resteth here, and admired at its own contrivance: for he being able to move his whole Head upward and downward and on every side, might have unawares thought himself sufficiently well provided for. But Nature has added Muscles also to the Eyes, that no Perfection might be wanting: For we have of occasion to move our Eyes our Head being unmoved, as in reading and viewing more particularly any Object set before us: and that this may be done with more ease and accuracy, she has furnished that Organ with no less than six several Muscles.

5. And indeed this framing of Muscles not only in the Eye, but in the whole Body, is admirable. For is it not a wonder that even all our flesh should be so handomely contriv'd into distinct pieces, whose Rifte and Insertions should be with such advantage, that they do serve with such ease to move some part of the Body or other; and that the parts of our Body are not moved only so conveniently as will serve us to walk and subsist by, but that they are able to move every way imaginable that will advantage us? For we can fling our Legs and Arms upwards and downwards, backwards, forwards and round, as they that spin, or would spread a Mole-hill with their feet. To say nothing of Respiration, the contraction of the Diaphragme for the keeping down the Guts, and so enlarging the Thorax, that the Lungs may have play, and the assistance of the inward Intercostal Muscles in deep Sighings, when we take more large gulps of Aire to cool our heart overcharged with Love or Sorrow: nor of the curious fabric of the Larynx, so well fitted with Muscles for the modulation of the Voice, tunable Speech, and delicious Singing: not, lastly, of Nature's so industriously perforating the Tendons of the second Joynets both of Fingers and Toes, and her so careful transmitting of the Tendons of the third Joynets through them.

6. You
6. You may add to these the notable contrivance of the Heart; its two Ventricles and its many Valvule, so framed and situated as is most fit for the reception and transmission of the Blood, which comes about through the Heart, and is sent thence away warm to comfort and cherish the rest of the Body: For which purpose also the Valvule in the Veins are made, that the Blood may more easily ascend upwards.

7. But I will rather insist upon such things as are easie and intelligible even to Idiots, who if they can but tell the Joints of their Hands or know the use of their Teeth, they may easily discover it was Counsel, not Chance, that created them. For why have we three Joints in our Legs and Arms, as also in our Fingers, but that it was much better then having but two, or four? And why are our fore-teeth sharp like chisels to cut, but our inward-teeth broad to grind, but that this is more exquisite then having them all sharp or all broad, or the fore-teeth broad and the other sharp? But we might have made a hard theft to have lived through in that worser condition. Again, why are the Teeth so luckily placed, or rather why are there not Teeth in other bones as well as in the jaw-bones? for they might have been as capable as these. But the reason is, Nothing is done foolishly nor in vain; that is, there is a Divine Providence that orders all things. Again, to say nothing of the inward curiosity of the Ear, why is that outward frame of it, but that it is certainly known that it is for the bettering of our Hearing?

8. I might add to these, that Nature has made the hindmost parts of our body which we sit upon most feby, as providing for our Face, and making us a natural Cushion, as well as for instruments of Motion for our Thighs and Legs. She has made the hinder part of the Head more strong, as being otherwise unfenced against falls and other casualties. She has made the Back-bone of several Vertebra, as being more fit to bend, more tough, and lets in danger of breaking, then if they were all one entire bone without those gristly Juncature. She has strengthened our Fingers and Toes with Nails, whereas she might have sent out that substance at the end of the first and second joyn[t; which had not been so handsome nor useful, nay rather somewhat troublesome and hurtful. And lastly, she has made all the Bones devoid of sense, because they were to bear the weight of themselves and of the whole Body. And therefore if they had had sense, our life had been painful continually and dolorous.

9. And what she has done for us, she has done proportionably in the contrivance of all other Creatures; so that it is manifest that a Divine Providence strikes through all things.

10. And therefore things being contrived with such exquisite Curiosity as if the most watchful Wisdom imaginable did attend them, to say they are thus framed without the assistance of some Principle that has Wisdom in it, and that they come to pass from Chance or some other blind unknowing Original, is fully and humorously to affect a thing because we will affect it, and under pretence of avoiding Superstition, to fall into that which is the onely thing that makes Superstition it self hateful or ridiculous, that is, a wilful and groundless adhering to conceits without any support of Reason,
11. And now I have considered the fitness of the parts of Mans Body for the good of the whole, let me but consider briefly the fitness of the Passions of his Mind, whether proper, or common to him with the rest of Animals, as also the fitness of the whole Man as he is part of the Universe, and then I shall conclude.

And it is manifest that Anger does so actuate the Spirits and lighten the Courage of men and beafts, that it makes them with more ease break through the difficulties they encounter. Fear also is for the avoiding of danger, and Hope is a pleasant premeditation of enjoyment, as when a Dog expects till his Maffen has done picking of the bone. But there is neither Hope, nor Fear, nor Hate, nor any peculiar Passion or Inclination in Brutes, that is in vain: why should we then think that Nature should mistarry more in us then in any other Creature, or should be so careful in the Fabrick of our Body, and yet so forgetful or unlucky in the framing of the Faculties of our Souls; that that Fear that is so peculiarly natural to us, viz. the Fear of a Deity, should be in vain, and that pleasant Hope and Heavenly Joys of the Mind which man is naturally capable of, with the earnest direction of his Spirit towards God, should have no real Object in the world; and so Religious affection which Nature has so plainly implanted in the Soul of Man should be to no use, but either to make him ridiculous or miserable? Whenas we find no Passion or Affection in Brutes, either common or peculiar, but what is for their good and welfare.

12. For it is not for nothing that the Hare is so fearful of the Dog, and the Sheep of the Wolf: and if there be either Fear or Enmity in some Creatures for which we cannot easily discern any reason in respect of themselves, yet we may well allow of it as reasonable in regard of us, and to be to good purpose. But I think it is manifest that Sympathy and Antipathy, Love and Enmity, Aversion, Fear, and the like, are notable whetters and quickners of the Spirit of Life in all Animals; and that their being obnoxious to Dangers and Encounters does more closely knit together the vital Powers, and makes them more sensibly relish their present Safety; and they are more pleased with an Escape then if they had never met with any Danger. Their greedy assaults also one upon another while there is hope of Victory highly gratifies them both: and if one be conquer'd and slain, the Conqueror enjoys a fresh improvement of the pleasure of life, the Triumph over his Enemy. Which things seem to me to be contriv'd even in the behalf of these Creatures themselves, that their vital heat and moisture may not always only simmer in one sluggishtenour, but sometimes boil up higher andseethe over, the fire of Life being more then ordinarily kindled upon some emergent occasion.

13. But it is without Controversie that these peculiar Passions of Animals many of them are useful to Men, (as that of the Lizard's enmity against the Serpent,) all of them highly gratifie his Contemplative faculty, some seem on purpose contriv'd to make his Worship merry: For what could Nature intend else in that Antipathy betwixt the Ape and Snail, that that Beast that seems so boldly to claim kindred of Man from the resemblance of his outward shape, should have so little Wit or Courage
rage as to run away from a Snail, and very ruefully and frightfully to look back, as being afraid she would follow him, as Erasmus more largely and pleasanly tells the whole Story.

14. But that Nature should implant in Man such a strong propensity to Religion, which is the Reverence of a Deity, there being neither God nor Angel nor Spirit in the world, is such a Slur committed by her, as there can be in no wife excogitated any Excuse. For if there were a higher Species of things to laugh at as we do at the Ape, it might seem more tolerable. But there can be no end, neither ludicrous nor serious, of this Religious property in Man, unless there be something of an higher Nature then himself in the world. Wherefore Religion being convenient to no other Species of things besides Man, it ought to be convenient at least for himself: But supposing there were no God, there can be nothing worfe for Man then Religion.

15. For whether we look at the External Effects thereof, such as are bloody Massacres, the disturbance and subversion of Commonweals, Kingdoms and Empires, most savage Tortures of particular persons, the extirpating and disposition of whole Nations, as it hath happened in America, where the remotest Spaniards, in pretence of being educated in a better Religion then the Americans, vilified the poor Natives so much, that they made nothing of knocking them on the head merely to feed their dogs with them; with many such unheard of Cruelties: Or whether we consider the great affliction that that severe Governours of the life of Man brings upon those Souls the feifes on, by affrighting horrors of Conscience, by puzzling and befoiling them in the free use of their Reason, and putting a bar to more large searchs into the pleasing knowledge of Nature, by anxious cares and disquieting fears concerning their state in the Life to come, by curbing them in their natural and kindly enjoyments of the Life present, and making bitter all the pleasures and contentments of it by some checks of Conscience and suspicions that they doe something now that they may rue eternally hereafter; besides those inexorable Agonies of Mind that they undergoe that are more generously Religious, and contend after the participation of the Divine Nature, they being willing, though with unspeakable pain, to be torn from themselves to become one with that Universal Spirit that ought to have the guidance of all things, and by an unfaityable desire after that just and decorous temper of Mind (whereby all Arrogancy should utterly cease in us, and that which is due to God, that is, all that we have or can doe, should be lively and sufficiently attributed to him, and we fully and heartily acknowledge our selves to be nothing, that is, be as little elated, or no more relish the glory and praise of Men, then if we had done nothing or were not at all in being) do plunge themselves into such damps and deadnes of Spirit, that to be buried quick were left torture by far then such dark privations of all the joys of life, then such sad and heart-sinking Mortifications: I say, whether we consider these inward pangs of the Soul, or the external outrages cau'd by Religion (and Religious pretence will animate men to the committing such violences as bare Reason and the single Passions of the Mind unback'd with the fury of Super-
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Perfition will never venture upon it is manifest that if there were no God, no Spirit, no Life to come, it were far better that there were no such Religious propensions in Mankind as we see universally there are.

For the fear of the Civil Magistrate, the convenience of mutual aide and support, and the natural scourge and plague of Diseases would contain men in such bounds of Justice, Humanity and Temperance, as would make them more clearly and undisturbedly happy, then they are now capable of being from any advantage Religion does to either publick State or private person, supposing there were no God.

Wherefore this Religious Affection which Nature has implanted and as strongly rooted in Man as the fear of Death or the love of Women, would be the most enormous slip or bungle she could commit; so that she would so shamefully fail in the last Act, in this contrivance of the nature of Man, that in stead of a Plaudite she would deserve to be hissed off the Stage.

16. But the having done all things else so wisely, let us rather suspect our own Ignorance then reproach her, and expect that which is allowed in well-approved Comedies, στοιχεῖον ἀνατρέπειν for nothing can unloose this knot but a Deity. And then we acknowledging Man to dwell as it were in the borders of the Spiritual and Material world (for he is urinisque mundi nexus, as Scaliger truly calls him) we shall not wonder that there is such tugging and pulling this way and that way, upward and downward, and such broken disorder of things; those that dwell in the confines of two Kingdoms being most subject to disorder and confusion. And hitherto of the Passions of the Mind of Man, as well those that tye him down to the Body, as those that lift him up towards God, Now briefly of the whole Man as he is part of the Universe.

17. It is true, if we had not been here in the world, we could not then have missed our selves; but now we find our selves in being and able to examine the reasonableness of things, we cannot but conclude that our Creation was an Act of very exquisite Reason and Counsel. For there being so many notable Objects in the world to entertain such Faculties as Reason and inguitive admiration, there ought to be such a member of this visible Creation as Man, that those things might not be in vain: And if Man were out of the world, who were then left to view the face of Heaven, to wonder at the transcurision of Comets, to calculate Tables for the Motions of the Planets and Fix'd Stars, and to take their Heights and Distances with Mathematical Instruments; to invent convenient Cycles for the computation of time, and consider the several forms of Years; to take notice of the Directions, Stations and Repedations of those Erratick Lights, and from thence most convincingly to inform himself of that pleasant and true Paradox of the Annual Motion of the Earth, to view the ASPerities of the Moon through a Dioptrick-glass, and venture at the Proportion of her Hills by their shadows; to behold the beauty of the Rain-bow, the Halo, Parell and other Meteors; to search out the causes of the Flux and Reflux of the Sea, and the hidden virtue of the Magnet; to inquire into the usefulness of Plants, and to observe the variety of the Wisdom of the first Cause in framing their bodies, and giving sundry ob-

servable
serving instincts to Fishes, Birds and Beasts? And lastly, as there are particular Priests amongst Men, so the whole Species of Mankind being induced with Reason and a power of finding out God, there is yet one singular End more discoverable of his Creation, viz, that he may be a Priest in this magnificent Temple of the Universe, and send up Prayers and Praises to the great Creator of all things in behalf of the rest of the Creatures. Thus we see all filled up and fitted without any defect or useless superfluity.

18. Wherefore the whole Creation in general and every part thereof being so ordered as if the most exquisite Reason and Knowledge had contrived them, it is as natural to conclude that all this is the work of a Wise God, as at the first sight to acknowledge that those inscribed Urns and Coins digg'd out of the Earth were not the Products of unknowing Nature, but the Artifice of Man.
AN ANTIDOTE AGAINST ATHEISM.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

1. That, good men not always faring best in this world, the great examples of Divine Vengeance upon wicked and blasphemous Persons are not so convincing to the obstinate Atheist. 2. The irreligious Seers and Sacrileges of Dionysius of Syracuse. 3. The occasion of the Atheists incredulity in things supernatural or miraculous. 4. That there have been true Miracles in the world as well as false. 5. And what are the best and safest ways to distinguish them, that we may not be imposed upon by History.

1. Hitherto I have insisted upon such Arguments for the proving of the Existence of God as were taken from the ordinary and known Phenomena of Nature; for such is the History of Plants, Animals and Man. I shall come now to such Effects discovered in the World as are not deemed Natural, but Extraordinary and Miraculous. I do not mean unexpected discoveries of Murthers, a confpicious Vengeance upon proud and blasphemous Persons, such as Nicanor, Antiochus, Herod, and the like, of which all Histories, as well Sacred as Profane, are very full, and all which tend to the impressing of this divine Precept in the Poet upon the minds of Men,

Difficite Justitiam monitis & non temnere Deos.

For though these Examples cannot but move indifferent men to an acknowledgment of Divine Providence, and a Superior Power above & different from the Matter, yet I having now to doe with the obstinate & refractory Atheist, who, though an obdurate comtender of the Deity, finding hunself
himself to be safe and well at eafe, will shuffle all these things off, by
asking such a Question as he did to whom the Priests of Neptune shewed
the many Donaria hung up in his Temple by his Votaries saved from
ship-wreck, and therefore vaunted much of the Power of that God of the
Sea: But what is become of all thofe, said he, that notwithstanding their
Vows have been left? So I say, the Atheift to evade the force of this Ar-

gument will whisper within himself, But how many proud blasphemous A-
thetical men, like myfelf, have escaped, and thofe that have been accoun-
ted good have died untimely deaths?

Such as Aesop and Socrates, the Prophets, Apostles and Martyrs, with
fundry other wife and good men in all Ages and Places, who yet being
not fo well aware of the ill condition and reftines of this wicked World,
of which they have truthly profefTed themselves no Citizens, but Strangers,
have suffered the greatest mischiefs that can happen to humane Nature,
by their innocent meaning and intermeddling in aliena Republica: It hav-
ing usually been more safe, craftily and cautiously to undermine the Ho-
nour of God, then plainly and honestly to seek the good and welfare of
Men.

2. Nay, outrageous affronts done on purpose to Religion, will the
Atheift further reply, have not onely past applauded by the World, but
unpunifh'd by Divine Justice: As is notorious in that Sacrilegious Wir,
Dionysius of Syracufe, who spoiling Jupiter Olympus of his costly Robe
very aftant and ponderous with Gold, added this Apologetical jeer to his
Sacrilege, That this golden Vefiment was too heavy for the Summer, and
too cold for the Winter, but one of wool would fit both Seafons.

So at Epidaurus he commanded the golden Beard of Achilapinus to
be cut off and carried away, alleging, that it was very unfit that the Son
should wear a Beard, whenas his Father Apollo wore none.

That alfo was not inferior to any of his Sacrilegious jefts, when
taking away the golden Cups and Crowns held forth by the hands of the
Images of the Gods, he excufed himself, faying, that he received but what
they of their own accord gave him; adding, that it were a very great
piece of foolishnefs, whenas we pray to the Gods for all good things, not
to take them when they fo freely offer them with their own hands.

These and other fuch like irreligious Pranks did this Dionysius play,
who notwithstanding fared no worfe then the moft demure and innocent,
dying no other death then what ufually other Mortals do: as if in those
Ages there had been as great a lack of Wit as there was here in England
once of Latin, and that he escaped a more severe Sentence by the benefi-
Of his Clergy. But others think that he was pay'd home and punifi'd in
his Son that fucceeded him. But that, will the Atheift reply, is but to
whip the abfent; as Aristotle wittily faid to him that told him that fuch
an one did unmercifully traduce him behind his back.

Wherefore I hold it more convenient to omit fuch Arguments as may
intangle us in fuch endless Altercations, and to bring onely thofe that
cannot be resolved into any Natural caufes, or be phanfied to come by
Chance, but are fo Miraculous, that they do imply the preience of fome
free Subtile understanding Effence distinct from the brute Matter and or-
dinary power of Nature.
3. And these Miraculous effects, as there is nothing more cogent if they could be believed, so there is nothing more hard to the Atheist to believe then they are. For Religionists having for pious purposes, as they pretend, forged so many false Miracles to gull and spoil the credulous people; they have thereby with the Atheist taken away all belief of those which are true. And the childish and superstitious fear of Spirits in Melancholick persons, who create strange Monsters to themselves and terrible Apparitions in the dark, hath also helped them with a further evasif, to impute all Spectres and strange Apparitions to mere Melancholy and disturbed Phantasm.

4. But that there should be so universal a fame and fear of that which never was, nor is, nor can be ever in the world, is to me the greatest Miracle of all.

For if there had not been at some time or other true Miracles (as indeed there ought to be, if the Faculties of Man, who so easily listens to and allows of such things, be not in vain) it is very improbable that Priests and cunning Deluders of the people would have ever been able so easily to impose upon them by their false. As the Alchymist would never goe about to sophisticate Metals, and then put them off for true Gold and Silver, but that it is acknowledged that there is such a thing as true Gold and Silver in the world. In like manner therefore as there is an endearvour of deluding the people with false Miracles, so it is a sign there have been and may be those that are true.

5. But you'll say there is a Touchstone whereby we may discern the truth of Metals, but that there is nothing whereby we may discover the truth of Miracles recorded every where in History. But I answer, There is, and it is this.

First, if what is recorded was avouched by such persons who had no end nor interest in avouching such things.

Secondly, if there were many Eye-witnesses of the same Matter.

Thirdly and lastly, if these things which are so strange and miraculous leave any sensible effect behind them.

Though I will not acknowledge that all those Stories are false that want these conditions, yet I dare affirm that it is mere humour and fulleness in a man to reject the truth of those that have them; for it is to believe nothing but what he seeth himself: From whence it will follow, that he is to read nothing of History, for there is neither pleasure nor any usefulness of it, if it deserve no belief.
CHAP. II.

1. The Moving of a Sieve by a Charm. Coskinomancy. 2. A Magical Cure of an Horse. 3. The Charming of Serpents. 4. A strange Example of one Death-strucken as he walked the Streets. 5. A Story of a sudden Wind that had like to have thrown down the Gallows at the hanging of two Witches.

And now that I have premised thus much, I will briefly recite some few of those many Miraculous passages we meet with in Writers, beginning first with the bare and simple Effects of Spirits, as I will aforehand adventure to pronounce them, and then afterwards we shall come to the Apparitions of Spirits themselves.

And of those bare Effects we will not care to name what may seem flighted first, Bodinus relates how himself and several others at Paris saw a young man with a Charm in French move a Sieve up and down. And that ordinary way of Divination which they call Coskinomancy, or finding who stole or spoiled this or that thing by the Sieve and Shears, Piëtorius Vigilanlus professeth he made use of thrice, and it was with success.

2. A friend of mine told me this Story concerning Charms: That himself had an Horse which, if he had stood found, had been of a good value. His Servants carried him to several Farriers; but none of them had the skill to cure him. At last, unknown to their Master, they led him to a Farrier that had, it should seem, some tricks more then ordinary, and dealt in Charms or Spells, and such like Ceremonies: in virtue of these he made the Horse found. The Owner of him after he had observ’d how well his Horse was, asked his Servants how they got him cured: whence understanding the whole matter, and observing also that there was an S. branded on his buttock, which he conceited stood for Satan, chid his Servants very roughly, as having done that which was unwarrantable and impious. Upon this profession of his dislike of the fact, the Horse forthwith fell as ill as ever he was, insomuch that for his unserviceableness he was fain to be turned up loose in the pasture. But a kinsman of the Owners coming to his house, and after cunning to see the Horse in the Grounds, took the advantage of a low price for to sell a Gelding, and bought him. The Horse had no sooner changed his Master, but presently changed his plight of body also, and became as found as ever.

3. Charming also of Serpents is above the power of Nature. And Wierus tells us this Story of a Charmer at Salzburg. That when in the sight of the people he had charmed all the Serpents into a ditch and killed them, at last there came one huge one far bigger then the rest, that leapt upon him, and winded about his wafte like a girdle, and pulled him into the ditch, and so killed the Charmer himself in the conclusion.

4. That also I will adventure to refer to the Effects of Spirits which I heard lately from one Mr. Dark of Westminster concerning her own Husband,
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Husband, who being in the flower of his Age, well in health and very cheerful, going out of his house in the morning with an intent to return to Dinner, was, as he walked the streets, sensibly struck upon the thigh by an invisible hand, (for he could see no man near him to strike him.) He returned home indeed about dinner-time, but could eat nothing, only he complain'd of the sad Accident that befell him, and grew forthwith so mortally sick, that he died within three days. After he was dead, there was found upon the place where he was struck the perfect figure of a man's hand, the four fingers, palm and thumb, black and funk into the flesh, as if one should clap his hand upon a lump of daw.

And hitherto there is nothing related which will not abide the exactest trial, and be cleared from all suspicion of either Fraud or Melancholy. But I shall propound things more strange, and yet as free from that suspicion as the former.

5. And to say nothing of Winds sold to Merchants by Laplanders, and the danger of loosing the Third knot (which was very frequent, as *Olavs affirms, before those parts of the world were converted to Christianity). I shall content my self for the present with a true Story which I heard from an eye-witness concerning these preternatural Winds. At Cambridge, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, there were two Witches to be executed, the Mother and Daughter. The Mother, when she was called upon to repent and forfake the Devil, said, there was no reason for that; for he had been faithfull to her those three-score years, and she would be so to him so long as she lived; and thus she died in this obstinacy. But the hanging thus upon the Gallows, her Daughter being of a contrary minde, renounced the Devil, was very earnest in prayer and penitence; which, by the effect, the people conceived the Devil to take very hailfully. For there came such a sudden blast of wind (whenas all was calm before) that it drave the Mother's body against the Ladder so violently, that it had like to have overturn'd it, and shook the Gallows with such force, that they were fain to hold the posts for fear of all being flung down to the ground.

* De Genibus Septentrional. lib. 3. sub iii. De Magia & Maleficis Fin-rotual.
CHAP. III.

1. That Winds and Tempefts are raised upon mere Ceremonies or forms of words. 2. The unreasonableness of Wierus his doubting of the Devils power over the Meteors of the Aire. 3. Examples of that power in Rain and Thunder. 4. Margaret Warne discharged upon an Oak at a Thunder-Clap. 5. Amantius and Rotarius cast headlong out of a cloud upon a house-top. 6. The Witch of Fconstance seen by the Shepherds to ride through the Aire. 7. That he might add more other Instances from Eye-witnesses, of the strange Effects of invisible Demons, 8. His compendious Rehearsal of the most remarkable exploits of the Devil of Mafcon in lieu thereof. 9. The Reasons of giving himself the trouble of this Rehearsal.

1. Wierus, that indutrious Advocate of Witches, recites several Ceremonies that they use for the raising of Tempefts, and doth acknowledge that Tempefts do follow the performance of those Ceremonies, but that they had come to pass nevertheless without them: which the Devil foreseeing, excites the deluded Women to use those Magick Rites, that they may be the better persuaded of his power. But whether there be any causal connexion betwixt those Ceremonies and the ensuing Tempefts, I will not curiously decide. But that the connexion of them is supernatural, is plain at first sight. * For what is casting of Flint-Stones behind their backs toward the West, or striking a little Sand in the Aire, or sprinkling the Wet of it toward Heaven, the stirring of Urine or Water with their finger in a Hole in the ground, or boiling of Hogs Bristles in a Pot? What are these fooleries available of themselves to gather Clouds and cover the Aire with Darkness, and then to make the ground smoak with peals of Hail and Rain, and to make the Air terrible with frequent Lightnings and Thunder? Certainly nothing at all. Therefore the ensuing of these Tempefts after such like Ceremonies must be either from the prevision of the Devil (as Wierus would have it) who set the Witches on work, or else from the power of the Devil which he hath in his Kingdom of the Aire.

2. And it seems strange to me that Wierus should doubt this power; when he gives him a greater; for what is the transporting of Vapours or driving them together, to the carrying of Men and Cattel in the Aire; (of which he is a confident Assertor) unless it require larger Devils or greater numbers? And that there are sufficient numbers of such Spirits will seem to any body as credible as that there are any at all. But now for the truth of this, that certain Words or Ceremonies do seem at least to cause an alteration in the Aire, and to raise Tempefts, Remigius writes that he had it witnessed to him by the free confession of near two hundred men that he examined: Where he adds a Story or two, in which there being neither Fraud nor Melancholy to be suspected, I think them worth the mentioning.

3. The one is of a witch, who, to satisfy the curiosity of them that had power to punisli her, was set free that the might give a proof of that power she professed she had to raise Tempests. She therefore being let goe, presently betakes her selfe to a place thick set with Trees, scrappes a Hole with her hands, fills it with Urine, and stands it about so long, that the caus'd at last a thick dark Cloud charged with Thunder and Lightning, to the terror and affrightment of the beholders. But the bade them be of good courage, for she would command the Cloud to discharge upon what place they would appoint her, which she made good in the light of the Spectators.

The other Story is of a young Girle, who, to pleasure her Father complaining of a drought, by the guidance and help of that ill Master her Mother had devot'd and consecrated unto, rais'd a Cloud, and made her Father's ground onely, all the rest continuing dry as before.

4. Let us add to these that of Cunitus and Margaret Warriner. While this Cunitus was bussie at his Hay-making, there arose suddenly great Thunder and Lightning, which made him run homeward and forfake his work, for he saw six Oakes hard by him overturned from the very Roots, and a seventh also shatter'd and torn a pieces: he was fain to lose his hat, and leave his fork or rake for haste; which was not so fast, but another crack overtakes him and rattles about his ears: upon which Thunder-clap he presently espied this Margaret Warriner, a reputed Witch, upon the top of an Oak, whom he began to chide. She deferred his secrecy, and she would promise that never any injury or harm should come to him from her at any time.

This Cunitus depos'd upon Oath before the Magistrate, and Margaret Warriner acknowledg'd the truth of it, without any force done unto her, several times before her death, and at her death, Remigius conceives she was discharg'd upon the top of the Oak at that last Thunder-clap, and there hung amongst the boughs; which he is induc'd to believe from two Stories he tells afterwards.

5. The one is of a Tempest of Thunder and Lightning, that the Herdsmen tending their Cartel on the brow of the Hill Alman in the field of Cunitus were frighted with, who running into the Woods for shelter, suddenly saw two countreymen on the top of the Trees which were next them, so dirty, and in such a pickle, and so out of breath, as if they had been dragg'd up and down through thorns and miry places; but when they had well eyed them, they were gone in a moment out of their sight they knew not how nor whither. These herdsmen talked of the business, but the certainty of it came out not long after. For the free confessions of those two men they then saw, being so exactly agreeing with what the Herdsmen had related, made the whole matter clear and undoubted.

The other Story is of the same persons, known afterward by their names, viz. Amantimus and his partner Rotarius, who having coursed it aloft again in the Aire, and being cast headlong out of a Cloud upon an house, the latter of them, being but a Novice and unexperienced in those supernatural exploits, was much astonish'd and afraid at the strangeness of the matter; but Amantimus being used to those feats from his youth, his
his Parents having devoted him from his childhood to the Devil, made
but a sport of it, and laughing at his friend called him Fool for his fear,
and bade him be of good courage; for their Master, in whose power
they were, would falsely carry them through greater dangers then those.
And no sooner had he said these words, but a whirlwind took them and
set them both face upon the ground: but the house they were carried
from so shook, as if it would have been overturn’d from the very foun-
dations. This both those men, examin’d apart, confessed in the fame
words, not varying their story at all; whose confessions exactly agreed
in all circumstances with what was observed by the Country people
concerning the time and the manner of the Tempeft and shaking of the
house.

6. I will only adde one Relation more of this nature, and that is of a
Witch of Constance, who being vex’d that all her Neighbors in the
Village where she lived were invited to the Wedding, and so were drink-
ning and dancing and making merry, and the solitary and neglected, got
the Devil to transport her through the Aire, in the midst of day, to a
Hill hard by the Village: where the digging a hole and putting urine into
it, rais’d a great Tempeft of Hail, and directed it so that it fell only upon
the Village, and pelted them that were dancing with that violence, that
they were forc’d to leave off their sport. When she had done her exploit,
she returned to the Village, and being spied, was suspected to have raised
the Tempeft; which the Shepherds in the field that saw her riding in the
Aire knew well before, who bringing in their witness against her, she con-
fess’d the fact.

7. We might abound in instances of this kind: (I mean, supernatural
effects unattended with miraculous Apparitions,) if I would bring in all
that I have myself been informed of by either Eye-witnesses themselves,
or by such as have had the narrations immediately from them. As for
example, Bricks being carried round about a room without any visible
hand; Multitudes of Stones flung down at a certain time of the day from
the roof of an house for many moneths together, to the amazement of
the whole Country; Pots carried off from the fire and set on again, no
body meddling with the; The violent flapping of a Chest-cover, no hand
touching it; The carrying up linens, that have been a bleaching, so high
into the Aire, that Table-cloths and Sheets looked but like Napkins,
and this when there was no wind, but all calm and clear; Glafs-win-
dows struck with that violence as if all had been broken to shivers, the
glafe jingling all over the Floor, and this for some quarter of an hour
together, when yet all has been found whole in the Morning; * Boxes
carefully locked unlocking themselves, and flinging the Flax out of them;
Bread tumbling off from a Fourn of its own accord; Womens pattens
rising up from the floor, and whirling against people; The breaking of
a Combe into two pieces of it self in the window, the pieces also flying in
mens faces; The rising up of a Knife also from the same place, being carried
with its haft forwards; Stones likewise flung about the house, but not
hurting any mans person; with several other things, which would be too
voluminous to repeat with due circumstances: and the less needful,

I 2

See Bodin. Mag. Demonio-

man. I. c. 8.

* These following

pilgrages, with some oth-

ers, being carefully en-
quired into by a learned and
judicious person, but very
incredulous, did in the end
convince him of Witchies
& Spirits, that he could not
abstain from ac knowledge
it to a friend of his under his
own hand.
there being already published to our hands such Narrations as will flore
us with Examples enough of this kind.

8. Amongst which that Relation of Mr. Francis Perreand, concern-
ing an unclean Spirit that haunted his house at Macon in Burgundy, both
for the variety of matter and the Authenticness of the Story, is of prime
use. For though this Demon never appear'd visible to the eye, yet his
presence was palpably deprehenible by many freaks and pranks that he
play'd. As in drawing the Curtains at Midnight, and plucking off the
blankets; In his holding of the doors, and in rolling of billets; In his
knocking and flinging things against the Wainscot; In his whistling such
tunes as they teach Birds, and in his singing profane and baudy Songs;
In his repeating aloud the Lords Prayer and the Creed; In his imitating
the voices and dialects of several persons, as also the crying of Hunt-
men, the croaking of Frogs, and the speeches of Jugglers and Moun-
banks; His scoffing and jeering and uttering merry conceits, as that of
Pays de Vaux, where he said they made goodly Carbonado's of Witches,
and thereupon laughed very loud; His bringing commendations from
remote friends, and his telling stories of fightings and murders; His dis-
covering of things done in private to the Actors of them; His exprobra-
ting to a grave Divine the singing of a baudy song in a Tavern;
His tossing of a roll of cloth of fifty ells; His disordering of skeans of
yarn, and pulling men at their work by their coats backward; His fling-
ing the hat of one at his face while he was asleep in his house, and snach-
ing a candlestick out of a maid's hand; His entangling and tying things
in such knots as it was impossible for any one to untie them, and yet him-
self untying them in a moment; His tumbling the bed as soon as it has
been made into the midst of the floor, and taking down books from
their shelves in the study; His making a noise like a volley of shot, and
imitating the found of Hemp-dressers four beating together; His making
muffick of two little bells he found amongst rusty iron in the house,
which he used not onely there but in several other places, whose sound
they could hear pass by them in the Aire, though they could fee nothing;
His hiding of a Goldsmiths Jewels and tools for a while, and then drop-
ping them out of the Aire on the table; His flinging of stones about the
houfe, but without hurt, as in the former Narration; His often beating
a new Maid in her bed, and pouring water on her head till he had forced
her away; And lastly, his pulling a certain Lawyer by the arm into the
midst of the room, and there whirling him about on the tiptoe, and then
flinging him on the ground.

This is a short Epitome of the most remarkable exploits of that invi-
fible Devil of Macon. For, as I remember, he was not so much as once
seen in any shape all this time; unless it was he that Lullier and Repay met
at a corner of the street in the habit of a Country-woman spinning by
Moon-shine, who upon their nearer approach vanisht from their sight.

9. I have given my self the trouble of transcribing these particulars,
partly because they conduce so much to the discovery of the nature of
these kind of Spirits (these Effects making it suflicible that he did not
much missthe mark that ventur'd to style them Hominés Aéros) and
partly
partly for the both copiousness and suitableness of the Story to the present Theme; but lastly and chiefly, for the unexceptionable truth and Authenticness of the Narration: the observation of these strange passages being made not by *one solitary person, but by many together; nor by a person of suspected integrity, but of singular gravity and exemplarity of life; nor carelessly or credulously, but cautiously and diligently, by searching every corner of the house, and setting bolts and barricades to all the doors and windows thereof, stopping the very Cat-holes of the doors, and leaving nothing that might give way to suspicion of Imposture; a candle also burning every night all the night long, the places also from whence the voice came in the day-time being searched and the things therein by divers persons, from whence when one Simeon Meissonier had amongst other things brought away a bottle, the Devil fell a laughing, that he should think him such a fool as to go into it, as being liable thereby to be flopped up therein by his finger; and lastly, the Experience made not once or twice, but in a manner every day for a quarter of a year together.

To the truth of the miraculousness of the Narration the silence of the Dog gives also further suffrage, he being otherwise very watchfull and ready to bark at the least noise, and yet never barking at the loud speaking and hideous noises of the Demon: Which the prophane Goblin himself took notice of, rogishly avouching that it was because he had made the sign of the Cross on his head; for he was then on a merry pin and full of jarking.

To all which you may further adde the Authority of the Reverend and Learned Mr. P. Du Moulin, Father to the now Dr. Du Moulin, and the smart judicious reasoning of his accomplisht Son, in his Preface to Mr. Perrreand’s Relation, namely, That this familiar Conversation of the Devil was not in a corner or in a Desart (where the Melancholy of Witches is supposed to make them fancy they converse with him) but in the midst of a Great City, in an house where there was daily a great resort to hear him speak, and where men of contrary Religions met together, whose proueneful to caft a disgrace upon the dissenting parties did occasion the narrow examining and full confirming the truth thereof, both by the Magistrate and by the Diocesan of the place.

And lastly, that nothing may be wanting to convince the incredulous, we adjoin the Testimony of that excellently-learned and noble Gentleman Mr. R. Boyle, who conversed with Mr. Perrreand himself at Geneva, where he received from him as a present a Copie of his Book before it was printed, and where he had the opportunity to enquire both after the Writer and several passages of his Book; and was so well satisfied, that he professes that all his settled indisposedness to believe strange things was overcome by this special Conviction.

* Not writ by one pen. For Marcilin, a Preacher then at Melun, wrote the same story; and Terme, a frequent eye-witness of the pranks of this Demon, left a Relation written and signed with his own hand, which Perrreand kept by him.
CHAP. IV.

1. The Supernatural Effects observed in the bewitched Children of Mr Throgmorton and Mrs Mulchamp. 2. The general Remarkables in them both. 3. The possession of the Religious Virgins of Werts, Hesliment, &c. 4. The story of that famous Abbate Magdalena Cruca, her useless and ludicrous Miracles. 5. That she was a Sorceress, and was thirty years married to the Devil. 6. That her story is neither any Figment of Priests, nor delusion of Melancholy.

1. We will now pass to those supernatural Effects which are observed in Persons that are bewitch'd or possess'd. And such are, Foretelling things to come; telling what such and such persons speak or do as exactly as if they were by them, when the party possess'd is at one end of the Town and sitting in a house within doors, and those parties that act and confer together are without at the other end of the Town; to be able to see some and not others; to play at Cards with one certain person, and not to discern any body else at the table besides him; to act, and talk, and goe up and down, and tell what will become of things, and what happens in those fits of possession, and then, so soon as the possessed or bewitched party is out of them, for him to remember nothing at all, but to enquire concerning the welfare of those whose faces he seemed to look upon but just before, when he was in his fits. All which can be no symptoms nor signs of any thing else but the Devil got into the body of a man, and holding all the Operations of his Soul, and then acting and speaking and sporting as he pleases in the miserable Tenement he hath crowded himself into, making use of the Organs of the Body at his own pleasure, for the performing of such pranks and feats as are far above the capacity, strength or agility of the party thus bewitched or possess'd.

All these things are fully made good by long and tedious observations recorded in The discovery of the Witches of Warbois in Huntingdonshire, Anno 1594, the memory whereof is still kept fresh by an Anniversarie Sermon preach'd at Huntington by some of the Fellows of Queen's College in Cambridge.

There is also lately come forth a Narration how one Mrs Muschamp's Children were handled in Cumberland, which is very like this of Mr Throckmorton's Children of Warbois.

2. That which is generally observed in them both is this, That in their fits they are as if they had no Soul at all in their Bodies, and that whatsoever operations of Sense, Reason or Motion there seems to be in them, it is not any thing at all to them, but is wholly that Stranger's that hath got into them. For so soon as their fits are over, they are as if they had been in so profound a sleep, that they did not so much as dream, and so remember nothing at all of what they either said or did, or where they had been; as is manifest by an infinite number of Examples in the forenamed relations.

3. Of
3. Of the truth of which passages here at home we being very well ascertain'd, we may with the more confidence venture upon what is recorded concerning others abroad. As for example, The possession of Religious Virgins in the Monastery of Werts, others in Hesimon, others also not far from Xantes, and in other places, where there were Ewy-witnesses enough to take notice how strangely they were handled, being flung up from the ground higher than a man's head, and falling down again without harm; swarming upon Trees as nimbly as Cats, and hanging upon the boughs, having their flesh torn off from their bodies without any visible hand or instrument; and many other mad pranks, which is not so fit to name, but they that have a minde may read at large in Wierus.

4. I would pass now to other Effects of Witchcraft, as the conveying of Knives, Balls of hair and Nails into the bodies of them that are bewitched; but that the mention of these Nuns puts me in mind of that famous story in Wierus of Magdalena Crucia, first a Nun, and then an Abbateffe of a Nunnery in Corduba in Spain. Those things which were miraculous in her were these: That she could tell almost at any distance how the affairs of the world went, what consultations or transactions there were in all the Nations of Christendome, from whence she got to her selfe the reputation of a very Holy woman and a great Prophetess. But other things came to pass by her, or for her sake, no les strange and miraculous, as that at the celebrating of the holy Eucharist the Priest should always want one of his round Wafers, which was secretly conveyed to Magdalen by the administration of Angels, as was suppos'd, and the receiving of it into her mouth are it in the view of the people, to their great astonishment and high reverence of the Saint. At the elevation of the Host Magdalen being near at hand, but yet a wall between, that the wall was conceived to open, and to exhibit Magdalen to the view of them in the Chappell, and that thus she partaked of the consecrated bread. When this Abbateffe came into the Chappell her selfe upon some special day, that she would set off the solemnity of the day by some notable and conspicuous Miracle: for she would sometimes be lifted up above the ground three or four cubits high; other sometimes bearing the Image of Christ in her arms, weeping favourly, she would make her hair to increase to that length and largeness that it would come to her heels, and cover her all over and the Image of Christ in her arms, which anon notwithstanding would shrink up again to its usual size; with a many such specious, though unprofitable, Miracles.

5. But you'll say that the Narration of these things is not true, but they are feigned for the advantage of the Roman Religion, and so it was profitable for the Church to forge them and record them to posterity. A man that is unwilling to admit of any thing supernatural would please himself with this general shuffle and put off. But when we come to the Catastrophe of the Story, he will finde it quite otherwise: for this Saint at last began to be suspected for a Sorceress, as it is thought, and she being conscious, did of her own accord, to save her selfe, make confession of her wickednes to the Visitors of the Order, as they are called, viz. That for
thirty years she had been married to the Devil in the shape of an Ethiopian; that another Devil, servant to this, when his Master was at dalliance with her in her Cell, supplied her place amongst the Nuns at their publick Devotions; that by virtue of this Contract she made with this Spirit she had done all those Miracles she did. Upon this confession she was committed, and while she was in durance, yet she appear'd in her devout postures praying in the Chappel as before at their set hours of Prayer: which being told to the Visitors by the Nuns, there was a strict watch over her that she should not stir out. Nevertheless she appeared in the Chappel as before, though she were really in the Prison.

6. Now what credit or advantage there can be to the Roman Religion by this Story, let any man judge. Wherefore it is no Figment of the Priests or Religious persons, nor Melancholy, nor any such matter (for how could so many Spectators at once be deluded by Melancholy?) but it ought to be deem'd a real Truth: And this Magdalena Crucia appearing in two several places at once, it is manifest that there is such a thing as Apparitions of Spirits. But I must abstain as yet from touching that argument, I having not dispatch'd what I propounded concerning the vomiting up of Nails, the conveying of Knives and pieces of Wood into the Bodies of men, and the like. Which things are so palpable and incapable of delusion, that I think it worth the while to insist a little upon them.

C H A P. V.

1. Knives, Wood, Pieces of Iron, Balls of Haire in the body of Ulricus Neufeller. 2. The vomiting of Cloth stuck with Pins, Nails and Needles, as also Glass, Iron and Haire, by Wierus his Patients, and by a friend of Cardan's. 3. Wierus his Story of the thirty possessed Children of Amsterdam. 4. The Convictions of these Narrations. 5. Objections against their Convictions answered. 6. Of a Maid Darnoniacke speaking Greek; and of the miraculous binding of another's hands by an invisible power.

1. I Will begin with that memorable true Story that Langius tells of one Ulricus Neufeller, who being grievously tormented with a pain in his side, suddenly felt under his skin, which yet was whole, an iron Nail as he thought. And so it prov'd when the Chirurgeon had cut it out: But nevertheless his great torments continued, which enraged him so that he cut his own Throat. The third day, when he was carried out to be buried, Encharius Rosenbader and Johannes ab Ettenfel, a great company of people standing about them, disected the Corps, and ripping up the Ventricle, found a round piece of Wood of a good length, four Knives, some even and sharp, others indented like a Saw, with other two rough pieces of Iron a span long. There was also a ball of Hair. This hapned at Fugenfel, 1539.

2. Wierus
2. Wierus tells also of one that was possessed, of which himself was an Eye-witness, that vomited up pieces of Cloth with Pins stuck in them, Nails, Needles, and such like stuff: which he contends doth not come from the stomach, but by a prestigious sleight of the Devil is onely ingested into the mouth.

Cardan relates the like of a good simple Countrey-fellow and a friend of his, that had been a long time troubled with vomiting up Glass, Iron, Nails and Hair, and that at that time he told Cardan of it, he was not so perfectly restored but that something yet craftid in his belly, as if there were a Bag of Glass in it.

I might add feasonably hereunto what is so credibly reported of Mrs Mushamp's Child, that it was seen to vomit up pieces of Wood with Pins stuck in it.

3. But I will conclude all with that Story of about thirty Children that were so strangely handled at Amsterdam, 1566. of the truth whereof Wierus professeth himself very well assured. They were tortured very much, and cast violently upon the ground; but when they arose out of their fitt, knew nothing, but thought they had been onely asleep. For the remedying of this mischief they got the help of Physicians, Wizards and Exorcists, but without success. Onely while the Exorcists were reading, the Children vomited up Needles, Thimbles, shreds of Cloth, pieces of Pots, Glass, Hair, and other things of the like nature.

4. Now the advantage I would make of these Relations is this, That these Effects extraordinary and supernatural being so palpable and permanent, they are not at all liable to such Subterfuges as Atheists usually betake themselves to, as of Melancholy and disturmbance of Phante in those that profess they see such strange things, or any Fraud or Impositure in thofe that act.

5. All that can with any shew of Reason be alleged is this, That such parties in their fitts of Distraction may devour such things as they vomit up, or at least put them into their mouths. But they that are by might easily fee that, distracted people doing things carelessly and openly. And these things happen to thofe that are thus handled against their wills: and as they are not discovered to doe any such things of themselves, so neither do they confess afterwards that they did it, when they are come to their right sense; and ordinarily it is found out that some Woman or other by Sorcery or Witchcraft was the Author of it.

Besides, it is evident that there can be no mistake at all in some of these passages: For how can an iron Nail get betwixt the skin and the flesh, the skin not at all ripped or touch'd? or how is it possible for any body to swallow down Knives and pieces of Iron a span long? which besides that Story of illicius Neusfeller, is made good in another of a young Wench, who when she had made clean a pair of shoes with a Knife, which she put in her bofom, the after seeking for it, it could not be found any where, till at length it began to discover it self in a swelling on her left side, and at last was pulled out thence by a chirurgion. You may read the whole Relation in Wierus. It was done at Leuenfeet in the Dukedom of Brunswick, 1562. An old Woman had come to the houfe
houfe in the morning, and a strange black Dog was found under the table.

6. There are also other miraculous & supernatural Effects, as in that Maid of Saxone's speaking of Greek; and in another, whom Cellius Rhodigius profest he saw, that spoke from betwixt her Legs; a third at Paris, whom Dr. Picard and other Divines would have dipoffected, whom one Holleria, a Physician deriding, as it had been nothing but Melancholy in the Woman and Ignorance in those Divines, was after convinc'd of the contrary, when he saw her standing betwixt two other women, and crying out of a sudden, discerning her hands to be so fast bound that there was no loosing of them without cutting the string. There was not the appearance of any thing to any body but to the possessed only, who said she saw then a white cloud come near her when she was bound.

CHAP. VI.

1. The Apparition Eckerken. 2. The Story of the pyed Piper. 3. A Triton or Sea-God seen on the banks of Rubicon. 4. Of the Imps of Witches, and whether these old women be guiule of so much dotege as the Atheist fancies them. 5. That such things pass betwixt them and their Imps are impossible to be imputed to Melancholy. 6. The examination of John Winnick of Molewirth. 7. The reason of Sealing Covenants with the Devil.

1. But it is now high time to clear up this more dim and cloudy discovery of Spirits into more distinct and articulate Apparitions, according as I did at first propound. And these I shall cast into two ranks: such as appear near to us on the Ground, or such as are seen afar off, above in the Aire. And here again to begin with small things first. Near Elton, a Village half a mile distant from Embrica in the Dukedom of Cleve, there was a thing had its haunt, they called it Eckerken; there appeared never more then the shape of an Hand, but it would beat Travellers, pull them off from their horses, and overturn carriages. This could be no Phantie, there following for real Effects.

2. The Story of the pyed Piper, that first by his Pipe gathered together all the Rats and Mice, and drown'd them in the River; and afterward, being defrauded of his reward, which the Town promis'd him if he could deliver them from the plague of those Vermine, took his opportunity, and by the same Pipe made the Children of the Town follow him, and leading them into a Hill that opened, buried them there all alive; hath so evident proof of it in the town of Hammel where it was done, that it ought not at all to be difcredited. For the fact is very religiously kept amongst their ancient Records, painted out also in their Church-windows, and is an Epoch joyned with the year of our Lord in their Bills and Indentures and other Law-Instruments.

3. That
3. That also seems to me beyond all exception and evasion which Suetonius relates of a Spectre appearing on the banks of the River Rubicon, which was thus, Julius Caesar having marched with his Army to this River, which divides Gallia Citerior from Italy, and being very doubtful with himself whether he should pass over into Italy or not, there was seen on the River side a Man of a prodigious stature and form, playing on a Reed. The strangeness of his person as well as the pleasantness of his Mufick had drawn several of the Shepherds unto him, as also many of the Souldiers, amongst whom were some Trumpeters, which this Triton (as Melancthon ventures to call him) or Sea-god well observing, nimbly marches away one of the Trumpets out of their hands, leaps forthwith into the River, and founding a March with that strength and violence that he seem'd to rend the Heavens, and made the aire ring again with the mighty forcibleness of the Blast, in this manner he passed over to the other side of the River: whereupon Caesar taking the Omen, leaves off all further dispute with himself, carries over his Army, enters Italy, feecure of success from so manifest tokens of the favour of the Gods.

4. To confirm this truth of Apparitions, if we would but admit the free confeffions of Witches concerning their Imps, whom they so frequently fee and converse withall, know them by their names, and doe obeisance to them, the point would be put quite out of all doubt, and their proofs would be so many that no volume would be large enough to contain them. But fortooth these must be all Melancholy old women that dote and bring themselves into danger by their own Phantasies and Conceits. But that they do not dote I am better assured of, then of their not doting that say they do. For, to satisfy my own curiosty, I have examined several of them, and they have discours'd as cunningly as any of their quality and education. But by what I have read and obferv'd, I discern they serve a very perfidious Master, who plays wrecks many times on purpose to betray them. But that is onely by the bye.

5. I demand concerning these Witches who confes their contract and frequent converse with the Devil, some with him in one shape, others in another, whether mere Melancholy and Imagination can put Powders, Rods, Ointments, and such like things into their hands, and tell them the use of them, can impress Marks upon their bodies, so deep as to take away all fene in that place; can put Silver and Gold into their hands, which afterwards commonly proves but either Counters, Leaves, or Shells, or some such like useless matter. These real Effects cannot be by mere Melancholy. For if a man receive any thing into his hand, be it what it will be, there was some body that gave it him. And therefore the Witch receiving some real thing from this or that other shape that appeared unto her, it is an evident sign that it was an external thing that she saw, not a mere figuration of her Melancholy Phaftie. There are innumerable Examples of this kind; but the thing is so triflial and ordinary, that it wants no Instances. I will only set down one, wherein is the apparition of three Spirits.

6. John Winnick of Malfeworth in Huntingdonshire being examined April 11th 1646. confessed as follows. Having left his purse with
...seven shillings in it, for which he suspected one in the family where he lived, he faith that on a Friday, while he was making hay-bottles in the barn, and swore and cursed and raged, and wish'd to himself that some wise body would help him to his purse and money again, there appear'd unto him a Spirit in the shape of a Bear, but not so big as a Coney, who promis'd, upon condition that he would fall down and worship him, he would help him to his purse. He assented to it; and the Spirit told him, to morrow about this time he should find his purse upon the floor where he made bottles, and that he would then come himself also; which was done accordingly: and thus at the time appointed recovering his purse, he fell down upon his knees to the Spirit, and said, My Lord and God, I thank you. This Spirit brought then with him two others, in the shape the one of a white Cat, the other of a Coney, which at the command of the Bear-Spirit he worshipp'd also. The Bear-Spirit told him he must have his Soul when he died, that he must suck of his body, that he must have some of his Blood to seal the Covenant. To all which he agreed; and so the Bear-Spirit leaping up to his shoulder, prick'd him on the head, and thence took blood. After that they all three vanished, but ever since came to him once every twenty four hours, and suck'd on his body, where the Marks are found. And that they had continually done thus for this twenty nine years together. That all these things should be a mere dream is a conceit more flight and foolish than any dream possibly can be. For that receiving of his purse was a palpable and sensible pledge of the truth of all the rest. And it is incredible that such a series of circumstances, back'd with twenty nine years experience of being suck'd and visited daily, sometimes in the day-time, most commonly by night, by the same three Familiars, should be nothing but the hanging together of so many Melancholy Conceiving and Phansee.  

7. Nor doth the sealing of Covenants and writing with Blood make such Stories as these more to be suspected: for it is not at all unreasonable that such Ceremonies should pass betwixt a Spirit and a Man, when the like palpable Rites are used for the more firmly tying of Man to God. For whatsoever is craze and external leaves stronger Imprefs upon the Phansee, and the remembrance of it strikes the Mind with more efficacy. So that assuredly the Devil hath the greater hand upon the Soul of a Witch or Wizard that hath been perswaded to compleat their Contract with him in such a gross sensible way, and keeps them more fast from revolting from him, then if they had only contracted in bare words.
CHAP. VII.  

1. The Story of Anne Bodenham, a Witch who suffered at Salisbury, Anno 1653. The Author's particular Information concerning her. 2. The manner and circumstances of her first Conjuring up the Devil. 3. An Objection answered concerning the truth thereof. 4. The Objection more fully answered by a second Conjuration. 5. An Objection answered concerning this second Conjuration, and still further cleared by the circumstances of a third. 6. The Witches fourth and last Conjuration, at which Anne Styles made a Contract with the Devil. 7. That these transactions could be no Dreams nor Fancies of Anne Styles, nor she knowingly forsworn in her avouching them upon Oath. 8. Which is further proved by the impartialness of her Confession. 9, 10. By her Contract with the Devil, evidenced from the real effects thereof. 11. And by her behaviour at the Assizes when she gave evidence. 12. An answer to certain Objections. 13. Sundry Indications that Anne Bodenham was a Witch. 14. The Summary Conclusion, That the above-related Conjunctions are no Fictions of Anne Styles, but real Transactions by Anne Bodenham.

1. To that of John Winnick, it will not be amiss to add a more late and more notable Narration concerning one Anne Bodenham, a Witch, who lived in Fiherton-Anger, adjacent to the City of new Sarum in the County of Wilts, who was arraigned and executed at Salisbury 1653. He that has a mind to read the Story more at large, may consult Edmund Bower, who was an eye-witness and ear-witness of several passages. But I shall only set down here what is most material to our present purpose, partly out of him, and partly from others who were then at the Assizes, and had also private Conference with the Witch, and spoke also with the Maid that gave evidence against her.

This Anne Bodenham, it seems, concealed not her skill in foretelling things to come, and helping men to their stolen goods, and other such like feats, that the more notable sort of Wizards and Witches are said to pretend to and to practise.

2. Amongst others that resorted to her, there was one Anne Styles, servant to Rich. Goddard Esq; of the Cloşe in new Sarum, sent by Mr. Mason this Goddard's Son in Law (he having a design to commence a Law Suit against his Father,) to learn of the Witch what would be the event of the Suit, who being asked by the Maid, who had three skillings to give her for her pains, she took her staff, and there drew it about the house, making a kind of a Circle; and then took a book, and carrying it over the Circle with her hands, and taking a green glass, did lay it upon the book, and placed in the Circle an earthen Pan of Coals, wherein she threw something, which burning caused a very noisome stink, and told the Maid, she should not be afraid of what she should then see, for now they would come: (they are the words she used,) and so calling Belzebub, Tormentor, Satan and Lucifer appear; there suddenly arose a very
very high wind, which made the house shake, and presently the back-door of
the house flying open, there came five Spirits, as the Maid supposed, in the
likeness of ragged Boys, some bigger than others, and ran about the house,
where she had drawn the staff, and the Witch threw down upon the ground
cribs of bread, which the Spirits picked up, and leapt over the Pan of coals
oftentimes; which she set in the midle of the Circle, and a Dog and a Cat of
the Witches danced with them: and after some time the Witch looked again
in her book, and threw some great white seeds upon the ground, which the
said Spirits picked up, and so in a short time the wind was laid, and the
Witch going forth at her back-door the Spirits vanished. After which the
Witch told the Maid, that Mr. Mafon should demand fifteen hundred pound,
and one hundred and fifty pound per annum, of Mr. Goddard; and if he
denied it, he should prosecute the Law against him, and be gone from his
Father, and then he should gain it: with which message the Maid returned
and acquainted Mr. Mafon.

3. But it may be it will be objected, That there were some poor ragged
Boys that comploted there with Anne Goddaham to get money upon
pretence of Conjuring and foretelling future events, when it was
indeed nothing else but a cheat within the power of an ordinary knavish
wit. But the loudness of the wind, and the forcible shaking of the house
upon those Magical Words and Ceremonies, may easily answer, or ra-
ther quite blow away, such frivolous Evasions.

4. But if the Objector will yet persist in his opinion, let him read the
circumstances of the second Conjurage of this Witches. For the same
Maid being sent again to her from the same party, to enquire in what part
of the house the Poison was that should be given her Miftris, Hereupon
she took her stick as before, and making therewith a Circle, the wind rose
forthwith: then taking a besom, she swept over the Circle, and made an-
other; and looking in her book and glass as formerly, and using some words
softly to her self, she stood in the Circle and said, Belzebub, Tormentor, Lu-
cifer and Satan appear. There appeared first a Spirit in the shape of a little
Boy, as she conceived, which then turned into another shape something like a
Snake, and then into the shape of a juggled Dog with great eyes, which went
about in the Circle; and in the Circle she set an earthen Pan of Coals, where-
in she threw something which burned and shone, and then the Spirit vanished.
After which the Witch took her book and glass again, and showed the Maid in
the glass Mrs. Sarah Goddard's Chamber, the colour of the Curtains, and the
bed turned up the wrong way, and under that part of the bed where the bol-
sier lay she showed the poison in a white paper. The Maid afterward returned
home, and acquainted Mrs. Roffewell with what the Witch had showed her in
a glass, that the poison lay under Mrs. Sarah's Bed, and also spoke to her that
they might go together and take it away.

The transformation of a Boy into a Snake, and of that Snake into a
juggled Dog with staring eyes, is a feat far above all humane art or wit
whatsoever.

5. Nor can it be imagined that Melancholy had so disturbed the mind
of the Maid, that she told her own dreams or fancies for external sensible
transactions. For she was employed by others in a real Negotiation be-
twixt
twixt them and the Witch, and ever brought back her answers to them, receiving also things from her, by the help of those ragged Boys she raised up, as appears in a third Conjuration of hers, when the Maid was another time sent to procure some exemplary punishment upon Mr. Goddard's two Daughters, who yet were unjustly, as it seems, apercued with the suspicion of endeavouring to poison their Mother-in-law. The Witch receiving the Wenches errand, made a Circle as formerly, and set her Pan of Coals therein, and burnt somewhat that flanke extremely, and took her book and glass as before it related, and said, Belzebub, Tormentor, Lucifer and Satan appear. And then appeared five Spirits, as she conceived, in the shapes of little ragged Boys, which the Witch commanded to appear, and goe along with the Maid to a Meadow at Wilton, which the Witch shewed in a glass, and there to gather Verneine and Dill. And forthwith the ragged Boys ran away before the Maid, and she followed them to the said Meadow: and when they came this her, the ragged Boys looked about for the Herbs, and removed the Snow in two or three places before they could finde any; and at last they found some, and brought it away with them; and then the Maid and the Boys returned again to the Witch, and found her in the Circle, paring her Nails: and then she took the said Herbs, and dried the same, and made Powder of some, and dried the Leaves of other, and threw bread to the Boys, and they eat and danced as formerly; and then the Witch reading in a book they vanished away. And the Witch gave the Maid in one paper the Powder, in another the Leaves, and in the third the paring of the Nails, all which the Maid was to give her Mistress. The Powder was to put in the young Gentlewomens, Mrs. Sarah and Mrs. Anne Goddard's drink or broth, to rot their guts in their bellies; the Leaves to rub about the brims of the Pot, to make their teeth fall out of their heads; and the paring of the Nails, to make them drunk and mad. And when the Maid came home and delivered it to her Mistress, and told her the effects of the Powder and the other things, her Mistress laughed and said, That is a very brave thing indeed. But yet she had the discretion not to make use of it.

6. This Powder was shewn at the Affizis (so that it could be no Fancy or Dream) together with a piece of Money that she received of the Spirits, which one of them first bit and gave it the Witch, and then the Witch gave it to the Maid. The hole also in her finger was then shewn, out of which blood was squeezed to subscribe a Covenant with the Devil, as you may see in the fourth and last bout of Conjuring the Witch performed in the Maid's presence. For she being advised by Mr. Goddard's household to go to London, she went to the Witches first before she quit the Country; who being made acquainted with her journey, asked her whether she would goe to London High or Low? To which she replied, What do you mean by that? She answered, If you will goe on High, you shall be carried to London in the Aire, and be there in two hours; but if you goe a Low, you shall be taken at Sutton Towns end and before, unless you have help. But before she departed, the Witch earnestly desired the Maid to live with her, and told her if she would doe so, she would teach her to doe as she did, and that she should never be taken. Then the Maid asked her what she could doe. She answered, You shall know presently; and forthwith she appeared.
appeared in the shape of a great black Cat, and lay along by the Chimney: at which the Maid being very much affrighted, she came into her own shape again, and told her, I see you are afraid, and I see you are willing to be gone; and told her, if she was, she should stay so, and not speak against her Conscience: and the Maid replied, she was willing to go, and not to dwell with the Witch. Then the Witch said, she must seal unto her body and blood not to discover her: she promising to do, she forthwith made a Circle as formerly she had done, and looking in her book, called, Belzebub, Tormentor, Lucifer and Satan appear. Then appeared two Spirits in the likeness of great Boys, with long shagging black hair, and stood by her looking over her shoulder; and the Witch took the Maid’s forefinger of her right hand in her hand, and pricked it with a pin, and squeezed out the blood, and put it into a Pen, and put the Pen in the Maid’s hand, and held her hand to write in a great book; and one of the Spirits laid his hand or Claw upon the Witches while left the Maid wrote: and when she had done writing, while left their hands were together, the Witch said Amen, and made the Maid say Amen, and the Spirits said Amen, Amen: and the Spirit’s hand did feel cold to the Maid as it touched her hand, when the Witches hand and hers were together writing. And then the Spirit gave a piece of silver (which he first bit) to the Witch, who gave it to the Maid; and also stuck two Pins in the Maid’s head-clothes, and bid her keep them, and bid her be gone; and said also, I will vex the Gentlewoman well enough, as I did the man in Clarington Park, which I made walk about with a bundle of Pales on his back all night in a pond of water, and he could not lay them down till the next morning.

7. All these things the Maid depo.sed upon Oath; and I think it now beyond all controversy evident, that unless she did knowingly forswear her self, that they are certainly true: for they cannot be imputed to any Dreamings, Phantasies, nor Melancholy. Now that the Maid did not forswear her self, or invent these Narrations she swore to, many Arguments offer themselves for eviction.

As first, That it is altogether unlikely that a sorry Wench, that could neither write nor read, should be able to excogitate such Magical Forms and Ceremonies, with all the circumstances of the effects of them, and declare them so punctually, had she not indeed seen them done before her eyes.

Secondly, If she had been so cunning at inventing Lies, she could not but have had so much wit as to frame them better for her own advantage, and for theirs by whom she was employed; or told so much only of the truth as would have been no prejudice to her self, nor any else to have it revealed.

8. For in brief, the case stood thus: Her Mistris either had, or feigned her self to have, a suspicion that her two Daughters in law, Mistris Sarah and Mistris Anne Goddard, comploted to poison her. Here-upon this Maid Anne Styles was sent to the Witch, upon pretence to know when this poisonning would be, and how to prevent it; and at the second time she consulted her, the Witch sent her to the Apothecaries to buy her some white Arsenick, and bring her it, which she taking told her
Thirdly, all the hearing but and for it coming to the knowledge of the two Sisters how they were suspected to endeavour the poisoning of their Mother, and that they had bought an ounce and half of Arsenick lately at the Apothecaries, they, to clear themselves from this suspicion, made diligent enquiry at all the Apothecaries shops throughout Sarum, and at last found where the poison was bought. Hereupon the Maid was desired by her Mistris to goe away and shift for her self, to avoid that trouble and disgrace that might come upon them, if she should stay and be examined before some Justice. While she was upon her journey, Mr. Chandler, Son-in-law to Mr. Goddard, hearing how his Mother-in-law was in danger of being poisoned, and that a Servant of hers that had bought the poison was fled, he forthwith with another man made after her, overtook her near Sutton, had her there into an Inn, where she confessed what has been above related. Which Confession, I say, cannot be any Figment or forged tale, but certain truth, it making nothing for the parties advantage, or theirs that employed her, but rather against them, and mainly against her self; whereas if she had only confessed the buying of the Arsenick with the purpose of preventing her Mistris's being poisoned, by the help and skill of the Witch or Wife-woman, it might have gone for a tolerable piece of folly, could not seem so criminal and execrable as these other acts do. Nothing therefore but a guilty Conscience and the power of truth did extort from her this impartial Confession, which thus every way touches her friends, her self, and the Witch.

9. Thirdly, That her compact with the Devil was no Fable but a sure truth (and if that be true, there is no reason to doubt of the rest) was abundantly evidenced by the real effects of it. For after she had delivered the piece of Money above-mentioned and the two pins to Mr. Chandler, she said she should be troubled for not keeping these things secret. For the Devil told her, so long as she kept them secret, she should never be troubled; but now, she said, having revealed them, she feared she should be troubled. And that those grievous troubles and agonies she was after found in were not mere freaks of her own disturbed Phantasy, but the Tyranny of Satan, will appear from several Circumstances.

For at her recovery from the first fit she fell into, (which was in Stockbridge) both Mr. Chandler and William Atwood, the man that went with him, saw a black shade come from her, whereupon presently she came to her self.

Again, she was so strong in her fits, that six men or more could not hold her; and once as they were holding her, she was caught up from them so high, that her feet touched their breasts, when she was in the Prison at Sarum. As also at another time about midnight, she being miserably tormented, and crying out, "The Devil will carry me away," she was pulled from them that held her, and cast from the low bed where she lay to the top of an high bed, with her Clothes torn off her back, and a piece of her skin torn away. The Candle in the room standing on the Table was
was thrown down and put out: at which time there being a little boy that was almost asleep, but with this noise affrighted, he had no power with the rest to go out of the room, but stayed there, and saw a Spirit in the likeness of a great black man with no head in the room, stuffing with the Maid, who took her and set her into a chair, and told her that she must goe with him, he was come for her Soul, she had given it to him. But the Maid answered, that her Soul was none of her own to give; and he had already got her blood, but as for her Soul he should never have it: and after a while tumbling and throwing about of the Maid, he vanished away.

And that that which the Boy heard and saw was no fancy of his own, but a reall object of his Senses, the Witches condition in another Chamber at the same time does not obscurely argue. For she was then seen with her clothes off, in her fetters, running about like mad; and being asked why she ran about the room, she replied, She could not keep her bed, but was pulled out by violence; and being asked the reason why, she replied, Pray you what is the matter in your Chamber? Nothing, said they, but a Child is not well. To which she answered, Do not you lie to me, for I know what is the matter as well as your selves.

10. But to return to the Maid, from whom we may draw further Arguments relating also to the Witch. As that, when the Maid had not for many dayes and nights together taken any rest, and being then under most grievous hunyings and tortures of the body, the Witch being brought into the room where she lay, the design unknown to her, and the time of her entring, yet so soon as the Witch had set one foot into the room, she gave a most hideous glance with her eyes, and shut them presently after, falling asleep in a moment, and slept about three hours so fast, that when they would have wakened her they could not by any art or violence whatever, as by stopping her breath, putting things up her nostrils, holding her upright, striking of her, and the like. The Witch also declared her unwillingness that she should be wakened, crying out, O pray you by no means awake the Maid, for if she should awake I should be torn in pieces, and the Devil would fetch me away bodily. And a further evidence that this sleep of the Maid did some way depend upon the Witch is, that so soon as the Witch had gone from under the roof where she was, the Maid wakened of her self; and so soon as the Maid wakened, and was at ease (the Devil, as she said, having gone out of her stomack, but doing her no violence, onely making her body tremble a little,) the Witch began to roar and cry out, The Devil will tear me in pieces. These things you may read more fully and particularly in the Narration of Edmond Bower, who was an eye-witness of them. But what I have transcribed from thence I think is sufficient to convince any indifferent man, that what befell the Maid after her revealing those secrets she was intrusted with, was not counterfeited, but real, nay, I may safely say, Supernatural.

11. Fourthly and lastly, her behaviour at the Assizes, when she gave evidence against the Witch, was so earnest and serious, with that strength of mind and free and confident appears to the Witch her self, that, as I was informed of those that were Spectators of that Transacti-
Chap. VII. An Antidote against Atheism.

on, it had been argument enough to the unprejudiced, that she swore nothing but what she was assured was true. And those floods of tears and her bitter weepings after Sentence was passed on the Witch, and her bewailing of her own wickedness and madness, and professing her unwillingness notwithstanding, if it might be done without sin, that the Witch might be reprieved, may further wash away all suspicion of either Fraud or Malice.

12. Nor can the Witches denying (even to her dying day) what the Maid swore to, enervate her testimony. For the Maid tells the whole truth as it was, even to the hazard of her own life, which the Witch indeed denies, but for the saving of hers. And it is no wonder that one that would bid a pox on the Hangman when he defired her to forgive him at her death, should lye and impudently deny any thing to save her own life.

But you'll object, that this reputed Witch may indeed be wicked enough, and willing enough to doe any thing; but the power of her wickedness not reaching to such performances as the Maid witnessed against her, we may well believe her rather then the Maid. The sense of which Objection, if I understand it, can be nothing but this; that either this Anne Bodenham was no Witch, or else the things charged upon her were absolutely impossible. The meaning of the latter whereof assuredly is, that it is impossible any one should be a Witch, there being no such things as Spirits to be conjured up by them. Which is unskilfully to let goe the Premisses as finding them too strong, and to quarrel with the Conclusion.

13. But if the sense be (admitting there are Witches) that she was none; I think it may be evidently evinced that she was, from what she undoubtedly both did and spake. As for example, from her shewing of the Maid in a Glass the shapes of sundry persons, and their actions and postures, in several rooms in her Master's house, whither when she had returned from the Witch, she told them punctually what they had been doing in her absence, which made Elisabeth Rojewell, one of the Family, professes, that she thought Mrs. Bodenham was either a Witch or a woman of God. Besides, what hapned to her in reference to the fits of the Maid, which has been already insisted upon, are shrewd suspicions of her being a Witch. As also what she boasted of to Mr. Tucker's Clerk concerning a purse that hung about her neck in a green string, that she could doe many feats with it; and that if he would give her half a dozen of Ale, she would make a Toad spring out of it. Her confession to Mr. Langley of Sarum, that she lived with Dr. Lamb, and learnt the art of raising Spirits from him, which she also confessed to Edmond Bower; to whom also she acknowledged her skill of curing diseafes by Charms and Spells, that she could discover stolen goods, and shew any one the thief in a Glass: and being asked by him for the Red Book half wrote over with blood, being a Catalogue of those that had fealed to the Devil, she denied not the knowledge of the book, but said it was with one in Hampshire. She also professed that she used many good Prayers, and said the Creed backwards and forwards, and that she prayed to the Planet Jupiter for the curing of Diseafes.
She also acknowledged she had a Book whereby she raised Spirits, calling it a Book of Charms, and said it was worth thousands of other books; and that there was a particular Charm in it for the finding of a Treasure hid by the old Earl of Pembroke in the North part of Wilton Garden.

To another party, being asked by him whether there were any Spirits, she made this reply, That she was sure there were; and confirmed it to him by several passages of late, and particularly by that of one forced to walk about all night with a bundle of Pales on his back in a pond of water, which is mentioned at the end of the fourth Conjuration above recited. She did also highly magnifie her own art to him, venturing at Astrological terms and phrases, and did much scorn and blame the ignorance of the people; averring to him with all earnestness and confidence that there was no hurt in these Spirits, but that they would do a man all good offices, attending upon him and guarding him from evil all his life long.

But certainly her ragged Boys were no such, who discharged the Maid from keeping the Commandments of God, and told her they would teach her a better way; as she also confessed to the same party.

Adde unto all this, that this Anne Bodenham was searched both at the Gaol and before the Judges at the Assizes, and there was found on her shoulder a certain mark or teat about the length and bigness of the nipple of a woman's breast, and hollow and soft as a nipple, with an hole on the top of it.

14. Wherefore to conclude, there being found upon her, there being done and spoken by her such things as do evidently indigitate that she is a Witch, and has the power of raising Spirits, and she being accused by one of raising them up, who in no likelihood could excogitate any such either Magical Forms, Effects or Circumstances, as are above recited, and who tells her story so indifferently, that it touches her self near as much as the Witch, and upon her revealing of the villany was so handled that it was plainly above any natural distemper imaginable; it cannot, I say, but gain full affent of any man, whom prejudice and obstinacy has not utterly blinded, that what the Maid confessed concerning her self and the Witch is most certainly true.
CHAP. VIII.

1. Two memorable Stories, with the credibility of them. 2. The first of a Shoemaker of Breflaw, who cut his own throat. 3. His appearing after death in his usual habit, and his vexatious haunting the whole Town. 4. That he being dug up after he had been eight months buried, his body was found intire and fresh, and his jointes timber and flexible. 5. That upon the burning thereof the Apparition ceased. 6. Which also hapned in a Maid of his, when she had vext and disturbed people for a whole moneth together. 7. That the Relator of the Story lived in the Town at what time these things fell out.

I have insifted fo long upon the foregoing Narration, partly becaufe it is very fresh, fo that any man may satisfy himself concerning the truth thereof that has any doubt of such things; and partly because it is so notorious, that it is hardly to be parallel'd by any we meet with in Writers, considering all circumstances. And yet if they were as new, I know not but those Relations of Martinus Weinrichius, a Silesian Physician and Philosopher, which by way of Preface are prefixed to Picas Mirandula his Strix or De Indificacione Demonum, may seem as convincing as that.

The Stories are two and very memorable, and the more credible, becaufe the things hapned in the age of the Narrator, some few years before he wrote them, and in his own Countrey; and he doth avouch them with all imaginable confidence to be most certainly true. The former of them is this.

2. A certain Shoemaker in one of the chief Towns of Silesia, in the year 1591, Septemb. 20, on a Friday betimes in the morning, in the further parts of his house, where there was adjoyning a little Garden, cut his own throat with his Shoemakers knife. The Family, to cover the foulnefs of the fact, and that no disgrace might come upon his widow, gave out that he died of an Apoplexie, declined all visits of friends and neighbours, in the mean time got him wafhed and laid linens so handsomely about him, that even they that faw him afterwards, as the Parfon and some others, had not the leaft fufpicion but that he did dye of that difeafe; and fo he had honest Burial, with a funeral Sermon and other circumstances becoming one of his rank and reputation. Six weeks had not pafs but fo strong a rumour broke out that he died not of any difeafe, but had laid violent hands upon himfelf, that the Magiftracy of the place could not but bring all thofe that had seen the corps to a strict examination. They shuffled off the matter as well as they could at first, with many fair Apologies in the behalf of the deceased, to remove all fufpicion of fo hainous an act: but it being prefled more home to their Confience, at laft they confessed he died a violent death, but defired their favor and clemency to his widow and children, who were in no fault; adding alfo, that it was uncertain but that he might be flain by some external mishap,
or if by himself, in some irresistible fit of phrensy or madness.

Hereupon the Council deliberate what is to be done. Which the Widow hearing, and fearing they might be determining something that would be harsh, and to the discredit of her Husband and her self, being also animated thereto by some buffe-bodies, makes a great complaint against those that raised these reports of her Husband, and resolved to follow the Law upon them, earnestly contending that there was no reason upon mere rumours and idle defaminations of malevolent people, that her Husband's body should be digged up or dealt with as if he had been either Magician or Self-murderer. Which boldness and pertinacity of the woman, though after the confession of the fact, did in some measure work upon the Council, and put them to a stand.

3. But while these things are in agitation, to the astonishment of the Inhabitants of the place, there appears a Spectrum in the exact shape and habit of the deceased, and that not only in the night, but at mid-day. Those that were asleep it terrified with horrible visions, those that were waking it would strike, pull, or press, lying heavy upon them like an Ephialtes: so that there were perpetuall complaints every morning of their last nights rest through the whole Town. But the more freaks this Spectrum play'd, the more diligent were the friends of the deceased to suppress the rumours of them, or at least to hinder the effects of those rumours; and therefore made their address to the President, complaining how unjust a thing it was, that so much should be given to idle reports and blind suspicions, and therefore beseech'd him that he would hinder the Council from digging up the corps of the deceased, and from all ignominious usage of him: adding also, that they intended to appeal to the Emperor's Court, that their Wildoms might rather decide the Controversie, then that the cause should be here determined from the light conjectures of malicious men.

But while by this means the business was still prostrated, there were such flirs and tumults all over the Town that they are hardly to be described. For no sooner did the Sun hide his head but this Spectrum would be sure to appear, so that every body was fain to look about him and stand upon his guard, which was a fore trouble to those whom the labours of the day made more sensible of the want of rest in the night. For this terrible Apparition would sometimes stand by their beds-sides, sometimes cast it self upon the midst of their beds, would lie close to them, would miserably suffocate them, and would strike them and pinch them, that not onely blew marks, but plain impressions of his fingers would be upon sundry parts of their bodies in the morning. Nay, such was the violence and impetuoufulness of this Ghost, that when men forsook their beds and kept their dining-rooms, with Candles lighted, and many of them in company together, the better to secure themselves from fear and disturbance, yet he would then appear to them, and have a bout with some of them notwithstanding all this provision against it. In brief, he was so troublesome, that the people were ready to forfake their houses and seek other dwellings, and the Magistrate to awakened at the perpetual complaints of them, that at last they resolved, the President agreeing thereto, to dig up the Body.

4. He
4. He had lain in the ground near eight moneths, viz. from Sept. 22. 1591. to April 18, 1592. When he was dug up, which was in the presence of the Magistrate of the Town, his body was found entire, not at all putrid, no ill smell about him, saving the putrefaction of the grave-Clothes, his joynets limber and flexible, as in those that are alive, his skin only flaccid, but a more fresh grown in the room of it, the wound of his throat gaping, but no gear nor corruption in it; there was also observed a Magical mark in the great toe of his right foot, viz. an Excrecence in the form of a Rose. His body was kept out of earth from April 18. to the 24. at what time many both of the same Town and others came daily to view him. Thefe unquiet flirs did not ceafe for all this, which they after attempted to appeafe by burying the corps under the Gallows, but in vain; for they were as much as ever, if not more, he now not sparing his own Family: insomuch that his Widow at laft went her self to the Magistrate, and told them that she should be no longer against it, if they thought fit to fall upon some course of more strict proceedings touching her Husband.

5. Wherefore the feventh of May he was again dug up, and it was observable that he was grown more sensibly fleshy since his laft interment. To be short, they cut off the Head, Arms and Legs of the corps, and opening his Back took out his Heart, which was as fresh and intire as in a Calf new kill'd. These, together with his Body, they put on a pile of wood, and burnt them to Ashes, which they carefully sweeping together and putting into a Sack (that none might get them for wicked uzes) poured them into the River, after which the Spectrum was never seen more.

6. As it alfo happened in his Maid that dyed after him, who appeared within eight daies after her death to her fellow servant, and lay fo heavy upon her that the brought upon her a great swelling of her eyes. She in grievously handled a Child in the cradle, that if the Nurse had not come in to his help, he had been quite spoiled; but the crossing her self and calling upon the name of Jesus, the Spectre vanifhed. The next night she appeared in the shape of an Hen, which when one of the Maids of the house took to be so indeed and followed her, the Hen grew into an immense bignets, and presently caught the Maid by the throat and made it swell, fo that she could neither eat nor drink of a good while after.

She continu'd these flirs for a whole moneth, flapping some fo smartly that the strokes were heard of them that ftood by, pulling the bed alfo from under others, and appearing sometimès in one shape, sometimès in another, as of a Woman, of a Dog, of a Cat, and of a Goat. But at laft her body being digged up and burnt, the Apparition was never seen more.

7. These things were done at Breslaw in Silesia where this Weinrichius then lived, which makes the Narration more considerable. This concealing the name of the parties, I conceive, was in way of civility to his deceased Towns-man, his Towns-mans Widow, and their Family.
CHAP. IX.

1. The second Story of one Cuntius, whose first Pen-man not only dwelt in the Town, but was a sad sufferer in the Tragedie. 2. The quality of Cuntius, his fatal blow by his Horse, and his desperate affliction of Mind. 3. Prodigies attending his death. 4. A Spiritus Incubus in the shape of him, with other disorders. 5. More hideous disorders, as also his appearing to a Gosip of his in behalf of his Child. 6. Several sad effects of his appearing upon several persons. 7. His miserable usage of the Parson of the Parish and his Family, who is the Pen-man of the Story. 8. A brief Rehearsal of many other mad Pranks of this Spectre. 9. A remarkable passage touching his Grave-stone. 10. The florid plight of Cuntius after he had been buried near half a year, his grasping of a Staff, and the motion of his Eyes and of his Blood. 11. The prodigious Weight of his body. 12. As also the Incombustibleness thereof. 13. How hard set the Atheist will be for a subterfuge against this Story.

1. THE other Story he sets down he is not the first Pen-man of (though the things were done in his time, and, as I conceive, some while after what has been above related; as a passage in the Narration seems to intimate) but he transcribed it from one that not only dwelt in the place, but was often infested with the noisom occurrences of that troubleom Ghost that did so much mischief to the place where he dwelt. The Relation is somewhat large, I shall bring it into as narrow compass as I can.

2. Johannes Cuntius, a Citizen of Pensch in Silesia, near sixty years of age, and one of the Aldermen of the Town, very fair in his carriage, and unblamable, to mens thinking, in the whole course of his life, having been sent for to the Maiors house (as being a very understanding man and dexterous at the dispatch of business) to end some controversies concerning certain Wagoners, and a Merchant of Pannonia having made an end of those affairs, is invited by the Maior to Supper: he gets leave first to goe home to order some businesse, leaving this sentence behind him, It's good to be merry while we may, for mischiefs grow up fast enough daily.

This Cuntius kept five lusty Geldings in his Stable, one whereof he commanded to be brought out, and his hoie being loose, had him tied to the next post: his Master with a Servant buffed themselves to take up his leg to look on his hoof, the Horse being mad and metalom struck them both down, but Cuntius received the greatest share of the blow: one that stood next by helpt them both up again. Cuntius no looner was up and came to himself, but cry'd out, Wo is me, how do I burn and am all on a fire! Which he often repeated. But the parts he complained of most, the women being put out of the room, when they were searched, no appearance of any stroke or hurt was found upon them. To be short, he fell downright
downright sick and grievously afflicted in Mind, loudly complaining, that his Sins were such that they were utterly unpardonable, and that the least part of them were bigger then all the Sins of the world besides, but would have no Divine come to him, nor did particularly confess them to any. Several rumours indeed there were that once he fold one of his Sons, but when and to whom it was uncertain, and that he had made a Contract with the Devil, and the like. But it was observed and known for certain, that he had grown beyond all expectation rich, and that four dais before this mischance he being witness to a Child, said, that that was the last he should be ever witness to.

3. The night he died his eldest Son watched with him. He gave up the Ghost about the third hour of the night, at what time a black Cat opening the casement with her nails (for it was shut) ran to his bed, and did so violently scratch his face and the bolster, as if the endeavoured by force to remove him out of the place where he lay. But the Cat afterwards suddenly was gone, and he was no sooner gone, but he breathed his last. A fair tale was made to the Pastor of the Parish, and the Magistracy of the Town allowing it, he was buried on the right side of the Altar, his Friends paying well for it. No sooner Cuntius was dead but a great Tempet arose, which raged most at his very Funeral, there being such impetuous Storms of Wind with Snow, that it made mens bodies quake and their teeth chatter in their heads. But so soon as he was interred, of a sudden all was calm.

4. He had not been dead a day or two, but several rumours were spread in the town of a Spiritus incubus or Ephialtes, in the shape of Cuntius, that would have forced a Woman. This hapned before he was buried. After his Burial the same Spiritre awakened one that was sleeping in his dining-room, saying, I can scarce withold myself from beating thee to death. The voice was the voice of Cuntius. The watchmen of the Town also affirmed that they heard every night great stirs in Cuntius his Houfe, the fallings and throwings of things about, and that they did fee the gates stand wide open betimes in the mornings, though they were never so diligently that o're night; that his Horses were very unquiet in the Stable, as if they kicked and bit one another; besides unusual barkings and howlings of Dogs all over the Town. But these were but preludious suspections to further evidence, which I will run over as briefly as I may.

5. A Maid-servant of one of the Citizens of Pentsch (while these Tragedies and stirs were so frequent in the Town) heard, together with some others lying in their beds, the noise and tramplings of one riding about the Houfe, who at last ran against the walls with that violence that the whole Houfe shaked again as if it would fall, and the windows were all fill'd with flashings of light. The Master of the house being informed of it, went out of doors in the morning to see what the matter was; and he beheld in the Snow the impressions of strange feet, such as were like neither Hores, nor Cows, nor Hogs, nor any Creature that he knew.

Another time, about eleven of the clock in the night, Cuntius appears to one of his Friends that was a witness to a Child of his, speaks unto him,
him, and bids him be of good courage, for he came only to communicate unto him a matter of great importance. *I have left behind me, said he, my youngest son James, to whom you are God-father.* Now there is at my eldest son Steven's, a Citizen of Jegerdor, a certain Ghost wherein I have put four hundred and fifteen Florens: *This I tell you, that your God-son may not be defrauded of any of them, and it is your duty to look after it, which if you neglect, woe be to you.* Having said this, the Spectre departed, and went up into the upper rooms of the House, where he walked so stoutly that all rattled again, and the roof swagged with his heavy stampings. *This, Cuntius his Friend told to the Parson of the Parish a day or two after for a certain truth.*

6. But there are also other several notorious passages of this Cuntius. As his often speaking to the Maid that lay with her Mistresses, his Widow, to give him place, for it was his right, and if she would not give it him, he would write her neck behind her.

His galloping up and down like a wanton horse in the Court of his House. His being divers times seen to ride, not only in the streets, but along the valleys of the field and on the Mountains, with so strong a trot that he made the very ground flath with fire under him.

His bruising of the body of a Child of a certain Smith, and making his very bones so soft, that you might wrap the corps on heaps like a glove.

His miserably tugging all night with a Jew that had taken up his Inne in the Town, and tallow him up and down in the lodging where he lay.

His dreadful accosting of a Wagoner, an old acquaintance of his, while he was but in the stable, vomiting out fire against him to terrifie him, and biting of him so cruelly by the foot that he made him lame.

7. What follows, as I above intimated, concerns the Relator himself, who was the Parson of the Parish, whom this Fury so squeezed and pressed when he was asleep, that waking he found himself utterly spent and his strength quite gone, but could not imagine the reason. But while he lay musing with himself what the matter might be, this Spectre returns again to him, and holding him all over so fast that he could not wag a finger, rowled him in his bed backwards and forwards a good many times together. The same hapned also to his Wife another time, whom Cuntius, coming through the casement in the shape of a little Dwarf and running to her bed side, so wrung and pulled as if he would have torn her throat out, had not her two Daughters come in to help her.

He pressed the lips together of one of this Theologer's Sons so, that they could scarce get them asunder.

His House was so generally disturbed with this unruly Ghost, that the Servants were fain to keep together aights in one room, lying upon straw and watching the approches of this troublesome Fiend. But a Maid of the house, being more courageous then the rest, would needs one night goe to bed, and for sake her company. Whereupon Cuntius finding her
her alone, presently assaults her, pulls away the bedding, and would have carried her away with him; but she hardly escaping fled to the rest of the Family, where she espied him standing by the candle; and straightway after vanishing.

Another time he came into her Master's Chamber, making a noise like a Hog that eat grains, snacking and grunting very tonorously. They could not chase him away by speaking to him; but ever as they lighted a Candle he would vanish.

On another time about Evening, when this Theologer was sitting with his Wife and Children about him, exercising himself in Musicke, according to his usual manner, a most grievous stink arose suddenly, which by degrees spread itself to every corner of the room. Hereupon he commends himself and his family to God by prayer. The smell nevertheless encreased, and became above all measure pestilently noisome, insomuch that he was forced to goe up to his chamber. He and his Wife had not been in bed a quarter of an hour, but they find the same stink in the bed-chamber; of which while they are complaining one to another, out steps the Spectre from the wall, and creeping to his bed-side breathes upon him an exceeding cold breath of so intolerable stinking and malignant a fent, as is beyond all imagination and expression. Hereupon the Theologer, good soul, grew very ill, and was fain to keep his bed, his face, belly and guts swelling, as if he had been poisoned; whence he was also troubled with a difficulty of breathing, and with a putrid inflammation of his eyes, so that he could not well use them a long time after.

8. But taking leave of the sick Divine, if we should goe back and recount what we have omitted, it would exceed the number of what we have already recounted. As for example, The trembling and sweating of Cnutius his Gelding, from which he was not free night nor day: The burning blew of the Candles at the approaches of Cnutius his Ghost: His drinking up the milk in the milk-bowls, his flinging dung into them, or turning the milk into blood: His pulling up posts deep set in the ground, and so heavy that two lusty Porters could not deal with them: His discoursing with several men he met concerning the affairs of the Wagoners: His strangling of old men: His holding fast the Cradles of Children, or taking them out of them: His frequent endeavouring to force women: His defiling the water in the Font, and fouling the Cloth on the Altar on that side that did hang towards his grave with dirty bloody spots: His catching up Dogs in the streets, and knocking their brains against the ground: His sucking dry the Cows, and tying their tails like the tail of an Horfe: His devouring of Poultry, and his flinging of Goats bound into the Racks: His tying of an Horfe to an empty Oat-tub in the Stable to clatter up and down with it, and the hinder foot of another to his own head-stall: His looking out of the window of a low Tower, and then suddenly changing himself into the form of a long staff: His chiding of a Matron for suffering her servant to wash dyes on a Thursday, at what time he laid his hand upon her, and she said it felt more cold then ice: His pelting one of the women that washed his corps, so forcibly, that the prints of the Clods he flung were to be seen upon the wall.
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... wall: His attempting to ravish another, who excusing her self, and saying, My Cuntius, thou seest how old, wrinkled and deformed I am, and how unfit for those kinds of sports, he suddenly set up a loud laughter and vanished.

9. But we must not insist upon these things; onely we will add, one passage more that is not a little remarkable. His grave-stone was turned of one side, shelving, and there were several holes in the earth, about the bigness of mouse-holes, that went down to his very Coffin, which however they were filled up with earth and all made plain over night, yet they would be sure to be laid open the next morning.

It would be a tedious busines to recite all these things at large, and prosecute the Story in all its particular Circumstances. To conclude therefore, their calamity was such from the frequent occurrences of this restless Fury, that there was none but either pitied them or despised them; none would lodge in their Town, trading was decayed, and the Citizens impoverished by the continual stirs and tumults of this unquiet Ghost.

10. And though the Atheist may perhaps laugh at them as men undone by their own Melancholy and vain imaginations, or by the wagery of some ill neighbours; yet if he seriously consider what has been already related, there are many passages that are by no means to be resolved into any such Principles: but what I shall now declare, will make it altogether unlikely that any of them are.

To be short therefore, finding no rest nor being able to excogitate any better remedy, they dig up Cuntius his body, with several others buried both before and after him. But those both after and before were fo putrefi'd and rotten, their Sculls broken, and the Sutures of them gaping, that they were not to be known by their shape at all, having become in a manner but a rude mass of earth and dirt; but it was quite otherwise in Cuntius: His Skin was tender and florid, his Joyns not at all stiff, but limber and moveable, and a staff being put into his Hand, he grasped it with his fingers very fast; his Eyes also of themselves would be one time open and another time shut; they opened a vein in his Leg, and the blood sprang out as fresh as in the living; his Nose was entire and full, not sharp, as in those that are gasly sick or quite dead: and yet Cuntius his body had lain in the grave from Feb. 8. to July 20. which is almost half a year.

11. It was easily discernible where the fault lay. However, nothing was done rashly, but Judges being constituted, Sentence was pronounced upon Cuntius his Carcase, which (being animated thereto from success in the like case some few years before in this very Province of Silesia, I suppose he means at Breslaw where the Shoemakers body was burnt) they adjudged to the fire.

Wherefore there were Masons provided to make a hole in the wall near the Altar to get his body through, which being pulled with a rope, it was so exceeding heavy that the rope brake, and they could scarce lift him. But when they had pull'd him through, and gotten him on a Cart without, which Cuntius his Horse that struck him (which was a lufty-
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Lufty-bodied Jade) was to draw; yet it put him to it so, that he was ready to fall down ever and anon, and was quite out of breath with striving to draw so intolerable a load, who notwithstanding could run away with two men in the same Cart pretently after, their weight was so inconsiderable to his strength.

12. His body, when it was brought to the fire, proved as unwilling to be burnt as before to be drawn, so that the Executioner was fain with hooks to pull him out, and cut him into pieces to make him burn, Which while he did, the blood was found so pure and spiritous, that it spurted into his face as he cut him; but at last, not without the expence of two hundred and sixteen great billets, all was turned into ashes. Which they carefully sweeping up together, as in the foregoing Story, and casting them into the River, the Spectre never more appeared.

13. I must confess I am so flow-witted myself, that I cannot so much as imagine what the Atheist will excogitate for a subterfuge or hiding-place from so plain and evident Convictions.

Hitherto of Witches and other devoted Vassals of Satan in several; we shall now consider their Assemblies and Conventicles, and urge further proofs of Spirits and Apparitions from thence.

Chap. X.

1. The Nocturnal Conventicles of Witches; two examples thereof out of Paulus Grillandus. 2. Of the Witch of Lochie, with a reflexion on the unexceptionableness of these Instances for the proof of Spirits. 3. The piping of John of Hembach to a Conventicle of Witches. 4. The dancing of Men, Women and cloven-footed Satyrs at Mid-day. 5. John Michael's dumb Musick on his crooked staff from the bough of an Oak at that Antick dancing. 6. The Impresse of a Circle with cloven feet in it on the ground where they danced.

Paulus Grillandus reports of one not farre from Rome, who at the persuasione of his Wife anointing himself, as she had done before him, was carried away in the aire to a great Assembly of Wizards and Witches, where they were feasting under a Nut-tree. But this stranger not relishing his cheer without Salt, at last the Salt coming, and he blessing of God for it, at that Name the whole Assembly disappeared, and he poor man was left alone naked an hundred miles off from home; whither when he had got he accused his Wife: she confess'd the fact, discovering also her companions, who were therefore burnt with her.

The same Author writes also of a young Girl thirteen years old in the Dukedom of Spalato, who being brought into the like company, and admiring the strangenesse of the thing, and crying out, Blessed God, what's here to doe? made the whole Assembly vanish, was left her felt in
the field alone, and wandering up and down was found by a countryman, to whom he told the whole matter.

2. So the Husband of the Witch of Lochia, whom she brought into the like Assembly, by saying, O my God, where are we? made all to vanish, and found himself naked alone in the field fifteen dayes journey from home.

Several other Narrations to this purpose Bodinus sets down, which these sensible effects of being so far distant from home, and being found naked in the fields, shew to be no freaks of Melancholy, but certain truth. But that the Devil in these junquetings appears to theGuests in the form of a Satyr, black Goat, or else sometimes in the shape of an ill-favoured black man, is the ordinary Confession of Witches, by this way discovered and convicted.

3. I will only add a Story or two out of Remigius concerning these kindes of Conventicles, and then I will proceed to some other proofs.

John of Hembach was carried by his Mother being a Witch to one of these Meetings, and because he had learn'd to play on the Pipe, was commanded by her to exercise his faculty, and to get up into a Tree, that they might the better hear his Musick, Which he doing, and looking upon the Dancers, how uncouth and ridiculous they were in their motions and gestures, being struck with admiration at the novelty of the matter, suddenly burst out into these words, Good God, what a mad company have we here! Which was no sooner said, but down came John, Pipe and all, and hurt his shoulder with the tumbling cast; who when he called to the company to help him, found himself alone, for they had all vanished. John of Hembach told what had hapned, but people knew not what to make of it, till some of that mad Crew that danc'd to his Pipe were apprehended upon other suspicions, as Catharina Pravotia, Kelvers Orilla, and others, who made good every whit what John had before told (though they knew nothing of what he told before) adding also more particularly that the place where he pip'd to them was Maybach.

4. The other memorable Story that I shall relate out of Remigius is this. One Nicola Langbernhard, while she was going towards Asfensvaria along a hedge side, spied in the next field (it was about Noon-time of day) a company of men and women dancing in a ring; and the posture of their bodies being uncouth and unusual, made her view them more attentively, whereby she discerned some of them to have cloven feet like Oxen or Goats (it should seem they were Spirits in the shape of lusty Satyrs:) the being astonished with fear cries out, Jesus, help me, and send me well home. She had no sooner said so, but they all vanished leaving only one Peter Großetter, whom a little after she saw snatch'd up into the aire, and to let fall his Maulkin (a stick that they make clean Ovens withall) and her self was also driven so forcibly with the wind, that it made her almost lose her breath. She was fain to keep her bed three dayes after.

5. This Peter (though at first he would have followed the Law on Nicola for flandering him, yet) afterward freely confess'd and discove red others of his companions, as Barbelia the wife of Joannes Latomus, &
Mayetta the wife of Laurentius, who confessed she danced with those cloven-footed creatures at what time Peter was amongst them. And for further evidence of the business, John Michael, Herdsman, did confess, that while they thus danced, he plaid upon his crooked staff, and struck upon it with his fingers as if it had been a Pipe, setting upon an high bough of an Oak; and that so soon as Nicola called upon the Name of Jesus, he tumbled down headlong to the ground, but was presently catch’d up again with a whirlwind, and carried to Weiller Meadows, where he had left his Herds a little before.

6. Adde unto all this, that there was found in the place where they danced a round circle, wherein there was the manifest marks of the treading of cloven feet, which was seen from the day after Nicola had discovered the business, till the next Winter that the Plough cut them out. These things hapned in the year 1590.

**C H A P. XI.**

1. Of Fairy-Circles. 2. Questions propounded concerning Witches leaving their bodies, as also concerning their Transformation into bestial shapes. 3. That the Reasons of Wierus and Remigius against real Transformation are but weak. 4. The Probabilities for, and the Manner of, real Transformation. 5. An argumentation for their being out of their bodies in their Ecstasies. 6. That the Soul’s leaving the Body thus is not Death, nor her return any proper Miracle. 7. That it is in some cases most easy and natural to acknowledge they do leave their bodies, with an instance out of Wierus that suits to that purpose. 8. The Author’s Skepticism in the point, with a favourable interpretation of the proper extravagances of Temper in Bodinus and Des-Cartes.

It might be here very reasonable, upon the foregoing Story, to enquire into the nature of those large dark rings in the graves which they call Fairy-Circles, whether they be the rendezvous of Witches, or the dancing-places of those little Puppet-Spirits which they call Elves or Fairies. But these curiosities I leave to more buxom wits. I am only intent now upon my serious purpose of proving there are Spirits; which I think I have made a pretty good progress in already, and have produced such Narrations as cannot but gain credit with such as are not pervertly and wilfully incredulous.

2. There is another more profitable Question started, if it could be decided, concerning these Night-revellings of Witches, whether they be not sometimes there, their Bodies lying at home; as sundry Relations seem to favour that opinion: * Bodinus is for it, * Remigius is against it.

It is the same Question, Whether when Witches or Wizards profess they will tell what is done within so many miles compass, and afterwards, to give a proof of their skill, first anoint their Bodies, and then fall down dead.
dead in a manner, and so lie a competent time senseful, whether, I say, their Souls goe out of their Bodies, or all be but represented to their Imagination.

We may adde a third, which may haply better fetch off the other two; and that is concerning your Augenspaet (which the Germans call Were-Wolff, the French Loups garous) Men transformed into Wolves; and there is much what the fame reason of other Transformations. I shall not trouble you with any Histories of them, though I might produce many. But as well thofe that hold it is but a delusion of the Devil, & mere Tragedies in Dreams, as that they are real tranfactions, do acknowledge, that thofe parties that have confessed themselves thus transformed have been weary and sore with running, have been wounded, and the like.

Bodinus here alfo is deferted of Remigius, who is of the fame minde with Wierus, that fly, smooth Physician, and faithful Patron of Witches, who will be fure to load the Devil as much as he can, his shoulders being more able to bear it, and fo to ease the Haggges.

3. But for mine own part, though I will not undertake to decide the Controversie, yet I think it not amifs to declare that Bodinus may very well make good his own, notwithstanding any thing thofe do alledge to the contrary. For that which * Wierus and * Remigius feme to much to stand upon, that it is too great a power for the Devil, and too great indignity to Man, that he fhould be able thus to transform him, are, in my minde, but flight Rhetorications, no found Arguments.

For what is that outward mis-shape of Body to the inward deformity of their Souls, which he felps on fo notoriously? And they having given themselves over to him so wholly, why may he not use them thus here, when they fhall be worse used by him hereafter? And for the changing of the species of things, if that were a power too big to be granted the Devil, yet it is no more done here, when he thus transforms a Man into a Wolf, then when he transforms himself into the shape of a Man. For this Wolf is still a Man, and that Man is still a Devil. For it is fo as the Poet fays it was in Ulyfles his Companions which Circe turned into Hogges, They had the Head, the Voice, the Body and Briftles of Hogs;

but their Understanding was unchanged, they had the Mind and Memory of a Man as before. As Petrus Bourgoutus profefeth, that when his companion Michael Verdung had anointed his body and transform'd him into a Wolf, when he look'd upon his hairy Feet, he was at first afraid of himself.

4. Now therefore it being plain that nothing material is alleged to the contrary, and that Men confess they are turn'd into Wolves, and acknowledge the salvage cruelties they then committed upon Children, Women and Sheep, that they finde themselves exceeding weary, and sometimes wounded, it is more natural to conclude they were really thus transformed, then that it was a mere delusion of Phanfly.

For I conceive the Devil gets into their Body, and by his subtle substance, more operative and searching then any fire or putrefying liquor, melts
melts the yielding Compages of the Body to such a consistency, and so much of it as is fit for his purpose, and makes it pliable to his Imagination; and then it is as easy for him to work it into what shape he pleases, as it is to work the Aire into such forms and figures as he ordinarily doth. Nor is it any more difficulty for him to mollifie what is hard, then it is to harden what is so soft and fluid as the Aire.

5. And he that hath this power, we can never stick to give him that which is leffer, viz. to instruct men how they shall for a time forsake their Bodies, and come in again. For can it be a hard thing for him that can thus melt and take a-pieces the particles of the Body, to have the skill and power to loosen the Soul, a Substance really distinct from the Body and separable from it; which at last is done by the easie course of Nature, at that final dissolution of Soul and Body which we call Death? But no course of Nature ever transforms the Body of Man into the shape of a Wolf; so that this is more hard and exorbitant from the order of Nature then the other.

6. But, you'll say, the greatness and incredibleness of the Miracle is this, That there should be an actual separation of Soul and Body, and yet no Death. But this is not at all strange, if we consider that Death is properly a disjunction of the Soul from the Body by reason of the Body's weakness any longer to entertain the Soul, which may be caused by extremity of Diseases, outward Violence or Age; and if the Devil could restore such Bodies as these to Life, it were a Miracle indeed. But this is not such a Miracle, nor is the Body properly dead, though the Soul be out of it. For the life of the Body is nothing else but that fineness to be actuated by the Soul. The conservation whereof is help'd, as I conceive, by the anointing of the Body before the Ecstasy: which ointment filling the pores, keeps out the cold, and keeps in the heat and spirits, that the frame and temper of the Body may continue in fit case to entertain the Soul again at her return. So the vital flames of the carcasse being not yet spent, the pristine operations of Life are presently again kindled, as a Candle new blown out, and as yet reeking, suddenly catches fire from the flame of another, though at some distance, the light gliding down along the finoke.

7. Wherefore there being nothing in the nature of the thing that should make us incredulous, these Sorceresses so confidently pronouncing that they are out of their Bodies at such times, and see and doe such and such things, meet one another, bring meffages, discover secrets and the like, it is more natural and easie to conclude they be really out of their Bodies then in them. Which we should the more easily be induced to believe, if we could give credit to that Narration Wierus tells of a Souldier, out of whose mouth whilest he was asleep a thing in the shape of a Weasel came, which nudling along in the grafs, and at last coming to a brook side, very busily attempting to get over, but not being able, some one of the flanders by that saw it made a bridge for it of his sword, which it passed over by, and coming back made use of the same passage, and then entred into the Souldiers mouth again; many looking on. When he awaked, he told how he dream'd he had gone over an iron bridge, and
other particulars answerable to what the spectators had seen aforehand.

* De Praetig. Démon, lib. 1. cap. 14. * Wierus acknowledgeth the truth of the Relation, but will by all means have it to be the Devil, not the Soul of the Man; which he doth in a tender regard to the Witches, that from such a truth as this they might not be made so obnoxious to suspicion that their Ecstasies are not mere Dreams and Delusions of the Devil, but are accompanied with real effects.

8. I will not take upon me to decide so nice a Controversie, only I will make bold to intermeddle thus far, as to pronounce Bodinus his opinion not at all unworthy of a rational and sagacious man: and that though, by his being much addicted to such like speculations, he might attribute some natural effects to the ministry of Spirits, when there was no need so to doe; yet his Judgment in other things of this kind is no more to be slighted for that, then Cartesius, that stupendious Mechanical Wit, is to be disallowed in those excellent inventions of the causes of those more general Phenomena of Nature, because by his successes in those he was imboldened to enlarge his Principles too far, and to affert that Animals themselves were mere Machinas: like Aristoxenus the Musician, that made the Soul nothing else but an Harmony; of whom Tully pleasantly observes, Quod non receptis ab arte sua. Every Genius and Temper, as the sundry sorts of Beasts and living Creatures, have their proper excrement: and it is the part of a wise man to take notice of it, and to chuse what is profitable, as well as to abandon what is useless and excrementitious.

CHAP. XII.

1. The Coldness of those Bodies that Spirits appear in, witnessed by the experience of Cardan and Bourgotus. 2. The natural reason of this Coldness. 3. That the Devil does really lie with Witches. 4. That the very Substance of Spirits is not Fire. 5. The Spectre at Ephesus. 6. Spirits skirmishing on the ground. 7, 8. Field-fights and Sea-fights seen in the Aire.

But to return into the way, I might add other Stories of your Démones Metallici, your Guardian Genii, such as that of Socrates, and that other of which Bodinus tells an ample Relation, which he received from him who had the society and assistance of such an Angel or Genius, which for my own part I give as much credit to as to any Story in Livy or Plutarch; your Lares familiariæ, as also those that haunt and vex Families, appearing to many, and leaving very sensible effects of their appearances. But I will not so far tire either my self or my Reader. I will only name one or two more, rather then recite them. As that of Facius Cardanus, who relates, as you may fee in * Cardan, how a Spirit that familiarly was seen in the house of a friend of his, one night laid his hand upon
upon his brow, which felt intolerably cold. And so * Petrus Bourgous confessef, that when the Devil gave him his hand to kiss, it felt cold. And many more examples there be to this purpose.

2. And indeed it stands to very good reason that the Bodies of Devils, being nothing but coagulated Aire, should be cold, as well as coagulated Water, which is Snow or Ice; and that it should have a more keen and piercing cold, it consisting of more subtile particles then those of Water, and therefore more fit to inflaminate, and more accurately and stingingly to affect and touch the nerves.

3. Wherefore Witches confessing so frequently as they do, that the Devil lies with them, and withall complaining of his tedious and offensive coldness, it is a shrewd presumption that he doth lie with them indeed, and that it is not a mere Dream, as their friend Wirtus would have it.

4. Hence we may also discover the folly of that opinion that makes the very Essence of Spirits to be Fire: for how unfit that would be to coagulate the Aire is plain at first sight. It would rather melt and diffuse those consistencies, then constringe them and freeze them in a manner. But it is rather manifest that the Essence of Spirits is a Substance specifically distinct from all corporeal matter whatsoever. But my intent is not to Philofophize concerning the nature of Spirits, but only to prove their Existence.

5. Which the Spectre at Ephesius may be a further argument of. For that old man which Apollonius told the Ephesians was the walking plague of the City, when they stoned him and uncovered the heap, appear'd in the shape of an huge black Dog as big as the biggest Lion. This could be no imposture of Melancholy, nor Fraud of any Priest. And the learned Grofinus, a man far from all Levity and vain Credulence, is so secure of the truth of Tyaneus his Miracles, that he does not stick to term him impudent that has the face to deny them.

6. Our English Chronicles also tell us of Apparitions, armed men, foot and horse, fighting upon the ground in the North part of England and in Ireland for many Evenings together, seen by many hundreds of men at once, and that the grass was troden down in the places where they were seen to fight their Battails: which agreeeth with Nicola Langbernbour her Relation of the eleven-footed Dancers, that left the print of their hoofs in the ring they trod down for a long time after.

7. But this skirmishing upon the Earth puts me in mind of the last part of this argument, and bids me look up into the Aire. Where, omitting all other Prodigies, I shall only take notice of what is most notorious, and of which there can by no means be given any other account then that it is the effect of Spirits. And this is the Appearance of armed men fighting and encountering one another in the Sky. There are so many examples of these Prodigies in Historians, that it were superfluous to instance in any. That before the great slaughter of no less then fourscore thouand made by Antiochus in Jerusalem, recorded in the second of Maccabees chap. 5, is famous. The Historian there writes, "That through all the "City for the space almost of forty daies there were seen Horsemen "running in the Aire in cloth of Gold, and arm'd with Lances, like a band "of
"of Souldiers, and Troops of Horsemen in array encountering and running 
one against another, with shaking of shields and multitudes of pikes, 
and drawing of swords, and casting of darts, and glittering of golden 
ornaments, and harness of all forts. And Josephus writes also con-
cerning the like Prodigies that hapned before the destruction of the 
City by Titus, prefaceing first, that they were incredible, were it 
not that they were recorded by those that were Eye-witnessefs of 
them.

8. The like Apparitions were seen before the Civil wars of Marius 
and Syla. And Melancthon affirms that a world of such Prodigies were 
seen all over Germany from 1524 to 1548. Snellius amongst other places 
dothe particularize in Amersfort, where these fightings were not 
much higher then the house tops; as also in Amsterdam, where there 
was a Sea-fight appearing in the Aire for an hour or two together, many 
thousands of men looking on. And to say nothing of what hath been 
seen in England not long agoe, there is lately a punctual narration of such 
a Sea-fight seen by certain Hollanders, and lent over hither into England; 
but a Lion appearing alone at the end of that Apparition, though it may 
be true for ough I know, yet it makes it obnoxious to Suspicion and 
evasion, and so unprofitable for my purpose. But the Phenomena of this 
kind, whose reports cannot be suspected to be in subserviency to any 
Poltick design, ought in reason to be held true, when there have been 
many profest Eye-witnessefs of them. And they being resolvable into no 
natural caufes, it is evident that we must acknowledge supernatural ones, 
such as Spirits, Intelligences or Angels, term them what you please.

C H A P. XIII.

1. The main reason why good Spirits so seldom converse with men.
2. What manner of Magick Bodinus his friend used to procure the more 
sensible assistance of a good Genius. 3. The manner of this Genius his 
sensible Converse. 4. The Religiosity of the Party, and the Character 
of his Temper. 5. His escapes from danger by advertisements of the 
good Genius. 6. The Genius his aversion from Vocal conversation 
with him. 7. His usefull Assistance by other Signs. 8. The manner of 
his appearing to him awake, and once in a Slumber.

I had here ended all my Stories, were I not tempted by that re-
markable one in Bodinus to out-run my method. I but named 
it in the foregoing Chapter; I shall tell it now more at large. I am the 
more willingly drawn to relate it, such examples of the confociation of 
good Spirits being very scarce in History. The main reason whereof, as I 
conceive, is, because so very few men are heartily and sincerely good. The 
Narration is more considerable, in that he that writes it had it from the 
mans own mouth whom it concerns, and is as follows.

2. This
2. This Party, a holy and pious man, as it should seem, and an acquaintance of Bodinus's, freely told him how that he had a certain Spirit that did perpetually accompany him, which he was then first aware of when he had attain'd to about thirty-seven years of age, but conceived that the said Spirit had been present with him all his life-time, as he gathered from certain Monitory Dreams and Visions, whereby he was fore-warn'd as well of several Dangers as Vices. That this Spirit discovered himself to him after he had for a whole year together earnestly pray'd to God to send a good Angel to him, to be the Guide and Governor of his life and actions; adding also, that before and after Prayer he used to spend two or three hours in meditation and reading the Scriptures, diligently enquiring with himself what Religion, amongst those many that are controverted in the world, might be best, beseeching God that he would be pleased to direct him to it; and that he did not allow of their way, that at all adventures pray to God to confirm them in that opinion they have already preconceived, be it right or wrong. That while he was thus busy with himself in matters of Religion, that he lighted on a passage in Philo Judeus in his Book De Sacrificis, where he writes, that a good and holy Man can offer no greater nor more acceptable Sacrifice to God than the Oblation of himself; and therefore following Philo's counsel, that he offered his Soul to God. And that after that, amongst many other divine Dreams and Visions, he once in his sleep seemed to hear the voice of God laying to him, I will save thy Soul, I am he that before appeared unto thee. Afterwards that the Spirit every day would knock at the door about three or four a clock in the morning, though he rising and opening the door could see no body; but that the Spirit persist'd in this course, and unless he did rise, would thus rouze him up.

3. This trouble and boisterousness made him begin to conceal that it was some evil Spirit that thus haunted him, and therefore he daily pray'd earnestly unto God that he would be pleased to send a good Angel to him; and often also sung Psalms, having most of them by heart.

Wherefore the Spirit afterward knocked more gently at the door, and one day discovered himself to him waking, which was the first time that he was assur'd by his senses that it was he, for he often touch'd and stirr'd a Drinking-glass that stood in his chamber, which did not a little amaze him.

Two days after, when he entertain'd at Supper a certain friend of his, Secretary to the King, that this friend of his was much abash'd while he heard the Spirit thumping on the bench hard by him, and was strucken with fear; but he bade him be of good courage, there was no hurt towards; and the better to assure him of it, told him the truth of the whole matter.

Wherefore from that time, faith Bodinus, he did affirm that this Spirit was always with him, and by some senible signe did ever advertise him of things; as by striking his right Ear, if he did any thing amiss; if otherwise, his left. If any body came to circumvene him, that his right Ear
Ear was struck, but his left Ear if a good man and to good ends accosted him. If he was about to eat or drink any thing that would hurt him, or intended or purposed with himself to do any thing that would prove ill, that he was inhibited by a signe; and if he delayed to follow his business, that he was quickened by a signe given him.

When he began to praise God in Psalms and to declare his marvelous Acts, that he was prefently raiied and strengthened with a spiritual and supernatural power.

4. That he daily begg’d of God that he would teach him his Will, his Law and his Truth; and that he fet one day of the week apart for reading the Scripture and Meditation, with singing of Psalms, and that he did not stir out of his house all that day: but that in his ordinary conversation he was sufficiently merry and of a cheerful minde, and he cited that saying for it, vidi facies Sanctorum latas. But in his conversing with others, if he had talked vainly and indiscreetly, or had some days together neglected his Devotions, that he was forthwith admonished thereof by a Dream. That he was also admonished to rise betimes in the morning, and that about four of the clock a voice would come to him while he was asleep, saying, Who gets up first to pray?

5. He told Bodinus also how he was often admonish’d to give Alms, and that the more Charity he bestowed the more prosperous he was. And that on a time when his enemies sought after his life, and knew that he was to goe by water, that his Father in a Dream brought two Horses to him, the one white, the other bay; and that therefore he bid his servant hire him two horses, and though he told him nothing of the colours, that yet he brought him a white one and a bay one.

That in all difficulties, journeyings and what other enterprizes soever, he used to ask counsel of God; and that one night, when he had begged his blessing, while he slept he saw a vision wherein his Father seemed to bless him.

At another time, when he was in very great Danger, and was newly gone to bed, he said that the Spirit would not let him alone till he had raiied him again; wherefore he watched and pray’d all that night. The day after he escaped the hands of his Persecutors in a wonderful manner; which being done, in his next sleep he heard a voice saying, Now sing, Qui sedet in latibulo Altissimi.

6. A great many other passages this Party told Bodinus, so many, indeed, that he thought it an endless labour to recite them all. But what remains of those he has recited, I will not stick to take the pains of transcribing them.

Bodinus asked him why he would not speak to the Spirit for the gaining of the more plain and familiar converse with it. He answered that he once attempted it, but the Spirit instantly struck the door with that vehemency, as if he had knock’d upon it with a hammer: whereby he gathered his dislike of the matter.

7. But though the Spirit would not talk with him, yet he could make use of his judgement in the reading of books and moderating his studies. For if he took an ill book into his hands and fell a reading, the
the Spirit would strike it, that he might lay it down; and would also sundry times, be the books what they would, hinder him from reading and writing overmuch, that his mind might rest, and silently meditate with it felt. He added also, that very often while he was awake, a small, subtile, inarticulate sound would come unto his Ears.

8. Bodinus further enquiring whether he ever did see the Shape and Form of the Spirit, he told him that while he was awake he never saw any thing but a certain light very bright and clear and of a round compass and Figure; but that once being in great jeopardy of his life, and having heartily pray'd to God that he would be pleased to provide for his safety, about break of day, amidst his flumberings and wakings, he esp'y'd on his bed where he lay a young Boy clad in a white Garment, tinged somewhat with a touch of purple, and of a visage admirably lovely and beautiful to behold. This he confidently affirmed to Bodinus for a certain truth.

CHAP. XIV.

1. Certain Enquiries upon the preceding Narration; as, What these Guardian Genii may be. 2. Whether one or more of them be allotted to every man, or to some none. 3. What may be the reason of Spirits so seldom appearing; 4. And whether they have any settled shape or no. 5. What their manner is of afflicting men in either Devotion or Prophecy. 6. Whether every man's complexion is capable of the Society of a good Genius. 7. And lastly, Whether it be lawful to pray to God to send such a Genius or Angel to one, or no. 8. What the most effectual and divinest Magick.

1. It is beside my present scope, as I have already professed, to enter into any more particular and more curious Disquisitions concerning the nature of Spirits, my aim being now onely to demonstrate their Existence by those strange Effects recorded everywhere in History. But this last Narration is so extraordinarily remarkable, that it were a piece of disrespect done to it, to dismiss it without some Enquiries at least into such Problems as it naturally affords to our consideration; though it may well seem plainly beyond the power of humane Wit or laws of Modesty to determine any thing therein.

In the first place therefore, it cannot but amuse a man's mind to think what these officious Spirits should be that so willingly sometimes offer themselves to converse with a man: Whether they may be Angels incapable of incorporation into humane Bodies, which vulgarly is conceived: Or whether the Souls of the deceased, they having more affinity with mortality and humane frailty then the other, and so more sensible of our necessities and infirmities, having once felt them themselves, a reason alleged for the Incarnation of Christ by the Author to the He-
An Antidote against Atheism.

Book III.

breads: which opinion has no worse favourers then Plutarch, Maximus
Tyrinus, and other Platonists: Or lastly, whether there may not be of
both sorts. For separate Souls being invisibly, in a condition not unlike
the Angels themselves, it is easy to conceive that they may very well
undergo the like offices.

2. Secondly, we are invited to enquire, Whether every man have
his Guardian Genius or no. That Witches have many, such as they are,
their own Confessions testify. The Pythagoreans were of opinion that
every man has two Genii, a good one and a bad one. Which Mahomet
has taken into his Religion, adding also, that they sit on men's shoul-
ders with table-books in their hands, and that the one writes down
all the good, the other all the evil a man does. But such expressions
as those I look upon as symbolical rather than natural. And I think
it more reasonable that a man changing the frame of his mind, chan-
ges his Genius withall: or rather, unless a man be very sincere and
single-hearted, that he is left to common Providence, as well as
if he be not desperately wicked or deplorably miserable, scarce any par-
ticular evil Spirit interposes or offers himself a perpetual Assistant in
his affairs and fortunes. But extreme Poverty, irksome old Age, want of
Friends, the Contempt, Injury and Hard-heartedness of evil Neigh-
bours, working upon a Soul low sunk into the Body, and wholly de-
void of the Divine life, does sometimes kindle so sharp, so eager, and
so piercing a desire of Satisfaction and Revenge, that the thrieks of men
while they are a murmuring, the howling of a Wolf in the fields in the
night, or the squeaking and roaring of tortured Beasts, do not so cer-
tainly call to them those of their own kind, as this powerful Magick of
a penfive and complaining Soul in the bitterness of its affliction attracts
the aid of these over-officious Spirits. So that it is most probable that
they that are the forwardest to hang Witches are the first that made them,
and have no more goodness nor true piety then these they so willingly
prosecute, but are as wicked as they, though with better luck or more
discretion, offending no further then the Law will permit them; and
therefore they securely starve the poor helples man, though with a great
deal of clamour of Jusice they will revenge the death of their Hog or Cow.

3. Thirdly, it were worth our disquisition, Why Spirits so seldom
now-a-dais appear, especially those that are good; whether it be not
the wickedness of the present Age, as I have already hinted; or the ge-
eral prejudice men have against all Spirits that appear, that they must be
straightways Devils; or the frailty of humane nature, that is not usual-
ly able to bear the appearance of a Spirit, no more then other Animals
are, for into what agonies Horses and Dogs are cast upon their approach,
is in every ones mouth, and is a good circumstance to distinguish a real
Apparition from our own Imaginations: or lastly, whether it be the con-
dition of Spirits themselves, who, it may be, without some violence done
to their own nature cannot become visible; it being haply as trouble-
some a thing to them to keep themselves in one steady visible consis-
tence in the aire, as it is for men that dive, to hold their breath in the
water.

4. Fourthly,
CHAPTER XIV. AN ANTIDOTE AGAINST ATHEISM.

Fourthly, it may deserve our search, Whether Spirits have any settled form or shape. Angels are commonly pictured like good plump cherry-cheek’d Lads, Which is no wonder, the boldness of the same Artists not sticking to picture God Almighty in the shape of an old man. In both it is as it pleases the Painter. But this story seems rather to favour their opinion that say that Angels and separate Souls have no settled form but what they please to give themselves upon occasion, by the power of their own Phalanx. Ficinus, as I remember, somewhere calls them Aereal Stars. And the good Genii seem to me to be as the benign Eyes of God running to and fro in the world, with love and pity beholding the innocent endeavours of harmless and single-hearted men, ever ready to doe them good and to help them.

What I conceive of separate Souls and Spirits, I cannot better express then I have already in my Poem of the Preexistence of the Soul, which therefore will not be altogether impertinent to repeat in this place.

Like to a light fast lock’d in lanthorn dark,
Whereby by Night our wary steps we guide
In flabby streets, and dirty Chancels mark;
Some weaker rays from the black top do glide,
And sticher streams perhaps through th’horny side:
But when we’ve pass’d the peril of the way,
Arriv’d at home, and laid that care aside,
The naked light how clearly doth it ray,
And spread its joyful beams as bright as Summers day!

Even so the Soul in this contracted state,
Confined to these fright Instruments of Sense,
More dull and narrowly doth operate,
At this hole bares, the Sight must ray from thence,
Here stails, there smells: But when she’s gone from hence,
Like naked lamp she is one shining spear,
And round about has perfect cognoscence,
What’re in her Horizon doth appear,
She is one Orb of Sense, all Eye, all aery Eare.

And what I speak there of the condition of the Soul out of the Body, I think is easily applicable to other Genii or Spirits.

5. The fifth Enquiry may be, How these good Genii become serviceable to men for either heightning their Devotions, or enabling them to Prophecy; whether it can be by any other way then by descending into their Bodies, and possessing the Heart and Brain. For the Euchites, who affect the gift of Prophecy by familiarity with evil Spirits, did utterly obliterat in their Souls the πνευματικα φημεια, the Principles of Goodness and Honesty (as you may see in Pallas αριστος ενεργειας παραγων) that the evil Spirits might come into their Bodies, whom those sparks of Virtue, as they said, would drive away, but those be-
ing extinguish they could come in and possess them, and enable them to Prophecy. And that the Imps of Witches do sometimes enter their own Bodies as well as theirs to whom they lend them, is plain in the story of the Witches of Warbois. It is also the opinion of Trismegist, that these Spirits get into the Veins and Arteries both of men and beasts.

Wherefore concerning the Dreams and Visions of this holy man that so freely imparted himself to Bodinus, it may be conceived reasonable that the good Genius infused himself into his very Body, as well as the bad into the bodies of the wicked; and that residing in his Brain and figuring of it, by thinking of this or that Object, as we our selves figure it when we think, the external Senses being laid asleep, those figurations would easily be represented to the Common sense; and that Memory recovering them when he awaked, they could not but seem to him as other Dreams did, saying that they were better, they ever signifying something of importance unto him.

But those Raptures of Devotion by day might be by the Spirit's kindling a purer kind of Love-flame in his Heart, as well as by fortifying and raising his Imagination. And how far a man shall be carried beyond himself by this redoubled Soul in him, none, I think, can well conceive, unless they had the experience of it.

6. And if this be their manner of communion, it may well be enquired into, in the sixth place, Whether all men be capable of consociation with these good Genii. Cardan somewhere intimates that their approaches are deprehenible by certain sweet smells they cast. From whence it may seem not improbable, that those Bodies that smell sweet themselves, where the Minde does not flink with Pride and Hypocrifie, have some natural advantage for the gaining their Society. But if there be any peculiar complexion or natural condition required, it will prove less hopeful for every one to obtain their acquaintance. Yet Regeneration come to its due pitch, though it cannot be without much pain and anguish, may well rectifie all uncleannesse of nature; so that no singularly-good and sincere man can reasonably despair of their familiarity. For he that is so highly in favour with the Prince, it is no wonder he is taken notice of by his Courtiers.

7. But the last and most considerable question is, Whether it be lawful to pray to God for such a good Genius or Angel. For the Example in the foregoing Story seems a sufficient warrant. But I conceive Faith and Desire ought to be full-fell to make such Voyages prosperous, and our end and purpose pure and sincere. But if Pride, Conceitedness, or Affectation of some peculiar privilege above other Mortals, spur a man up to so bold an Enterprize, his Devotions will no more move either God or the good Genius, then the whining voice of a Counterfeit will stir the affection of the discreetly Charitable. Nay, this high Presumption may invite some real Friends to put a worse jest upon him then was put upon that tattered Rogue Guzman by those Mock-Spirits, for his so impudently pretending Kindred, and so boldly intruding himself into the knowledge and acquaintance of the Gentry and Nobility of Genoa.

8. But
CHAP. XV.  An Antidote against Atheism.

8. But the safest Magick is the sincere consecrating a man's Soul to God, and the aspiring to nothing but to profound a pitch of Humility, as not to be conscious to our selves of being at all touched with the praise and applause of men; and to such a free and universal sense of Charity, as to be delighted with the welfare of another as much as our own. They that solely have their eye upon these, will find in coming in whatever their heart can desire. But they that put forth their hand to catch at high things, as they fancy, and neglect these, prove at laft but a Plague to themselves and a Laughing-stock to the world.

These are the several Speculations that the foregoing Narration would naturally beget in the minds of the curious. But methinks I hear the Atheist replying to all this, That I have run a long division upon uncertain grounds, and asking me, not without some scorn and anger, whether I believe that multifarious Fable I have reheard out of Bodinus, and so much descanted upon. To which I answer, That I will not take my oath that the most likely passage in all Plutarch's Lives or Livy's History is assuredly true. But however that I am not ashamed to profess, that I am as well assured in my own judgement of the Existence of Spirits, as that I have met with men in Westminster-Hall, or seen beasts in Smithfield.

CHAP. XV.

1. The Structure of Mans body, and Apparitions, the most conviciive Arguments against the Atheist. 2. His first Evasion of the former of them, pretending it never was but there were men and women and other Species in the World. 3. The Author's answer to this pretension. First, That every man was mortal, and therefore was either created or rose out of the Earth. 4. Secondly, That even in infinite succession there is something First ordine Naturæ, and that these First were either created or rose out of the Earth. 5. Thirdly, That if there were alwaies men in the world, and every man born of a woman, some was both Father and Son, Man and Babe at once. 6. That it is contrary to the Laws of mere blind Matter, that man in his adult perfections should exist therefrom at once. 7. The Atheist's second Evasion, That the Species of things arose from the multifarious attempts of the motion of the Matter, with a threefold Answer thereto. 8. An Evasion of the last Answer, touching the perpetual exactness in the fabric of all living Species, with a threefold Answer also to that Evasion. 9. The further serviceable ness of this Answer for the quite taking away the first Evasion of the Atheist.

Thus have we gone through the many and manifold Effects represented to our Senses on this wide Theatre of the World; the faintest and obscurest whereof are Arguments full enough to prove the Existence
istence of a Deity. But some being more palpable then other some, and more accommodate to awaken the dull and slow belief of the Atheist into the acknowledgement of a God, it will not be amiss to take notice of what Evasions he attempts to make for the extricating himself out of those that he fancies the most sensibly to entangle him, and the moft strongly to hinder his escape.

And fuch are especially thefe two last I insifted upon, The curious frame of Mans Body, and Apparitions.

2. And the force of the former some endeavours to evade thus; "That there hath ever been Man and Woman and other Species in the world, and fo it is no wonder that like should propagate its like, and therefore that there is no want of any other invisible or material cause but the Species of things themselves: and fo these admirable contrivances in Nature must imply no divine Wisdom nor Counsel, nor any fuch thing.

3. But here I demand, whether there were ever any Man that was not mortal, and whether there be any mortal that had not a beginning; and if he had, it must be either by Generation, or Creation. If by Creation, there is a God: If by equivocal Generation, as rising out of Earth, our Argument will hold good still notwithstanding this Evasion. But if you lay there was never any man in the world but was born of a Woman, this must amount but to thus much, that there hath been an infinite number of successions of births. If there be meant by it any thing more then thus, it will not prove fensc.

4. For though our Phenisian cannot run through an infinite series of Effects, yet our Reason is asfured there is no Effect without a Cause, and be the Progres of Causes and Effects as infinite as it will, at laft we reolve it naturally into fome First: and he that denies this, seems to me wilfully to wink against the light of Nature, and doe violence to the Faculties of his Mind. And therefore of necessity there must be at laft one first Man and Woman which are first ordine Nature, though infinity of time, reckoning from the preuent, caueth a confusion and obscurity in our apprehensions. And thofe which are thus first in order of Nature or Causality, must alfo exift first before there can be any other Men or Women in the World. And therefore concerning thofe first, it being manifest that they were born of no Parents, it follows they were Creatcd or rofe out of the Earth, and fo the Evasion will be frustrated.

5. Befides, if you affirm that there was never any Man in the world but who was born of a Woman, and fo grew to Mans estate by degrees, it will fall to fome mans share to be a Babe and a Man at once, or to be both Father and Child. For fo fon as Mankind was, (let it be from Eternity, and beyond Eternity is nothing) thofe that then exifted were begot of fome body, and there was nothing before them to beget them, therefore they begot themselves.

6. But that they fhould at once then have been perfeft men, their substances being of alterable and passive matter, that is wrought diverfly and by degrees into the frame it hath, according to the perpetual testimony of Nature, is as raft as if they should fay that Boots and Shoes and
and Stockins, and Pyes and Peels and Owens, have been together with all Eternity: whereas it is manifest there ought to be an orderly interval of time before these things can be, wherein must precede the killing of Oxen and flaying of them, as also of Sheep, tanning, spinning, cutting, and many more such like circumstances. So that it is enormously ridiculous to say that Mankind might have been at once from all Eternity, unless the Omnipotency of a God, who can doe whatever we can imagine and more, should by his unrefitible Fiat cause such a thing in a moment so soon as himself was, which was ever, and he was never to seek for either power or skill.

But that the fluid and blind Matter of it self should have been thus raised up from all Eternity into such compleat Species of things, is very groundles and irrational. I say, that there ever should be such a thing as this in the world, a man at once existing of himself in this corporeal frame that we fee, who notwithstanding did afterwards dye like other mortals, is a Fable above all Poetical Pigments whatsoever, and more incredible then the fondest Legend that any Religion ever offered to the Atheists belief.

7. Others therefore deferiting this way of Evasion betake themselves to another, which, though it seem more plausible at first view, is fully as frivolous. They say, "That all the Species of things, Man himself not excepted, came first out of the Earth by the omnifarious attempt of the particles of the Matter upon one another, which at last light on so lucky a construction and fabrick of the Bodies of Creatures as we see; and that having an infinite series of time to try all tricks in, they would of necessity at last come to this they are.

But I answer, that these particles might commit infinite Tautologies in their strokes and motions, and that therefore there was no such necessity at all of falling into those forms and shapes that appear in the world. Again, there is that excellent contrivance in the Body, suppose, of a Man, as I have heretofore instanced, that it cannot but be the effect of very accurate Knowledge and Counsel.

And lastly, this concourse of Atoms, they being left without a guide, is a miracle above all apprehension, that they should produce no inept Species of things, such as should of their own nature have but three Legs, and one Eye, or but one Ear, rows of Teeth along the Vertebra of their Backs, and the like, as I have above intimated; these ineptitudes being more easy to hit upon then such accurate and irreprehensible frames of Creatures.

8. But to elude the force of this Argument against the fortuitous concourse of Atoms, they'll exccitgate this mad evasion; "That Nature did indeed at first bring forth such ill-favoured and ill-appointed Monsters, as well as those that are of a more exquisite frame; but those that were more perfect fell upon those other and kill'd them and devoured them, they being not so well provided of either limbs or senses as the other, and so were never able to hop fast enough from them, or maturely to discover the approaching dangers that ever & anon were coming upon them. But this unjust and audacious calumny can't
caft upon God and Nature will be easily discover'd and convicted of
falhood, if we do but consider,

First, that Trees, Herbs and Flowers, that do not stir from their pla-
ces, or exercise such fierce cruelty one upon another, are all in their se-
veral kinds handsme and elegant, and have no ineptitude or defect in
them.

Secondly, that all Creatures born of putrefaction, as Mice and Frogs
and the like, as those many hundreds of Insects, as Grasshoppers, Flies,
Spiders and such other, that these also have a most accurate contrivance
of parts, and that there is nothing fram'd rashly or ineptly in any of
them.

Lastly, in more perfect Creatures, as in the Scotch Barnacles, which
Historians write of; of which if there be any doubt, yet Gerard re-
lates that of his own knowledge, (which is as admirable, and as much
to our purpose) there is a kind of Fowl which in Lancashire are called
Tree-Geefe; they are bred out of rotten pieces of broken Ships and
trunks of Trees caft upon a little Ifland in Lancashire they call the pile
of Foulders: the same Author faith he hath found the like also in other
parts of this Kingdom. Those Fowls in all respects, though bred thus
of putrefation (and that they are thus bred is undeniably true, as any
man, if he pleafe, may satisfie himself by consulting Gerard, the very
laft page of his History of Plants) are of as an exact Fabrick of Body, and
as fitly contriv'd for the functions of such a kind of living Creature, as
any of those that are produced by propagation. Nay, these kind of Fowls
themselves do also propagate, which has impofed fo upon the foolishnes
of some, that they have denied that other way of their generation;
whenas the being generated one way does not exclude the other, as is
seen in Frogs and Mice.

Wherefore those productions out of the Earth and of Putrefaction be-
ing thus perfect and accurate in all points as well as others, it is a ma-
nifest discovery that Nature did never frame any Species of things inept-
ly and foolishly, and that therefore she was ever guided by Counsel and
Providence, that is, That Nature her self is the effect of an all-knowing
God.

9. Nor doth this consideration only take away this present Evasion,
but doth more palpably and intelligibly enervate the former. For what
boots it them to flie unto an infinite propagation of Individualls in the
same eternal Species, as they imagine, that they might be able always
to affign a Cause answerable to the Effect, whenas there are such Ef-
fects as these, and Products of Putrefaction, where Wisdom and Coun-
sel are as truly conspicuous as in others? For thus are they nevertheless
necessarily illaqueated in that inconvenience which they thought to have
escaped by so quaint a subtily.

C H A P.
CHAP. XVI.

1. The Atheists Evasions against Apparitions: as first, that they are mere Imaginations. 2. Then, that though they be realities without, yet they are caused by the force of Imagination, with the confusion of these Conceits. 3. Their fond conceit, that the Skirmishings in the Aire are from the exuvious Effluxes of things; with a confusion thereof. 4. A copious confusion of their last subterfuge, (viz. That those Fightings are the Reflexions of Battels on the Earth) from the distance, and debility of Reflexion; 5. From the rude Politure of the Clouds; 6. From their inability of reflecting so much as the image of the stars; which yet were a thing far easier; First, by reason of the undiminishablenes of their magnitudes. 7. Then from the purity of their light. 8. Thirdly, from the possession of our Eye in the shade of the Earth. 9. Lastly, from their dispersednes, ready from every part to be reflected if the Clouds had any such Reflexivity in them. 10. That if they have any such Reflexivity as to represent battels so exceeding distant, it is by some supernatural Artifice. 11. That this Artifice has its limited laws. 12. Whence at least some of these aerial battels cannot be Reflexions from the Earth. 13. Machiavel's opinion concerning these Fightings in the Aire. 14. Nothing so demonstrable in Philosophy as the being of a God. 15. That Pedantick affectation of Atheism whence it probably arose. 16. The true causes of being really prone to Atheism. 17. That men ought not to oppose their mere complexional humours against the Principles of Reason, and Testimonies of Nature and History. His Apology for being so copious in the reciting of Stories of Spirits.

Now for their Evasions whereby they would elude the force of that Argument for Spirits which is drawn from Apparitions, they are so weak and sily, that a man may be almost sure they were convinced in their judgement of the truth of such like Stories, else it had been better flatly to have denied them, then to seek such idle and vain Reasons of them.

For first, they say they are nothing but Imaginations; and that there is nothing real without us in such Apparitions.

2. But being beaten off from this slight account, for that many see the same thing at once, then they fly to so miraculous a power of Phansey, as if it were able to change the Air into a real shape and form, so that others may behold it as well as he that framed it by the power of his Phansey.

Now I demand of any man, whether this be not a harder Mystery and more unconceiveable than all the Magical Metamorphoses of Devils or Witches. For it is far easier to conceive that some knowing thing in the Air should thus transform the Air into this or that shape; being in that part of the Air it doth thus transform, then that the Imagination of
of man, which is but a Modification of his own Minde, should be able at a distance to change it into such like Appearances. But suppose it could, can it animate the Aire that it doth thus metamorphize, and make it speak, and answer to questions, and put things into mens hands, and the like? O the credulity of belotted Atheism! How intoxicated and infatuated are they in their conceits, being given up to fentudity, and having loft the free use of the natural Faculties of their Minde!

But shall this force of Imagination reach as high as the Clouds also, and make Men fight pitched Battels in the Aire, running and charging one against the other?

3. Here the same bold pretender to Wit and Philosophy, * Cæsar Varinus (who cunningly and jugglingly endeavours to infuse the poison of Atheism into the minde of his Reader on every occasion) hath recourse to those old cast rags of Epicurus his School, the Exuviosa Effluves of things, and attempts to salve these Phenomena thus; That the vapours of Mens bodies, and it seems of Horses too, are carried up into the Aire, and fall into a certain proportionable portioone of parts, and so imitate the figures of them aloft among the Clouds.

But I demand how the vapours of the horses finde the vapours of their Riders: and when and how long are they coming together? and whether they appear not before there be any Armies in the field to send up such vapours: and whether harnes and weapons send up vapours too, as Swords, Pikes and Shields: and how they come to light so happily into the hands of those Aerial men of war, especially the vapours of Metals (if they have any) being heavier in all likelihood then the reek of Animals and Men: and lastly, how they come to discharge at one another and to fight, there being neither life nor soul in them: and whether Sounds also have their Exuvia that are referred till these solemnities; for at Alborough in Suffolk 1642, were heard in the Aire very loud beatings of Drums, shooting of Muskets and Ordonancie, as also in other such like Prodigies there hath been heard the founding of Trumpets, as Snellius writes, And * Pliny also makes mention of the founding of Trumpets and clashing of Armour heard out of the heavens about the Cimbrick Wars, and often before. But here at Alborough all was concluded with a melodious noise of Musical Instruments.

The Exuvia of Fiddles it seems fly up into the Aire too, or were those Musical Accents frozen there for a time, and at the heat and firing of the Cannons, the Aire relenting and thawing, became so harmoniously vocal? With what vain conceits are men intoxicated that willfully wink against the light of Nature, and are estranged from the true knowledge and acknowledgment of a God!

4. But there is another Evaison which the same sedulous Infinuator of Atheism would make use of in case this should not hold, which seems more sober, but no less false: and that is this; That these fightings and skirmishings in the Aire are only the reflection of some real battel on the Earth. But this in Nature is plainly impossible. For of necessity these Armies thus fighting, being at such a distance from the Spectators that the fame of the battel never arrives to their ears, their eyes can never behold it

* His Nat. lib. 2. cap. 57.
it by any reflection from the Clouds. For besides that reflection makes
the images more dim then direct light, such a distance from the Army to
the clouds, and then from the clouds to our eye, will lessen the species so
exceedingly that they will not at all be visible.

5. Or if we could imagine that there might be sometimes such an ad-

vantage in the figure of the Clouds as might in some sort remedy this

lesening of the species, yet their surfaces are so exceeding rudely poli-
sh'd, and reflection (which, as I said, is ever dim enough of itself,) is here so

extraordinarily imperfect, that they can never be able, according to the
course of Nature, to return the species of Terrestrial Objects back again
to our sight, it being so evident that they are unfit for what is of far lesse
difficulty. For we never finde them able to reflect the image of a Star,
wheras not onely glass, but every troubled pool or dirty plash of water
in the high-way does usuall y doe it.

6. But that it is far easie for a Star then for any of these objects
here upon Earth to be reflected to our Eyes by those rude naturall
Looking-glasses placed among the Clouds, sundry reasons will sufficiently
inform us.

For first, The Stars do not abate at all of their usual magnitude in
which they ordinarily appear to us by this reflection, the difference of
many hundreds of Leagues making no difference of magnitude in them;
for indeed the distance of the Diameter of the Orbit of the Earth makes
none, as must be acknowledged by all those that admit of the annual mo-
tion thereof. But a very few miles do exceedingly diminish the usual
bigness of the species of a Horse or Man, even to that littlenesst that they
grow invisible. What then will become of his sword, shield or spear? And in these cases we now speake of, how great a journey the
species have from the Earth to the Cloud that reflects them, I have inti-
mated before.

7. Secondly, it is manifest that a Star hath the preminence above
these Terrestrial Objects, in that it is as pure a light as the Sun, though
not so big, but they but opaque coloured bodies; and that therefore there
is no comparision between the vigour and strength of the species of a Star
and of them.

8. Thirdly, in the Night-time the Eye being placed in the shadow of
the Earth, those reflections of a Star will be yet more easily visible;
wheras the great light of the Sun by Day must needs much debilitate
thesae reflected Images of the Objects upon the Earth, his beams striking
our Eyes with so strong vibrations.

9. Fourthly and lastly, there being Stars all over the Firmament so
as there is, it should seem a hundred times more easie for natural Causes
to hit upon a Paraster or Parafiron (for let Analogy embolden me so to
call theae seldom or never seen Phanomena, the image of a single Star or
whole Constellation reflected from the Clouds) then upon a Parellos or
Parafelenes. But now the story of theae is more then an hundred times
more frequent then that of the Paraster. For it is so seldom discovered;
that it is doubted whether it be or no, or rather acknowledged not to be;
of which there can be no reason, but that the clouds are so ill polished that

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they are not able to reflect so considerable a light as a Star. From
whence, I think, we may safely gather, that it is therefore impossible that
they should reflect so debile species as the colours and shapes of Beasts
and Men, and that so accurately as that we may see their swords, helmets,
shields, spears, and the like.

10. Wherefore it is plain that these Apparitions on high in the Aire
are no reflexions of any Objects upon Earth; or, if it were imaginable
that they were, that some supernatural cause must assit to conglaciate
and polish the surfaces of the clouds to such an extraordinary accuracy of
figure and smoothness as will suffice for such prodigious reflexions.

And that these Spirits that rule in the Aire may not act upon the ma-
terials there as well as Men here upon the Earth work upon the parts
thereof, as also upon the neighbouring Elements so far as they can reach,
shaping, perfecting and directing things according to their own purpose
and pleasure, I know no reason at all in Nature or Philosophy for any
man to deny. For that the help of some officious Genii is imploied in such
like Prodigies as these, the seasonablest of their appearance seems no
contemptible argument, they being, according to the observation of Hi-
storians, the * Forerunners of Commotions and Troubles in all Kingdomes
and Commonwealths.

11. Yet nevertheless as good Artificers as I here suppose, they work-
ing upon Nature must be bounded by the Laws of Nature: and reflexion
will have its limits as well as refraction, whether for conveyance of spe-
cies, or kindling of heat; the laws and bounds whereof that differing
Wit Cartesius being well aware of, doth generously and judiciouly pro-
nounce, That a burning-Glass, the distance of whose focus from the Glas
doth not bear a left proportion to the Diameter thereof then the distance
of the Earth from the Sun to the Diameter of the Sun, will burn no more vehe-
mently then the direct rays of the Sun will do without it, though in other re-
spects this Glafs were as exactly shaped and curiously polished as could be ex-
pectt from the hand of an Angel.

12. Wherefore suppose the surface of the clouds polished never so
well and fitted for reflexion, it is still evident that some of these Appa-
rintions cannot be such as are mere reflexions of Armies skirmishing on
the ground. For those that are observed to fight determinately over
such or such a City, if they be but the mere reflexions of fights, of ne-
cessity they must be from some Armies not far off: and if so, they could
not but be discovered, at least by speedy report. Whence it is manifest,
that such Skirmishings in the clouds are real Encounters there, not the
Images or Reflexions of Battels on the Ground. And considering that
there have been such real Prodigies of fightings on the ground it self
by these Aereal Courters, as I have * above intimated, it is but reason-
able to conceive, that the generality of the rest of these prodigious Skir-
mishings, though not determinate to this or that City, are really in the
clouds or skye, not a shadow or reflexion of Battels upon the Earth.

But that these Fightings have been seen over such and such Cities,
were easie to make good out of History: I shall onely instance in Snellius
his report of Amortisfort, that such Skirmishings were seen there, and that
nigh
An Antidote against Atheism.

13. His own words are so free and ingenious, and his judgment so considerate, (though he will not pretend to Philosophy) touching the reason of these strange sights, that I think it worth the while to transcribe them. *Hujusmodi rerum causas ab eis explicari posse credo qui rerum naturalium ac supernaturalium cognitione insignes sunt, a quae usu alienum esse fator: nisi forte cum philosophis quibusdam pronunciandum censeamus, acem plenum spiritibus & intelligentiis esse, que res futuras prævidentes, & causibus humanis condoleentes, eas humanis per hujusmodi signa pronunciant, ut se adversus ea tempestivius preparare & communiere queant. Ut ut se habeat, Experientiæ certè compertum habemus talia signa sequi solere magnos aliquos motus.

14. I have now completed this present Treatise against Atheism in all the Three parts thereof: upon which while I cast mine eye, and view that clear and irrefutable evidence of the Cause I have undertaken, the external Appearances of things in the world so faithfully seconding the undeniable dictates of the innate Principles of our own Minds, I cannot but with confidence aver, That there is not any one notion in all Philosophy more certain and demonstrable then That there is a God.

And verily I think I have ransacked all the corners of every kind of Philosophy that can pretend to bear any stroke in this Controversie with that diligence, that I may safely pronounce, that it is mere brutifh Ignorance or Impedence, no Skill in Nature or the Knowledge of things, that can encourage any man to profess Atheism, or to embrace it at the proposal of those that make profession of it.

15. But I conceive it is, that at first some famoufly-learned men being not so indiscreetly zealous and superstitious as others, have been mistaken by Ideots and traduced for Atheists, and then ever after some one vain-glorious Fool or other hath affected, with what safety he could, to seem Atheistical, that he might thereby, forsooth, be reputed the more learned, or the profounder Naturalist.

16. But I dare assure any man, that if he do but search into the bottom of this enormous disease of the Soul, as Trismegist truly calls it, he will find nothing to be the cause thereof but either vanity of mind, or brutifh Sensuality and an untamed desire of satisfying a man’s own will in every thing, an obnoxious Conscience, and a base Fear of divine Vengeance, ignorance of the Canons of and insufficiency of second causes, a jumbled feculency and incomposethedness of the spirits by reason of perpetual intemperance and luxury, or else a dark bedeadng Melancholy that do starves and kills the apprehension of the Soul, in divine matters especially, that it makes a man as inapt for such Contemplations as if his head was filled with cold Earth or dry Grave-moulds.

17. And to such flow Constitutions as these, I shall not wonder if, as the first Part of my Discourse must seem marvellous subtle, so the last appear ridicously incredible. But they are to remember, that I do not

* Disput. de Republica lib. 1, cap. 56.
here appeal to the Complexional humors or peculiar Relishes of men that arise out of the temper of the Body, but to the known and unalterable Ideas of the Mind, to the Phenomena of Nature and Records of History. Upon the last whereof if I have something more fully insisted, it is not to be imputed to any vain credulity of mine, or that I take a pleasure in telling strange stories, but that I thought fit to fortify and strengthen the faith of others as much as I could, being well assured that a contemptuous disbelief of such like Narrations concerning Spirits, and an endeavour of making them all ridiculous and incredible, is a dangerous Prelude to Atheism itself, or else a more close and crafty profession and insinuation of it. For assuredly that Saying is not more true in Politicks, No Bishop, no King; then this is in Metaphysicks, No Spirit, no God.
APPENDIX
To the foregoing ANTIDOTE AGAINST ATHEISM:
Wherein is contained
An Answer to certain Objections made against several Passages thereof.

By HENRY MORE, D.D.
Fellow of Christ's College in Cambridge.

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APPENDIX
To the Foregoing
ANTIDOTE
AGAINST
ATHEISM.

CHAP. I.

1. The Author's reason of adding this Appendix to his Antidote. 2. An Enumeration of the chief Objections made against the First Book thereof.

1. Unexpected Innocency and misdoubted Truth can win no greater credit then by strictest examination: For the world is thereby more fully ascertained of the unblamableness of the one and of the solidity of the other, then it can be possibly without so publick a Trial. Wherefore that so great an advantage may not be wanting to that weighty Cause we have in hand, I was not contented onely to let down such Reasons for the Existence of God which in my own judgement I conceiv'd to be irrefutably firm; but that the firmness of them may appear more conspicuous to all men, I have brought into view the chiefest and most material Objections I could meet with, whether raised by those that of themselves have excepted against any Argument I have made use of, or by such as have been invited more curiously to search and discover, where they could, any weakness or inconsequence in any Argumentation throughout the whole Treatise. And the chiefest Exceptions and Objections against the First Book are these:

2. First, That the Ground of our Demonstration of the Existence of God from his Ideas, is, That there are Innate Ideas in the Mind of Man; which, say they, is false.

Secondly, That there is no such Idea of God at all as we have describ'd;
neither Innate nor Acquisititious or Transcriptitious, because it involves in it the Notion of a Spirit, which again consists of such particular Notions as are utterly unconceivable.

Thirdly, That Existence is no Term of Perfection, and therefore is not inseparably involved in the Notion of a Being absolutely Perfect, or of God.

Fourthly, That though Necessary Existence be included in the Idea of God, yet our inferring from thence that he does exist, is but a Sophism, because a Being absolutely Evil, as well as absolutely Perfect, includes necessary Existence in the Idea thereof.

Fifthly, That if there be any necessary Existent, it is plain that it is Matter, which we unadvisedly call Space, which we cannot imagine but did ever and will ever necessarily exist.

Sixthly, That God did not put this Idea of himself into the Mind of Man, but the subtler sort of Politicians, that have always used Religion as a mere Engine of State.

Seventhly, That Fear and Hopes of Natural Conscience are nothing indeed but these Passions rais'd upon a belief of a God which men have had by Tradition or Education.

Lastly, That these Arguments whereby we prove the Incorporeity of the Soul of Man, will also conclude the Incorporeity of the Soul of a Beast, and that therefore they are Sophistical.

To these I shall answer in order with as little Pomp and Luxuriancy of words, and as much Plainness and Perspicuity, as I may, in so subtile and difficult a matter.

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C H A P. II.

1. That the force of his Argument for the Existence of God from his Idea, does not lie in this, that there are Innate Ideas in the Mind of man. 2. That the force of arguing from the Idea of a thing, be it innate or not innate, is the same, proved by several instances. 3. The reason why he contends for Innate Ideas. 4. The seeming accuracy of a Triangle to outward sense no disproof but that the exact Idea thereof is from the Soul her Self. 5. That it doth not follow that, if there be Innate Ideas, a Blind man may discourse of Colours. 6. That Brutes have not the Knowledge of any Logical or Mathematical Notions. 7. Why Zeno's Asse goes in a right line to the bottle of Hay. 8. That those actions and motions in things that are according to Reason and Mathematicks, do not prove any Logical or Mathematical Notions in the things thus acting or moving.

1. That some have excepted against our Demonstration of the Existence of God from his Idea, in that they have conceived that it is founded upon this Principle, That there are Innate Ideas in the Soul of Man; I can impute the mistake not so much to Ignorance as Inadversity. For no mans parts can be so weak, but that if he attend to what we
we have written, he must plainly see that the stress of our Argument is not
laid upon this Notion of *Innate Ideas*, but upon that confessed Truth,
That there are some things so plain, that however the Soul came to the
knowledge of them, the cannot but attenti to them, and acknowledge
them to be undeniably true.

2. Now the *Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect* being such, that it must
needs be acknowledged according to the light of Nature to be indeed the
ture *Idea of such a Being*, call it *Innate* or not, it is all one, the Demon-
stration will as inevitably follow as if it were acknowledged an *Innate
Idea*, as we shall more plainly discern if we instance in other *Ideas*; as
for example, in the *Idea of a Triangle*, of a regular Geometrical body, and
of a *round Solid*. For the nature of these *Ideas* is such, that the Mind of
man cannot possibly deny but that they are such and such distinct *Ideas*,
and that such and such affections belong unto them. As for example,
That every *Triangle* is either *Isopleuron, Isosceles, or Scalenum*; so that
there are just *Three kinds* of them in reference to their sides, and no
more: That there are *Five regular Bodies* in Geometry, neither more
nor less, viz. the *Cube*, the *Tetraedrum*, the *Octaedrum*, the *Dodecaedrum*
and the *Ecofaedrum*. That there is one only kind of *round Solid*, viz.
the *Sphere or Globe*. And so contemplating the *Idea of a Being absolutely
Perfect* (be the *Idea innate* or not *innate*, it is all one) we cannot but con-
clude that there can be but *one only* such in number; and that *That one
also cannot fall to be, as we have demonstrated at large.*

3. But however, though we need no such *Principle* for the carrying
on of our Demonstration as this of *Innate Ideas*, yet because I thought it
true, and of concernment to animate the Reader to attend the *Notions* of
his own Mind, and relish the excellency of that Judge we are to appeal
to, I held it not unfit to insin something upon it: And I am ready now
to make it good, that this *Principle* is true, notwithstanding any thing
that I find alleged against it.

4. For what I contend for in the sixth Chapter of this first Book,
That the *exact Idea of a Circle* or a *Triangle* is rather hinted to us from
those describ'd in *Matter* then taught us by them, is still true notwithstanding
that *Objection*, that they seem *exact* to our *outward Senses* carelessly
perusing them, though they be not so. For we plainly afterward correct
our selves, not onely by occasion of the *figure*, which we may ever discern
imperfect, but by our *Innate knowledge*, which tells us that the *outward
Senses* cannot see an *exact Triangle*, because that an *Indivisible point*, in
which the Angles are to be terminated, is to the *outward Sense* utterly
invisible.

Besides, it is to be considered, that though we should admit that a
*Triangle* could be so drawn that to our *outward Sense*, look on it as nar-
rowly as we could, *even* through Microscopes, it would ever seem *exact*;
yet they that *never saw* or *took notice* of any such accurate delineation,
do of themselves upon the intimation of ruder draughts frame to them-
selves the *exact Idea of a Triangle*, which they having not learned from
any outward *Object*, must needs be the *inward representation* of their own
*Minds.*
5. But now for other Objections, That a Blind man would be able to discourse of Colours, if there were any Innate Ideas in his Soul; I say, it does not at all follow, because these Ideas that I contend to be in the Soul, are not Sensible, but Intellectual, such as are those many Logical, Metaphysical, Mathematical, and some Moral Notions. All which we employ as our own Modes of considering sensible Objects, but are not the sensible Objects themselves, of which we have no Idea, but only a capacity, by reason of the Organs of our Body, to be affected by them. The reason therefore of a blind man's inability of discoursing of Colours, is only that he has no Substratum or Phantasm of the Subject of the discourse, upon which he would use these innate Modes or frame of Notions that are naturally in his Mind, and which he can make use of in the speculation of sundry other sensible Objects.

6. And whereas it is further objected, That these Logical and Mathematical Notions came in at once at the Senses, because Brutes have the knowledge of them, upon whom we will not belittle so rich an inward furniture as these Innate Ideas, I answer, that Brutes have not the knowledge of any such Notion, but what they act is from a mere Concatenation of sensible Phantasmagories representing things grateful or ungrateful to the Sense: as to instance in those particulars that are objected, That a Dog will bark at one noise, suppose the knocking at the door; and not at another, as the falling of a stone or of a dish from off a shelf; that he will follow one sent, as that of the Hare, and neglect another, and the like; these are all done, not that he has any Notion of Effect and Cause, but by mere Concatenation of Phantasmagories representing things as grateful or ungrateful, or neither grateful nor ungrateful to his Sense, in which case he is not mov'd at all. And if a Dog chop at the bigger morsel, it is not that he considers the notion of inequality; but because that sensible Object does more powerfully move his appetite. So if he take one single side of a Triangle to come to the corner of it, where a piece of bread may be placed, it is not because he considers that a straight line is the shortest betwixt the same terms, but hezenibly feels that going directly to it he shall be sooner at it then if he went about; as Zenon instances well in an A, at one corner of a Pasture & the fodder in the other, that he would goe directly to that corner the fodder lay in, which as he thought was a marvellous witty jeer to Euclides his Demonstration, that any two sides of a Triangle are bigger then the third, as being to plain a Truth that no A could mis of it.

7. But by the favour of so Critical a Philosopher, we may very well suspect that neither Dog nor A, that makes toward any Object, goes directly in a straight line to it because he considers that a crooked one is further about, but because the visual line guides him straight to the Object he looks at, in which he goes as naturally, without any reflexion upon Mathematical Notions, as a stone cast out of a sling of it self endeavours to fleer its course with a Motion rectilinear: which having not so much as Sense, we can in no wise suspect, to be capable of the rudest Notion in Geometry.

8. Wherefore it is a mere fallacy, to argue that Brutes, because they doe such things as are Reasonable or Mathematical, therefore they doe them
Chap. III. An Appendix to the foregoing Antidote.

That, considering the lapse of Man’s Soul into Matter, it is no wonder she is so much puzzled in speculating things Immaterial. 2. That all Extension does not imply Physical Divisibility or Separability of Parts, 3. That the Emanation of the Secondary Substance from the Central in a Spirit, is not properly Creation. 4. How it comes to pass that the Soul cannot withdraw her self from pain by her Self-contracting Faculty. 5. That the Soul’s extension does not imply as many Wills and Understandings as imaginable Parts, by reason of the special Unity and Indivisibility of her Substance. 6. Several Instances of the Puzzledness of Theology in the firm conclusions of Sense, and of Reason. 7. The unimpeachable of the manner of that strong union some parts of the Matter have one with another. 8. What is meant by Hylomorphism, and how a Spirit, though not insensible, may be the Impeller of Matter. 9. That the inexplicable of a Spirit’s moving Matter is no greater argument against the truth thereof, than the inexplicable of that line that is produced by the Motion of a Globe on a Plane is an argument against the Mobility thereof. 10. That the strength of this last Answer consists in the Assurance that there are such Phenomena in the World as utterly exceed the Powers of mere Matter; of which several Examples are hinted out of the foregoing Treatise.

That the Souls of Men, the lowest dregs of all the Intellectual Orders, should be plunged and puzzled in the more close and accurate Speculation of things Spiritual and Intellectual, is but reasonable; especially considering that even Matter itself, in which they tumble and wallow, which they feel with their hands and wail with all their Sense; if they once offer to contemplate it in an Intellectual and Rational manner, their Phantasies are so clouded in this dark state of incarceration in these earthly Bodies, that the Notion thereof seems unimaginable and contradictory,* as I have largely enough already intituted upon.

But that the Notion of a Spirit, which seems so to obscure the clearness of the Idea of God, is no such inconsistent and unaccountable Notion as some would have it, I hope I shall sufficiently evince by answering the shrewdest Objections that I think can be made against it.

Whereas
An Appendix to the foregoing Antidote.  CHAP. III.

2. Whereas therefore we have defined a Spirit (I mean chiefly a created one) as well from those more absolute powers of Self-contraction and dilation, as also from those relative faculties of Penetrating, moving and altering of the Matter; we will now set down the Objections made against them both.

And against the first it is objected, That it is impossible for the Mind of Man to imagine any Substance having a power of Self-dilation and Contraction to be unextended, and that Extension cannot be imagined without diversity of parts, nor diversity of parts without a possibility of division or separation of them; because diversity of parts in any Substance supposes diversity of substances, and diversity of substances supposes independency of one another: from whence it will follow that Indivisibility is incompatible to a Spirit, which notwithstanding we have added in the Definition thereof.

I confess the Objection is very ingenious and set on home; but withall conceive that the difficulty is easily taken off, if we acknowledge some such thing to be in the nature of a Spirit as has been by thousands acknowledged in the nature of Intentional Species. We will therefore represent the property of a Spirit in this Symbole or Hieroglyphick.

Suppose a Point of light from which rays out a luminous Orb according to the known principles of Opticks: This Orb of light does very much resemble the nature of a Spirit, which is diffus'd and extended, and yet indivisible. For we'll suppose in this spirit the Center of life to be indivisible, and yet to diffuse it self by a kind of circumscript'd omniscience, as the Point of light is discernible in every point of the Luminous Sphere. And yet supposing that Central lucid Point indivisible, there is nothing divisible in all that Sphere of light. For it is ridiculous to think by any Engine or Art whatsoever to separate the luminous rays from the shining Center, and keep them apart by themselves; as any man will acknowledge that does but carefully consider the nature of the thing we speak of.

Now there is no difficulty to imagine such an Orb as this a Substance as well as a Quality. And indeed this Sphere of light it self, it not inhering in any Subject in the space it occupies, looks far more like a Substance then any Accident. And what we fancy unadvisedly to befall Light and Colors, that any point of them will thus ray orbicularly, is more rationally to be admitted in Spiritual substances, whose central essence spreads out into a Secondary Substance, as the luminous rays are conceiv'd to shoot out from a lucid Point. From whence we are enabled to return an Answer to the greatest difficulty in the foregoing Objection, viz. That the conceived parts in a Spirit have an inseparable dependence upon the central Essence thereof, from which they flow, and in which they are radically contained; and therefore though there be an Extension of this whole substantial power, yet one part is not separable or discernible from another, but the entire Substance, as well Secondary as Primary or Central, is indivisible.

3. But let us again cast our eye upon this lucid Point and radiant Orb we have made use of; It is manifest that those rays that are hindered from shooting
shooting out so far as they would, need not loose their virtue or Being, but only be reflected back toward the shining Center, and the obstacle being removed, they may shoot out to their full length again: so that there is no generation of a new ray, but an emission of what was actually before. Whereby we are well furnished with an Answer to a further Objection, that would inculcate that this Emanation or Efflux of the Secondary Substance from the Central is Creation properly so called, which is deemed incompatible to any creature.

But we answer, that both the Central and Secondary Substance of a Spirit were created at once by God, and that these free active Spirits have only a power in them of contracting their vital rays and dilating of them, not of annihilating or creating of them: For we also added in the Definition of a Spirit, Self-penetration, or the running of one part into another, if we may call them parts. And this Answer I hold so satisfactory, that I think it needful to allege the opinion of Durandus, who contends that Creation is not incompatible unto a creature, provided that it be acknowledged to be done by virtue of donation from the first Creator, and in an inevitable observance to his Laws. We might also further scruple whether any Emanation may be properly call'd Creation, but enough has been already said to satisfy this Objection.

4. But we are further yet urged concerning this Self-contraction and dilatation, for it is demanded why the Soul of Man, which we acknowledge a Spirit, does not contract itself or withdraw itself from those parts which are pain'd, or why she does not dilate herself beyond the bounds of the Body. To which is answered, That the Plantal faculty of the Soul, whereby she is unitable to this terrestrial Body, is not arbitrary, but fatal or natural, which union cannot be dissolved unless the bond of Life be loosened, and that vital congruity (which is in the Body, and does necessarily hold the Soul there,) is either for a time hinder'd or utterly destroy'd.

5. The last Objection against the Self-extension of a Spirit is, That there will be as many Wills and Understandings as Parts. But I have, in that Symbolical representation I have made use of, so represented the Extension of a Spirit, that it is also acknowledged Indivisible; whereby the Objection is no sooner propounded than answered, that engine lying in readiness to receive all such assaults.

6. Now for the Objections made against the Relative faculties of a Spirit, to wit, The power of penetrating, moving and altering the Matter; there is mainly this one, That Matter cannot be altered but by Motion, nor Motion be communicated but by Impulse, nor Impulse without Impenetrability in the Impulser, and that therefore how a Spirit should move Matter which does penetrate it, is not to be imagined.

But I answer, first, what our Imagination is baffled in, either our outward Sensers or inward Reason often prove to be true. As for example, our Reason attending to the nature of an exact Globe and Plane, will undoubtedly pronounce that they will touch in a point, and that they may be moved one upon another: But our Imagination cannot but make this exception, That the Globe thus drawn upon the Plane describes a line which
which must necessarily consist of points, point perpetually following point in the whole description; which how monstrous it is to be admitted, I have already intimated in the foregoing Discourse.

So likewise the Angle of Contact included betwixt the Periphery and a Perpendicular falling on the end of the Diameter of a Circle, Geometri- cians demonstrate by Reason to be less then any acute Angle whatsoever, insomuch that a line cannot fall betwixt the Periphery and the Perpendicu- lar: whence the Phantasy cannot but imagine this Angle to be indivi- sible, which is a perfect contradiction, and against the definition of an Angle, which is not the coincidence but the inclination of two lines. Be- sides, a lefser Circle inscrib'd in a greater, so that it touches in one point, through which let there be drawn the common Diameter of them both, and then let fall a Perpendicular on that end of the Diameter where the Circles touch; it will be evident that one Angle of Contact is bigger then the other, when yet they are both indivisible, as was acknowledged by our Imagination before: So that one and the same Angle will be both divisible and indivisible, which is again a plain contradiction.

And as Imagination is puzzled in things we are sure of by Reason, so is it also in things we are certain of by Sense; for who can imagine how it comes about that we see our image behind the Looking-glass? for it is more easy to fancy that we should deprehend our faces either in the very surface of the glass, or else in the place where they are: For if the reflected rayses might serve the turn, then we should finde the distance of our image no greater then that of the glass; but if we be affected also by the direct rayes, methinks we should be led by them to the first place whence they came, and finde our faces in that reall situation they are.

7. But to instaunce in things that will come more near to our purpose. We see in some kindees of Matter almost an invincible union of parts, as in Steel, Adamant, and the like, what is it that holds them so fast to- gether? If you'll say, some inward Substantial form; we have what we look'd for, a Substance distinct from the Matter. If you say it is the qua- lity of Hardnes in the Matter that makes it thus hard, that is no more then to say, it is so because it is so. If you say it is a more perfect reft of parts one by another then there is in other Matter; if that be true, it is yet a thing utterly unimaginable: as for example, That upon Matter exactly plain, more plain and solid then a Table of Marble, if a man laid a little Cube upon it of like plainness and solidity, that this Cube by mere immediate touching of the Table should have as firm union therewith as the parts of the Cube have one with another, is a thing that the Phantasy of man cannot tell how to admit. For supposse at first you drew along this Cube on the Table, as it would easily goe, both surfaces being so exactly smooth, and that then you left drawing of it; that these two smooth bodies should presently stick so fast together that a Hammer and a Chiefill would fearce fever them, is a thing utterly unimaginable.

Wherefore the union betwixt the Parts of the Matter being so strong, and yet so unimaginable how it comes to pass to be so, why should we not admit as strong or stronger union betwixt a Spirit and a Body, though our Phantasy suggest it will pass through, as well as it does that smooth bodies will
will ever lie loose, unless there be some cement to hold them together: And this union once admitted, Motion, Activity and Agitation being so easy and prone a conception of the property of a Spirit, it will as easily and naturally follow that it does move or agitate the Matter it is thus united to.

8. But again to answer more closely, I say, this present Objection is nothing else but a Sophism of the Phaenoy, conceiving a Spirit as a Body going through some pervious hole or passage too wide and patent for it, in which therefore it cannot stick or be firmly settled in it. To which Imagination we will oppose, that though Spirits do penetrate Bodies, yet they are not such thin and lank things that they must of necessitv run through them, or be unable to take hold of them, or be united with them, but that they may fill up the capacity of a Body penetrable by Spirits: which penetrability of a Body or Matter when it is saturated or fill’d, that Spirit that thus fills it is more strongly riveted in, or united with the Body or Matter, than one part of the Matter can be with another.

And therefore we will acknowledge one special faculty of a Spirit, which after penetration it doth either naturally or arbitrarily exert, which is this, to fill the Receptivity or Capacity of a Body or Matter so far forth as it is capable or receptive of a Soul or Spirit.

And this affection of a Spirit we will make bold to call, for more compendiousness, by one Greek term οινοεια which, that there may be no fulpicion of any fraud or affected foolery in words, we will as plainly as we can define thus, A power in a Spirit of offering so near to a corporeal emanation from the Center of life, that it will so perfectly fill the receptivity of Matter into which it has penetrated, that it is very difficult or impossible for any other Spirit to possess the same; and therefore of becoming thereby so firmly and closely united to a Body, as both to actuate and to be acted upon, to affect and be affected thereby.

And now let us appeal to Imagination her self; if Matter does not fit as close, nor cloer, to a Spirit then any one part of Matter can do to another: For here union pervades through all, but there conjunction is only in a common Superficies, as is usually fancied and acknowledged. And this Hylopathia which we thus suppose in a finite Spirit or Soul, I further add, may well answer in Analogoy to that power of creating Matter which is necessarily included in the Idea of God.

9. But lastly, if the manner how a Spirit acts upon a Body, or is affected by a Body, seems so intricate that it must be given up for inexplicable; yet as the mobility of an exact Globe upon a Plane is admitted as an evident and undeniable property thereof by our UNDERSTANDING, though we cannot imagine how it always touching in a point should by its motion describe a continued line, (and the like may be urged from the other following instances of Intricacy and perplexedness;) to supposing such manifold operations in Nature, that Reason can demonstrate not to be from the Matter itself; we must acknowledge there is some other Substance besides the Matter that acts in it and upon it, which is Spiritual, though we know not how Motion can be communicated to Matter from a Spirit.
10. And the strength of this our third and last Answer consists in this, that there are indeed several such operations apparently transcending the power of Matter, of which we will only here briefly repeat the heads, having more fully discoursed of them in the foregoing Treatise.

And first, I instance in what is more general, and acknowledged by Des-Cartes himself, who yet has entitled the Laws of Matter to the highest Effects that ever any Man could rationally do: and 'tis this: That that Matter out of which all things are, is of itself uniform and of one kind. From whence I infer, that of it itself therefore it all either rests or moves. If it all rests, there is something besides Matter that moves it, which necessarily is a Spirit: If it all move, there could not be possibly the coalition of any thing, but every imaginable particle would be actually looef from another. Wherefore there is required a Substance besides Matter that must bind what we finde fix'd and bound,

The second Instance is in that admirable Wisdom discoverable in all the works of Nature, which I have largely inferred on in my Second Book, which do manifestly evince that all things are contriv'd by a wise Principle: But who but a fool will say that the Matter is wise, and yet notwithstanding out of the putrescied parts even of the Earth it self, as also out of the drops of dew, rotten pieces of wood, and such like geer, the bodies of Animals do arife to artificially and exquisitely well framed, that the Reason of Man cannot contemplate them but with the greatest pleasure and admiration:

Thirdly, Those many and undeniable Stories of Apparitions do clearly evince, that an Understanding lodges in sundry Aery bodies, when it is utterly impossible that Aire should be so arbitrariously changed into shapes, and yet held together as an actuated vehicle of life, if there were not something besides the Aire it self that did thus posses it and moderate it, and could dilate, contract, and guide it as it pleased; otherwise it would be no better figured nor more steadily kept together then the fume of Tobacco or the reek of Chimneys.

Fourthly and lastly, It is manifest that that which in us understand, remembers and perceives, is that which moves our bodies, and that those Cognositive Faculties can be no operation of the bare Matter. From whence it is evident that there is in our bodies an Intellectual Spirit that moves them as it pleases; as I have largely enough prov'd in the last Chapter of the First Book of my Antidote, and shall yet further confirm when we come to the Objections made against it.
CHAP. IV.

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CHAP. IV.

1. That Existence is a Perfection, verified from vulgar Instances. 2. Further proved from Metaphysical Principles. 3. An Appeal to ordinary Reason. 4. That at least Necessary Existence is a Perfection, if bare Existence be not. 5. An Illustration of that last Conclusion.

1. To avoid the Necessity and Evidence of our Demonstration of the Existence of God drawn from the inseparable connexion of the Notion thereof with his Idea (we urging That necessary Existence must needs be included in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect) there are some that stick not to affirm that Existence is no Term of intrinsical Perfection to any thing. For, say they, imagine two pieces of Gold equal in weight, purity and all other respects, but one only duration or necessity of Existence; we cannot justly, without being humourfome or phanfiful, attribute preeminence to one more then to the other. To which answer, That as two pieces of Gold are better then one, so one piece of Gold that will last twice as long as another is twice as good as the other, or at leaft much better then the other; which I think is so evident that it wants no further proof.

But further, that we may not onely apply our selves to answer Objections, but absolutely to ratifie the present Truth; That Existence is a Perfection: First, it is palpably plain, according to that fenfible Aphorism of Solomon, Better is a living Dog then a dead Lion.

2. But then again to argue more generally, The Metaphysicians, as it is very well known, look upon Existence as the formal and actual part of a Being; and Form or Act is acknowledged the more noble and perfect Principle in every Essence; and therefore if they can be distinguished in God, is so there also: if they cannot, then it is thereby confess, that we cannot think of the Idea of God but it immediately informs us that he doth Exist. And I recommend it to the inquiry of the Hebrew Critics, whether מְדָעָה, from whence is מְדָעָה, does not rather signify Existence then Essence.

3. Thirdly, let the Metaphysicians conclude what they please, it is evi- dent to ordinary Reason, that if there be one conception better then another, that implies no imperfection in it, it must be cast upon what is most perfect: But Existence is better then non-existence, and implies no imperfection in it; therefore it must be cast upon an Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect.

4. But fourthly and lastly, Though it were possible to cavil at the single Notion of Existence, that it neither argued Perfection nor Imperfection, nor belong'd to either; yet there can be no shew of exception against the highest and most perfect manner of existing, but that that is naturally and undeniably included in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect; and that therefore we do but rightfully contend that necessary Existence is inseparably contained in the notion of God.

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5. For as for example, while it is confessed that Matter is finite and cannot be otherwise, for a Body to be figured implies neither Perfection nor Imperfection, but is a natural and necessary affection thereof; yet to be ordinately figured, is an undoubted Perfection of a Body: so in like manner, though it were confessed that mere Existence is neither Perfection nor Imperfection, yet so noble a Mode thereof as necessarily to Exist, must without all tergiversation be acknowledged a notion of Perfection, and therefore to accrew naturally to the Idea of a Being absolutely perfect.

CHAP. V.

1. That there is a vast difference betwixt arguing from forced Figments or fancies and from the natural Ideas of our own Minds. 2. That the Idea of a Being absolutely Evil does not imply necessary Existence, whether it signify a Being absolutely Imperfect, or absolutely Wicked, 4. Or absolutely Miserable, 5. Or absolutely Wicked, 6. That if by a Being absolutely Mischievous were meant solely the Infinite power of doing hurt, this is God, whose absolute Goodness prevents the execution thereof. 7. That the right Method of using our Reason is to proceed from what is plain and undisputed to what is more obscure and suspicious. 8. That according to this Method, being assured first of the Existence of a Being absolutely Perfect from his Idea, we are therewithall enabled to return answer, that Impossibility of Existence belongs to a Being either absolutely Miserable or absolutely Mischievous. 9. That the Phenomena of the World further prove the impossibility of the Existence of a Being absolutely Mischievous. 10. And that the Counsels and Works of God are not to be measured by the vain Opinions of Men.

1. As for those that admit necessary Existence to be included in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect, but would shew that our Inference from thence, viz. That this perfect Being doth Exist, is false and sophistical, because necessary Existence is contained in the Idea of a Being absolutely Evil, which notwithstanding we will not admit to Exist (for, say they, that which is absolutely Evil is immutably and ever unavoidably such, and cannot but be so, and therefore it cannot but Exist, and ever has Existed:) To these we answer, That we shall easily discover the grand difference betwixt such arbitrary and forced Figments and fancies as these, and the natural and consistent Ideas of our own Mind, if we look more carefully and curiously into the Nature of what these Objects have ventured to utter, and sift out what either themselves mean, or what must necessarily be understood by this Idea of a Being absolutely Evil, which they have thus forged.

2. By the Idea of a Being absolutely Evil must be meant either the Idea of a Being absolutely Imperfect, or absolutely Wicked, or absolutely Miserable, or absolutely Mischievous.

Now the Idea of what is absolutely Imperfect removes from it whatever
ever sounds Perfection; as if all Perfection were 1000, then this Idea removes from this absolute imperfection every unite of these 1000, allowing not so much as an unite or fraction of an unite, no not the possibility of them, to what is thus absolutely imperfect. So that what is absolutely imperfect is impossible to Exist. But necessary Existence is a Term of Perfection, as was plainly demonstrated before.

3. The Idea of a Being absolutely Wicked removes from it all manner of Goodness, Equity, Decorum, Righteousness; and implies a firm and immutable aperation of the Will from all these, and a settled and unchangeable purpose of doing things wickedly: but intimates nothing either of the Necessity or Contingency of the Existence of the Substance of this Being; that being neither here nor there to the moral deformity thereof, as is evidently plain at first sight.

4. The Idea of a Being absolutely Miserable is the Idea of a Being that sustains the fullest and compleatest torments that are conceivable; and this must be in a knowing, passive, and reflexive Subject. Now, I say, this torture arising partly from the sense of present smart, and partly out of reflexion of what it has suffered, and a full belief that it shall suffer thus eternally; this miserable Being, though but a Creature, is as perfectly tormented as it could possibly be if it necessarily existed of itself. For if it were always, though but contingently and dependently of another, the torture is equally perfect; and therefore necessary Existence is not included in the Idea thereof.

Again, the Objector is to prove that a Being wholly Immaterial can suffer any torture: which till he do, it seeming more reasonable that it cannot, I shall flatly deny that it can; and therefore do assert, that a torturable Being is a Spirit incorporate; and affirm also, as a thing most rational, that this Spirit, if very great pain was upon it, such as that it were better for him not to be at all then to be in it, that anguish by continuance would be so increased, (pain infinitely overpowering the vital vigour, and overpoising the contents of life and sense) that it would die to the Body in which it is thus tormented. But if it be not in so ill a plight as to change its state of conjunction, but that the torture proves tolerable; then necessary Existence would not be its misery, but some part of happiness: so that there can be no such thing as a Being absolutely Miserable in the world. For Misery rank'd up to the highest would make the thing cease to be. As a man cannot say an absolute big Triangle; for a Circle will be always bigger; or rather no Figure can be absolutely big, because the nature of it is to be limited.

Thirdly, The Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect is compos'd of Notions of the same denomination, all of them of themselves founding absolute Perfection; but the Idea of a Being absolutely Miserable is not compiled of Notions that found absolute Mifery of themselves. For what Mifery, but rather good, is there in necessary Existence? Wherefore if we should contend that an inference from the Idea of a thing to its necessary Existence is only warrantable there where the Idea consists of Notions of one denomination, the Objector is to take off the distinction.

Or, to speak more plainly, Absolutely necessary Existence and Self-
existence is one and the same Notion: But Self-existence is the most high and perfect mode of Existence that is conceivable, and therefore proper to what is most absolutely Perfect. Wherefore to transplant Self-existence to so pitiful an Idea as the Idea of a Being absolutely Miserable, is as abonous and prodigious as to clap the head of a Lion to the body of a Snail. Nay, indeed, it seems more contraditious, that being but the misplacing of Body and Figure, but this the implantation of an inward Property into a wrong Subject; nay infinitely contrary properties in the same Subject.

5. Fourthly and lastly, As for a Being absolutely Mischievous, it seems indeed to include necessary and unavoidable Existence as well as Omnipotency and Omniscience; or else this Sovereign Mischief is not so full and absolute as our apprehension can conceive. These added to a peremptory and immutable desire or will of doing all mischief possible for Mischief sake, do fully complete the Notion of this absolute Mischievous Being.

But how spurious and unnatural this Idea is, is evident in that it does again forcedly tie together Notions of a quite contrary nature; the greatest Imperfection with the highest Perfections, joyning the incommunicable Attributes of God with that which is haply worse then we can demonstrate to be in any Devil; nay such as seem a contradiction in any Subject whatsoever.

Wherefore, as I intimated before, if any man pretend our Argument to be a Sophism, and in imitating it would discover the fallacy in some other Matter, he is exactly to observe the Laws thereof in his imitation, and constitute an Idea of Notions that agree with the same Title, as they exquisitely do in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect, for there is no Notion there but what founds highest Perfection.

But in this Idea of a Being absolutely Mischievous there is nothing that of its own nature signifies mischief, but that wicked and malicious desire of doing mischief merely for mischief sake, Which is a degree of Imperfection link into the borders of Inconsistency and Contradiction. But yet to be able accurately to destroy all good whatsoever, implies again an Omnipotency in Power, and an Omniscience. But what is omnipotently and absolutely mischievous, must also destroy itself, as an infinitely-big Triangle implies no Triangle at all. So that this Idea is not free from the intanglement of multifarious Contradictions in the conception thereof.

6. But if by a Being absolutely Mischievous were meant, a Being that has the power and skill of doing all mischief imaginable, and indeed far above all the Imagination and Conceit of man, and that so effectually and universally that nothing possibly can prevent him; this is indeed the Eternal God, who is necessarily of himself, and prevents all things, and can be limited in his actions by none but by himself: but he being that absolute and immutable Good, and full and pure Perfection, he cannot but include in his Idea that precious Attribute of Benignity; and therefore acting according to his entire Nature, he is not only Good himself, but, by the prerogative of his own Being, keeps out such mischievous So-
vexations as have been here pleaded for, from ever having any Existence in the world.

7. Wherefore to bring our Answer to a head, I say, we are to use that natural method in this Speculation that men that know the use of their Faculties observe in all others, viz. to assent to what is most simple, easie and plain first, and of which there can be no doubt but that the Notion is congruous and consistent; and such is the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect, no arbitrarious or fortuitous figment, or forced complement of Notions that jarre one with another, or may be justly suspected, if not demonstrated, to be incoherent and repugnant; such as for example would be a walking Tree, or an intelligent Stone, or the like; but such as wherein the Notions naturally and necessarily come together to compleat the conception of some one single Title, as being homogeneal and essential thereunto.

8. And then what I contend for is this, That attending to this Natural Idea of God, or a Being absolutely Perfect, we unavoidably discover the necessity of actual Existence, as inseparable from him, it being necessarily included in this Idea of absolute Perfection: which is still more undeniable fet on in the last part of my Argument, where I urge that either Impotibility, Contingency, or Necessity of actual Existence must needs belong to a Being absolutely Perfect; but not Impotibility nor Contingency, therefore Necessity of actual Existence.

And therefore being so well secured of this Truth, I require the Objector to bring up his Argument to this last and clearest frame; and let him also argue that either Impotibility, Contingency, or Necessity of actual Existence, belongs either to a Being absolutely Miserable or absolutely Mischiefous; and I shall confidently answer, Impotibility of Existence, and give him a further Reason, besides what I intimated before of the incongruity of the Notions themselves, that it is also repugnant with the Existence of God, whom, without any rub or scruple, attending to the natural and undistorted suggestions of our own Faculties, we have already demonstrated to exist.

9. And still to make our Answer more certain concerning a Being absolutely Mischiefous, it is most evident He is not, and therefore fifth he must be of himself if he be at all, it is impossible he should be: And that he is not, is plain, because things would then be infinitely worse then they are, or not at all; whenas I dare say they are now as well as it is fit or possible for them to be, if we had but the wit and sense to comprehend the whole counsel and purpose of Providence, and knew clearly and particularly what is past and what is to come.

10. But if we take up, out of our own blindness or rashness, Principles concerning the Providence of God that are inconsistent with his Idea (such as the Ptolemaical Syteme of the Heavens, which (as some say) Alphonse looked upon (though others tell the story of the misplacement of certain Mountains on the Earth) as so perplex'd a Bungle, that transported with zeal against that fond Hypothesis, he did scoffingly and audaciously profess, that if he had stood by whilst God made the World, he could have directed the Frame of it better) we shall indeed then have occasion to quarrell,
quarrell, but not with either the Counsels or Works of God, but rather with the Opinions of ignorant and mistaken men.

CHAP. VI.

1. That the sense of his Argument from the Idea of God in the first posture, is not imply that the Idea is true, and if God were, his Existence were necessary; but That this Idea being true does exhibit to our Minde an absolute necessary Existence as belonging to Him. 2. That the Idea of the God of the Manichees does not include in it necessary existence. 3. That to say that necessary Existence included in the Idea of a Being absolutely perfect is but conditional, is a Contradiction. 4. The second posture of his Argument made good, and that by virtue of the form thereof the Existence of the Manichean God is not conclusively. 5. The invincible Evidence of the third posture of his Argument in the judgement of his Antagonist himself. 6. That the force of his Argument in the fourth and last posture is not, That we conceive the Idea of Matter without necessary Existence, but that, look as near as we can, we finde no necessary existence included therein, as we do in the Idea of God. 7. That the Faculties of our Minde, to which he perpetually appeals, are to be supposed, not proved to be true.

And now having thus clearly satisfied the Objection taken from the Idea of a Being absolutely Evil, it will be easie to turn back the edge of any Argument of the like nature, be it never so skilfully & cunningly directed against us. As that which I had from an ingenious hand, which because it seems very witty to me as well as invincible to the Objector, I shall propound it in his own words; the tenour whereof runs thus:

If a man may have a true Idea or Notion of that which is not, yea and of that which is not and yet would necessarily be if it were, then your Argument for the Existence of God, from necessary Existence being comprehended in his Idea or Notion, is un concluding. How you can deny this Argument, I cannot possibly conceive, the substance of your first Argument from the Idea of God being contained therein in the first posture of it.

But a man may have a true Notion of that which is not, yea and of that which is not and yet would necessarily be if it were; as for instance, of the Evil God of the Manichees.

But I anwier briefly to the Proposition thus, That it does not reach our Case: because we argue God does exist, not because the Idea of him is true, and if he did exist he would necessarily exist; for conditional necessary Existence, as being less perfect than absolute necessary Existence, cannot belong to a Being absolutely Perfect: but because this true Idea, without any If or And, does suggest to our Natural Faculties, That necessary Existence being involved in his Idea alone, the like not happening in any other Idea beside, without any more a-do, he doth of himself absolutely and really exist.

To
To the Assumption I answer, That the Manichees God, if he could exist at all, would so do necessarily; and my reason is, because God would never create a foul a Monfter.

2. But if you still urge that the Idea of this Evil God of the Manichees includes necessary Existence in it, it being the Notion of a God, and yet he is not existent; and that therefore the true God cannot be proved to exist, because necessary Existence is involved in his Idea: I further answer, That the Notion of the Manichees God does not naturally include necessary Existence in it, because it is not the Notion of a Being absolutely Perfect, and that the Notion of an Evil God is a mere forced or fortuitous Figment, and no better sense then a Wooden God, whose Idea implies not necessary Existence, but an impossibility thereof.

3. But the Objector proceeds, and we must attend his motions, only before he comes to the second posture of our Argument, he takes notice of my charging of all those with self-contradiction that acknowledge that necessary Existence is contained in the Idea of God, or a Being absolutely Perfect, and that thereby is signified that necessary Existence belongs unto him, and yet unfay it again, by adding, If he do not exist. But I answer, my charge is true: For to say necessary Existence belongs to a Being, which we notwithstanding profess may not be for all that, is to admit a contradiction; for thus the same thing by our Faculties is acknowledged both necessary and contingent, that is, that it cannot but be, and yet that it may not be; which if it be not a Contradiction in this case, I know not what is: for no less then absolutely necessary Existence must be comprized in the Idea of a Being absolutely perfect.

4. But the Argument will still appear more plain in the second posture. For if there be any fraud or fallacy, it lies in this term, Necessary, which I have truly explain'd (and it is not denied) to signify nothing else but an inseparable connexion betwixt the Subject and the Predicate. Wherefore Existence having an inseparable connexion with God, it must needs follow that this Axiom, God does Exist, is eternally and immutably true. But here to reply, If he did exist, is to insinuate that for all this he may not exist, which is to say, that what is immutably true is not immutably true, which is a palpable contradiction.

But the Objector here flies for aid to the God of the Manichees, desiring me to put the Manichean God in stead of the God whose Existence I would prove, whereby I may discern my own Sophisme. Well, if it be not Idolatry, let us place him there; but how shou'dism he is and unfit to fill this place, you may understand out of what I said before, That the Manichean God does no more imply in the Notion thereof necessary Existence then a Wooden God does, nay it rather implies impossibility of existence. For the Notion of God is the same, that is, of a Being absolutely perfect, which must involve in it the most absolute Goodness that may be. Now bring the Manichean God into sight, and let us view his inscription: He is an evil absolutely good; which, as I said before, is far worse sense in my conceit then a Wooden God, and therefore impossibility, and not Necessity of Existence, is contained in his Idea.

5. The third posture of my Argument is formidable even to the Objector.
jector himself: for whereas I urge, That either Impossibility, Contingency, or Necessity of Actual Existence belongs to a Being absolutely Perfect, he confesses here, that the Manichean God will succour him no longer; but as a man left in distress he complains, that it is an hard case, that we must be put to prove the Existence of God impossible, or else we must be forced to admit that he is. But afterwards being better advised, he takes notice that if he be not, it is impossible for him to be; and therefore, say I, it is but just that we expect of him that will deny that he is, to prove his Being impossible, especially the force of our Argument so necessarily casting him upon it. But in my conceit he had better save his pains; then venture upon so frustaneous an undertaking: for he may remember that the Idea of this Being absolutely Perfect is so fram'd, that in the judgement of any man that has the use of his Faculties, there is no inconsistency nor incompossibility therein, nor the least shadow for suspicion or shyness. And besides, since impossibility of existing is the most impassable grievance that any Being can bear to Existence, it must needs be an outrageous incongruity to attribute it to a Being absolutely Perfect, it so naturally and undeniably belonging to a Being absolutely Imperfect, as hath been noted before.

Wherefore if either the doubting or obdurate Atheist will say the Existence of God is impossible, that will not argue any weakenss or vanity in my Argument, but rash boldness and blind impudence in him that shall return so irrational an Answer.

6. But the Objector has arrived now to the fourth and last posture of our Argumentation, of which he conceives this is the utmost summe. That either there is a God, or Matter is of it self; but Matter is not of it self, because necessary Existence is not included in the Idea thereof. Against which he allleges, that as thousands have the Idea of a Triangle, and yet have not any knowledge of that property of having the three Angles equal to two right ones; so a man may have the Idea of Matter, and yet know nothing of the necessity of its Existence, though it have that property in it.

But I answer, This does not reach the force of our Argument; for look as curiously and skillfully as you will into the Idea of Matter, and you can discover no such property as necessity of Existence therein. And then again, the weight of my reasoning lieth mainly in this, That necessity of Self-existence being so plainly and unavoidably discoverable in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect, but not at all discernible in the Idea of Matter; that we do manifest violence to our Faculties while we acknowledge Self-existence in Matter, no Faculty informing us so, and deny it in God, the Idea of God so conspicuously informing us that necessary Self-existence belongs unto him. So that all that I contend for is this, That he that denies a God, runs counter to the light of his Natural Faculties, to which I perpetually appeal.

7. But if you will still say, It may be our Faculties are false; I say so too, that it might be so if there were no God by whom we were made; for then we were such as we finde our selves, and could seek no further, nor assure our selves but that we might be of that nature, as to be then mistaken
mistaken most when we think we are most sure, and have used the greatest caution and circumstpection we could to avoid error. But it is sufficient for us that we ask no more then what is granted to them that pretend to the most undeniable Methods of Demonstration, and which Geometry her self cannot prove, but supposes; to wit, That our Faculties are true.

CHAP. VII.

1. That that necessity of Existence that seems to be included in the Idea of Space is but the same that offers it self to our Mind in that more full and perfect Idea of God. 2. That there is the same reason of Eternal Duration, whose immediate subject is God, not Matter. 3. That Space is but the possibility of Matter, measurable only as so many several possible Species of things are numerable. 4. That Distance is no Physical affection of any thing, but only Notional. 5. That Distance of Bodies is but privation of tactile union, measurable by parts, as other Privations of qualities by degrees. 6. That if distant Space after the removal of Matter be any real thing, it is that necessary Being represented by the Idea of God. 7. That Self-Existence and Contingency are terms inconsistent with one another.

1. Others there are that seem to come nearer the mark, while they allege against the fourth posture of our Argument that necessary Existence is plainly involved in the Idea of Matter. For, say they, a man cannot possibly but imagine a Space running out in infinitum every way, whether there be a God or no. And this Space being extended thus, and measurable by yards, Poles, or the like, it must needs be something, in that it is thus extended and measurable; for Non-entity can have no affection or property. And if it be an Entity, what can it be but corporeal Matter?

But I answer, If there were no Matter, but the Immensity of the Divine Essence only, occupying all by his Ubiquity, that the Replication, as I may so speak, of his indivisible substance, whereby he presents himself entirely everywhere, would be the Subject of that Diffusion and Menstruability. And I add further, That the perpetual obversation of this infinite Amplitude and Menstruability, which we cannot disimagine in our Phantasie but will necessarily be, may be a more rude and obscure Notion offered to our Mind of that necessary and self-existent Essence which the Idea of God does with greater fulness and distinctness represent to us. For it is plain that not so much as our Imagination is engaged to an appropriation of this Idea of Space to corporeal Matter, in that it does not naturally conceive any impenetrability or tangibility in the Notion thereof; and therefore it may as well belong to a Spirit as to a Body. Whence, as I said before, the Idea of God being such as it is, it will both justly and necessarily

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Antidote, Book 1, ch 5: sect 11.
necessarily cast this ruder notion of Space upon that Infinite and Eternal Spirit which is God.

2. Now there is the same reason for Time (by Time I mean Duration) as for Space. For we cannot imagine but that there has been such a continued Duration as could have no beginning nor interruption. And any one will say, it is non-feste that there should be such a necessary duration, when there is no real Essence that must of it self thus be always, and for ever so endure. What or who is it then that this eternal, uninterrupted and never-fading duration must belong to? No Philosopher can answer more appositely then the holy Psalmist, From everlasting to everlasting thou art God. Wherefore I say that those unavoidable imaginations of the necessity of an Infinite Space, as they call it, and Eternal duration, are no proofs of a Self-existent Matter, but rather obscure sub-indications of the necessary Existence of God.

3. There is also another way of answering this Objection, which is this; That this Imagination of Space is not the imagination of any real thing, but only of the large and immense capacity of the potentiality of the Matter, which we cannot free our Mindes from, but must necessarily acknowledge, that there is indeed such a possibility of Matter to be measured upward, downward, every way in infinitum, whether this corporeal Matter were actually there or no; and that though this potentiality of Matter or Space be measurable by furlongs, miles, or the like, that it implies no more any real Essence or Being, then when a man recounts so many orders or kindes of the Possibilities of things, the compute or number of them will infer the reality of their Existence.

4. But if they urge us further, That there will be a real distance even in Space devoid of Matter; as if, for Example, Three Balls of brass or steel were put together in this empty Space, it is utterly unimaginable but that there should be a Triangular distance in the midst of them: it may be answered, That Distance is no real or Physical property of a thing, but only notional; because more or less of it may accrue to a thing, whereas yet there has been nothing at all done to that to which it does accrue. As suppose one of these Balls mentioned were first an inch distant from another; this distance betwixt them may be made many miles, and yet one of them not so much as touch'd or stirr'd, though it become as much distant as the other.

5. But if they urge us still further, and contend, That this distance must be some real thing, because it keeps off those Balls so one from another; suppose two of them two miles distant in empty Space, and one of them to lie in the mid-way; if that two miles distant would come to the other so soon as that but one mile distant, it must have double celerity of motion to perform its race: I answer briefly, that Distance is nothing else but the privation of actual union, and the greater distance the greater privation, and the greater privation the more to doe to regain the former positive condition; and that this privation of actual union is measured by parts, as other privations of qualities are by degrees; and that parts and degrees, and such like notions, are not real things themselves any where, but our mode of conceiving them, and therefore we can bestow
bestow them upon Non-entities as well as Entities, as I have discovered elsewhere more at large.

6. But if this will not satisfy, 'tis no detriment to our cause: For if after the removal of corporeal Matter out of the world, there will be still Space and Distance in which this very Matter, while it was there, was also conceived to ly, and this distant Space cannot but be something, and yet not corporeal, because neither impenetrable nor tangible; it must of necessity be a Substance Incorporal necessarily and eternally existent of itself: which the clearer Idea of a Being absolutely perfect will more fully and punctually inform us to be the Self-subsisting God.

7. But that we may omit nothing that may seem at all worth the answering, There are that endeavour to decline the stroke of our Argument in the third and fourth posture thereof, by saying that Contingency is not incompatible to God or any thing else: for all things that exist in the world, happen so to do, though they might have done otherwise. But no man would answer thus, if he attended to what he answered, or to the light of his own Reason, that would instruct him better. For, for example, if Matter did exist of itself, it is evident that it does necessarily exist, and could not have done otherwise: for Self-existence prevents all impediments whatsoever, whereby a thing may seem to have been in danger possibly to have fallen short of actually existing.

And as for God, it is as evident, that it is either impossible for him to be, or else that he is of himself; and if of himself, his Existence is unpreventable and necessary; as any man must needs acknowledge that understands the terms he ventures to pronounce.

CHAP. VIII.

1. That the Idea of God is a natural and indelele Notion in the Soul of Man. 2. That if there were some small obscurity in the Notion, it hinders not but that it may be natural. 3. That the Politician's abuse of the notion of God and Religion argues, them no more to be his Contrivance, then natural Affection, love of Honour and Liberty are, which he in like manner abuses. 4. A twofold Answer to an Objection touching God's implanting his Idea in us upon counsel or design.

1. THAT the Idea of a Being absolutely perfect is a Notion natural to the Soul, and such as she cannot deny but it is exactly representative of such a Being, without any clashing of one part against another, all the Attributes thereof being homogeneal to the general Title of Perfection to which they belong, is a thing so plain, that I dare appeal to any man that has the use of his Faculties, whether it be not undoubtedly and immutably true.

Nor can what is objected make it at all suspected of falsity: for whereas it is supposed, that the Atheist will pretend that the thousandth part
part of the world never had any such Idea; and that those that have had it, have blotted it out of their Souls; and those that have it most deeply imprinted upon them, are not so sure of it as two and two make four; I briefly answer, That all men ever had and have this Idea in their Souls, nor is it in their power to blot it out, no more then to blow out the Sun with a pair of bellows. Interest, diversion of their Minds to other matters, distemper of Body by Sensuality or Melancholy, may hinder the actual contemplation or discovery of this Idea in the Mind, but it cannot radically obliterate it.

2. For the last allusion, That it is not so clear as two and two make four; suppose it were true, yet it does not invalidate our position, That this Truth we contend for is natural and undeniable. For many Truths on this side of that easiness at least, if not clearness, cannot but be acknowledged naturally and undeniably true.

3. But now to come more near to the business, and that grand suspicion of Atheists, That this Notion of a God is only a crafty Figment of Politicians, whereby they would contain the People in Obedience, and that it is they that by their cunning and power have impressed this Character upon the minds of men; I answer, That what is naturally in man already, they cannot put there. They may, I confess, make a Political use of it; as indeed it is not so true as dreadful and detestable, That mere Statesmen make no conscience of prostituting the most Sacred things that are to their own base trivial Designs. But to argue therefore that there is no such thing as Religion, or a God, because they do so abominably abuse the acknowledgement of them to Political purposes, is as irrationally inferred as if we should contend that there is not naturally any Self-love, love of Wife and Children, desire of Liberty, Riches or Honour, but what Politicians and Statesmen have conveyed into the hearts of men: because by applying themselves skillfully to these affections, they carry and winde about the People as they please; and by the inflaming of their Spirits by their plausible Orations, hurry them many times into an hazard of losing the very capacity of the enjoyment of those hopes that they do fairly and fully spread out before them.

4. The most material Objection that I can conceive can be made against our second Argument from the Idea of God, as it is subjected in our Soul, is this, That this Idea is so plain and conspicuous a Truth, that it cannot but be in an intellectual Subject, and therefore we cannot well argue as we do in the ninth Chapter of our first Book, That this Idea in our Soul was put there that we might come to the knowledge of our Maker; for it is necessarily there, and what is necessarily is not of counsel or purpose.

But to this I answer, first, That our Bodies might have been of such a frame that our Minds thereby had been ever hindered or diverted from attending this Idea, though it could not possibly but be there.

And in the second place, That it is not any inconvenience to us to acknowledge, that the Idea of God is such that no intellectual Being can be conceived without it, that is, can be imagined of an intellectual nature, and yet not necessarily acknowledge upon due proposa that this Idea is undeniably
undeniably true: for hereby it is more manifest how absurd and irra-

tional they are that will pretend to Reason and Understanding, and yet

excuse themselves from the acknowledging of so plain a Truth.

CHAP. IX.

1. That the natural frame of Conscience is such, that it suggests such Fears

and Hopes that imply that there is a God. 2. That the ridiculousness

of sundry Religions is not any proof that to be affected with Religion is no

Innate faculty of the Soul of man.

1. THE strength of my Argument from Natural Conscience is this,

That men naturally fear Misfortunes, and hope for Success, ac-

cordingly as they behave themselves. But I must confess that this proof

or reason is the most lubricous and unmanageable of any that I have made

use of, it being so plainly obnoxious to that cavil or evasion, That the

Fears and Hopes of Conscience are not from any natural knowledge of

God, but from the power of Education, which is another Nature.

Now there scarce being any Nation that hath not aw'd their Children

by some rudiments or other of Religion, we are not able to give a sincere

instance that will fitly set off the validity of our Argument, and we do

not know how to help our selves but by a Supposition.

We will therefore suppose a man of an ordinary stamp ( for I do profess

that some men are born to enormously deformed for their ingenuity or in-

ward nature, that a man can no more judge of what is the Intellectual or

Moral property of a man by them, than what is the genuine shape of his body

by a Mole or Monster ) not to have inculcated into him any Principles of Religion,
or explicite or Catechistical doctrine of a God, but to be of such a temper only

( whether by Nature or Education, tis all one ) as to deem some things fit and right to be done, and others unfit

and unjust. For what is just and unjust, good and evil, amiable and exec-

rable, is more palpable and plain, according to the judgement of some,

then the Existence of a Deity. I say, suppose such a man should commit

some things that he held very hainous and abominable crimes, as Murder

of Father or Mother, Incest with his Sister, betraying of his truest Friends,
or the like, and should after not by the hand of the Magistrate be

punished, ( he doing these things so cunningly that they escap'd his cog-

nitude ) but should immediately thereupon be continually unfortunate, his

Barns and Stacks of Corn burnt by Lightning from heaven, his Cartel

die in his grounds, himself afterward tormented with most noisome and

grievous Diseafes; all which notwithstanding befall many in the course

of nature; I appeal to any one, whether he can think it at all probable but

that this man will naturally and unavoidably be so touch'd in Conscience,

as to suspect that these Misfortunes are fallen upon him as a punishment

from some invisible Power or Divine hand that orders all things justly.

2. What is alleged against our Argument from the Universality of

Religious
Religious veneration, viz. The manifold ridiculous Religions in the world, from whence it is inferred that the Mind of man has no Innate principle of Religion at all in it, it being mouldable into any shape or form of Worship that it pleases the Supreme Power in every Countrey to propose; I anchorer to this,

First, That if every Religionist would look upon extraneous Religions with the same venerable candor and awful sobriety that he does upon his own, he might rather finde them worthy to be pitied for their fallenesfs then laughed at for their ridiculousnesfs. But it no more follows that all Religions are false because fo many are, than that no Philosophick opinions are true because so many are false.

But, secondly, The multitude of various and, if you will, fond Religions in the world, into which the Nations of the earth are mouldable, the more ridiculous, the never the worse for our purpofe, who contend that Religion is a natural property of man. For the necessity of its adherence to our nature is more manifeftly evidenced thereby, who can no more be without Religion then Matter can be without Figure, though few parts of it have the happinesfs to be framed into what is Regular or Ordinate, or to have any beauty or proportion in their shape, and yet break the Matter as you will, it will be in some shape or other.

C H A P. X.

1. That though the Conarion might be the Seat of Common Sense, yet it cannot be the Common Percipient, 2. As being incapable of Sensation, 3. Of Memory, 4. Of Imagination, 5. Of Reafon, 6. And of Spontaneous Motion. 7. That these Arguments do not equally prove an Incorporeal Subfance in Brutes; nor, if they did, were their Souls straightway immortal. 8. That we cannot admit Perception in Matter as well as Divifibility, upon pretence the one is no more perplexd then the other, because both Sense and Reafon averrers the one, but no Faculty gives witness to the other. 9. In what Sense the Soul is both divisible and extended. 10. A Symbolical representation how he may receive multitudes of distinct figurations into one indivifible Principle of perception. 11. That the manifeft incapacity in the Matter for the Functions of a Soul affures us of the Exifence thereof, be we never so much puzzled in the speculation of her Essence.

1. W E have in the laft Chapter of our first Book largely and evidently enough demonstrated, That neither the Animal Spirits the nor Brain are the first Principle of Spontaneous motion in us; we touch'd also upon the Conarion: but because our Oppofers will not be fo flightly put off, we shall here more fully & particularly fhow the impoffibility of that part proving any fuch Principle of Motion, though I confefs it bids very fair to be the Organical seat of Common Sense, because it is fo conve-
niently placed near the Center of the Brain; and if the transmiffion of
Motions which act upon the Organs had not some such one part to ter-
minate in, it is conceiv’d by some (but I suspect more wittily then solidly)
that these outward Organs of Sense being two, the Objects would seem
two also; which is contrary to experience.

But though the Conarion may be the Organ of sundry perceptions from
corporeal Objects, and the Tent or Pavilion wherein the Soul is chiefly
seated; yet we utterly deny that without an Immortal inhabitant this
arbitrary Motion which we are conscious to our selves of can at all be
performed in us or by us: for if we attend to the condition of our own
natures, we cannot but acknowledge that that which moves our Body
thus arbitrarily, does not only perceive sensible Objects, but also remem-
bers, has a power of free Imagination and of Reason.

2. And to begin with the first of these; I say that mere Perception of
external Objects seems incompatible to the Conarion. For it being of like
nature with the rest of the Brain, it is not only divisible, but in a sort
actually divided one particle from another; else it could not be so soft as
it is, though it be something harder then the rest of the Brain. Now I
say, the Images of sensible Objects, they spreading to some space in the
surface of the Conarion against which they hit, one part of the Conarion
has the perception, suppose, of the head of a man, the other of a leg, the
third of an arm, the fourth of his breast; and therefore though we should
admit that every particle of such a space of the Conarion may perceive
such a part of a man, yet there is nothing to perceive the whole man, un-
less you’ll say they communicate their perceptions one to another. But
this communication seems impossible; for if Perception be by impression
from the external Object, no particle in the Conarion shall perceive any
part of the Object but what it receives an impress from. But if you will
yet say, that every part of the Object impresses upon every part of the
Conarion wherein the Image is, it will be utterly impossible but that the
whole Image will be confounded, and the distinctness of Colours lost, espe-
cially in leffer Objects.

3. Now for the Faculty of remembering of things, that it cannot be in
the Conarion we prove thus: For that Memory, which is the standing
seal or impression of external Objects, is not there, is plain; for if it
were, it would spoil the representation of things present, or rather after-
Objects would be sure to deface all former impressions whatsoever. But
if you’ll say that Memory is in the Brain, but Reminiscency in the Conarion;
I answer, That these Impresses or signatures made by outward Objects
in the brain must also of necessity be obliterated by superadvenient Im-
pressions. For whether these Images or Impresses consist in a certain
posture or motion of the Plicatile Fibres or subtile threds of which the
Brain consists, it is evident that they cannot but be cancelled and oblite-
rated by occasion of thousands of Objects that invade our Senes daily,
which must needs displace them, or give them a new motion from what
they had before.

But suppose Memory were thus seal’d upon the Brain, and transmitted
its Image through the Animal Spirits in the ventricles, as an outward
Object does its Species through the Aire to the Eye; being that perception is by impression, and that the impression was left in the Conarion, though retain'd in the Brain, how can the Conarion ever say that it had any such impression before: for the impression once wiped out, it is as if it never had any, and therefore can never remember that it had. Besides, the perception of this image in the Brain is as incompatible to the Conarion as the perception of any external Object, upon which we have already infilled.

4. And thirdly, For the power of free Imagination, whereby the Conarion is suppos'd to excogitate the several forms or shapes of things which it never saw: I enquire, whether it be the thin Membrane, or the inward and something soft and fuzzy Pulpe it contains, that raises and represents to itself these arbitrary Figments and Chimeras; and then, what part or particle of either of them can perform these fine feats; and (what is most material) whether the representations being corporeal, there be not a necessity of the Conarion's being so affected or impressed as in external corporeal Objects: and then I demand how this passive soft substance should be able to impress or signe itself, or how one part of this body should be able to act upon another for this purpose; and there being a memory also of these figmental impressions, how they can be sealed upon the Brain the seat of Memory. For admitting the Conarion to imitate the manner of impression of outward Objects in inventing Images of her own, the then impressing these Images upon the Brain, it will be like as if we should make use of the impression of a Seal upon some hard matter to seal some softer matter with; in which case the two impressions will be notoriously different, those parts that give out in the one, in the other giving in.

5. Fourthly, As concerning Reason, besides that it is manifest in the use thereof that we comprehend at once the Images or Phantasmes of not only different but contrary things in the very same part or particle of the Conarion, (for if they be in different parts, what shall judge of them both?) as when, for example, we conclude hot is not cold, or a crooked line is not a straight line, which cannot be conceived without a confusion of both impressions: there is also another consideration of Notions plainly immaterial, which do not impress themselves upon the Conarion, nor any part of the Brain, or on the outward Organs from sensible Objects, but are our own innate Conceptions in the speculation of things; and such are sundry Logical, Metaphysical and Mathematical Notions, as I have elsewhere made good. Wherefore it seems altogether incredible that the Conarion, being so gross and palpable a body as it is, should have any Notions or Conceptions that are not corporeal and conveyed to it from material Objects from without.

6. But fifthly and lastly, It is very hardly conceivable how the Conarion, if it were capable of Sense and perception, should, being thus but a mere pulpous protuberant knob, by its nods or joggs drive the Animal spirits to curiously, as not to mis the key that leads to the motion of the least joint of our body, or to drive them in so forcibly and smartly, as to enable us to strike so fierce strokes as we see men do, especially these
Animal spirits being so very thin and fluid, and the Coniarion so broad and blunt: For the one gives us to conceive, That the Spirits, especially being so faintly struck as they are likely to be by the Coniarion, and certainly sometimes are, will gently wheel about all over the ventricles of the Brain, and be determined to no key thereof that leads to the Muscle of this or that particular joynt of the body; and the other, That if this impulse of the Coniarion will forcibly enough drive forward the Spirits in the ventricles of the Brain, that that wind will fling open more doors then one, whenas yet we see we can with a very considerable force move a finger or a toe, the rest of our body remaining unmoved. We might add also, That it is hard to conceive how this Pinal Glandula can move it self thus spontaneously without Muscles and Spirits, or some equivalent mechanical contrivance; and if it do, to what purpose is that great care in Nature of Muscles and Animal spirits in the frame of Animals? if it do not, we shall further inquire concerning the Spring of Motion, and demand what moves the Animal Spirits that must be imagined to move the Coniarion. For in Motion corporeal it is an acknowledged Maxime, Whatever is moved, is moved by another. So demonstrable is it every way that the first principle of our spontaneous motion is not nor can be seated in any part of our Body, but in a Substance really distinct from it, which men ordinarily call the Soul.

7. Nor does that at all invalid the force of our Demonstration which some alledge, that our Arguments are Sophistical, because they as certainly conclude that there is an Incorporeal substance in Beasts as they do that there is one in Men.

For I answer, first, That they conclude absolutely concerning Men, that there is an Incorporeal Soul in them, because we are certain there be in them such Operations that evidently argue such a nature; but we are not so certain of what is in Beasts: and very knowing men, but of a more mechanical Genius, have at least doubted whether Beasts have any Cognition or no, though in the mean time they have professed themselves sure, that if they had, they could not but have also Immaterial Souls really distinct from their Bodies.

Secondly, Admit our Arguments proved that there were Souls in Brutes really distinct from their Bodies, is it any thing more then what all Philosophers and School-men, that have held Substantial forms, have either expressly or implicitly acknowledged to be true? But if they be Incorporeal, say they, they will be also Immortal, which is ridiculous. If they mean by Immortal, unperishable, as Matter is, why should they not be so as well as Matter it self; this active substance of the Soul, though but of a Brute, being a more noble Essence, and partaking more of its Makers perfection, then the dull and diffipable Matter? But if they mean by Immortality, a capacity of eternal life and bliss after the dissolution of their Bodies, that's a ridiculous consequence of their own, which we give the Authors of free leave to laugh at; it concerns not us nor our present Argument. For we conceive that the Soul of a Brute may be of that nature as to be vitally affected only in a Terrestrial Body, and that out of it it may have neither sense nor perception of any thing; so as to it self it utterly perishes.

8. That
8. That seems an Objection of more moment, Being there are Properties that cannot but be acknowledged to be in a Body or Matter, and yet such as imply strange repugnancies in the conception thereof, (as suppose that perplexed property of Divisibility, which must be into points or in infinitum, either of which confounds our Imagination to think of them) why we may not acknowledge that a Body may also have Sense and Understanding, though it seem never so contradicitions in the more close consideration thereof. But I answer, This arguing is very Sophistical, because by the same reason we should admit that the Head of an Onion understands and perceives as well as the Conversation in a Man. For you can bring no greater Argument against it then that it is contradicitious and repugnant that it should be. But you'll reply, That we plainly see that some part of the Body of man must have Sense and Understanding in it, but we discern no such thing in an Onion. But I demand, By what Faculty do we discern this? If you answer, Our own Sense tells us so; I say, our own Sense, if we did not confideit, would confidently suggest to us that our Finger feels and our Eye sees; when as 'tis plain they do not, for the very same thing that feels and sees, moves also our Body: but neither our Eye nor our Finger move the Body, and therefore they neither feel nor see.

And yet without our Eye we cannot see in this state of conjunction, as without the due frame and temper of our Brain we cannot well understand; but it no more follows from thence that the Brain understands, and not something distinct from it, then that the Eye sees. Wherefore it is apparent that there is no Faculty in us that can clearly inform us that any part of our Body is indued with Sense and Understanding.

From whence we see the great disparity betwixt admitting of Divisibility in Matter (though the Notion be never fo perplex'd) and of Sense and Understanding in a Body, (which indeed brings on more perplexity then the other, if it be very accurately look'd into;) because we are fully ascertained by Sense, and I may say by Reason too, that Matter is divisible, but no Faculty at all can pretend to ascertain us that a Body is capable of either Sense or Reason.

9. But there seems to be a worser Objection then this still behind, which is this: That though we have evidently proved the impossibility of there being either Sense, Understanding or Spontaneous Motion in Matter or a Body, yet we are never the nearer; for the like difficulties may be urged against there being any Sense or Understanding in a Spirit, sith a Spirit cannot but be extended, nor extended but divisible, nor divisible but incapable of Sense or Understanding, as we have argued before against Matter.

But to this I answer, If by Extension be meant a Fuxta-position of parts, or placing of them one by another, as it is in Matter, I utterly deny that a Spirit is at all in this sense extended. But if you mean only a certain Amplitude of presence, that it can be at every part of so much Matter at once, I say it is extended; but that this kind of Extension does not imply any divisibility in the substance thus extended; for Fuxta-position of parts, Impenetrability and Divisibility goe together, and therefore where
the two former are wanting, Extension implies not the Third.

But when I speak of Indivisibility, that Imagination create not new troubles to her self, I mean not such an Indivisibility as is fancied in a Mathematical point; but as we conceive in a Sphere of light made from one lucid point or radiant Center. For that Sphere or Orbe of light, though it be in some sense extended, yet it is truly indivisible, supposing the Center such: For there is no means imaginable to difcerp or separate any one ray of this Orbe, and keep it apart by it self disjoumed from the Center.

10. Now a little to invert the property of this Luminous Orbe when we would apply it to a Soul or Spirit. As there can be no alteration in the radiant Center, but therewith it is necessarily in every part of the Orbe, as suppose it were redder, all would be redder, if dimmer, all dimmer, and the like: so there is also that unity and indivisibility of the exterior parts, if I may so call them, of a Spirit or Soul with their inmost Center, that if any of them be affected, the Center of life is also thereby necessarily affected; and these exterior parts of the Soul being affected by the parts of the Object with such circumstances as they are in, the inward Center receives all so circumjunctiion, that it has necessarily the intire and unconfused images of things without, though they be contrived into so small a compass, and are in the very center of this Spiritual Substance.

This Symbolical representation I used before, and I cannot excogitate any thing that will better fet off the nature of a Spirit, wherein is implied a power of receiving multitudes of particular figurations into one indivisible Principle of Sense, where all are exactly united into one Subject, and yet distinctly represented; which cannot be performed by the Conception it self, as I have demonstrated, and therefore it remains that it must refer to a Soul, whose chief feat may haply be there as to the act of perception.

11. But if any shall abuse our Courtesie of endeavouring to help his Imagination (or at least to gratifie it) in this Symbolical representation we have made, by conceiving of this Center of the Soul but as some dull divisible point in Matter, and of no greater efficacie, and of the vital or arbitrarious extension of it, as grossely as if it would necessarily argue as real a divisibility and separability of the parts as in a Body; to prevent all such cavils, we shall omit those finnefities of the extension or indivisibility of a Soul or Spirit, and conclude briefly thus:

That the manifold contradictions and repugnancies we finde in the nature of Matter to be able to either think or spontaneously to move itself, do well assurwe us that these operations belong not to it, but to some other Substance: wherefore we finding those operations in us, it is manifest that we have in us an Immortal Being really distinct from the Body, which we ordinarily call a Soul. The speculation of whose bare Essence though it may well puzzle us, yet those Properties that we finde incompatible to a Body, do sufficiently inform us of the different nature of her; for it is plain she is a Substance indued with the power of cogitation (that is, of perceiving and thinking of Objects) as also of penetrating and Spontaneously moving of a Body: which Properties are as immediate to her
her as impenetrability and seperability of parts to the Matter; and we are not to demand the cause of the one no more then of the other.

CHAP. XI.

1. That Subtily is not inconsistent with the strongest Truth. 2. That the subordinate serviceableness of things in the world are in the things themselves, not merely in our Phantasy. 3. That the difficulty of obtaining such serviceable commodities is rather an Argument for Providence then against it. 4. That Beauty is no necessary Result from the mere Motion of the Matter. 5. That it is an intellectual Object, not taken notice of by Brutes. 6. That the preying of Animals one upon another is very well consistent with the Goodness of the First Cause. 7. As also the Creation of offensive Animals, there being curbs and correctives to their increase. 8. That the immediate Matter of the Foetus is homogeneal. 9. That the notion of the Archetyp Seminal forms is no such intricate Speculation.

We have now gone through all the Objections against the First Book of our Antidote; whereat if the more courtely complexioned, that they may still seem to have something further to object, shall scoffingly cavil, as if we had used over-much subtily in the management of our Arguments, I can onely advertise them of this, That Subtily is as consistent with Truth as the most groffe Theories; as is manifest in manifold Mathematical Speculations, then which there is nothing more certain nor undeniable to the Reason of Man. But that the coherence of Notions that are subtle in themselves should be as easily plain and conspicuous as the broad Objects of Sense, is a very incongruous conceit, and can be the expectation of none but those that are utterly unskilfull in the nature of such like contemplations.

But the defence of our Second Book will be not onely more short, but lefle obscure, our Arguments there for the most part being such that even the unlearned can judge of them, and few of them but fo evidently convivtive that there can be nothing materiall alledged against them. But fuch Objections as there are I shall briefly set down and anfwer.

2. And the first is made against our reafoning for Providence from the excellent Usefulness of Stones, Timber, Metals, the Magnet, &c. For those long and subordiante concatenations of instrumenal serviceableness of such things, say they, is but our fancy, no designe of any First Cause. And how easy a thing is it for the wit of Man to bring things together that are of a distant nature in themselves, and to imagine many Series of means and ends in matters that do have dependence one of another but what himself makes? But I anfwer, that the severall Usefull dependences of sundry matters of this kind we onely find them, not make them. For whether we think of it or no, it is for example manifet that Fewell is good to continue Fire, and Fire to melt Metals; and Metals to make In-

struments,
struments, to build ships or houses, and so on. Wherefore it being true that there is such a subordinate usefulness in the things themselves that are made to our hand, it is but reason in us to impute it to such a Cause as was aware of the usefulness and serviceableness of its own works.

3. Nor are we to cavil because these useful things, such as Stones, Metals, Coals, and the like, are to be had with so much labour, whenas men were better released from all such drudgery, that they may have the more time to contemplate the World, and seek after God, and exercise those better Faculties of the humane Nature: For we see plainly that the lapsed condition of Man is such, that Idleness is no spur to Virtue or Piety, but rather a Nurse to all beastliness and Sensuality. Besides that few mens Minds are of so Speculative a temper that they can with any great pleasure attend such meditations as will prove worth their leaving of a more Practicall and laborious life, which does not exclude men from being pious and honest, as certainly no Calling at all does. Wherefore that to the generality of men all useful things come hardly, is indeed rather an Argument of Providence, and that that Cause that framed the Earth knew well aforehand what the disposition of the terrestrial Man would be.

4. The second Objection is against our Argument from the Beauty of Plants, which I contend to have its first original from an Intellectual Cause, Beauty itself being such an Intellectual Object. But to this are objected two things. First, that Beauty is a necessary result of the mere motion of the Matter. Secondly, that it is no Intellectual Object, for Women and Children seem to be more taken with it then Men, and Brutes as well as either.

The former they will prove thus: That Colour, which is one part of Beauty, is the result of mere Matter, is, say they, plain from the Rainbow, which is assuredly such a mere natural result: And for Symmetry, which is the other part of Beauty, and in Plants consists in their leaves and branches parallely answering one another, as also the several parts of the same leaf: there is, say they, a kind of Natural necessity that there should be such an uniform correspondence as this in these branches and leaves; because the nourishment must follow the tract of the Vessels of the Seed, which being regular in their first conformation, the branches and leaves which sprout out must also be regular. Now this regular conformation of the Seed came from the uniform motion of particles in the Mother-plant; and lastly, the first Mother-plant of any kind from the regular motion of the Matter.

But I answer, That though the Posture as well as the Colour themselves of the Rainbow be necessary results of the mere Matter, and are nothing but the Reflexion and Refraction of the light of the Sun in the round drops of a rorid cloud, as Cartesius has admirably demonstrated; and that there is nothing at all further required hereunto saving the position of our Eyes in a line drawn from the Sun, and continued to this rorid cloud spread out so that the coloured circle may have for its Radius either about forty two or fifty one degrees, for then this Effect will necessarily follow; and if this rorid cloud extend it self fo far every way, that there
will be at fifty one degrees distance from the aforesaid line, as well as at fourty two, this dewy temper of the Aire, there will necessarily appear two Rain-bows at once, as has been frequently seen; and so, I confess, some things being put, the Colours of Flowers will be a necessary result of the Matter in such a motion or posture: Yet for all this, the variety of the placing of these Colours of Flowers cannot but shew that it is a thing either fortuitous or arbitrarious; but being that they ever some way gratifie the beholder, it is a signe that it is not fortuitous, and therefore it must be arbitrarious, and from some Counsel that contriv’d them thus.

But that I insist upon most and contend to proceed from an Intellectual principle is their Symmetry, against which the Objection seems very in-valid, the reason of it being thus, as you plainly see, That the regular Motion of the Matter made the first Plant of every kind: for we demand, What regulated the Motion of it so as to guide it to form itself into such a state that at last it appears a very pleasant Intellectual spectacle, and exceeding hard (if not impossible) to be hit upon without some other Director distinct from the blinde Matter? As a man will easily believe, if he do not think so much upon the Trunks and Branches of Trees (whose shooting out of the ground, and then having arms again shooting out of the trunk and branching themselves into many subdivisions, is not so difficult to conceive) as upon their Blossoms, Fruits, and Leaves. As in the Leaf of the Oak and of Holly, and abundance of leaves of Herbs & their Flowers, as in Monks-hood, Snap-dragon, sundry forts of Flie-flowers, as the Flie-flower properly so called, the Butterfli-Satyrion, the Gnat-Satyrion, to which adde the Wasf-Orchis, the Bee-flower, and the like. The Matter could never have hit upon such hard and yet regular shapes, had it not been regulated by something besides it self; the concinnity of which figures gratifying us that are Rational, we ought in all reason to conclude that they came from a Principle Intellectual.

5. But it was objected in the second place, That Beauty is no Intellectual Object, because Women and Children are more taken with it then Men, and Beasts as well as either. To which I answer, That Children are not so much taken with the Symmetry as the gaynes of colours in things that are counted beautiful, as Larks are mightily pleased at the thining of the Glass the Lark-catcher exposes to their view. But if they can also discover a want of Symmetry and correppondancy, as supposing a Flower which has some leaves crop’d off, that Spirit which is in them being Intellectual, it is not at all unreasonable it should exercise it self upon such easy Objects as these betimes. But that They or Women are taken more without beauty then Men, is because Men imploy their Intellectuals about harder tasks, and so cannot minde these smaller matters. Otherwise there is no question but if they could be idle from other employments, they would be as devout admirers of beauty as Women themselves, and be as well pleased with theirs, if they have any, as they themselves are with it.

But as for Brutes, I deny that they have any sense of so noble an Ob-
ject
jeft as Beauty is, or take any notice of the chief requisite in it, which is Symmetric and concinnity of parts, or of any order of colours, but only of the colours themselves. And it is no wonder that as the sight of red stockings will inflame the Spirits of a Turk-ey-cock with anger, as also the sight of the blood of grapes or mulberries provoke the Elephant to fight; so other fresh colours of sundry sorts may please and exhilarate the spirits of several Animals, as Light does of moft. And therefore if the Horse prance and carry himself proudly when he has gay and glittering furniture, it is from no other reason than what we have already declared. And if a Dog bark at a ragged Beggar more then at a handfomely-clad Gentleman, it is to be inquired into, whether a Beggar's Curre will not bark more at a Gentleman then at a Beggar, the fene of Beauty neither pleasing nor provoking this Animal, but the unusualness of the Object stirring up his choler. And that Birds prune their feathers, is not any delight in decency and comeliness, but to rid themselves of that more uncouth and harsh fene they feel in their skins by the incompofure of their ruffled plumes. So for the choice of their Mates in either Birds or Beasts for copulation, it is very hard to prove that they are guided so much by fight as scent; and then if by sight, whether it be not colour rather then exact symmetry of parts that moves them.

And lastly, if we should admit at any time that Brutes may be more pleased with a beautiful Object (taking Beauty in the entire Notion thereof) then with one less beautiful, it is but a confused delight, nor do they any more relish it as Intellectual, then Children (that are ordinarily well pleased to see Geometrical instruments that are made of Brass or Ivory or fuch like materials) do the exact cuttings and carvings of the characters and lines thereof as they are rational and Matheatical. And therefore we may very well conclude, that the Beauty of bodies is naturally intended no more for Brutes then fuch Mathematical instruments for Children: but all fuch Objects are directed to Creatures Intellectual from that Eternal Intellectual Principle that made them.

6. The third Objection is against Animals preying one upon another, and Man upon them all. For this, fay they, is inconfiftent with that Eternal Goodness that we profefs to have created and ordered all things. To which I anfwer, That it is not at all inconfiftent: For the nature of that Absolute Universal and Eternal Goodness is not to dote upon any one particular, as we do (whose complexions haply may make us more then ordinarily compaffionate (though moft men have too little of that natural Benignity) and whose short sight plungeth us too much into the fene of what is present) but taking a full and free view of the capacities of Happiness in fuch kinde of Creatures, contriv'd their condition to be fuch as was beft for the generality of them, though the neceffity and incomposibility of things would be fure to load fome particular Creatures with greater inconveniency then the reft.

And therefore that feveral kinde of terrestrial Creatures more exactly might be happy in their animal nature, this Sovereign Goodness was content to let it be fo, that ever and anon fomething that by the Animal fene would be neceffarily accounted Tragical and miserable should light upon
some few; the species of things in the mean time being still copiously enough preferred, and marching on fately in this Theatre of the World in their several succeffions.

Now it is evident that the main powers of the Animal life are natural craft, strength and activity of body, and that any purchase by these is far more pleasant to a living Creature than what easily comes without them. Wherefore what can be more grateful to a terrestrial Animal, than to hunt his prey and to obtain it? But all kinds of Creatures are not capable of this special happiness. Some therefore are made to feed on the fruits of the Earth, that they may thus not only enjoy themselves, but occasionally afford game and food to other Creatures. In which notwithstanding the Wifdome of God as well as his Goodnes is manifest, in that while they are thus a sport and prey to others, yet they are abundantly preferred in their several generations. But I have so fully and methodically treated of all such scruples against Providence in my Enquiry into the Caufes and Occafions of Atheifm, that we can content our selves with this short intimation of an Anfwer in this place.

Onely we will add, That if the Souls of Brutes prove immortal (which the best of Philofophers have not been averse from) the Tragedy is still lefle horrid: but yet that ought not to animate us caufefully and petulant-ly to diflodge them, because we know not how long it will be till they have an opportunity to frame to themselves other Bodies; and the in-tervall of time betwixt is as to them a perfect death, wherein they have not the fenfe nor enjoyment of any thing. And for my own part, I think that he that fflights the life or welfare of a brute Creature, is naturally fo unjust, that if outward Laws did not restrain him, he would be as cruel to Man.

7. The fourth Objection is againft our Argument for Divine Providence drawn from the confeideration of that happy Mitigation of the trouble and offcnurenfs of some Animals by others that bear an enmity to them, and feed upon them as their prey, as the Cat for example does on the Mouse. Now, say they, it were a more exadt sign of Providence if there were no fuch offcnive Creatures in the world to trouble us, then to bring on the trouble by making these Animals, and then to take it off again by making others to correct the mischief that would follow.

But no man would argue thus if it were not that he had over-carelefly taken up this false Principle, That the World was made for Man alone, whereas affuredly the Bleffed and Benigne Maker of all things intended that other living Creatures should enjoy themselves as well as Men, which they could not if they had no exifence: Therefore Providence is more exadt, in that she can thus fpread out her Goodnes further, even to the joynings of the more inferiour ranks of Creatures, without any confiderable inconvenience to the more noble and superior.

Befides, all these Creatures that are thus a prey to others are their sport and fufтренnce, and fo pleafure others by their death, as well as enjoy themselves while they are yet in life and free from their enemy. To fay nothing how they are both in some fort or other useful to man himself, and therefore fometimes would be misfed if they were wanting.

8. The
8. The fifth and last Objection is against our concluding a Substance different from Body, from the Homogeneity of that immediate Crystalline Matter out of which the Fetus is effermed, suppose in an Egee, the fame being also observable in other generations. To avoid the force of which Argument, it is denied that there is any such Homogeneity of parts, but that there are several Heterogeneous particles, though to us invisible, which being put upon Motion by the heat of the Hen or some equivalent warmth, like particles will be driven to their like, and so the Chicken will be effermed: But that to acknowledge any other Archeus, brings inextricable difficulties along with it. For where, say they, were all the Archai which chap’d the Wafps out of an Horfe’s Carcase? Are they parts of the Horfes Soul, or new intruding guests upon the old ones being ejected? If the former, then the Soul of an Horse is divisible, and consequently material, or, if you will, truly Matter: If the latter, where were those little Intruders before? Or be they so many sprigs or branches of the common Soul of the world? But, if so, why have they not one common fene of pain and pleasure amongst them all? But to all these I answer in order.

And to the first part of this Objection I say, That it cannot but be a very strong premption, that Nature intends an utter Homogeneity of Matter before the fall upon her Work of effermation; she so constantly bringing it to as perfect Homogeneity as we can possibly discern with our Senses. And there being no conceivable convenience at all in the Heterogeneity of parts, I think the conclusion is not rash, if we averre that the immediate matter of effermation of the Fetus is either accurately Heterogeneous, or if there be any Heterogeneity of parts in it, that it is only by accident, and that it makes no more to the first work of effermation or organization of the Matter, then those Atomes of dust that light on the limners colours make to the better drawing of the picture. For to say that those sundry forts of particles put upon motion by external warmth do gather together by virtue of similitude one with another, is to avouch a thing without any ground at all, against all grounds of Reason.

For what can this Similitude of Parts consist in, if not either in the likeness of figure, or in the equality of agitation or magnitude? Now Bodies of the like figure being put upon motion, will not direct their courses one towards another any thing the more for being alike in shape. Indeed Bodies of like figure of equal agitation and magnitude in a confused agitation may very likely goe together, as we see done (where yet we cannot promise our selves to exact similitude of the particles in their figure) in the thinner Spirits of distilled liquors, that all mount upward, in the Tartarous parts of wine, that are driven outward to the sides of the vessel; in the feculency of urine, that sinks to the bottom of the glass; in the subsidency of this dreggish part of the world, the Earth, if it may so properly be laid to subside and be at the bottom, as in the midst of the more refined and subtle Elements. And so in like manner the Fermentation of the matter which precedes the effermation of Creatures may haply arrive to some such rude effect as is seen in the forenamed instances: but it can never amount to such an artificial contrivance of Organs as are in living Creatures.
But if by *Likeness of Parts* they mean *only fitness of Parts for figure and motion*, they both being so framed and moderated, that upon external warmth their agitation will necessarily cast them to lock one with another, and to be linked into this admirable and useful frame of the body of an Animal; that Artifice would be so particularly nice and curious, that it is utterly unconceivable but that it must imply either the attendance, or at least first contrivance, of a *Knowing Principle*, that put the Matter into so wonderful an order; as to be able by such precise laws of *Figure and Motion* to exhibit so noble Objects to our Sense and Understandings: And thus our Adversaries will gain nothing by this supposal.

But though this may seem barely possible, yet I conceive it is very improbable that such an infinite number of particles that must concur to make up a *Fetus*, should have such a particular figuring and law of Motion impressed upon each of them, as to enable it to take its right station or posture in the structure of a living Creature. *For methinks this is going about the busi, when as the more compendious way would be to make some Immaterial Substance, such as are conceived to be the *Semantic Forms* of Plants and Animals, or the *Archei*, as others call them. For this *Form* or *Archeus* is a thing more simple and plain, and requires a more simple and plain qualification of the subject it works upon, to wit, that it be only *homogeneal*, and dispersed, or yielding to the tender assaults of that Substantial power of life that resides in it.

9. Nor is this opinion of the *Archei* or *Semantic Formes* intangled in any such difficulties, but may be easily answered. For as for those many pretended intricacies in the instance of the formation of *Waspes* out of the Carcase of a Horse, I say, the *Archei* that framed them are no parts of the Horse's Soul that is dead, but several distinct *Archei* that do as naturally join with the *Matter* of his body so putrefied and prepared, as the Crowes come to eat his flesh.

But you demand where these *Archei* were before. To which I answer, Can there want room for so small pieces of *Spirituality* in so vast a compass as the comprehension of the Univerfe? I shall rather reply, Where were they not? the *World of life* being excluded out of no place, and the sundry sorts of Souls being as plentiful and as obvious there, as those *Magnetic* particles are in this corporeal world; and you can scarce place your *Loadstone* and *Iron* any where, but you will finde their presence by the sensible effects of them: Or if you will have a gouger comparison, they are as cheap and common as dust flying in the Aire in a dry and windy Summer.

To the last puzzle propounded, whether these *Archei* be so many sprigs of the common *Soul of the world*, or particular subsistences of themselves; there is no great inconvenience in acknowledging that it may be either way. For it does not follow that if they be so many branches or distinct rays of the great *Soul of the world*, that therefore they are that very Soul it self; and if they be not, they may have their pleasures and pains apart distinct from one another: And what is pleasure and pain to them, may haply be neither to their Original, moving her no more then the chirping of a Cricket does thofe that are attentive to a full
Confort of loud Musick, or the biting of a Flea does a man tortured on a Rack.

But suppose we say, They are so many Substances as independent on the Soul of the world as the Matter it self is (though all depend on God) there is no difficulty at all nor inconvenience in that position; nor need we trouble our selves where they are, or what becomes of them then, either before they actuate this or that part of the Matter, or after they have done actuating the same, no more then of the parts of the Matter actuated by them. For as every particle of the Matter is safely kept within the compass of the corporeal world, whether it be acted upon by any Soul or Archeus or not; so every Archeus or Soul is as safe in the World of life, and as sure from being exterminated out of the comprehension of Immaterial Beings, whether it act upon any part of the material world or no. For Substance, be it of what nature it will, it cannot perish without a Miracle. And why God should annihilate that which in succession of Time may again have opportunity to act its part, and prove serviceable to the world, no man, I think, can excogitate any Reason.

CHAP. XII.

I. Objections against the Story of the Charmer of Saltzburg. 2. And of the bewitched Children at Amsterdam, with some others of that kinde; 3. As also against that of John of Hembach and John Michael Pipers to the Antick dancings of Devils. 4. Also against the disappearing of the Convencile of Witches at the naming of God; 5. And against a certain passage of that Story of the Guardian Genius which Bodinus relates.

1. THE Passages excepted against in my Third Book are either Historical or Philosophical. The Historical are chiefly these: First, against the Narration concerning the Charmer of Saltzburg it is objected, That that last & greatest Serpent might not be the Devil, but a mere Serpent, To which I answer, That it is very probable that that Serpent (here serving himself so for the last, and bringing so sad a fate upon the Charmer, as if he would either imitate a revenge of the death of so many of his own kinde, or spitefully flurre the glory and victory of their now almost triumphant enemy) had more in it than an ordinary natural Serpent, that is, that it was either the Devil so transformed, or a Serpent actuated and guided by him: which we shall the easiater believe, if we consider that the whole busines of Charming is of no natural efficacy; but supernatural, if it take any effect at all.

2. The second Objection is against those Stories of several possefled parties that have seemed to have vomited strange stuff out of their stomacks, as if it might be done by some sleight and cunning, only to get money. In answer whereto I must needs confess, that there are no real strange effects or events in the world but some or other, if it be possible, either
either out of design of gain or in waggery, may attempt the imitating of them. But this fraud might easily be discovered by prudent spectators, such as I suppose those two Physicians were, Cardan and Wierus, who, if there had been nothing in the business but the sleight of a fuggler, could not have been deceived by that Imposture.

And as for the Children at Amsterdam, the spectacle was so miserable, and their torture by report so great, and then the parties so many, and all attempts of Art or Religion so fruiterious, that it seems very incredible that there should be either fraud or foolery in the matter. As for the Maid of Saxony her speaking Greek, it were a ridiculous thing indeed to look upon it as supernatural, unless it were known that no body taught her that language; and therefore in such cases the judgement and sagacity of the first Relators is to be supposed, as in that Story that Fer\n

3. The third Objection is against the Mirth of some of the Stories recorded, as that of John of Hembach and John Michael the Pipers. But these Narrations are to seem never the more incredible for those passages of mirth, if we consider that those Apostate Spirits that have their haunts near this lower Aire and Earth, are variously laps'd into the enormous love and liking of the Animal life, having utterly forsaken the Divine; and that there are such Passions and Affections in them as are in wicked Men and Beasts; and that some of them especially bear the same Anal\ny to an unfallen Angel that an Ape or Monkey does to a sober man, so that all their pleasure is in unlucky ridiculous tricks; and that even those that are more fercient, if they ever relaxate into mirth, that it is foolishly antick and deformed, as is manifest in all those stories of their dancings and nocturnal Revellings: for they bear a secret hatred to whatsoever is comely and decorous, and in a perpetual scorning to it doftort all their actions to the contrary Mode, applauding themselves soledly in an unlimited liberty, and of doing whatever either their fond or foul Imagination sugget to them; affecting nothing but the lust of their own wills, and a power to make themselves wondred at and terrible.

4. The fourth Objection is against those Passages of the Nocturnall Conventicles of Witches, disappearing at the naming of God or Jesu. For the Devils (say they) are not at all afraid of these Names, but can name them by way of scorn or abuse themselves, and apply them to their own persons. But the Exception is easily satisfied, if we do but distinguishing betwixt the minds of the speakers of these words. Therefore I say it does not follow, because they can stand the pronouncing of these words amongst themselves, that they can also when they are named with an honest heart and due devotion.

Besides, it is not irrational (though they could withstand the power of these Names, and the devotion of them that use them) that it may be an indispensible ceremony amongst them not to continue their Conven\nticles if any be near or present that make an open and serious profession of
of the fear of God. And it is also evident how burthenfome the presence of a truly religious person is to wicked men, especially at that time they have a mind more freely to indulge to their own wickedness.

5. The fifth and last Objection is against a Vision or Dream, wherein he that had for so many years the society of a Guardian Genius or Good Angel, seem’d to hear these words, I will save thy Soul, I am he that before appeared unto thee, as if this Genius or Angel had been himself the Eternal God, But this need breed no scruple. For first, there being no shape of any person represented to him in this Vision, it may goe only for a Divine suggestion of the Spirit of God affuring him of his love and providence over him now, as heretofore he had done in like Visions or Dreams.

And then secondly, if we should admit that the Angel should speak so unto him, the Angel in this case is not properly said to speak as a Person, but as an Instrument, so as a mans Tongue speaks, whereas yet a mans Soul or himself more properly speaks then the Tongue. Wherefore if God take so full possession of all the powers and faculties of an Angel, that for a time he lothes the fenfe of his own personality, and becomes a mere passive Instrument of the Deity, being as it were the Eye or Mouth of God; what in this case he speaks is to be understood of God, and not of himself.

Thus I have, I hope, satisfied the difficulties concerning all the Historical passages of this Third Book, that are still remaining in it. For I must confess that I have expunged some that seemed not so accurately agreeable with those laws I set my self, upon my clover view. Not that I know any thing of them whereby I can discover them to be false, but because wanting that conformity, they must be acknowledged by me not so convincingly true.

C H A P. X I I I.

1. That the Transformation of an humane body into another shape may be done without pain. 2. That there may be an actual separation of Soul and Body without Death properly so called. 3. That the Bodies of Spirits may be hot, or cold, or warm, and the manner how they become so. 4. In what sense we may acknowledge a First in an Infinite succession of generations. 5. That the story of Tree-Geefe in Gerard is certainly true. 6. That God must be a Spirit properly so called. 7. That Spirits ordinarily so called are not Fire nor Aire, but Essences properly Spiritual, demonstrated from the solute Arenesity (as I may so speak) of Aire and Fire. 8. That this soluteness makes those Aereal Compaiges incapable of Personality, spontaneous Motion, and Sensation: 9. As also of transfiguring their vehicle into those complete shapes of Animals they appear in; 10. And of holding it together in winds and storms; 11. And lastly, of transporting Men and Cattle in the Aire. 12. That
12. That if Spirits or Daemons be nothing but mere complements of Airy or Fiery Atoms, every Devil is many Millions of Devils. 13. The preeminence of Arguments fetched from the History of Spirits above those from the Operations of the Soul in the Body for the proving of a Substance Immaterial.

1. The first Philosophical Objection is against the Transformation of an humane body into the shape suppose of a Wolf for any such like creature: For it is conceived that it cannot be done without a great deal of pain to the transformed, To which I answer, That though this Transformation be made in a very short time, yet it may be performed without any pain at all. For that part in the Head which is the seat of Common Sense I conceive is very small (suppose it to be the Conarion, it is not very big;) wherefore the Devil getting into the Body of a man and posseffing that part with the rest, can intercept or keep off all the transmigrations of motion from other parts of the Body, that, let him doe what he will with them, the Party shall feel no pain at all; so that he may soften all the parts of the Body besides into what consistency he please, and work it into any form he can his own Vehicle of Aire, and the Party not be sensible thereof all the time. And there is the same reason of reducing the Body into its own shape again, which is as painles to the Party that suffers it. Nor is there any fear that the Body once loofened thus will ever after be in this loose melting condition; for it is acknowledged even by them that suppose Bodinæus, whose cause I undertake, that a Spirit can as well stop and fix a Body as move it. Wherefore I say, when the Devil has fixed again the Body in its prifthine shape, it will according to the undeniable laws of Nature remain in that state he left it, till something more powerful disfettle and change it: and every Body is overpowered at last, and we must all yield to death.

2. The second Objection is against our acknowledging an actual separation of Soul and Body without death, death being properly, as we define it, a disjunction of the Soul from the Body by reason of the Bodies unfitness any longer to entertain the Soul, which may be caused by extremity of diseases, by outward violence or old age. Now, say they, What is violence, if this be not, for the Devil to take the Soul out of the Body? But the Answer is easie, That any separation by violence is not death, but such a violence in separation as makes the body unfit to entertain the Soul again; as it is in letting the blood run out by wounding the body, and in hindring the course of the spirits by strangling it, or drowning it, or the like. For to revive such a Body as this would be a miracle indeed, in such cases as these, death having seified upon the Body in a true and proper sense; and then none but God himself can thus kill and make alive.

3. The third Objection is against the notable coldness of the bodies of Devils. For at the great trial of Witches at S. Edmondsbury in August 1645. I heard some of them openly confess at the Bar, sayes the Objector, that when the Devil lay with them, he was warm. To which I might answer, if I had a mind rather to shuffle then precisely to satisfy the
the exceptions made against what we have wrote, that it may be some warm yong man had got into the place of the cold Devil: for who knows what joggles there might be in these things?

But to anfwier more home to the purpofe, I confefs that the Bodies of Devils may be not only warm, but findingly hot, as it was in him that took one of Melanchthon's relations by the hand, and fo scorched her, that the bare the mark of it to her dying day. But the examples of cold are more frequent, as in that famous fторy of * Cantius, when he toucht the arm of a certain woman of Pentfch as the lay in her bed, he felt as cold as ice, and fo did the Spirit's claw to * Anne Styles: and many other stories there are of that nature. But I will not deny but their bodies may be also warm, els if it is not intelligible how those two execrable Magi should reap such unexpressible pleafure, the one from his Armellina, the other from his Florina, as they profefs themselves to have done, in a certain Dialogue of Francifcus Picus his, which he has entituled Strix, or De Ludiicratione Daemonum; and affures us in his Epiftle before it, that it is a true history, and that he fets down but fuch things as he has either seen with his eyes, or elfe heard from the confeffion of Witches themselves.

The force therefore of the Objection is levelled againft what we do not affert, that the Bodies of Devils are found only cold: But what we would intimate is only this, that their Bodies being nothing but coagulated or constringed Aire, when they put them in fuch a posture as to constringe their vehicles in a greater meafure by far then agitate the fingle particles of it, that it will then seem not only cold as congealed water does, but more piercingly and ftrangingly cold, by reafon of the subtily of the parts.

But when they not only strongly constringe their vehicle in the whole, but also fiercely agitate the fingle particles thereof, their Body will become findingly hot, and imitate in fome meafure heated brafs or iron, wherein the particles keep clofe together, and yet every one is fmarly moved in itself. As is plain to us if we spit upon those metalls fo heated; for they will make the fpittle hizze and bubble, the particles of the mettals communicating their motion to the fpittle that lies upon them; and will turn all liquor into vapours, as we ordinarily fee in the burning of Vinegar and Rose-water in a chamber to perfume the room. For what is this perfuming but the fetting of the Aqueous separable parts of the liquor on motion fo strongly, as to the mounting of them into the Aire and difperring of them into fumme, by the fierce and strong agitation of the inseparable parts of the heated fire-hovel?

But laftly, If a Spirit ufe his Agitative power moderately and his conftringe forcibly enough to feel folid or palpable to that man or woman he has to deal withal, he may not only feel warm, but more pleasantly and gratefully warm then any earthly or flefhly body that is; for the subtily of the Matter will more punctually hit, and more powerfully reach the Organs of Sense, and more exquisitely and enravifhingly move the Nerves, then any terrestrial body can polynomially. But in the mean time the Spirit himfelf is neither hot, nor warm, nor cold, nor any thing else that belongs to a Body, but a Subfance specifically distinct from all corporal!
poreal Matter whatsoever, as I have already intimated in the place we now defend.

4. The fourth Objection is against our asserting, That it is an incongruous and self-contradictory position to hold, * That there never was any man but was born of a woman, though we should admit the successions of mankind infinite. For, say they, the contradiction is only if you can finde out a First: But in infinite succession there can be no First in any senfe at all; for if a First, then a Second, and so on to our own times, and thus the Series would be numerable, and consequently finite; which is a contradiction, for then the succession would be both finite and infinite.

But I answer, First, that I can demonstrat, That there is a First in infinite succession out of such principles as the Aristotle does or is necessarily to grant, and that is, that Matter is ab aeterno, and that some part thereof at least moved ab aeterno. Now it is plain that this Matter that moved ab aeterno either moved of it self, or was moved by another. If the latter, then we have a First in an infinite succession of motions: for that which moved this Matter moved ab aeterno, is first in order of causality, as is undeniably plain to any one that understands sense.

But you'll say that this Matter that moved ab aeterno was moved of it self. Be it so, yet no part of it can move in this full Ocean of Matter that is excluded out of no space, but it must hit some other part of Matter so soon as it moves, and that another, and so on. And thus there might be a Succession of Motions ab aeterno or infinite, and yet a first in order of causality. For that primordial Motion of the Matter is plainly first and the cause of all the rest: And our Understanding can never be quiet till it has penetrated to some such first in the order of Causes.

And then Secondly, to that subtle Argumentation that would prove that this infinite succession would be both finite and infinite, I answer, That it is a mere Sophisme from the ambiguity of the term first, which signifies either Priority of Succession or Priority of Causality. In the first sense if we admit a first, the succession will be finite according to our own Faculties, for we cannot but run beyond, we finding the succession bounded in that first. But in the other sense, first sets no bounds to succession, but leaves it free and infinite.

Or we may answer thus, That beginning from this moment and going on to the first primordial Motion, and calling this present moment first, and the next before it the second, that it will amount to a number truly infinite, and that our Understanding can never go through it: but, though God's Understanding can, that it does not follow that the number is therefore finite; for an infinite mind may well comprehend an infinite number. But for us whose capacities are finite, if we would venture to name a first in infinite succession, we should call it πρωτόν ατερνόπωσμενον, the first infinitesimal, and acknowledge our selves unable to go through, our Understandings being finite.

5. The fifth and last Objection is against that Story out of Gerard of the Tree-geese in the Island of the Pile of Foulders. For it is objected by one that inquired of some that lived near the place, that it was not confirmed to him, but that they told him only that at the time of the year it was
Chap. XIII. An Appendix to the foregoing Antidote.

was a notable place for birds' nests, and that one can scarce walk in the Island but he will tread on a nest of Eggs. But to this may be answered, either that those parties that were consulted were men that looked not after such curiosities as these; or that the rotten pieces of ships or trunks of trees that were washed up thither by the Sea, have been a long time agoe washed away again, and so the examples of this rarity being not freshly renewed, that the memory of it may be lost with many of those Parts: For it is nigh threecore years since Gerard wrote, but while he was living, he offered to make his narration good by sufficient witnesses; and he professes he declares but what his eyes had seen and his hands had touched.

And he also adds a Story of another sort of Tree-goose which he gathered in their shells from an old rotten tree upon the shore of our English Coast betwixt Dover and Runney: He brought a many of them with him to London, and opening the shells, which were something like Muscles, he found these Birds in several degrees of maturation; in some shapeless lumps only, in others the form of Birds, but bare, in others the same form and shape, and with down also upon them, their shells gaping, and they ready to fall out.

I might add a third kind described to me by a Gentleman out of Ireland, which he has often observed upon those Coasts; but it is not material to insist upon the description thereof. All that I aim at is this, That this truth of Birds being bred of putrefaction is very certain, of which I am so well assured by this Gentleman's information as well as that narration of Gerard, that I must confess for my own part I cannot doubt of it at all. And it might countenance my credulity, if I could be here justly suspected of that fault, that the Objector himself upon further enquiry is at length fully satisfied concerning the same truth.

6. We have now answered all the Objections, as well Philosophical as Historical, made against those particular passages in my Third Book. There remains only one of a more universal nature, and indeed of such importance, that if I do not satisfy it, it does utterly subvert the main design of our whole Third Book against Atheism, wherein we would fetch off men to an easier belief of a God, from the History of Spirits. For admitting all those Stories to be true, yet, say they, it does not at all follow that there are Spirits in that sense that I define Spirits, and in such a notion as is understood in my explication of the Idea of God, viz. That there should be an Immaterial or Incorporeal Substance that can penetrate and alter the Matter; for they themselves are but a thinner kind of Body, such as Air or Fire, or some such like Subtle Element, and not pure Spirit according to our Definition thereof.

If this were true, I must confess that our last Book against Atheism is of no efficacy at all; and can do nothing towards the end it was intended for. For if there be a God, of necessity he must be a Spirit properly so called; otherwise he cannot be Infinite. Nor can he be this Universal Matter in the world, though we suppose it boundless; because he could not then be perfect. But he must be an Essence of which this Matter depends, and in which he is, penetrating and possesting all things. Which any one will easily
easily believe, if he were assured that there are particular Spirits that penetrate and actuate this or that part of the Matter, which I contend that those Stories which I have related do evidently evince,

7. For I appeal to any one that knows what Fire and Air is, whether they be not as truly a mere aggregation of loofened particles of the Matter as an heap of sand; only they are so little, that they are invisible and insensible in their distinct particularities, but as truly disjoued Atomes (if I may so call what is still divisible) as the grains of sand we speak of.

8. Now this being supposed, which nothing but Ignorance can deny, we shall plainly discover that such things are done by Spirits, as we usually call them, as are altogether incompatible to any compages of these small grains or Atomes of Matter of which Air and Fire do consist. For first, Either all these Grains or Atomes have Sense, Imagination and Understanding in them, or but some few, or but one only. If all or some few, it is plain that they are so many distinct intelligent Beings, and a distinct intelligent Being is a Person; so that this one person is many persons; which is plainly contradictory, at least foolishly ridiculous. But if the residence of Sense, Imagination and Understanding be plac'd in one, how is it possible that that one Atome should be able spontaneously to move all the rest? And the same reason would be if we should feat Sense and Reason in some few inward Atomes. For how could they bring away those behinde them, or carry on those on the side of them, or drive them before them, so as that they would not divide and be left behinde? And yet it is a threwd presumption that the Sea of Sense is confined to some small compass in the Vehicle of a Spirit, it being so in the Body of a Man. For if it were not, but that every part of the Vehicle had Sense in it self, the external Object would seem in God knows how many places at once, and the Images of things would be either utterly confounded, or the Atomes, when they put themselves upon their march, would mistake their mark, and following directly their sense, would of necessity break one from another and destroy the whole.

9. Again, It is manifest that that which has the power of sensation in a Spirit has also the power of Memory, else they could not remember the Objects of Sense, if it were not one and the same thing in them that had both Sense and Memory: and that which remembers does also imagine, and that which imagines by the power of imagination transforms the Vehicle into various shapes and figures, and holds it there in that shape so long as it thinks good.

Now I demand, how can this possibly be done by either one or a few Particles or Atomes refiding in any part of the Vehicle? How can they either hold together the other, or lay hold upon them, to restrain them and conftraine them into this or that form, suppose of a Dog, Colt, or Man? But to say that Imagination is in every part of the Vehicle, and to admit those particles to imagine that have not so much as Sense (as the farr greater part seem not to have from what even now was intimated) is altogether unreasonable.

10. Thirdly, That which Lucretius allidges against the Immortality of the Soul, supposing it such a congeries of little Atomes as here Spirits are
are supposed, is as strong an Argument against the Existence of such
kinds of Spirits. For they would be blown out like a candle, or torn in
pieces with the windes, and be dissipate like smoke or clouds.

II. Fourthly and lastly, The transportation of Cattel, and of Witches
themselves to their Nocturnal Conventicles through the Aire, if Spirits
or Devils be but a mere congestion of subtile Atomes Aiery or Fiery, with
out an inward Immaterial Principle that has a power to hold fast the par
ticles together, is a thing altogether impossible. For it is evident that
the weight of a Man or a Beast will sink through the Aire, and never rest
till they reach the Earth; and so they would do through the Vehicle of
a Spirit, that is as subtile, fluid and yielding as the Aire it self is, were
there not an Internal effence and principle that was able to constringe and
hold together this fluid body or Vehicle of the Spirit, and so make it to
sustain the weight. For all Bodies hard or fluid are equally impenetrable;
and therefore if any power should hold the Aire together so as to restrain
it near within one compass or space, and yet not change the usual con-
fistency of it, it would be as winde in a bladder; and a man might lie up
on it as safely as upon a soft bed, and never fear sinking through.

But in this loose composure of Atoms which they say is all that is in a
Spirit (though we should admit of that ridiculous supposition, that every
Atom can imagine and apply it self to one joynt design of holding all
close together) yet it is hard to conceive, that this actual division of the
whole into so many subtile, exile, invisible particles does not so enfeeble
the spontaneous offers towards the sustaining and carrying away of the
burden, that their endeavours would ever prove frustraneous.

12. But I need not insist upon that which, it may be, may seem a
point something more lucubrious, whenas we have what is more palpably
incongruous presenting it self to our view. For this compilation of Aiery
or Fiery particles being the only substance acknowledged in a Spirit, all
Atome having Imagination and Reason in it to apply it self to one
joynt design, they must be, as I have intimated heretofore, as properly so
many distinct persons as the grains of sand are so many distinct individ-
uals of Matter, and therefore every one Devil is indeed 5000 millions
of Devils and more; a thing that a man would little dream of, or admit
to be any more then a dream, if he thinks of it waking. But if such things
as these will not be acknowledged as absurd, but shamelesly admitted
and swallowed down for true; I must confess that there is no Demon-
stration against impudence and pertinacity, and that I am not able to
prove to such that either Brutes have life, or that the moats that play in
the beams of the Sun are devoid of Sense and Reason.

13. The substance of these Arguments, as the Reader may remem-
ber, I have made use of elsewhere for the proving of an Incorporeal Prin-
ciple residing and acting in the Body of man; but the frame and manage-
ment of them, in this place is not a little different, and their force far
more conspicuous and apparent, the fixt consistincy and Mechanical fa-
brick of an humane Body being able to perform many things that the
fluid and unorganized Vehicle of Fire and Aire cannot possibly doe, un-
less we admit an immaterial essence to be in it, and so thoroughly to posses

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it all over, as to have the power to confine it and transform it into those various shapes it does appear in. And therefore though our Argumentations for an Immortal Soul in the Body of man be solid and irrefutable; yet because the truth is more palpably and undeniably demonstrable in the Fiery or Airy Vehicles of what we ordinarily call Spirits, I conceive that our Third Book against Atheism is very convenient, if not necessary, not at all needless nor unprofitable.
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S 2 Enthusiasms
Enthusiasmus Triumphatus;
OR,
A BRIEF DISCOURSE
OF
The Nature, Causes, Kinds, and Cure
OF
ENTHUSIASM.

By HENRY MORE, D.D.
Fellow of Christ’s College in Cambridge.

Πολλοὶ μὲν ἐνθυσίας, πολλοὶ δὲ τε Βάκχοι.

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A BRIEF DISCOURSE OF
The Nature, Causes, Kindes, and Cure OF ENTHUSIASM.

SECTION I.

The great Affinity and Correspondency betwixt Enthusiasm and Atheism.

Theism and Enthusiasm, though they seem so extremely opposite one to another, yet in many things they do very nearly agree. For, to say nothing of their joint conspiracy against the true knowledge of God and Religion, they are commonly entertain'd, though successively, in the same Complexion. For that Temper that disposes a man to listen to the Magisterial Di- states of an over-bearing Phaivy, more then to the calm and cautious insinuations of free Reason, is a subject that by turns does very easiily lodge and give harbour to these mischievous Guests.

For as Dreams are the Fancies of those that sleep, so Fancies are but the Dreams of men awake. And these Fancies by day, as those Dreams by night, will vary and change with the weather and present temper of the Body: So those that have onely a fiery Enthusiasticke acknowledgment of God; change of diet, feculent old age, or some present damps of Melancholy, will as confidently represent to their Phaivy that there is no God, as ever it was represented that there is one. And then having lost the use of their more noble Faculties of Reason and Understanding, they must according to the course of Nature be as bold Atheists now, as they were before confident Enthusiasts.

Nor do these Two unruly Guests onely serve themselves by turns on the same party, but also send mutual supplies one to another, being lodg'd in several persons. For the Atheist's pretence to Wit and natural Reason (though the foulnefs of his Mind makes him fumble very dotingly in the use
A brief Discourse of Enthusiasm. Sect. II, III, IV.

use thereof) makes the Enthusiasm secure that reason is no guide to God: And the Enthusiasm's boldly dictating the careless ravings of his own tumultuous Fancy for undeniable Principles of Divine knowledge, confirms the Atheist that the whole business of Religion and Notion of a God is nothing but a troublesome fit of over-curious Melancholy.

Wherefore there being that near alliance and mutual correspondence betwixt these two enormous distempers of the Mind, Atheism and Enthusiasm, I hold it very suitable and convenient, having treated of the former, to add this brief Discourse of the Nature, Causes, Kinds, and Cure of this latter Disease.

Sect. II.

What Inspiration is, and what Enthusiasm.

The Etymology and variety of the significations of this word Enthusiasm I leave to Criticks and Grammarians; but what we mean by it here, you shall fully understand after we have defined what Inspiration is: For Enthusiasm is nothing else but a misconception of being inspired. Now to be inspired is, to be moved in an extraordinary manner by the power or Spirit of God to act, speak, or think what is holy, just and true. From hence it will be easily understood what Enthusiasm is, viz. A full, but false, persuasion in a man that he is inspired.

Sect. III.

A search of the Causes of Enthusiasm in the Faculties of the Soul.

We shall now enquire into the Causes of this Distemper, how it comes to pass that a man should be thus befuddled in his own conceit. And truly unless we should offer less satisfaction then the thing is capable of, we must not onely treat here of Melancholy, but of the Faculties of the Soul of man, whereby it may the better be understood how she may become obnoxious to such disturbances of Melancholy, in which she has quite lost her own Judgement and freedome, and can neither keep out nor distinguish betwixt her own Fancies and real Truths.

Sect. IV.

The several Degrees and Natures of her Faculties.

We are therefore to take notice of the several Degrees and Natures of the Faculties of the Soul, the lowest whereof the exercises without so much as any Perception of what she does; and these Operations are
Sect. V.  A brief Discourse of Enthusiasm.

fattall and natural to her so long as she is in the Body; and a man differs in them little from a Plant, which, therefore, you may call the Vegetative or Plantal Faculties of the Soul.

The lowest of those Faculties of whose present operations we have any Perception, are the Outward Senses, which upon the pertingencie of the Object to the Sensitive Organ cannot fail to act, that is, the Soul cannot fail to be affected thereby, nor is it in her power to suspend her Perception, or at least very hardly in her power.

From whence it is plain that the Soul is of that nature, that the sometimes may awake fatally and necessarily into Phantasmes and Perceptions without any will or consent of her own.

Which is found true also in Imagination, though that Facultie be freer then the former. For what are Dreams but the Imaginations and Perceptions of one asleep? which notwithstanding steal upon the Soul, or rise out of her without any consent of hers; as is most manifest in such as torment us, and put us to extreme pain till we awake out of them.

And the like obreptions or unavoidable importunities of Thoughts, which offer or force themselves upon the Mind, may be observed even in the day-time, according to the nature or strength of the complexion of our Bodies; though how the Body doth engage the Mind in Thoughts or Imaginations, is most manifest in Sleep. For according as Choler, Sanguine, Phlegme, or Melancholy are predominant, will the Scene of our Dreams be, and that without any check or curb of dubitation concerning the truth and existence of the things that then appear.

Of which we can conceive no other reason then this, That the Inmost Seat of Sense is very fully and vigorously affected, as it is by Objects in the day, of whose real existence the ordinary assurance is, that they so strongly strike or affect our Sensitive Facultie, which refides not in the external Organs, no more then the Artificer's skill in his instruments, but in some more inward Receffes of the Brain: and therefore the true and real Seat of Sense being affected in our Sleep, as well as when we are awake, 'tis the leffe marvel the Soul conceits her dreams, while she is a dreaming, to be no dreams, but real Transactions.

Sect. V.

Why Dreams, till we awake, seem real Transactions.

Now that the Inward Sense is so vigorously affected in these Dreams proceeds, as I conceive, from hence: Because the Brains, Animal Spirits, or whatever the Soul works upon within in her Imaginative operations, are not considerably moved, altered or agitated from any external motion, but keep intirely and fully that figuration or modification which the Soul necessarily and naturally moulds them into in our Sleep: so that the opinion of the truth of what is represented to us in our Dreams is from hence, that Imagination then (that is, the inward figuration of our Brain or Spirits into this or that representation) is far stronger then any motion or agitation from without, which to them that are awake dimmes
dimmes and obscures their inward Imagination, as the light of the Sun doth the light of a Candle in a room; and yet in this case also according to Aristotle Phanfly is ἀναφαί τις ἀδηλή, a kind of sense, though weak.

But if it were so strong as to bear it self against all the occurrions and impulses of outward Objects, so as not to be broken, but to keep it self entire and in equal splendour and vigour with what is represented from without, and this not arbitrarily, but necessarily and unavoidably, as has been already intimated, the Party thus affected would not fail to take his own Imagination for a real Object of Sense: as it fell out in one that Car-tesius mentions, (and there are severall other Examples of that kind) that had his arm cut off, who being hoodwinkt, complained of a pain in this and the other finger, when he had lost his whole arm.

And a further Instance may be in mad or Melancholy men, who have confidently affirmed that they have met with the Devil, or converted with Angels, when it has been nothing but an encounter with their own fancie.

Sect. VI.

The enormous strength of Imagination the Cause of Enthusiasme.

Wherefore it is the enormous strength of imagination (which is yet the Soul’s weaknesse or unwieldiness, whereby she so farre finks into Phantasmes that she cannot recover her self into the use of her more free Faculties of Reason and Understanding) that thus peremptorily engages a man to believe a lie.

And if it be so strong as to assure us of the presence of some externall Object which yet is not there, why may it not be as effectual in the begetting of the belief of some more internall apprehensions, such as have been reported of mad and fanaticall men, who have so firmly and immutably fancied themselves to be God the Father, the Messiah, the Holy Ghost, the Angel Gabriel, the last and chiefest Prophet that God would fend into the world, and the like?

For their conceptions are not so pure or immateriall, nor solid or rational, but that these words to them are alwayes accompanied with some strong Phantasm or full Imagination; the fulnesse and clearnesse whereof, as in the case immediately before named, does naturally bear down the Soul into a belief of the truth and existance of what she thus vigorously apprehends: and being so wholly and entirely immered in this conceit, and so vehemently touched therewith, she has either not the patience to consider any thing allledged against it, or if she do consider and find her selfintangled, she will look upon it as a piece of humane sophistry, and prefer her own infallibility or the infallibility of the Spirit before all carnal reaonings whatsoever; as those whole Phanfies are fortified by long use and education in any absurd point of a falfe Religion, though wise enough in other things, will firmly hold the Conclusion, notwithstanding the clearest Demonstration to the contrary.

Now what Custom and Education doth by degrees, ditempered
Phansy may doe in a shorter time. But the case in both is much like that in Dreams, where that which is represented is necessarily taken for true, because nothing stronger enervates the perception. For as the ligation of the outward Organs of Sense keeps off such fluctuations or undulations of motion from without as might break or obscure these representations in sleep, so prejudice and confidence in a conceit, when a man is awake, keeps his fond imagination vigorous and entire from all the assaults of Reason that would cause any dubitation.

Nor is it any more wonder that his Intellectuals should be found in other things, though he be thus delirious in some one point, no more then that he that thinks he sees the devil in a wood, should not be at all mistaken in the circumstance of place, but see the very same path, flowers and grasse that another in his wits sees there as well as himself.

To be short therefore, The Originall of such peremptory delusions as mankind are obnoxious to, is the enormous strength and vigour of the Imagination; which Faculty though it be in some sort in our power, as Respiration is, yet it will also work without our leave, as I have already demonstrated: and hence men become mad and fanaticall whether they will or no.

Sect. VII.

Sundry natural and corporeal Causes that necessarily work on the Imagination.

Now what it is in us that thus captivates our Imagination, and carries it wide away out of the reach or hearing of that more free and superior Faculty of Reason, is hard particularly to define. But that there are sundry material things that do most certainly change our Mind or Phanfly, experience doth sufficiently witness.

For our Imagination alters as our Blood and Spirits are altered, (as I have above intimated and instanced in our Dreams) and indeed very small things will alter them even when we are awake; the mere change of Weather and various tempers of the Aire, a little reek or suffumigation, as in those seeds Pomponius Mela mentions, which the Thracians, who knew not the use of wine, wont at their feasts to cast into the fire, whereby they were intoxicated into as high a measure of mirth as they that drink more freely of the blood of the grape: The virtue of which is so great, that, as Josephus phrased it, it seems to create a new soul in him that drinks it. Ἐλκάπανίτι δὲ ραλκάπανέτας τις ἐν αὐταίς ἑκοιμέροις, It transforms and regenerates the Soul into a new nature.

But it doth most certainly bring a new Scene of Thoughts very ordinarily into their Minds that have occasion to meddle with it. Which made the Persians undertake no weighty matter nor strike up a bargain of any great consequence, but they would consider of it first both welnigh fuddled and sober. For if they liked it in all the representations that those two contrary Tempers exhibited to their Minds, they thought themselves...
selves well assured that they might proceed safely and successfully therein.

And yet *wine* doth not always so much change the thoughts and alter our temper as heighten it, insomuch that its effect proves some-time contrary only by reason of the diversity of persons; some being weeping drunk, others laughing, some kind, others raging; as it happens also in those that are stung with the *Tarantula*, *Alii perpetuum rident, aliis canunt, aliis plorant, &c.* as *Sennertus* observes out of *Mathiolius*

But that which they both seem most to admire is, That the Phaenise of the *Tarantulati* should be so mightily carried away with Mufick; for they do not only forget their pain, but dance incessantly. Of which *Epiphanius Ferdinandus* tells a very remarkable story of an old man ninety four yeares of age, that could scarce creep with a staffe, who yet being bit by the *Tarantula*, presently upon the hearing of Mufick leaped and skipped like a young kid.

A-kin to this is that kind of madness which they call *S. Vitus* his Dance, which disease *Sennertus* rightly affirms to proceed from a certain malignant humour gendred in the body of near cognition with this poison of the *Tarantula*; which will help us for the explicating of the causes of stranger workings on the Phaenise then has yet been mentioned; as for example, in the *λυκαρσίωπος*, *γάλεαρσίωπος*, and *κυναρσίωπος*, which are distempers of the Mind, whereby men imagine themselves to be *Wolves*, *Cats*, or *Dogs*.

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**Sect. VIII.**

*The power of Meats to change the Imagination.*

There are several relations in the forenamed *Author* concerning the power that *Nourishment* has to work upon *Imagination*, and to change a man’s disposition into the nature of that creature whose blood or milk doth nourish him.

A Wench at *Breslaw* being struck with an *Epilepsie* upon the seeing of a *Malefactor’s* head cut off by the *Executioner*, when several other remedies failed, was persuaded by some to drink the blood of a *Cat*; which being done, the wench not long after degenerates into the nature and property of that Animal, cries and jumps like a *Cat*, and hunts mice with like dexterity and watchfulness that they do, pursuing them as close as she could to their very holes. This Narration he transcribes out of *Weinrichius*.

And he has another short glance upon another in the same *Writer*, of one that being long fed with *Swine’s* blood, took a special pleasure in wallowing and tumbling himself in the mire: as also of another Girl who, being nourished up with *Goat’s* milk, would skip like a *Goat* and browse on trees as *Goats* use to doe.

We might add a fourth, of one who by eating the brains of a *Bear* became of a *Bear-like* disposition; but we will not insist upon smaller considerations.
Sect. IX.

Baptifla Porta his Potion to work upon the Phanfly.

Baptifla Porta drives on the matter much further, professing that he had acquaintance with one that could, when he pleased, so alter the imagination of a man, as he would make him fancy himself to be this or that Bird, Beast, or Fish; and that in this madness the party thus deluded would move his body, as near as it was capable, so as such Creatures use to doe; and if they were vocal, imitate also their voice.

This intoxicating Potion is made of the extract of certain herbs, as Solanum manicum, Mandrake, and others, together with the heart, brain, and some other parts of this or that Animal with whose image they would infect the Phanfly of the party. And he doth affirm of his own experience, that trying this feast upon some of his companions when he was young, one that had gormandized much beef, upon the taking the potion, strongly imagined himself to be surrounded with Bulls, that would be ever and anon running upon him with their horns.

Sect. X.

The power of Diseases upon the Phanfly.

What happens here in these cases where we can trace the Causes, sometimes falls out where we cannot so plainly and directly find out the reason. For Physicians take notice of such kind of Madmesses as make men confidently conceive themselves to be Dogs, Wolves, and Cats, when they have neither eaten the flesh nor drunk the blood of any Cat, Dog, or Wolf, nor taken any such artificial potion as we even now spake of to bring them into these diseases.

The causes of this cannot be better guessed at then has been by Senneretus in that of St. Vitus his dance. For as there the Body is conceived to be infected by some malignant humour near a-kin to the poison of the Tarantula; so in these distempers we may well conclude that such fumes or vapours arise into the Brain from some distempe in the Body (though the particular causes we do not understand) as have a very near analogie to the noxious humours or exhalations that move up and down and mount up into the Imagination of those that have drunk the blood of Cats, or have been nourished with the milk of those Animals above named, or taken such intoxicating potions as Baptifla Porta has described.
Sect. XI.

Of the power of Melancholy, and how it often sets on some one absurd conceit upon the Mind; the party in other things being sober.

We have given several Instances of that mighty power there is in natural causes to work upon and unavoidably to change our imagination. We will name something now more general, whose nature notwithstanding is so various and Vertumnus-like, that it will supply the place of almost all particulars, and that is Melancholy; of which Aristotle gives witness, that according to the several degrees and tempers thereof men vary wonderfully in their constitutions; it making some flow and fortis, others wild, ingenious and amorous, prone to wrath and lust, others it makes more eloquent and full of discourse, others it raises up even to madness and Enthusiasme: and he gives an example of one Marcus a Poet of Syracuse, who never verified so well as when he was in his distracted fits.

But it is most observable in Melancholy when it reaches to a disease, that it sets on some one particular absurd imagination upon the Mind so fast, that all the evidence of Reason to the contrary cannot remove it, the parties thus affected in other things being as sober and rational as other men. And this is so notorious and frequent, that Aretus, Sennertus and other Physicians define Melancholy from this very Effect of it.

Sect. XII.

Several Examples of the foregoing Observation.

Aristotle affords us no Examples of this kind; others do. Democritus junior, as he is pleased to style himself, recites several Stories out of Authours to this purpose. As out of Laurentius one concerning a French Poet, who usin in a fever Unguentum populem to anoint his temples to conciliate sleep, took such a conceit against the smell of that ointment, that for many yeares after he imagined every one that came near him to sent of it; and therefore would let no man talk with him but aloof off, nor would he wear any new clothes, because he fancied they smelt of that ointment: but in all other things he was wise and discreet, and would talk as sensibly as other men.

Another he has of a Gentleman of Limosin (out of Anthony Verduer) who was perswaded he had but one leg, affrighted into that conceit by having that part struck by a wild Boar, otherwise a man well in his wits.

A third he hath out of Platerus, concerning a Countryman of his, who by chance having fallen into a pit where Frogs and Frogs-spawn was, and having swallowed down a little of the water, was afterward so fully perswaded that there were young Frogs in his belly, that for many yeares following he could not rectifie his conceit. He betook himself to the study of
Sect. XIII. A brief Discourse of Enthusiasm.

of Phystick, for seven yeares together to find a cure for his disease: He travelled also in Italy, France and Germany, to confer with Physicians about it, and meeting with Platerus confulted him with the rest. He fancied the crying of his guts to be the croaking of the Frogs; and when Platerus would have deceived him by putting live Frogs into his excrements that he might think he had voided them and was cured, his skill in Phystick made that trick ineffectual. For saving this one vain conceit, the man was, as he reports, a learned and prudent man.

We will add one only a fourth out of Laurentius, which is of a Noble-man of his time, a man of reason and discretion in all other things, saving that he did conceive himselfe made of glasse: and though he loved to be visited by his friends, yet had a speciall care that they should not come too near him, for fear they should break him.

Not much unlike to this is that of a Baker of Ferrara, that thought he was compos'd of butter, and therefore would not sit in the Sun nor come near a fire, for fear he should be melted.

It would be an infinite task to set down all at large. Sennertus has given some hints of the variety of this distemper, remitting us to Schenckius, Marcell, Donatus, Forefsus and others for more full Narrations. Some, faith he, are vexed and tormented with the fear of death, as thinking they have committed some crime they never did commit; some fancy they are eternally damned, nay they complain that they are already tormented with hell-fire; others take themselves to be a dying, others imagine themselves quite dead, and therefore will not eat; others fear that the heavens will fall upon them, others dare not clinch their hands for fear of bruising the world betwixt their fists; some fancy themselves Cocks, some Nightingales, some one Animal, some another; some entertain conference with God or his Angels, others conceive themselves bewitched, or that a black man or Devil perpetually accompanies them; some complain of their poverty, others fancy themselves perphans of honour, Dukes, Princes, Kings, Popes, and what not. Much to this purpose may you see in Sennertus, and more in Democritus junior.

Sect. XIII.

A seasonable application of the foregoing Examples for the weakening of the authority of bold Enthusiasts.

That which is most observable & most useful for the present matter in hand is, That notwithstanding there is such an enormous lapse of the Phanfy and Judgement in some one thing, yet the party should be of a sound mind in all other, according to his natural capacities and abilities; which all Physicians acknowledge to be true, and are ready to make good by innumerable Examples. Which I conceive to be of great moment more thoroughly to consider.

I do not mean how it may come to passe (for that we have already declared) but what excellent use it may be of for to prevent that easie
and ordinary Sophisme which imposes upon many, who, if an Enthusia
speak eloquently, and it may be rationally and piously (you may be sure
zealously and fervently enough, and with the greatest confidence can be
imagined) are so credulous that, because of this visible dresse of such
laudable accomplishments, they will believe him even in that which is not
only not probable, but vain and foolish, may sometime very mischievous
and impious to believe; as, That the party is immediately and extraor-
dinarily inspired of God, That he is a special Messenger sent by him, the
last and best Prophet, the holy Ghost come in the flesh, and such like stuff as
this: which has been ever and anon set on foot in all ages by some En-
thusiasts or other.

Amongst whom I do not deny but there may be some who for the
main practical light of Christianity might have their judgments as con-
sistent, as those Melancholists above named had in the ordinary pruden-
tial affairs of the world: But as for this one particular of being super-
naturally inspired, of being the last Prophet, the last Trumpet, the Angel in
the midst of Heaven with the Eternall Gospel in his hand, the holy Ghost in-
corporated, God come to judgement, and the like, this certainly in them is
as true, but farre worfe, dotage, then to fancy a mans self either a Cock
or Bull, when it is plain to the senses of all that he is a Man.

Sect. XIV.

That the causality of Melancholy in this distemper of Enthusiasm is
more easily traced then in other Extravagancies.

But it being of so weighty a concernment, I shall not satisfie my self
in this more general account of Enthusiasm, that it may very well be
resolved into that property of Melancholy whereby men become to be de-
lirious in some one point, their judgement standing untouched in others.
For I shall easily further demonstrate that the very nature of Melancholy is
such, that it may more fairly and plausibly tempt a man into such conceits
of Inspiration and Supernatural light from God, then it can possibly do
into those more extravagant conceits of being Glasser, Butter, a Bird, a
Beast, or any such thing.

Sect. XV.

Melancholy a pertinacious and religious complexion.

For besides that which is most general of all, that Melancholy enclines
a man very strongly and peremptorily to either believe or misbelieve
a thing (as is plain in that passion of Suspicion and Jealousie, which upon
little or no occasion will winne so full assent of the Mind, that it will
engage a man to act as vigorously as if he were certain that his jealousies
were true) it is very well known that this Complexion is the most Reli-
gious
gious complexion that is, and will be as naturally tampering with Divine matters (though in no better light then that of her own) as Apes and Monkeys will be imitating the actions and manners of Men.

Neither is there any true spiritual Grace from God but this mere natural constitution, according to the several tempers and workings of it, will not only resemble, but sometimes seem to surpass, by reason of the fury and excess of it, and that not only in Actions, but very ordinarily in Eloquence and Expressions; as if here alone were to be had that lively sense and understanding of all holy things, or at least as if there were no other state to be parallel'd to it.

The event of which must be, if a very great measure of the true Grace of God does not intervene, that such a Melancholish as this must be very highly puffed up, and not only fancy himself inspired, but believe himself such a special piece of Light and Holiness that God has sent into the world, that he will take upon him to reform, or rather annul, the very Law and Religion he is born under, and make himself not at all inferior to either Moses or Christ, though he have neither any found Reason nor visible Miracle to extort belief.

SECT. XVI.

That men are prone to suspect some special presence of God or of a Supernatural power in whatever is Great or Vehement.

But this is still too general, we shall yet more particularly point out the Causes of this Imposture. Things that are great or vehement. People are subject to suspect they rise from some Supernatural cause; insomuch that the Wind cannot be more then ordinarily high, but they are prone to imagine the Devil raised it, nor any fore Plague or Difcover, but God in an extraordinary manner to be the Author of it.

So rude Antiquity conceiv'd a kind of Divinity in almost any thing that was extraordinarily great. Whence some have worshipped very tall Trees, others large Rivers, some a great Stone or Rock, others high and vast Mountains; whence the Greeks confound great and holy in that one word ἵππος, that signifies both; and the Hebrews by the Cedars of God, the mountains of God, the Spirit of God, and the like, understand high Cedars, great Mountains, and a mighty Spirit or Wind. We may add also what is more familiar, how old Women and Nurtures use to tell little Children when they ask concerning the Moon, pointing at it with their fingers, that it is God's Candle, because it is so great a Light in the night. All which are arguments or intimations, that man's nature is very prone to suspect some special presence of God in any thing that is great or vehement.

Whence it is a strong temptation with a Melancholish when he feels a storm of devotion or zeal come upon him like a mighty wind, his heart being full of affection, his head pregnant with clear and sensible representations, and his mouth flowing and streaming with fit and

T 3 powerful.
powerfull expressions, such as would astonish an ordinary Auditorie to hear, it is, I say, a shrewd temptation to him to think that it is the very Spirit of God that then moves supernaturally in him, whenas all that excess of zeal and affection and fluency of words is most palpably to be resolved into the power of Melancholy, which is a kind of natural inebriation.

And that there is nothing better then Nature in it, it is evident both from the experience of good and discreet men, who have found themselves strangely vary in their zeal, devotion and elocution, as Melancholy has been more or less predominant in them: and also from what all may observe in those that have been wicked, mad and blasphemous, and yet have surpassed in this mistaken gift of Prayer, as is notorious in Hacket, who was so befotted with a conceit of his own zeal and eloquence, that he fancied himself the Holy Ghost.

**SECT. XVII.**

*The mistake of heated Melancholy for holy Zeal and the Spirit of God.*

And when men talk so much of the Spirit, if they take notice what they ordinarily mean by it, it is nothing else but a strong and imperious motion whereby they are zealously and fervently carried in matters of Religion: so that Fervour, Zeal and Spirit, is in effect one. Now no Complexion is so hot as Melancholy when it is heated, being like boiling water, as Aristotle observes (Ἐὰν ἴκανος ὅρμαζα, ἀν τὸ ζευ, &c.) so that it transcends the flame of fire, or it is like heated stone or iron when they are red hot, for they are then more hot by far then a burning Coal. We shall omit here to play the Grammian, and to take notice how well Aristotle's τὸ ζευ, forthcoming the very word zeal of which we speak, but shall cast our eyes more carefully upon the things themselves, and parallel out of the same Philosopher what they call Spirit, to what he affirms to be contained in Melancholy. "Ο τὸ κυρός ἡ χεισοίν τῶν μελαίνων χώλης μοιματικας ἐστιν.

The Spirit then that wings the Enthusiast in such a wonderful manner, is nothing else but that Flatulency which is in the Melancholy complex, and rises out of the Hypochondriacal humour upon some occasional heat, as Winde out of an Ebolipila applied to the fire. Which fume mounting into the Head, being first actuated and spirited and somewhat refined by the warmth of the Heart, fills the Mind with variety of Imagination, and so quickens and enlarges Invention, that it makes the Enthusiast to admiration fluent and eloquent, he being as it were drunk with new wine drawn from that Cellar of his own that lies in the lowest region of his Body, though he be not aware of it, but takes it to be pure Nectar, and those waters of life that spring from above. Aristotle makes a long Parallelism between the nature and effects of Wine and Melancholy, to which both Fernelius and Sennertus do referre.
SECT. XVIII, XIX. A brief Discourse of Enthusiasm.

SECT. XVIII.

The Ebbs and Flowes of Melancholy a further Cause of Enthusiasm.

But this is not all the advantage that Melancholy affords towards Enthusiasme, thus unexpectedly and suddenly to surprise the Mind with such vehement fits of Zeal, such streams and torrents of Eloquence in either exhorting others to piety, or in devotions towards God; but it adds a greater weight of belief that there is something Supernatural in the business, in that the same Complexion discovers it self to them that lie under it in such contrary Effects.

For as it is thus vehemently hot, so it is as stupidly cold; whence the Melancholift becomes faithlesse, hopelesse, heartlesse, and almost witlesse. Which Ebbs of his Constitution must needs make the overflowing of it seem more miraculous and supernatural. But those cold and abject fits of his make him also very sensibly and winningly rhetorical, when he speaks of disconsolation, desertion, humility, mortification, and the like, as if he were truely and voluntarily carried through such things; whenas onely the fatal necessity of his Complexion has violently drag'd him through the mere shadows and refemblances of them.

But he finding himself afterwards beyond all hope or any sense or prelavage of any power in himself lifted aloft again, he does not doubt that any thing left was the cause of this unexpected joy; and triumph then the immediate arme of God from heaven that has thus exalted him; when it is nothing indeed but a Paroxysme of Melancholy, which is like the breaking out of a flame after a long smoaking and reeking of new rubbish laid upon the fire. But because such returns as these come not at set times, nor make men sick, but rather delight them, they think there is something divine therein, and that it is not from Natural causes.

SECT. XIX.

The notorious mockery of Melancholy in reference to Divine love.

There is also another notorious Mockery in this Complexion, Nature confidently avouching her self to be God, whom the Apostle calls Love, as if it were his very Essence; whereas indeed it is here nothing else but Melancholy that has put on the garments of an Angel of light.

There is nothing more true then that Love is the fulfilling of the Law, and the highest Perfection that is compatible to the Soul of man; and that this also is so plain and unavoidable, that a man may be in a very high degree mad, and yet not fail to attest unto it. Nay, I dare say, Melancholy itself would be his monitory to re-mind him of it, if there were any possibility that he should forget so manifest and palpable a Truth.

For the sense of Love at large is eminently comprehended in the temper of the Melancholift, Melancholy and Wine being of so near a nature
one to the other. Ἡμεῖς τὰς προσμετέχειας θεωρούμενοι, οὐτὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος τῆς ζύμης, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἐνθυσιασμῶν καθό, ἀλλά πρὸς τὴν ἀληθείαν. Αἰτία τοῦτος, διὸ, ἐκ τῆς ἁμαρτίας τῆς ἤπειρος, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς κακίας τῆς ὁμορραγίας. Αὐτὸς δὲ, τὸ πρὸς τὴν σοφίαν καὶ τὸν πεπραγμένον, οὐτὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος τῆς ζύμης, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἐνθυσιασμῶν καθό, ἀλλά πρὸς τὴν ἀληθείαν. Αἰτία τοῦτος, διὸ, ἐκ τῆς ἁμαρτίας τῆς ἤπειρος, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς κακίας τῆς ὁμορραγίας. 

**Sect. XX.**

That Melancholy partakes much of the Nature of Wine, and from what complexion Poets and Enthusiasts arise, and what the difference is betwixt them.

But now that Melancholy partakes much of the nature of Wine, he evinces from that it is spirits, and that it is spirits, from that it is humours: and that Melancholy is spirits or spirits, he appeals to the Physicians, οἱ τὰς προσμετέχειας παρὰ τὴν ἐνθυσιασμῶν μελαγχολίαν φαινὺν ἐκ τῶν ψυχικῶν κατηφορικῶν τιμῶν. Wherefore the Philosopher assigns another companion to Venus besides the plump youth Bacchus which the Poets bestow upon her, who, though more seemingly sad, yet will prove as faithful an attendant as that other, and this is Melancholy. Καὶ οἱ μελαγχολίκοι οἱ πλεῖστοι λάγνοι διονύσιος, ὁ τοῦ ἄφοστοιμος νυμφήμον. Now besides this Flatulence that solicits to lust, there may be such a due daff of Sanguine in the Melancholy, that the Complexion may prove stupendiously entralling. For that more sluggish Dulcor of the blood will be sometime so quickned and actuated by the fiercenesse and sharpnesse of the Melancholy humour (as the fulsomnesse of Sugar is by the acrimony of Limons) that it will afford farre more sensible pleasure; and all the imaginations of Love, of what kind soever, will be farre more lively and vigorous, more piercing and rapturous, then they can be in pure Sanguine itself.

From this Complexion are Poets, and the more highly-pretending Enthusiasts: Betwixt whom this is the great difference, That a Poet is an Enthusiast in jest, and an Enthusiast is a Poet in good earneft; Melancholy prevailing so much with him, that he takes his no better then Poetical fits and sigments for divine Inspiration and real Truth.
Sect. XXI.

A brief Discourse of Enthusiasm.

Sect. XXI.

That a certain Dofis of Sanguine mixt with Melancholy is the Spirit that usually inspires Enthusiasts, made good by a large Induction of Examples.

But that it is a mere natural flatulous and spiritous temper with a proportionable Dofis of Sanguine added to their Melancholy, not the pure Spirit of God, that thus inacts them, is plainly to be discovered not onely in their language, which is very sweet and melting, as if sugar-plums lay under their tongue, but from notorious circumstances of their lives. And in my apprehension it will be a sufficient pledge of this Truth, if we set before our eyes those that have the most highly pretended to the Spirit, and that have had the greatest power to delude the people.

For that that Pride and tumour of mind whereby they are so confidently carried out to profess, as well as to conceive, so highly of themselves, that no leff Title must serve their turns then that of God, the Holy Ghost or Paraclet, the Me'tius, the last and chiefest Prophet, the Judge of the quick and the dead, and the like, that all this comes from Melancholy is manifest by a lower kind of working of that Complexion.

For to begin with the first of these Impostours, Simon Magus, who gave out that he was God the Father, he prov'd himself to be but a wretched lecherous man by that inseparable companion of his, Helena, whom he called Selene, and affirmed to be one of the Divine powers, when she was no better then a lewd Strumpet.

There was also one Menander a Samaritan, that vaunted himself to be the Saviour of the world, a maintainer of the same licentious and impure opinions with Simon.

Montanus professed himself to be the Spirit of God; but that it was the Spirit of Melancholy that besotted him, his two Drabs, Prisca and Maximilla, evidently enough declare, who are said to leave their own husbands to follow him. We might adde a third, one Quintilla, a woman of no better fame, and an intimate acquaintance of the other two, from whence the Montanists were also called Quintillians.

Manes also held himself to be the true Paraclet, but left a Sect behind him indoctrinated in all licentious and filthy principles.

Mahomet, more successful then any, the last and chiefest Prophet that ever came into the world, (if you will believe him) that he was Melancholick his Epileptical fits are one argument; and his permission of plurality of wives and concubines, his lascivious descriptions of the joyes of Heaven or Paradise, another.

But I must confess I do much doubt whether he took himself to be a Prophet or no; for he seems to me rather a pleasant witty companion and shrewd Politician, then a mere Enthusiast; and so wise, as not to venture his credit or success upon mere conceits of his own, but he builds upon the weightiest principles of the Religion of Jews and Christians: such as, That God is the Creator and Governor of the world, That there are Angels
Angells and Spirits, That the Soul of man is Immortall, and That there is
a Judgement and an everlasting Reward to come after the natural death of
the Body. So that indeed Mahometism seems but an abuse of certain
Principles of the doctrine of Moses and Christ to a Political design, and
therefore in it fell far to be preferred before the vain and idle Enthusiasms of David George: who yet was so highly conceited of his own light,
that he hoped to put Mahomet's name out of joynt, giving out of himself
that he was the last and chiefest Prophet, whenas left to the intoxication
of his own Melancholy and Sanguine, he held neither Heaven nor Hell,
neither Reward nor Punishment after this life, neither Devil nor Angel, nor
the Immortality of the Soul; but though born a Christian, yet he did
Mahometize in this, that he also did indulge plurality of wives.

It should seem that so dark and fullsome a dash of Blood there was
mixed with his Melancholy, that though the one made him a pretended
Prophet, yet the other would not suffer him to entertain the least preface
of any thing beyond this mortal life.

He also that is said to insift in his footsteps, and talks so magnificently of
himself, as if he was come to judge both the quick and the dead, by an
injudicious distorting and forcing of such plain substantial passages of
Scripture as assure us of the Existence of Angels and Spirits and of a Life
to come, bears his condemnation in himself; and proclaims to all the
world that he is rather a Priest of Venus, or a mere Sydereal Preacher out
of the sweetness and powerfulness of his own natural Complexion, then a
true Prophet of God, or a friend of the mystical Bride-groom Christ Jesus;
to whose very person, as to her Lord and Sovereigne, the Church his
Spouse doth owe all reverential love and honour.

But such bloated and high-swollen Enthusiasms, that are so big in the
conceit of their own inward worth, have little either sense or belief of
this duty, but fancy themselves either equal or superior to Christ, whom
notwithstanding God has declared Supreme Head over Men and Angels.
And yet they would disthronc him, and set up themselves, though they
can shew no Title but an unfound kind of popular Eloquence, a Rhapso-
die of flight and loft words, rowling and streaming Tautologies, which
if they at any time bear any true sense with them, it is but what every or-
dinary Christian knew before; but what they oft insinuate by the bye,
is abominably false, as sure as Christianity it self is true.

Yet such fopperies as these seem fine things to the headless and pu-
sillanomous: but surely Christ will raise such a discerning spirit in his
Church, that by Evidence and conviction of Reason, not by Force or
external power, such Mock-prophets and false Mystasies as these will be
discountenanced and hissed off of the stage; nor will there be a man that
knows himself to be a Christian that will receive them.
S E C T. XXII, XXIII, XXIV. A brief Discourse of Enthusiasm.

S E C T. XXII.

More examples to the same purpose.

W E have, I think, by a sufficient induction discovered the Condition and Causes of this mysterious mockery of Enthusiastical Love in the highest workings of it, and shewn how it is but in effect a Natural Complexion, as very often Religious Zeal in general is discovered to be: As is also observable from the tumultuous Anabaptists in Germany, for amongst other things that they contended for, this was not the least, to wit, a freedom to have many Wives. So that it should seem that for the most part this Religious heat in men, as it arises merely from Nature, is like Aurum fulminans, which though it flye upward somewhat, the greatest force when it is fired is found to goe downward.

This made that religious Sect of the Begaundi conceit that it was a sin to kiss a woman, but none at all to lie with her. The same furnish'd Carpocrates and Apelles, two bifie Sectaries in their time, the one with his Marcellina, the other with his Philomena, to spend their lust upon.

S E C T. XXIII.

Of Enthusiastical Joy.

B UT enough of this. Nearest to this Enthusiastical affection of Love is that of Joy and Triumph of Spirit, that Enthusiasts are several times actuated withall to their own great admiration. But we have already intimated the near affinity betwixt Melancholy and Wine; which clears the heart of God and Man, as is said in the Parable. And assuredly Melancholy, that lies at first smearing in the Heart and Blood, when Heat has overcome it (it consisting of such solid particles, which then are put upon motion and agitation) is more strong and vigorous than any thing else that moves in the Blood and Spirits, and comes very near to the nature of the highest Cordialls that are. Which Aristotle also witneses, affecting that Melancholy while it is cold causes sadness and depondency of minde, but once heated, ἐναρέσκεται τὰ τοῖς ὑδάτινοι, Ecstasies and Raptures with triumphant joy and singing.

S E C T. XXIV.

Of the mystical Allegories of Enthusiasts.

T HERE are Three delusions yet behinde, which, because they come into my memory, I will not omit to speak of, viz. Mystical Interpretations of Scripture, Quakings, and Visions; all which are easily resolved into
A brief Discourse of Enthusiasm. S E C T. XXV.

into Effects of Melancholy. For as for the first, we have already shewn that Melancholy, as well as Wine, makes a man Rhetorical or Poetical, and that Genius how fanciful it is, and full of Allusions and Metaphors and fine resemblances, every one knows. And what greater matter is there in applying Moral and Spiritual meanings to the History of the Bible, than to the History of Nature? and there is no Rhetorician nor Poet but does that perpetually. Or how much easier is it to make a Story to set out a Moral meaning, than to apply a Moral sense to such Stories as are already a foot? And for the former, Aesop was old excellent at it without any suspicion of Inspiration; and the latter Sir Francis Bacon has admirably well performed in his Sapientia Veterum, without any such peculiar or extraordinary illapses of a divine Spirit into him, a business, I dare say, he never dreamt of, and any man that understands him will willingly be his Compurgator.

S E C T. XXV.

of Quaking, and of the Quakers.

AND for Quaking, which deluded souls take to be an infallible sign they are inacted by the Spirit of God, that it may be only an Effect of their Melancholy is apparent. For none have so high Passions as Melancholists, and that Fear, Love or Veneration in the height will cause great Trembling, cannot be denied; and to these Passions none are any thing nigh so obnoxious as thofe of the Melancholy Complexion, because of the deepness of their refentments and apprehensions.

That Fear causes Trembling there is nothing more obvious: and it is as true of Love, which the Comedian has judiciously noted in that passage where Phædria upon the fright of his Thais, speaking to Parmeno, Totius treme, faies he, horreoque postquam aspexi bane.

And for Veneration, which consists in a manner of these two mixt together, it is a Passion that Melancholy men are foundly plunged in whether they will or no; when they are to make their addresses to any person of honour or worth, or to goe about some solemn or weighty performance in publick, they will quake and tremble like an Aspin-leaf; some have been struck silent, others have fallen down to the ground.

And that Phantasy in other cases will work upon the Spirits, and cause a tumultuous and disorderly commotion in them, or so suffocate the Heart that motion will be in a manner quite extinct, & the party fall down dead, are things so familiarly known, that it is enough onely to mention them.

Wherefore it is no wonder, the Enthusiast fancying these natural Paroxymns with which he is surprized to be extraordinary Visits of the Deity, and Illapses of the holy Ghost into his Soul, which he cannot but then receive with the highest Veneration imaginable, it is no wonder, I say, that Fear and Joy and Love should make such a confusion in his Spirits, as to put him into a fit of trembling and quaking. In which case the Fervour of his Spirits and Heat of Imagination may be wrought up to
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to that pitch that it may amount to a perfect Epilepsie; as it often happens in that Sect they call Quakers, who undoubtedly are the most Melancholy Sect that ever was yet in the world.

Sect. XXVI.

That Melancholy disposes to Apoplexies and Epilepsies:

And that Melancholy it self disposes a man to Apoplexies and Epilepsies, is acknowledged both by Philosophers and Physicians. For what is Nacrotical and deads the motion of the Spirits, if it be highly such, proves also Apopleitical. Besides, grosse Vapours stopping the Arteria Carotides and Plexus Choroïdes, and so hindring the recourse and supply of Spirits, may doe the same. Some would illustrate the matter from the fumes of Char-coale, that has often made men fall down dead. But take any or all of these, Melancholy is as like to afford such noxious vapours as any other Temper whatsoever. And that an Epilepsie may arise from such like Causes, these two diseases being so near a-kin, as Galen writes, is very reasonable; and that the morbidick matter is ἐνυμέρωσε τις ἡδα ὁσπερ ἀυτε, as his Master Pelops expresses it, it is evident from the sudden and easy discussion of the fit.

Sect. XXVII.

Of the nature of Enthusiastic Revelations and Visions.

But in both these there being a ligation of the outward senses, whatever is then represented to the Mind is of the nature of a Dream. But these fits being not so ordinary as our naturall sleep, these Dreams the precipitant and unskillfull are forward to conceive to be Representations extraordinary and supernatural, which they call Revelations or Visions; of which there can be no certainty at all, no more then of a Dream.

Sect. XXVIII.

Of Ecstasy; the nature and causes thereof.

The mention of Dreams puts me in mind of another Melancholy Symptome, which Physicians call Ecstasy, which is nothing else but Somnus præter naturam profundus: the Causes whereof are none other then those of natural Sleep, but more intense and excessive; the Ecstasy is the deliration of the party after he awakes, for he takes his Dreams for true Histories and real Transactions.

The reason whereof, I conceive, is the extraordinary clearness and fulnes.
fulness of the representations in his sleep, arising from a more perfect privation of all communion with this outward world; and so there being no interferences or cros-strokes of motion from his body so deeply overwhelmed and bedeaded with sleep, what the imagination then puts forth of herself is as clear as broad day, and the perception of the Soul is at least as strong and vigorous as it is at any time in beholding things awake, and therefore memory as thoroughly sealed therewith as from the sense of any external object.

The vigour and clearness of these visions differs from those in ordinary sleep, as much as the liveliness of the images let in artificially into a dark room accurately darkened differs from those in one carelessly made dark, some chinks or crevices letting in light where they should not.

But strength of perception is not sure ground of truth: And such visions as these, let them be never so clear, yet they are still in the nature of dreams. And he that regardeth dreams, is like him that catcheth at a shadow, or followeth after the wind, as Sirachides speaks.

**Sect. XXIX.**

Whether it be in man's power to cast himself into an Enthusiastick Apoplexy, Epilepsie or Ecstasie.

Wether it be in any man's power to fall into these Epilepsies, Apoplexies, or Ecstasies when he pleases, is neither an uleleis nor a desperate question: For we may find a probable solution from what has been already intimated.

For the Enthusiastic in one of his Melancholy intoxications (which he may accelerate by solemn silence and intense and earnest meditation) finding himself therein so much beyond himself, may concept it a sensible presence of God, and a supernatural manifestation of the Divinity, which must needs raise that passion of Veneration and most powerful Devotion, which consists of Love, Fear and Joy: Which single Passions have been able to kill men or cast them into a trance. How can they then (if they be well followed by imagination and desire in the Enthusiasm of a nearer union with this inward Light) fail to cast him into tremblings, convulsions, Apoplexies, Ecstasies, and what not? Melancholy being so easily changeable into these Symptomes: And it is very probable that this may be the condition of some of those they call Quakers.

But for S. Anthonius's African Presbyter (who was named Restitutus) who by a lamenting voice or mournful tone would be cast into such an Ecstasie, he is found alone in that, and is hardly imitable, it arising from some proper and peculiar constitution of his own.

That Cardan and Facius his Father could cast themselves when they would into an Ecstasie, I can as easily believe as that the Laplanders could, and do in my own judgement refer them both to one cause, which Senertus notes that Cardan somewhere does intimate concerning his Father, that he had δαίμονα πάππορ, which I conceive also to be the case of the worser

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In his Institut. Medicin. lib. 2. part 3. sect 2. cap. 4. See also Bodin's Magor. Damon. lib. 2. cap. 5.
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wonder sort of Quakers. But this kind of Enthusiasm I do not so much aim at as that which is Natural.

As for those Visions that Enthufiasms see waking, we have already referred their Causes to that strength of Imagination in a Melancholy Spirit.

SECT. XXX.

Of Enthufiastic Prophecy.

And for that Fervour of mind whereby they are carried out so confidently to foretell things to come, that there is nothing Supernatural in it may be evidenced, in that either some probable grounds, that ordinary prudence may discover, might move them to think this or that, (the vehemency of their own Melancholy adding that confidence to their preface as if God himself had set it upon their Spirit;) or else in that they most frequently preface false, and therefore when they foretell true, it is justly imputed to chance. As a man that dreams a nights, it is a hard case if in so many years dreams he light not on some εὐδοξεῖας, as they are called, such as are plainly and directly true, προφητικὰς εὐθυγράμματα τολᾶμος, as they that shoot oft, may sometimes hit the mark, (as Plutarch speaks;) but ’tis more by luck then good skill.

SECT. XXXI.

Of the Prefage of a mans own heart from a Supernatural impulse sensible to himself, but unexplainable to others, where it may take place, and that it is not properly Enthufiasm.

And yet notwithstanding I humbly conceive, and I hope may doe so without any suspicion of the least tincture of Fanaticism, that there may be such a preface in the spirit of a man that is to act in things of very high concernment to * himself, and much more if to the publick, as may be a sure guide to him, especially if he continue constantly sincere, just and pious. For it is not at all improbable but such as can neither can they imagine the manner of it. And this is the case, I think, wherein that of Nsacides may be verified, That a mans own heart will tell him more then seven watchmen on an high Tower. But this is Enthusiasm in the better sense, and therefore not so proper for our Discourse, who speak not of that which is true, but of that which is a mistake: the Causes whereof we having so fully laid down, we will now consider the Kinds of it, but briefly and onely so far forth as suits with our present purpose and design.

V 2  Where-
A brief Discourse of Enthusiasm. S E C T. XXXII.

Wherefore setting aside all accuracie, we shall content our selves to distribute it, from the condition of the Persons in which it refides, into Political and Philosophical. For Enthusiasm most-what works according to the natural Genius of the party it doth surprize.

S E C T. XXXII.
Several Examples of Political Enthusiasm.

Wherefore those whose Temper carries them most to Political affairs, who love rule and honour, and have a strong sense of Civil rights, Melancholy heating them makes them sometimes fancy themselves great Princes (at least by divine assignment) and Deliverers of the people sent from God; such as were in likelihood the false Messiahs that deceived the people of the Jews, as Thudas and that Egyptian Impoflor, also Baruchab, Jonathas, Dofieus, and several others, who, it's likely, it being the common fame amongst the Jews that the Messiah the Deliverer was about that time to come, according to the heat and forwardness of their own Melancholy, conceited themselves to be him. Which is the easier to believe, there being several Instances in History of those that have fancied themselves Monarchs, Popes, and Emperours, whenas yet they have been but Foot-boys, Grooms, and Serving-men.

Whether there might not be as much of Villany as Melancholy in some of these false Messiahs, if it be suspected, it will be hard to take off the suspicion. But there was a German, in whom we may more safely instance, not many years agoe here in England. He styled himself a Warrior of God, David the second, and in deep compassion of the sufferings of his Country would very fain have got some few Forces here to carry over, with which he was confident he could have silenced the enemy, and settled all Germany in peace.

The man seemed to be a very religious man, and a great hater of Tyranny and oppriffion, and very well in his wits to other things; onely he was troubled with this infirmity, that he fancied himself that David the Prophets foretell of, who should be that peaceable Prince and great Deliverer of the Jews. He publifhed a short writing of his, which I had the opportunity of seeing, which was full of zeal and Scripture-eloquence: I saw his person in London, if he that shewed me him was not mistaken. He was a tall proper man, of a good age, but of a very pale countenance.

Another also of later years I had the hap to meet withall, whose discourse was not only rational, but pious, and he seemed to have his wits very well about him; nor could I discover the least intimation to the contrary, onely he had this flaw, that he conceived that he was by God appointed to be that fifth Monarch of which there is so much noise in this age, which imagination had so possessed him, that he would sometime have his servant to serve him all in plate and upon the knee, as a very learned and religious friend of mine told me afterward.
Sect. XXXIII. A brief Discourse of Enthusiasm.

Sect. XXXIII.

David George his prophecy of his rising again from the Dead, and after what manner it was fulfilled.

Herefore I do not look upon this man as so sober as the former, nor on either as comparable to that David that was born at Delph, lived first in lower Germany with those of his Sect, after came to Basil, Anno 1544, and there dyed 1556, and was dugged up again 1559. Wherein his prophecy of himself was in an ill-favoured manner fulfilled, who, to uphold the fluctuating minds of his followers, whom he would have persuaded that he was immortall, told them at his death, that he should rise again within three years, prefaging that of himself that he denied would ever come to passe in any one else.

Sect. XXXIV.

A description of the person, manners, and doctrine of David George.

This David George, a man of very low parentage, was yet, in the judgement of his very enemies, one of notable natural parts, a comely person to look upon, and of a gracefull presence. He was also square of body, yellow-bearded, gray-ey’d bright and shining, grave and sedate in speech; in a word, all his motions, gestures and demeanours were so decent and becoming, as if he had been wholly compos’d to honesty and godliness. He lived very splendidly and magnificently in his house, and yet without the least stir or disorder. He was a religious frequenter of the Church, a liberal reliever of the poor, a comfortable vitter of the sick, obedient to the Magistrate, kind and affable to all persons, discreet in all things, very cunning in some, as in his closeness and reservedness in his Doctrine to those of Basil, where he liv’d, to whom he communicated not one iota of it, but yet he sedulously dispersed it in the further parts of Germany both by Books and Letters; the main Heads whereof you shall hear as follows.

1. That the Doctrine hitherto delivered by Moses, the Prophets, Christ himself, and his Apostles, is maimed and imperfect, published onely to keep men in a childish obedience for a time, till the fulness and perfection of David George his Doctrine should be communicated to the world, which is the onely Doctrine that can make mankind happy, and replenish them with the knowledge of God.

2. That David George is the true Christ and Messiah, the dear Son of God, born not of the flesh, but of the holy Ghost and Spirit of Christ, which God had reserved in a secret place, his Body being reduced to nothing, and has infused it wholly into the Soul of David George.

3. That this David the Messiah is to restore the house of Israel, and re-erect the Tabernacle of God, not by the Cross, afflictions and death,
as the other Messiah; but by that sweetness and love and grace that is given to him of his Father.

4. That the power of remission of sins is given to this David George, and that it is he that is now come to judge the world with the last Judgement.

5. That the holy Scriptures, the Sayings and Testimonies of the Prophets, of Christ and of his Apostles, do all point, if rightly understood in the true mystery of them, to the glorious coming of David George, who is greater then Christ himself, as being born of the spirit, and not of the flesh.

6. That all sin and blasphemy against the Father or the Son may be remitted or pardoned; but the sin against the holy Ghost, that is, against David George, is never to be remitted.

7. That the resurrection of Christ out of the grave, and the resurrection of the dead, is a mere Mysterie or Allegorie.

8. That Angels and Devils are only Good men and Evil men, or their Vertues and Vices.

9. That Matrimony is free, no obligation, and that no man thereby is confined to one woman; but that procreation of children shall be promiscuous or in common to all those that are born again or regenerated by the spirit of David George.

These things are recorded in the Life and Doctrine of David George, published by the Rector and University of Basil 1559.

Sect. XXXV.

The evident Causes of that power of speech in David George.

As for his own Writings, not a little admired by some, his moving Eloquence, his powerfull animations to the great duties of Godliness, I have already laid down such natural Principles as they may be easily resolved into, without any recourse to any supernatural Spirit. For a man illiterate, as he was, but of good parts, by constant reading of the Bible will naturally contract a more winning and commanding Rhetorick then those that are learned; the intermixture of Tongues and of artificiall Phrases debasing their style, and making it found more after the manner of men, though ordinarily there may be more of God in it then in that of the Enthusiasst.

Sect. XXXVI.

An account of those seeming graces in David George.

If he may with some zeal and commotion of mind recommend to his Reader Patience, Peaceableness, Meekness, Brotherly-kindnesse, Equity, Difcretion, Prudence, Self denial, Mortification, and the like, there is nothing
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nothing in all this but what his own Sanguine temper may suggest without any inspiration from God.

For there is no Christian Virtue to be named which concerns manners, but Complexion will afford avarious imitation of it: and therefore they answering in so near similitude one to another, it will be an easy thing to colour over those mere Mock-graces with Scripture Phrases; so that he that has but these complexionall Virtues and a Scripturall style, amongst the leffe skillfull will look like an Apostle or Prophet, but amongst the rude Multitude he may boast himself to be what he will, without suspicion or contradiction.

The most unlikely of all these imitations is Self-denial, which seems abhorrent from a Sanguine temper: But Enthusiasm is not without a mixture of Melancholy, and we are speaking now of Enthusastic Sanguine, in which the fiercer Passions will also lodge; and therefore this Self-denial and Mortification may be nothing else but the Sanguine's conflict and victory over the most base and fierce Melancholy.

And that it is the Reign of Sanguine, not the Rule of the Spirit, is discoverable both from the complexion of the Head of this Sect, as also from the general disposition of his followers, and that tender love they bear to their own dear carcasses, who would not, I dare say, suffer the least aching of their little fingers by way of external Martyrdom for any Religion; and therefore their prudence and discretion consists most in juglings, equivocations, and flight turgidations, peaceable compliances with any thing rather then to suffer in body or goods: which is the natural dictate of Sanguine triumphant.

Which dominion yet seems far better then the Tyranny of Choler and Melancholy, whose pragmatical ferocity can neither prove good to itself nor just to others; being prone to impose, and as forward to avenge the refusal of every frivolous and impertinent foppety or abhorred falsitie, with inhumane and cruel perfections.

Sect. XXXVII.

That David George was a man of a Sanguine Complexion.

Now that Sanguine was the Complexion of David George, the foregoing description of his person will probably intimate to any Physiognomer. For it is very hard to find an healthy body very comely and beautiful, but the same proves more then ordinarily venereal and lustful. We might instance in several both men and women, Helena, Laos, Fanstina, Alembades, Isumel Sophi of Persia, and Demetrius, who is said to have been of an admirable countenance and majeSTick graceful presence, mingled with gravity and benignity, also exceeding full of clemency, justice, piety and liberality; but so libidinous and voluptuous, that no King was ever to be compared to him.
Sect. XXXVIII.

Further and more sure proofs that David George was of a Sanguine Temper.

But two surer signs are yet behind of this Prophet's natural Constitution, which are, His denying of a life to come and Existence of Angels or Spirits, and his allowing of plurality or community of Wives.

The former whereof I must confess I cannot so much impute to any thing as to a more luscious and fulsome mixture of Sanguine in his Enthusiastic complexion. For nothing will so flake a man's desires, or dead his belief of that more Spiritual and Immortal State and condition, as this sweet glut of Blood that so thickens and clouds the Spirits, that the Mind cannot imagine or prefigure any thing beyond the present concernment of this mortal Body.

And of the latter I think it is acknowledged by all, that no such genuine cause can be ascribed as this same complexion of Sanguine that disposes men so strongly to the love of women.

Sect. XXXIX.

That it was a dark fulsome Sanguine that hid the truth of the great Promises of the Gospel from his eyes.

WHerefore this Enthusiast being overborn by the power of his own constitution into the misbelief of those great Promises of Eternal life set forth in the Scripture, took the Holy Writers thereof either to be mistaken, or only to have intended Allegories by what they writ. And that Fervour that he found in himself to Love, and Peace, and Equity, and the like, boiling so high as to the driving of him into a perseveration that he was inspired, he conceived his misbelief of those precious Promises of Immortality and Glory in the heavens a special piece of Illumination also; and the Resurrection of the dead to be nothing else but to be raised into a like ardency towards such things with himself, and to a like misbelief with him of that celestial Crown the Apostle speaks of. And therefore he not being able to raise his mind by faith to heaven, he brought heaven to earth in his vain imagination:

Which was lefts pains then Mahomet took, who was fain to walk to the mountain, when he saw the mountain would not move to him.
Sect. XL.

A brief Discourse of Enthusiasm.

Sect. XL.

The exact likeness betwixt David George and the Father of the modern Nicolaitans, with the Author's cenfure of them both.

This is a brief account of David George, whose error the Father of our modern Nicolaitans did drink in so carefully, as if he were loath one drop should spill beside. Never was that in Solomon so plainly verified in any as in these two, As face answers to face, so the heart of man to man.

Wherefore concerning them both I dare pronounce, That though they equalized themselves to Chrift, and made themselves Judges of the quick and the dead, yet they were more devoid of true judgment in matters of Religion then the meanest of sincere Christians: And though they have so defiled or (as they phrase it) begadded themselves all over, I might say, bedaubed themselves with the feigned and counterfeit colours or paint of high dwelling words of vanity to amaze the vulgar; yet they were in truth mere men, of shallow mindes and liquorforme bodies, cleaving to the pleafures of the flesh, and so deeply relifhing the sweet of this present Life, that all hope or desire of that better was quite extinct in them; and therefore their settled and radicate ignorance made them so Enthusiastically confident in their own errour.

Sect. XLI.

A seasonable Advertisement in the behalf of them that are unawares taken with such Writers; as also a further confirmation that Enthusiastic madness may consist with sobriety in other matters.

But that my zeal to the Truth may not turn to the injury of any, I cannot pass by this Advertisement; That this poison we speak of is so subtilly conveyed and silently suppos'd in the reading these writings, that a good man and a true Christian may be easily carried away into an approbation of them without any infection by them (as not minding what they imply or drive at) or yet any defection from the main Principles of Christianity: and indeed by how much the heat seems greater toward the highest perfection of Holiness, the Reader is made the more secure of the Writer's soundness in the main Essentials of Religion, though it be far otherwise at the bottome.

For Madness and Melancholy drive high, and we have prov'd by divers Instances that a man may be most ridiculously and absurdly wild in some one thing, and yet found and discreet in the reft; as Gazens handomely sets it out in a story of an old man that conceited himself God the Father. And Acofa verifies it in a true history of his own knowledge concerning a certain learned and venerable Professor of Divinity in the Kingdom of Peru, whom he doth affirm to have been as perfectly in his sense, as to soundness
foundness of brain, as himself was at that time when he wrote the Narration; which being something long, I shall transcribe only what precisely makes to my purpose.

This Peruvian Doctor would sadly and soberly affirm that he should be a King, yea and a Pope too, the Apostolical See being translated to those parts; as also that holiness was granted unto him above all Angels and heavenly hosts, and above all Apostles; yea, that God made profer unto him of Hypostatical union, but that he refused to accept of it. Moreover that he was appointed to be Redeemer of the world as to matter of Efficacy, which Christ, he said, had been no further then to Sufficiency onely. That all Ecclesiastical estate was to be abrogated, and that he would make new Laws, plain and easy, by which the restraint of Clerks. men from Marriage should be taken away, and multitude of Wives allowed, and all necessity of Confession avoided. Which things he did maintain before the Judges of the Inquisition with that earnestness and confidence, with so many and so large citations out of the Prophets, Apocalypse, Psalms, and other books, with such unexpected Applications and Allegorical interpretations of them, that the Auditory knew not whether they should laugh more at his fancy, or admire his memory. But himself was so well affliured of the matter, that nothing but death could quit him of the delirium. For he dyed a Martyr to this piece of madness of his, to the eternal infamy of his Judges, who were either so unwise, as not to know that Melancholy may make a man delirious as to some one particular thing, though his Intellecials be found in others; or else so cruel and barbarous, as to murder a poor distracted man. The story you may read more at large in a late * Treatise concerning Enthusiasm.

What I have transplanted hither, is further to evidence the truth of what Physicians say of Melancholy, that it may onely befool the Understanding in one point, and leave it found in the rest; as also to confirm what I did above observe, that Enthusiasts for the most part are intoxicated with vapours from the lowest region of their Body, as the Pythia of old are conceived to have been inspired through the power of certain exhalations breathed from those caverns they had their recepts in. For what means this bold purpose of contriving a new law for plurality of Wives amongst Christians, but that his judgment was overclouded by some venereal fumes and vapours?

* Dr. Meric Casaubon's Treatise concerning Enthusiasm, chap. 3.

Sect. XLII.

Of Philosophical Enthusiasm.

That other kinde of Enthusiasm I propounded was Philosophical, because found in such as are of a more Speculative and Philosophical complexion. And Melancholy here making them prone to Religion and devotion, as well as to the curious Contemplation of things, these natural motions and affections towards God may drive them to a belief that
 Sect. XLIII, XLIV. A brief Discourse of Enthusiasm.

that he has a more than ordinary affection towards them, and that they have so special an affiance and guidance from him, nay such a mysterious, but intimate and real, union with him, that every fine thought or fancy that steals into their mind ought to be look’d upon by them as a pledge of the Divine favour, and a singular illumination from God himself.

Wherein they seem to me to imitate the madness of Elionora Meliorina, a Gentlewoman of Mantua, who being fully perswaded she was married to a King, would kneel down and talk with him, as if he had been there present with his retinue; and if she had by chance found a piece of glass in a muck-hill, light upon an oyster-shell, piece of tin or any such like thing that would glister in the Sun-shine, she would say it was a jewel sent from her Lord and husband, and upon this account fill’d her cabinet full of such trash.

In like manner these inspired Melancholists stuff their heads and writings with every flaring fancy that Melancholy suggetts to them, as if it were a precious Truth bestowed upon them by the holy Spirit; and with a devotional reverence they entertain the unexpected Paroxysms of their own natural distemper, as if it were the power and presence of God himself in their Souls.

Sect. XLIII.

Sundry Chymists and Theosophists obnoxious to this disease.

This disease many of your Chymists and several Theosophists, in my judgement, seem very obnoxious to, who dictate their own Conceits and Fancies so magisterially and imperiously, as if they were indeed Authentick meffengers from God Almighty. But that they are but Counterfeits, that is, Enthusiasts, no infallible illuminated men, the gross popgeries they let drop in their writings will sufficiently demonstrate to all that are not smitten in some measure with the like Lunacy with themselves. I shall instance in some few things, concealing the names of the Authors, because they are so sacred to some.

Sect. XLIV.

A promiscuous Collection of divers odde conceits out of several Theosophists and Chymists.

Often therefore attentively, for I shall relate very great mysteries. The virtues of the Planets do not ascend, but descend. Experience teaches as much, viz. That of Venus or Copper is not made Mars or Iron, but of Mars is made Venus, as being an inferior Sphere. So also Jupiter or Time is easily changed into Mercury or Quick-silver, because Jupiter is the second from the firmament, and Mercury the second from the Earth, Saturn
Saturn is the first from the Heaven, & Luna the first from the Earth. Sol mixeth it fell with all, but is never bettered by his Inferiours. Now know that there is a great agreement betwixt Saturn or Lead, and Luna or Silver, Jupiter and Mercury, Mars and Venus, because in the midst of these Sol is placed.

What can it be but the heaving of the Hypochondria that lifts up the Mind to such high comparisions from a supposition so false and foolish? But I have observed generally of Chymists and Theosophists, as of several other men more palpably mad, that their thoughts are carried much to Astrology, it being a fancifull study built upon very flight grounds, and indeed I do not question, but a relic of the ancient Superstition and Idolatry amongst the rude Heathens, which either their own Melancholy, or something worse, instructed them in.

There are other pretty conceits in the Writers concerning those heavenly Bodies: as, That the Starres and Planets, the Moon not excepted, are of the same quality with precious stones that glister here on the earth, and that though they act nothing, yet they are of that nature as that the wandring Spirits of the aire fee in them, as in a looking-glass, things to come, and thereby are inable to prophefy.

That the Stars are made of the Sun, and yet that the Sun enlightens them.

That our Eyes have their originall from the Stars, and that that is the reason why we can fee the Stars.

That our Eyes work or act upon all they see, as well as what they see acts on them. That also is a very speciall mystery for an inspired man to utter; That there is onely Evening and Morning under the Sun.

That the Stars kindle heat in this world every where for generation, and that the difference of Stars makes the difference of Creatures.

That were the heat of the Sun taken away, he were one light with God.

That all is Gods self.

That a mans self is God, if he live holy.

That God is nothing but an hearty Loving, friendly Seeing, good Smelling, well Tasting, kindly Feeling, amorous Kissing, &c. Nor the Spirit, say I, that inspires this mystery any thing but Melancholy and Sanguine.

That God the Father is of himself a dale of darknesse, were it not for the light of his Sonne.

That God could not quell Lucifer's rebellion, because the battel was not betwixt God and a Beast, or God and a man, but betwixt God and God, Lucifer being fo great a share of his own Essence.

That Nature is the Body of God, nay God the Father, who is also the World, and whatsoever is any way sensible or perceptible.

That the Star-powers are Nature, and the Star-circle the mother of all things, from which all is, subsists, and moves.

That the Waters of this world are mad, which makes them rave and run up and down so as they do in the channels of the Earth.

That the blew Orb is the waters above the Firmament.
That there be two kinds of Fires, the one cold and the other hot, and that Death is a cold fire.

That Adam was an Hermaphrodite.

The Fire would not burn, nor there have been any darkness, but for Adam's fall.

That it is a very suspicable matter that Saturn before the fall was where Mercury, and Mercury where Saturn is.

That there are Three Souls in a man, Animal, Angelical, and Divine; and that after Death the Animal Soul is in the grave, the Angelical in Abraham's bosome, and the Divine Soul in Paradise.

That God has eyes, ears, nose, and other corporeal parts.

That every thing has Sense, Imagination, and a fiducial Knowledge of God in it, Metals, Meteors and Plants not excepted.

That this Earth at last shall be calcined into Crystall.

That at the Center of the Earth is the Fire of Hell, which is caused and kindled by the Primam mobile and influences of the Stars.

That the Arctic pole draws waters by the Axle-tree, which after they are entered in, break forth again by the Axle-tree of the Antarctic.

That the Moon, as well as the Stars, is made of a lefse pure kind of Fire mixed with Aire.

That the pure Blood in man answers to the Element of Fire in the great world, his Heart to the Earth, his Mouth to the Arctic pole, and the opposite Orifice to the Antarctic pole.

That the proper feat of the Mind or Understanding is in the mouth of the Stomack or about the Splene.

That Earthquakes and Thunders are not from natural causes, but made by Angels or Devils.

That there were no Rain-bows before Noah's flood.

That the Moon is of a conglaciated substance, having a cold light of her own, whereby the light of the Sun which she receives and cafts on us becomes so cool.

Sect. XLV.

A particular Collection out of Paracelsus.

Hitherto our Collections have been promiscuous, what follows is out of Paracelsus only; as for example:

That the variety of the Altitudes of the Sun does not cause Summer and Winter, because the Sun has the same heat, be he higher or lower; but that there be Estival and Hibernall Stars that are the grand causes of these seafons.

That the abscence of the Sun is not the cause of Night, forasmuch as his light is so great that it may illuminate the Earth all over at once as clear as broad day; but that Night is brought on by the influence of dark Stars that ray out darkness and obscurity upon the Earth, as the Sun does light.
That the Gnomi, Nymphes, Lemures and Penates, Spirits endued with Understanding as much or more than Men, are yet wholly mortal, not having so much as an immortal Soul in them.

That the Stars are as it were the Phials, or Cucurbits, in which the Meteorical Sal, Sulphur and Mercury are contained; and that the Winds which are made of these, by the Ethereal Vulcanes, are blown forth out of these Eunuchstories, as when a man blows or breaths out of his mouth.

That the Stars are as it were the Pots in which the Archeus or heavenly Vulcan prepares pluvious matter, which exhaled from thence first appears in the form of clouds, after condenes to rain.

That Hail and Snow are also the fruits of the Stars, proceeding from them as flowers and blossomes from herds or trees.

That Thunder is caused by the Penates, who taking Ethereal Sulphur, Sal-nitre and Mercury, and putting them into their Aludel, that is their Star, after a sufficient preparation there, the Star then pours them forth into the Aire; and so they become the matter of Thunder, whose sound is so great and terrible, because it is re-echoed from the arched roof of Heaven, as when a Gun is let off under an hollow vault.

That the Lightnings without Thunder are as it were the deciduous flowers of the Ethereal Stars.

That the stars eat and are nourished, and therefore must ease themselves; and that those falling Stars, as some call them, which are found on the earth in the form of a trembling gelly, are their excrement.

That those Meteors called Dracones volantes have a brutish understanding and sense in them.

That the Parelus and Parafelena are made by the Penates as by Artificers, that counterfeit the form and shape of a silver Pot in adulterate metal.

That all Humane and natural understanding is in the Stars, and conveyed from thence to man, and that he must suck it from thence to feed his Soul, as he takes in meat to nourish his Body.

That the reason of Divination is this, That a man has a sydereall body besides this terrestrial which is joined with the Stars; and so when this sydereall body is more free from the Elements, as in sleep, this body and the Stars confabulating together, the Mind is informed of things to come.

That the Stars are struck with a terror or horror of the approach of any man's death, whence it is that no man dies without some sign or notice from them, as the dances of dead men, some noise in the house, or the like.

That as by a Divine faith the dead are raised and mountains cast into the midst of the Sea; so by the faith of Nature the influence of the Stars, who know all the secrets of Nature, is to be commanded, and thereby a man may know naturally what is to come.

That Giants, Nymphs, Gnomi and Pygmies were the conceptions and births of the Imaginative power of the influence of the Stars upon Matter prepared by them, and that they had no Souls; as it is most likely the Inhabitants of the more remote parts of the world have none, as not being the offspring of Adam.
That a Fowler by the help of his Star need not go after Birds, for they will fly after him; and so Fishes swim to the Fisherman, and wilde Beasts follow the Hunter upon the same account of his Stars.

That the separation of the three parts of the world, Europe, Asia, Africa, is a certain representation of the three Chymical principles, Sal, Sulphure and Mercury, of which three the whole World was made.

That there is an artificial way of making an Homunculus, and that the Fairies of the woods, Nymphs and Giants themselves had some such original, and that these Homunculi thus made will know all manner of secrets and mysteries of art, themselves receiving their lives, bodies, flesh, bone, and blood from an artificial principle.

That Paracellus has given occasion to the wildest Philosophick Enthusiasms that ever were yet on foot.

These are the rampant and delirous Fancies of that great boaster of Europe Paracelsus, whose unbridled Imagination and bold and confident obstruction of his uncouth and lufpine inventions upon the world has, I dare say, given occasion to the wildest Philosophical Enthusiasms that ever were broached by any either Christian or Heathen. That last conceit of his some have endeavoured to Allegorize, as the Persians do the Alcoran, ashamed of the grosse sense of it, but in my apprehension so rigidly and unfuturably, that it would confirm a man the more, that the letter is the intended truth; and if one compare it with what he writes of Nymphs, Giants and Fairies in his Scientia Astronomica, he will make no further doubt of it.

That Paracellus his Philosophy, though himself intended it not, is one of the safest sanctuaries for the Atheist, and the very prop of ancient Paganism.

Here is some affectation of Religion, I confess, in his Writings, and farre more in his Followers, who conceive themselves taught of God; when I plainly discern, their Brains are merely heated and infected by this strong spirit of Phantasfrie that breaths in Paracelsus his Books.

I know it is no part of Prudence to speak slightly of those that others admire; but that Prudence is but Craft that commands an unfaithfull silence. And I know not how any honest man can discharge his conscience in prudentially conniving at such falsities as he sees infine the Minds of men, while they do not onely abuse their Intellecuals by foppith and ridiculous conceptions, but insinuate such dangerous and
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mischievous Opinions as fupplant and destroy the very Fundamentals of Christian Religion.

For I appeal to any man, What is nearer to ancient Paganism then what this bold writer has uttered concerning the Stars & or what Sanctuary so safe for the Atheist that derides and eludes all Religion, as such a miraculous Influence of the Heavens as Paracelsus describes in his Scientia Astronomica? Wherefore I should be very much amazed at the Madmen and Inconsistency of him and his followers, who have ever and anon a fling against Heathen Philosophy, when themselves take into their writings the very dregs of it, viz. the grosse Principles of the ancient Pagan Superstition and Idolatry, did I not remember that they are Enthusiasts, and follow not the guidance of Reason, but the strength of Phanzy.

Jupiter est quodcumque vides, &c.

This taken in the courtfeft fenfe, I make no question but it was the grand Principle from whence did flow so many Varieties and Impurities of the Pagan Superstition, they fancying they met God in every object of their fenfes; and our exorbitant Enthusiasts professing, That every thing is God, in love or wrath: Which, if I understand any thing, is no better then Atheism. For it implies that God is nothing else but the Universal Matter of the World, dressed up in several shapes and forms, in sundry properties and qualities; some grateful, some ungrateful; some holy, some profane; some wise, some senseless; some weak, some strong, and the like. But to flie God into so many parts is to wound him and kill him, and to make no God at all.

S e c t. XLVIII.

How the Paracelsian Philosophy justifies the Heathens worshipping of the Starres, derogates from the authority of the Miracles of our Saviour, makes the Gospel ineffectual for the establishing of the belief of a God and a particular Providence, and gratifies that professed Atheist Vaninus in what be most of all triumphs in, as serving his turn the best to elude all Religion whatsoever.

Again, how does Paracelsus justifie the Heathen’s worshipping the Stars, he making them such knowing, powerfull, and compassionate spectatours of humane affairs! And why might they not pray to them as Anne Bodenham the Witch did to the Planet Jupiter for the curing diseases, if they have so much power and knowledge as to generate men here below, and conferre’ gifts upon them? For it would be no more then asking a mans Father or Godfather blessing. For if it be admitted that any one Nation is begot by the Starres, the Atheist will assuredly assume that they are all so.

Moreover how shall we repair the losse and damage done to the Authority of our blessed Saviour his Miracles: whereby not onely Christianity, but the first Fundamentals of all true Religion are eminently established, viz. The discovery of a Speciall and Particular Providence of God, and
and an hope of a Life to come. For if the Stars can make such living creatures of prepared Matter that have sense and understanding, which yet have no immortal Souls, but wholly return into dead Matter again, why is it not so with men as well as them? And if they can contribute the power of such wonder-working wisdom as was in Moses and in Christ, or what is so very nigh to it; what footsteps do there remain of proof that there is any God or Spirits? for all is thus resolvable into the power of the Stars. A thing that that zealous and inditrious Atheist Cæsar Vaninus triumphs in exceedingly, in his Amphitheatrum sterner Providentiae, where he cites several Astrological passages out of Cardan, under pretence to refute them, in which he fetches the Original of those three eminent Law-givers, Moses, Christ, and Mahomet, from the influence of the Stars.

The Law of Moses is from Saturn, saies Cardan, that of Christ from Jupiter and Mercury, that of Mahomet from Sol and Mars; the Law of the Idolaters from the Moon and Mars.

And in another place Cardan imputes that sweetnefs, and meeknesse, and wisdom, and eloquence that was in our Saviour, whereby he was able to dispute in the Temple at twelve years of age, to the influence of Jupiter.

Pomponatus also acknowledges the wisdom and miracles of Christ, but refers all to the Stars; a man as far laps'd into Atheism, I conceive, as Vaninus himself: So that these wilde Fancies of the Enthusiasts are in truth the chief Props or Shelters that Atheists uphold or defend themselves by. * But how fancieful and confounded an account there is of Astrology, let any man that has patience, as well as sobriety of reason, judge.

Sect. XLIX.

That Paracelsus and his followers are neither Atheistical nor Diabolicall; and what makes the Chymift ordinarily so pitifull a Philofopher.

I do not speak these things as if I thought either Paracelsus or his followers thus Atheistical, but to shew their Panflastic & Enthusiasticall, they so hotly pretending to matters of Christianity and Religion, and yet handling them so grossly and indifferently, blustering out any garish foolery that comes into their mind, though it be quite contrary to the Analogie of Faith, nor has any shew of ground in solid Reason, only to make themselves to be stared upon and wondered at by the world.

But the Event of it is, that as some admire them, so others execrate them, as men of an impious and diabolical Spirit. Which I confess I think too harsh a censure, well-meaning men being lyable to Melancholy and Lunacies as well as to Agues and burning Feavers. Yet a man should be so far off from thinking the better of any discovery of Truth by an Enthusiasticall Spirit, that he should rather for that very cause suspect it, because that Temper that makes men Enthusiasticall is the greatest enemy.
to Reason, it being more thick and muddy, and therefore once heated intoxicates them like Wine in the mufle, and is more likely to fill their Brains full of odde fancies, then with any true notions of Philosophy.

But men of a purer blood and finer spirits are not so obnoxious to this distemper: For this is the most natural feat of sublimer Reason; whereas that more Mechanical kind of Genius that loves to be tumbling of and trying tricks with the Matter (which they call making Experiments) when desire of knowledge has so heated it that it takes upon it to become Architectonic and flye above its sphere, it commits the wildeft hallucinations imaginable, that material or corporeal fancie egregiously fumbling in more subtile and spiritual speculations.

This is that that commonly makes the Chymift so pitifull a Philofopher, who from the narrow inspection of some few toys in his own art, conceiveth himselfe able to give a reason of all things in Divinity and Nature; as ridiculous a project, in my judgment, as that of his, that finding a piece of a broken Oak on the fand, buffed his brains above all measure to contrive it into an entire Ship.

Sect. L.

The Writer of this Discourse no foe to either Theofophift or Chymift, onely he excuses himself from being over-credulous in regard of either.

WHAT I have hitherto spoken I would have so underflood, as coming from one that neither contemns the well-meaning of the Theofophift, nor difallows the induftry of the Chymift, but I shall ever excufe my felf from giving any credit to either, any further then fome lufty Miracle, transcendent Medicine, or folid Reason shall extort from me.

Sect. LI.

The Cure of Enthusiasm by Temperance, Humility, and Reason.

WE have spoken of the Kinds of Enthusiasm so far as we held it serviceable for our design, we shall now touch upon the Cure of this Disease. Where having all pretence to the knowledge of Physick or acquaintance with the Apothecaries shop, we shall set down only such things as fall under a Moral or Theological consideration, giving onely instructions for the guidance of a mans life in reference to this grand error of Enthusiasm: which a sober man cannot well determine whether it be more ridiculous, or deplorable and mischievous.

Now the moft sovereign Medicine that I know against it is this Diatton, or Composition of Three excellent Ingredients, to wit, Temperance, Humility, and Reason; which as I do not despair but that it may recover those that are somewhat farre gone in this Enthusiastick distem-
Sect. LII, LIII. A brief Discourse of Enthusiasm.

per, so I am confident that it will not fail to prevent it in them that are not as yet considerably smitten.

Sect. LII.

What is meant by Temperance.

By Temperance I understand a measurable Abstinence from all hot or heightning meats or drinks, as also from all venereous pleasures and tactual delights of the Body, from all softness and effeminacy; a constant and peremptory adhesion to the perfectest degree of Chastity in the single life, and of Continency in wedlock, that can be attain'd to. For it is plain in sundry examples of Enthusiasm above named, that the more hidden and lurking fumes of Luft had tainted the Phanfies of those Pretenders to Prophecy and Inspiration.

We will add also to thefe, moderate exercise of Body, and reasonable taking of the fresh aire, and due and discreet use of Devotion, whereby the Blood is ventilated and purged from dark oppressing vapors; which a temperate diet, if not fasting, must also accompany: or else the more hot and zealous our addressees are, the more likely they are to bring mifchief upon our own heads, they raising the feculency of our intemperance into those more precious parts of the Body, the Brains and Animal Spirits, and so intoxicating the Mind with fury and wildness.

Sect. LIII.

What is meant by Humility, and the great advantage thereof for Wisdom and Knowledge.

By Humility I understand an entire Submission to the will of God in all things, a Deadness to all self-excellency and preeminency before others, a perfect Privation of all desire of singularity or attracting of the eyes of men upon a mans own person, as little to relish a mans own praise or glory in the world as if he had never been born into it; but to be wholly contented with this one thing, that his Will is a subduing to the Will of God, and that with thankfulness and reverence he doth receive whatever Divine Providence brings upon him, be it sweet or sour, with the hair or against it, it is all one to him, for what he cannot avoid, it is the gift of God to the world in order to a greater good.

But here I must confess, that he that is thus affected, as he seeks no knowledge to please himself, so he cannot avoid being the most knowing man that is. For he is surrounded with the beams of Divine Wisdom, as the low depressed Earth with the rays of the Stars; his deeply and profoundly humbled Soul being as it were the Centre of all heavenly illuminations, as this little globe of the Earth is of those celestial influences. I profess I stand amazed while I consider the ineffable advantages
of a Mind thus submitted to the Divine Will, how calm, how compre-
henfive, how quick and sensible she is, how free, how sagacious, of how
tender a touch and judgment she is in all things. Whences Pride and
strong desire ruffles the Mind into uneven waves and boisterous fluc-
tuations, that the eternal light of Reason concerning either Nature or Life
cannot imprint its perfect and distinct image or character there; nor can
so subtle and delicate motions and impressions be sensible to the Under-
standing disturbed and agitated in so violent a storm.

That man therefore who has got this Humble frame of Spirit, which is
of so mighty concernment for acquiring all manner of Wisdom, as well
Natural as Divine, cannot possibly be so foolish as to be mistaken in that
which is the genuine result of a contrary temper; and such is that of
Enthusiasm, that puffis up men into an opinion that they have a more
then ordinary influence from God that acts upon their Spirits, and that
he designes them by special appointment to be new Prophets, new Law-
givers, new Davids, new Messiahs, and what not? when it is nothing
but the working of the Old man in them in a fanatical manner.

Sect. LIV.

What meant by Reason, and what the danger of leaving that Guide; as also
the mistake of them that expect the Spirit should not suggest such things
as are rational.

By Reason I understand so settled and cautious a Composure of Mind
as will suspect every high-flooted & forward Fancy that endeavours to
carry away the affent before deliberate examination; she not enduring to
be gull'd by the vigour or garishness of the representation, nor at all to be
born down by the weight or strength of it, but patiently to trie it by
the known Faculties of the Soul, which are either the Common notions
that all men in their wits agree upon, or the Evidence of outward Sense,
or else a clear and distinct Deduction from these.

Whatever is not agreeable to these three, is Fancy, which testifies
nothing of the Truth or Existence of any thing, and therefore ought not,
nor cannot be assented to by any but mad men or fools.

And those that talk so loud of that higher Principle, The Spirit, with
exclusion of these, betray their own ignorance; and while they would
by their wilde Rhetorick diffwade men from the use of their Rational
faculties under pretence of expectation of an higher and more glorious
Light, do as madly, in my mind, as if, a company of men travelling by
night with links, torches and lanthorns, some furious Orator amongst
them should by his wonderful strains of Eloquence so befool them into a
misconceit of their present condition, comparing of it with the sweet and
chearful splendor of the day, as thereby to caufe them, through impa-
tience and indignation, to beat out their links and torches, and break
a-pieces their lanthorns against the ground, and fo chufe rather to foot it
in the dark with hazard of knocking their noses against the next Tree
they
they meet, and tumbling into the next ditch, then to continue the use of those convenient lights that they had in their sober temper prepared for the safety of their journey.

But the Enthusiast's mistake is not only in leaving his present Guide before he has a better, but in having a false notion of him he does expect. For assuredly that Spirit of illumination which resides in the Souls of the faithful, is a Principle of the purest Reason that is communicable to the humane Nature. And what this Spirit has, he has from Christ (as Christ himself witnessed) who is the Eternal λόγος, the all-comprehending Wisdome and Reason of God, wherein he sees through the Natures and Ideas of all things, with all their respects of Dependency and Independence, Congruity and Incongruity, or whatever Habitude they have one to another, with one continued glance at once.

Whatever of Intellectual light is communicated to us, is derived from hence, and is in us Particular Reason, or Reason in Succession, or by piece-meal. Nor is there any thing the holy Spirit did ever suggest to any man but it was agreeable to, if not demonstrable from, what we call Reason. And to be thus persuaded, how powerful a Curb it will be upon the exorbitant impressions and motions of Melancholy and Enthusiasm, I leave it to any man to judge.

**Sect. LV.**

Further Helps against Enthusiasm.

To these three notable and more general Helps, we might add some particular Considerations whereby we may keep off this Enthusiastic pertinacity from our selves, or discover it when it has taken hold upon others. As for example; If any man shall pretend to the discovery of a Truth by Inspiration, that is of no good use or consequence to the Church of God, it is, to me little less then a Demonstration that he is Fanatical. If he heaps up Falshoods as well as Truths, and pretends to be inspired in all, it is to me an Evidence he is inspired in none of those Mysteries he offers to the world.

**Sect. LVI.**

Of the raised language of Enthusiasms, and of what may ordinarily fall from them.

There are certain advantages also that Enthusiasms have, which are to be taken notice of, whereby they have imposed upon many; as, That they have spoken very raisedly and divinely, which most certainly has happened to many persons a little before they have grown stark mad; and that they may hit of something extraordinary is no pledge of the truth of the rest.

For
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For this unquiet and tumultuous spirit of Melancholy shaking their whole bodily frame, is like an Earthquake to one in a dungeon, which for a small moment makes the very walls gape and cleave, and lets in light for a while at those chinks; but all closes up again suddenly, and the prisoner is confined to his wonted darknese. This therefore was a Chance in Nature, not a gracious visit of the Spirit of God.

Sect. LVII.

Of Enthusiastic Prophecy that ordinarily happens to fools and mad-men, and the reason why; as also why Eschatical men foresee things to come, and of the uncertainty of such Predictions.

Hereunto you may also joyn the luck of Prophecy, be it sleeping or waking; for such things have happened to mad-men and fools, and Aristotle offers at a pretty reason that may reach both. Ἡ γὰρ σκέψεως ἡ προφητείας ἀπὸ τῶν τινῶν ἑρωτικῶν, ἀλλὰ δεσπότης ἡ ἀλήθεια ἢ μηδὲν πεπνευμένος ἢ μηδὲν γνωστὸν τοι ἡμῖν ἀνδρός. To which he also addes why Eschatical men foresee future things, ὦτι αἱ ἔνδοξα μυστήρια ἐν θυρήματι, ἀλλ' ἀπόφθεγμα (οὐ), καὶ εἰρήνην διὸν μαλακαὶ αἰσθήματα. All which intimates thus much, That an alienation of mind, and rest from our own motions, fits us for a reception of impressions from something else, and so by a quick sense and touch we may be advertised through a communication of motion from the Spirit of the world what is done at a distance; or what Causes are conspiring to bring this or that to passe, which turning off again make the Prediction false: For every thing that offers to be, does not come into actual being. Wherefore all these Pre-fages are not ōμοθετία, but may be onely ἱστορία. Ἡ γὰρ ἡ ὑπὸς ἱστορία, οἱ δὲ σέλας they are the words of Aristotle, but such as some skilfull Platonist will most easily explain.

All that I aim at is this, That Prophecy may arise from on this side of the pure and infallible Deity, and it is our mistake that we think that what Predictions fall out true, are certainly foreknown by the Foreteller. For the present conspiracy of Causes that shoot into the vacant mind may corrupt and alter, and be blown away like clouds, that at first seem to assure the husbandman of a following rain.

Sect. LVIII.

That if an Enthusiast should cure some diseases by touching or stroaking the party diseased, yet it might be no true Miracle.

But there is yet a stronger allurement then Prophecy to draw on belief to the Enthusiast, which is a semblance of doing some Miracle, as the curing some desperate disease; as it hapned very lately in this Nation. For it is very credibly reported, and I think cannot be denied, That one by the stroaking of a mans arm that was dead and useless to him,
Sect. LIX.  A brief Discourse of Enthusiasm.

him, recovered it to life and strength. When I heard of it, and read some few pages of that miraculous Physician's writing, my judgment was, that the cure was natural, but that his Blood and Spirits were boiled to that height, that it would hazard his Brain: which proved true, for he was stark mad not very long after.

There may be very well a Sanative and healing Contagion as well as morbid and venemous. And the Spirits of Melancholy men being more mally and ponderous, when they are so highly refined and actuated by a more than ordinary heat and vigour of the Body, may prove a very powerfull Elixir, Nature having outrdone the usual pretences of Chemifery in this case.

Sect. LIX.

Of the Willingness and Patience to suffer in Enthusiasts.

Their Willingness also to suffer or Patience in suffering may seem to give an extraordinary Testimony to some Enthusiasts, as if there were something Divine or Supernatural in them. But admiration will abate, if we consider how passionately some abhor from the Sense of Pleasure, accounting it the Sumnnum malum, the greatest evil. For which Paradox Antipheines is noted in "Aulus Gellius, as also for his suitable Motto, Marsus μελάνηθρον καθαρίστατο, as if downright Madness were more tolerable then it. Others there are, who according to mere Complexion love to conflict with troubles and dangers: such as tho' are who undergoe Warfires and Sea-voyages with a natural delight. Others make it their study, and pride themselves in it, to become insensible of pain, or to bear it as if they were not at all affected by it; insomuch that the Condition has passed into a term of Art amongst the Stoicks, who call this power 'Ἀνάφας and 'Ἀνάλγονα.

But this is nothing but a Spartan observation of Mind back'd with the sense of shame, a desire of glory, or the contentment of being conscious to themselves of their own Sountness and tolerance. Of which a notorious Instance is that of the Lacedemonian Lad, who having concealed a Fox under his coat, would not cry out though he was a gnawing of his very entrails.

Anaxarchus his pain though it seems not so sharp, yet his courage appears as great; in that he could Philofophize so freely, while he was by the cruelty of Archelaus braying in a mortar; whence he cried out in the midst of their thumpings upon him, Πίπος, Πίπος 'Ανάφας, Πίπος Πίπος, Πίπος 'Ανάλγος' adding therein wit to his philo- sophy, and comparing his Body to the Sack, but making his Soul as good as absent, and the Sack empty, by her profess'd insensiblenes of the strokes and unconcernedness in what befell the Body: Which yet notwithstanding, setting aside his natural surmise of the Soul's Immortality, was nothing but fallen and inconsiderate Stoicism; for his Body had then more reason to fear their blows then his Soul, the alone being capable of

Nonnus in his Syagog. His- tor upon Greg. Nazianzen's Inveffiques against Julian the Apostle.
of sense and pain. So that the special support of his Mind was but an in-
veterate error and fancy.

How Wrath and Indignation will also hold up the Spirits against Fear
and Pain, is seen in that brief Instance of Theano, who being forcibly
urged to betray the secrets of her Country, bit out her tongue and spat
it at the face of the Tyrant. These are Examples evident enough of that
affected and nor altogether unattainable power of Indolency amongst the
Heathen.

What to call that which *Gellius reports of a certain Gladiator of
Cæsar's, who would laugh when his wounds were a drying and cleansing,
I know not: for it seems more then a simple Aræaturia or Indolentia.
But out of these Examples and Considerations it is manifest, That there
is no such divinity or supernatural holiness in the floutly and perempto-
riily bearing of pain, nor any necessity of a Divine assistance therein.
Either simple Resolution of mind upon some imbibed Dogma, or the power
of some concealed Passion, may enable them to bear up against all.

And yet these are but small things in comparison of what the En-
thusiasm is armed with upon the account of his peculiar condition. For be-
fides that his very Complexion makes him stiff, inflexible and unyielding,
(for there is no Temper so sturdy and peremptory as Melancholy is, even
in cases more dispensable) there is yet a further force added thereto
from the strong conceit he has of being inspired, and consequently of
his Cause being infallibly good: For this tends naturally to the making
of him invincible in his Sufferings, he being conscious to himself both
of the firm goodness of his Cause, as he conceives, and of the indispen-
sable nesses of his duty in adhering thereto. To which you may add the
certain expectation of future glory and happiness for his Martyrdom.
So plain it is that there is nothing supernatural or miraculous in the case.

* N. Ant. ii. 11. c. 5.

SEC. LX.

That the resolved Sufferings for mistaken points in Religion is no good
argument against the truth of all Religion.

I Must confess that an ordinary reflexion upon this resolvedness of suf-
fering to the utmost extremity in persons that are thus mistaken in
the points they suffer for, cannot but make such as are Atheistical
inclined subject to think That there is no Truth nor Certainty at all in
Religion; since that where men seem to themselves so certain, that they
dare and do actually pawn their lives upon it, yet they are so grossly
misktayed. And it is plain they are so, in that persons of contrary per-
swations suffer with the like confidence and to the like extremity, chufing
rather to leave their lives then their Opinions and Party. Which is
found true both in Jews, Mahometans, Papists and Protestants.

This indeed at first sight bears no small shew of Reason; but if more
nearly lookt into, will prove but a weak and sorry Sophism. For if this
Ratiocination were solid, it would follow That there were nothing true
in
in Philosophy neither. For assuredly men are as firmly persuaded contrary ways in the same points there, as they are in Religion; and there can be but one part true. But that they are not so persuaded of the matter that they will die for it: is not because they do not as firmly believe their Opinions in Philosophy, but because there is no obligation of Conscience and an Eternal Interest founded in them as there is in Religion. Otherwise if it were a conscientious point of Religion to be a Copernican, Tychonist, or Aristotelian, in reference to the Systeme of the World, I think there is no question to be made but there would be Martyrs for them all, at least, for two of them, the one being so exquisitely consonant to Reason, the other so grossly accommodated to Sense.

Besides, I cannot but note, That it is very low and unphilosophical in these Atheistical Writers, to make their Appeal concerning these noble Theoremes of the Existence of God and the Truth of Religion to so petty a Court of Judicature as mere Humane Testimony. For such in their arguing do they make the Sufferings of Martyrs in opposite Religions, and fancy their laying down of their lives but as the laying of great wagers. Which Topick some have Sarcastically called the Argument of Fools.

But whatever force Humane Testimony hath in these Cases, it is so farre from serving the Atheist's turn, that it makes against him. For admit that these Anti-Martyrs (as I may so call them) give witness singly one against another, yet they jointly give witness against the Atheist, sealing it with their blood, That there is a God, and a Life to come. Which I take not to be only the Effect of Education, but of a natural Sagacity in the better sort of men, and a proneness in them to think so: which being further strengthened by the Institutes of Religion, especially so clear and convicive as Christianity, may very well get the power of engaging a mans Conscience to lay down his life even for such things as mere Education has impressed upon him, or some Melancholy conceit. But the firme bottome and support of all, and that without which they would not suffer for any thing, is the sincere and unshaken belief That there is a God, and an Happiness to be expected after this Life. Whereupon the Conscience being scrupulous, and not daring to act or assent to such things as it may be the onely strongly suspects to be evil or false, chuses the safer way for her main interest, namely, rather to suffer then to sin.

So that it is not so much the firm belief of these things they suffer for (suppose either Papist or Protestant) as the care of doing nothing that they suspect is sinfull, which makes them undergo Martyrdom.

Whence the very ground of the Atheist's Paralogism is also found invalid. Nor is it plain from their suffering that they are so firm and determinate in the points they suffer for that are false. But admit the Enthusiasm be, Fanaticism is but a disease of Religion, and implies no more that there is no Religion, then Madness that there is no Reason, or any Corporeal Disease that there is no such thing as Health or an humane Body in the world.
**Sect. LXI.**

Of the remote Notions, mysterious Style, and moving Eloquence of Enthusiasts.

W
ever credit the Enthusiast may conciliate to himself from his moving Eloquence, his mysterious style and unexpected notions, they are easily to be resolved into that Principle of Melancholy above named, the fentence of which Complexion is so deep and vigorous, that it cannot fail to inable the Tongue to tell her story with a great deal of life and affection; and the Imagination is so extravagant, that it is farre easier for her to ramble abroad and fetch in some odd skue conceit from a remote obscure corner, then to think of what is nearer and more ordinarily intelligible. But these things are so fully and plainly comprehended in those Generall Causes of Enthusiasm we have already declared, besides what we have particularly touched upon before, that it will not be worth our labour to insist any longer upon them. When we have satisfied a Scruple or two concerning what we have said of Melancholy and Enthusiasm, I think we shall have omitted nothing materially pertinent to this present Speculation.

**Sect. LXII.**

How we shall distinguish betwixt pure Religion and Complexion.

A
nd the first is, How we can distinguish betwixt Religion and Melancholy, we having attributed so notable Effects thereunto. The second is, Whether we have not reviled and vilified all Enthusiasm whatsoever, and invited men to a cold Pharisaical stupidity and acting, merely according to an outward letter without an inward testimony of life.

The meaning of the first Scruple must be restrain'd to such things as in their externals are laudable and approveable, viz. whether such as they be out of a Divine or Natural principle, whether from God or Complexion. For in those things that are at their very first view discerned to be culpable, it is plain that they are not from God.

I answer therefore, That there are three main discriminations betwixt the Spirit and the most Specious Complexion. The first is, That that Pity or Goodness which is from the Spirit of God is universal, extirpating every vice, and omitting nothing that is truly a divine vertue.

The second is, A belief of those Holy Oracles comprehended in the Old and New Testament, they being rightly interpreted; and particularly of that Article, That Jesus Christ, even he that died on the Cross at Jerusalem between two thieves, is the Son of God, and Soveraign of men and Angels, and that he in his own person shall come again to judge the quick and the dead.

The
Sect. LXIII. A brief Discourse of Enthusiasm.

The third and last is, An universal Prudence, whereby a man neither admits nor acts any thing but what is solidly rational at the bottom, and of which he can give a good account, let the succeffe be what it will. He that finds himself thus affected, may be sure it is the Spirit of God, not the power of Complexion or Nature that rules in him. But this man to others, if they be unbelieving, and for rude and unprepared as not to be capable of Reason, he is nothing to them, unlefe he can doe a Miracle. How vain then is the Enthusiast that is destitute of both? But those ancient Records of Miracles done in the behalf of Christianness are a sufficient Testimony of the Truth of our Religion to those whose hearts are rightly fitted for it.

Sect. LXIII.

That the devotional Enthusiasm of Holy and Sincere souls has not at all been taxed in all this Discourse.

To the Second scruple I answer, That there has not one word all this time been spoken against that true and warrantable Enthusiasm of devout and holy Souls, who are so strangely transported in that vehement Love they bear towards God, and that unexpressible Joy and Peace they find in him. For they are modest enough and sober in all this, they witnessing no other thing to the world then what others may experience in themselves, and what is plainly set down in the holy Scriptures, That the Kingdom of God is Righteousness and Peace and Joy in the Holy Ghost.

But in none of these things do they pretend to equalize themselves to Christ, whom God has exalted above men and Angels, but do profess the efficacy of his Spirit in them to the praise and glory of God, and the comfort and encouragement of their drooping Neighbour. But what is above this, without evident Reason or a Miracle, is most justly deemed to proceed from no Supernatural assistance, but from some Hypochondriacall distemper.

And what I have said in behalf of Christians, is in its measure due to those diviner sort of Philosophers, such as Plato and Plotinus, whom you shall finde, upon the more then ordinary sensible visits of the divine Love and Beauty descending into their enravished Souls, profess themselves no less moved then what the sense of such expressions as these will beare, ἀνακριβεῖσθαι ἡ λεπτομέρεια, ἔκειναν ἔξηγεν, ἐνθύμησιν or ἐνθυμομένην. To such Enthusiasm as this, which is but the triumph of the Soul of man inebriated, as it were, with the delicious sense of the divine life, that bleffed Root and Original of all holy wisdom and vertue, I must declare my self as much a friend, as I am to the vulgar fanatical Enthusiasm a professed enemy. And eternal shame stop his mouth that will dare to deny but that the fervent love of God and of the pulchritude of vertue, will afford the spirit of man more joy and triumph then ever was tasted in any lustfull pleasure, which the pen of unclean Witts do so highly magnify both in Verfe and Profe.

Y 2 Sect.
That the Fewell of Devotion even in warrantable and sincere Enthusiasm is usually Melancholy.

Moreover for these Rapturous and Enthusiasticall affections even in them that are truly good and pious, it cannot be denied but that the fewell of them is usually natural or contracted Melancholy; which any man may perceive that is Religious, unless his Soul and Body be blended together, and there be a confusion of all; as it is in mistaken Enthusiasms, that impute that to God which is proper to Nature.

But Melancholy usually disposes, and the Mind perfects the action through the power of the Spirit. And a wise and holy man knows how to make use of his opportunity, according to that Monition of the Apostle, If a man be sad, let him pray; if cheerfull, let him sing Psalms.

That there is a peculiar advantage in Melancholy for Divine Speculations, with a prevention of the Atheist's objection thereupon.

But there is also a peculiar advantage in Melancholy for Divine Speculations: And yet the Mysteries that result from thence are no more to be suspected of proving mere Fancies, because they may occasionally spring from such a Constitution, then Mathematical Truths are, who owe their birth to a Mathematical Complexion; which is as truly a Complexion as the Religious Complexion is, and yet no sober man will deny the truth of her Theorems. And as it would be a fond and improper thing to affirm that such a Complexion teaches a man Mathematicks, so it would also be to affirm that Melancholy is the onely mother of Religion.

How it comes to passe that men are so nimble and dexterous in finding the truth of some things, and so slow and heavy in other some; and that the dulness of the Atheist's perception in Divine matters is no argument against the truth of Religion.

But most certain it is, and Observation will make it good, That the Souls of men while they are in these mortall Bodies are as so many Prisoners immured in severall prisons, with their single loop-holes looking into severall quarters, and therefore are able to pronounce no further than their proper prospect will give them leave. So the severall Complexions of mens Bodies dispouse or invite them to an easie and happy discovery.
discovery of some things, when yet notwithstanding if you confer with them concerning other some, that lie not within their prospect or the limits of their natural Genius, they will be enforced either to acknowledge their ignorance, or if they will take upon them to judge (which is the more frequent) they will abundantly discover their error and mistake.

Which sometimes seems so gross and invincible, that a man may justly suspect that they want not only the patience, but even the power of contemplating of some Objects, as being not able to frame any conception of what they are required to think of: And such are the duller sort of Atheists, that rank the notion of a Spirit, and consequent of a God, in the list of Inconsistencies and ridiculous Non-sense. Wherein though they seek to reproach Religion, they seem to me mainly to shame themselves; their Atheism being very easy to be parallel'd with Enthusiasm in this regard. For as some Enthusiasts being found plainly mad in some one thing, have approved themselves sober enough in the rest: so these Atheists, though they shew a tolerable wit and acuteness in other matters, yet approve themselves sufficiently slow and heavy in this.

S E C T. L X V I I.

That the Enthusiast, though he be necessarily assaulted by his own Complexion, yet not irresistibly, and that therefore the guilt of his extravagancies lies at his own door.

I Have now with what brevity I intended run through the Nature, Causes, Kinds, and Cure of Enthusiasm, and looking considerately back on the Stage I have gone, fancy all my steps perfect, unless in that part that concerns the Causes of this Distemper, whose enumeration may seem defective, in that I have omitted the activity of the Devil, and the wilful wickedness of the Mind of man, but resolved all into Complexion, or present temper, or rather distemper, of the body arising from natural causes that necessarily act thereupon. Whence men may judge my Discourse as well an excuse for, as a Discovery of, this Dileafe of Enthusiasm.

But I answer, That though these causes do act necessarily upon the body, and the body necessarily upon the Mind, yet they do not act irresistibly, unless a man have brought himself to such a weakness by his own fault, as he that by his intemperance has cast himself into a Fever, who then fatally becomes subject to the laws thereof. And though the Devil of himself may do much, yet he can do no more then God permits, who will suffer no man to be tempted above what he can bear, provided he be sincere and faithful, and give not himself to fanaticke fits, either from Pride, or for some sinister projects in the world. For to such as these Enthusiasm may prove Balneum diaboli, as is vulgarly said of Melancholy; whereas, on the contrary, it may be the ladder of Regeneration to them that unfeignedly love and fear God, and endeavour to be simple
A brief Discourse of Enthusiasm.  Sect. LXVII.

simple and true of heart in all things. So plainly unexcusable are those that have so notoriously miscarried in this fanatick Distemper.

And further touching the Defectuouneness in my Enumeration of the Causes of Enthusiasm, in that I omitted the Agency of the Devil, I answer, that his Causality is more vagrant, more lax and general then to be brought in here, where my aim was to indigitate the more proper and constant causes of that Disease. I might addde also less philosophical for this present search, which was onely into the natural principles of the said Distemper. And for that of the vitiofity of mans will, it is evidently supposed in my prescription of the Cure of Enthusiasm, the neglect whereof is plainly a mans own fault. For it is his own fault that he is not temperate, humble, and attentive to Reason: without recourse to which indispenfable vertues he can never be freed from that foulnefs and uncleannes of his Astral Spirit (which is the inmoft lodge and Harbour of all imposturous fancyes and Enthusiastick dreams) nor can ever arrive to that secure state of the Soul,where the importunities of deceitfull Imagination are alwaies declined and eluded by the safe Guidance and Conduct of the Intellectual Powers.

See Mystery of Godliness, Book 6, ch.13, sect. 7.
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HE N.
HENRICI MORI

EPISTOLAE QUATUOR

AD

RENATUM DES-CARTES:

CUM

Responsis Clarissimi Philosophi ad duas Priores, cumque aliiis aliquot Epistolis, quarum Occasiones, Argumenta, Ordinem versa pagina tibi demonstrabit.

Aristot.

Τοῖς ὑποτάτοις βουλομένῳ σφέγγα ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκείνης καλῶς.

LONDINI,

Typis F. Fleber, & venales profant apud G. Morden Bibliopolam Cantabrigiensem. MDCCLXII.
Continentur in hac parte,

1. Epistola Claudii Clerelii ad H. Morum, quâ veniam ab eo petit publicandi literas ejus ad Cartesium.

2. Responsorium H. Mori.

3. Epistola prima H. Mori ad R. Des-Cartes, ubi precipuè agitur de Natura Corporis & Vacui, de Mundi extensione, deque senfu Brutorum.

4. Responsorium R. Cartesii.

5. Epistola secunda H. Mori ad R. Cartesium, ubi Responfa ad priores Objecliones novis, ut plurimum, Instantiis diluit, variâsque proponit Questiones de Mundi extensione, de natura Motus, de particulis stiriatis, de Anime unione cum Corpore, ipsius; in corpus imperio, de conversione globulorum ætherorum in elementum primum, de flexibilitate particularum acquarum, & de Materie denique ætheramia.

6. Responsorium Cartesii ad dietas Instantias & Questiones.

7. H. Mori Epistola tertia ad R. Cartesium, quâ quæ haœtëns disputata sunt breviter recognoscit, dein varia è Principis Philosopbia nunc probanda nunc explicantia proponit.

8. Henrici Mori Epistola quarta ad R. Cartesium, quæ varia itidem tum è Dioptrice tum è Meteoris proponit aut probanda aut elucidanda.


10. Responsorium H. Mori ad diænum Fragmentum.

11. Epistolâ H. Mori ad V. C. quæ Apologistam compleîtitur pro Cartesio, quæque IntroducMionis loco esse poterit ad universam Philosophiam Cartesianam.

Clarissimo
Epistola Claudii Clerfeli ad H. Morum.

57

Clarísimo Viro

HENRICO MORO.

LEGII vir eximie, & perlegi summa cum voluptate tuas ad D. Cartesium difficultates, quas ei tertio Idus Decembris 1648, tertio nonas Martii, 10, Calendas Augusti, & duodecimo Calendas Novembris 1649, proposuisti; miratusque sum ingenium tuum, & summan humanitatem, quæ fretus aures fum hac ad te confiderer refcribere, ut de ipsis quæ facere instituio te certiorem faciam, & à te impetrem ea quæ mihi necessaria sunt, ut opus quod suscepì ad finem perducam. Scies igitur me habere præ manibus præcipuæ Autographa quæ inomparabiles Philosophos D. Cartesius, D. Chanuto, olim apud Sereniissimam Sueciam Regiam, nunc verò apud Batavos legarum meritiissimo, affini meo, apud quem Suecia vivit functus est, relicuit: Inter quæ funt & illa literarum quas pluribus ex amicos suis refcrípsit ex quibus praecipuæ colliago, quæ vel Philosophiam suam tangunt, vel ea quæ perfiçienda susceperat refpcictunt, vel difficultates à plerisque summis viris, inter quos non minimum tenes locum, ipsi præpositoris solvunt, ut eam omnes publici juris faciam, quod fpero me brevi peracturum. Sed quia literæ illæ quæ difficulitates respondent vix possent intelligi, nifi etiam ea quæ occasionem ipsi dederunt tale quid respondendi simul in lucem edantur, nec tamen mihi honestum visum fuerit hoc exequi abique venia & licentia eorum qui ipsi refcrípsum, à quibusdam petiti, & implorati, ut illud mihi concederent, quod etiam fpero à te, pro summa tua humanitate & incredibili erga Cartesium studio, mihi concessum iri. Sed praeterea cuperem ut mihi exemplaria mitteres eam omnium quas à D. Cartesio accepisti eipfolarum: duas enim tum præ manibus habeo, quarum prior respondet tuis tertio Idus Decembris datis; altera, ipsis quæ tertio nonas Martii scriptæ sunt. Supereft igitur tertia, quæ mihi defceft, quæque tuis 10, Calendas Augusti & 12. Calendas Novembris datis satisfacere debet: quæ propefto non potest non esse pulcherrima, & continere plura scito dignissima, cum tot tuis tantissimè difficulitatis & quæfitionibus, cum ex principiis Philosophiæ tum ex Dioptrice excerptis, respondere debat, cujus ramen duas lentaxat paginas inveni; quæ tandem inquantos tuis satisfacere tentant, nec ullum verbum ad quæsta tua super Principii & Dioptrice continent. Quare summopere exopto & enixe præcor, ut & mihi licentiam concedas literas tuas simul cum responsis imprimiendi, & ut simul ad me mittas quadras habes à D. Cartesio; ut & posteritatis utilitatis, & Amici nostri famæ ac memoriae consulamus, Præter hac aetem literarum Autographa, plura adhuc habeo celeberri mi Viri praecella monumenta, quæ finguila tuo tempore lucem videbunt, & quam non parum jucunditatis puto tibifore allatura, utpote qui in evolvendis Cartesianis scriptis tam impiger videris. Si mihi vernaculâ lingue uti licuisse, aptius acque ornitius fententiam meam explicuissem: sed
nè in varios errores inciderem, styllum contræxi, &c., ut potui, non ut volui, mentem mean tibi aperuī; quod rogo ut mihi condones, & scias me tuae semper humanitatis & sapientiæ laudatorem & cultorem fore.

Parīsii 12. Dec. 1654. CLAUDIUS CLERSELIER.

Responsor

HENRICI MORI.

Iterae tuæ, Vir Clarissime, datæ Lutetiae Parisiorum pridie Idus Decembris, anno 1654, non pervenerunt ad manus meas ante decimum septimum Calendarum Maii. Miror tantum temporis interfluxisse, Granthamæ tunc agebam in agro Lincolniensi. Rus enim concederam cùm alius de causis tum ad conferandam valetudinem. Vehementer equidem gaudebam postquam intelliæ præclarum tum institutum edendi omniam Cartesii scriptæ quæ apud te sunt, quo non solum nobilibissimi Philosophi famæ ac memoriae, verum etiam communi omnium literatorum utilitati optimè consules. In neminem enim aptius quadrar, quàm in divinum illum virum, Horatianum illud,

—Quæ nil molitur inepté.

Quam ob causam si ego tibi à consiliis efferem, nihil quicquam eorum supermmeret quæ vel ille tentavit ullo modo in rebus Philosophicis, vel feliciter ad exitum perduxit; sed lucem viderent omnia, in majus Reipub. Literarum commodum. Ac proinde, ut nullum impedimentum effeceram ut illi ac generóso proposito, vel utro tibi concederem copiam edendi primas meas secundasque litteras ad Cartesium conscriptas; quippe quod absque eis, ut rectè mones, responsa ejus tam commode intelligi non posserent: nec multum abs re fore difficerent, si tertias meas simul edideris, quæ per eas responsum fit alterius illius Cartesians. Sed cùm quarèae meæ nullis illius literis respondant, nec illis ab ipso responsum fit quicquam, utpote inopinatæ morte præreptæ, de ipsis aliquantûm habito an publici juris facerem, Caeterum omnem scrupulum eximieret, si quis ex amicis ipsius aut familiaribus, qui frequenter eum invicerent, & collocuti sunt, vel cum eo vixerunt conjuxissent, respondendi vices suppuleræ; tunc enim parum dubito quin operæ esset pretium illæ etiam in lucem dare. Quod si hoc in praefens impetrari non posset, modo probabile esset quod literae illæ meæ, tertiae quæscriptæ, editer alienor alquecum ex pertioribus Philosophiæ Cartesianiæ sectatoribus ad responsum omnibus difficiliatibus inibi Cartesio ipse propositis, ex illa saltem ipse faculti animum inducerem ut jus tibi concedam eas in publicum proferendi. Quid autem futurum sit in hac re ipse forsan opportunità quæ ego conjecturam capies. Nè multis igitur te morer, totum hoc negotium judicio tuo兼顾ori permetto, ut, quod facio opus sit, facias. Incredibile est quarto mœore tum affectus, audito praemuto Cartesii fato, quippe qui ingenii...
nium virtutésque incomparabiles viri impensé amavi & miratursum. Praeterea, accedit ingens defiderium perlegendi responda ejus, quae expectavi, ad tertias quartasque meas literas, quae universam illius Philosophiam percurrunt. Inchoante integrum responsum ad meas datas Io. Cal. Aug. ex te intelligo. Quod fragmentum scripsisse eum conjicio cum Egnmundae effect in Hollandia. Definiti autem, ut per amicos suis certoreme me fecit, ab incepto, quod animus occupatissimus pratis ad iter Suecicum non potuit vacare tam subtilia tantique, uti ipse dixit, momenti difficilatibus & disquisitionibus; sed constanter pollicitus est suis, fe proximo vere reveraturum, & tunc mihi copiose & perficuo omnia explicaturum. Sed cum invidea mors cartera nobis præcipuerit, nollem vel illud Fragmentum duarum paginarum, quorum mentionem facis, interire. Quod ad solidiora illa Cartesiana monumeta attinet, quae profiteris te habere, quae, uti promittis, lucem viitura sunt suo tempore, gemit profectò animus ad tam latum gratiâque nuncium; avidèque interim cupio, fi tibi non sit molemum, ut argumenta titulosve singulorum librorum recenfas in proximis suis litteris. Revisite enim in me, ex quo nuperas tuas accepi, pristinis ille arbor erga Philosophiam Cartesianam, qui aliquantulum ab obitu defideratissimi nostri Amici deferberat, cum nova legendi materies non sappeteret. Sed, ut ingenu à fatear quod res est, illud folum in caura non fuit, fed peculiaria quodam studia que aliò animum avocaran. Eft enim illud rerum pondus, veritas pulchritudo, amplitudo ingenii & acumen. Theorematum denique omnium admirabilis ille ordo & consequens in scriptis Cartesianis, ut vel millies lecita non fordescant: non magis quam lux Solis, cujus ortum singulis diebus aves, pecudes, ipsique adeò homines gratulabundi contemplatur.

Nec certè folum lecita juvenda est hæc Cartesiana Philosophia, sed aprimè utiles, quicquid aut mufitent aut deblaterent aliis, ad summam illum omnii Philosophiae finem, putà Religionem. Cùm enim Peripatetici formas quædam contemdet effe substantiales, quæ è potentiâ materie orientur, quæque cum materia ita coalescent, ut ab ilia subsistere non possint, ac proinde neceffario demum redeunt in porentiam materie (cuò ordini accenfen viventium férè omnium animas, etiam eas quibus fenfum cogitationemque tribuunt); Epicurei autem, explofsis illis substantialibus formis, ipsi materie vim fentiendi cogitandiæ inesse flatuunt; folum, quod feio, inter Physiologos eixtit Cartesius, qui substantiales illas formas, animàve materiæ exortas, è Philosophia fulfult, materiâque ipfam omni fentiendi cogitandiæ facultate planè spoliavit. Unde, fi principis stare tur Cartesianis, certissima effet ratio ac Methodus demonstrandi, & quod Deus fit, & quod anima humana mortalis effe non posfit. Quæ fuint illa duo folideffima fundamenta ac fulcrum omnis veræ Religionis. Hæc breviter noto, cùm possim & alia bene multa hic adjicere, quæ eodem speculant. Sed summam dicam, nullam extare Philosophiam, nisi Platonicum forte exceperis, quà tam firmiter Atheis viam praecedit ad pervertas iftas cavillas & subterfugia quò fete solent recipere, quàm hac Cartesiana, fi penitiùs intelligatur. Unde fpero, quod omnes boni clementiss erent amplissimas illas laudes quibus incomparabile Virum cumulo, in iis quas ad eum scripti litteris, credôque, quicquid hæc pra-
fens ætas senefit de Cartesio (nam ut nunquam vivis, ita rarò recenti defunctorum memoria parcit invidia) quòd posueritas eum omnì cum laude & veneratione fit exceptura, optimumque illius Philosophiae usum fit agnitura. Quod lubentiò praedico, ut majorem in modum tibi animos accendam ad pergendum in nobili illo instituto, edendi omnia quæ habes Cartesii scripta Philosophica; quo pactò cum alios multos, tum me prater cæteros, devincies, qui in illis evolvendis tantam peripere foelo voluptatem.

Si tibi vifum fuerit meas ad Cartesium litteras publicare, vehemens hoc abs absit juxta ista exemplaria quæ jam habes, quia multò correctiora tibi paro. Deprehendi enim, postquam attentius legeram, non paucà corrigenda, quñ imprudenti mihi exciderunt pro nimio animi fervore & festinatione cum ad Cartesium scriberem. Expunxi quàdam ex Quaestis in tertii quartisque meis literis; sed primàe secundæque integra sunt.

Quòd mentis fere jam elapsus est ex quo tuas accepi litteras, nec tamen ad te rescripi, id profectò factum est per nullam negligentiam aut incuriam. Non possum enim non magni te æstimare, tum propter eximium tum ingenium, ad omnem, quod fatis ex literis tuis perpexi, aequitatem & humanitatem compositum ac conformatum, tum propter honorificam Clarissimi fratris tui Chanuti, olim apud Suevos, nunc vero, uti narras, apud Batavos Legati meritissimi, in Cartesium defunctum pietalem. Sed tòrum id temporis quod effluxit partim negotiis, quibus eram ruri difficultus, partim meis ad Cartesium literis cæsariandis transscribendisque, postquam ad Academiam Rediissim, impensum est; nec putabam fore operæ pretium ad te rescribere, prius quam âta perfectionem. Jam verò in parato sunt omnia, tam meærum quàm Cartesianarum literarum exemplaria: neutra tamen ad te mitto hac vice, quippe quòd experiundum putavi prìbus, quàm tutò hæ, quás jam scripsi, literæ ad manus tuas pervenerint: postquam id intelleixerim, mittam ad te continuò. Perlubenter interim ex te audire vellem, quòd usque devenéris in nobili illo negotio quod scribis te suscipisse. Rem fane mihi pergratam praestabis, si per proximas tuas literas ea ëre certiorum me feceris. Vale, Vir Clarissime, & generosum illud opus quod moliris feliciter exequere. Sic optat.

Cantabrigia, 1 Colleogio Christi, "pridie Idus Maii, 1655. "

Tibi Cartesianisique omnibus additiìsimus

HENRICUS MORUS.

Clarissimo
Clarißimo Virō

RENAÔO DES-CARTESES
HENRICUS MORUS ANGLUS.

Quanta voluptate perfusus est animus meus, Vir Clarissime, in scriptis tuis legendis, nemo quisquam praefer te umum potest con-jectare.

Equidem aetum assessmente me haud minus exultasse in recognoscendis intelligendisque praebulis tuis Theorematis, quam ipse in inveniendis, aequaque caros habere atque deamare pulcherrimos illos ingeni tuis fecus, ac si proprius eos enixus effec animus. Quod & certe fecisse aliquo modo mihi videtur, exerendo se se atque expediendo in eodem sentius ac cogitationes, quis genero? tua mens praecipit & praemonstravit. Quis ranf isiufmodi sunt, ut, cum intellectui judicijque meo adeo sint congeneres, ut non sperem fore ut incidam in quocum conjunctions magis ac consanguineum, itan ranf a nullius ingeniio alieni esse possit, cujus itidem ingenium non sit a resa ratione alienum.

Libere dicam quod sentio: Omnes quoque exsittertur, aut etiamnum existunt, Arcanorum Naturae Antithesis, si ad Magnificam tuam in domino commensurant, Pumilos planè videri ac Pygmaeos: meque, cum vel uincâ vice evolvissem Lucubrationes tuas Philosophicas, sulpicatam esse, illustringsam tuam dicipulam, Serenissimam Principem Elizabham, universis Europarum, non feceminis solum, sed viris, etiam Philosophis, longe evasisse sapientiorem. Quod mox evidenteris reprehendi, cùm incepierim scripta tua paulo penitius rimari & intelligere.

Tandem enim clarè mihi aures Cartesiana Lux, (i.e.) libera, distincta, sibiæque consiant Ratio, qua Naturam pariter ac paginas tuas mirificè colluvattrit; ita ut aut nullæ aut paucissimæ superint latebræ, & loci quos non pateficit nobilis illa fax, aut saltem vel levissimo nego-tio, mihi cum libitum fuerit, mox sit patefactura. Omnia pectectò tam concinnat in tuis Philosophicæ Principis, Dioptricis & Meteoris, tamine pulchri fiti ipsi Naturae conamina sunt, ut mens Ratiocine humana jucundus vix optaret lartulve spectaculum.

In Methodo tua, usorio quodam, sed eleganti ranè, modalitē generis, talem te exhibes virum ut nihil indole genioque tuo suaviss & amabiliss, nihil excellens & generosiss vel fingi possit, vel expeti.

Quorum autem hac? Non quod putarem, Vir Clarissime; aut tua interesse aut Reipublica Literarum ut hac constiterem; sed quid mirabilis illius voluptatis ac fructus quem e scriptis tuis percepi conficientia extorquere hoc qualcuque eft animi in te grati testimonium. Praeco, ut certum te facerem, etiam apud Anglos esse qui te tuàque magni ætimant, divinarque animi tuorum vehementer supsiciunt & admirat: Neminem autem hominem meipso impenitus te atare possit, eximiamque tuam Philosophiam atcientius amplexari.

Z 4

Sed
Sed reversa, illufriflime Carteti, ut nihil diffimulem; quamvis pulcherrimum illud Philosophiae tuae corpus ac effentiam valde depeream, fatoer ramen paucula excidiffe in secunda Principiorum parte, quae certe animus meus aut paulo hebetior eff quam ut capiar, aut ut admitter, averfator.

Sed praecipue tuae Philosophiae Summa nihil indì periclicitur, cùm hujusmodi fìt, ut cùm aut falfa merito aut incerta judicari possint, ita nihil ad effentiam Philosophiae tuae ac fundamenta pertinere, illáque fine ilíis optimè poftit conftare. Quæ verò ea fìt, fì tibi non fìt tædio, breviter nunc exponam.

Primò, definitionem Materiæ seu Corporis instituis multò quàm par est latiorum. Res enim extensa Deus videtur effe, atque Angelus, imò verò res qualibet per se subsiffent; ita ut eisdem flibus claudi videatur extenfio atque effentia rerum absolu/a, quæ tamen variari potest pro effentiarium ipfum varietate. Atq; equi'lem quòd Deus extenditur suo modo, hinc arbitror patere, nempe quod fìt omnipraefens, & univerfam mundi machinam fingularique ejus particularis intime occupet. Quomodo enim motum imprimeret materiæ, quod feciffè aliando, & etiamnum facere, ipfe fateris, ìfi proximè quafi attingeret materiam univerfi, aut flatem aliando attigiiflet: Quod certè nunquam feciflet nifi adfutift ubique, fingularique plagas occupavit fier. Deus igitur suo modo extenditur atque expanditur, ac proinde est res extensa.

Neque tamen ille corpus iìlud est, fìve materia, quam ingeniofa illa Artifex, Menf scilicet tua, in globulos ftriatafque particularis tam affibrè tonavit. Quamobrem res extensa latior corpore est.

Animùmque inhi ulterior adítit ut à te hac in re diffentiam, quod ad confirmationem hujusce tuae definitionis tam fæcum adhibes argumen-tum, & ferme Sophificum. Quòd utique corpus poftit esse corpus fìne mollitie, vel duritie, vel pondere, vel levitate, &c. illis enim aliisq; omnibus qualitatisbus quæ in materia corporea fentientur ex ea fublatis, ipfam integram remanere. Quod perinde efft ac ìi dixeris, libram Ceræ, ìcum poftit effe libra ceræ, quamvis ipfiusfigura èphäricà, vel cubicà, vel pyramidalis, &c. sub nulla figura poftit remanere integram ceræ librum. Quod tamen imposibile est. Quamvis enim hæc vel illa figura non tamentè cohæret cum cerà quin illam exuere poftit, ut tamen cerà temper fit figurata necèfitas fumma efft & æcïlìmà. Ità quamvis matèria non fit necessarii mollis, nec dura, nec calida, nec frígida, ut tamen fit fænsibils est fumma necèfitārium; vel, si malles, tangibilis, prout optime dèfinis Lucretius.

Tangere enim, & tangi, nisi corpus nulla poftit res.

Quæ certè notio minus debet à tua mente abborrere, cùm Philosophia tua omnem fensum, cùm antiquus illis apud Theophrastum magì adhæs, tæctum planiflimè conftituit. Quod vero verius effe ipse facillimè admitter, Sed ìi minus placet corpus defìnìs ab habitudine ad fensus nostròs, Tangibilitas hæc latior fit ac diffusior, & signifìcit mutuum illum con-tac tum tangendique potentiam inter corpora qualibet, fìve animata fìve inanimata fuerint, effòque superfìcierum duorum pluriumve corporum immediata juxtaposìtio. Quod & aliam innuit matèria fìve corporis con-ditionem
Epistola Prima H. Mori ad R. Cartesium.

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ditionem, quam appellare poteris *impenetrabilitatem*; nempe quod nec penetras alia corpora, nec ab illis penetrari posset. Unde manifestissimum est dictârnum inter Naturam divinam ac corpoream, cum illa hanc penetrasse, hec verò fê ipfam penetrare non posset. Unde fane felicitas mihi videtur cum Platonis fuis Virgilius philosophari, quam Cartesius ipse, cum ex illorum sententia sit cecinerit,

--- Totâmque infusa per artus

Mens agitat molem, & magnos se corpore miscet.

Mitto alias insigniores Divinae extensionis conditiones, cum non opus sit hoc loco explicare. Vel hac paucâ suffixerint ad demonstrandum multò tutius fuisse materiam definitissime substantiam *tangibilem*, vel modo super explicato *impenetrabilem*, quam Rem extensam. Dicta enim vel *Tangibilis*, vel *Impenetrabilis*, competit corpori adaequat, tua autem definitio peccat in legem *a Sè by *e* *r* *s*., neque enim est reciproca cum definitio.

Secundo, Quando inuis nè virtute quidem divinâ fere posse ut propriè dicitum existat vacuum, &c, fionne corpus ex vafo tolleretur, quod latera necessario coirent; ita proiectò mihi videntur non solum falsa, sed minus confona antecedentibus. Si enim Deus motum materiæ imprimis, quod fupra docuisti, annon ille potest contrà obniti, et inhibere nec coeant vaœs latera: Sed contradicio est diffare vaœs latera, & tamen nihil interjacere. Idem non fenit litterata Antiquitas, Epicurus, Democritus, Lucretius, aliique. Sed ut leviusculum illud argumenti genus missum faciam; divinam contendo interjacere extensam, tulentque hic suppositum esse infirmum, materiam solummodo extendi: Latera tamen ut antea coituras non necessitate Logicâ sed naturali; Deindeque solum hanc coitionem inhibere posse. Cum enim particula, primum praefertim secundisque Elementi, tam furibundo motu agitentur, necesse est qua ceditur, eo quanta praecipites, aliisque fibi contiguas fecum abripiant.

Infeliciter igitur succedit, quod tam bellum Theorema de modo Reractonis & Condenfationis, quod certè ego aliis de causis verifimum esse censeo, tam lubrico suffulcitis fundamento.

Tertio, Singularis illam subtilitatem non capio, quâ atomos, id est particulas sua natura indivisibles, non dari evincis. Ut enim, inquis, effectur Deus eas particulas à nullis creaturis dividi posse, non certè fìbì ipsì easdem dividendi facultatem potuit adimere, quia fieri non potest ut propriam suam potentiam imminuas. Eodem argumento probaveris, Deum nunquam fecis ut hecternus orietur Sol, quoniam potentia ejus jam efficere non potest ut Sol hecternus non effet ortus; nec villissimam posse muscam occidere,

*Si modo qui priiit, non perisse potest*,
quod fit de fêipso Ovidius; aut materiam non creâs, cùm fit divisi- bilis in tempem divisiabilia, ac proinde Deus nunquam posset absolvere ac perficere hanc divisionem. Pars enim reftat indivisa, quamvis divisibilis, atque ita perpetuo eludit potentia divina, nec plenè se exercere potest, finémque fortiri.

Quartò, Indefinatum quam mundi extensionem non intelligo. Exten- sio enim illa indecinita vel simpliciter infinita est; vel tantùm quod nos.

Si
Si intelligis extensioinem infinitam simpliciter, cur mentem tuam obscuras vocabulis nimium suppres sis ac modestis: Si tantum quod nos infinitam, revera erit finita extensio; neque enim mens nostra aut rerum aut veritatis mensura est. Ac proinde, cum alia sit simpliciter infinita expansio, divinae utique efficientiae, materia tuorum vorticum à centris suis recedet, totaque mundi machina in dissipatas atomos vagóisque abibit pulvi culos.

Atque sanè eò magis hic admiror modestiam tuam atque metum, quod adeò tibi caves à materiae infinitudine, cum particularis actu & infinitas & divisas ipse agnoveris Art. 34, & 35. Quod certè si non fecisses, extorqueri tamen posse videtur hoc modo. Nam cum quantum sit in infinitum divisibile, partes actu infinitas habere oportet. Ut enim cultello alióque quovis instrumento corpus in partes palpabiles, quae non actu sunt, mechanice difficere prorfus est amphibor, sive impossible, ita vel mente quantitatem dividere in partes toti realiter actuque non inexistentes, plane amphibor est ac rationi absonum.

Quibus inuiper adjungi potest, hypothesin hanc, quod mundus simpliciter ac revera sit infinitus, æqualem vis habere ad explicandam iuxta et confirmandam rationem rarefactionis & condensationis, quam suprà propofuit Art. 6, 7. atque iftud principium, folius corporis esse extensio nem, & nihilum non posse extendi. Quod enim ibi praèfet Logica seu contradictoria necessitas, idem hic necessitas Physica vel mechanica certissimè praebetur.

Cum enim omnia in infinitum ülque materiâ seu corporibus sint plena ac referata, penetrationis lex impiet nè fiat ultra distantia in rarefactione corporibus nuda, aut accessio partium ad se invicem in condensatione, fine interjacentium particularum expulsione.

Atque haec vel nunc quæ a me dicta sunt ratione mentisque maxime videntur perpíca, tullque placitis longè longèque certiora.

Cæterum ã nulla tuaar opinionum animus meus, pro ea quâ est mollitie ac tenteritudine, æqué abhorret, ac ab internecia illæ & jugulatrice sentientia, quam in Methodo tuli, brutis omnibus viram sensumque eripiens, dicam, an potius praæripiens: neque enim vixisse unquam pateris. Hic non tam fuppscio rutilantem tui ingenii aciem, quàm reformati, utpote de animantium fato sollicitus, acumèque tuum non subtile solùm agnofo, sed chalybis infrar rigidum ac crudelè, quod uno quasi ìctu universum ferme animantium genus vitæ ausìt fensusque spoliare, in marmora & machinas vertendo.

Sed videamus obsecro quid in causa est quod in brutas animantes quicquam tam severiter statuat. Loqui utique non possunt, causamque sùam apud judicem dicere, & quod crimen aggravat, cum ad loquelas organis faitis sint instructa, uti patet in Picis & Phìttracis. Hinc vitæ sensusque multæs sunt.

Verùm enimvero quomodo fieri possit ut aut Pìttraci aut Picae voces nostras iminentur, nisi audirent, sensusque percepérant quid loquimur? Sed non intelligunt, inquis, quid sibi volunt ìtae voces quasi effutunt imitando. Quidnì tamen ipsi quid volunt fatisintelligant, cibum feliciter quem à Dominis hoc artificio acquirunt? putant igitur se cibum mendicar,
Epistola Prima H. Mori ad R. Cartesium.

dicare, quod id fìa loquacitate toties voti compotes fiunt. Et quorufum, quâto, illum attentio eft & aurisultatio in avibus cantatoris, quam praæ fæ
erunt, si nullus fit in ipsis fenfu nec animadversio? Unde illa vulpium
cänùmque aëuria & faggiicas? Quì fit ut minœ & verba feroientes
cohibeant bellugas? Canis famelicis cùm furtim quid abfultit, cur quafi
facti conscìci clâm fìe furrupit, & meticulosù ac diffidenter incedens ne-
mimi occurring gratulatur, fed averfo pronòque roftro fumam ad diftos
pergit viam, fuppicìeò cautus ñe ëb patrarum fcelus penas luat? Quo-
modo ifta fieri possunt sine interna facti conscientia? Copiapña ifta histo-
riolarum cögeries, quibus nonnulli conantur demonstrare rationem
insefse animalibus brutis, hoc saltem évincet, fen humming memoriâque
insefse. Sed infinitum effect tales narratiunculas hic attexere, quibus
ficio bene multas ifius modi fesse, ut eam vim vel subtilifimum acumen
haud poscit eludere.

Sed video planē quid te huc aedigid, ut bruta pro machinis habeas; Im-
mortalitas utique animarum nostrarum demonstranda ratio, quæ cum
supponent corpus nullo modo cogitare possee, concludit, ubicumque eft co-
gitatio, subfiantiam à corpore realiter distinctam adeffe operare, adeoque
immortalem. Unde sequitur, bruta si cogitent, substantias immortales
fibi annexas habere.

Atqui obfereo te, Vir perspicacifsimæ, cùm ex ifta demonstrandi ratio-
ne necesse effet bruta animaliantia aut fenfu spoliare, aut donare immortali-
tate, cur ifpa malles inamas machinas statuere quàm corpora animabus
immortalibus acțuta? praesertim cum illud ut naturæ phænomenis mi-
nimé confonunt, itâ plane fit inaudítum hæcenus; hoc verò apud fapien-
tsimos veterum ratum fit ac comprobatum, Pythagoram putâ, Platono-
mem, aliòque. Et certè animo: hoc adderet Platonicis omnibus perfis-
stendi in sua de brutorum immortalitate fententia, cùm tam insigne in-
génum ëo angustiarum redactum fit, ut si animas brutorum immortales effe
non concedatur, universa bruta intensitas machinas necessario statuat.

Hac sunt paucula illa (magne Cartesi) in quibus mihi fas effe putabam
à te diffentire. Cartera mihi adeò arrient atque addendantur, ut mihi
illis habeam magis in deliciis; adeoque intimis animi feniibus con-
sona fùnt atque cognata, ut non folum tardioribus commocè explicare,
fed etiam contra pugnacissimos quoque feliciter, fi opus effet, defendere
me possem confidam.

Quod reliquam eft, exorandus es, Vir illufrisìme, ut hæc noftra boni
confulas, nec me ulius levitatis vanæque ambitionis suspecìum habeas,
quasi affectarem Clarissímorum virorum familaritates ac amicitias, cùm
& ipse fì possem, haud cuperem, inclarescere, rem turbulentam fannam
judicans, privatoque orto valde inimicam.

Neque profectò quamvis animo fim in te admodum prono ac proclivi,
id unquam tibi significãsem, nisi ab aliis instigatus; fed te tuaque amore
latentì taticilique veneratione prosequi contentus sumfem.

Nec obniæ à te efflagito ut refcribas, utpote quem contemplationem
fumme arduis, vel experimentis faciundis maxime utilibus pariter ac diffi-
cilibus, occupatisìmum autem.

Permitto igitur híc tibi tuo jure uti, né sim in publicum injurius. Quod
Cantabrigia, è Collegio Christi,  
Idus Decembris, anno 1648.

Singulari tua sapientia  
cultori devotissimo,  
HENRICO MORO.

Docissimo & Humanissimo Viro  
HENRICO MORO  
RENATUS DES-CARTES.

Audes quas in me congeris, Vir humanissime, non tam ullius mei  
meriti, utpore quod eas aquare nullum potest, quæm tua erga me  
benevolentiam testes sunt. Benevolentiam autem ex sola scriptorum  
meorum lectione contracta candorem & generositatem animi tui tam  
aperté ostendit, ut totum me tibi, quamvis antehac non noto, devinciat.  
Ideoque perliberenter is quæ ex me quæris respondebas.

1. Primum est, cur ad corpus definiendum dicam illud esse substantiam  
extensam potius quàm sensibilem, tangibilem, vel impenetrabilem. At res  
te monet, si dicitur substantia sensibilis, tunc definiri ab habituinde ad sen-  
sus nostrorum, quà ratione quaedam eius proprietas duntaxat explicatur, non  
integra natura, quà cùm possit existere, quamvis nulli homines existant,  
certe a sensibus nostris non pender. Nec proinde vide cur dicas, esse  
fummè necessarium ut omnis materia sit sensibilis. Nam contrà, nulla est  
quæ non sit planè insensibilis, si tantum in partes nervorum nostrorum  
particulis multitvminores, & singulas forisim fatis celeriter agitatas, sit  
divisa.

Meúmque illud argumentum quod sævum & ferme Sophisticum  
appellas, adhibui tantum ad eorum opinionem refutandam, qui recum  
existimant omne corpus esse sensibile, quam, meo judicio, apertè & de-  
monstrativè refutat. Poteft enim corpus rerinere omne fum corporis  
naturam, quamvis non sit ad sensum molle, nec durum, nec rigidum, nec  
calidum, nec denique habeat ullam sensibilem qualitatem.

Ut vero inciderem in eum errorem quem videris mihi velle tribuere,  
per comparationem cæræ, quæ quamvis possit non esse quadrata, nec ro-  
tunda, non possit tamen non habere aliquam figuram, debuiissem, ex eo  
quod juxta mea principia omnes sensibiles qualitates in eo solo confiabant  
quod particulas corporis certis modis moveantur, vel quiefcant, debii-  
sem, inquam, concludere, corpus posse existere, quamvis nullæ ejus par-  
ticulæ moveantur, nec quiefcant, quod mihi nunquam in mentem venit.  
Corpus itaque non rectè definitur substantia sensibilis.

Videamus nunc an fortè apatius dici possit substantia impenetrabilis, vel  
tangibilis, eo sensu quæm explicuisti.

Sed rursus ista tangibilitas & impenetrabilitas in corpore est tantum ur
Sed, inquis, Deus etiam & Angelus, resque alia qualibet per se sub-fistens est extensa, ideoque latius patet definitio tua quam definitum. Ego vero non soleo quidem de nominibus disputare, atque ideo si ex eo quod Deus sit ubique, dicit alicuius cum esse quodammodo extending, per me licet. *Atqui nego veram extendingem*, quales ab omnibus vulgo concipitur, vel in Deo, vel in Angelis, vel in mente nostra, vel denique in ulla substantia quae non sit corpus, reperiri. Quippe per ens extendingem, communiter omnes intelligunt aliquid imaginabile, (five fit ens rationis, five reale, hoc enim jam in medium relinquo,) atqui in hoc ente varias partes determinatae magnitudinis & figurae, quarum una nullo modo alia sit, possunt imaginatione distinguere, unaque in locum aliarum posse; etiam imaginatione transferre; sed non duas simul in uno & eodem loco imaginari: *Atqui de Deo, ac etiam de mente nostra, nihil tale dicere licet; neque enim est imaginabilis, sed intelligibilis dantexat, nec etiam in partes distinguibilis, præfertim in partes quae habeam determinatas magnitudines & figurae. Denique, facile intelligimus & mentem humanam, & Deum, & simul plures Angelos in uno & eodem loco esse posse; unde manifeste concluditur, nullas substantias incorporasse proprie esse extendens; sed eas intelligo tanquam virtutes aut vires qualidam, quæ quovis se applicent rebus extendens, non idecirco sunt extendae, ut quovis in ferro candenti sit ignis, non ideo ignis ille est ferrum. Quod vero nonnulla substantiae notionem cum rei extensae notione confundat, hoc sit ex falso prejudicio, quia nihil putant existere, vel esse intelligibile, nisi sit etiam imaginarib; ac revera nihil sub imaginationem cadit, quod non sit aliquo modo extendingem. Jam vero quemadmodum dicere licet ianitatem fioli homini competere, quamvis per analogiam & Medicina, & æcr temperatur, & alia multa dicantur etiam fana; ita illud solum quod est imaginabile, ut habens partes extra partes, quæ sint determinatae magnitudinis & figurae, dico esse extendens, quamvis alia per analogiam etiam extensa dicantur.

2. Ut autem transeamus ad secundam tuam difficultatem; si examinemus quodnam sit ens extendens à me descriptum, inveniemos planè idem esse cum spatio, quod vulgus aliquam plenum, aliando vacuum, aliquando reale, aliquando imaginarium esse putat. In spatio enim, quantunvis imaginario & vacuo, facile omnes imaginantur varias partes determinatae magnitudinis & figurae, possuntque unas in locum aliarum imaginatione transferre; sed nullo modo duas simult né mutuò penetrantes in uno & eodem loco concipere, quoniam implicat contradictionem ut hoc fiat, & spatii parasites nulla tollaturo. Cùm autem ego considerarem tam reales proprietates non nisi in reali corpore esse posse, auius tum affirmare, nui-
Quod nee fed dico Eodem omne corpus, cùm videat se negare non posse quin aliqua in omni spatio substantia sit, quoniam in eo omnes proprietates extensionis revera reperiantur, malle tamen dicere divinam extensionem implere spatium in quo nullum est corpus, quàm fateri nullum omnino spatium sine corpore esse posse. Etenim, ut jam dixi, praeterea illa Dei extensione nullo modo subjectum esse potest verum proprietatum, quas in omni spatio distinctissime percipimus. Neque enim Deus est imaginabilis, nec in partes distinguisibilis quae sint mensurabiles & figuratae.

Sed facile admittis nullum vacuum naturaliter dari. Solicitius es de potentia divina, quam putas tollere posse id omne quod est in aliquote vafe, simulque impedire ne coeant vafis latera. Ego verò cum sicam meum Intellectum esse finitum, & Dei potentiam infinitam, nihil unquam de hac determino; sed confidero duntaxat quid posset à me percipi vel non percipi, & caveo diligenter ne judicium illum meum à perceptione differat. Quapropter audacter affirmò, Deum posse id omne quod possibile esset percipio; non autem è contrà audacter nego, illum posse id quod conceptui meo repugnat, sed dico tantum implicare contradictionem. Sic quia video conceptui meo repugnare ut omne corpus ex aliquote vafe tollatur, & in ipso remaneat extensione, non aliter à me concepta quàm prius concipieratur corpus in eo contentum; dico implicare contradictionem, ut talis extensione ibi remanaret post sublatum corpus, ideoque debere vafis latera coire: Quod omnino confonum est mei cœtis opinionibus. Dico enim alibi nullum motum dari nisi quodammodo circularem; unde sequitur non intelligi distinctè, Deum aliquod corpus ex vafe tollere, quin simul intelligatur, in ejus locum aliud corpus, vel ipfa vafis latera motu circulatori succedere.

3. Eodem modo etiam dico implicare contradictionem, ut aliœ den- tum atomi, qua concipientur extende ac simul indivisibles; quia quamvis Deus eae tales efficere potuerit ut à nulla creatura dividatur, certò non possumus intelligere ipsum se facultate eas dividendi privare potuisse. Nec valet tua comparatio deis quæ facta sunt, quod nequeant infesta esse. Neque enim pro nota impotentiae fumimus, quod quis non posset facere id quod non intelligimus esse possibile; sed tantum quod non posset aliquid facere ex is quæ tamquam possibili distinctè percipimus. At sœ Percipimus esse possibile ut atomus dividatur, quandoquidem eam extensionem esse supponimus; atque ideo si judicemus eam à Deo dividi non posse,
poste, judicabimus Deum aliquid non posse facere, quod tamen possibile esse percipimus. Non autem eodem modo percipimus fieri posse, ut quod factum est sit infectum, sed esse contra, percipimus hoc fieri planè non posse; ac proinde non esse ullum potentiam defecatum in Deo, quod istud non faciat. Quantum autem ad divisibilitatem materie, non eadem ratio est: est enim non possim numerare omnes partes in quas est divisibilis, earumque idcirco numerum dicam esse indefinitum; non tamen possim affirmare illarum divisionem à Deo nunquam absolvii, quia scio Deum plura posse facere quàm ego cogitatione mea complecti; atque istam indefinitam quarundam partium materie divisionem revera fieri solere in Artic.34. concepsi.

4. Neque vero affectatae modi sunt, sed cantela, meo judicio, necessaria, quò quid quaegam dicam esse indefinita potius quàm infinita; solus enim Deus est quem positività intelligo esse infinitum: de reliquis, ut de mundi extensione, de numero partium in quas materia est divisibilis, & similibus, an sint simpliciter infinita necne, propter me ne necire; scio tantum me in illis nullum finem agnosce, atque idcirco respectu mei dico esse indefinita.

Et quamvis mens nostra non sit rerum vel veritatis menfura, cæte debet esse menfura eorum quæ affirmamus aut negamus. Quod enim est absurdius, quid inconsideratus, quæ velle judicium ferre de ipsis ad quorum perceptionem mentem nostram attingere non posse consitemur?

Miro autem te non modo id velle facere videri, cūm ais, sit tantum quod nos sit infinita, revera est finita extensio, &c; sed præterea etiam divinam quandam extensionem imaginari, quæ latius pateat quàm corporum extensio, atque ita supponere Deum partes habere extra partes, & esse divisibilem, omnemque prorsus rei corporeae essentiam illi tribue.

Nè verò quis scerupulus hic superstit? Cūm dico extensionem materie esse indefinitam, sufficere hoc puto ad impedientiun nè quis extra illum locus fingi quest, in quem meorum vorticum particularis abire possit, Ubicumque enim locus ille concipiatur, ibi, jam juxta meam opinionem, aliqua materia est, quia dicendo eam esse indefinitate extensam, dico ipsum latius extendi quàm omne id quod ab homine concipi potest.

Sed nihilo minus existimo maximam esse differentiam inter amplitudinem ipsum corposis extensionis, & amplitudinem divinae, non dicam extensio, atque quæ propriè loquendo nulla est, fed substantiæ vel essentiae, ideoque hanc simpliciter infinitam, illum autem indefinitam appello.

Cæterum non admittor quod pro singulari tua humanitate concedis, nempe reliquis meas opiniones possit confarre, quamvis id quod de materia extensione scripsi refutetur: unum enim est ex principis, meóque judicio certissimus, Physicae meæ fundamentis, profiteorque mihi nullas rationes fatisiacere in ipfa Physica, nisi quæ necessitatem illam, quam vocas Logicam five contradictoriam, involvant; modo tantum ea excipias quæ per solam expenmentiam cognosci possint, ut quod circa hanc terram unicus sit Sol vel unica Luna, & similibus. Cumque in reliquis à meo senfus non abhorreas, spero etiam his te facilè affrenatur, simodo confideres præjudicium esse quod multi existiment ens extensum, in quo nihil est quod moveat senfus, non esse veram substantiam corporam, sed spatium.
vacuum duntaxat; quodque nullum sit corpus nisi sensibile, utque nulla substantia nisi quae sub imaginationem cadat, ac proinde sit extensa.

5. Sed nulli præjudicio magis omnes affectivus quum ei, quod nobis ab inuentae ætate perfusisse bruta animantia cogitare. Quippe nulla ratio nos movit ad hoc credendum, nisi quod videntes pleraque brutorum membra in figura externa & motibus à nostris non multum differre, unicumque in nobis esse credentes illorum motum principium, animam scilicet, quæ eadem moveret corpus & cogitaret, non dubitavimus quin aliqua talis anima in illis repertetur.

Postquam autem ego advertissi, distingueva esse duo diversa motuum nostrorum principia, unum scilicet planè mechanicum & corporum, quod à sola spirituum vi & membrorum conformatio dependet, potestque anima corporea appellari; aliud incorporeum, mentem scilicet, sive animam illam quam definis substantiam cogitamentum; quæ privi diligentius an ab his duobus principis orientent animalium motus, an ab uno duntaxat. Cùmque clari perpexerim posse omnes oriri ab eo solo quod corporeum est & mechanicum, pro certo ac demonstrato habui, nullo pacto à nobis probari posse, aliquam esse in brutis animam cogitamentem. Nec moror affutias & lagacirates canum & vulpium, nec quæcunque alia quæ propter cibum, venerem, vel metum à brutis fiunt. Proficior enim me posse perfacilé illa omnium à sola membrorum conformatione profecta explicare.

Quamvis autem pro demonstrato habeam, probari non posse aliquam esse in brutis cogitationem; non ideo puto posse demonstrari nullam esse, quia mens humana illorum corda non pervadit. Sed examinando quidnam sit hæc de re maximè probable, nullam video rationem pro brutorum cogitationem militare præter hanc unam, quod cùm habeant octos, aures, lingua, & reliqua feminum organa fictur nos, verisimile sit illa sentire fictum nos; & quia in nostris fentiendi modo cogitatio includitur, similèm etiam illis cogitationem esse tribuendum. Quæ ratio cùm sit maximè obvia, mentes omnium hominum à prima ætate occupavit. Sunt autem aliae rationes multè plures & fortiore, sed non omnibus ita obvia, quæ contrarium planè perfuadent. Inter quas fuum quidem locom obtinere, quod non sì fìm probable omnes rerum, culicis, erucas, & reliqua animalia immortali animâ prædata esse, quòm machinarum infarke movere.

Primò, quia certum est in corporibus animalium, ut etiam in nostris; esse olla, nervos, musculos, sanguinem, spiritus animales, & reliqua organa ita disposita, ut se solis abique utra cogitatione omnes motus quos in brutis observavimus cìe possint. Quod patet in convulsionibus, cùm mente invitât machinamentum corporis vehementius faepæ ac magis diversis modis lemn sì mover, quâm ute voluntatis sìleat moveri.

Deinde, quia rationiifenentaneum videtur, cùm ars sit naturæ imitatrix, posse sintque homines varià fabricare automata in quibus sìne utra cogitatione est motus, ut Natura etiam sua automata, sed arte factis longè praefiantiora, nempe bruta omnia, producet, praefertim cùm nullam agnocamus rationem propter quam, ubi est talis membrorum conformatio qualem in animalibus videmus, cogitatione etiam debitasse; atque
Epistola Secunda H. Mori ad R. Cartesium.

ideo majori admiratione dignum sit, quod mens aliqua reperiatur in uno-quoque humano corpore, quam quod nulla sit in ullis brutis.

Sed rationum omnium qua beffias cogitatione deftitutas esse perfu- dent meo judicio practicam est, quod quamvis inter illas unae alis ejuf- dem speciei sint perfectiones, non fucos quam inter homines, ut videre licet in equis & canibus, quorum aliquis careris multo felicitas que do- centur addiscunt, & quamvis omnes perfacile nobis impetus fuos natu- rales, ut iras, metus, famen, & simulia, voce vel aliis corporis motibus significent, numquam tamen haec quae fuerit observatum, ullum bruta- tum animal eò perfectionis devenisse ut verà loquelifateretur, hoc est, ut aliquid vel voce vel nutibus indicaret, quod ad solam cogitationem, non autem ad impetum naturalem, posset referri. Hae enim loquela unicum est cogitationis in corpore latentis signum certum, arque ipsa utuntur omnes homines, etiam quam maxime stupidi & mentes capti, & linguar vocisque organis destituti, non autem um brutum; eamque idcirco pro vera inter homines & bruta differentia sumere licer.

Reliquas rationes cogitationem brutis adimentes brevitatis causd hic omitto. Velim tamen notari me loqui de cogitatione, non de vita vel fenso: vitam enim nulli animali denego, utpote quam in solo cordis ca- lore consiftere statuo, nec denego etiam fenso quatenus ab organo corporeo dependet. Sicque hae nea opinio non tam crudelis est erga bellus, quam pia erga homines, Pythagoreorum superstitionem non ad- diciatos, quos nempe á crimini sulpicione absolvit quoties animalia comen- dunt vel occidunt.

Hae autem omnia fortasse proximis scripsi quam acumen ingenii tui requirebat; volui enim hoc pacto testari paucissimorum objectiones mihi haec quæ gratae fuissent ac tuas, humanitatemque & candeorem tuum maxime tibi devinixisse

Egmone prope Alchmarius, Nonis Febraruii 1649.

Omnium veræ sapientiae studiosorum cultorem observantisum;

RENATUM DES-CARTES.

Clarisimo Viro, Nobilissimoque Philofoho,

RENATO DES-CARTES,

HENRICUS MORUS ANGLUS.

Opinionis quam de te concepi, nuperiisque meos literis apud te testa- tus fum, quanta quanta fit (Vir illultrissime) me non ponietur, nec unquam, fat scio, poterit ponitere. Quin & adaugit pluri- mum tui apud me exestionem, quod ad stupendam illam mentis tuae amplitudinem divinumque acumen, fuavitas tanta morum acceperit & humanitas. Quam certè ut nunquam suspectam habui, ita nunc fanè eru-

A a 3 ditissimas
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dicitius tuas literas habeo pro certissimo illius argumento. Caeterum nè tanti favoris te poeniteat, quafi in fervum caput collati, nève vilefact meum erga te studium, atque amor, tanquam ab abjicio jacentique animo profectus, quo tandem modo responfâ tua mihi satiisfeceint, palâm, uti hominem liberum decet, apertèque profitebor. Quod tamen nè minimum tibi vel mihi ipfi negotium facellat, fuores orationis texturas missas faciens, rem rotam in Inftantias quasdam breves, aut falem notaftunculas super fingulis responsorum tuorum particulis, compingam.

Ad Responsam circa primam Difficultatem

Inftantia I.

Definiri ab habitudine ad fensus nostros, &c.

Hic regei poteft; Cùm radix rerum omnium ac effentia in aternas defossa lateat tenebras, rem quamlibet necessâriò definiri ab habitudine aliqua. Quae habitudo proprietas dici poteft in subfabantia, cùm non sit subfiantia; quamvis agnoficam libenter proprietates alias alii esse priores; hoc autem tantum me voluisse, Satius nimimum esse per adequantam quamlibet proprietatem, quàm per formam, quam vocant, definito latio-rem, rem definivisse. Porò, cùm ipse corpus definis rem extenfam, ipsam illam extensionem insuper adnoto constitere in habitudine quadam partium ad se invicem, quatenus aliae extra productae sunt, quæ habitudinem non esse rem absolutam manifeftam eft.

II.

Quamvis nulli homines exifiant.

Si omnes mortales conniverent, Sol tamen non exueret fumam videndi aptitudinem, quamprimùm oculos aperuerint denù; ut neque securis, fecandi, quamprimùm ligna aut lapides oblati fuerint.

III.

Nervorum nostrorum particulis multò minores.

Deum tamen artificem adaptare posse credo nervos fatis exiguos exiguis istis materiae particulis, ac proinde fensibilitatem materiæ hoc modo comminutæ integrâm manere. Porò, hoc particulae à moço cellare poterint, atque coalescere, nofrisique hoc modo nervis fensibiles denuò evaderè; quod de subfiantia incorpora nullo modo verum eft.

IV.

Quamvis non sit ad fensum molle, &c.

Certum eft aut ad nervos nostros sensibios durum fore vel molle, &c. aut faltem ad iisiuimodi nervos, quales, si vellet, Deus fabricare poterint, ut modò monuimus; atque hoc fatis eft, quamvis Deus nunquam fabricatus sit iisiuimodi nervos. Ut revera partes terræ versus centrum sunt ex fessibiles, quamvis nunquam extrahendae sint in Solis conspectum, nec eò descenditus sit quiquam cum lychno vel lampade.
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V.

Est tantum, ut in homine Rispibilitae, proprieum quartum modo.

Quod si ratio etiam alius competeret animalibus, rectius definiretur homo animal ricipibile quam ratione. Nondum autem quopiam demonstratum est tangibilitatem et impenetrabilitatem propria esse substantiae extensae affectiones, quamvis corporis esse meritum quovis agnoverit. Equidem possum clarè concipere substantiam extensam quaecumque nullum ullo modo habeat tangibilitatem vel impenetrabilitatem. Igitur tangibilitas vel impenetrabilitas non immediate substantiam extensam consequitur, quatenus extensa est.

VI.

Atqui nego veram extensionem, &c.

Per veram extensionem intelligis quam tangibilis & impenetrabilis comitatur. Hanc ipse etiam nego in Deo, nudi se vel mente vel Angelo reperiri. Interea tamen affero aliam esse extensionem aquæ veram, quamvis non aquæ vulgarem Scholísque tritam, quæ in Angelis menteque humana ut terminos, ita & figuram habet, sed pro imperio Angelis mentisque variabiliem; Mentisque sive animas nostras atque Angelos, eadem profus manente substantiâ, contrahere se possit, & certos denuò ad limites se expandere.

VII.

Nihil est intelligibile nisi sit etiam imaginabile, &c.

Equidem aliquanto sum prior in illam Aristotelis sententiam, sed cum qui spatii partes aborbeant alteras, penituisse coincidant & penetrant se invicem.

Ad Responsum circa secundam Difficultatem

Instantia I.

Unas in locum aliarum imaginatione transferre.

Mea quidem imaginatio non potest, nec concipere si transferantur, quin una vacui spatii partis absorbeant alteras, penituisse coincidant & penetrant se invicem.

II.

Nec dubitari a magnis viris, Epicuro, Democrito, &c.

Nullus dubito quin optimo jure differtias, cum non solum istis, sed universis Natura interpretibus longè major fis (mea sententia) longèque auguius.

III.

Quin aliqua in omnium spatii substantia sit, &c.

Id sane concessi pacis ergò. Sed clarè mihi non constat. Nam si Deus hanc mundi universitatem annihilaret, & multò post aliam crearet de nihilo, Intermundium illud, seu absentia mundi, suam habere durationem quam tot dies, anni, vel secula mensurassent. Non exsistens igitur est duratio, quæ extensio quædam est, Ac proinde Amplitude Nihili, purè Vacui, per ulnas vel orgyas mensurari potest, ut Non-exsistens in sua

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non existentia duratio per horas, dies menfesque mensuratur. Sed con-
cedo, quamvis nondum vi coactus, in omni spatio alienum substantiam in-
est; neque tamen sese eam effe corpoream, cum extendunt five praeventia
divina posuit effe subiectum mensurabilitatis, v. g. Praeventiam five exten-
sionem divinam occupare affero unam alteramque oryam in hoc vel illo
vacuo: nec tamen omnino sese Deum effe corporeum, ut pact ex supra
dicitis, Instantiâ s. Sed super haœre est agendum alibi.

IV.

Dico implicare contradictionem, ut talis extensione, &c,

Sed hic libenter quærerem, numquid necesse sit ut aut talis extensione sit
qualem in corpore concipis, aut nulla. Deinde, cum & alias res præter
corpora extendi suo modo conceperis, annon analogica illa extensioni,
quam vocas, vicee obeat extensionem corporæ, atque ìtæ illam vim contra-
dictoriam retundat. Praeventim cum analogica hæc extensione ad propriè
diactam tam propè accedat, ut fit menfurabilis, certòque pedum uniarum-
ve numeros occupet.

V.

Nullum motum dari, nisi quodammodo circularem.

Hoc necessario confici condisc, necessitate putat Physicâ, supponendo
duntaxat omnia corporibus plena, nullamque extensionem aliæ in-
tegram mundi extensionem excedere: qua in parte ego fatis fum secu-
rus: sed inexprimibilem hanc contradictionis vim fateor me nondum
fatis deprehendere.

Ad Responsum circa tertiam Difficultatem.

Quæ concipientur extensione simul indivisibiles.

Cum mentem tuam sic explicueris, nulla inter nos est controversia.

Ad Responsum circa quartam Difficultatem.

Instantiâ I.

An sint simpliciter infinita nec nece, profiteor me nescire.

Haud tamen latere te potest, quin sint vel simpliciter infinita, vel
reversa finita, quamvis utrum horum sint facili statuere non possis.
Quòd autem vortices tui non disrupruntur et fiatcunt, non oblivum
videatur indicium mundum reversa effe infinitum. Ipsa tamen interea
liberè profiteor, quamvis audaciter possim affertire huic axiomatic,
Mundus finitus est, aut non finitus, vel, quod idem hic est, infinitus, me
tamen non posse plenè animo complecti rei cujusvis infinitudinem; sed
illud imaginationi meæ hic accidere, quod Julius Scaliger alicubi scribit
de dilatatione & contractione Angelorum, non possi licite se in infinite
rum extendere, nec in puncti specialis coangustare. Quia autem Deum
positivè infinitum agnoscit (i. e. ubique existimem) quod tu meritò facis,
non video, si liberæ ratione permittatur, quod háfiìter, quin continuò
etiam admittat nullibi otiosum, sed eodem juris, fàdemque facilitatem quà
hanc nostrar, ubi nos degimus, vel quoutque oculi animatique nofer per-
vadit.
vadit, materiam ubique produxisse. Sed sufius acturus eram quam infinitutui; hunc impetum suprimo, nce tibi sim molestior.

II.

Cum ait, si tantum quod nos sit infinita, re vera erit finita.

Aio, addoqute insuper consequentiam esse manifestissimam, quoniam particula (tantum) plane excludit omnem infinitatem ade raequae tantum quoad nos dicitur infinita, ac proinde re vera erit finita extensio; Mentem autem meam hic attingere ea de quibus pronuncio, cum planissime mihi conficerit mundum aut finitum esse aut infinitum, ut paulo ante insinuavi.

III.

Atque ita supponere Deum habere partes extra partes, & esse divisibilem, omnemque prorsus rei corporae essentiam illi tribuere.

Nullam tribuo. Nego enim extensionem corpori competere quatenus corpus est, sed quatenus ens, aut saltem substantia est. Praeterea cum Deus, quantum mens humana Deum capiat, sit totus ubique, integrasque sua essentia omnibus locis sive spatiis spatiorumque punctis adfit, non sequitur quod partes haberet extra partes, aut, quod consequens est, quod sit divisibilis, quamvis ardet consertamque loca omnia occupet, nullis relictis intervallis. Unde praeventiam, feu amplitudeinem, ut ipsa vocas, divinam, menfurabilem agnofoam, Deum autem ipsum divisibilem nullo modo.

Quod autem Deus singula mundi puncta occupet, patentur ad unum omnes tam Idiote quam Philosophi, ipsque clarè & distinctè animo perciption & complector. Jam verò eodem modo se habet effentia divina intra atque extra mundum, ita ut si singamus mundum coelo stellato visibili, centrum divinæ essentiae; totatisque ejus praeventia, eodem modo repeteretur extra coelum stellatum, quod intra clarè concipimus repeti atque reiterari. Hanc autem repetitionem centri divini, quæ mundum occupat, ulteriori productam, infinita par est extra coelum visibile spatium secum expandere; quam mihi comitetur materia tua indefinita, actum erit de tuis vorticibus. Atque ut hae molliora videantur, expe-riamur affensus nostros in successiva Dei duratione.

Deus est æternum, h.e. vita divina omnes seculorum evolutiones rerum, rationes, praeteritarum, futurarum & praeventium, simul comprehendit. Hac tamen vita æterna singulis etiam temporis insidet qualì atque inequitat momentis; ita ut rectè verèque dicamus Deum per tot dies, menues, horàsve intra æternitate fretum. Exempli causâ, si supponamus mundum ante centum annos conditum, annon integra illa omnìque complectens Dei æternitas per horas, dies, menues & annos (putà centum) succedentes ad hunc uiue diem duravit? At verò nihilò alter est Deus à mundo condito ac fuit ante mundum conditum.

Manifestum igitur est, praeter æternitatem infinitam, in Deum etiam cadere durationis successionem. Quod si admittimus, cur non extensionem etiam infinita spatia adimplerent pariter ac infinitam durationis successionem illi tribueamus?

Imò verò quoties altius & anquisìtiùs istis de rebus mecum cogito, ea fum
Epistola Secunda H. Mori ad R. Cartesium.

fum in sententia, quod utraque extensio, tam spatii quam temporis, Non-entibus juxta atque Entibus competere possit; tulpicorque aequo
ex praedico fieri posse, cun omnia ea que sensu manubulique uturpamus, utpote crafa & corporeae, sperem sint extensa, quod & contra omnia ex-
tenfa protinus conclusimus corporea, quam quod eodem sensus praedici-
cium facit ut putemus aliqua que non sunt corporea extendi.

Quod autem extensio cadat in non-ens, ex eo conceptrum capimus,
quod extendi nihil alium inuit nisi partes extera extra partes. Pars autem
& totum, subjectum & adjunctum, causa & effectum, adversa & relata,
contradictentia & privantia, & id genus universa, notiones Logicae sunt;
easque tam non entibus quam entibus applicamus: Unde non sequitur,
quod quidquid concipimus partes habere extra partes, ens fit reale con-
cipiendum.

Sed quoties hic colluciantur mentes humanae cum propriis umbris, aut,
lascivientium carolorum inftar, propriis ludunt cum caudis: Nam istiul-
modi profecto pugnae atque lufus ibi inifituuntur a mente nostra, dum
rationes modolique Logicos, juxta quos res externas considerat, non ad-
vertit suos duntaxat se cogitandi modos, fed putans eos esse aequal in
rebus ipsis a se distinctum, luam captando quasi caudam, ad lafitudinem
ufque luditur miferique illaqueatur. Sed plura quam vellem imprudens
hic effutii : Ad reliqua propero.

IV.

Ubi cumque enim locut ille consciapatur, ibi aliqua materia est.

Nae tu hic cautus homo es, & elegantem modo aut, admittis raman
tandum mundum esse infinitum, si Aristoteles infinitum recte definit, 
Phyl. 1, 3, & alii in eis eis, cujus aliquid semper est extra. Nihil nunc est
ulterior quoq difideamus.

V.

Sed nihilominus existimo maximam esse differentiam inter ampli-
tudinem ipsius corporeae extensionis, &c.

Et ipse pariter existimo immunte quantum diiferre divinam amplitute-
num & corpoream. Primio, quod illa sub sensum cadere non possit, hoc
possit sub sensum cadere. Deinde, quod illa sit increata & independentem,
hoc dependens & creata. Illa porro penetrabilis, per omnia pervadens,
hoc crafa & impenetrabilis. Denique, quod illa ex totalis & integrate
effentia repetitione ubiquitaria, hoc ab externa, fed immediata, partium
applicatione & juxtapositione orta sit; ita ut nemo, nisi plumbeus plane
fit atque insigniter hebes, lupficari possit,

Impia nos rationis inire elementa, viamque
Indogredi scientis, (ut & ille loquitur.)

Praetertim cun ex Theologis sunt, illeque alias fortes sat scripulosis, qui
tamen agnoecunt Deum, fi voluisse, potuisse mundum ab aeterno creare.
Et tamen aequo abfursum videntur infinitam durationem, ac magnitudinem
infinitam mundo tribuere.
VI.

Unum enim est ex praecipuis, meoque judicio certissimis, Physica mea fundamentis.

Quod sit materia indeterminata, nullitate, absolute, fundamentum esse Physica tuae apprimi necessarium sit intelligi, & certe nullus dubito quin verum sit: sed an veram demonstrandi rationem insequutur is, id equidem ambiguo: Cùm principium illius demonstrationis sit, omne fundamentum esse realis ac corporeum; quod mihi fateor nondum constare, ob rationes a me superdata. Imó vero, ut ingenuè fatear quod mihi jam in mentem venit, si neque nudum spatium, prout postulat tuae demonstratio, nec Deus omnino extenditur, né indefinita quidem materia opus est tuae Philosophiae, certus finitusque studiorum numerus suffecerit. Mundi enim hujus finitas latera non habebunt quo recedanr, nee dehiscere poterunt mediis vortices, ne intermedium spatium extendatur, novusque non-ens induat dimensiones. Sed tamen naturalis impetus alió mihi praecipitat, in hanc utique fidem, secundum nempe divinam, cum nullibi sit oriosa, ubique locorum materiam produxìste, nullis vel angustissimis praetermissis intervallis.

Quæ tam facilè cùm admitto, Philosophia tua apud me non corrueat ob defectum dicti fundamenti. Plancèque video Physices tuae veritatem non tam apertè & oftensivè se exerere in hoc vel illo articulo, quâm ex universalium omnium filo & textura elucièere, ut ipse rectissimè mones Part. 4. artic. 233. Quòd si quis integrum tuae Philosophiae faciem simul contuerit, tam concinna est, sicque juxta ac rerum phænomenis consensa, ut meritò imaginetur, te Naturam ipsum opificem vidisse ab hoc polito spectculo enitentem.

Ad Responsum circa Difficultatem ultimam

Instantia I.

Sed nulli praedictio magis omnes absuevimus, &c.

Quod mihi de me ipsò confat plur quàm fatis, ab hujusce enim prædicti laqueis sentio me expediri non posse ullo modo.

II.

Proficiscum enim me posse perficè illa omnia ut a sola membrorum conformatione præfecta explicare.

Lata tanè & judicand Provincia! Hoc est praetiteris, ( & credo quantum ingenium humanum poterit te hac in re praetituturum in quinta textâ parte Physice tuae; quas, ut audio ferè a te perfectas jam esse & absolutas, ita vidè exspecto efficiéntique rogo, ut quamprimum potest fieri lucem videant, vel potius ut nos in ipsis ulteriorem naturæ lumine videamus: sed ad rem redeo) Hoc, inquam, si praefiteris, agnosce te demonstrasse in brutos animantibus ineffe animam, neminem demonstrare posse: Sed interea loci, quod & ipse submones, quod non sit anima in brutis, te necdum demonstrasse, nec demonstrare posse ullo modo.

III.
III.

Præter hanc unam, quod cum habēant oculos, audres, &c.

Maximum, meo judicio, argumentum est, quod tam subtiliter sibi præca-veant & prospicient, ut narratianculis veris pariter ac mirandis, si otium effet, demonstrare posset. Sed credo te in consimiles historias in-cidisse, me autem in nullis extant libris.

IV.

Quod non sit tiam probabile omnes vermes, culices, erucas, &c.

Nisi fortè imaginemur illiusmodi animas, Mundi Vita, quem appellant "Ficinus", arenam quasi esse ac pulverem, & infinita ferè ex illo penario, animarum agmina fatali quodam impetu in preparatum materiam semper prolabi. Sed concedo hac citius dici posse quàm demonstrari.

V.

Ut aliquid voce vel nutibus indicaret, &c.

Annon canes annuunt caudis, ut nos capitemur annis brevibus latrars, sed canes mendicant. Imo vero aliquando Domini cubitum pede, quæ possumrum cum reverentia, tangentes, quasi fùi ubi, blandò hoc cum signo commonefaciunt.

VI.

Quam maximè stupidi ac mente capti, &c. non autem ullam brutum, &c.

Nec infantes ulli per aliquàm multa saltem mensiam spatiam, quamvis: plorent, rideant, irascantur, &c. Nec diffidias tamen, opinor, quin in-fantes sint animati, animâaque habeant cogitamentum.

Responsa hae sunt (Vir Illustriiffime) quæ tuis prœclaris Responsis mihi visum est reponere. Quæ et æquæ grata futura sint ac nuperæ meæ objectiones, fanè praäfigere non possum.

Humanitas tua quand verfus ètas perspexi, & diuturnior cum scriptis tuis confuetudo, audientiorem me fecerunt, vereor nè fuerim prolixus nîmii et molestus.

Equidem ferme obtitus eram potissimi mei instituti, quod non fuit aernas tecum altercationes reciprocâre; sed cum hanc opportunitatem sim nactus, tanti viri de rebus quæ fo obstulerint Philosophicis judicium pla-cidâ experiri, & praecipue si qua difficultas emergiret inter legendos tios libros, teipsum audire interpretantem. Quam profèce gratiam si lubens facilisque concepieris, fannmopere mi tibi devincies.

Et fanè quâm lubenter eximiae tuae artis ac peritiae mihi copiam feceris, certum est jâm nunc in paucis quibusdam periculum facere.

Primò ignit quærò, An ë Deò ita statui, aut alio quovis modo fieri potuisse, ut mundus esset finitus, id est certo aliquo millarium num-mero circumscriptus. Non leve enim argumentum videtur mundum posse esse finitum, quod plerique omnes impossibile putant esse in-finitum.

Secundò, Siquid mundi hujus finibus propò affideret, quærò an possit gladium per mundi latera ad capulum usque tranfinittere, ët ët totus ferè
Quaeque etiam efficiet ut terra circu saum axem gyret, & c. Quomodo efficiet Luna ut terra uno die gyros suis abfolvat, cum ipfa 30 ferè dies in suas absumat periodos? Quæ vero scribuntur Artic. 151. hac quaestionem, opinor, non attingunt.

Quinto, de particulis ifitis contortis, quas friatas vocas, Quomodo ita contorqueri potuerunt, & eo ipso in infinita fragmina & atomos non disjungi? Quem lentorem, quam tenacitatem in prima illa materia, fibi ubiqui simili & homogenea, imaginari possimus? Unde mollescere ibi particulæ primum, indeque obscurerunt?

Sexto, Artic. 189. Part. 4, animam sive mentem intime cerebro con-/junitam. Perlubenter equidem hic audirem sententiam tuam de conjunctione animæ cum corpore: An cum toto corpore conjungatur, an cum cerebro folo, an vero in solum conarium, tanquam in parvulum aliquod ergastulum, compingatur. Id enim fedem sensus communem, animâque aèxempli, à te monitus agnosco. Dubito tamen annon per universum corpus animæ pervadat. Deinde quero ex te, cùm anima nullas habeat nec ramosæ nec hamatas particulas, quomodo tam arcte unitur cum corpore. Sciscitórique subindo, annon aliquid exercit se in natura, cujus nulla ratio Mechanica reddi potest. Illud dunque, cujus in nobis coniectum, quo oritur modo? Quæque ratio fit imperii animæ nostræ in spiritibus animales, quâ potest eos amandare in quamlibet corporis partem? Quodo fagarum spiritus, quos vocant familiares, materiam tam apte fìbi adaptant arque constringunt, ut visibles & palpables se exhibeant excrandis vetulis? Hoc autem fieri non solum vetulæ, sed juvenes fàce, nullâ vi coactæ, sponte mihi faftæ sunt non paucæ. Porro, annon & ipfi hoc ipsum aliquo modo in animabus nostris experimur, dum pro arbitrio nostro spiritus nostròs animales ciere & sistere, exerere & revocare possumus? Quoero igitur, numquid dedeceret hominem Philosophum in rerum universitéate substantiam aliquam agnoscre incorpoream, quæ tamen Bb possit
possit aut omnes, aut saltem plurimas, affectiones corporea, non fecus ac ipfa corpora in se mutuo, ut corpus aliquod imprimere, quales sunt motus, figura, situs partium &c. Imò vero, cum ferme contet de motu; fine mora superaddere etiam quae motus consequentia sunt, ut dividere, conunge, dislipare, vincire, figurare particias, figuratas disponere, expositas rotare, vel quovis modo movere, rotatas continere, & id genus alio; unde lumen, colores, & reliqua sensus objecta prodir necesse est, juxta eximiam tuam Philosophiam.

Praeterea, cum nihil nec corporeum neque incorporeum potest agere in aliud nisi per applicationem sua effentiae, necesse infuper ducere, ut, sive Angelus sit, sive Daemon, sive anima, sive Deus, qui agat praedictis modis in materiam, effentia cujuslibet inequitet quasi illis materia partibus in quas agit, aut aliquibus alius quae in has iphas agant per motus transmussionem, imò ut integra aliquando adfint materia quam gubernat & modificat; ut constat in Genis, sive bonis sive malignis, qui se humanis oculis patefcreant: Aliter enim qui poterant constringere materia, & in hae vel illa figura continere?

Postremò, Cum tam flupendam virtutem habet substantia incorporea, ut per nudam sui applicationem, fine funiculis aut uncis, fine fundis aut cuneiis, materiam constringat, explicit, dividit, projicit, & fimul retenat, nonne verisimile videatur ut in seipsum fesse posset colligere, cum nulla obstet impenetrabilis, & diffundere se denuo, & similia?

Hac abs te peto, Vir docet itine, quantum per ortum licebit, ut dignatus exponere, utiptote quem scio tam intima quam extima Naturæ mysteria rimatum esse, commodèque interpretari posse.

Septimò, de globulis æthereis quære, Si Deus mundum ab æterno condidisset, annon multis abhinc annis comminuti & contrafcti suissent ititi globuli in partes indefinitè subtiles; mutuis collisionibus vel attritio-nibus, primique Elementi faciem jam olim induissent, ita ut universus mundus in unam immensam flamman multa antè secula abiísser:

Octavo, de partículis tuis aqueis, longis, teretibus, & flexibilibus, Numquid habent poros? Id sánæ ihi non videtur probabile, cum sint simplicia corpora, partículaque præma ex nullis aliiis partículis compli-catae, sed fragmina ex integra primâque materia elísa, ac proinde planè homogenea. Hinc dubito, qui poterunt flecitì fine penetratione dimensionum. Putamus enim alicuando ad annulì inftar incurvari; Superficies concava minor eit convexa, &c, Rem probè tenes. Non est quod híc immorer.

Nec tamen si poros habere contenderes, quod nunquam opinor facies, difficulatatem toller. Quippe quòd quæstio tunc insitus est de pororum labris vel lateribus: Necessefario enim alicuando flectetur quod non habet poros.

Atque haec difficultas pertinet non solùm ad oblongas suas partículas, sed etiam ad ramoselas illas, aliaëque ferme omnes, quas flectì necesse est, & tamen non disrupi.

Nonò, & ultimo, Utrum materia, sive æternum singamus sive hefter-no die creatam, fíbi liberè permissa, nullâque aliunde impullium fulci-piens, moveretur, an quieceret. Deinde, an quies sit modus corporis privativus,
privativus, an vero positivus. Et sine positivum malles sine privativum, unde confert utrumlibet. An denique ulla res affectirionem ullam habere posset naturaliter & a fe, qua penitus poteft destruiti, vel quam aliunde posset adscircere.

Hacenus fer& circa generalia pra&clara: Physices fundamenta luft, dicam, an potius laboravi & progrescurus posthae ad specialiora, si facilitas tua atque comitas e&o me invitaverit, aut faltam permiferit. Et aequiori fan& animo fer&es, cum hic de primis agatur principiis, si superficiose omnia examinavi, viamque quasi palpando, singulaque curiosius contredicavi, lente me promovi & testudineo gradu. Video enim ingenium humanum it& comparatum esse, ut facilius longe quid consequens sic difpiciat, quam quid in natura primo verum; noftramque omnium conditionem non multum abludere ab illa Archimedis, &e: urdo, g. uniow y g w. Ubi primum figamus pedem invenire multo magis fatagimus, quam ubi invenimus ulterior progre&.

Quod ad mirificas illas structuras attinet quas ex iltis principiis generalibus erexitfi, quamvis prima fronte adeo sublimes & ab aspectu nofro remotae viderentur, ut omnia apparetur nugibus tenebrisque obvoluta, dies tamen difficultates comminuit, paulatimque evanuerunt ita obscuritates, adeo ut perpaucae, pra& quod tum factum est, in conspectum jam veniant.

Hoc autem neceffe duxi ut profiterer, ne aeternum a me expectes tibi creatum iri negotium, sed lubenti& mihi defcibas, parique humanitate hafce efficitationes meas accipias qua primas quas mihi objecriones. Quod si feceris (clariffime Cartesi) supras quam dicit posset tibi obstrictum dabis

Humanitatis tua ac Sapientiae  
admiratorem religiosissimam  
HEN. MORUM.
aquata: nam si referatur ad sensus nostros, non convenit tenuissimis materiā partículis: si ad alios imaginarios, quales vis ad Dei posse fabricari, forsan etiam Angelis & Animabus conveniet, non enim faciliūs intelligo nervos sentórios adeò subtiles, ut à quām minutíssimi materiā partículis moveri possint, quām aliquam faculatem cujus ope mens nostra possit alias mentes immediatē sentire sive perciπere. Quamvis autem in extensio habitudinem partium ad invicem facile comprehendamur, videor tamen extensioem optimē perciπere, quamvis de habitudine partium ad invicem planē non cogitem: Quod debeat etiam potiori jure quam ego admittere, qua extensioem ita concipis. ut Deo conveniat, & tamen in eo nullas partes admittis.

Nondum demonstratur Tangibilitatem aut Impenetrabilitatem proprias esse substantiæ extensæ affectiones. Si concipis extensioem per habitudinem partium ad invicem, non vidēris negare posse quin unaquāque ejus pars alias vicinas rango, hæcque tangibilitas est vera proprietas, & rei intrinœca, non autem ea quae à sensu tætūs denominatur.

Non potest etiam intelligi nam partem rei extensæ aliam sibi æqualem penetrare, quin hoc ipso intelligatur medium partem ejus extensiois tolli vel annihilari, quod autem annihilatur aliud non penetrat: sicque meo judicio demonstratur impenetrabilitatem ad effectiam extensiois, non autem ullius alterius rei, pertinent.

Affero aliam esse extensionem quæ veram. Tandum igitur de re convenimus, supereft quœstio de nomine, an haec posterior extensio quœ vera sit dicenda. Quantum autem ad me, nullam intelligo nec in Deo nec in Angelis vel mente nostra extensionem substantiæ, sed potentiam duntaxat: ita ēlicet ut possit Angelus potentiam suam exercere nunc in majorem, nunc in minorem substantiæ corporeæ partem: nam si nullum esset corpus, nullum etiam ipatium intelligerem cui Angelus vel Deus esset coextensus. Quod autem quis extensionem, quæ soliūs potentiae esset, tribuat substantiæ, ejus prajudicium esse puto, quo omnem substantiam, & ipsum Deum, supponit imaginabilem.

Ad secundas Instantias.

Une vacui spatii partes absorbeant alteras, &c. Hic repeti, si absorbeantur, ergò media pars spatii tollitur & esse definit, quod autem esse definit aliud non penetrat; ergò impenetrabilitas in omni spatio esset admittenda.

Intermundium illud suam hæceret durationem, &c. Puto implicare contradictionem, ut concipiamus aliquam durationem intercedere inter destructionem prioris mundi & novi creationem. Nam si durationem iñtam ad succussionem cogitationum divinarum vel quid similis referamus, ert error intellectus, non vera ullius rei perception. Ad sequentiam jam respondi, notando extensionem quæ rebus incorporeis tribuitur esse potentiae duntaxat, non substantiæ; quæ potentia cum sit tantum modus in re ad quam applicatur, sublato extenso cui coëxifat, non potest intelligi esse extensa.
Ad penultimas Instantias.

Deum positivi infinitum, id est, ubique existentem, &c. Hoc ubique non admitto. Videris enim hic infinitatem Dei in eo ponere, quod ubique existat: cui opinioni non assentior, sed puto Deum ratione suae potentiae ubique esse, ratione autem suae effentiae nullam planè habere relationem ad locum.Cum autem in Deo potentia & effentia non distinguantur, sitius esse puto in calibus de mente nostra vel Angelis, tanquam perceptioni nostrae magis adaequatis, quam de Deo, ratiocinari. Sequentes difficulitates ex eo prejudicio mihi videntur omnes ortæ, quod nimis affluverimus quaslibet substantias, etiam eas quas corpora esse negamus, tanquam extensas imaginari, & de entibus rationis interpenetrant Philosophani, entis fidei rei proprietates non enti tribuendo. Sed rectè memineo, non entis nulla esse posse vera attributa, nec de eo posse ullo modo intelligi partem & totum, subjectum, adjectum, &c. Ideoque optimè concludis cum propriis umbris mente lucem, cum entia Logica considerat.

Certus finitisque studiorum numerus suffecerit, &c. Sed repugnat meo conceptui ut mundo aliquid terminum tribuam, nec aliam habeo menduram eorum esse, qui affirmare debeo vel negare quam propriam perceptionem. Dico idcirco mundum esse indeterminatum vel indefinitum, quia nullus in eo terminos agnoço; sed non in unum vocare infinitum, quia percipio Deum esse mundo majorem, non ratione extensionis, quam, ut fape dixi, nullam propriam in Deo intelligo, sed ratione perfectionis.

Ad ultimas Instantias.

Hoc si praefiteris, &c. Non certus sum max Philosophiae continuationem unquam in lucem profiteram, quia pendet à multis experimentis, quorum faciendorum necio an copiam fini unquam habiturus; sed spero me hac afferate brevem tractatum de Affectibus editurum, ex quo apparet bit quo pacto in nobis ipsis omnibus motus membrorum, qui affectus nostros comitantur, non ab anima, sed ad sola corporis machinatione peragiti existimem. Quod autem Canes annuntiant Canis, &c. Sunt tantum motus qui comitantur affectibus, eosque accuratè distinguendos puto à loquela, qua sola cogitationem in corpore latentem demonstrare. Nec infantes ulli, &c. Dispars est ratio infantium & brutorum: Nec judicarem infantibus esse præditos, nisi viderem eos esse eundem naturam cum adultis: bruta autem eoufque nunquam adolecunt, ut aliqua in ipsis cogitationibus nota certa deprehendatur.

Ad Quæstiones.

Ad primam. Repugnat conceptui meo, fide, quod idem est, puto implicare contradictionem, ut mundus sit finitus vel terminatus, quia non possit omnem non speculam spatium ultra quaslibet presuppositos mundi fines; tale autem spatium apud me est verum corpus: nec moror quod ab alius
nullis imaginariium vocetur, & idque mundus finitus existimetur; novi enim ex quibus praetudiciis error iste profectus est.

Ad secundam. Imaginando gladium traiici ultra mundi fines, octendis te etiam non concipere mundum finitum, omnem enim locum ad quem gladius pertingit, revera concipis ut mundi partem, quamvis illud quod concipis vacuum voces.

Ad tertiam. Non melius possim explicare vim reciprocam in mutua duorum corporum ab invicem separatione, quam si tibi ponam ob oculos navigiolum aliquod haren's in luto juxta fluminis ripam, & duos homines, quorum unus flans in ripa navigiolum manibus pellet, ut illud ad terra removeat, eodemque proflus modo alius flans in navigio ripam manibus pellet, ut illud idem a terrare moveat. Si enim horum hominum vires sint aequalis, conatus eijus qui terrae infinit, terraque idcirco conjunctus est, non minus conferat ad motum navigii quam conatus alterius qui cum navigio transfertur. Unde patet actioem qua navigium a terra recedit non minorem effer in ipfa terrae quam in navigio. Nec est difficultas de eo qui a te fedeante recedit; cum enim de translatione hic loquo, intelligo tantum eam quae fit per separationem duorum corporum & immediate tangentium.

Ad quartam. Motus Lunae determinat materiam coelestem, & ex consequenti etiam terram in ea contentam, ut versus unam partem potius quae versus aliam, nempe in figura ibi posita, ut ab A versus B, potius quae versus D, flectatur, non autem dat ei celeritatem motus: & quia hiac celeritas pendet a materia coelesti, quae propter propter eadem est juxta Terram ac juxta Lunam, deberet Terra duplo celerius convolvi quam convolvit, ut circiter sexages circulum sium absolveret eo tempore quo Luna femel percurrit sium sexages majorem, nisi obfurrec magnitudo, ut in Artic. 151, p. 3; dictum est.

Ad quintam. Nullum suppono esse lentorem nullâmque tenacitatem in minus materie particulis, nisi quemadmodum in sensibilibus & magnis, quae nempe ex motu & quiev partum dependet. Sed notandum est, ipfas particulas sfiaras formari ex materia subtilissima, & divisa in minutias innumerabiles vel numero indefinitas, quae ad ipfas componendas simul junguntur, adeo ut plures diversas minutias in unaque particula sfiata concipiam quan vulgus hominum in aliis corporibus valde magnis.

Ad sextam. Conatus sum explicare maximam partem eorum quae hic petis in tractatu de affectibus. Addo tantum, nihil mihi haecenus occur- ri fi circa naturam rerum materialium cujus rationem mechanicam non facillime possim excogitare. Atque ut non dedecet hominem Philosophum putare Deum posse corpus movere, quamvis non putet Deum esse corporum; ita etiam eum non dedecet alicuid simile de aliis substantiis incorporatis judicare. Et quamvis existimem nullum agendi modum Deo & creaturis univocé convenire, faietor tamen me nullam in mente mea ideam reperire quæ repræfentet modum quo Deus vel Angelus materiam potest movere, diverfam ab ea quae mihi exhibet modum quo ego per meam cogitationem corpus meum movere me posse mihi conficius sum.

Nec
Epistola Tertia H. Morii ad R. Cartesium.

Nec vero mens mea potest se modò extendere, modò colligere, in ordine ad locum, ratione substantiali sua, sed tantum ratione potentiae quam potest ad majora vel minora corpora applicare.

Ad septimam. Si mundus ab æterno suisset, procul dubio haec Terra non manifestet ab æterno, sed alia alibi producere suisset, nec omnis materia abisset in primum Elementum: ut enim quodam ejus partes uno in loco comminuuntur, ita alia in alio loco simul coalescent; nec plus est motus vise agitationis in tota rerum universitate uno tempore quàm alio.

Ad octavum. Particulas aquæ, aliisque omnes quæ sunt in terra, poros habere sequitur evidenter ex modo quo terræ productionem descripsit, nempe à partibus materiae primi elementi simul coalescentibus: cum enim hoc primum Elementum nullis confert partibus nisi indefinité divisì, hinc sequitur concipiendos esse poros utque ad ultimam possibilem divisionem in omnibus corporibus ex eo confatis.

Ad nonum. Ex ipsis quibus adest dixi de duobus hominibus, quarum unus movetur una cum navigio, alius in ripa stat immutus, fatis ostendi me putare nihil esse in unius motu magis positivum quàm in alterius quiete.

Quid siibi velint haec tua ultima verba, An ulla res affectiorem habere potest naturaliter et à se, quà penitus potest desitui, vel quam aliunde potest adscire, non fatis percipio.

Caeterum velim ut pro certo existimes mihi semper fore gratissimum ea accipere quæ de scriptis meis vel quaeres vel objectis, & pro viribus responsum esse.


Olyfrisissimo viro, Principiique Philosopho,

RENATO DES-CARTES,

HENRICUS MORUS.

VIX me abstinebam (Vir Clarissime) quin ab acceptis tuis litteris continuò ad te rescriberem: quamvis prosectò id à me factum suisset incivilis; quippe quod fatis existimem intelligerem te per septimanas bene multas negotias fore distico universum. Quin & mihi ipsi tum temporis à patris obitu acciderunt multa quæ me alió avocarent, impediveruntque adeò ut quod voluissem maximè prætare, haud commodo potuissim. Jam vero ad te tuaque reversus, fatisque nactus ostii, rescribo, gratiasque ago maximas, quod quaerendi de tuis scriptis quod luber objiciendi plenum mihi jus tam liberè benigne concederis.

Caeterum, ne abuti videas hac summa humanitate tua ad prolixiores alterationes (nam haec enim in loco Philosophiae verfati sumus qui Bb 4 B. 2030.)
Epistola Tertia H. Mori ad R. Cartesium.

...lucubritique subtilitatisbus opportunitur exitit, in confiniis unique Physics, Metaphysicæ & Logicæ) ad ea propero quæ certum magis firmunque judicium capiunt.

Obiter tantum notabo, atque primò ad Responfionem ad Infantias primas; Quantum ad Angelos animatis separatas, si immediate suas invicem deprehendant effentias, id non dici posse fenum propriâ, si ipsos fingas penitus incorpores. Me verò lubentem cum Platonics, antiquis Patribus, Magisque ferme omnibus; & animas & geniis omnes, tam bonos quàm malos, planè corporeos agnoscere, ac pròinde fenum habere propriâ dictum (i. e.) mediante corpore, quo induuntur, eortum. Et protetctò cùm nihil non magnum de tuo ingenio mihi policœar, perquam gratissimum effet si coniecturas suas, quas credo pro ea qua polles fagacitate ac acumine fore ingeniöfissimas, mecum breviter communícibus super lacre. Nam quòd quidam magníficè se efferunt in non admittingo substantias ullass quas vocant separatas, ut daemonas, Angelos, animatis post mortem superflites, & maximopere hic sibi applaudunt, quasi re bene gestâ, & tanquam eo ipso longè sapientiores evallisent cæteris mortali-bus, id ego non hujus ætimo. Nam quod sapientes observavi, hi sunt, ut plurimum, aut Taurini fanguinis homines, perdiréque melancholici, aut immæquantum fensibus & voluptatibus dediti; Atque denique, faltrem fì permetteret religio, quà fola superflitosè fret Deum effe agnoscat. Me verô non pudet palam profiteri, me vel femoni omni Religionis imperio, meâ fponde agnoscre genios esse atque Deum; nec ullum alium tamen me posse admittere, nisi qualem optimus quisque ac sapientissimus exoptaret, fi deeflet, existere. Unde semper fupicitus fum, profìgatissimi improbatis fummæque fupeditatis triumphum esse Atheitifum; Atheorûmque gloriationem perinde effe ac si fultissimus populus de sapientissimi benignissimique Principis cepe ovarent inter se & gratularentur. Sed neécio quo impetu hoc excurfum eff. Redeo.

Secundò, Quod ad demonstrationem illum tuam attiner, quà concludis omnem substantiam extensam esse tangibilem & impenetrabilem; videor mihì hæc posse regerere: in aliqua felicit substantia extensa partes extra partes esse posse, fineulla evirto-nsa, seu mutua resistentia, atque hinc perit propriè dicta Tangibilitas. Deinde, extensisonem simul cum substantia in reliquam replicari extensionem & substantiam, nec deperdi magis quàm illam substantiæ partem quà retrahitur in alteram; atque hinc cadit illa Impenetrabilitas: quæ profiteor me clarè & dfinquente animo concipere. Quòd autem aliquid reale claudi posset,fineulla hœe diminutione minoribus majoribusque terminis, conflat in motu, ex tuis ipsius principis, Nam idem numero motus nunc majus nunc minus subjìctum occupat, juxta tuam etiam sententiam. Ego verò pari facilitate & perspicuitate concipio dare posse substantiam quàe fineulla hœe imminatione dilatari & contrahi posset, sive per se id fiat, sive aliunde.

Postremò igitur, Et demíror equidem quòd ne in intellectu tuum cadere posset, quòd aut mens humana aut Angelus hoc ferme modo sint extensi, quæ implicaret contradictionem. Cuìn ego potissim putarem implicare contradictionem quàd potentia mentis fit extensa, quà mens ipsa non sit extensa ullo modo. Cùm enim potentia mentis fit modus mentis
Epistola Tertia H. Mori ad R. Carcesium.

mentis intrinseca, non est extra mentem ipsum, ut pater. Et confimilis ratio est de Deo: unde me confimilis firer admirario, quod in Respon-

dione ad penultimas Instantias concedis eum ubique esse ratione potentia, non ratione effentiae; quasi potentia Divina, qua Dei modus est, extra

Deum effe sita, cum modus realis quilibet intimé semper insit rei cuius

est modus: Unde necesse est Deum esse ubique, si potentia ejus ubi-

que sit.

Neque suspiciari possimus per potentiam Dei intelligi te velle effectum

in materiam tranfinissum. Quod si hoc intelligas, non video tamen quin
eodem res recitad. Nam hic effectus non transmittitur nisi per poten-
tiam Divinam, quae attingit materiam suspicientem, hoc est, modo aliquo
reali unitur cum ea, ac proinde extenditur; nec tamen interea separatur
ab ipsa Divina Effentia. Videatur enim, ut dixi, confpiciua contradiction.
Sed hifice statui non immorandum.

Ad Quæstiones tranfivolando, postquam monuerim, quam contristat an- 

num continuationis tuae Philofophiæ desperatio: Sed aquire refcribant

tamen certe philosophi minus desideratissimi quem hanc aetas partura-
tis; citò & feliciter in lucem prodeat exopto.

Ad Respon. ad Quæstiones.

Ad primam & secundam respondes sanè constanter & convenienter

tuis principis, quod a quolibet, nisi sententia vicerit melior, & exspecto,

laudo.

Ad tertiam; Ex navigiolo illo tuo has mihi comparavi merces. 1. In

motu esse mutuum eorum quæ moveri dicuntur renixum, 2. Quietem

esse actionem, nempe renixum quendam, sine resistentiam. 3. Moveri
duo corpora, esse immediate separari. 4. Immediatam illam separationem

eesse motum illum, sive translationem, praecipe sumptum.

Cum vero duo corpora se expediant a se invicem, nisi vim in utroque

expedixerece & avulsiorem adjectives notiones translationis, seu motus,

motus hic erit extrinsecus tantum respectus, aut aliquod fortasse levit.

Separari enim vel significat, superficies corporum quæ se modo mutuo
tangebant diffare a se invicem, (distantia autem corporum extrinsecus

tantum est respectus,) vel significat non tangere quæ modo tangebant,

qua privatio duntaxat est, vel negatio. Certè de sententia tua hac in re

non fatis clarè mihi constat.

Ego vero, si mihi ipsi permiterer, judicarem motum esse vimillum vel

actionem quà se a se invicem mutuo expediant corpora qua dicis moveri,
immediatam autem illam separationem eorumdem esse effectum dictorum

motuum, quamvis sit vel nuius duntaxat respectus, vel privatio. Sed

alter tibi visum est Philo sophiæ in explicatione definitionis Motus, 

Artic, 25. Part. 2, ubi equidem mentem tuam non plenè capio.

Ad reliquas Quæstiones omnes quas propofoi respondisti perspicue &
appositè. Sed ad plenorem intelligentiam eorum quæ ad sextam acum-

mulavi, exspecto dum prodeat exoptatissimus tuus libellus de Ate-

ATIBUS.

Cæterum, quantum ad verba illa mea ultima, Annalares, &c, partu-

ribat
Epistola Tertia H. Mori ad R. Cartesium.

ribat profectò mihi mens evanidam aliquam subtilitatem, quæ jam effugir, nec meâ interest revocare.

Hoc tantum quàrum denuò, Utrùm materia fìbi liberè permìssa, i.e. nullum aliud im pulsùm fuscipien, moveretur, an quiesceret. Si moveretur à fé naturaliter, cùm materia fit homogenea, & ea propter motus ubique effet æqualis, fequitur quòd tota materia simulac fuerit, difficieretur in partes tam infinitè exiles, ut nihil ullo modo ulteriori abradi posset ab ulla particula. Quicquid enim abradendum imaginari, jam disjectum est ac disjunctum, ob intimam vim motùs per univerbam teriam p ervadentis, vel, fì malles, intimi. Nec partium aliæ aliis magis mutuò adhæreferent, alióve cursum flectent quàm alio, cùm fìnt omnes prorsus conßimiles juxta quamlibet rationem imaginabïlem. Nulla enim figura aperitas vel angulo fìtas fìgni potefì, quæ non jarn contula fìt ad ultimum quod motus poterit praëtare, nec ulla motus in ualùs in uallis particulis ponenda est, cùm materia supponatur perfectè homogenea. Si naturaliter igitur moveretur materia, nec Sol, nec Caelum, nec Terra effet, nec vortices ulla, nec heterogeneum quicquam, fìve fensibile fìve imaginabile, in rerum natura. Ideoque perìret tuum condendi: cœlos terrâque, cæteraque sensibilia, mirificum artificio.

Quòd fì materiam quiescere dicis ex fì ni aliunde moveretur, quòdque hac quies fit positivum quid, vim in é materia aeternum pateretur, & affectio naturalis destrueretur in perpetuum, ut contra dominaretur: quod videtur duriusculum. Nec tamen tutius forfan effet quietem statuer motus privationem, fìve negationem, caderet enim omnis resistendi actio in materia quiescente, quam tamen agnoscis: Quamvis & id ipsum intellectui meo non nihil negotii facefìat. Dum enim quietem aotionem statuis materie, motum etiam eandem effe statuus necesse est; fìquidem materiam non agit nisi movendo, aut saltam conando motum. Malè profectò me habenti ifì scrupuli, quos quàm primum eximere mihi poteris, obfcreco ut eximas.

Quinetiam adeò superfìtiosè hac prima principia penfìto, ut nova jam mihi ingeratur difficultas de natura motùs. Cùm fìlícete motus corporis modus fit, ut figura, fìrns partium, &c. qui fieri posset, ut transeat ab uno corpore in aliud, magis quàm aliis modi corpori? Et universalim imaginatio mea non capit, qui posset fieri ut quicquam quod extra subjeftum esse non potefì ( cujufmodi sunt modi omnes ) in aliud migret subj ectum. Deinde quàram, cùm unum corpus in aliud minus, sed quiescens, impingit, fecúmque defert, annon quies quiescentis corporis simuliter transmigrat in deferens, æqùè ac motus moventis in quiescens? Videtur enim quies res adeò otiosa ac pigna, ut eam tadbet itineris. Cùm tamen æquà reals fit ac motus, ratio cogit eam tranfìre. Postremò, obftupefo plañè, dum confidero quòd tam levicula ac vilis res ac motus, folicibus etiam à subjefto & transmigrabilis, adeoque debilis ac evandæ naturæ ut periret protinus nisi suffentaretur à subjefto, tan potenter tamen contorqueret subj ectum, & hac vel illæc tam fortiter impellere. Equidem pròrior sum in hanc tententiam, quòd nullus prorsum fit motuum tranfìtus, sed quòd ex impulso unitatis corporis aliud corpus in motum quási expergiscur, ut anima in cogitationem ex hac vel illæ occurrent: quòdque corpus
Corpus non tam suscipiat motum, quam si in motum exerat a corpore alio commonefactum; & quod paulo ante dixi, eodem modo se habere motum ad corpus ac cogitatio se habet ad mentem, nimimur neutrum recipi, sed oriri utroque subiecto in quo inveniuntur; atque omne hoc quod corpus dicitur, sudden & semelente esse vivum, utpote quod ulti-
mam insinuamque Divina essentia, quae perfectissimam vitam autum, nimirum esse finum ac idolum, veruntamen senfu ac animadversione de-
stitutam.

Ceterum transistus ille tuus motuum a subiecto in subiectum, idque a majori in minus, & vicevillm, ut suprâ monui, optimâ reprezentat naturam meorum Spirituum extensorum, qui contraere se posseunt, & rursus expandere; penetrare facillime materiam, & non implere; agitare quovis modo ac movere, & tamen fine machinis illis & uncorum nexu. Verum diuitiis in hoc loco hâsi quâm putâram: sed ad institutum propero, hoc est, ad novas Quæstiones proponendas, super singulis illis Articulis Principiorum tuae Philosophipæ, quorum vim nondum fatis intelligo.

Ad Partis prímae Artic. 8.

Perspicue videmus, &c. Nec perspicue videmus extensionem, figu-
ram, & motum localem, ad naturam nostram pertinere, nec videmus perspicue non pertinere. Utinam hic breviter demonstres, nullum cor-
pus posse cogitare.

Ad Artic. 37.

Annon major perfectio est id folum velle posse hominem quod sibi optimum esset, quam posse etiam contrarium, cum melius sit semper felicë esse quam vel summis aliquando efferi laudibus, vel etiam semper?

Ad Artic. 54.

Hic rursus repetò, quod oportebat demonstrare, nihil extensum cogi-
tare, aut quod videbatur facilius, nullum corpus posse cogitare. Est enim
dignum ingenio tuo argumentum.

Ad Artic. 60.

Quamvis mens posset contemploi seipsum ut rem cogitantes, exclusa omni corporeâ extensione in hoc conceptu, non tamen evincit quicquam aliud nisi quod mens posset esse corporea vel incorporea, non quod sit de facio incorporea. Iterum igitur rogandus es ut demonstrares, ex aliquibus operationibus mentis humanae qua corporea natura competere non pos-
fit, hanc mentem nostram esse incorpoream.

Ad Partis secundae Artic. 25.

Non vim vel actionem qua transferit, ut ostendam illum semper esse in
mobi, &c. Annon igitur vis ipfa atque actio motus effi in re mota?
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Ad Artic. 26.

Eftne igitur in quiescentibus perpetua quaedam vis flatoria, vel actio sistentis, & corroborandi contra impetus omnes, quibus partes eorum divelli possint & disjici, vel tamen corpus alió abripi & transferri? Adeò ut Quiæ recte definiri posse, Vis quædam vel actio interna corporis, quà corporis partes actē contrastringuntur ad fe invicem & comprimuntur, adeòque à divisione vel dimotione per impulsum alieni corporis defenduntur? Hinc enim illud configureret, quod à meo intellectu minimè alienum est, Materiam utique vitam esse quandam obscuram (utpote quam ultimam Dei ombram existimo) nec in sola extensione partium constringere, sed in aliquali semper actione, hoc est, vel in quiete vel in motu, quorum utrumque revera actionem esse ipse concedis.

Ad Artic. 30.

Hic articulus videtur continere demonstrationem evidentissimam, quod translatio five motus localis (nisi extrinsecus fit corporum respectus duntaxat) non fit reciprocus ullo modo.

Ad Artic. 36.

Quæro, annon mens humana dum spiritus accendit attentius diutiusque cogitando, corporisque insuper ipsis calefacit, motum augeat universi?

Ad Artic. 55.

Nunc videtur cubus perfectè durus perfectèque planus motus super mensa, putè perfectè durà perfectèque plana, eo ipso instanti quo à motu sistentur æquè firmiter coalearit cum mensa ac cubi vel mensae partes cum seipsis; an manet divisus à mensa fémper, aut ad tempus saltum, post quietem? Nulla enim est compresura cubi in mensam, cum hunc motum tanquam in vacuo factum imaginemur super mensam extra mundi partem, si fieri posset, sitam, (ac proinde ubi nullus locus est gravitati vel levitati) motumque siti ex ea parte ad quam tendit cubus, Videntur igitur ex lege naturæ, cum jam divisa sint cubus & mensa, & nulla actio realis detur quâ conjungantur, mansura semper actu divisa.

Ad Artic. 56, & 57.

Non video qui sit opus ut tam amplos particularum gyros ac ludus circa corpus B describas. Videntur enim fatis, si putemus singulas aqvae particularias simili imputo moveri à materia subtilli, & aqvales esse particularum magnitudines. Hinc enim, cum B à quolibet latere brevissimis gyris vel femigryris (vel alia quacumque ratione) motus proxime adjacentium particularum contunditur, necesseari quiescit, nec in unam partem magis quam in aliam promovebitur.
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Ad Artic. 57. lineâ 19.

Nec incidunt per lineas tam rectas, &c. Quid quod jam ad circularem magis accedunt, cum antea ovalem magis referebant figuram? Non plene capio.

Ad Artic. 60.

Sed ipsas quatenus celerius aguntur in quaśibet alias partes ferri. Poffuntne igitur celeritas motûs & ejusdem determinatio divortium pati? Perinde enim videtur ac si fingamus viatorem currentem, currum quidem dirigere Londinium versus, sed celeritatem cursûs nihilominus ferri Cantabrigiam versus, vel Oxonium. Subtilitas quam neutra Universitas capiet, nisi forte intelligas per ferri, motum moliri, vel nisi ut aliquorsum fiat motus.

Ad Partis tertiar Articulum 16.

Annon juxta Ptolemaicam hypothesen Veneris lumen, ad modum Luna, nunc decreceret, nunc cresceret, quamvis non eisdem munus & legibus?

Ad Artic. 35.

Qui sit ut Planetae omnes in eodem non circumgyrentur Plano, vide licet in Plano Ecliptice, macularque adeò Solares; aut altèm in planis Ecliptice parallelis, ipsâque Luna; aut in æquatore, aut in Plano æquatori parallelo, cum a nulla interna vi dirigantur, sed externo tantum ferantur impetu.

Ad Artic. 36, 37.


Ad Artic. 55.

Quae in orbem aguntur. Sed quomodo primum inceperunt tam immensa materie spatia in gyros convolvì, vorticeque fieri?

Ad Artic. 57.

Eius partem que à funda impeditur, &c. Videtur percepti difficilius, quod lapis A impediatur à motu in D, cum nec de facto illuc unquam feratur, nec si impedimentum tolleretur illuc naturaliter pergeret; pergeret enim omnino versus C.
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Ad Artic. 59.

Novam vim motús acquiri, & tamen conatum renovari hic dicis: Nescio quâm bene cohaerent, Nam si nova vis acquiritur & superadditur, non est renovatio motús, sed augmentatio. Quod si globulus A movendo motum auget in eodem puncto baculi existens, (nam vorticis globulos hoc exemplum respicit) cur non temper motus seipsum movendo accedit & auget: Hoc autem modo jam pridem omnia in flamman abissent.

Ad Artic. 62.

Hic quæro, cùm conatus globulorum, in quo lux & lumen consitit, fiat per integram vorticis amplitudinem, ita ut basi trianguli BFD multò major esse possit quàm DB, & ab utraque productæ diametri DB, decies putà vel centies majoris factæ, extremitatibus globuli obliquo conatu in cuspidem aliquam ad F oculum equilibrat intuentis, reprimantur, cur lux, putà Solis, non major videtur quàm quæ fit intra circulum DCB:

Ad Artic. 72.

Non penitus hoc artificium contorquendi materiam primi elementi in spirales five cochleares formas intelligi; præsertim in locis ab axe paulo remotoribus. Nisi hoc fiat, non tam quod globuli torquentur circa particulas primi elementi, quàm quod ipsum primum elementum, ab ipsis fortasse globulis leviter in gyrationem determinatum, se ipsum inter triangularem illa spatia contorquet, lineasque spirales in se describat. Oro te, ut hic mentem plenius explices. Sed & alia subinde hic oritur dubitatio. Cùm particula haec contorta content ex minutissimis particulis & raptissimè agitatis, quomodo illa minutissimae particulae in ullam formam vel magnitudinem majorem coalesceant, præsertim cùm in formandis hisce particulis fistatis distortio illa sit motusque obliquitas.

Ad Artic. 82.

Tam supræmi quàm infimi, &c. Prodigii infar mihi videtur rapidus hic globulorum supremorum cursus, (praesertim si cum mediorum comparatur) & qui cauas quas in subscripto Articulo profer longè excedere. Si quid ulterior advenire possis, quo mollius hoc dogma reddatur, gratum profecto effet audire.

Ad Artic. 84.

Cur cometæ cauda, &c. Primam quamque impatience tibi obtrudo occasionem explicandi quodlibet: Rogo ut hanc rem etiam hoc in loco breviter expedias.

Ad Artic. 108.

Per partes vicinas Ecliptica 2 H in cælum abire coguntur. Quò sit ut non
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non omnes fere illuc abeam, potius quam a polo ad polum migrando vorticem, quem vocas, componat.

Ad Artic. 121. lineâ ultimâ.
Aviis causis asiduè potest mutari, &c. A quibus?

Ad Artic. 129. lin. 15.

Non prius appare quæm, &c. Cur circumfluxus illius materiæ, cum fit adeò transparentes, impedit Cometam nec videatur? Circumfluens enim materia Jovem Planetam non abdit ab oculis nostris. Et quæ necesse est ut non nisi obvolutus materiâ reliquâ vorticis Cometa inde egrediatur?

Ad Artic. 130. lineâ 21.

Minitur quidem, &c. Cur non deletur penitus, si vortex AEIO fortius, vel a quæ fortiter, urget vicinos vortices, quam ille ab ipsis urgetur?

Ad Artic. 149.

Brevi accedet ad A, &c. Cur non ad Fusque pergit, impingitque in ipsum terram?

Quia sì à rectâ linea minus defleès. Non solum constat lineam NA continuatam cum AB, lineam magis rectam constitutere quam eandem NA cum AD continuatam; sed cum Luna à centro S recedat ad modum globulorum cœlestium, magis naturaliter videtur confingere versus B, quam versus D descendere.

Ad Partis quartæ Artic. 22.

Nec Terra proprio motu cieatur, &c. Non video quid refert unde sit motus ille circularis, modò sit in Terra, nec deprehendo quin illi celerimy gyri Telluris impofita omnia recessent versus cœlos, quamvis motus non esse proprius, sed ab interna materia cœlesti profectus, nisi agitatio circumjacenti ætheris, quam supponis multò celeriorum, fatum illud praeverteret. Nec videtur Terra habere rationem corporis quiescentis, quod conatam partium recedendi à centro; (Videtur enim illud necessarium in omni corpore circulariter moto;) sed quòd simul circumvolvitur cum ambiente ætherë, nec separatur superflcies, hac forsan ratione dicitur Terra quiescere. Hæc autem dico ut ex te intelligam, annon ratio quòd partes Terræ non dissiliens ad solam celeritatem motus particularum Aetherei referenda sit.

Ad Artic. 25.

Propter suarn particularum motum iness levitas. Quid igitur existimas de frigido & cædentem ferro? Utrum præponderat? Præterea, quomodo moles aquæ levior sit ob motum partium, cum motus harum partium
tium tandem à globulis determinatur deosum. Hinc enim videtur magis accelerari decensus corporis, unde major æstimabilur gravitas. Atque hoc modo aqua auro praeponderabit.

Ad Artic. 27.

Nisi fortè aliqua exterior causa, &c. Quænam sint illæ causæ, paucis obscurc ut innuas.

Ad Artic. 133. lin. 12.

Axi parallelos, Parallelismi mentio hic me monet de difficultatibus quibusdam ferè inextricabilibus. Primo, Cur tui vortices non sint in modum columnâ, seu cylindri, potius quam ellipsis, cum quodlibet punctum axis sit quasi centrum a quo materia coelestis recedat, & quantum video, aequali profusus impetus. Deinde, Primum elementum (cum ubique ab axe oporteat globulos æquali vi recedere) cur non æqualiter per axem totum in cylindri formam produeat; sed in ipharicam figuram congeñtum ad medium ferè axis relegatur? Nam occurrus hujus elementi primi ab utroque polo formæ æqualiter impedit quo minus totus axis productum flamma luceret. Cùm enim ubique curvistit axis æquali vi recedant globuli, faciliss praeterlabentur se invicem, rectâque perpend ad oppositos polos Materiæ subtilissimæ irruentia fluenta, quàm excavabant vel diffundent sibi in aliqua axis parte spatium majus quàm praefens & æqualis vorticis circumvolutioni lubens admitteret, vel ipoque suâ offerent. Tertio denique, Cum globuli coelestes circa axem vorticis itantur & axi & sibi invicem, nec paralleliœm perdant dum locum aliquatenus inter seipsum mutant, impossibile videtur ut ullæ omnino sìat particularum friatarum intortio, nisi ipse particula sibi æqualis circa triangula-ribus illis spatii circa proprios axes circumrotentur; quod quàm commodò fieri possit non video, quemadmodum supererit moni.

Ad Artic. 187.

Nulla sympathia vel antipathia miracula, &c. Utinam igitur hic explicès, si breviter hérë possit, qua ratione mechanicâ eventit ut in duabus chordis, etiam diversorume instrumentorum, vel unifonis, vel ad illud intervallum Musicum quod .Locale dicitur attemperatis, si una percussit, altera in altero instrumento subsiliat, cùm quæ propiores & laxiores etiam sint, imò & in eodem instrumento in quo chorda percussit tenœse, non omnino moveantur, Experimentum vulgare est & notissimum. Nulla verò sympathia mihi videtur magis rationes mechanicas fugere quàm hic chordâ- rum confensus.

Ad Artic. 188.

Ac sextam de homine essem, &c. Perge, Divine Vir, in isthœ opere excolendo & perficiendo. Pro certissimo enim habeo,nihil unquam Reipub. literariæ aut gratius aut utilius in lucem proditurum. Nec est quòd ex- perimen-
Epistola Tertia H. Morii ad R. Cartesium

perimentorum defectum hic caufaris. Nam quantum ad corpus nostrum, accepti à dignis fide authoribus, te, quà ad humani corporis Anatomiam spectant, accuratissimè univerfa exploraffe. Quod autem ad animam, cum talem ipfe nactus fis, quà in maximè sublimes ampliffimaque operationes evigilavit, spirituque habebas agillumos & fubtiliffimos, generofa tua mens, innatà fut vt coelefisque vigore, tanquam igni Chymicorum aliquo, freta, ita excudit te, variatique in formas tranfmutabit, ut ipfa fibi facile esse posset infinitorum experimentorum officina.

Ad Artic. 195.

Et Meteoris explicui, &c. Pulcherrimam fane colorum rationem in Meteoris explicuit. Eft tamen ea de re improba quædam difficulitates, quàm magnum imaginationi meæ negotium facerit. Quippe quòd quàm colorum varietatem ftauas ex proportione quæ habet globulorum motus circularis ad rectilinearum oriri, evenit necelfari ut aliquando etiam in iisdem globulis & motus circularis rectilinearum, & rectilinearis circularem eodem tempore superefet. Verbi gratiâ, In duobus parietibus oppofitis, quorum unus rubro, alter caruleo colore obductus eft, interjacentes globuli ob rubrum parietem celerijs movebuntur in circulum quàm in lineam rectam, ob parietem tamen caruleum celerijs in lineam rectam movebuntur quàm in circulum, & eodem proflis tempore, quà sunt planè a dirècto. Vel fic, In eodem parieti cujas pars, putat dextra, rubet, media nigra eft, finiftra carulea, quàm ad oculum temper fìat defcufatio, omnes globuli ob radiorum concurrentium singularum globulorum motus proportionem, circularis nimium adrecutm, fucipient; adeò ut neciffe fit colores omnes in imo oculi permiferi & confundì, Neque ullam rationem solvendi hunc nodum exegitare poftum, nisi fortè supponendum fit, motum hunc circularem esse duntaxat breves quòdam & celeres conatus ad circulationem, non plenum motum, ut revera fit in motu recto diétorum globulorum. Et ad plerisque omnes alias difficulitates quas tibi jam propofui, aliquales saltem solutiones vel proprio marte eruere forfan puterò. Sed quàm humanitas tua hanc veniam mihi confefferit, quàm singularis tua dexteritas in solvendi hujusmodi nodis, quàm in nuperis tuis literis perfpexi, me infuper invitataverit, (quamvis enim breviter, pro anguftis temporis in quas conjeftus tunc eras, egiffè te video; tam plenè tamen mihi satisfacis, tamque fortiter animifius mihi moves, ac fi præfens digito digito premeres,) quàm denique majorem præfæ laturæ fint authoritative elucidationes tuæ, tum apud me ipsum, tum apud alios, fi ulius fuerit; e re nostra putavi fore, hæc omnes difficulitates tibi ipfi proponere, quàs quàm solvere, nifi magnopere fallor, penitiflimè tua Philosophia Principia intelligam univerfa. Quod equidem quantifacio vix credibile eft. Hone autem præfentes gryphos mihi quàm expediveris (quo quantò cithis fìt, propter impotentem illum amorem quò in tua rapior, ed gratius futurum eft) quaestiones alias e Dioptrice tua petitas mox accipies à

Philosophia tua studiofissimo

H E N. M O R O.

C c 3
Epistola Quarta H. Mori ad R. Cartesium.

Clarissimo Viro, summóque Philosoopho,

RENATO DES-CARTES,
HENRICUS MORUS.

E Quidem impensè doleo, Vir Clarissime, quòd tam subitò à vicinia nostra abreptus sis, & in tam longinquas abduètus oras. Habeo tamen, ut nihil diffimule, quo hanc animi ægritudinem ac molestiam mitigare possum, mèque ipsum consolari. Et certè non minimum est, quòd is honor tibi optimè merenti habitus sit, etiam apud gentes remotissimas, nominisque tui claritudo ad Septentrionales usque spistitidines crassâque nebulas tam potenter penetraverit; neque (id quod caput rei est) fruètra: cum tans literarum & literatorum amor generofum pectus Illustissimæ Heroïnae, Serenissimæ Reginæ Suecorum, incesserit, ut famâ librisque tuis non contenta, à scribendo ad te, ut eam inviferes, nunquam desliteris, donec voti fæcta sit compos. Quod cesso credo in magnum illius regni commodum & ornamentum. Quas ob causas fœtor me minus inclementer tuli utraque ab hisce regionibus nostra, & nonceperam me à hinc etiam exspectatam illius Epistolæ quam, prout promisisti, antec abitum tuum à te expectabam: cum jam recuperanda solum omnem tantum beět ut abjiciam, ut è contrà fortiter confidam te non solùm illis quas anté scriptis, sed & præsentibus litteris, cùm ad manus suas pervenerint, brevi responsum. Qua fætus confidentia ad Dioptricen tuam péro; mox ad Meteora, si quid portòt ibi occurrerit difficultas, profecturus; ut tandem animam meas is omnibus exonerare possim quæ in rem nostram putabam fore tibi plenius proponere. Spero enim hoc modo me, chim omnìa ex mea parte perfècta sint que præstare oportebat, mollisem animæ meæ conciliaturum quietem, minùsque in posterum me anxie habiturum.

Ad Dioptrices Cap. 2. Artic. 4. lin. 21.

Nullò modo illi oppositum. Linteum C E videtur opponi B pilæ, aliquo saltem modo, etiam quatenus pila dextrosam furtur. Quod siç patebit.

Nam G H plene opponitur pilæ B, perfecetèque impedid cursum ejus, tam versus HE quam versus CE, feu deorsum. Cum igitur tam prope accedat CE ad posituram GH, ut deficit tantùm angulus HBE, sive GBC, ad perfecam oppositionem tendentæ veris HE; C E etiam suam servans positoram, aliquatenus opponitur pilæ B, etiam quatenus cursum tendit versus HE. Quod insuper manifestissimùs apparebit, si fingamus CE udæ argillæ planitiem, & pilam, putà æneam, ab
A ferri ad B, ubi aliquo utque penetrabit, sed statim suffocabitur vis cur-\-sus tam veritus HE quam veritus CE, quod tamen non fieret, si pila ferretur secundum lineam CBE, sed sine impedimento pergeret veritus HE, praefertim si nulla inesse fuit pila gravitas: unde patet planitium CE opponi pila B descendenti ab A, etiam quatenus furtur veritus HE, quod oportet demonstrare.

*Dimidiam sue velociatim partem amittat*, lin. 27. Partem hic aliquam velociatim amittam esse lubens concedam; sed quod & in hoc Articulo & in proxime sequenti supponis hanc partem velociatatem desperi tantum veritus C E, non veritus F E, nullus capio. Cùm enim unicus realis motus sit pila, (quamvis varias imaginari possimus pro libitum tendentias hujus motûs, quaeque pergerë fingis pilam, tardiæ incedet quâm ante mortum minutum. Caüa igitur tendentia pilæ ad I potius quam ad D, non petenda est à tarditate vel celeri-\-tate motûs, fed à resistentia magni illius anguli CBD, & à debilitate minoris illius anguli EBD, cujus acies ob exilitatem suam & materiæ fluiditatem facilitius ceder pilæ, quando anguli BCD. Alioqui si causa referenda est ad celeritatem vel tarditatem, pila de-\-scendens ab H in B cursum etiam deflece teret. Hic schema tum confuile, si opus est, pag. 84.

*Ad Artic. 6. lin. 7.*

Tam oblique incumbat, ut linea F E duèta, & c. Perpetua hic tua de-\-monstrandi ratio, quò pilæ profectuà sit, lepidam profectò in se habet subtilitate, sed quæ causam rei non videtur attingere. Vera enim & realis causa intelligenda est ex amplitudine anguli CBD, & exilitate EBD anguli, & ex magnitudo etiam pilæ, quæ quod major est, eo minorem depressionem lineæ A B veritus C E requirit, ad resiliendum veritus acerem L. Major enim pilæ non tam commodè levat atque aperit cupidem acu-\-tioris anguli, quo intret in ipfam putà aquam, sed contundendo potius transvolat reflexa.

In priori igitur refractione, videlicet à perpendicular, determinatio de-orsum minuitur necessariò, pilaw autem retardatur per accidens, ob mollitiem cursum immutantis. In posteriori determinatio deorsum augetur; pilaw autem si acceleratur, acceleratur per accidens, ob novi medii faciliorem tranfum. Determinationis igitur mutatio ejufque caufa ad refractiones juxta ac reflexionem funt planè necessaria; velocitas & tarditas ipfius motus funt duntaxat accessorìa, vel potius planè supervacuanæ. Imò vero, novam quod pilæ feu globuli accelerationem attinet intr medio faciliior, videtur quidem illa percepitur perquam difficilis; propertia quòd novum illud medium non suppeditat novos gradus mutûs, sed tantum permittit pilæ quos etiamnum habet superfìtes fine ulteriori ulla diminutione integros posfìdere, ùm nullos ad se arripiat, vel imbibat. Æquæque absurdum videtur, novos, vel, si malles, pristìnìs motus gradus refluittu pilæ medium faciliùs intranti, ac concedere in puncto reflexionis pilam aliquo momento hæterè priusquam refliat, quod meritori explodis Art. 2, hujus cap.

Caput 6. Ad Artic. 9.

Sed ex solo siti exiguorum partium cerebri, &c. Suntne igitur iftiu-modi in cerebri diffeéìone particulæ visibiles, an ratione duntaxat colligis iftiu-modi effe oportere in hunc usum destinatas? Mihi verò nihil opus harum effe videtur, sed eadem organa quæ motum tranfinittunt, animam etiam commonefæere necessariò, unde illa sìat motus tranfmit-fio, si nullum interjacent impedimentum.

Ad Artic. 13.

Similem illi, quà Geometra per duas fìtiones, &c. Duriuscula hac videtur obscuriorque comparatio, in nihiloque contingentis, nisi quòd utro-bique binæ fumuntur fìtiones. Geometrae enim, vel, si malles, Geodæ-tæ, fìtiones fumunt, in linea ab arbo re putat vel turri rectà producat; Ob-culus locum mutans in linea tranfversa, & ferme objecto parallela, si rectè rem capio.

Ad Artic. 16.

Ex cognitione seu opinione quam de distantia habemus, &c. Adæqua-tas fortasse caufas apparentis corporum magnitudinis explicare perquam difficile effet. Sed in uno hoc maximè confìstere opinor, nimìrum in magnitudine & parvitate decussationis anguli. Ille enim quòd major est, major apparebit ejufdem corporis magnitudo; quò minor, minor. Deinde, quod observatur dignissimum est, cùm objectum aliquod, pollicem putà tuum, intra grani unius distantiam oculo admoveris, hic decussatio-nis angulus quater aut quinqueis major erit quàm ille qui fit ad oculum à pollice distantem decem ferme grana; & si adhucamovebitur pollex ab oculo per aliquot dena grana, semper anguflior reddeetur angulus decus-sationis, sed minori semper proportione, per dena quàque grana, & mi-nori; semper tamen aliquantò anguflior evadit quàm antea, donec tan-dem
Et cum fingula & quàm oeulo
Unde uti & ita
Reduo quin
Servatis apparebat
nuncque anguli
igitur meam
decem ret
C
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H
fint
fundu duorum oculorum, majoris felicit & minoris,
C D fit objectum majus & remotius, E F objectum minus, sed propinquus, E G F vel K G L Angulus decussationis.
Primum, hic statuo effe nihil quendam, seu transmissionem motus ab
E in L & a D in K. Et animadversionem meam rectâ excurrentem per
lineam K G F D offendere unam extremitatem objecti C D, videlicet D, eo revera quo ineft loco, & per lineam L G E C offendere alteram extremitatem objecti C D, videlicet C, in suo itidem loco, & sic de ceteris partibus tam extimis quam intermedii Objecti C D. Recto igitur excursu hoc animadversionem max, obverfam objecti magnitudinem deprehendo, cujus diametri apparentis mensura est angulus E G F. Servatis igitur eisdem rectis lineis per quas excurrat mea animadversione, & eadem anguli magnitudine in oculo H I, quam modò in K L, dico objectum D C æquæ magnum apparere ac in oculo K L. Unde poftea colligo, magnitudinem objecti apparentem ad anguli decussationis magnitudinem, non ad magnitudinem imaginis, referri. Poftermò, ut magnudo apparens objecti non fit ex magnitudine imaginis in oculi fundo (ut iuxta pateat ex eo, quod eadem fit imaginis magnitudo objecti minoris E F qua majoris C D, tant in H I oculo quam in K L) ità neque simpliciter ex magnitudine anguli decussationis: alioquin objectum E F æquæ magnum apparenet ac objectum C D, cum idem fit decussationis angulus. Sed amoto E F minore objecto, objectum C D revera multò majus apparebit quam apparebat modò objectum E F, cum tam entraque cernentur tub eodem decussationis angulo. Unde merito conduli potest, apparentem cujusque objecti magnitudinem partim ex anguli decussationis, partimque ex rea! corporis magnitudine oriri. Neque mirum est animadversionem meam per lineas rectas nisius illius five motus transfini pergentem eò ulque penetrare, ibique se fixtere ubi motus hic primum incipit, videlicet
ad
ad C & D; ut neque eas (cum revera magis distant quam E F, nec sub minori angulo videntur) apparere etiam magis distantes quam E & F, totumque adeo objectum C D majus simpliciter apparere quam objectum totum E F.

Ad Artic. 19.

Quoniam sumus affecti judicare, &c. Quid igitur cenfes de caco illo a nativitate sua quem sanavit Christus, si speculum planum ipsi objectum sui sit antequam consuetudo judicium depravasset? Numquid ille vultum suum citra speculum, non ultra, vel pone speculum, deprahendisset? Mi-rificè torcit & fatigavit imaginationem quem hic imaginis pone speculum lufus, cujus cauas nondum me fatis percepisse fatero. Neque enim mihi ullo modo fatisfacit hæc depravata judicandi consuetudo. Si rationes reales magis magisque mechanicas excogitate poteris, & nobiscum communicare, rem fane gratissimam praestabis.

Ad Artic. 20. lin. ultimâ.

Inde sequitur diametrum illorum, &c. Cur non diameter Solis vel Lunæ videatur pedalis vel bipedalis, ob angulum decusificationis ad eam rationem diminuturn, quæ apta fit corpora ejusdem reales magnitudinis, cujus sunt Sol & Luna, sub hanc pedalem vel bipedalem magnitudinem apparentem, ad istas distantias, repræsentare?

Ad Artic. 21.

Quia tam versus Horizontem quam versus verticem, &c. Igitur majores Sol & Luna ad Horizontem apparent quam pro distantia oporter ap-parere. Et ea potius est dicenda vera magnitudo apparentis, fove non fallax, quæ certæ legi subjicitur, quam quæ externis aliqibus adjunctis alteratur.

Ad Caput 7. Artic. 22.

Quæ arte ob alias causas, &c. Quam invertendi artem hic intelligis? Et quas ob causas ab ipfa ablines?

Ad Caput 8. Artic. 20.

Aut diversis partibus parallelos. Quid fibi hinc veloc radii diversis parti-bus paralleli, nullo modo intelligo. Nihil enim hujufmodi quicquâ exhibe-tur in schemate hoc, pag. 172, de pto. Ut mentem hic apertius explicère oro. Obscurissimum etiam illud est, nisi ego sim tardissimus, quod habetur ad calculum hujus Articuli, de decussatione radiorum duo vita convexa, D B Q & d b q, permentium. Sed ad marginem hujus loci in editione tua Gallica relegas nos ad paginam 108, id est, ad figuram illam quæ in Latina editione habetur paginâ 164. Ego vero ibi in vitris illis nullam omnino video radiorum decussationem, fed ranim inter vita, ad commonem focom I. Nulli enim ibi radii apparent nisi paralleli, qui paralle-lisnum

Quò magis hæc perspicilla objectorum imagines augent, cō pauciora simul reperentur. Cūm perfectiora hæc perspicilla aperturam vitri exteriorís majorem habent, eaque plurés proinde parallelós radios ab objectó sucipit quàm imperfectiorum minor apertura, omnēque illí radii ad fundum oculi à convexa diècti vitro superficie contorquentur, cur non plura etiam objecta, quæ ac majores imagines, in oculo poterunt depingere:

Ad Caput 10. Artic. 4. lin. 17.

Hyperbole omnino similis & aqualis priori deprehenditur. Supponis igitur Hyperbolas omnes, quarum foci æquidistant à verticibus, quamvis ha per conum, illæ per funem & regulam describantur, per یننیی coïncidere: quod ut falfum non video, ita putó tamen veritatem illius, cūm fundamentum fit totius quam mox expositurūs es machinae, suisse operæ pretium demonstrāsse, aut sāltem rationem levi aliquo indicio innuisse.

Ad Artic. 6. pag. 202. lin. 27.

Habebit enim & aciem & cuspidem. Aciem habeat, sed quam cuspidem habere poterit non video, praeterit cūm acies hujus instrumenti fabricanda sit recta, non concava, sic enim est sphærica; quae si continuat extremos circulos latitudinis Rotae, ad interiores tamen non adapta- bitur; major enim erit quàm ut cūm illis conveniat. Unde nec tanger instrumenti hujus cuspidis circumducuam Rotam in mediis latitudinis Īpatriis:

Ad Artic. 7. linea 17.

Tantam esse non debere ut ejus semidiameter, distantia qua erit inter lineas 12 & 55. &c. Hujusce rei rationem autumno, quod tunc concava vitri superficies sphærica fieret, non Hyperbolica.

Ad Artic. 10.

Ut nonnullós ex maximè industrias & curiositä, &c. Lubenter ex te aude direm numquis ex peritioribus illis artificibus periculum fecerit admic in ingenio-
ingeniosissimo hoc tuo invento, & quo succulit. Nam quod quidam hic munitam, aliquos tentasse, operamque lusisse, id aut falsum arbitrò, aut opifices illos qui tentáruit ex peritioribus non suisse.

Quod ad Meteora attinet, difficultates quae ibi occurrerunt pauciores sunt, & levioris, opinor, momenti. Quales autem sint mox audies.


...et denique prope terram quàm prope nubes. Hoc asseris de radiis tam rectis quàm reflexis. Qui autem fieri possit ut recti, nisi quatenus reflexentur & replicantur iterum in se prope Terram, vim caloris augeat, non video. Tum verò non sunt simpliciter recti, sed recti cum reflexis conjuncti. Imò verò potius minui videtur vis caloris in aëre terrâ vicino, quàm nonnullis fuì motüs aetheri globuli communicent cum particularibus terrestribus, unde prope terram tardior est motus eorum & languentior quàm in superioribus aëris regionibus. Non igitur abs re effet si hic explices, cur calefact aëris prope Terram magis quàm prope nubes. Et an non fieri possit, ut quamvis motus minor sit prope Terram quàm in superfìnis aëris partibus, major tamen calor sentiatur, ob inaequalitatem huysce motus.


...etiam inferiores adèr raras atque extensas, &c. At cum tam rara sint, qui possunt alias in se cadentes nubes excipère, ibique sitere? Videntur potius praefua tentitate ad Terram transmissura, si eò, alias, profecturae essent.

Ad Artic. 7. lin. 2.

Ob ãëris circumquaque positi resonantiam, &c. Ita sinè singit Paracelsus toniturum tam immanitatem boarè & mugi, ob arcuta coeli templà, non absumili ratione atque si quis ëneam machinam nitratò pulvere onuittam dissipodeter sub Tecto teludineato. Tu verò, fat fecio, nullis laquearibus atherem claudi sustines, ac produci videatur verissimilium, quòd quò magis ëdixit distat à Terrà, eò debilior futurus sit tonitus, quàm nèc tam commodè fit resonantia, quàd quò reverberetur fomin, tam longè abbit ab aliis corporibus.


Pauci quippe tantummodo radii, &c. Numquid igitur radiorum pau citas cærûleum colorèm generat? Videntur hoc haud ita cononum præcedentibus. Quippe quòd cum supra statueris, colorès oriris ex varia proportione rotationis phararularum ad motum earundem rectum, & particularim cærûleum ex rotatione minores quàm progressù proficiici, quasi in eo ipso confirar ipfà cærulei colorès ratio; nunc tamen causam refers non tam ad rotationis defectum, quàm paucitatem radiorum resilientium a superficie maris. Hic igitur quarto utrum sentias nullam aliam esse colorum
Fragmentum Resp. R. Cartesii ad Epist. Tertiam H. Morii.

rum rationem præter eam quam ipsa tam subtiliter & ingeniosè exposuisti, an & alius modis colores oriri possint, nullâ hâbîtâ ratione rotationis globulorum motûque rectilinei: præterim cûm & ipsius innumquam marinam caruleam videri ob paucitatem dumtaxat radiorum. Et certe explicatù hanc facile est, cûm globuli in æquoris superficici impingunt, cur non aut albefact mare aut rubescent, cûm fortius impingunt, aut illis refrigeri fortius in superficie maris, quâm in coelo præ vaporibus albelescenc.

Proposui jam omnia quæ in scriptis tuis Physicis mihi visa sunt aut intellectu difficilia, aut intellectu difficulter vera. In quibus legendis mirari non imméritò tibi subeant ingenii mei conditionem & fatum; qui cûm pro-fiteri aúsim me caétera omnia in tuis scriptis satîs intimè intelligere, (ubi pluríma tamen reperiuntur, quæ multò difficultiora videri possint quàm de quibus fæpius hæfìco) ista tamen quà tibi propoíti explicanda aut munienda, non æquè ác illa caétera intelligerem. Ego vero hanc naturam meam atque indolem, quàm á puero uque in me ipso observavi, (quâ nempe maxima facetunô numero feliciter vinco; viztus interim à minimis) ad hunc uque diem emendare non potui. Humanitatis tuae erit ignoscere quod nefas est corrigere, nullòque pacto aut affectàæ ignorantia aut disputandi pruriginí imputare, quod tam multa congeserim. Feci enim non ex effræni aliquo disputandi desiderio, sed potius ex religioso quodam erga tua studio.

Non tam certandi cupidus, quam propter amorem,
Quodse imitari aveo:
Quod sitè quidem ille; Ego vero hac in causa verissime. Quod reliquum est, Clarifíme Cartesi, exorandus es, ut ista omnia quæ scripti aequi bonique confultas, & cum primo tuo otio recribas. Quod si dignatus fueris, peristilium illum tandem effici, qui semper fuit haætens

Cantabrigiae, è Collegio Christi,
Philosophie tua studiosissimus,
HEN. MORUS.

Ce qui suit a esté trouvé parmy les Papiers de Monsieur Des-Cartes, comme vn projet ou commencement de la réponse qu'il préparoit aux deux précédentes Lettres de Monsieur More.

Cum tuam Epistolam decimo Calendas Augusti datam accepis, para-
bam me ad navigandum Sueciae verisus, &c.

1. An sensus Angelorum sit propriè dictus, & an sint corpori,
 necne.

Resp. Mentes humanas à corpore separatas sensum propriè dictum non habere; de Angelis autem non constare ex sola ratione naturali an creati sint inmóre mentium à corpore distinturarum, an verò in móre earundem cor-
pori unitarum; nec me unquam de iis de quibus nulnum habeo certam

d rationem.
rationem quicquam determinare, & conjecturis locum dare. Quod Deum dicas non esse considerandum nisi qualem omnes boni esse cuperent, si deeset, probò.

2. Ingeniosae instansia est de acceleratione motus, ad probandum eandem substantiam nunc majorem nunc minoré locum posset occupare, sed tamen est magna disparitas, in eo quod motus non sit substantia, sed modus, & quidem talis modus, ut intime concipiamus quo pacto minus vel augeri possit in eodem loco. Singularum autem entium quædam sunt propriæ notiones, de quibus ex ipsis tantum, non autem ex comparatione aliorum, est judicandum: Ita figura non competit quod motui, nec utrique quod rei extensa. Qui autem semel bene perspexit nihil nullas esse proprietates, atque ideo illud quod vulgo vocatur spatium vacuum non esse nihil, sed verum corpus, omnibus suis accidentibus (five ipsis qua possunt adesse & abesse sine subjiceti corruptione) extendit, notaverit; quomodo unaqueque pars ipsius five spatii five corporis sit ab omnibus alis diversa & impenetrabilis, facilè percipiunt nulli alteri rei eandem divisibilitatem, & tangibilitatem, & impenetrabilitatem, posse competere.

3. Dixi Deum extensum ratione Potentiae, quod feilicet illa Potentia se exserat, vel exserere possit, in re extensa: Certòque est Dei essentiam debere ubique esse praesentem, ut ejus potentia ibi possit se exserere; sed nego illam ibi esse per modum rei extensa, hoc est, eo modo quo paulo ante rem extensam descripsi.

4. Inter merces suas ais te ex navigiolo meo tibi comparasse, duœ mihi videntur adulterate. Una est, quod quies sit actio five renixus quidam, etiam enim quiescens, ex hoc ipso quod quiescat, habeat illum renixonum, non ideo ille renixus est quies. Altera est, quod moveri duo corpora sit immediatè separari, sœpe enim ex iis quæ ita separantur unum dicitur moveri, & aliquid quiescere, ut in Art. 25, & 30. partis 2. explicui.

5. Translationis illa, quam motum voco, non est res minoris entitatis quæm sit figura, nempe est modus in corpore. Vis autem movens potest esse ipsius Dei conservantes tantumdem translationis in materia, quantum à primo creationis momento in ea posuit; vel etiam substantiae creatæ, ut mentis nostræ, vel cujusvis alterius rei, cui vis dederit corpus movendi. Et quidem illa vis in substantiæ creatæ est ejus modus, non autem in Deo; quod quia non ita facili ab omnibus potest intelligi, nolui de ista re in scriptis meis agere, ne videret favere eorum sententiae qui Deum tanquam animam mundi materiae unitatem considerant.

6. Considero materiam tibi liberæ permissem, & nullum aliunde impullum fucepientem, ut planè quiescentem; illa autem impellitur à Deo, tantumdem motus five translationis in ea conservante quantum ab initio posuit; neque ista translationis magis violenta est materiae quam quies: Quippe nomen violenti non refertur nisi ad nostram voluntatem, quæ vim pati dicitur, cùm aliquid sit quod ei repugnat. In natura autem nihil est violentum, sed æquæ naturale est corporibus quod se mutuat impulsant, vel elidant, quando ita contingit, quam quod quiescant. Tibi autem puto ea in re parare difficultatem, quod concipias vim quandam in corpore quiescente per quam motui ressitit, tanquam si vis illa esset positivum quod, nempe actio quædam, ab ipsa quies distinetum; cùm tamen nihil planè sit à modali entitate diversum.

7. Rectè
De animarum futu femper praebetur, & aliud quod sepelatur a secundo puncto, & alius quod ad tertio, &c. Cum autem dixi tantumdem motus in materia semper manere, hoc intellecti de vi ejus partes impellente, quæ vis nunc ad unas partes materiam, nunc ad alias se applicat, ut alia leges in Artic. 45. & sequentibus partis secundae propositarum. Non itaque opus est ut fias sollicitus de transeuntione quietis ex uno subjeto in alidum, cum nè quidem motus, quatenus est modus quieti oppositus, ita transeunt.

8. Quæ additis nempe tibi videri corpus stupidè & temulentè esse vivum, &c. tanquam fuaviter confidero: pro libertate quam mihi concedis, hic semel dicam, nihil magis nos à veritate invenienda revocare, quam si quedam vera esse statuamus, quæ nulla positiva ratio, sed sola voluntas nostra, nobis persuadit, quando scilicet aliquid commentati fve imaginati fumus, & pollea nobis Commentum placerit ut tibi, de Angelis corporis, de umbra Divini effentiae, & fimilibus, quale nihil quisquam debet amplecti, quia hoc ipso viam ad veritatem tibi praeccludar.

Responsio ad Fragmentum Cartesii, ex Epistola Henrici Mori ad Claudium Clerfier.

Quod tantopere tibi placuerunt nupera max literæ (Vir Clarissime) id profeétò nulli earum lepori aut acumin, sed singulari tuae humanitati imputandum est. Cujus & locupletius adhuc argumentum dedisti, quod ad me nec rogentem nec expeçtántem gratissimum illud misisti Epistola Cartesiana Fragmentum; ultrimque nonnulliis earum difficulum quis Cartesio propositi, ipse tam benignè tentasti satisfacere. Quod quidem officium aut hoc aut nullà possum ratione compendi, nempe fi eis omnibus quæ uterque vestrum scripsitis breviter respondam.

1. Primò igitur, quantum ad Cartesiana illa attinet, De animarum separatarum angelorumque sensi, dum omni penitus corpore deftinuuntur, inter nos convenit, neutros nempe habere sensum propriè dicium. Quod verò Angeli subtilissimus semper corporibus indui fuerint, indicio est, quod nonnulli ex ipsis propriè voluntate mali eavaerunt. Spiritus autem purè ac perfectè immaterialis nulli labi aut lapsi in obnoxious esse videtur; non est enim, cùm adeò simplex sit, unde posset tentari statio-nèmque suam deferere.

2. Nullo modo eludi potest iniuntia mea de eodem numero motu qui nunc majus nunc minus subjacet occupat, ni malè mentem explicaverit suam, aut sententiam à me monitus retrectaverit. Nam motum à D d 2 corpore
corporis in corpus transferrī ipse docet differtis verbis, discipulūsque ejus ac interpres * Henricus Regius eodem modo transire affirmat ac hæreditas à Stoico pervenit ad Seinum. Nec disparitas illa quicquam huc facit, quod motus sit tantum modus, spiritus autem substantia, cum utrumque quid reale sit; idò verò causae nostræ magis favet, cum impossibile sit ut idem numero modus nunc hoc, nunc illud subjectum, subjective partem occupet, idem autem numero spiritus fat commodè possit. Miro igni tur infelicitatem Regiani ingenii, qui cum eundem numero motum tam liberè à corpore ad corpus vagari passus sit, animam tamen humanam foetulento cadaveri tam inhumaniter incarceraverit, nec exesis sive absumptis Natura vinculis foras evolare permiserit. Quod ad ideam spatii attinet, illúmque toties inculcatum Aphorismum, *Nihil nullam esse affectionem*, tam fusè & copiosè ad illa respondi in superioribus meis litteris ad Cartesium, ut planè supervacuacum ducim quicquām hic adhicere.

3. De Dei etiam, quam vocant, Omnipsaesentia nullum supereft inter nos diffidium, cum ubique eum esse agnoscar, vímque suam in subjectam materiam exercere, extensionem porrò aliæqualem ei competere, sed longè diversam ab ea quæ dividibili ac impenetrabili corpori competit.

4. Nullas ego merces in Cartesiano navigio adulteravi; nam quòd conqueritur me ita permiscere ac confundere illum corporis quiescentis renixum cum quiete, ut nullam inter ipfæ distinctionem admittam, id contendo optimò jure esse factum. Quod enim est, si non fit quies, quo sè corpus quiescentis ab abrapiione feu translatione, quam ille motum vocat, defendit? Eft igitur renixus ille nihil alid nifi ipfis ipsius quies, rem quiescentem confervans in statu quiesci; hoc est, res perseverat in eo statu quo est justa leges Naturæ, donec fortior aliqua caufa eum mutaverit. Quod si renixus hic, sive constantia, quiescit actio aliqua effet, cum omnis actio corporea fit motus, quiescit etiam motus aliquis effet; quod videatur valde rationes absumn. Ego igitur potius sulpicor incomparabilem Philòsophum aliorum culpà, qui falsis pro imperio omnia agunt, rationem motus adulteræ, nè videretur, quod superfìtiosa Peripateticorum schola pro piaculo ferè habet, telluris motum asserere, dum eam in communi omnium Planetarum vortice agnoscit circa Solem circumferri.

Pari etiam facilitate adulteratione illa altera dituditur. Nam cum ipse Cartesius motum seu translationem reciprocam esse statuat, nec tamen eam vim ullam esse vel actionem in corporibus divulsis ac transfatis, quid, quæsi, potest esse nisi immediata corporum separatio? Quod si motus fit immediata corporum separatio, continuò sequitur, quod moveri duo corpora fit immediate separari. Quod autem unum ex istis fœpulis dicatur quiescere, id profeœd gratis dicendum est, cum fit impossibile. At verò nisi quiescit terra E F G H, dum corpus A B transfertur ab E versus F, ac C D ab H versus G, terra uno eodemque tempore in contrarias partes movetur. Unde iterum constat ipsum Cartesium genuinam motus notionem adulterasæ, Vide Part. 2. Art. 30.

5. Videtur Tranlatio minus habere entitatis quàm Figure, quoniam haec est magis absoluta affectio corporis in quo est, illa ad aliud duntaxat relatio. Quod ad vim motricem spectat, sive in Deo sive in Mente Divina.
vina five in Anima Mundi cum Platonics statuat: praecipserat tamen factum est quod tam egregius Philosophus hanc virtutem materiae ipsi non tribuerit, sed aliis alicui subjeclo, quod proinde non potest non esse immanerale seu incorporatum. Videbat enim procul dudio Vir perspicaciissimus, nisi quis licentiam ibi arripseret quidlibet temeret & precario affirmandii vel negandi, quod necesse est agnoscer eunferam materiam sua naturae esse homogeneam, juxta ideam ejus animo noftra obversantem, praeterim cum nulla caufa fingi possit illius in ea diversitatem. Hinc sequitur mundanam materiam totam sua naturae aut moveri aut quiescere. Quod si tota per se moveatur, nullius rei effet, ne ad momentum quidem, permanens compages, dlevantibus statim sua sponte a fe invicem particulis, vel potius nunquam in unum coalescentibus, quod abunde fatís probavi in Literis meis ad Cartesium.

6. Apertè igitur profitteret Cartesius sè, cum Ficino reliquisque Platonici, materiam ibi liberè permissem, nullumque aliunde impulsum sufficierentem, considerare ut planè quiescentem. Quod verò impulsum hic ipsi non fit violentus, juxta cum illo sentio: non folum quod nomen violenti proprii non referatur nisi ad noftrum voluntatem, quae vim partis dicitur cum aliquid fit quod ei repugnat; sed quod materia quodammodo motus hoc vel impulsi perficiatur. Nec quicquam obfatur renixus ille qui fingitur in materia quiescente, cum non proprii aetio fit, sed tantum rei quiescentis in sua quiete persiflentia, ut iple inuit hoc in loco Cartesius,

7. Rectè me hic dicit adversere motum, quatenus est modus corporis, non posse tranfere ex uno in alium, neque fe ullubi hoc scriptis. Regius verò dat àr opera rem sic explicat ac si error effet aliter fentire, prout fuipra monui. Quin & ipsius Cartesii verba hunc fenfun prae fæplanifimè ferre videntur, Part. 2. Art. 4o, ubi afferit corpus majorem vim habens ad pergendum alterum corpus movere, ac quantum ei dat de suo motu tantundem perdere. Imò verò & vis illa qua de hic agit idem mihi videtur atque motus iste. Sed cuilibet Authori fua scripta interpretandi jus eft.

8. Mea illa suavis quæ vocat si miscerentur cum ejus feveris, optimum credendarum inè factum iri temperamentum. Ego tamen interim venumuft Cartesiani ingenii rigorem non retrectanter suavior ac deofculor; quamvis hoc fapiuos notaverim, nempe eos qui Mathematicam certitudinem in rebus omnibus tam pertinaciter affectant, infelicitissime omnium in quibusdam vacillasse. Ea enim argumentandi ratio quæ demonstrationis speciem præeierit, simul atque deprehènsa fìt non esse legitima demonftratio, nullius loci argumentum merito judicare.

Præterea, in adhibendo allusiones quædam & similitudines nulla fraud subefle poterit, modò meminerimus res propriis nominibus non appellari; sed tralatitias, nec materiam five univerfum mundi corpus ideò esse umbram, quod quasi umbra effe divinae effentiae indigaverim. Hac enim allusio non docet corpus revera esse umbram, sed à Deo pendere ut umbra à corpore. Deinde, ut umbra aliqua corporis imaginem refert, sed obscursimulam maximè degenerem; sic in corpore five materia caeca quædam ac evanīda esse Divinæ effentiae vestigia, quæ cùm, uti dixi, vita
Epistola H. MORI ad V.C.


1. EM magnam à me postulas, V. C. nempe ut de Philosophorum Triumviratæ hujus seculi maximæ insignium septentiam feram. Quorum quidem de duobus nihil plane flatuere possim, utpote quos nondum perlegi; nec è re credo fore mea eos unquam perlegere. Miror equidem quod ex me quæras quid de tertio illo sentiam, cùm præ- claram illum opinionem quam de eo concepti plus femel publicè testatus sim. Sed dum portò fœciscaris, quas potissimum ob cauas illius Philosophium, tam avidè sim amplexus, uberioris Responsor argumentum mihi suppediar importunior illa interrogatio, Neque enim quæstio est una atque simplex, sed accusatricula cujusdam aculeo præarmata, quasi Cartesiana omnia fine delectu admitterem & forverem. Verum multò aliter feres habet ac sulpicaris. Quamvis enim incomparabils Philosophus in Inventis suis ac Ratiorum plerisque omnibus adeò suprahumanam fortem felix sit ac ingeniofus ut, quod ubique fere praestat, id nulliùm eum non praestitisse credere coegi videamur; me tamen Natura tam tarda ac habittabundo ingenio finxit, ut nullius mortalis au- thoritas mentis aciem ita potuerit unquam perftringere, ut huc fæcino de- vinctus eis Theorematis fidem haberem quorum veritas fatis solidis ar- gumentis non sit suffulta, multò minùs eis quæ proprìis animi sensibus ac rationi repugnant. Itaque breviter dicam; Tantum abeit ut tam avide Cartesiana omnìa cruda cócta perinde devenirem, ut liberè apud te proftendendum cenúmerim, me in illius Scriptis observasse nonnulla quæ nullò pæco deglutire possim. Quæ operæ pretium fore existimò tibi recensere, ut postquam Cartesium perlegeris, quod brevi te facturum scribis, judici- cium tuum experiri possim, an de eisdem Theorematis juxta mecum sentias;
2. Ad tria causarum genera revocare possumus quicquid uspiam lapsus est Cartesius. Nimimum vel ad simplicem nudamve inadvertentiam, qualis in omnes ferè mortales cadere solet: Vel ad nimium five prudentia five honesta cujusdam altutiae studium, cujus haud adeo multè rei sunt: Vel denique ad enormem quandam Mathematicæ certitudinis ac necessitatis in singulis suis conclusionibus affectationem; quò certè perpauci adhuc aperirârunt in rebus naturalibus, nemo prorsus eò utique pervenit, nec fortassis unquam est perverturnus.

3. Ad primum genus referre potest modus ille quem explicat Refractionis, Dioptric, cap. 2. & ratio situs imaginum in Reflexione, cap. 6. cum paucis aliis, de quibus fors anmox plura dicemus.

4. Secundi generis duo insignia occurrunt exempla, Primum eft, explicatio naturæ Motús, quem dicit semper esse reciprocum. Quæ quidem notio manifiætis contradictionibus mihi semper vilia est involvi. Maluit tamen hoc modo obscurare verbis scientiam, quàm non exempli minus motus tribuere terræ quàm aut Copernicus tribuit aut Tycho; imò omnem notum illi adimere, ut majorem gratiam Philosophiae sua conciliaret, sibi quæ melius caveret ab eos hominibus apud quos inventeàa confluante cacâque authoritas plus valet quàm luculentissima quavis demonstratio. Manebat enim precoludbio alæ menti infìxum durum illud Galliæ factum, qui tam liberos circuitus terræ tribuendo circa Solem, libertatem sibi ademiteam, greffiûque proprios intra carceris limites circumscripti.

Alterum exemplum est de brutis animantibus, quas inanimes Machinas intenfàque Automata esse fìngit. Quod lepidum commentum ipsi fuit necessè comminisci, nè brutorum animas pariter ac nostras ex sua Philo- phenandi ratione concluerat immortales. Cùm enim firmiter teneret nè vilìffimum quidem cogitandi actum cadere in Materiam qualitercunque modificatam, fi agnoverset ãenûm inèffe brutis, debuisse etiam concedere substantiam ipsis inèffe realiter à materia diffìntam, hoc eft, animam immortalem. Senfù igitur maluit bruta privare, quàm sì finère intenfatorum & captìoforum hominum odoúsis quaﬆìunculis de brutorum ãatù poft mortem irretiri & torqueri.

Huic generi accenferi debeat quod obiter profert Princip. part. 3. Art. 2. de non invèiligandis finibus earum rerum quas in Natura complexu videmus. Quo monito proculudbio sibi præcavit ab importunis illis sciètationibus quas malè feriati homines urgere poßen, de universo generè tam Comètarum quàm Planetarum, uti etiam de Stellis, quàs totidem quasì Solese effe ipse planè agnoçit. Admodum enim proeliæ erat porro interrogare, in quàm finem tot Solæ cræfìet Deus, quibusve lucerent. Et, cùm in Planetis omnibus (utpote qui eandem fère originem, ab incurtatis felicit solibus, eundémque productionis modum, habuerint) fit terra, mare, àer, magnes, aurifodine, &c, quàrere infuper, annon etiam tum bruta animalia, tum nobiliores illi incola, homines, singulis inèfent. Transcurrentes denique Planetas hospitiûmque sibi in aliqùo vortice quærentes, annon credibile fit novorum ipsos Terarum orbium esse jaéta rudimenta. E quibus spîosifis quàtìonibus facillîmè òe expedire poffe sperabat Cartesius, naturë praemonendo tam profundum effe Dei confi-
Epistola H. Mori ad V. G.

lium in Naturâ operibus, ut summae sit temperatiss fines eorum investi
gare. Novit enim homo nautificissimus potiorem multò esse ignorantiae
timationem, quâm intempestivæ venditionem scientiæ.

5. Ad tertium genus spectat id quod adhibet ad demonstrandum Rare
tionem & Condenfationem fieri ad modum spongïe: nempe Distan
tiam, fiue spatium, ac corpus idem eſt realiter, nec ullam ullubi fangi
poſſe eſtenomen quæ non fìt realis affectio alicius corporis. Quod funda
mentum magnopere Cartesio placuit, quoniam certitudine, si fieri poteft,
pluquam Mathematicâ fuum Rarefactionis & Condenfationis
modum confirmat, ac præterea totam doctrinam de immensis numero ac
magnitude Vorticibus, déque particulis primum elementi in infinitum di
visis, immiſçe suffultit. Mihi verò Fundamentum illud non arıdet ullo
modo. Tum quod rationes illæ quæ pro eo adductæ Cartesius non fatis
validæ sunt, prout fusès in literis meis probavi; tum quod innuit Materiæ
aut per se independenter exiſtere, aut fætem ab omni æternitate simul
cum Deo exìtìffe, necessario ab ipso producam eique coævam. Quo
rum prius cum vera Dei notione planè auctore est, posterius durum ac
temarìum. Quamvis non sit diſftendum fuisse ſemper, atque etiam
num effe, qui utrumvis opinem cum Dei Existentia cultuque religioso
fieri conjungunt.

Porro, ad morbum hunc Mathematicum summaeque certitudinis pru
riginem reducenda eſt & illa Cartesii de conclusioſibus ex Mechanica
mótis neciſseitate, per univerfam suam Philosophiam, perpetuo deduc
cedis magnifica Pollicitatio. Neque enim putabat Vir sagacissimus ſe
fatis fecurum de certitudine eorum modorum quibus Natura Phano
mena fieri afferit, si Divina confilia (qua variiſ modis eadem Phanom
mena exhibere poſſint) cum Materiae Motuſque legibus difcerentur.
Sed ingens hic ador atque ſtudium deducendi ſingula ex certa hac atque
inevitabili Materiae lega Motuſque, eſjidem menfurâ in universo Mundo
femper permanenti, generofum Cartesii ingenium ita eſſe neceſſavit, ut non
rarò præproprié ſeim imaginatis sit fæd praëtiriffe, quod tam effiſcit
ubique præſtare desiderat. Omissis aliis, unum duxet, ſed praefulgi
dum maximique momenti, producam exemplum, nempe de eſſeſtione
particularum ſtriatarum, earundemque motu. Tamquam enim abeſt ut ne
ccesariò ſiant eo modo quo ille rem explicant, ut valde improbabile videa
tur, imò forfan imperifsimile, eae ita eſſeſtorari, aut formatas ejuſmodi legi
bus moveri.

Intorsionem enim particularum ſtriatarum ex motu globulorum Vor
ticis per quem tranfeunt oriri afferit, magisque vel minus intortas eſt
pro celeritate motus globulorum circa eum Vorticis circumvolutorum
Eas nempe quæ longiſ, magis, qua verò profpiß aut ab axe, minus
interqueri, quemadmodum conſtat ex * Artic. 90, 81, tertiae part.
Princip. Philosophiæ. Sed nulla prorsus videtur Mechanica neciſseitas ut
columellae illæ triangulares communi vorticis raptu in gyrum vertantur
circum proprios axes. Idem enim hic experiri poſſimus in qualibet mate
ria, præfertim in rotunda pariter ac longa, postìque in tubo vel canali
aliqœ Telluris axi paralēlo. Hanc enim nemo fomniaverit ex raptu terræ
in circuitum, circa pròprum itidem axem in canali ſuo gyratun iri. Par
igitur.

* Vide Tranſ. Gallic. Et que
cer troi cananœ sunt plus ou
moins sourcœ,
a proportion de
ces elles pa
de cœntro,
qui sont
plu ou moins
eoit agés de ces
effeins, à cause
que les parties
du second êle
ENTS tourno
c plus vitc en
ces endroits plus
eoit qu'aux
autres plus pro
ches.
igitur, si non potiori, ratione intelligamus triangulares illas particulas in columnae formam productas communi Vortice mox circumagi, nec tamen interim si bi ullos proprios gyros acquirere ex hac circumactione, Nam aequè certum est ( idque certitudine prorfus mechanicā ) omnes globulos ab axe vorticis illā circumrotationis vi repelli, quàm gravia omnia craffīque corpora versus centrum terrae remitti; ita ut omne subterfugium haec praelude videatur insanía responsa comminificent. Quibus addas vel ipfam figuram harum columnarum triangularem, anguli columnellarum adeo erunt robusti quæ crafftiam suam ut baud facile invertere, ita ut omne subterfugium in hinc praecludi videatur inania responsa comminificent. Quibus addas vel ipsam figuram harum columnarum triangularem, anguli columnellarum adeo erunt robusti ut non äquiventer intorqueri. Redoigitur, sed celerrimo curru pergent triangulares haec columnulse per spatium illa triangularia fine uta sui invertere, modo contina serie spatiorum anguli in eiusmoderer periperantur lineis.

Quod si anguli horum spatiorum triangulairium in eiusmod lineis non reperiatur, ëd anguli & latera alternatim se mutuo fecent ( quod fanè factu facilis videur, globulis eo situ in formam stabilirem magnifique compaßam relabentibus ) videamus tandem an hoc modo res felicius succederit, exfitteritque ulla Mechanica neceffitas ut dictæ columnulae in formam cochlarem torquantur. Supponamus igitur materiam primi Elementi transeundo per spatiuin triangulare ABC sibi acquisitive figuram triangularem, ipsi vero hoc modo formatae proxime occurrere

alterum spatium triangulare DEF, angulis suis prioris latera secans, si eo nempe situ committerentur. Proceò longè ab eft ut intorquere hæ particularis eas legibus quibus intorqueri contendit Cartesius. Nam tametfi Materia subsiliima simul ac fatis lentuerit formam necessariò acquirat triangularem transeundo, putas per ABC, præ tenteritudine tamen consistentiae suæ motûque celeritate via credibile est quin, dum impingit hæc columnula in DEF, E F, F D, latera trianguli DEF abradat prorfus, & deperdat omnem illam materiam quæ continetur angulis a A a, b B b, c C c, fìatque indæ non triangularis, fed flexangularis, penèque rotunda, unde & contortionis necessitates illa Mechanica planè periret. Et certè si daremus productos illos angulos columnulae triangularis allifione illæ non abradis, fed protuberantia globulorum, qui succedens triangularem spatium claudunt, invari duntaxat & intorquere ( quod tamen, ut dixi, ob celeritatem
Epistola H. Mori ad V. C. i

celeritatem transitus recensque formatae partculari teneituridinem nullo modo est probabile) sequeretur tamen nihilominus quem admodum esse fortuitam quas in partes haec columnae intorquere, nempe an secundum ordinem Vorticis G H, an vero contra. Nam cum globuli aetherei proximè fibi adjacentes sint ejusdem magnitudinis, triangularia illa spatiale æqualia erunt æqualiterque se interfecabunt, ita ut angulus A, dum impingit in latum F D, in ipsis medium lateris necessario cadat, & sic de reliquis. Unde nulla supputet ratio quare columnæ illæ triangulares in torquereantur versus H magis quàm versus G, & vice versa: Ac proinde merito concludi possit, partcularia striatas nunc haec nunc illæ in efformatione sua torqueri, nec omnes ab eodem polo venientes in eadem partes esse intortas. Quo quidem pacto evertenterentur penitus notissimæ illæ Magnetismi leges, Mundique Phænomena mutarentur. Quamobrem necesse est atiorem aliquam cautam & divinorem quam Materiam Motuumque puræ Mechanicam ad hoc opus addiscere, si tam affabrè, tam confianti artificio, inque tam utiles fines definato, cochlearum in formam columnæ illæ triangulares sint torquenda.

Idemque statuendum est de curfu & tendentia ipsarum hoc modo jam intortarum. Nam ad certas partes legè certâ pergere supponuntur, quæ tamen Mechanica esse non possit. Ut quando transeunt per Materiam subitalem sideris jam cortice incrustari incipientis, aut jam ferme incrustati: Nifi hic vis aliqua directrix Mechanicâ divinior striatarum curfum regat ac moderetur, impossibile est quin ab axe sideris latera versus rejeciantur, alteraque extremitate eodem recta corticem feriant lineâ ad axem sideris non paralleâ, sed ad angulos ferè rectos eum fecanti. Incredibile enim est alteram extremitatem striatarum partcularum alteri ut plurimum non præponderare magisve solidam esse. Hoc talitem manifestum est, cùm haæ striatae simul cum sideri circumrotentur, necesse fore ut ab axe recedant, confertumque verius eam sideris partes qua propius ab sunt ab Ecliptica retrudantur; unde maxima vis Magnetismi verius Telluris Æquatorem, nulla ferè versus Polos reperiretur. Quod si minus pura jam evaferit Elementi primi Materia, contractisque foribus ali quantulam lentuerit, partcularia striatae tam longo itinere motum suum perderent, viam fibi findingo per his Materiæ lentorem crassiorémque confistantiam.

Sed concedamus recte hic omnìa intùs peragi ac feliciter, videamus quid fiat de his striatis particularis cùm integro impetu exfluerint foras; Certè mihi credibile non est, si nullam aliam vim habarent moderatricem præter legem puræ mechanicae, eas tam prospero exitu reditique curfu suos repetere posse. Nam ut omittam quanm facile fit particularis Australis in foramina Borealia & boreales in Australia impingere, illique impactionibus metas magneticos (præsertim dum tenei sunt recensque formati) turpirer deformare; id certè mihi videtur supra omnem Mechanica legem postimum, quod factis quasi agminibus tam constanti curfu re vertantur à Polo ad Polum, & in liberum atherem non recta proficiscantur ut jacta spicula vel fagittae. Mechanicum enim legibus magis con fonum effet ut viam fibi perfurarent per ærem (etiam si eum fingeremus aliquanto crassiorém) motûmque suum ac vîm hîcse conatibus impens

dendo
dendo perderent, quam ut, datquasi operat, reditum molientur, cur-
sumque ad alterum polum tam longe distantem dirigerent. Nam cum se-
mel partibus Terrae magneticae in aerem se projecerint, clauduntur pro-
tinus aeris partibus omnimodo confimilibus, ut quae proximè ftabi invi-
cem adjacent. Unde manifestum est, nihil corporei in caufa effe posse cur
hae particulari homogeneis undique aeris partibus isthoc modo involucr
hac potius erumperent quam illac, aut quod reverti mallent quam recta
viam conficere, vel in sublime ferri, sed lubesse altius aliquid Principium
& divinium quod errantes revocet, quodque motus cursùique earum in
fines certos & destinatos ubique moderetur & gubernet.

Postremo, ad wannopositiar hanc five μουσεολογιαν Mathematicam re-
ferre poteris cautum illud ac scrupulosum Principium, viz. Quod ne tan-
tillo quidem plus minusve motus fit in rerum Univerfitate uno tempore
quam alio. Quod nullis, quod iciam, rationibus defendi potest nisi preca-
riris vel fictis. Cujus generis dux mihi occurrit. Prima est, nec Genios
nec Animas humanas materiam posse movere, sed motus ejus ductaxat
versus hac vel illam partem determinare, cùm planè gratis dicunt fìc
Effentiam ullam activam ac operativam, quales ab omnibus æstimatur sub-
stantia spiritualis, habere vim coercendi, fìftendi ac gubernandi materiam
motam, & tamè nè minimam quidem vim unquam habere posse eandem
ullatenus movendi. Altera est, Corpus quod alteri corpori motum im-
primi, quantum illi motus imprimit, tautundem de suo tempem perdere,
partem quan perdit eandem numero in alterum corpus tranfire: quod
credo me, fi vacaret, ex speculatione Potentiurum, ques vocant, Me-
chanicam facillum posse refutare. Sed cum hac de eodem prorufus,
tam numero quàm menfurâ, motu in Mundo femper permanentc opinio
ad quosdam Carteffi fequaces magis quàm ad eipsum pertineat, illis po-
tius quàm ipsi impingenda est hæc temeritatis culpa.

Vides tandem quàm non omnes illas dapès quibus tam laute amicos
hos excipit Carteffi, promisca inuitue devoro.

6. Postquam igitur hanc suspirationem diluit, libenter quaætioni respon-
derem, fi verba fensùque paullum mutaveris. Utique fi mihi non ex-
probaveris tam avidos Inventorum Carteffianorum ætæaque amplexus,
fed interrogaveris columna quare profiteor me tanto cum studio &
voluptate Philofophiam evolvere Carteffiam. Habeo enim in promptu
multa quæ respondere possum.

Primò enim, nullus dubito quin omne id quod appellit ad fensus
notros à Mundo fenfibili, ( hoc est, ab externis Objectis, que Phæno-
mena vulgo vocantur, quibus fensus notri afficuntur ) nihil omnino
fit aliud quàm motus corporae aliter atque aliter ex magnitudine, figura,
fìtique partium Materiae modificatus. Quod manifestò patebit omnes
fensos ipfùque objecta percurrunti.

De tæctu palam est, qui non afficitur nisi aliquis corporis præfione,
adfrictione, impactione five illifione, f similibus. Porro, quod id quod
admoveatur corpori notro videatur molle vel durum, calidù vel frigidum,
& id genus reliquis, motum tribuendum esse òque manifestum est. Saccha-
rum enim, fæxa òc ferrum attritione contracfa & in tenues pulvisculos com-
minuta mollia fiunt ; Aqua vero, ex motus privacione partiumque unione
ac
ac quiete in glaciem compacta, dura. Unde constat duritiem confitgere in firma unione quiescenti partium, mollitiem in eorum disjuncture, modò satis tenues sint, majorémque fore mollitiem igitur motus tenuitati acceperit; quod fusè, quodopus effect, demonstrari poffet. Eadem etiam effe rationem de calido & frigido ex eo liquet, quod motus ad hunc vel illum gradum adurgete calor excitatur, & remisso illo motus gradu vel diminuitur vel tollitur: Quemadmodum clarè videmus in aqua bulliuntes super ignem in vafe posita. Quin & ipfius ignis naturam in vehementiim particularum agitacione confitgere ex eo planè deprehendimus, quod maximam partem abuli fui in flamman, quæ vehementi motu agilique vibratione furtum furtur, absumit, ipsòque cineres in minuitissimæ partes disjungit, unde & ipfi molles aliquatenus evadunt. Pari ratione reliquæ qualitates tactiles ex natura motus explicari poffent; sed id justi volumini, non unius Epiftoli, opus effect.

Cùm autem de tactu confet, quod nihil id fit aliud quam motus corporæ us quod ipfium afficitur, securi ite possumus idem contingere in guftu, cum & ipfe fit tactus quidam (etiam astipulante & Aristotele) illiusque perceptiones fiant ex Objecîi atque Organi contactu corporœ, variûque ex variis motus effectis in Objecûo. Omnes enim cibi ex aliis atque aliis ignis minimis (cujus naturam in vehementiim particularum agitacione confitgere modò probatum est) alios atque alios saporibus fibi afficiunt, varifque modis guftum afficiunt. Quod aœque verum est de Medicamentorum tam saporibus quam viribus. Ultraque enim ignis arte (qui, ut ipfius dixi, nihil aliud est quæ motus quidam Materiæ modificatus) augurent, minuentur, variantur. Est autem & ipse Sol ignis, cujus itidem calore fructus terræ omnes maturitatis gradus subeunt.

Et quod ad odoratum attinet, quamvis non videatur hic esse idem ille organi Objecûique contactus, fenlationem tamen motu corporæ hieri ex eo confat, quod odores vento feruntur ad nares, & sibi divertuntur. Unde palam est eos esse particularis quasdam ææri innatantes & odoratús organo impingentes. Quod adhuc manifestius apparat in suffumigationibus, ubi agitacione ignis odores majori copiâ excitantur fortiusque nares feriunt.

Soni etiam ab æcre transvehuntur, deflectuntur corporum oblaculatis, & ab adversis ventis impediantur. Unde planè suam produnt naturam, indicatque se esse certos quasdam motus per æcrem transmißos? Quod etiam planius apparat ex ipforum generatione. Nunquam enim auditur sonus nisi ex aliis corporum collisione: Quemadmodum palam est tam in Animalium vocibus & in pulsandis in infandâ in instrumentis Muficis quàm in inconditis quibuslibet repitibus & fragorisibus. Ipsa etiam Echo huc veritati accinit, quæ nihil alius est nisi sonus à corpore aliquo concavo repercussus, five reflexus. Quod autem, quæso, à corpore refleâti potest quod ipsis rerum non fit corpus? Sonus igitur nihil aliud est quàm motus quidam ææris, Echo autem nihil praeter motus hujus reverberationem.

Quemadmodum verò ex Echo deprehendimus sonum motus esse quendam corporœm, ita pari ratione conclusere possumus id quod ad oculos nostrós appellit ab Objecûis visibilibus nihil esse alius praeter hujuscemodi.
modi motum distinctis quibusdam legibus modificatum. Nam species illas visibles, quas vocant, & corporeis reflecti apud omnes est in conscfio. Nihil autem a corpore reverberari possit nisi corpus, jam monui-mus ex se fatiis esse manifestum, Univerfim igitur verum est, Senfationem nihil esse aliud nisi motus corporei perceptionem.

Cujus quidem Theorematis (quod obiter moneo) insignis est utilis ad eos reuotatios qui specificas necio quas fonniant Materiæ differentias, fingúntque; certas particularum congeries, omni figurae, motus, soliditatis, fitqve quæ fepotiti, ex fola specifica fua natura immediata & immutabili varia illa Mundi Phenomena fenibus noftris exhibere. Nam planè con-ñat ex praedicitis, aliisque id genus quamplurimus quæ adicii posint, tum species hujusmodi materiales omnes subinde mutari, tum fenis noftris non aliter ab ipfis affici quàm per certas figurae, motus, magnitudinis, fitqve leges in ipfis particularis.

Et certe quod ad prius attinet, Nemo qui hujusmodi specificas differentias in Materia fingit, nisi temere & abique omni ratione philofophari velit, negare potest, quin quæ, fenfù judice, maximè difcraent, specie etiam eadem oporteat different. Jam verò, quæ major, obfècro, differentia fenibus noftris unquam occurrit, quàm quæ Stellarum inter & opacam hanc terram, quàm calcamus, intercedit. Quod praecipue feft argumentum demòntrandì eandem numero materiae species quàm maximè oppositas subire, ac proinde materiam nullubi specie differre, fi Hypothesi Carte-fiana de mutatione Stellarum in Planetas nuda Hypothesis non effet, fed agnita veritas. Hoc enim pacto conïatet, quodlibet corpus terreftre, quantumvis durum & craffum, ex subtilifsimi omnium materia (quæ ex ramentis globulorum æthereorum, ubique, uti patet ex uniformi lumnis perceptione, homogeneorum, originem duxit) conuationem effet, & fi arte quidem non posset, saltem Naturæ & Temporum Fatorumque ferie in eadem minutias dèteri poße ac diffolvi. Cæterum ut Hypotheses misilas faciamus, faccedeam ex fane ac ferenæ æquam vim habet loida illa ma-cularum Solis obfervatio, quæ procudhibo ex subtilifimis illis particulis fiiunt ipfò æthere tenuioribus. Quin & quà cominis conficiuntur idem tæfantur, ut craslorum corporum, putà fæbi, cera, ligni in tenues splen-dentique fiammas tranfmutation, quemadmodum & graminum herba-rümque in fanguinem, carnem, offa, pellésque bovinas vel ovinas conver-fio. Gramina enim, fi fenis noftròs consulfamus, ab ifis animalium partì-bus immane quantum differentur, ac proinde, juxta fuprà dictum postula-tum, specificè.

Quod vero ad alterum illud specificat, de particulis Materiæ specie di-finctis, quasi fola hác specificà virtute Phenomena varietatem fenibus exhiberent, motu, fitu, quiete, figura, cæterisque Materiæ modificatio-nibus feclufis, abundè mihi reuotaturn videtur ex praedicitis obfervationi-bus, quibus clarè conñatat. Omne id quod ad fenis noftròs appellit motum esse corporeum aliter atq; aliter ex magnitudine, figura & fimiilibus partium Materiæ affectionibus modificatum. Nec opus est quicquam huc adjicere, quia quàm animadverteris quàm manifesta hujus veritatis infťan-tia est natura lumenis & colorum elucefcar. Lumen enim oriri ex motu indè patet, quod, fi vehemens fit aut propinquum, calor fenfibilis ipfum comi-tetur.
Colores autem non esse specificas quasdam qualitates, sed motum certis legibus modicum, consistat ex Iride & Principe; quandoquidem nec in roridis illis nubium guttis, nec in ipso primate, utpote diaphanis, ullus insit color, sed lumen certis modis refractum reflectum in illam colorum varietatem degenerat. Quod manifestum est indicium nec ullos specificos coloris corporibus opacis ineunte, sed lumen ab eorum superficie alter atque aliter, pro situ exteriorum particularum, reflectit: quo mutatus coloris protinus mutantur: uti constat in aer, ferro, aliisque metallis, quorum superficies colorum mutant aquis corrodentibus vel salinis aereis particularis impetitque fodicata. Quippe quod necefine sit, quod particularum situs alter alter, si non figuris, in superficie aereis furtive hac insulatur atque impetu mutentur, globulis ætheraei aliter ab ære, putat, niteint, ab ærugoineo aliter reflectantur.

Quamobrem eum tam clarè constet omnia mundi Phænomena, quatenus sensibus nostris patens, motu percipi, certè ille mihi verissimas Philosophiae leges observare videtur qui tam accuratè causas horum Phænomenòv & tam profundè scrutatur, ut præcisi nobis enaret quo situ, quo tenuitate, quibusque particularum figuris motus illi omnes, qui variè sensus nostris afficiunt, modificantur. Hoc autem stupendum in modum nobis praeditit à me nunquam facis laudatút Cartesius.

7. Pratera, nemo quifquam est qui materiae motusque naturam vel mediocris intelleget, qui non planè viderit ex eo solo quod Deus certum motus gradum (eundem putà quem in Mundo jam experimur) Materiæ impellerit, quod varia indè Phænomena sint emergens. Fieri enim non potest quin ea motus mensura materiam ita diffingat & in exiles minutias conterat ut, quanquam quædam dura (id enim ex minorì motus gradu alibi contingere) alia tamen mollia, quædam fænfuli frigida, alia calida, alia planè ignea apparerent. Credóque Deum ex deisti nato duobus hisce simplicissimis rerum Principiis liberos suas vagóque gyros semper permitisse, quamdiu intra illos limites continenteri ut æquem commodi rerum Naturae forent, atque si ipsum impetus divinior quædam vae lege compencerentur; ut eo magis adhăndieretur ingenio humano rerum naturalium contemplatio.

Physicum enim puto esse neminem qui, si mentem propositumque suum probè noverit, non agnoget lè causas rimari effe effe rerum corporum, eaque, siieri potest, longiori serie deductas, nusquæ neceñsario concatenatas. Quales certè nillæ reperirentur, si naturalibus & in se necessariis motus corporèi legibus Deus, intermediaente superiori aliquà virtute, ubique fedulò obsèrveret: Nulliusque causæ efficientis investigatio effe posset nisi inimmaterialis nobisque minime omnium inteligibilit: qualis est Peripateticorum forma substantialis, quæ eadem serè notione pariter ac nomine per res singulas pervagatur, nihilique nobis indicat prater ignorantiam nostrarum ac nугacitatem, quos non puderet interro ganti de Aqua, Ignis & fimilibus, quid & unde sint; elatis superficiis respondere, Ignem & Aquam Aquam esse & Ignem, ex eo quod forma quædam substantiæ, quæ Ignem & Aquam constitutunt, è gremio Materiæ in nescio quas Materiæ partes proreperiunt, eoque pacto duò illa elementa Mundo exhibuerint. Apæ frivolas itas ac otiosas nanias, Ee 2 quibus
quibus omnis humani ingenii industria consopitur & suflaminatur, omnifoque ejusflagacitas & acumen retunditur & inutile redditur! Non tam torpidum naturalis Contemplationis objectum nobis propofuit Deus: sed tamen necessarius Motus ac Materiæ legibus prudenter permifit quantum ad per SCRIPTURAS rerum naturalium caufas nos excitare, & inventarum voluptate delineare posuit. Adeò ut non fit ubique necesse ad cæcum illud ignaviae & ignorantiae afylum confugere, internas scilicet formas subfiantiales. Quis enim qui inter Philosophos nomen fuum profittere rogatus de Lunæ phæbus, de eclipsibus ueriquisite luminaris, si omniis apertis illis ac necessariis Mathefæos ac Naturæ rationibus, responde{ter ea omnia proficicet ex internis Lunæ Soli{que principiis formique essentialibus, qua faciunt ut certis temporibus Sol juxta ac Luna lumine privetur, Lunâque static visibus sub hac vel illa pha{fi videatur, quis, inquam, eft è Philo{phorum grege qui tam frigide & jejune respondens non altis cachinns ab omnibus excipere tur:

Quid autem faceret misellus hic homuncio, si de Planetarum flatio{nibus, directionibus & retrogradationibus fierat quaelib? Neque enim recipere fe potefst ad Hypothesis Ptolemaicam, utpote quæ manifestiffimiis scaret contradicationibus, uti omnes jam nörenti qui vel primoribus labiis rem Afronomicam deliberant. Succedat igitur Tychonica, ubi in libero ætheræ Planetæ omnes gyros fuos perficat; & rogemus hunc nostrum quid in caufa fit, cur Mars, Jupiter & Saturnus, postquam fe{tianti{us perrexerint fecundum ordinem Signorum, mox tanquam obtutus tacito defixi drepente fu{fiant, po{f{tæque, quasi jam in memoriam re{vocarent rem aliquam cuju{ oblit{ fuerant, inopinatò recurrant. Pro{culubio eadem femper ob{berraret chorda, dicere quid id fieri ex internis horum Planetarum formis quas ipsis à prima creatione indiderat Deus, omnifque eorum lufus, pro{gres{us, re{gres{us & fationes eis naturales effe ex principiis fuis constitutivis, quemadmodum motus deorum lapidi motûque surfum igni connatus eft. Præclaram quidem Re{pcionem, talisque Repfoonis ignaviae & incertiæ nequaquam indignam! Dimilfo igitur Nugator hoc nugacifimo, experiamur quomodo huic qua{tioni fatis{fi{er po{lit ex apertis & confeffis Materiæ Motûque legibus, quales NaturaÆ Artique Mechanicaæ planè communes effe meritò fætuit Car{tieus.

Venerem citra ultrâque. Solem circuitus suos peragere ex ipfius phæbus con{tat, eademque ratio eft de Mercurio. Martem autem, Jovem & Saturnum circa Solem ferri nemo adhuc dubitavit. Hos igitur quinque Planetas circa Solem ire & redire manife{ tum eft. Quærendum est de{in{ceps an moventur viam fibi fecando per materiam ætheris, an motu ipfius ætheris circumvæhantur. Primum autem non fieri ex eo liquet, quod tam celeres Planetarum tran{itus materiæ coele{tis re{ficientia impediret, perfer{eque paxillo tem{po{e motum suum fluido ipsum ætheri com{ municando. Reliquum eft igitur ut circumvæhantur ip{fi ætheris motu, totaæ materiæ coele{tis, cui innantant, vorticis in{tar circa ipsum Solem torque{tatur. Investigemus tandem quid de Terra fiat, quæ pro{culubio intra limites hujus vorticis inventur. Stabite{lla in{rá{ipo{quo ætheri flaminâ{e, an mo{v{bitur? Quibus autem uncis, quibus funibus & anchoris in pro{funde.

Et nè fortè interim de Luna fí súlicitus; cùm certum fit eam circa terram perpetuó singulis mensibus tanquam affidumbiam illius pediíquam circumcurrere, nec id fieri possè nifi ope vortícis, quemadmodum iam demonstratum est; necesse est ut Luna peculiari vortice circa Tellurem circumferatur. Cujus in medio cùm fit ipsa Tellus, omnésque illius poros materia coeléstis, quæ in hunc particularem vorticem torquetur, pervertat, fieri non potest per leges Natura quin ipsa Tellus huìus vortícis vi in gyros circa proprium axem rapiatur. Ut summarím igitur dicam, impossibile est, si motús corporíe leges confúlámus, quin Terra diurno illo motu annoque seatur quibus eam ferri olim docuit Ethnícorum fápiens tissimus Pythagóras, cujútque doctrínam ante seculum unum & alterm Nicolam Copernícum in locum revocavit.

Vides quam perspicues simplicibusque Príncipíis vel inviti ducimus ad eam Hypothesín (fi modò Hypothesís illa dicenda sit quæ reali Naturæ compagne necessarió continetur) quà posita rationes & causæ non possíbiles vel probabiles, sed necessariæ & ineluctabiles, omnium fieré Phänómeno quæ Aítronómorum ingenìa per tam multa fecula torserant, manifestò deteguntur. Nomenímagis necessarió corpus nostrum in Sole umbram proiect, quam ex hoc rerum, quod demonstravimus, systémathe Pythagórico, nota illa Planetarum Phænómena omnia, quæ mox ordine breviter recenfémus, conféquentur.

Cujusìmòdi sunt, motús Saturni, Jovis, Martís, Mercurií, Veneris in Epicyclis fuis; quâ tamen interim supelletìque Sol destituétur.

Quòd dicti illi quinquæ Planetarum sunt directi, stationarii, & retrogradiens Epicyclis fuis; cùm tamen Luna in suo Epicyclo nec stationaria videbitur, nec retrograda.

Quòd circuitus Epicyclorum Saturni, Jovis & Martís eam habeant ad motum Solis rationem, ut semper perficiantur eo temporis spatio quod elabitur ab una singulorum conjunctione cum Sole ad alteram; quodque in singulis itís conjunctionibus cum Sole reperiantur in Apogéis Epicyclorum, Oppositionibus verò in eorundem Perigéis.

Præterea, Periodos Epicycli Saturni celeriores fore quãm Jovis, & Jovis quãm Martís; Martis verò Retrogressiones majores fore quãm Jovis, Jovísque quãm Saturni.

in alis atque alis signis Zodiaci possit contingere. Ut nihil dicam de Pha-
nomenis ex motu Terrae diurno emergentibus; Stellas nempe Planetar-
que omnes, quamvis immensis spatii & a terra & a se invicem distantes,
viginti tamen quatuor horarum spatia circa terram ineffabili celeritate
impetusque contrario retorqueri.

Quorum Phaenomena omnium, necno aliorum quorundam, sim-
plicius hact Pythagoras Hypothesis (quam veram esse tam certi esse positi-
num, quam quod folia que ab arbore in fluvium decidunt secundo, non
adverso, flumina seruntur) tam evidentes & necessarias causas exhibet, ut
nemo nisi planè stupidos & delirus de eis possit dubitare, nisi Deus datā
operâ Natura leges turgare, cum non opus sit, fingere vellet. Quod
quām sit insulmum fignetum fastis super demonstravimus.

Tandem perspiciscis, V. C. quam pulchra sit & apprime graa humano
ingenio hac philosophandi ex immutabilibus & necessariis Natura legis
petitiae quo in genere cum Cartesiis caeteros mortales infinitis
paralangis antecelluerit,

Qui genus humanum ingenio superavit, & omnes
Praetexit, stellas extoruit uti aethereus Sol,
is minime mirari debes si aliquanto frequentiorem scriptorum ipsius lectio-
nem mihi foloe indulgere.

8. Veruntamen quamvis admodum certus sum aliquum multa Natu-
ra Phaenomena ex Mechanicis legibus demonstrari posse; nihil tamen
aeg quæ persuāsum habeō quæ non omnia, imò nē millefimam quidem eo-
rum partem, eo modo possit explicari. Primò enim, si ex eo folo, quod
Deus ad certum aliquum gradu Materiam agitaverit & in motum ci-
verit, totius Mundi fabrica facta fuerit, plantis brutorumque corpori-
bus, imò & hominum, non exceptis; creatio Univeri Benignitati fo-
llummodo Divinae ac Omnipotentiae, exclusa illius Sapientia, essent tri-
bueda. Nisi quis fortē putaret, non minoris esse sapientiae ex conflario
talem Mundi Materiam creāsse quæ ex solis Mechanicæ legibus necessari-
ris in hanc rerum formam pulcherrimam emergēret, quàm aliam ali-
quām quâ innumeris aberrantium motuum correctionibus & castigationi-
bus indigēret.

Deinde, ha motuum leges adeò simplices sunt idemque ferè ubique
praestantes, ut incredibile prorsus videatur miram hanc rerum varietatem
indé posse oriri. Quod enim praetar motus ulla nisi quod rectā pergar,
aut autem recta pergere conetur quod pars materiae ab altera parte
refletatur, aut eam secum auferat, partemque fui motus ipsi communi-
ceit quod denique in varias minutias differingatur magnitudine, figurā,
situ distinctas. Differing eitget, si lubet, corpus quodvis durum, &
pistillo in pulverem contundē, mox adhibito microscopio singulos pulvi-
sculos contemplare. Videbis, procudibus, pulsulciborum figurās à rude-
rum fragmentis nihilo differentes, nisi quod minores sunt nec primi
tertiiique elementi particulas à pulvisulis hicè differre, nisi quod ipsis
adhib multò sint minores. I nunc & judica quam bellæ rerum formæ ex
cacis confusorum horum fragmentum concursibus, allisionibus & coal-
tionibus orientur, quali artificio illa depingent aut papilionum alas aut
caudas pavonum. Ut nihil dicam de stupendo Divinæ Mentis conflifo in
formando
formando internas omnium animalium partes: ubi nihil ineptè admisiùm est, sed singula tam accurata arte perfecâ, ut necesse sit agnofcere Principium aliquod Materiâ motiûre corporeo longe ãntius ac divinis huic provincia invigilare. Quamvis enim concederemus, (quod tamen ego nullo modo concedam) viliora quædam animalcula hoc modo produci posse, tamen omnes animalium ÿpecies sic esse productas, nullâque interim à tam caco & fortuito principio ineptè esse formatas, omnino est impossibile; quemadmodum copiosè demonstravi in Traçatâ adverius Atheos.

Quamobrem ex eo, quòd quædam Phænomena exhibere posse simplici Mayeriâ motus, omnia hoc pacto praèstari posse confiderâ, abjectîssima quædam ulla ÿesigna, i.e. ridicule & superflìtiosa quœdam Materiæ caeæadorori & cultus, mihi videtur, non legitima philosophandi ratio. Quæ de re cùm semper fuerim ÿatis persuasus, certè ex lectione Cartesii jam evasi omnium perÌusìssimus. Neque enim dubito, quantum ingenium humanum praèstare posset ex Mechanicis rerum rationibus, incomparâbilem hunc Philosopham praèstisse. Deprehendo tamen eum magnis illis pollicitis de perpetua conclusionum certitudine ex necèsâriis Mechanicâ legibus deducendarum ÿapisciule excidisse, idque in reddenda ratione rudorum generaliorumque Naturæ Phænomenâ; neque enim ultra illos limites adhuc procefferat. Quid igitur eum suflie facturum putemus fi tentâffe humani corporis vel alius alicuius Animalis generationem ex eis folis principiis demonstrâre?


9. Sed nequa ÿiat injuria mirando Cartesii ingenio, quamvis omnia per univeròm illius Philosophiàm nexus hoc Mechanico planèque necèsârio non cohaereant, ità ut unam perpetuam ac congenerêm catenam exhubere possint; ÿatendum est tamen, non paucas hujusmodi inventâri catenulas verè aureas affabréque factas. Ex quibus omnibus, non nudis quiìdem Mayeriæ legibus, sed diviniùri aliquid vi coercûtis & ÿigatis, pulchra ÿane ÿatisque firma conclusionum omnium fit concatenatio. Verbi causa, Quamvis certi ÿeste non possìmus ex legibus Mechanicâs striatas illas particulâs solâ vorticis contorsionem formarì, quemadmodum ÿam diximus; facile tamen supponere possimus (nifi ÿalæreà quaìd quadrant correpri eouque infanire velimus, ut audacter affirmemus omnia prorsus Universi Phænomena, ÿe ÿirripibus quidem, necdum animalibus, ÿa conditione exemptis, ÿolo motu corporeo ÿerì) facile, inquam, possimus supponere vim aliquam virtutì illi analogam, quà animales factûs (five matrum in utero, five in Telluris communis omnium parentis matrice) tam admirabili arti-
ficio efformantur, in cælo juxta ac in terra regnare, id est, Divinam Providentiam nullis locis aut faptis excludi, sed ubique praefò effe paratâmage ad attenuata: subetcâque Materiâ motus ìta moderandos, ut nihil ullubi omissatur aut flat quod non cedit aut in utilitatem aut in ornamentum Universi: atque ex hac vi (five Animam, cum Cartesio, illam appellare malles, five Spiritum) ubique & omnibus fedulò proficiente, effectusque suis præcipuos in subtilissimis & fluidissimis Materiâ partibus exhibente, coehiare illas particulas (fìne quibus Axis terrestris parallellismus, Temperaturn cardines, Magnes, Navigatio, Gentium commercia stare non possit) mature fuiffe efformatas.


Eadem igitur rerum serier quæ reperitur apud Cartesium totò agnofic potest, sed non eadem ubique hujus serier connexio. Necesse enim est ut subindè fe intermi fecat Divina illa Mundi rerûmque generandarum Universæ Providentia, 10. Quamvis autem id à Cartesio non fit praëstitum quod à nullo mortali prætarì posse pro certissimo habeò, nempe ut causs rerum omnium naturalium uno tenore congenerique serie à capite ad calcem deducantur, nullâ aliâ interpositâ ët praeter mechanicam illam prorsúsque corpoream, cujus effectus cogoscere procul dubio pura putà illa Naturæ scientia habenda est: tamen in immensam Gentis philosophicae voluptatem pariter ac commodum hoc fæltem accuratè perfect, ut clarè sciòte intelligamus immediatas causas effectricè, eàsque congeneres òmper purèque corporaes, omnium ferè rerum fensibilium quas tracìtas. Quà certè difficultis est provincia, & quam nulli praeter eum fuccepere quos non meritor positerit eam unquam fuccepisse. Perfenticìs tandem ob quàm multas gravèfque causas tantè facio Cartesium.

11. Sed ut nihil te celem, una adhuc mihi supæref peculiari ratio, quæ quamvis forsan alīis admodum paradoxâ videri possit, apud me tamen non parum gratia conciliat Philosophiæ Cartesiana. Eòt autem illius cum Mosaica Mundi creatione conformitas. Rem miram, inquies, narras,

Hanc Cabbalam à Judaeis acceptam, numerisque singulorum dierum opera adumbrantibus involutam, magnī fecit Pythagorās; nec fīvit Arcanum in vulgus emanare, quantvis fortē de eo discipuli ejus symbolis illsis numerīs fēnūm tegentibus vel apud imperitos aliquando garrīre non re- cūfārent. Nucleum igitur fībi ferventem, putaminis fragınina dēmitit po- pulo projectunt; qua alii rūs, homochatione alii, alii suspicaci quadam veneratione exceperunt; indēque quàm plurimas numerorum & appella- tiones & virtutes verē Pythagoricas litteris mandārunt. Quōrum autem iōta omnia in inqüies. Breviter tibi dicam, Equidem mihi videor horum corticis fragmīnum ope nucleum ipsum inveniisse ac recuperāsse. Dum enim Moseicae creationis fēnūm Philosophicum fērīō meditābar, oculus hinc indē, nunc in verīsima qualibet, quod judicare potui, Philosophiāe principiā, nunc in Textūm ipsum confectīs, revera nulla inveniisse potui quae tam examuṣsim Moseicae paginae congruerent quàm illa Cartesiana.


12. Quod ad vagos illos susurros ac rumores fęcētāt quos spargīs de Cartesio, quasi de Deo non rectē fentītē, nihil eōs moror. Novi enim maximorum ac liberrimorum ingeniorum perpetuum fērē suisse fatum a fēmi- docēto.
Epistola H. Mori ad V. C.

semidocto vulgo Atheismi esse suspecta. Nec tamen differeor in illius scriptis paucula reperiri qua vel ab invidis, vel imperitis, in eam partem nimis facile positum torquere: qualia sunt trivii præcipue. viz.

13. Primum, Implicare contradictionem Spatium vel Extensionem dari quæ revera non sit corpora; quo tamen morbido dogmate ipsas etiam Scholas laborare memini me observāre.

Alterum, Ex Mechanicis motūs materie legibus omnia Naturae Phænomena esse demonstranda.

Postræmum, Fines Phænomenon ab ingenio humano non esse indagandos.

Quæ trivii tam prævō aspectu subdolōque niciu se fæ cele mutuo contiuentur, ac si Deum ac Providentiam è Mundo exturbare serio conspirarent. Sed nihil profus ab eum aut confilis aut viribus est metendum. Primam enim illam opinionem ipse fatis copiosè ac solidè refutasse mihi videor in Literis meis ad Cartesium. Alterius verò, Tractatūs mei adversus Theos pars secunda perpetua est & inexpugnabilis Conclusio, Sed alter respondi atque institui. Dico igitur eum non ex morbo aliquo Atheisticō, sed, prout suprâ monui, solummodo ex effrāni quodam pruritum omnia concludendi certitudine planè Mathematicâ priores illas duas; ex nimio autem prudentiâ studiō, opinionem tertiam tenuisse: neque opus esse hifice diuitus immorari, quàm ex suprâ dictis ipse tibi possis plenissimum colligere Respōnsum.

14. Quod portum addis, quoddam submuzzitare, eum causam illum quam sufcepit, Existentiæ Dei Animæque immortalitatis demonstrandâ, datâ operâ prodidiisse, supicio est omnium injustissima & contumeliössima. Nam quod ad Dei existentiam attinet, primum illud argumentum quod adhibet non solum omnium optimum est quà ratio humana excogitare potest, sed revera absolutam perfectissimam demonstratio, & cui maximum conficius est Cartesius, prout videre est aliqui in Respōnsonibus suis Metaphysicis. Unde palpâm est eum duo illa altera (quæ minūs firmiter concludunt, nec tamen sua probability carent atque acutissine) primo huic, ne folum in campo stare videretur, in pompam potissimum, succenturiasse.

15. In demonstranda autem Animæ immortalitate vix latum quidem pilum aberravit; cùmque tam propè scopum attigerit, nullo modo dubitare possim quin confanter crediderit se revera eum attigisse. Cui confidentiae vivi inuspe addidit illud ingenii sui fatum, quo ita addictus erat virtutibus Materiæ Mechanicis contemplandis, ut nihil in ea somniare quidem potuerit præter motum localem, situm, figuram & similia: unde fecurus erat cogitationem totò coelo ab eis differentem alii aliqui substantia esse tribuendum.

16. Porrò, piae ac generosi illâ ad animam suam hortationes ac gratulationes paulò ante eis exiunt, quibus eam monebat de sereno morbo cum patientia, & de expectando liberationem ex hoc corporis ergastulo cum gaudio, abundè refellantur eum serio de Animæ immortalitate suis philosophatum.

17. Quibus omnibus adjici potest tam de Dei existentia quàm de conditione Animæ (nisi illum existere, hanc verò substantiam esse crediderit
derit à Materia planè distinctam) quàm plurima in illius scriptis occur-

tere (ubi tamen abíque omni atque fóco eum agere ipsae circumstantiae

fatis arguant) quibus ipfe fibi pugnare manifestò deprehendatur: Cú-

jusmodi sunt,

1. Materiam ubique unam esse perfectæque homogeneam.

2. Ex eo nos certos esse quod non fallimur ubi clare ac distinctè rem

percipimus, quod non fortuito nati sumus, sed à benignissimo Deo

creati.

3. Substantiam esse quæ suã vi existit, ac proinde Deo ac creaturæ

non univocè competere, Materiæ tamen mentiæ nostræ competere

univocè.

4. Cognitionem substantiam intelligentem, Extensiónem corpus con-

stituere. Et quemadmodum motus localis, fitus, figura sunt modi cor-

poris; ita imaginationem, memoriam, voluntatem esse modos substantiæ

cognitantis.

5. Imaginationem esse duplicem, corpoream & incorpoream; illum

ope cerebri mentem nostram exercere, hanc abfque illius ope.

6. Libero nos pollere arbitrio, in ejusque ufo legitìmo veram con-

sìstere generofitatem.

7. Per imaginem quodam non magnam fæcè, sed tamen in varias

partes extensam, Conarióque impressam, objectorum nos visibilium per-

ceptionem habere.

8. Menti nostro inesse quædam non à sensibus hautas, sed ipsi planè

conntas, notiones communes rerumque ideæ.

9. Denique, quod alio prorsus modo concipimus magnitudines, fugi-

ræ; alio dolores, coloris, & similia.

Quæ omnia partim cum Dei exsistentia, partim cum Anima à corpore

distinctione reali tam intímè conjuncta sunt, ut nisi planè deliraverit Car-

tesius, impossiìble fìt quin utramque ex animo tenuerit.

Nam quòd ad primum attinet, manifestum est ex lumine Naturæ, simplicius

ejudem speciei substantis easdem prorsus genter ac gradu proprieties

competere. Quemadmodum igitur certi fumus cullibet circulo

cujusquælibe magnitudinis eandem ubique esse rationem diametri ad per-

ipheriam, ita easdem esse in qualibet Materiæ partícula proprieties

securi esse possumus, Quamobrem, si Materia immediate ex sua natura

movetur, continuò fequeetur, Omnem Materiam, semel si nullâ vi deti-
netur, eodem motûs gradu agitari. Unde necesse est ut Terra reli-

quique Planetæ liqueferent in materiam subtilitate & fluiditate aèri

faltam, si non ætheri, parem; vel potius, ut nunquam in tam craf

fiam consistentiam coafluient. Palam est igitur Materiam ex fe quie-

scere, quod & apertè mihi profèfìus est perspicaciíssimus Philòphus

in suis ad me Literis. Unde impossibile est quin animitus agnoept omni-

potentem aliquem Materiæ motorem Deum: Ímò & animæ nostræ à

corpore realem distinctionem, nisi & omnem prorsus Materiam sentire

vellet, quod valde ridiculum est, tantòque Philòpho indignum.

Deinde, alterum illud principium tantùm facit, ut fertìo agnoept ipsum

certitudinis illius, quam credit se habere de omnibus suis naturalium

rerum demonstrationibus, practicum esse fundamentum; prout videre

Haec autem si recte pensataveris, modumque scribendi distinctum & sobrium quem adhibet (Part. 1. Art. 51, 52, 53, 54.) debite observaveris, non fuipicaberes eum Theorema tertium quartumque lufu vel joco, fed bona fide descripistile; præsertim si insuper cogitaveris, minimè est probable eum Metaphysicæ suæ compendium Philosophiae principiis praetextere voluiffe, nisi sensisset hoc pacto universa uno quasi filo, eoque tenacissimo firmissimoque, cohæfura.

Quinta conclusio planè Platonica est, quæ est Philosophia omnium religiosissima. Atque reliquia quatuor ejusdem færè generis sunt, clarèque arguunt aliquid Materiâ longè praestantius longèque divinìus in nobis habitare.

18. Plurima hoc possim acumulare, quæ passim in Epistolis ejus occurrunt, quorum nonnulla operæ esse pretium duco tibi recenfere, ut indè perpicierc possis quàm ubique fìbi confìans unìque fìt Cartesius. Hujusmodi sunt,

1. Animam videre, non oculos.
2. Animam ex unione cum corpore quædam bona majora fìbi repræsentare quàm revera sunt.
3. Liberum nostrum arbitrium nos Deo quodammodo aequiparare, Ad Reginam Suecæ Epist. 1.
4. Quòd minus sit damni vitam perdere quàm usum Rationis,quoniam ipsâ Philosophia sola, etiam sine Fidei documentis, fìmè nobis ingenerat melioris status post mortem, facitque ut Anima nostra nihil æque onerofum fore præfagiat quàm tali corpori alligari quod suam profus adiam libertatem.
5. Duo esse volupptatum genera, Unum quod ad Animam solam, alterum ad Hominem, <i>i.e.</i> ad animam quatenus corpori unitam, spectat. Has fluxas esse & caducas ; illas, quemadmodum ipsâ Anima, immortalæ.
6. Quod tria potissimum cognitù necessaria sunt ad beatam vitam ; Existentia Dei, Animarum nostrarum immortalitates, & Immensitas Univerfi, Ad Elizab. Princip, Epist. 6.
7. Animam, quando datâ operâ cogitâ de rebus imaginabilius pariter ac intelligibilius, novâ signare cerebrum impressione ; eamque respectu animaæ actionem esse, non passionem, proprièque hanc dici imaginationem.
8. Providentiam Dei omnia complecti, tam minima quàm maxima, Ad eandem, Epist. 8.
9. Amorem duplicem esse, vel Intellectualem, vel Corporeum ; hunc propriè passionem esse, illum Animaæ etiam a corpore separatae competere.
10. Deum esse Spiritum, sive Rem cogitantem infinitæ perfectionis, noftrâque Animam illius esse quosi subobserveam quandam imaginem, Ad D. Chanuam, Epist. 35.
12. In rebus corporeis omnem actionem & passionem in solo motu locali
locali confittère, nonnà autem illà ad res immaterialès extendi posse, quando alicquid motui analogum in ipsis consideratur; atque ità volitio-
em in mente Actionem dici posse, intelleccionem verò & visionem Paffi-
ònem. Ad eundem, Epist. 83.

13. Perceptionem Universalium ad imaginacionem non pertinere, sed 
ad intellectum solum, qui Ideam ex sepIsa singularem ad multa referret. Ad 
eundem, Epist. 88.

Superfunt multa alia quæ huc faciunt tum in Epistolis tum in Traètatu de 
Affectibus; quæ tamen lubens praætereo, né fim infinitus. Addo 
duntaxat, nullatenus esse verisimile tam parum & defacatum ingenium, 
tantà modestiæ, humanitate, morumque integritate flpatum, in tam for-
didam foveam fœtidümque barathrum incidere potuisse.

19. Nihil igitur reftat, quod ściam, ob quod Cartesius Atheifmi suspe-
ètus esse posset, nisi quòd meritus audiat omnium Philosophorum præcel-
lementifimus. Est enim fancticum quoddam genus hominem, qui quantò 
quis sapientior sit Naturæque consultior, tantò eum semper autumant ab 
omi Religionem alieniorem: quasi quantò quis imperitior sit & stolidior, 
tantò magis ad Dei cultum foret idoneus.

Gentes olim Judæorum quando affinit capite colère finxerunt, 
magnōque fe hoc pacto sperabant eos opprobrio afficere. Pari equidem 
contumeliâ mihi videntur illi Deum ipsum onerare, qui imaginatur à 
nullis eum rite coli posse nisi Onocephalis. Ignorantium fæc rerumque 
inscitiam nihil necesse est ad cultum divinum adhibere, sed Innocentiam 
Omni níve ac lucre candidiorem.

20. Catæra quæ fæpemunero obiici scribis magis toleranda sunt, sed 
noni minus ridicula. Mente utique emortum fuisse incomparabilem Philo-
sophum ac vertigine corruptem. Allusiisse ineptulos illos credo ad do-
ftrinam de Vorticiibus. Præclarum quidem jocum, & Cartesi obrecta-
toribus dignum! Sed urgent seniò tam inopinatam, tam vaga, tamque 
longè petita commenda Scriptis ejus referripit, ut in neminem hominem 
nisi mente captum posse ullo modo cadere. Ecquis enim est, inquiet, 
-homo fobrius & consideratus qui unquam fusciper eüf fatis rationem con-
dendi Solém, Stellas, Planetàsque demonstrare quibusque Materiae 
figuris motibusqueLux fingulique colores sunt particularim definire e 
duram hanc denique opacàmque Terram, quam calcamus, lucidam ali-
quando fuisse Stellam apertè statuere? Verum nihil diffido quis facile 
evincere possefi Democritum non intàiire, sed populum; nec tam ulti 
Cartesi dementia tribuendum esse quòd tam mira Paradoxa invenerit, 
quàm aliorum fociordis & stupori quòd in conßiniles cogitationes non 
incidissent.

21. Nihil enim in hisce omnibus exccogitavit Cartesius nisi quod par-
tim ex obviis quibusdam experimentis, partim ex novis & accuratis tam 
prætentis quàm proximorum secúlorum observationibus & conclusionibus, 
Jagaci animali ammodum proclive esset cogitare. Varii enim tum Phi-
losophic tum Astronomi, tanquam inferioris ordinis Operarii, rudera jam 
sustulerant; materiamque præparaverant sublimi huic ingenio verèque 
Architectònicum.

Tycho Planetarum orbes solidos è coelo descubaverat; totumque co-

rum
rum spatium in fluidum reduxerat aetherem. Astronomi & Philosophi
nobiliores plerique omnes doctrinam veterem de Telluris motu à Co-
pernico renovatam uno ore comprobaverant, ipsamque Terram (quippe
quam non solum circa Solem se gyrantem, sed etiam, Lunae infar, Solis
lumen, idque in ipsam Lunam, Eclipsibus & Novilunius reflexentem, de-
prehenderunt) in Planetarum album communi confcripserant. Giliius Solem
stellam fixam, stellisque fixas tot Solis esse statuerat, Jovémque quatuor Satellitibus eum circumscurfantibus, tanquam tot
Lunulis, circumstipaturum, Tubo suo optico detecerat. Scheinerus im-
menfo volumine Doctrinam de Solis maculis earumque generatione, dif-
figatione, motuque circa Solem, Solisque circa proprium Axem, plenam
perfètâmque tradiderat. Et stellis fixis quasdam nunc majores, nunc
minores videri, imò novas profusus apparece aliquando, mox evanescere,
multi observaverant. Cometas magnitudine terræ pares, vel majores,
in Planetarum regione discurrere ipse iterum Tycho aliique certissimis in-
diciis demontraverant. Gilbertus denique non solum virtutes Magneti-
s summi arte & induftria explicaverat; sed, quod caput rei est, ipsam
Terram ingentem quendam esse magnetem argumentis evidentissimis con-
firmaverat.

22. Difpiianus, quofo, jam sedulù quam nec vagas nec longè pe-
titas conclusiones hinc deduxerat Cartesius, sed obvias & cum diètis pro-
batissimorum Philosophorum Observationibus artissimè conjunctas. Pra-
cipuum verò Fundamentum ejus Philosophia in eo jactum videbimus
quod Perigeum Martis phafèfque Veneris invito Tychoni extorserat, in
cœlorum nempta Fluiditate. Quid enim sit esse fluidum optimè intellec-
t Cartesius, fieriique non possé nifi Materia, vehementi motu per omnes
ejus partes pervadente, eâque quaquaversum agitante & disjungente, in
minutiissimas particulas diffingatur: quam pars maxima (quicquid in eis
exstat affiduis agitationibus & allisionibus detrito) non possunt tempore
procedente non rotundæ evadere, nec earum triangaria intervalia non
longè minutoribus materiæ particulis, rotundarum formatione abraxis,
imperit; nec denique ramenta haec tam commenfurata esse triangulæri-
bus rotundarum intervallis, quin eorum major sit copia quam quæ ad spatia
illa implenda sufcercerit, ita ut sphæricæ illæ particulas, quas globulos
vocat, huic substilissimæ omnium materiæ laxius possint innare.

23. Portrò, cum in confesso sit apud omnes Coelum non solum esse
fluidum, sed Tellurem cum Planetis circa Solem in liquido hoc coelo cir-
cumferri, cùmque legibus Nature * repugnet ut aliter vel Tellus vel
Planetae circa Solem ferreentur quàm ipfo motu Materiæ coelestis deècti,
planè confatabat Cartesio, ingentem hanc coelestis Materiæ molem, in
qua Planetae Tellisque inveniuntur, neceffariò circa Solem in gyrum rapi,
Cujus adhuc ulterius indicium esse potuit ipsius Solis circa suum axem
circumrotatio; quemadmodum & aquarem vortex fælucas & folia suo
marginem circumvehementum familiare quoddam illius exemplum levèque
documentum,

24. Postremò, ex hoc raptu Materiæ coelestis quem jam fieri depre-
hendimus circa Solem, ipsum Solem olim fuiffe generatum, ab obvio illo
plumber fundâ circumacti experimento, non potuit non moneri. Oporte-
bat

* Vide Sect. 7.
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bat igitur eum concludere, solidioribus coeli particulis, globulis nempe æthereis, à centro vorticis recedentibus, subtilissimam materiam, quam aliquantulum redun-dasse diximus, eorum locum occupavisse, totumque illud impleviisse spatium ubi Solem nunc conspicimus, vel, si malles, spatium illud subtilissimâ hæ materiâ itthoc modo replectum nihil aliud esse nisi eum ipsum quem contemtur Solem. Cum verò observâvisset tandem affinitatem Soli intercedere cum stellis fixis, ut utrique in se lucem habeant, neutri loco dimoveantur, pronom erat facileque opus, ad exemplum Gileari, Solem hunc nostrum inter fixas stellas numerare, eundemque productionis modum utrique pariter attribuere, adeoque universam Mundii visibilis materiam, pro Stellarum numero, in infinitos ferè vortices dispecere.

25. Quibus evictis, continuò illi enotuit intima lucis luminisque nature Stellis Solique communis: In eo utique illam constituere, quod globuli coelestes partim suo, partim materiæ subtilissimæ motu protrusi, verus oculos nostros premerentur. Cujus rei certissimus esse putuit ex eo, quod Senem nihil esse aliius nisi motus corporei, certis legibus modificati & in organum ab objective transmissi, perceptionem ipsi clarè constabat, aliisque omniibus, nisi qui plane itutum, facile potest constare. Luminis autem naturâ penitus perspectâ, colores ipsi se ulter proside- runt. Admodum enim illi proclive erat cogitare, si motus per hos globulos transmissi perceptioni sit Lux, variato motu hoc ipsam perceptionem variatum iri. Variatio autem nulla occurrebat tam facilis atque obvia quam rationum circularis motis globulorum ad rectilineum, fêque hac in re probè divinaâse ex pristinis experimento tam solidè & ingeniosa demonstravit, ut dubitandi in posterum de hujus Theorematis certitudine nullum prorsus locum reliquerit.

26. Et quod ultimum illud spectat maximóâque omnium paradoxon, Tellurem sollicet hanc, quam pedibus calcamus tradamusque manibus, Solem aliquando fuisse Stellamve fixam; certè non pauca sunt quæ eum non modo invitaverint, sed fere coegerint, ita cogitare. Nam etiam eum Planetam esse omnes, nisi qui fortè infiniti subelli sint philosophi, audacter profinetur. Satellites autem Jovis non obscurè indigitabant eum adinifar Solis, qui tot Planetis jam cingitur, lucido folio olim regnavisse, quâque fulgentem circumflueraent sifeales comites hunc luce caffum lapsùmæque non deferuiffe. Unde non levis eum fuipicio occupare poterat, Soles Stellâsve fixas in Planetas procedentibus seculis mutari posse.

Modum autem quo id possit fieri facile intelligebat è maculis Solis, quæ illius faciæ aliquando ità obtesterunt, ut calor ejus maturandis frugibus vix suffecerint, pavidiusque mortales supremae Mundi fatum immine re putaverint. Cujus triiùssimi casus etiam Virgilius meminit in Georgicis,

*Cum caput obscurâ nitidum ferrugine tinxis, Impâque eternam timuerunt secula nostèm.*

Sed & de facto stellas foléfve aliquando ità obducì & incruftari maculis ut omni luce priventer, multiplicique cortice indurescant, facillimum illi erat augurari ex stellis illis novis in Cassiopes, Cygno, alibiique ex impro-

F f 2  

Vifo
visor apparentibus, & evanescentibus denuò post aliquem temporis lapsum. Quibus infuper addas Pleiadum unam ē septem numero eliam.

Quid autem posse hujusmodi incrustatis opacique globis accidere possit, ex natura Vorticum, quam callebat perfectissime, pari facilitate coniecibat. Probē enim novit extinctā stellā languere vorticem multumque debiliter, indeque neceffē effe eum spoliari & diripi à vicinis vorticibus ad centrum ejusque inundantibus, incrustatumque sidus ab iporum fortilimo mox abreptum iri: pro soliditate autem sua vel ē raptoris manu elapfurum, vel tam propē ad centrum descensurum ut circa Stellam Solēmve vorticis circumcurrēre cogatur.

Huc autem conjectūra fide m faciebant tum Planetæ pro diversa sua soliditate intervallis diversis circa Solēm circumrotati, præsertim Jupiter, Saturnus, arque Tellus, (quos olim Solēs Stellāsve ûffuē Lunarum fluentum subjunctum fællitium) tum Cometares discursus in fūmmo Solis nostrī vortice oberrantium. In promptu enim illi erat divinare ex Cometares mole ac distantia, eos esse fixas incrustatas, five Planetas itinerantes, certique fedem in vortice aliquo fibī quàrentes, & ad nostram Planetarum regionem descendere tentantes. Quid igitur hic faceret homo ingenio fagaci pariter ac libĕro: quomodo fo tot abdendantibus & versifimbībus indicis pelleculum ab affenù cohiberet?

27. Nec tamen adhuc ad rei apecem pervenimus. E longinquo tantum haec est eum monebant illa Phaenomena, fieri posse quod Planetae omnes olim ûffuerent Solēs: Cūm verō Planum hunc nostrum (Tellurum intelligo) cominus contemplatus fuerit, eumque Magnetem, juxta Gilberti doctorum, revera esse deprehenderit, nec tamen eum esse poße nisi ferreis serrō virorum curtibus obvolutum; praetetam verō Magnetis vin in eo consiſtere, quod particulae quaedam infensibles tali figura fuerint ûffuerat, ut quae per unum Magnetae polum intrant per alterum intrare non possint, (quod tum ex mutuo Magnetum repulsus polis eorum cognominibus ad invicem admoris, tum ex Magnetico Vorticis veligiis in ferrei limatura signatis, certò illi liquebant;) dictās porrò particulae tam subtiles effe ut lignum, vitrum, aurum, & quodlibet aliud corpus quantumvis solidum penetrarent, cūmque de coelō etiam illas defluere Polorum Telluris directio ipii indicārit, maximam verō illorum vin in ac copiam circa coeleſticum Vorticum axes reperiri, tum formaturum magnitudo, tum formandarum ratio persuāserit; formari enim debitē ubi Materiæ elementi prius jām lentore incipit contrahere ob minorem vorticis motum (quod procul dubio contingit propē axes vorticium, maximèque verus polos,) ûffuerat verō, si quando ab axibus vorticium multum divagantur (cūm majores fint ac fegniores relinquis primi elementi particulis) verus vorticium axes iterum retrudī: Cūm haec omnīa, inquam, tam clārē perspexerit Cartesius, res mira ûfficet, nisi non tam pelleculus quàm coactus apud fe agno orient Tellurem olim in axe aliquius Vorticis ûffuē, ibique tanquam in loco omnium maxime opportunum magnetismum suum acquisīverit.

28. Sed ut ad reliqua argumentorum capita recurramus: Etiam major adhuc illi ita concludēndi incumbebat necessitas, quōd univerſam Mundi aspectabiliis materiam, idque summo cum judicio, in tot vorticis distinxe-rar.

Neque enim hujus argumenti vim eludere poterat, fingendo durissimos illos terræ cortices magneticos revera non esse obducent cortices; sed terræ interiores jam esse, qui semper partem materiæ ex solum & durum, id est, nondum in minutis particulas ab universo illo motu, qui tantat omnia, diffraénam. Quippe hunc commento repugnât tum Telluris mora circa Solem, tum ipse magnetismus. Si enim tam solidâ esse, ex hoc Vortice erumperet protinus, & in alterum injecta ab illo continuò evaderet; & ita in æternum à vortice ad vorticem erraret, nec intraret ullam, nisi Catonis lege, ut statim exiret. Sed neque Magnes ullo modo esse posset. Quomodo enim illæ particulas magnéticas in tam solido corpore foramina libere excavarant?

29. Molles iigitur aliquando suisse vel interiores Terræ cunctas clarissimæ illi confubating, id est, ex minutis quibusdam particulis coalescente; neque id solum, sed omnium minutissimis. Eam enim particularum magnetica-rum subtilissimam esse ab experimentis ante oculos factis intelligebat, ut planè deprehenderet nullum corpus particulis quàm prius elementi majoribus coagmentatum, capax esse foraminum tam tenui & delicato artificio efformandorum. Intervalla enim nimirum laxe esse, particulas autem ipsas nimirum duras, ne factis fortasse latas ut in tortilem illam formam terebrarentur; omneque materiam crassiori filo ac texturae consistentem quàm fit illa omnium subtilissima, multò ineptiore esse ad recipiendum minutissima haec, & distinctissimo tamen artificio excavanda, foraminula, quàm rudem quercum vel fraxinem ad imaginés Caesarem pari spatii anguiatā quà in gennmis pretiosissimis inculpi solent. Quo pacto iterum magneticos Terrae cortices ex elementi prius materia conférate manifestò sibi demonstrabat. Cujus cùm tantam copiam quæ terræ condenda sufficeret extrâ centra Vorticem invenire non posset, necessè erat ut primam Telluris materiam in ipso alcuius Vorticis axe collocaret, ut hoc modo Planeta Terra, vel Magnes esse posset, postquam Sol vel Stella esse desistisset.

30. Si iigitur infantit Cartesius, summa fane cum ratione eum infanissifc dicendum est. Sed nec eo usque infanivit, ut quicquam amplius ex tam luculentis indicationibus fratueret, quàm quod ità Natura rerum comparata fit, ac si Terra haec, cujus incolæ sumus, olim fuisset Sol vel Stella fixa. Vides Carteﬁi indolem, quàm cauta ac modesta fit, quàm unequaque solida ac fobria.

atque fructum. Et profe&to mihi plane incredibile videatur, nisi ingentem illam f&em concepiflet demonftrandi omnia fer& Mundi Phenomena ex necessariis Mechanic& legibus, eum unquam tot tant&que tentare voluiffe, aut tentata potuiffe perficere. Jam verò tam prosperes fuccelfit, ut non poffim non fuppiri eum Antiquorum illam fcientiam quae ad Natu-ram fpectat maxima ex parte restaur&. Qua in re f&cc&me con- ject&le judicaverit perfipicax & pacifica Posteritas, reliqua mae Cab-bala ma&re admonfent fidem. Ubi tamem, uti in parte illa altera Physi-ca, deprehendent paucus me tantummodo five conclufiones, five principia rerum Metaphyficarum indigiftasse ; vaftas autem & hiantes interfecer lacunas, & e scriptis Platonics potiffimum implendas, aut faltem ab ali-quo quem ingenio plusquam Platonico fera Fata Mundo exhibuerint ; qui Dei rerumque aliarum incorporarum naturas penitiuis rimando, qui-que status earundem innumeris promfum retrorsumque fpe&ando, im- mens&oque illarum circuitus metiendo, qui demiffe tum ex fummi Nu- minis attributis, tum ex propriis immaterialium Ordinum facultatibus omnia penifmando, singulos illos graphos nexasque, quibus nefari & mal&-feriati homines devotos Religionis cultores irretire folent, tam facili- oper& solverit, ut nihil in poffetum nifi mifera quadam animi anguftia, nifi despicabilis (oliditas, aut impotentis quaedam & depolari- bis ad omnia flagitia perpetranda provictivas, & ex perpetra& futuri supphcii anxia & discrueius formido, obicem mortalibus ponere posfit, qu& minus pra- cipua Religionis Fundamenta fincer& & inconuifco affentu amplecantur, Quam quidem f&em non diffimul&ffe, fed eis de rebus verba feciffe, qu& ipi fortaffe nulla ex parte praefare valentus, agnofc quidem non adeo gloriofum quibusdam videri posfe : nihil tamen interim dubito quin fit honefhum, arderem fium us studium promovendi publicum humani generis commodum obiter monftra& & aliquo faltem modo succeden- tibus feculis facem praetuliffe.

32. Quod ad eos attinget quos ob Arifiotelis nugas univerfam Philofo- phiam vilipendere ais, quique nihil earum de quibus fcribunt Philofophi fciri posse fecur& praefumunt, aut, f& fci rentur, parum ad comnu- nem vitae usum conferre, non habeo quicquam quod illis reponam aptius aut accommodatius, quam quod quid olim hujusmodi farinae hominibus regef- fit Scaliger, Nulam utique ma&reigratis inscribam patre folere vo- luptatem quam expediam fatisdiumque contemplum. Quanquam profe&to ea non tam voluptas cenfenda videtur, qu&m confolatio quadam ac lenitio doloris quem capere posfit ex feliu damnis proprii rerumque optimarum iacturae. Est enim à Natura nobis omnibus inditum fatis magnum fciendi desiderium, nec minimam naturalis fcientiae partem compelligitur, nos ad pecudum infaif stupidos rerumque ignaros eihe non debere; nec tamen ad impossibilitium vel inutilium fcientiam teneri. Unde manifestum est eos qui nihil fciir posse tam ftudia& voce conque- runtur, non tam opprobrio afficere Philofophi& speculationes, quam fibi honefhum quaerere praterum, fesique excufare quod luxui, avaritiae, aut ambitioni totam fer& vitam impendant.

33. Aliquid autem in rebus naturalibus fciiri posse tam clar& edocuit Cartefius, ut nemo fit qui de eo dubitet quin de Mathematicis demon- strationibus
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inationibus eundem necesse sit dubitare. Imò verò, ut liberiús dicam, excusá hàc injuriosá modéstù ac seposítà, si intra communes utriusque Philosophiæ limites nos contineamus, tantundem scivisse Cartesium statuer eoponet in investigandis Naturae causis quantum ignoravit Aristoteles. Neque enim judicandum est quid in Philosophia fieri posset à severo ac fagaci ingenio, ex eo quod jam præstitum sit ab homine arguto sanè, sed parùm folido, ut qui nè prima quidem veræ Philosophiæ principia invenerat.

34. Sed demus, inquient, Cartesium vera illa Principia invenisse, causâque effectrices omnium Phænomenów naturales & immediatas, quas necevit argutus ille Græculus, in lucem eruísse; quid ísta ad vitæ usum faciunt? Si per usum vitæ intelligunt honores, opes, corporisque voluptates, non multùm eò facere lubens fatitur: interim tamen contendo, in veris philosophandi ratione repetiri aliquid honoribus multò excelsius, pretiosius opibus, & universis denique corporis voluptatibus suavius longè longèque jucundius. Qui autem quæ ad mentem ornandam, pascendam, & divino quodam gudio exhilarandam conducunt, ad humanam vitam nihil conferre existimant, næ illí mihi videntur se mentem habere penitus obliviti, apertèque profiteri vitam se degere prorsus belluinam.

Vale, v. c. & si fortè suffús ac liberís quàm par erat apud te de his rebus disserui, niumim hoccibi obsequi studium ignoce, méque, prout foles, amare perge.

H. M.
THE
IMMORTALITY
OF
THE SOUL.
So farre forth as it is demonstrable from the Knowledge of N A T U R E and the Light of R E A S O N.

By H E N R Y M O R E, D.D.
Fellow of Chrift's College in Cambridge.

Pythag.
Πάντα ἂ δέξε μετέχειν ὑπὸ ἀλμπετειρύνω, καὶ τοὺς διάμορφος τε καὶ ὅρων

Cardanus.
Quid jucundius quàm scire quid simus, quid fuerimus, quid erimus, atque cum his etiam divina atque suprema illa post obitum Mundique vicissituidines?

L O N D O N,
Printed by James Flesher, for William Morden Book-seller in Cambridge, M D C L X I I.
To the Right Honourable

EDWARD,
Lord Viscount

CONWAY and KILULTA.

My Lord,

Though I be not ignorant of your Lordships averseness from all Addressés of this kinde, (whether it be that your Lordship has taken notice of that usual Vanity of those that dedicate Books, in endeavouring to oblige their Patrons by over-lavish praises, such as much exceed the worth of the party they thus unmeasurably commend; or whether it be from a natural Modesty that cannot bear, no not so much as a just representation of your own Vertues and Abilities; or lastly from a most true Observation, That there are very few Treatises writ which are any thing more than mere Transcriptions or Collections out of other Authors, whose Writings have already been consecrated to the Name and Memory of some other worthy Persons long since deceased, so that they do but after a manner rob the dead, to furnish themselves with Presents to offer to the living) Yet notwithstanding this your averseness, or whatever grounds there may be surmised thereof, I could not abtain from making this present Dedication. Not so much I confess to gratify your Lordship (though it be none of the best Complements) as for mine own satisfaction and content. For I do not take so great pleasure in any thing as in the sense and conscience of the fitness and suetableness of mine own actions; amongst which I can finde none more exactly just and befitting then this; there being many Considerations that give you a peculiar right and title to the Patronage of this present Discourse. For besides your skill in Philosophy and
and real sense of Piety, two such Endowments as are rarely to be found together (especially in Persons of high quality) and yet without which matters of this nature can neither be read with any relish nor easily understood; there are also other things still more peculiar, and which naturally do direct and determine me to the choice I have made. For whether I consider the many civilities from your self and nearest Relations, especially from your noble and vertuous Lady, whom I can never think on but with admiration, nor mention without the highest respect: or whether I recollect with my self the first occasion of buying my thoughts upon this Subject, which was then when I had the honour and pleasure of reading Des-Cartes his Passions with your Lordship in the Garden of Luxemburg to pass away the time, (in which Treatise though there be nothing but what is handsome and witty, yet all did not seem so perfectly solid and satisfactory to me but that I was forced in some principal things to seek satisfaction from my self:) or lastly, call to minde that pleasant retirement I enjoyed at Ragley during my abode with you there; my civil treatment from that perfect and unexceptionable pattern of a truly Noble and Christian Matron, the Right Honourable your Mother; the solemnness of the Place, those shady Walks, those Hills & Woods, wherein often having lost the sight of the rest of the World, and the World of me, I found out in that hidden solitude the choicest Theories in the following Discourse: I say, whether I considered all these circumstances, or any of them, I could not but judge them more than enough to determine my choice to so Worthy a Patron.

Nor could the above-mentioned surmises beat me from my design, as not at all reaching the present case. For as for my part, I am so great a Lover of the Truth, and so small an Admireer of vulgar Eloquence, that neither the preface of any gross Advantage could ever make me stoop so low as to expose my self to the vile infamy or suspicion of turning Flatterer, nor yet the tickling sense of applause and vain-glory, to affect the puffy name and title of an Orator. So that your Lordship might be secure as touching the First surmise.
And verily for the Second, though I confess I might not
be at all averse from making a just and true representation
of your Vertues and Accomplishments; yet considering the
greatness of them, & the meanness of mine own Rhetorick,
I found it not so much as within my power, if I would, to en-
trench upon your Modefty; and therefore I must leave it to
some more able Pen to doe you and the World what right
whether you will or no.

And lastly, for that scruple concerning the theft or petty
sacrilegious of several Plagiaries, who, as it were, rob the Monu-
ments of the dead to adorn the living; it is the onely thing
that I can without vanity profess, that what I offer to you is
properly my own, that is to say, that the invention, applica-
tion and management of the Reasons and Arguments com-
prised in this Book, whether for confutation or confirmation,
is the genuine result of my own anxious and thoughtful Mind,
no old stuff purloined or borrowed from other Writers. What
truth and solidity there is in my Principles and Reasonings
were too great a piece of arrogance for me to predetermine.
This must be left to the judgements of such free and discerning
spirits as your Lordship: With whom if what I have writ
may find acceptance or a favourable censure, it will be the
greater obligation and encouragement to,

My Lord,

Your Lordships humbly devoted Servant,

HENRY MORE.
The Contents of the Preface.

1. The Title of the Discourse how it is to be understood. 2. The Author’s submission of his whole Treatise to the infallible Rule of Sacred Writ. 3. A plain and compendious Demonstration that Matter consists of parts indiscernible. 4. An Answer to an Objection touching his Demonstration against the Sun’s superintendency over the affairs of the Earth. 5. A confirmation of Mr. Hobbes his Opinion, That Perception is really one with Corporeal Motion and Re-action, if there be nothing but Matter in the World. 6. An Apology for the Vehicles of Demons and Souls separate. 7. As also for his so punctually describing the State of the other life, and so curiously defining the nature of a particular Spirit. 8. That his Elysiums he describes are not all Sensual, but Divine. 9. That he has not made the State of the wicked too easy for them in the other world. 10. That it is not one Universal Soul that hears, sees and reasons in every man, demonstrated from the Acts of Memory. 11. Of the Spirit of Nature; that it is no obscure Principle, nor unseasonably introduced. 12. That he has absolutely demonstrated the Existence thereof. 13. That the admission of that Principle need be no hinderance to the progress of Mechanick Philosophy. 14. The great pleasure of that study to pious and rational persons. 15. Of what concernment it would be if Des-Cartes were generally read in all the Universities of Christendome. 16. An excuse of the proximity of his Preface from his earnest desire of gratifying the publick, without the least offence to any rational or ingenious Spirit.

That the present Treatise may pass more freely and smoothly through the hands of men, without any offence or scruple to the good and pious, or any real exception or probable cavil from those whose Pretensions are greater to Reason than Religion, I shall endeavour in this Preface to prevent them, by bringing here into view, and more fully explaining and clearing, whatever I conceive obnoxious to their mistakes and obloques.

1. And indeed I cannot be well assured but that the very Title of my Discourse may seem liable to both their dislikes. To the dislike of the one, as being confident of the contrary Conclusion, and therefore secure. That that cannot be demonstrated to be true, which they have long since judged not worthy to be reckoned in the rank of things probable; it may be not so much as of things possible, To the dislike of the other, as being already persuaded of the truth of our Conclusion upon other and better grounds: which would not be better, if the natural light of Reason could afford Demonstration in this matter. And therefore they may haply pretend, that so ambitious a Title seems to juggle with the high Prerogative of Christianity, which has brought life and immortality to light.

But of the former I demand, By what Faculty they are made so secure of
their being wholly mortal. For unless they will ridiculously conjure themselves inspired, when as they almost as little believe there is either God or Spirit, as that they have in them an Immortal Soul, they must either pretend to the experience of Sense, or the clearness of Reason. The former whereof is impossible; because these bold declers of the Immortality of the Soul have not yet experienced whether we subsist after Death or no. But if they would have us believe they have thus concluded upon rational grounds, I dare appeal unto them, if they can produce any stronger Reasons for their Cause then what I have * set down for them, and if I have not fully and fundamentally anwered them. If they will say their confidence proceeds from the weak arguings of the adverse party; I answer, it is weakly done of them, (their own Arguments being as unconvincing as they can fancy their adversaries) to be so secure, that Truth is on their own part rather then on theirs. But this can touch only such managements of this Cause as they have seen already and censured. But that is nothing to me, who could never think I stood safe but upon my own legs. Wherefore I shall require them only to peruse what I have written, before they venture to judge thereof, and after they have read, if they will declare that I have not demonstrated the Cause I have undertook, I think it reasonable and just, that they punctually shew in what part or joyn of my Demonstration they discern so weak a coherence as should embolden them fall to dissent from the Conclusion.

But to the other I answer with more modesty and submission. That the Title of my Book doth not necessarily imply any promise of so full and perfect a Demonstration, that nothing can be added for the firmer assurance of the Truth; but only that there may be expected as clear a Proof as Natural Reason will afford us. From which they should rather inferre, That I do acknowledge a further and a more palpable evidence comprehended in Christian Religion, and more intelligible and convicitive to the generality of the World, who have neither leisure nor inclination to deal with the sophistries and anxieties of humane Reason and Philosophy. But I declined the making use of that Argument at this time, partly because I have a design to speak more fully thereof in my Treatise of the * Mystery of Christian Religion, if God so permit; and partly because it was unsuitable to the present Title, which pretends to handle the matter only within the bounds of Natural Light, unsufficent and Unguided by any miraculous Revelation.

2. Which will be a pleasant spectacle to such as have a Genius to these kinds of Contemplations, and wholly without danger; they still remembering that it is the voice of Reason and Nature, (which being too subject to corruption may very well be defecitious or erroneous in some things,) and therefore never trusting their dictates and suggestions, where they clash with the Divine Oracles, they must needs be safe from all seduction: though, I profess, I do not know any thing which I assert in this Treatise that doth disagree with them. But if any quicker-sighted then myself do discover any thing not according to that Rule, it may be an occasion of humble thankfulness to God for that great privilege of our being born under an higher and exacter light: whereby those that are the most perfectly exercised therein, are enabled as well to rectifie what is perverse, as to supply what is defective in the light of Nature; and they have my free leave aforesaid to doe both thoroughly all along the ensuing Discourse.
And this may serve by way of a more general Defence. But that nothing may be wanting, I shall descend to the making good also of certain Particulars, as many as it is of any consequence further to clear and confirm.

3. In the First Book there occurre only these Two that I am aware of. The one concerning the Center of a particular Spirit, whose Idea I have described, and demonstrated possible. The other concerns my Demonstration of the Impossibility of the Sun’s seeing any thing upon Earth, supposing him merely corporeal. In the making good the former, I have taken the boldness to assert, That Matter consists of parts indiscernible, understanding by indiscernible parts, particles that have indeed real Extension, but so little, that they cannot have less and be any thing at all, and therefore cannot be actually divided. Which minute Extension, if you will, you may call Essential (as being such that without that measure of it, the very Being of Matter cannot be conserved;) as the extension of any Matter compounded of these you may, if you please, term Integral; these parts of this compounded Matter being actually and really separable one from another. The Assertion, I confess, cannot but seem paradoxical at first sight, even to the ingenious and judicious. But that there are such indiscernible particles into which Matter is divisible, viz. such as have Essential Extension, and yet have parts utterly inseparable, I shall plainly and compendiously here demonstrate (besides what I have said in the Treatise it self;) by this short Syllogism.

That which is actually divisible so farre as actual division any way can be made, is divisible into parts indiscernible.

But Matter (I mean that Integral or Compound Matter) is actually divisible as farre as actual division any way can be made.

It were a folly to goe to prove either my Proposition or Assumption, they being both so clear, that no common notion in Euclide is more clear, into which all Mathematical Demonstrations are resolved.

It cannot but be confessed therefore, That Matter consists of indiscernible particles, and that Physically and really it is not divisible in infinitum, though the parts that constitute an indiscernible particle are real, but divisible only intellectually; it being of the very essence of whatsoever is, to have Parts or Extension in some measure or other. For, to take away all Extension, is to reduce a thing only to a Mathematical point, which is nothing else but pure Negation or Non-entity; and there being no medium betwixt extended and not-extended, no more then there is betwixt Entity and Non-entity, it is plain that if a thing be at all, it must be extended. And therefore there is an Essential Extension belonging to these indiscernible particles of Matter; which was the other Property which was to be demonstrated.

I know unruly Fancy will make mad work here, and clamour against the Conclusion as impossible. For Finite Extension (will she say) must needs have Figure, and Figure extuberancy of parts at such a distance, that we cannot but conceive them still actually divisible. But we answer, That when Matter is once actually divided as farre as possibly it can, it is a perfect contradiction it should be divided any further; as it is also that it cannot be divided actually as farre as it can actually be divided. And no stronger

Gg 3 Demon-
Demonstration then this against them can be brought against as by either Fancy or Reason: and therefore supposing we were but equal in our reasoning, this is enough to give me the day, who only contend for the possibility of the thing. For if I bring but fully as good Demonstration that it is, as the other that it is not, none can deny me but that the thing is possible on my side.

But to answer the above-recited Argument, though they can never answer ours; I say, those indiscernible particles of Matter have no Figure at all: As infinite Greatness has no Figure, so infinite Littleness has none also. And a Cube infinitely little in the exact sense, is as perfect a contradiction as a Cube infinitely great in the same sense of Infinity; for the Angles would be equal in magnitude to the Hexad thereof. Besides, wise men are assured of many things that their Fancy cannot but play tricks with them in; as in the Infinity of Duration and of Matter, or at least of Space. Of the truth whereof though they are never so certain, yet if they consider this infinite Matter, Space, or Duration, as divided, suppose, into three equal parts (all which must needs be infinite, or else the whole will not be so) the middle part of each will seem both finite and infinite; for it is bounded at both ends. But everything has two handles, as Epictetus notes; and he is a fool that will burn his fingers with the hot handle, when he may hold safe by the other that is more tractable and cool.

4. Concerning my Demonstration of the Impossibility of the Suns being a Spectator of our particular affairs upon Earth, there is only this one Objection, viz. That though the Sun indeed, by reason of his great distance, cannot see any particular thing upon Earth, if he kept always in that ordinary shape in which we should suppose that, if he were devoid of sense, he would doe; yet he having life and perception, he may change some part of his Body (as we do our Eye in contracting or dilating the pupil thereof) into so advantageous a Figure, that the Earth may be made to appear to him as big as he pleases.

Though some would be more ready to laugh at, then answer to, so odd a surmise, which supposes the Sun blinking and peering curiously into our affairs, as through a Telescope; yet because it comes in the way of reasoning, I shall have the patience seriously to return this Reply.

First, That this Objection can pretend to no strength at all, unless the Body of the Sun were Organical, as ours is; whenas be is nothing but fluid Light: so that unless he hath a Spiritual Being in him, to which this Light should be but the Vehicle, this arbitrary figuring of his fluid Matter cannot be effect'd. But to grant that there is any such incorporeal Substance in the Sun, is to yield me what I contend for, viz. That there are Immortal Substances in the World.

But that there is no such Divine Principle in him, whereby he can either see us, or aim at the producing any apparence on the Earth in reference to any one of us; by the activity of that Spirit in him, it is apparent from the scum and spots that lie on him: Which is as great an Argument that there is no such Divinity in him as some would attribute to him, (such as Pomponius, Cardan, Vaninus, and others) as the dung of Owls and Sparrows, that is found on the faces and shoulders of Idols in Temples, are clear evidences that they are but dead Images, no true Deities.

Lastly,
Lastly, though we should suppose he had a particular sentient and intelligent Spirit in him, yet the consideration of the vast distance of the Earth from him, and the thickness of her Atmosphere, with other disadvantages I have already mentioned in my Treatise, makes it incredible that he should be able to frame his Body into any Figure so exquisite as will compartment these insuperable difficulties.

5. In my Second Book the first Exception is concerning the 20th Axiom, which, say they, I have not proved, but only brought in the testimony of Mr. Hobbs for the support thereof; which therefore only enables me to argue with him upon his own Principles, wherein others will hold themselves unconcerned. But I answer, first, that it will concern all his followers as well as himself, so that it is no contemptible victory to demonstrate against all those so confident Exploders of Immaterial Substances, That their own acknowledged Principles will necessarily infer the Existence of them in the World. But in the next place, it will not be hard to produce undeniable Reasons to evince the truth of the above-named Axioms, viz. That Sense and Perception in Matter, supposing nothing but Matter in the World, is really the same with Corporeal Motion and Re-action.

For it is plain in Sensation, there being always external motion from Objects when our Senses are affected, and that inward Cogitation thus performed, appears from the heat that Thinking casts a man into; Wherefore generally all Cogitation is accompanied with motion corporeal, And if there be nothing but Body or Matter in the World, Cogitation itself is really the same thing with Corporeal Motion.

Moreover as in Sensation the Corporeal Motion is first, and Perception follows; so it is necessary that universally in all internal Cogitations also certain Corporeal Motions immediately precede these Perceptions, though we did admit that Matter moved it self: For no Sense would thence arise without resistance of something it hit against. Inform us that the subtilest Matter unresisted or not impress upon, would be no more capable of Cogitation than a Wedge of Gold or Pig of Lead. And therefore if we will but confess (what none but mad men will venture to deny) that a Pig of Lead or Wedge of Gold has not any Thought or Perception at all without some knock or allusion proportionable to their bigness and solidity, the subtilest Matter must likewise have none without some proportionable impression or resistance. Whence it is plain that always corporeal Re-action or Collision precedes Perception, and that every Perception is a kind of feeling, which lasts so long as this resistance or impress of motion lasts, but that ceasing, is extinguished, the Matter being then as stupid as in a Pig of Lead. And that therefore as in general there is always Corporeal motion where there is Cogitation, so the diversification of this motion and collision causes the diversification of cogitations, and so they run hand in hand perpetually, the one never being introduced without the fore-leading of the other, nor lasting longer than the other lasteth. But as heat is lost (which implies a considerable motion or agitation of some very subtile Matter,) so our Understanding and Imagination decays, and our Senses themselves fail, as not being able to be moved by the impression of outward Objects, or as not being in a due degree of liquidity and agility, and therefore in death our Bodies become as senseless as a lump of clay.
All Sensation therefore and Perception is really the same with Motion and Re-action of Matter, if there be nothing but Matter in the world.

And that every piece of Matter must perceive according as it itself is moved, whether by itself (if it were possible) or by corporeal impress from other parts, is plain, in that Matter has no subtile rays, or any power or efflux streaming beyond itself, like that which the Schools call species intentionales, nor yet any union more mysterious than the mere Juxta-position of parts.

For hence it is manifest that there can be no communication of any impress that one part of the Matter receives or is affected with from another at a distance, but it must be by jogging or crowding the parts interjacent. So that in every regard corporeal Motion or Re-action, with sufficient tenuity of parts and due duration, will be the adequate cause of all perception, if there be nothing but Matter in the world. This I think may suffice to assure any indifferent man of the truth of this part of Mr. Hobbs his Assertion, if himself could make the other part true: That there is nothing existent in Nature but what is purely corporeal. But out of the former part, which is his own acknowledged Principle, I have undeniably demonstrated that there is.

6. The other Exception is against that Opinion I seem to embrace touching the Vehicles of Demons and Souls separate, as having herein offended against the authority of the Schools. And I profess this is all the reason I can imagine that they can have against my Assertion. But they may, if they please, remember that the Schools trespassed against a more ancient authority than themselves, that is to say, the Pythagoreans, Platonists, Jewish Doctours, and the Fathers of the Church, who all hold that even the purest Angels have corporeal Vehicles. But it will be hard for the Schools to allege any ancient Authority for their Opinion. For Aristotle their great Oracle is utterly silent in this matter, as not so much as believing the Existence of Demons in the world (as Pomponatius and Vaninus his sworn disciples have to their great contentment taken notice of;) And therefore being left to their own dry subtleties, they have made all Intellectual Beings that are not grossly terrestrial, as Man is, purely Immaterial. Whereby they make a very hideous Chafme or gaping breach in the order of things, such as no moderate judgment will ever allow of, and have become very obnoxious to be foiled by Atheistical wits, who are forward and skilful enough to draw forth the absurd consequences that by hid in false suppositions, as Vaninus does in this. For he does not foolishly collect from the supposed pure Immateriality of Demons, that they have no knowledge of particular things upon Earth; such purely Incorporeal Essences being incapable of impression from Corporeal Objects, and therefore have not the Species of any particular thing that is corporeal in their mind. Whence he infers that all Apparitions, Prophecies, Prodigies, and whatsoever miraculous is recorded in ancient History, is not to be attributed to these, but to the influence of the Stars; and so concludes that there are indeed no such things as Demons in the Universe.

By which kind of reasoning also it is easy for the Psychopanthenists to support their Opinion of the Sleep of the Soul. For the Soul being utterly refin'd from all that is corporeal, and having no vital union therewith at
all, they will be very prone to infer, that it is impossible she should know any thing ad extar, if she can so much as dream. For even that power also may seem incompatible to her in such a state, she having such an essential aptitude for vital union with Matter, of so great consequence is it sometimes to desert the opinion of the Schools, when something more rational and more safe and useful offers itself unto us.

7. These are the main Objections my First and Second Book seem liable unto. My last I cannot but suspect to be more obnoxious. But the moft common Exception I foresee that will be againft it, is, That I have taken upon me to deprive the state of the other World so punctually and particularly, as if I had been lately in it: For over-exquisiteness may seem to smell of art and fraud. And as there is a diffidency many times in us when we hear something that is extremely suitable to our desire, being then most ready to think it too good to be true; so also in Notions that seem over-accurately fitted to our Intellectual faculties, and agree the most naturally therewith, we are prone many times to suspect them to be too easy to be true; especially in things that seemed at first to us very obscure and intricate. For which cause also it is very likely that the Notion of a particular Spirit, which I have so accurately described in my First Book, may seem the less credible to some, because it is now made so clearly intelligible, they thinking it utterly improbable that these things, that have been held alwayes such indeextricable perplexities, should be thus of a sudden made manifest and familiar to any that has but a competency of Patience and Reason to peruse the Theory.

But for my own part, I shall not assume so much to myself, as peremptorily to affirm that the Indiscernibility of a Spirit arises that way that I have set down, that is to say, that God has made a particular Spirit just in that manner that I have delineated. For his Wisdom is infinite, and therefore it was an impious piece of boldness to confine him to one certain way of framing the nature of a Being, that is, of endowing it with such Attributes as are essential to it, as Indiscernibility is to the Soul of Man. But only to have said in general, It is possible there may be a particular Essence of its immediate nature penetrable and indiscernible, and not particularly to have described the manner how it may be so; might have seemed to many more slight and unsatisfactory, Deceit lurking in Universalis, as the Proverb has it. And therefore for the more fully convincing of the adverse party, I thought fit to pitch upon a punctual description of some one way, how the Soul of Man or of a Daemon may be conceived necessarily indiscernible, though dilatable; not being very solicitous whether it be just that way or no, but yet well assured that it is either that way or some better. But this one way shows the thing possible at large: (As that mean contrivance of an Indian Canoe might prove the possibility of Navigation.) And that is all that I was to aim at in that place; saving that I had also a Zeal for the credit of the Platonists, whose imaginative presages I have often observed to hold a faithfull compliance with the severest Reason. And I think I have here demonstrated that their Fancy is not at all irrational in so usually comparing Form or Spirit to the radiant Light.

So in my description of the state of the other world, I am not very solicitous whether things be just so as I have set them down: but because some
some men utterly misbelieve the thing, because they can frame no particulars to what the Receptions and Intents of those Aerial Inhabitants may be, or how they pass away their time; with many other intricacies which urge to entangle this Theory; I thought it of main concernment to take away this Objection against the Life to come (viz. That no man can conceive what it is, and therefore it is not at all, which is the ordinary Exception also against the Existence of all Incorporeal Substances) by a punctual and rational Description of this future state. Which I exhibit to the world as an intelligible Hypothesis, and such as may very well be, even according to the dictates of our own Faculties, being in the mean time fully assured, that things are either thus, or after a better or more exact order. But, as I said, to propound some particular probable way, I thought it of no small service to those who totally distrust all these things for that reason mainly, as being such as we can make no rational representation of to the Understandings of men.

8. But there are also particular Objections. The first whereof is against our Aerial and Ethernal Elysiums, which forsooth, to make their reproach more witty, they will parallel with the Mahometan Paradise. But besides that I do in the very place where I treat of these things suspend my oftent after the description of them, there is nothing there offered in their description, but, if it were assevered so, might become the most refined spirit in the World. For there is nothing more certain than That the Love of God and our Neighbour is the greatest Happiness that we can arrive unto, either in this life, or that which is to come. And whatever things are there described, are either the Causes, Effects, or Concomitants of that noble and divine Passion. Neither are the External incitements thereto, which I there mention, rightly to be deemed Sensual, but Intellectual: For even such is also Sensible Beauty, whether it be in self Feature, Mufick, or whatever graceful Deportments and comely Actions, as Plotinus has well defined. And those things that are not properly Intellectual, suppose Odours and Srapours, yet such a Spirit may be transfused into the Vehicles of these Aerial Inhabitants thereby, that may more then ordinarily raise into all their Intellectual Faculties. Which he that observes how our Thoughts and Inclinations depend immediately on a certain subtle Matter in our Bodies, will not at all stick to acknowledge to be true. And therefore whatever our Elysiums seem to the rash and unjudicious, they are really no other thing then pure Paradises of Intellectual pleasure, Divine Love and blameless Friendship being the only delight of those places.

9. The next Objection is concerning the state of the Wicked, as if I had made their condition too easy for them. But this methinks any man might be kept off from, if he would but consider, that I make the rack of Conscience worse then a perpetually repeated death. Which is too-too credible to come to pass there, whenas we finde what execution Passions will doe upon us even in this life; the Sicilian Tyrants having not found out a more exquisite torture then they. And as for those Souls that have left the sense of Conscience, if any can doe so, I have allotted other punishments that are more corporeal, and little inferior to the fire of that great Hell that is prophesied of, as the portion of the Devils and the damned at the last Day.
By which neither then nor before could they be tortured (if we appeal to humane Reason, whom alone we appeal to, as judge, in this Treatise) if they were not vitally united with corporeal Vehicles.

10. The two last Exceptions are, the one touching the Soul of the World, the other the Spirit of Nature. The first is against our over-favourable representation of their Opinion that make but one Soul in the whole Universe, endowing her with Sense, Reason, and Understanding: which Soul they will have to act in all Animals, Demons themselves not excepted. In all which, say they, it is One and the same Universal Soul that Hears, Sees, Reasons, Understands, &c. This Opinion I think I have confuted in this Third Book, as sufficiently as any one Error can be confuted in all Natural Philosophy. And that favourable representation I have made there of it, has that in it, whereby, unless a man be very remiss and mindless, he may easily demonstrate the falseness of the Supposition. For though we may well enough imagine how, the Body being unchanged, and this Soul of the Universe exquisitely the same everywhere, that though the party change place, and shift into another part of the Soul of the World, he may retain the same Opinions, Imagination and Reasonings, so farre forth as they depend not on Memory (this Universal Soul raising her self into the same Thoughts upon the same Occasions:) yet Memory is incompelet unto that part which has not had the Perception before of what is remembred. For there is necessarily comprehended in Memory a Sense or Perception that we have had a Perception or Sense aforesaid of the thing which we conceive our selves to remember.

To be short therefore, and to strike this Opinion dead at one stroke; They that say there is but one Soul of the World, whose perceptive Power is everywhere, they must affert, that what one part thereof perceives, all the rest perceives; or else that perceptions in Demons, Men and Brutes are confined to that part of this Soul that is in them, while they perceive this or that. If the former, they are confutable by Sense and Experience: For though all Animals lie steeped, as it were, in that sullen Matter which runs through all things, and is the immediate Instrument of Sense and Percepcion; yet we are not conscious of one anothers thoughts, nor feel one anothers pains, nor the pains and pleasures of Brutes, when they are in them at the highest. Nor yet do the Demons feel one anothers affections, or necessarily assent to anothers opinions, though their Vehicles be exceeding peridious; else they would be all Aventourists, as well as those that appeared to Fa- cius Cardanus, supposing any were. Wherefore we may generally conclude, that if there were such an Universal Soul, yet the particular perceptions thereof are restrai ned to this or that part in which they are made: which is contrary to the Unity of a Soul, as I have already said in its due place.

But let us grant the thing (for indeed we have demonstrated it to be so, if there be such an Universal Soul, and none but it) then the grand Absurdity comes in, which I was intimating before, to wit, That that part of the Soul of the World that never perceived a thing, shall notwithstanding remember it, that is to say, that it shall perceive it has perceived that which it never perceived: And yet one at Japa may remember a countryman arrived thither that he had not seen nor thought of for twenty years before,

Nay,
Nay, which is more to the purpose, supposing the Earth move, what I write now, the Earth being in the beginning of Aries, I shall remember that I have written when she is in the beginning of Libra, though that part of the Soul of the World that possesse my Body then will be twice as distant from what does guide my hand to write now, as the Earth is from the Sun.

Nor can the plainness of this Demonstration be eluded by any Evasion whatsoever. For First, if we should admit that there be certain Marks seared in the Brain upon the seeing or considering this or that Object, whereby the Soul would impress the Memory thereof upon her more deeply, the virtue of remembering by this would be in that she had once joined such a Thought or Representation with such an Impression, otherwise it would avail nothing. Wherefore the Soul of the World, in B suppose, not having joined such a Representation with this Mark in the Brain as she did in A, can remember nothing thereby. For it is utterly unconceivable how any Figuration or Motion whatsoever in the Brain can represent to the Soul a Perception as perceived heretofore, if the Soul herself has heretofore had no such Perception. For there can be no Basis of this reflexive and comparative Act but the foregoing Perception of which the Soul is still conscious: Of which she cannot be conscious, if she never perceived it. Whence it is plain that these supposed Marks have not a capacity in them to impose upon the Soul of the World in B, so as to make her conceit she had a Perception of a thing, when indeed she never had.

But then again in the Second place, It is very evident that the power of Memory does not consist in such Marks or Figures in the Brain, nor in any Vibration or Motion there, as I have sufficiently proved in the following

* Discourse. Which further assures us, that Memory is wholly in the Soul herself, and that she is the sole Repository of all the Perceptions she has had, and that therefore the Soul of the World cannot perceive her self to have perceived a thing when she has not perceived it.

And Thirdly and lastly, It is hence also manifest (I mean from Memory being feared onely in the Soul her self, she acting in this, as in all other functions, only by virtue of a fit tenour of Spirits and due temper of Brain) That the Body changing place from A to B, that part of the Soul of the World in it at B will have the remembrance of such things as were never perceived in A, and forget, or rather have no knowledge of, what the Soul perceived there; and that therefore by changing place a man may chance to become in a moment an excellent Physician, Mathematician, or the like, or of a sudden become a Sott, and lose all his learning; which is the likeliest of the two. For the Fruits of that Meditation and Study are lost, when once the Body has left that part of the Soul of the World which did thus study and meditate. So impossible is it that every man should not have a particular Soul of his own.

Nor can this Error in the Soul of the World, of perceiving she has perceived when she has not, be argued possible in her from the adherence of that perpetual deemed mistake in our Outward Senses; as that we feel a pain, suppose in our finger, or white upon the wall, whereas there is neither white in the one, nor pain in the other, but only in our Common Percipient which is confined within our Brain. For it is apparent that if this be an Error, yet there is a plain and necessary Foundation thereof.
For as when we thrust a Cane against the ground, we necessarily feel different feelings; one when against Gravel, another against Stone, and a third against Mud or Earth, and feel them also at the distance of the Cane: So also is it in Colours; the Medium between the Object and the Eye being as the Cane, and the variety of feelings at the end of the Cane like that variety of Colours, of which there is a necessary causality in the variety of the Surfaces of the Objects, which the Common Percipient must needs perceive, and at such a distance as the Medium engages, as it was before in the length of the Cane. So that to perceive such differences at that distance they are and where they doe causally exist, is not so much an Errour as a Truth. And there is the same reason in ticklings or prickings in any part of the Body: For it is true that those differences are also causally there; and therefore our Perception is rightly carried thither. For there is there that harshness and dis-harmony to Nature, which the Soul cannot perceive but with an harsh and painfull perception, not only by reason of her interest and vital union with the Body, but also from the speciall nature of the Perception itself.

So that it seems to mean hard Censure to say the Soul does mistake in these Perceptions: and if she do in some sort, yet we can trace the necessary and determinate Cause, and that both very palpable and very intelligible. But for this Errour of the Soul of the World perceiving, suppose in B, that she has perceived what notwithstanding she never perceived, it is nothing quite of another kind, and an entire and undoubted mistake of which no imaginable Cause can be produced that should lead her into it. Whence it follows that she never commits it, and that therefore the reflexive Act of Memory, which does firmly assure us of a foregoing Perception, (no other Faculty having any power or pretense to evidence the contrary,) does necessarily infer, That every man has a Particular Soul of his own, and that such an Universal Soul, as the Avenroists fancy, will not save all Phenomena.

And yet I dare say, this wild Opinion is more tenable then theirs that make nothing but mere Matter in the world, but I thought it worth the while with all diligence to confute them both, the better of them being but a more refined kind of Atheism, tending to the subversion of all the Fundamentals of Religion and Piety amongst men.

II. As for the Spirit of Nature, the greatest exceptions are, That I have introduced an obscure Principle for Ignorance and Sloth to take sanctuary in, and so to enervate or forelock the useful endeavours of curious Wits, and hinder that expected progress that may be made in the Mechanick Philosophy, and this, to aggravate the crime, before a competent search be made what the Mechanical powers of Matter can doe. For what Mechanical solutions the present or foregoing Ages could not light upon, the succeeding may; and therefore it is as yet unseasable to bring in any such Principle into Natural Philosophy.

To which I answer, That the Principle we speak of is neither obscure nor unseasable; nor so much introduced by me, as forced upon me by inevitable evidence of Reason. That it is no obscure Principle, the clear Description I have given of it in my Treatise will make good. Against which I know no imaginable exception, unless it may seem harsh to any one that 2

Book 3. ch. 12.

Hh Substance
Substance devoid of all sense and perception, and therefore incapable of premeditated contrivance, should be supposed to form the Matter into such exquisite organization. But this can appear no difficulty to him that duly considers that what Phantaine is to our Soul, that Fabrick is to the Spirit of Nature: and that as the tenour of our Spirits (which are but subtile matter) will cause the Soul immediately to exert itself into this or that Imagination, no knowledge or premeditation interceding, so such or such a preparation or disposition of the Matter of the World will cause the Spirit of Nature to fall upon this or that kind of Fabrication or Organization, no perception or consultation being interposed.

Those that pretend that the introduction of this Principle is unseasonable, I demand of them when they will think it to be reasonable. For this simple surmise, That although all the Mechanical solutions of some Phenomena which have been hitherto offer'd to the world be demonstrably false, yet future Ages may light upon what is true, can be held nothing else by the judicious, but a pitiful subterfuge of fearful Souls, that are very loath to let in any such affrightfull Notion as an Immaterial or Spiritual Substance into the world, for fear the next step must be the acknowledgment also of a God, from whom they would fain hide themselves by this poor and precarious pretence. But I say, if the introduction of this Principle be not seasonable now, it will never be seasonable. For that admirable Master of Mechanicks Des-Cartes has improved this way to the highest, I dare say, that the Wit of man can reach to in such Phenomena as he has attempted to render the Causes of. But how in sundry passages he falls short in his account, I have both in the forenamed and following Chapter, as also elsewhere, taken notice. I will instance here only in the Phenomenon of Gravity, wherein I think I have perfectly demonstrated that both He and Mr. Hobbs are quite out of the story, and that the Causes they assign are plainly false. And that I have not mentioned the Opinions of others in this way, it was only because I look'd upon them as less considerable.

12. But you'll say that though these be all mistaken, yet it does not follow but that there may arise some happy Wit that will give a true Mechanical solution of this Problem. But I answer, That I have not only confuted their Reasons, but also from Mechanical principles granted on all sides and confirmed by Experience, demonstrated that the Decent (suppose) of a Stone, or Bullet, or any such like heavy Body, is enormously contrary to the Laws of Mechanicks, and that according to them they would necessarily, if they be loose, recede from the Earth, and be carried away out of our sight into the farthest parts of the Aire, if some Power move them. Mechanical did not curb that Motion, and force them downwards towards the Earth. So that it is plain that we have not arbitrarily introduced a Principle, but that it is forced upon us by the undeniable evidence of Demonstration. From which to suspend our assent till future Ages have improved this Mechanical Philosophy to greater height, is as ridiculous, as to doubt of the truth of any one plain and easy Demonstration in the first Book of Euclide, till we have travelled through the whole field of that immense study of Mathematicks.

13. Nor lastly needs the acknowledgment of this Principle to damp our endeavours in the search of the Mechanical causes of the Phenomena of Nature,
Nature, but rather make us more circumspect to distinguish what is the result of the mere Mechanical powers of Matter and Motion, and what of an Higher Principle. For questionless this secure presumption in some, That there is nothing but Matter in the world, has embolden them too rashly to venture on Mechanical solutions where they would not hold, because they were confident there were no other solutions to be had but those of this kinde.

14. Besides that to the Rational and Religious there is a double Pleasure to carry them on in this way of Philosophy: The one from the observation how far in every thing the Concatenation of Mechanical causes will reach; which will wonderfully gratifie their Reason: the other from a distinct deprecation where they must needs break off, as not being able alone to reach the Effect; which necessarily leads them to a more confirmed discovery of the Principle we contend for, namely the Spirit of Nature, which is the Vicarious power of God upon the Matter, and the first step to the abstrusest Mysteries in Natural Theologie; which must needs highly gratifie them in point of Religion.

15. And truly for this very cause, I think it is the most sober and faithful advice that can be offered to the Christian World, that they would encourage the reading of Des-Cartes in all publick Schools or Universities. That the Students of Philosophy may be throughly exercised in the just extent of the Mechanical powers of Matter, how farre they will reach, and where they fall short. Which will be the best assistance to Religion that Reason and the Knowledge of Nature can afford. For by this means such as are intended to serve the Church will be armed betimes with sufficient strength to grapple with their proudest Deriders or Opposers. Whereas for want of this, we see how liable they are to be condemned and born down by every bold, though weak, pretender to the Mechanick Philosophy.

16. These are the main Passages I could any way conceive might be excepted against in the ensuing Discourse: which yet are so innocent and firm in themselves, and so advantageously circumstantiated in the places where they are found, that I fear the Reader may suspect my judgement and discretion in putting my self to the trouble of writing, and him of reading, so long and needles a Preface. Which oversight though it be an argument of no great Wit, yet it may be of much Humanity, and of an earnest desire of doing a publick good without the least offence or dis-satisfaction to any that are but tolerable Retainers to Reason and Ingenuity. But for those that have bid a diet to both, and measure all Truths by their own humour some fancy, making every thing ridiculous that is not suitable to their own ignorant conceptions, I think no serious man will hold himself bound to take notice of their perverse constructions and mis-representations of things, more then a religious Eremit or devout Pilgrim to heed the ugly mows and grimaces of Apes and Monkies he may haply meet with in his wearisome passage through the Wilderness.
THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

CHAP. I.

1. The Usefulness of the present Speculation for the understanding of Providence, and the management of our lives for our greatest Happiness.
2. For the moderate bearing the death and misfortunes of our Friends.
3. For the begetting true Magnanimity in us.
4. And Peace and Tranquility of Mind.
5. That so weighty a Theory is not to be handled perfunctorily.

Fall all the Speculations the Soul of man can entertain her self withall, there is none of greater moment, or of closer concernment to her, than this of her own Immortality, and Independence on this Terrestrial Body. For hereby not only the intricacies and perplexities of Providence are made more easy and smooth to her, and she becomes able, by unravelling this clue from end to end, to pass and repass safe through this Labyrinth, wherein many both anxious and careless Spirits have lost themselves; but also (which touches her own interest more particularly) being once raised into the knowledge and belief of so weighty a Conclusion, she may view from this Prospect the most certain and most compendious way to her own Happiness; which is, the bearing a very moderate affection to whatever tempts her, during the time of this her Pilgrimage, and a careful preparing of herself for her future condition, by such Noble actions and Heroicall qualifications of Mind as shall render her most welcome to her own Country.

2. Which Belief and Purpose of hers will put her in an utter incapacity of either envying the life or successes of her most embittered Enemies, or of over-lamenting the death or misfortunes of her dearest Friends; she having no Friends but such as are Friends to God and Vertue, and whose Afflictions will prove advantages for their future Felicity, and their departure hence a passage to present possession thereof.

Hh 3
3. Wherefore, being fully grounded and rooted in this so concerning a persuasion, she is freed from all poor and abject thoughts and designs; and as little admires him that gets the most of this World, be it by Industry, Fortune or Policy, as a discreet and serious man does the spoils of School-boys, it being very inconsiderable to him who got the victory at Cocks or Cob-nut, or whose bag returned home the fullest stuffed with Counters or Cherry-stones.

4. She has therefore no amulation, unless it be of doing good, and of out-stripping, if it were possible, the noblest examples of either the present or past Ages; nor any contest, unless it be with herself, that she has made no greater proficiency towards the scope she aims at: and aiming at nothing but what is not in the power of men to confer upon her, with courage she sets upon the main work; and being still more faithfull to her self, and to that Light that assists her, at last tafts the first fruits of her future Harvest, and does more then prefige that great Happiness that is accruing to her. And so quit from the troubles and anxieties of this present world, states it with Tranquillity and Content, and at last leaves it with Joy.

5. The Knowledge therefore and belief of the Immortality of the Soul being of so grand Importance, we are engaged more carefully and punctually to handle this so weighty a Theory: which will not be performed by multiplying of words, but by a more frugal use of them; letting nothing fall from our pen, but what makes closely to the matter, nor omitting any thing materiall for the evincing the truth thereof,

**The Immortality of the Soul. Book I.**

1. That the Soule’s Immortality is demonstrable, by the Authors method, to all but mere Scepticks. 2. An Illustration of his First Axiome. 3. A confirmation and example of the Second. 4. An explication of the Third. 5. An explication and proof of the Fourth. 6. A proof of the Fifth. 7. Of the Sixth. 8. An example of the Seventh. 9. A confirmation of the truth of the Eighth. 10. A demonstration and example of the Ninth. 11. Penetrability the immediate Property of Incorporall Substance. 12. As also Indiscerptibility. 13. A proof and illustration of the Tenth Axiome.

A ND to stop all Creep-holes, and leave no place for the subterfuges and evasions of confused and cavilling spirits, I shall prefix some few Axiomes, of that plainness and evidence, that no man in his wits but will be ashamed to deny them, if he will admit any thing at all to be true. But as for perfect Scepticism, it is a disease incurable, and a thing rather to be pitied or laughed at, then seriously opposed. For when a man is so fugitive and unsettled, that he will not stand to the verdict of his own Faculties, one can no more fasten any thing upon him, then he can write in the water, or tye knots of the wind. But for those that
that are not in such a strange despondency, but that they think they know something already and may learn more, I do not doubt, but by a reasonable recourse to these few Rules, with others I shall set down in their due place, that they will be persuaded, if not forced, to reckon this Truth, of the Immortality of the Soul, amongst such as must needs appear undeniable to those that have parts and leisure enough accurately to examine, and throughly to understand what I have here written for the demonstration thereof.

A X I O M E I.

What ever things are in themselves, they are nothing to us, but so far forth as they become known to our Faculties or Cognitive powers.

2. This Axiome is plain of itself, at the very first proposal. For as nothing, for example, can concern the Visive faculty, but so far forth as it is visible, so there is nothing that can challenge any stroke to so much as a touching, much less determining, our Cognitive powers in general, but so far forth as it is cogniscible.

A X I O M E II.

Whatsoever is unknown to us, or is known but as merely possible, is not to move us or determine us any way, or make us undetermined; but we are to rest in the present light and plain determination of our own Faculties.

3. This is an evident Consectary from the foregoing Axiome. For the Existence of that that is merely possible is utterly unknown to us to be, and therefore is to have no weight against any Conclusion, unless we will condemn our selves to eternall Scepticisme. As for example, If after a man has argued for a God and Providence, from the wife contrivance in the frame of all the Bodies of Animals upon earth, one should reply, That there may be, for all this, Animals in Saturn, Jupiter, or some other of the Planets, of very inept fabricks; Horses, fuppofs, and other Creatures, with onely one Eye, and one Ear, (and that both on a side, the Eye placed also where the Eare should be) and with onely three Leggs; Bulls and Rams with horns on their backs, and the like: Such allegations as these, according to this Axiome, are to be held of no force at all for the enervating the Conclusion.

A X I O M E III.

All our Faculties have not a right of suffrage for determining of Truth, but onely Common Notions, Externall Sense, and evident and undeniable Deductions of Reason.

4. By Common Notions I understand whatever is Notimacally true, that is to say, true at first sight to all men in their wits, upon a clear perception of the Terms, without any further discourse or reasoning.
foning. (From External Sense I exclude not Memory, as it is a faithfull Register thereof.) And by undeniable Deduction of Reason, I mean such a collection of one Truth from another, that no man can discover any looseness or disjoynedness in the cohesion of the Argument.

**AXIOME IV.**

What is not consonant to all or some of these, is mere Fancy, and is of no moment for the evincing of Truth or Falshood, by either it’s Vigour or Perplexiveness.

5. Say mere Fancy, in Counter-distinction to such Representations as, although they be not the pure Impresses of some real Object, yet are made by Rational deduction from them, or from Common Notions, or from both, Those Representations that are not framed upon such grounds, I call mere Fancies; which are of no value at all in determining of Truth. For if Vigour of Fancy will argue a thing true, then all the dreams of mad-men must goe for Oracles: and if the Perplexiveness of Imagination may hinder assent, we must not believe Mathematical demonstration, and the 16th Proposition of the 3rd Book of Euclide will be confidently concluded to contain a contradiction.

**AXIOME V.**

Whatever is clear to any one of these Three Faculties, is to be held undoubtedly true, the other having nothing to evidence to the contrary.

6. Or else a man shall not be assured of any sensible Object that he meets with, nor can give firm assent to such Truths as these, It is impossible the same thing should be, and not be, at once; Whatever is, is either finite, or infinite; and the like.

**AXIOME VI.**

What is rejected by one, none of the other Faculties giving evidence for it, ought to goe for a Falsehood.

7. Or else a man may let pass such Impossibilities as these for Truth, or doubt whether they be not true or no, viz. The part is greater than the whole; There is something that is neither finite nor infinite; Socrates is invisible; and the like.

**AXIOME VII.**

What is plainly and manifestly concluded, ought to be held undeniable, when no difficulties are alleged against it, but such as are acknowledged to be found in other Conclusions held by all men undeniably true.

8. As for example, suppose one should conclude, That there may be Infinite Matter, or That there is Infinite Space, by very rational arguments; and that it were objected onely, That then the Tenth part of
of that Matter would be Infinite; it being most certain that there is Infinite Duration of something or other in the world, and that the Tenth part of this Duration is Infinite; it is no enervating at all of the former Conclusion, it being incumbered with no greater incongruity then is acknowledged to confit with an undeniable Truth.

AXIOME VIII.

The Subject, or naked Essence or Substance of a thing, is utterly unconceivable to any of our Faculties.

9. FOR the evidencing of this Truth, there needs nothing more then a silent appeal to a man's owne Mind, if he do not find it so; and that if he take away all Aptitudes, Operations, Properties and Modifications from a Subject, that his conception thereof vanishes into nothing, but into the Idea of a mere Undiversificated Substance, so that one Substance is not then distinguishable from another, but onely from Accidents or Modes, to which properly belongs no subsistence.

AXIOME IX.

There are some Properties, Powers and Operations, immediately appertaining to a thing, of which no reasons can be given, nor ought to be demanded, nor the Way or Manner of the cohesion of the Attribute with the Subject can by any means be fancied or imagined.

10. THE evidence of this Axiome appears from the former. For if the naked Substance of a Thing be so utterly unconceivable, there can be nothing apprehended there to be a connexion betwixt it and it's first Properties. Such is Actual Divisibility and Impenetrability in Matter. By Actual Divisibility I understand Discernibility, gros tearing or cutting one part from another. These are Immediate Properties of Matter; but why they should be there, rather then in any other Subject, no man can pretend to give, or with any credit aske, the reason. For Immediate Attributes are indemonstrable, otherwise they would not be Immediate.

11. So the Immediate Properties of a Spirit or Immaterial Substance are Penetrability and Indiscernibility. The necessary cohesion of which Attributes with the Subject is as little demonstrable as the former. For supposing that, which I cannot but assent, to be evidently true, That there is no Substance but it has in some sort or other the Three dimensions; This Substance, which we call Matter, might as well have been penetrable as impenetrable, and yet have been Substance: But now that it does so certainly and irresistibly keep one part of it self from penetrating another, it is so, we know not why. For there is no necessary connexion discernible betwixt Substance with three dimensions, and Impenetrability. For what some allege, that it implies a contradiction, that Extended Sub-
stance should run one part into another; for so part of the Extension, and consequently of the Substance, would be lost, this, I say, if nearly looked into, is of no force. For the Substance is no more lost in this case, than when a string is doubled and redoubled, or a piece of wax reduced from a long figure to a round: The dimension of Longitude is in some part lost, but without detriment to the Substance of the wax. In like manner when one part of an Extended Substance runs into another, something both of Longitude, Latitude and Profundity may be lost, and yet all the Substance there still, as well as Longitude lost in the other case without any loss of the Substance.

And as what was lost in Longitude was gotten in Latitude or Profundity before, so what is lost here in all or any two of the dimensions, is kept safe in Essential Spistitude: For so I will call this Mode or Property of a Substance, that is able to receive one part of itself into another, Which fourth Mode is as easy and familiar to my Understanding, as that of the Three dimensions to my Sense or Phantasy. For I mean nothing else by Spistitude, but the redoubling or contracting of Substance into less space then it does sometimes occupy. And Analogous to this is the lying of two Substances of several kinds in the same Place at once.

To both these may be applied the terms of Reduplication and Saturation: The former, when Essence or Substance is but once redoubled into itself or into another; the latter, when so oft, that it will not easily admit anything more. And that more Extensions then one may be commensurate, at the same time, to the same Place, is plain, in that Motion is coextensive with the Subject wherein it is, and both with Space. And Motion is not nothing; wherefore two things may be commensurate to one Space at once.

12. Now then Extended Substance (and all Substances are extended) being of it self indifferent to Penetrability or Impenetrability, and we finding one kind of Substance so impenetrable, that one part will not enter at all into another, which with as much reason we might expect to find so irresistibly united one part with another that nothing in the world could dislodge them: (For this Indiscerpsibility has as good a connexin with Substance as Impenetrability) they neither falling under the cognoscence of Reason or Demonstration, but being Immediate Attributes of such a Subject. For a man can no more argue from the Extension of Substance, that it is Discerpsible, then that it is Penetrable; there being as good a capacity in Extension for Penetration as Discerption; I conceive, I say, from hence we may as easily admit that some Substance may be of it self Indiscerpsible, as well as others Impenetrable; and that as there is one kind of Substance, which of its own nature is Impenetrable and Discerpsible, so there may be another Indiscerpsible and Penetrable. Neither of which a man can give any other account of, then that they have the Immediate Properties of such a Subject.

AXIOME
AXIOME X.

The discovery of some Power, Property, or Operation, incompatible to one Subject, is an infallible argument of the Existence of some other, to which it must be compatible.

13. AS when Pythagoras was spoken unto by the River Nessus, when he passed over it, and a Tree by the command of Theseus the chief of the Gymnosophists saluted Apolloius in a distinct and articulate voice, but small as a woman; it is evident, I say, That there was something there that was neither River nor Tree, to which these salutations must be attributed, no Tree nor River having any Faculty of Reason nor Speech.

CHAP. III.

1. The general Notions of Body and Spirit. 2. That the Notion of Spirit is altogether as intelligible as that of Body. 3. Whether there be any Substance of a mixt nature, betwixt Body and Spirit.

1. THE greatest and grossest Obstacle to the belief of the Immortality of the Soul, is that confident opinion in some, as if the very notion of a Spirit were a piece of Non-sense and perfect Incongruity in the conception thereof. Therefore to proceed by degrees to our maine designe, and to lay our foundation low and sure, we will in the first place expole to view the genuine notion of a Spirit, in the general acceptance thereof; and afterwards of several kinds of Spirits: that it may appear to all, how unjust that cavill is against Incorporeal Substances, as if they were mere Impossibilities and contradictory Inconveniences. I will define therefore a Spirit in generall thus, A Substance penetrable and indiscerpible. The fitness of which Definition will be the better understood, if we divide Substance in generall into these first kindes, viz. Body and Spirit, and then define Body to be A Substance impenetrable and discerpible. Whence the contrary kind to this is fitly defined, A Substance penetrable and indiscerpible.

2. Now I appeal to any man that can set aside prejudice, and has the free use of his Faculties, whether every term in the Definition of a Spirit be not as intelligible and congruous to Reason, as in that of a Body. For the precise Notion of Substance is the same in both, in which, I conceive, is comprifed Extension and Activity either connate or communicated, For Matter it fell once moved can move other Matter. And it is as easy to understand what Penetrable is as Impenetrable, and what Indiscerpible as Discerpible; and Penetrability and Indiscerpibility being as immediate to Spirit, as Impenetrability and Discerpibility to Body, there is as much reason to be given for the Attributes of the one as of the other, by
Axiome 9. And Substance in its precise notion including no more of Impenetrability then Indiscerpibillity, we may as well wonder how one kind of Substance can so firmly and irrefistibly keep out another Substance (as Matter, for example, does the parts of Matter) as that the parts of another Substance hold so fast together, that they are by no means Discerpible, as we have already intimated. And therefore this holding out, in one being as difficult a business to conceive as the holding together in the other, this can be no prejudice to the notion of a Spirit. For there may be very fast union where we cannot at all imagine the cause thereof, as in such Bodies which are exceeding hard, where no man can fancy what holds the parts together so strongly; and there being no greater difficulty here, then that a man cannot imagine what holds the parts of a Spirit together, it will follow by Axiome 7, that the Notion of a Spirit is not to be excepted against as an incongruous notion, but is to be admitted for the notion of a thing that may really exist.

3. It may be doubted, whether there may not be Essences of a middle condition betwixt thefe Corporeal and Incorporeal Substances we have described, and that of two sorts, The one Impenetrable and Indiscerpible, the other Penetrable and Discerpible. But concerning the firft, if Impenetrability be understood in reference to Matter, it is plain there can be no such Essence in the world; and if in reference to its own parts, though it may then look like a poifible Idea in itself, yet there is no footsteps of the existence thereof in Nature, the Souls of men and Daemons implying contraction and dilatation in them.

As for the latter, it has no priviledge for any thing more then Matter it self has, or fome Mode of Matter. For it being Discerpible, it is plain its union is by juxtaposition of parts, and the more penetrable, the les likely to convey Sense and Motion to any distance. Besides the ridiculous sequel of this supposition, that will fill the Univerfe with an infinite number of shreds and rags of Souls and Spirits, never to be reduced again to any felf or order. And laftly, the proper Notion of a Substance Incorporeal fully counter-distinct to a Corporeal Substance, necessarily including in it fo strong and indissoluble union of parts, that it is utterly Indiscerpible, whenas yet for all that in this general notion thereof neither Sense nor Cognition is implied, it is moft rational to conceive, that that Substance wherein they are must assuredly be Incorporeal in the strictest signification, the nature of Cognition and communion of Sense arguing a more perfect degree of union then is in mere Indiscerpibility of parts.

But all this Scrupulosity might have been faved, for I confidently promise my felf, that there are none fo perverely given to turgiversations and subterfuges, but that they will acknowledge, whereever I can prove that there is a Substance distinct from Body or Matter, that it is in the moft full and proper Sense Incorporeal.
CHAP. IV.

That the Notions of the several kinds of Immaterial Beings have no incongruity nor incongruity in them. 2. That the Nature of God is as intelligible as the Nature of any Being whatsoever. 3. The true Notion of his Ubiquity, and how intelligible it is. 4. Of the Union of the Divine Essence. 5. Of his Power of Creation.

We have shewn that the Notion of a Spirit in general is not at all incongruous nor impossible: And it is as congruous, consistent and intelligible in the sundry kinds thereof, as for example that of God, of Angels, of the Souls of Men and Brutes, and of the λόγοι αρετοικοι or Seminal Forms of things.

2. The Notion of God, though the knowledge thereof be much prejudiced by the confoundedness and stupidity of either superstitious or profane men, that please themselves in their large Rhetorizations concerning the unconceiveableness and utter incomprehensibleness of the Deity; the one by way of a devotional exaltation of the transcendency of his Nature, the other to make the belief of his Existence ridiculous, and craftily and perversely to intimate that there is no God at all, the very conception of him being made to appear nothing else but a bundle of inconsistencies and impossibilities: Nevertheless I shall not at all stick to affirm, that his Idea or Notion is as easy as any Notion else whatsoever, and that we may know as much of him as of any thing else in the world, For the very Essence or naked Substance of nothing can possibly be known, by Axiome 8. But for His Attributes, they are as conspicuous as the Attributes of any Subject or Substance whatever: From which a man may easily define Him thus; God is a Spirit Eternal, Infinite in Essence and Goodness, Omniscient, Omnipotent, and of himself necessarily Existent.

I appeal to any man, if every term in this Definition be not sufficiently intelligible. For as for Spirit, that has been already defined and explained. By Eternal I understand nothing here but Duration without end or beginning; by Infiniteness of Essence, that his Essence or Substance has no bounds, no more then his Duration: by Infinite in Goodness, such a benign Will in God as is carried out to boundless and innumerable benefactions: by Omniscience and Omnipotence, the ability of knowing or doing any thing that can be conceived without a plain contradiction: by Self-existence, that he has his Being from none other: and by necessary Existence, that he cannot fail to be. What terms of any Definition are more plain then thefe of this? or what Subject can be more accurately defined then this is? For the naked Subject or Substance of any thing is no other wise to be known then thus. And they that gape after any other Speculative knowledge of God then what is from his Attributes and Operations, they may have their heads and mouths filled with many hot scalding fancies and words, and run mad with the boisterousness of their own Imagination, but they will never hit upon any sober Truth.

Thus
3. Thus have I delivered a very explicite and intelligible Notion of the Nature of God; which I might also more compendiously define, An Essence absolutely Perfect, in which all the terms of the former Definition are comprehended, and more then I have named, or thought needful to name, much less to insist upon; as his Power of Creation, and his Omnipresence or Ubiquity, which are necessarily included in the Idea of absolute Perfection. The latter whereof some ancient Philosophers endeavouring to let out, have defined God to be a Circle whose Centre is every where and Circumference no where, By which Description certainly nothing else can be meant, but that the Divine Essence is every where present with all those adorable Attributes of infinite and absolutely Perfect Goodness, Knowledge and Power, according to that sentence in which I have explained them. Which Ubiquity or Omnipresence of God is every whit as intelligible as the overspreading of Matter into all places.

4. But if here any one demand, How the Parts, as I may so call them, of the Divine Amplitude hold together, that of Matter being so discernible; it might be sufficient to re-mind him of what we have already spoken of the general Notion of a Spirit. But besides that, here may be also a peculiar rational account given thereof, it implying a contradiction, that an Essence absolutely Perfect should be either limited in presence, or change place in part or whole, they being both notorious Effects or Symptoms of Imperfection, which is inconsistent with the Nature of God. And no better nor more cogent reason can be given of any thing, then that it implies a contradiction to be otherwise.

5. That Power also of creating things of nothing, there is a very close connexion betwixt it and the Idea of God, or of a Being absolutely Perfect. For this Being would not be what it is conceived to be, if it were destitute of the Power of Creation; and therefore this Attribute has no less coherence with the Subject, then that it is a contradiction it should not be in it, as was observed of the foregoing Attribute of Indiscernibility in God. But to allege that a man cannot imagine how God should create something of nothing, or how the Divine Essence holds so closely and invincibly together, is to transgress against the 3, 4, and 5. Axiomes, and to appeal to a Faculty that has no right to determine the case.

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C H A P. V.

1. The Definition belonging to all Finite and Created Spirits. 2. Of Indiscernibility. a Symbolical representation thereof. 3. An Objection answered against that representation.

We have done with the Notion of that Infinite and Uncreated Spirit we usually call God: we come now to those that are Created and Finite, as the Spirits of Angels, Men and Brutes; we will cast in the Seminal Forms also, or Archei, as the Chymists call them, though haply the world stands in no need of them. The Properties

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* See Book 3, ch. 12, and 13.
CHAPTER V.
The Immortality of the Soul.

Vertues of a Spirit, as it is a Notion common to all these, I have already enumerated in my Antidote, Self-motion, Self-penetration, Self-contraction and dilatation, and Indiscripibility, by which I mean Indiscripibility: to which I added Penetrating, Moving and Altering the matter. We may therefore define This kind of Spirit we speak of, to be A Substance Indiscernible, that can move it self, that can penetrate, contract, and dilate it self, and can also penetrate, move, and alter the Matter. We will now examine every term of this Definition, from whence it shall appear, that it is as congruous and intelligible, as those Definitions that are made of such things as all men without any scruple acknowledge to exist.

3. Of the Indiscernibility of a Spirit we have already given rational grounds to evince it not impossible, it being an Immediate Attribute thereof, as Impenetrability is of a Body; and as conceivable or imaginable, that one Substance of its own nature may invincibly hold its parts together, so that they cannot be disunited nor diiivered, as that another may keep out so floutly and irresistibly another Substance from entering into the same space or place with it self. For this aversion or Impenetrability is not at all contained in the precise conception of a Substance as Substance, as I have already signified.

But besides that Reason may thus easily apprehend that it may be so, I shall a little gratifie Imagination, and it may be Reason too, in offering the manner how it is so, in this kind of Spirit we now speak of. That ancient notion of Light and Intentional species is so far from a plain impossibility, that it has been heretofore generally, and is still by very many persons, looked upon as a Truth, that is, That Light and Colour do ray in such sort as they are described in the Peripatetical Philosophy. Now it is observable in Light, that it is most vigorous towards its fountain, and fainter by degrees. But we will reduce the matter to one lucid point, which, according to the acknowledged Principles of Opticks, will fill a distance of space with its rays of light: Which rays may indeed be reverberated back towards their Centre by interposing some opaque body, and so this Orbe of light contracted; but, according to the Aristotelian Hypothesis, it was always accounted impossible that they should be clipt off, or cut from this lucid point, and be kept apart by themselves.

Tho' whom dry Reason will not satisfy, may, if they please, entertain their Phanly with such a Representation as this, which may a little ease the anxious importunity of their Mind, when it too eagerly would comprehend the manner how this Spirit we speak of may be said to be Indiscernible. For think of any ray of this Orbe of Light, it does sufficiently set out to the Imagination how Extension and Indiscernibility may conliff together.

3. But if any object, That the lucid Centre of this Orbe, or the Primary Substance, as I elsewhere call it, is either divisible or absolutely indivisible; and if it be divisible, that as concerning that Immortal of a Spirit, this Representation is not at all serviceable to set off the nature thereof, by shewing how the parts there may hold together so indiscriminably; but if absolutely indivisible, that it seems to be nothing: To this I answer, what Scaliger somwhere has noted, That what is infinitely great or infi-

* See further in my Antidote, Book I. ch. 4.
  For. 3.
  Also the Append. chap. 3, ed. 10.

* Append. c. 13.
  For. 2.
nately small, the Imagination of man is at a loss to conceive it. Which
certainly is the ground of the perplexedness of that Probleme concerning
Matter, whether it consists of points, or onely of particles divisible in
infinitum.

But to come more closely to the business; I say that though we should
acknowledge the Inmost Centre of life, or the very First point, as I may so
call it, of the Primary Substance (for this Primary Substance is in some
sort gradual) to be purely indivisible, it does not at all follow, no not
according to Imagination it self, that it must be nothing. For let us
imagine a perfect Plane, and on this Plane a perfect Globe, we cannot con-
ceive but this Globe touches the Plane, and that in what we ordinarily
call a point, else the one would not be a Globe, or the other not a Plane.
Now it is impossible that one Body should touch another, and yet touch
one another in nothing. This inmost Centre therefore of life is some-
thing, and something so full of essential vigour and virtue, that though
gradually it diminisheth, yet can fill a certain Sphere of Space with its own
presence and activity, as a spark of light illuminates the dusky air.

Wherefore there being no greater perplexity nor subtlety in the con-
ideration of this Centre of life or Inmost of a Spirit, then there is in the
Atomes of Matter, we may by Axiome 7, rightly conclude, That Indiscer-
pibility has nothing in the notion thereof, but what may well consist with
the possibility of the existence of the Subject whereunto it belongs.

C H A P. VI.

1. Axiomes that tend to the demonstrating how the Centre or First point of
the Primary Substance of a Spirit may be Indiscerible. 2. Several
others that demonstrate how the Secondary Substance of a Spirit may be
Indiscerible. 3. An application of these Principles. 4. Of the union
of the Secondary Substance considered transfusely. 5. That the No-
ton of a Spirit has less difficulty than that of Matter. 6. An Answer
to an Objection from the Rational faculty. 7. Answers to Objections
suggested from Fancy. 8. A more compendious satisfaction concerning
the Notion of a Spirit.

And thus we have fairly well gratified the Fancy of the Curious
concerning the Extension and Indisceribility of a Spirit; but
we shall advance yet higher, and demonstrate the possibility of
this Notion to the severest Reason, out of these following Principles.

AXIOME XI.
A Globe touches a Plane in something, though in the least that is conceivable
to be real.

AXIOME XII.
The least that is conceivable is so little, that it cannot be conceived to be
discerible into less.
A X I O M E XIII.
As little as this is, the repetition of it will amount to considerable magnitudes.

As for example, if this Globe be drawn upon a Plane, it constitutes a Line; and a Cylinder drawn upon a Plane, or this same Line described by the Globe multiplied into itself, constitutes a superficies, &c. This a man cannot deny, but the more he thinks of it, the more certainly true he will find it.

A X I O M E XIV.
Magnitude cannot arise out of mere Non-Magnitudes.

For multiply Nothing ten thousand millions of times into nothing, the Product will be still Nothing. Besides, if that wherein the Globe touches a Plane were more than Indiscernible, that is, purely Indivisible; it is manifest that a Line will consist of Points Mathematically so called, that is, purely Indivisible, which is the grandest absurdity that can be admitted in Philosophy, and the most contradistinct thing imaginable.

A X I O M E XV.
The same thing by reason of its extreme lilleness may be utterly Indiscernible, though intellectually Divisible.

This plainly arisest out of the foregoing Principles: For every Quantity is intellectually divisible; but something Indiscernible was afore demonstrated to be Quantity, and consequently divisible, otherwise Magnitude would consist of Mathematical points. Thus have I found a possibility for the notion of the Center of a Spirit, which is not a Mathematical point, but Substance, in Magnitude so little, that it is Indiscernible, but in virtue so great, that it can send forth out of itself so large a Sphere of Secondary Substance, as I may so call it, that it is able to actuate grand Proportions of Matter, this whole Sphere of life and activity being in the mean time utterly Indiscernible.

2. This I have said, and shall now prove it by adding a few more Principles of that evidence, as the most rigorous Reason shall not be able to deny them.

A X I O M E XVI.
An Emanative Cause is the Notion of a thing possible.

By an Emanative Cause is understood such a Cause as merely by Being, no other activity or causality interposed, produces an Effect. That this is possible is manifest; it being demonstrable that there is de facto some such Cause in the world, because something must move it self. Now if there be no Spirit, Matter must of necessity move it self, where you cannot imagine any activity or causality, but the bare essence of the

Matter

13
Matter from whence this motion comes. For if you would suppose some former motion that might be the cause of this, then we might with as good reason suppose some former to be the cause of that, and so in infinitum.

**AXIOME XVII.**

*An Emanative Effect is coexistent with the very Substance of that which is said to be the Cause thereof.*

This must needs be true, because that very Substance which is said to be the Cause, is the adequate and immediate Cause, and wants nothing to be adjointed to its bare essence for the production of the Effect; and therefore by the same reason the Effect is at any time, it must be at all times, or so long as that Substance does exist.

**AXIOME XVIII.**

*No Emanative effect, that exceeds not the virtues and powers of the Cause, can be said to be impossible to be produced by it.*

This is so plain, that nothing need be added for either explanation or proof.

**AXIOME XIX.**

*There may be a Substance of that high Virtue and Excellency, that it may produce another Substance by Emanative causality, provided that Substance produced be in due gradull proportions inferior to that which causes it.*

This is plain out of the foregoing Principle. For there is no contradiction nor impossibility of a Cause producing an Effect less noble than itself, for thereby we are the better assured that it does not exceed the capacity of its own powers: Nor is there any incongruity, that one Substance should cause something else which we may in some sense call Substance, though but Secondary or Emanatory; acknowledging the Primary Substance to be the more adequate Object of Divine Creation, but the Secondary to be referrible also to the Primary or Centrall Substance by way of causall relation. For suppose God created the Matter with an immediate power of moving it self, God indeed is the Prime Cause as well of the Motion as of the Matter, and yet nevertheless the Matter is rightly said to move it self. Finally, this Secondary or Emanatory Substance may be rightly called Substance, because it is a Subject indue with certain powers and activities, and that it does not inhere as an Accident in any other Substance or Matter, but could maintain its place, though all Matter or what other Substance forever were removed out of that space it is extended through, provided its Primary Substance be but safe.

3. From these four Principles I have here added, we may have not an imaginative but rationally apprehension of that part of a Spirit which we call the Secondary Substance thereof. Whose Extension arising by gradull Emanation from the First and Primeft Essence, which we call the Centre of the Spirit (which is no impossible supposition by the 16, 18, and 19, Axiomes)
Axiomes) we are led from hence to a necessary acknowledgment of perfect Indiscerpibility of parts, though not intellectuall Indivisibility, by Axiome 17. For it implies a contradiction that an Emanative effect should be disjoyned from its original.

4. Thus have I demonstrated how a Spirit, considering the lineaments of it (as I may so call them) from the Centre to the Circumference, is utterly indiscerpible. But now if any be so curious as to ask how the parts thereof hold together in a line drawn cross to these from the Centre, (for Imagination, it may be, will suggest they lye all loose;) I answer, that the conjecture of Imagination is here partly true and partly false, or is true or false as the shall be interpreted. For if she mean by loose, actually disunited, it is false and ridiculous: but if only so discerpible, that one part may be disunited from another, that may not only be true, but, upon supposition the essentiall rayes are not fully enough redoubled within, plainly necessary; other wise a Spirit could not contract one part and extend another, which is yet an Hypothesis necessary to be admitted. Wherefore this Objection is so far from weakening the possibility of this Notion, that it gives occasion more fully to declare the exact conninuity thereof.

To be brief therefore, a Spirit from the Centre to the Circumference is utterly indiscerpible, but in lines cross to this it is closely coherent, but need not be indiscerpibly; which cohesion may consist in an immediate union of these parts, and transverse penetration and transcursion of Secondary Substance through this whole Sphere of life which we call a Spirit.

Nor need we wonder that so full an Orbe should swell out from so subtil and small a point as the Centre of this Spirit is supposed. Εἰ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἄγνωστον ἐστὶ, δυνάμει τῇ προμον καὶ μὴ ὑπερέχει πάντων, as Arisotle speaks of the Mind of man. And besides, it is but what is seen in some sort to the very eye in light, how large a Sphere of Aire a little spark will illuminate.

5. This is the pure Idea of a created Spirit in general, concerning which if there be yet any cavil to be made, it can be none other; then what is perfectly common to it and to Matter, that is, the unimaginableness of Points and Smallest Particles, and how what is discernible or divisible can at all hang together: but this not hindering Matter from actual existency, there is no reason that it should any way pretend to the inferring of the impossibility of the existence of a Spirit, by Axiome 7.

But the most lubricious supposition that we goe upon here, is not altogether fo intricate as those difficulties in Matter. For if that be but granted, in which I find no absurdity, That a Particle of Matter may be so little that it is utterly incapable of being made less, it is plain that one and the same thing, though intellectually divisible, may yet be really indiscerpible. And indeed it is not only possible, but it seems necessary that this should be true: For though we should acknowledge that Matter were discernible in infinitum, yet supposing a Cause of Infinite distinct perception and as Infinite power, (and God is such) this Cause can reduce this capacity of infinite discernibleness of Matter into act, that is to say,
say, actually and at once discern it or disjoin it into so many particles as it is discernible into. From whence it will follow, that one of these particles reduced to this perfect Parvitude is then utterly indiscernible, and yet intellectually discernible, otherwise Magnitude would consist of mere points, which would imply a contradiction.

We have therefore plainly demonstrated by reason, that Matter consists of parts indiscernible; and therefore there being no other Faculty to give suffrage against it, for neither Sense nor any Common Notion can contradict it, it remains by Axiome 5. that the Conclusion is true.

6. What some would object from Reason, that these perfect Parvitudes being acknowledged still intellectually discernible, must still have parts into which they are discernible, and therefore be still discernible; to this it is answered, That division into parts does not imply any discernibility, because the parts conceived in one of these Minima Corporalia (as I may so call them) are rather essential or formal parts then integral, and can no more actually be disjivered, then Sense and Reason from the Soul of a Man. For it is of the very essence of Matter to be divisible, but it is not at all included in the essence thereof to be discernible; and therefore where discernibility fails there is no necessity that divisibility should fail also. See the Preface, Sect. 3.

7. As for the trouble of spurious suggestions or representations from the Phantasy, as if these perfect Parvitudes were Round bodies, and that therefore there would be Triangular intervals between; void of Matter; they are of no moment in this case, the always representing a discernible magnitude in stead of an indiscernible one. Wherefore she bringing in a false evidence, her testimony is to be rejected, nay if she could perplex the cause far worse, she was not to be heard, by Axiome the 4.

Wherefore Phantasy being unable to exhibit the Object we consider, in its due advantages, for ought we know these perfect Parvitudes may lie so close together, that they have no intervals between: nay it seems necessary to be so; For if there were any such intervals, they were capable of particles left then the least of all; which is a contradiction in Reason, and a thing utterly impossible.

But if we should gratifie Phantasy so far as to admit of these intervals, the greatest absurdity would be, that we must admit an insensible Vacuum, which no Faculty will be able ever to confine. But it is most rational to admit none, and more consonant to our determination concerning these Minima Corporalia, as I call them, whose largeness is to be limited to the least real touch of either a Globe on a Plane, or a Cone on a Plane, or a Globe on a Globe; if you conceive any real touch left then another, let that be the measure of these Minute Realities in Matter. From whence it will follow, they must touch a whole side at once, and therefore can never leave any empty intervals.

Nor can we imagine any Angulosities or Round protuberances in a quantity infinitely little, more then we can in one infinitely great, as I have already declared in my Preface. I must confess, a mans Reason in this speculation is mounted far beyond his Imagination; but there being worse intricacies in Theories acknowledged constantly to be true, it can be
be no prejudice to the present Conclusion, by the 4, and 7. Axiomes.

8. Thus have we cleared up a full and distinct Notion of a Spirit, with so unexceptionable accuracy, that no Reason can pretend to assert it impossible nor unintelligible. But if the Theory thereof may seem more operose and tedious to impatient wits, and the punctuality of the Description the more hazardous and incredible, as if it were beyond our Faculties to make so precise a Conclusion in a Subject so obscure, they may ease their Understanding, by contenting themselves with what we have set down Chap. 2. Sect. 11, 12. and remember that that Wisdom and Power that created all things, can make them of what nature He pleases; and that if God will that there shall be a Creature that is penetrable and indiscernible, that it is as easy a thing for him to make one of its own nature, as one impermeable and discernible, and imbue it with what other Properties he pleases, according to his own will and purpose; which Indulments being immediately united with the Subject they are in, Reason can make no further demand how they are there, by the 9. Axiome.

CHAP. VII.


1. We have proved the Indiscernibility of a Spirit as well in Centre as Circumference, as well in the Primary as Secondary Substance thereof, to be a very consistent and congruous Notion. The next Property is Self-motion, which must of necessity be an Attribute of something or other; For by Self-motion I understand nothing else but Self-activity, which must appertain to a Subject active of it self. Now what is simply active of it self, can no more cease to be active then to Be; which is a sign that Matter is not active of it self, because it is reducible to Rest: Which is an Argument not only that Self-activity belongs to a Spirit, but that there is such a thing as a Spirit in the world, from which activity is communicated to Matter. And indeed if Matter as Matter had motion, nothing would hold together; but Flints, Adamant, Brads, Iron, yes this whole Earth would suddenly melt into a thinner Substance then the subtile Aire, or rather it never had been condensated together to this consistancy we finde it. But this is to anticipate my future purpose of proving That there are Spirits exisiting in the world: It had been sufficient here to have asserted, That Self-motion or Self-activity is as conceivable to appertain to Spirit as to Body, which is plain at first sight to any man that appeals to his own Faculties. Nor is it at all to be scrupled at, that any thing should be allowed to move it self, because our Adversaries, that say there is nothing but Matter in the world, must of necessity (as I have intimated already) confess that this Matter moves it self, though it be very incongruous so to affirm.

2. The congruity and possibility of Self-penetration in a created Spirit is
is to be conceived, partly from the limitableness of the Subject, and partly from the foregoing Attributes of Indiscernibility and Self-motion. For Self-penetration cannot belong to God, because it is impossible any thing should belong to him that implies imperfection, and Self-penetration cannot be without the lessening of the presence of that which does penetrate itself; or the implication that some parts of that Essence are not so well as they may be; which is a contradiction in a Being which is absolutely Perfect. From the Attributes of Indiscernibility and Self-motion (to which you may add Penetrability from the general notion of a Spirit) it is plain that such a Spirit as we define, having the power of Motion upon the whole extent of its essence, may also determine this Motion according to the Property of its own nature; and therefore if it determine the motion of the exterior parts inward, they will return inward towards the Centre of essential power; which they may easily do without resistance, the whole Subject being penetrable, and without damage, it being also indiscernible.

3. From this Self-penetration we do not only easily, but necessarily, understand Self-contraction and dilatation to arise. For this Self-moving Substance, which we call a Spirit, cannot penetrate it self, but it must needs therewith contract it self; nor restore it self again to its former state, but it does thereby dilate it self: so that we need not at all insist upon these Terms.

4. That power which a Spirit has to penetrate Matter we may easily understand if we consider a Spirit only as a Substance, whose immediate property is Activity. For then it is not harder to imagine this Active Substance to pervade this or the other part of Matter, then it is to conceive the pervading or dispersing of motion it self therein.

5. The greatest difficulty is to fancy how this Spirit, being so Incorporeal, can be able to move the Matter, though it be in it. For it seems so subtile, that it will pass through, leaving no more footsteps of its being there, then the Lightening does in the Scabbard, though it may haply melt the Sword, because it there finds resistance. But a Spirit can find no resistance any where, the closest Matter being easily penetrable and pervious to an Incorporeal Substance. The ground of this difficulty is founded upon the unconceivableness of any Union that can be betwixt the Matter, and a Substance that can so easily pass through it. For if we could but once imagine an Union betwixt Matter and a Spirit, the activity then of the Spirit would certainly have influence upon Matter, either for begetting, or increasing, or directing the motion thereof.

But notwithstanding the Penetrability and easy passage of a Spirit through Matter, there is yet for all that a capacity of a strong union betwixt them, and every whitis conceivable as betwixt the parts of Matter themselves. For what glue or Cement holds the parts of hard matter in stones and mettals together, or, if you will, of what is absolutely hard, that has no pores or particles, but is one continued and perfectly homogeneous body, not only to Sense, but according to the exact Idea of Reason: what Cement holds together the parts of such
The Immortality of the Soul.

CHAP. VII.

such a body as this? Certainly nothing but immediate Union and Rest. Now for Union, there is no comparison betwixt that of Matter with Matter, and this of Spirit with Matter. For the first is only superficial; in this latter the very inward parts are united point to point throughout. Nor is there any fear it will not take hold, because it has a capacity of passing through. For in this absolutely solid hard Body, which let be A, in which let us conceive some inward superficies, suppose E A C, this superficies is so smooth as nothing can be conceived smoother: why does not therefore the upper E D C slide upon the nearer part E F C upon the least motion imaginable, especially E F C being supposed to be held fast whilst the other is thrust against? This facility therefore of one Body passing upon another without any sticking, seeming as necessary to our Phantasi as a Spirit's passing through all Bodies without taking hold of them, it is plain by Axiome 7. That a firm union of Spirit and Matter is very possible, though we cannot conceive the manner thereof.

And as for Rest, it is compatible also to this conjunction of Matter with Spirit, as well as of Matter with Matter. For suppose the whole body A moved with like swiftness in every part, the parts of A then are according to that sense of Rest, by which they would explain the adhesion of the parts of Matter one with another, truly quiescent. So say I that in the Union of Matter and Spirit, the parts of the Matter receiving from the Spirit just such a velocity of motion as the Spirit exerts, and no more, they both rest in firm Union one with another. That which comes to pass even then when there is neither immediate Union then we speak of. For if we do but lay a Book on our Hand, provided our Hand be not moved with a swifter motion then it communicates to the Book, nor the Book be pulst on faster then the swiftness of our Hand; the Book and our Hand will most certainly retain their Union and goe together. So natural and easy is it to conceive how a Spirit may move a Body without any more perplexity or contradiction then is found in the Union and Motion of the parts of Matter it self. See the Appendix to my Antidote.

6. The last Term I put in the Definition of a Spirit is, the power of altering the Matter; which will necessarily follow from its power of moving it or directing its motion. For Alteration is nothing else but the varying of either the Figures, or postures, or the degrees of motion in the particles; all which are nothing else but the results of Local motion. Thus have we cleared the intelligibility and possibility of all the Terms that belong to the Notion of a created Spirit in general, at least of such as may be rationally conceived to be the causes of any visible Phenomena in the world: We will now descend to the defining of the chief Species thereof.
CHAP. VIII.

1. Four main Species of Spirits. 2. How they are to be defined. 3. The definition of a Seminal Form; 4. Of the Soul of a Brute; 5. Of the Soul of a Man. 6. The difference between the Soul of an Angel and an Humane Soul. 7. The definition of an Angelical Soul. 8. Of the Platonical Nost and Evanes. 9. That Des-Cartes his Demonstration of the Existence of the Humane Soul does at least conclude the possibility of a Spirit.

We have enumerated Four kinds of Spirits, viz. The άρωφία or Seminal Forms, the Souls of Brutes, the Humane Soul, and that Soul or Spirit which animates or informs the vehicles of Angels. For I look upon Angels to be as truly a compound Being, consisting of Soul and Body, as that of Men & Brutes. Their Existence we shall not now goe about to prove, for that belongs to another place. My present design is onely to expound or define the notion of these things, so far forth as is needful for the evincing that they are the Ideas or Notions of things which imply no contradiction or impossibility in their conception; which will be very easy for us to perform: the chief difficulty lying in that more General notion of a Spirit, which we have so fully explained in the foregoing Chapters.

2. Now this General notion can be contracted into Kindes, by no other Differences then such as may be called peculiar Powers or Properties belonging to one Spirit and excluded from another, by the 8. Axiome. From whence it will follow, that if we describe these several kindes of Spirits by immediate and intrinseal Properties, we have given as good Definitions of them as any one can give of any thing in the world.

3. We will begin with what is most simple, the Seminal Forms of things which, for the present, deciding nothing of their exisitence, according to their ιδεα ποσιβιλια, we define thus: A Seminal Form is a created Spirit organizing duly-prepared Matter into life and vegetation proper to this or the other kind of Plant. It is beyond my imagination what can be excepted against this Description, it containing nothing but what is very coherent and intelligible. For in that it is a Spirit, it can move Matter intrinsically, or at least direct the motion thereof: But in that it is not an Omnipotent Spirit, but Finite and Created, its power may well be restrained to duly-prepared Matter both for vital union and motion; He that has made these Particular Spirits, varying their Faculties of Vital union according to the diversity of the preparation of Matter, and so limiting the whole comprehension of them all, that none of them may be able to be vitally joyned with any Matter whatever: And the same first Cause of all things that gives them a power of uniting with & moving of matter duly prepared, may also set such laws to this motion, that when it lights on matter fit for it, it will produce such and such a Plant,
Plant, that is to say, it will shape the matter into such Figure, Colour and other properties, as we discover in them by our Senses.

4. This is the First degree of Particular Life in the world, * if there be any purely of this degree Particular. But now, as Aristotle has somewhere noted, the Essences of things are like Numbers, whose Species are changed by adding or taking away an Unite: add therefore another Intrinsicall power to this of Vegetation, viz. Sensation, and it becomes the Soul of a Beast. For in truth the bare Substance it self is not to be computed in explicate knowledge, it being utterly in it self unconceivable, and therefore we will only reckon upon the Powers, A Subject therefore from whence is both Vegetation and Sensation is the general notion of the Soul of a Brute. Which is distributed into a number of kindes, the effect of every Intrinsicall power being discernible in the constant shape and properties of every distinct kind of Brute Creatures.

5. If we add to Vegetation and Sensation Reason properly so called, we have then a settled notion of the Soul of Man, which we may more compleatly describe thus: A created Spirit indued with Sense and Reason, and a power of organizing terreftrial Matter into humane shape by vital union therewith.

6. And herein alone, I conceive, does the Spirit or Soul of an Angel (for I take the boldnes to call that Soul, whatever it is, that has a power of vitally actuating the Matter) differ from the Soul of a Man, in that the Soul of an Angel may vitally actuate an Aerial or Æthereal Body, but cannot be born into this world in a Terreftrial one.

7. To make an end therefore of our Definitions: an Angelical Soul is very intelligibly described thus: A created Spirit indued with Reason, Sensation, and a power of being vitally united with and actuating of a Body of Aire or Æther only. Which power over an Aereal or Æthereal Body is very easilly to be understood out of that general notion of a Spirit in the foregoing Chapters. For it being there made good, that union with Matter is not incompative to a Spirit, and consequently nor moving of it, nor that kind of motion in a Spirit which we call Contraction and Dilatation; these Powers, if carefully considered, will neccesarily infer the possibility of the Actuation and Union of an Angelical Soul with an Æthereal or Aier Body.

8. The Platonists write of other Orders of Spirits or Immaterial Substances, as the Nòs and Ethês. But there being more Subtilty then either usefulness or assurance in such like Speculations, I shall pass them over at this time; having already, I think, irreputably made good, That there is no incongruity nor incomposibility comprifed in the Notion of Spirit or Incorporeal Substance.

9. But there is yet another way of inferring the same, and it is the Argument of Des-Cartes, whereby he would conclude that there is de facto a Substance in us distint from Matter, viz. our own Mind. For every Real Affection or Property being the Mode of some Substance or other, and real Modes being unconceivable without their Subject, he infers that, seeing we can doubt whether there be any such thing as Body in the world (by which doubting we seclude Cognition from Body)
there must be some other Substance distinct from the Body, to which Cognition belongs.

But I must confess this Argument will not reach home to Des-Cartes his purpose, who would prove in Man a Substance distinct from his Body. For being there may be Modes common to more Subjects than one, and this of Cognition may be pretended to be such as is compatible as well to Substance Corporeal as Incorpooreal, it may be conceived apart from either, though not from both. And therefore his Argument does not prove That that in us which does think or perceive is a Substance distinct from our Body, but only That there may be such a Substance which has the power of thinking or perceiving, which yet is not a Body. For it being impossible that there should be any real Mode which is in no Subject, and we clearly conceiving Cognition independent for existence on Corporeal Substance; it is necessary, That there may be some other Substance on which it may depend; which must needs be a Substance Incorpooreal.

CHAP. IX.

1. That it is of no small consequence to have proved the Possibility of the Existence of a Spirit. 2. The necessity of examining Mr. Hobbs his Reasons to the contrary. 3. The first Exception out of Mr. Hobbs. 4. The second Exception. 5. The third. 6. The fourth. 7. The fifth. 8. The sixth. 9. The seventh. 10. The eighth and last Exception.

I have been, I believe, to admiration curious and solicitous to make good, That the Existence of a Spirit or Incorpooreal Substance is possible. But there is no reason any one should wonder that I have spent so much pains to make so small and inconsiderable a progress, as to bring the thing only to a bare possibility. For though I may seem to have gained little to my self, yet I have thereby given a very signal overthrow to the adverse party, whose strongest hold seems to be an unhaken confidence, That the very Notion of a Spirit or Substance Immaterial is a perfect Incomposibility and pure Non-sense. From whence are inferred no better Consequences than these: That it is impossible that there should be any God, or Soul, or Angel, Good or Bad; or any Immortality or Life to come. That there is no Religion, no Piety nor Piety, no Virtue nor Vice, Justice nor Injustice, but what it pleases him that has the longest Sword to call so. That there is no Freedom of Will, nor consequently any Rational remorse of Conscience in any Being whatsoever, but that all that is, is nothing but Matter and corporeal Motion; and that therefore every trace of mans life is as necessary as the tracts of Lightning and the fallings of Thunder; the blind impetus of the Matter breaking through or being stopp’d every where, with as certain and determinate necessity as the course of a Torrent after mighty storms and showers of Rain.

2. And
2. And verily considering of what exceeding great consequence it is to root out this fullen conceit that some have taken up concerning Incorpooreal Substance, as if it bore a contradiction in the very terms, I think I shall be wanting to so weighty a Cause, if I shall content my self with a bare recitation of the Reasons whereby I prove it possible, and not produce their Arguments that seem most able to maintain the contrary. And truly I do not remember that I ever met with any one yet that may justly be suspected to be more able to make good this Province then our Countreman Mr. Hobbs, whose inexuperable confidence of the truth of the Conclusion may well allure any man that dued considers the excellency of his natural Wit and Parts, that he has made choice of the most Demonstrative Arguments that humane Invention can search out for the evicit thereof.

3. And that I may not incurre the suspicion of mistaking his Assertion, or of misrepresenting the force of his Reasons, I shall here punctually set them down in the same words I find them in his Writings, that any man may judge if I doe him any wrong. The first place I shall take notice of is in his * Leviathan. The word Body in the most general acceptance signifies that which filleth or occupieth some certain room or imagined place; and dependeth not on the Imagination, but is a real part of that we call the Universe. For the Universe being the Aggregate of all Bodies, there is no real part thereof that is not also Body; nor any thing properly a Body, that is not also part of that Aggregate of all Bodies the Universe. The same also, because Bodies are subject to change, that is to say, to variety of appearance to the sense of living Creatures, is called Substance, that is to say, subject to various Accidents, as sometimes to be moved, sometimes to stand still, and to seem to our Senses sometimes Hot, sometimes Cold, sometimes of one Colour, Smell, Taste, or Sound, sometimes of another. And this diversity of seeming, (produced by the diversity of the operation of Bodies on the Organs of our Sense) we attribute to alterations of the Bodies that operate, and call them Accidents of those Bodies. And according to this accception of the word, Substance and Body signify the same thing; and therefore Substance Incorporeal are words which when they are joyned together destroy one another, as if a man should say an Incorporeal Body.

4. The second place is in his * Physicks. But it is here to be observed that certain Dreams, especially such as some men have when they are betwixt sleeping and waking, and such as happen to those that have no knowledge of the nature of Dreams, and are withall superstitions, were not heretofore nor are now accouted Dreams. For the Apparitions men thought they saw, and the voices they thought they heard in sleep, were not believed to be Phantasmes, but things subsisting of themselves, and Objects without those that Dreamed. For to some men, as well sleeping as waking, but especially to guilty men, and in the night, and in hallowed places, Fear alone, helped a little with the stories of such Apparitions, hath raised in their minds terrible Phantasmes, which have been and are still deceitfully receivd for things really true, under the names of Ghosts and Incorporeal Substances.

5. We will add a third out of the same Book. * For seeing Ghosts, sens-
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6. And a fourth out of his Humane Nature. But Spirits supernatural commonly signify some Substance without dimension, which two words do flatly contradict one another. And Article 5. Nor I think is that word Incorporeal at all in the Bible, but it is said of the Spirit, that it abideth in men, sometimes that it dwelleth in them, sometimes that it cometh on them, that it descendeth, and goeth, and cometh, and that Spirits are Angels, that is to say, Messengers, all which words do imply Locality, and Locality is Dimension, and whatsoever hath Dimension is Body, be it never so Subtile.

7. The fifth Exception shall be again out of his Leviathan. And for the Matter or Substance of the Invisible agents so fancied, they could not by natural cogitation fall upon any other conceit, but that it was the same with that of the Soul of Man, and that the Soul of Man was of the same Substance with that which appeareth in a Dream to one that sleepest, or in a Looking-glass to one that is awake: Which, men not knowing that such Apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the Fancy, think to be real and external Substances, and therefore call them Ghosts, as the Latines called them Imagines and Umbrae; and thought them Spirits, that is, thin aerial bodies, and those invisible Agents, which they feared, to be like them, save that they appear and vanish when they please. But the opinion that such Spirits were Incorporeal or Immaterial could never enter into the mind of any man by nature; because, though men may put together words of contradiction, as Spirit and Incorporeal, yet they can never have the imagination of any thing answering to them.

We will help out this further from what he also writes in his Humane Nature. To know that a Spirit is, that is to say, to have natural evidence of the same, it is impossible. For all evidence is conception, and all conception is imagination, and proceedeth from Sense; and Spirits we suppose to be those Substances which work not upon the Sense, and therefore are not conceivable.

8. The sixth, out of Chap. 45, where he writes thus: This nature of Sight having never been discovered by the ancient pretenders to Natural knowledge, much less by those that consider not things so remote (as that Knowledge is) from their present use; it was hard for men to conceive of those Images in the Fancy and in the Sense, otherwise than of things really without us. Which some (because they vanish away they know not whether nor how) will have to be absolutely Incorporeal, that is to say, Immaterial, or Forms without Matter, Colour and Figure, without any coloured or figured body, and that they can put on airy bodies, (as a garment) to make them visible when they will to our bodily eyes; and others say, are Bodies and living Creatures, but made of Air, or other more Subtle and aethereal matter, which is then, when they will be seen, condensed. But both of them agree on one general appellation of them, Daemons. As if the dead of whom they dreamed were not the Inhabitants of their own Brain, but of the Air, or of Heaven or Hell, not Phantasmes, but Ghosts; with just as much reason as if one should say he saw his own Ghost in a Looking-glass, or the Ghosts of the
CHAP. X. The Immortality of the Soul.

The stars in a River, or call the ordinary Apparition of the Sun of the quantity of about a foot, the Demon or Ghost of that great Sun that enlighteneth the whole visible world.

9. The seventh is out of the next Chapter of the same book. Where he again taking to task that Fargom, as he calls it, of Abstract Essences and Substantial Formes, writes thus: The world (I mean not the Earth only, but the Universe, that is, the whole mass of all things that are) is Corporeal, that is to say, Body, and hath the Dimensions of Magnitude, namely Length, Breadth and Depth; also every part of Body is likewise Body, and hath the like dimensions; and consequently every part of the Universe is Body, and that which is not Body is no part of the Universe: And because the Universe is all, that which is no part of it is nothing, and consequently nowhere.

10. The eighth and last we have a little after in the same Chapter, which runs thus: Being once fallen into this error of Separated Essences, they are thereby necessarily involved in many other absurdities that follow it. For seeing they will have these Forms to be real, they are obliged to assign them some place. But because they hold them Incorporeal without all dimension of Quantity, and all men know that Place is Dimension, and not to be filled but by that which is corporeal, they are driven to uphold their credit with a distinction, that they are not indeed any where Circumscribable, but Distinctive, Which terms, being mere words, and in this occasion insignificant, pass only in Latine, that the vanity of them might be concealed. For the Circumscription of a thing is nothing else but the determination or defining of its place, and so both the terms of distinction are the same. And in particular the essence of a man, which they say is his Soul, they affirm it to be all of it in his little finger, and all of it in every other part (how small soever) of his Body, and yet no more Soul in the whole Body then in any one of these parts. Can any man think that God is served with such Absurdities? And yet all this is necessary to believe to those that will believe the existence of an Incorporeal Soul separated from the Body.

CHAP. X.

1. An Answer to the first Exception. 2. To the second. 3. An Answer to the third. 4. To the fourth Exception. 5. An Answer to the fifth. 6. To the sixth. 7. To the seventh. 8. An Answer to the eighth and last. 9. A brief Recapitulation of what has been said hitherto.

We have set down the chiefest passages in the Writings of Mr. Hobbs, that confident Explorer of Immaterial Substances out of the world. It remains now that we examine them, and see whether the force of his Arguments bears any proportion to the firmness of his belief, or rather mis-belief, concerning these things. To strip therefore the first Exception of that long Ambages of words, and to reduce it to a more plain and compendious forme of reasoning,
the force of his Argument lies thus: That seeing every thing in the Universe is Body (the Universe being nothing else but an Aggregate of Bodies) Body and Substance are but names of one and the same thing; it being called Body as it fills a place, and Substance as it is the subject of several Alterations and Accidents. Wherefore Body and Substance being all one, Incorporeal Substance is no better sense then an Incorporeal Body, which is a contradiction in the very terms. But it is plain to all the world that this is not to prove, but to suppose what is to be proved, That the Universe is nothing else but an Aggregate of Bodies: When he has proved that, we will acknowledge the sequel; till then, he has proved nothing, and therefore this first argumentation must pass for nought.

2. Let us examine the strength of the second, which certainly must be this; if any at all; That which has its original merely from Dreams, Fears and Superstitious Fancies, has no real existence in the world: But Incorporeal Substances have no other Original. The Proposition is a Truth indubitable, but the Assumption is as weak as the other is strong; whether you understand it of the real Original of these Substances, or of the Principles of our knowledge That they are. And be their Original what it will, it is nothing to us, but so far forth as it is cognizable to us, by Axiome first, And therefore when he says, they have no other Original then that of our own Phanfy, he must be understood to affirm that there is no other Principle of the knowledge of their Existence then that we vainly imagine them to be; which is grossly false.

For it is not the Dreams and Fears of Melancholick and Superstitious persons, from which Philosophers and Christians have argued the Existence of Spirits and Immaterial Substances, but from the evidence of Externall Objects of Sense, that is, the ordinary Phenomena of Nature, in which there is discoverable so profound Wisdome and Counfell, that they could not but conclude that the Order of things in the world was from a higher Principle then the blind motions and jumbling of Matter and mere Corprosal Beings.

To which you may add, what usually they call * Apparitions, which are so far from being merely the Dreams and Fancies of the Superstitious, that they are acknowledged by such as cannot but be deemed by most men over-Atheistical, I mean Pomponatus and Cardan, nay by Vanius himself, though so devoted to Atheisme, that out of a perfect mad zeale to that despicable cause he died for it. I omit to name the Operations of the * Soul, which ever appeared to the wiseft of all Ages of such a transcendent condition, that they could not judge them to spring from so contemptible a Principle as bare Body or Matter. Wherefore to decline all these, and to make representation onely of Dreams and Fancies to be the occasions of the world's concluding that there are Incorporeal Substances, is to fancy his Reader a mere fool, and publickly to profess that he has a mind to impose upon him.

3. The third argumentation is this: That which appears to us as well sleeping as waking, is nothing without us: But Ghosts, that is Immortal Substances, appear to us as well sleeping as waking. This is the weakest Argument that has been yet produced: for both the Proposition and Assumption
Assumption are false. For if the Proposition were true, the Sun, Moon, Stars, Clouds, Rivers, Meadows, Men, Women, and other living creatures were nothing without us: For all these appear to us as well when we are sleeping as waking. But Incorporeal Substances do not appear to us as well sleeping as making. For the Notion of an Incorporeal Substance is so subtile and refined, that it leaving little or no impression on the Phantasy, its representation is merely supported by the free power of Reason, which seldom exercises it self in sleep, unless upon easy imaginable Phantasmes.

4. The force of the fourth Argument is briefly this: Every Substance has dimensions; but a Spirit has no dimensions. Here I confidently deny the Assumption. For it is not the Characteristicall of a Body to have dimensions, but to be Impenetrable. All Substance has Dimensions, that is, Length, Breadth, and Depth: but all has not Impenetrability. See my Letters to Monfieur Des-Cartes, besides what I have here writ in this present Treatise.

5. In the Exceptions belonging to the fifth place these Arguments are comprised. 1. That we have no principle of knowledge of any Immaterial Being, but such as a Dream or a Looking-Glass furnisheth us withall. 2. That the word Spirit or Incorporeal implies a Contradiction, and cannot be conceived to be Sensible by a natural Understanding. 3. That nothing is conceived by the Understanding but what comes in at the Senses, and therefore Spirits not acting upon the Senses must remain unknown and inconceivable.

We have already answered to the first in what we have returned to his second Argument in the second Exception.

To the second I answer, That Spirit or Incorporeal implies no contradiction, there being nothing understood thereby but Extended Substance with Activity and Indiscernibility, leaving out Impenetrability: Which I have above demonstrated to be the Notion of a thing possible, and need not repeat what I have already written.

To the third I answer, That Spirits do act really upon the Senses, by acting upon Matter that affects the Senses; and some of these Operations being such, that they cannot be rationally attributed to the Matter alone, Reason by the information of the Senses concludes, that there is some other more noble Principle distinct from the Matter. And as for that part of the Argument that asserts that there is nothing in the Understanding but what comes in at the Senses, I have, and shall again in its due place demonstrate it to be a very gross Error.

But in the mean time I conclude, that the Substance of every thing being utterly unconceivable, by Axiome 8. and it being only the Immediate Properties by which a man conceives every thing, and the Properties of Penetrability and Indiscernibility being as easy to conceive, as of Discernibility and Impenetrability, and the power of communicating of motion to Matter as easily as the Matter’s reception of it, and the Union of Matter with Spirit, as of Matter with Matter; it plainly follows, that the Notion of a Spirit is as naturally conceivable as the Notion of a Body.

6. In this sixth Exception he is very copious in jearing and making ridiculous
ridiculous the opinion of **Ghosts** and **Demons**; but the strength of his Argument, if it have any, is this, viz. If there be any such things as **Ghosts** or **Demons**, then they are (according to them that hold this opinion) either those Images reflected from water or Looking-glasses, cloathing themselves in airy garments, and so wandering up & down; or else they are living Creatures made of nothing but Aire or some more subtle and Ethereal Matter. One might well be amazed to observe such flight and vain arguing come from so grave a Philosopher, were not a man well aware that his peculiar eminency, as himself somewhere professes, lies in Politics, to which the humors and Bravadoes of Eloquence, especially amongst the simple, is a very effectual and serviceable instrument. And certainly such Rhetorications as this cannot be intended for any but such as are of the very weakest capacity.

Those two groundless conceits that he would obtrude upon the sober Affertors of **Spirits** and **Demons** belong not to them, but are the genuine issue of his own Brain. For, for the former of them, it is most justly adjudged to him, as the first Author thereof; it being a Rarity, which neither my self nor (I dare say) any else ever met with out of Mr. Hobbs his Writings. And the latter he does not only not goe about to confute here, but makes a shew of allowing it, for fear he should seem to deny Scripture, in Chap. 34. of his * Leviathan*. But those that assert the Existence of **Spirits**, will not stand to Mr. Hobbs his choice for defining of them, but will make use of their own Reason and Judgment for the settling of so concerning a Notion.

7. In this seventh Excerpt is contained the same Argument that was found in the first; but to deal fairly and candidly, I must confess it is better back'd then before. For there he supposeth, but does not prove, the chief ground of his Argument; but here he offers at a proof of it, couched, as I conceive, in these words *[and hath the dimensions of Magnitude, namely Length, Breadth and Depth]* for hence he would infer that the whole Universe is *corporeal*, that is to say, every thing in the Universe, because there is nothing but has *Length, Breadth and Depth*. This therefore is the very last ground his Argument is to be resolved into. But how weak it is I have already intimat'd, it being not *Trinal Dimension*, but *Impenetrability*, that constitutes a Body.

8. This last Excerpt seems more considerable then any of the former, or all of them put together: but when the force of the Arguments therein contained is duly weighed, they will be found of as little efficacy to make good the Conclusion as the rest. The first Argument runs thus; *Whatsoever is real, must have some place*: But *Spirits can have no place*. But this is very easily answered. For if nothing else be understood by *Place*, but *Imaginary Space*, Spirits and Bodies may be in the same Imaginary Space, and so the Assumption is false. But if by *Place* be meant the *Concave Superficies* of one Body immediately environing another Body, so that it be conceived to be of the very Formality of a *Place*, immediately to environ the *corporeal Superficies* of that Substance which is said to be placed; then it is impossible that a *Spirit* should be properly said to be in a *Place*, and so the Proposition will be false. Wherefore there being these two
two acceptions of Place, that Distinction of being there Circumscriptive and Definitive is an allowable Distinction, and the terms may not signify one and the same thing. But if we will with Mr. Hobbs (and I know no great hurt if we should doe so) confine the Notion of Place to Imaginary Space, this distinction of the Schools will be needless here, and we may, without any more ado, affert, That Spirits are as truly in Place as Bodies.

His second Argument is drawn from that Scholastic Riddle, which I must confess seems to verge too near to profound Non-sensè, That the Soul of man is tota in tota and tota in qualibet parte corporis. This mad Jingle it seems has so frightened Mr. Hobbs sometime or other, that he never since could endure to come near the Notion of a Spirit again, not so much as to consider whether it were a mere Bug-bear, or some real Being. But if Passion had not surprized his better Faculties, he might have found a true settled meaning thereof, and yet secluded these wide intricacies that the needleless Schools seem to have charged it with: For the Immediate Properties of a Spirit are very well intelligible without these Enigmatical flourishes, viz. That it is a Substance Penetrable and Indiscernible, as I have already shewn at large.

Nor is that Scholastic Enigme necessary to be believed by all those that would believe the Existence of an Incorporeal Soul; nor do I believe Mr. Hobbs his interpretation of this Riddle to be so necessary. And it had been but fair play to have been assured that the Schools held such a perfect contradiction, before he pronounced the belief thereof necessary to all those that would hold the Soul of Man an Immaterial Substance, separable from the Body. I suppose they may mean nothing by it, but what Plato did by his making the Soul to consist ὡς ἡμετερὴ ἡμετερὴν ὄνος: nor Plato any thing more by that divisible and indivisible Substance, than an Essence that is intellectually divisible, but really indiscriminable.

9. We have now firmly made good, that the Notion of a Spirit implies no contradiction nor incompossibility in it; but is the Notion or Idea of a thing that may possibly be. Which I have done so punctually and particularly, that I have cleared every Species of Substances Incorporeal from the imputation of either obscurity or inconsistency. And that I might not seem to take advantage in pleading their cause in the absence of the adverse party, I have brought in the most able Advocate and the most assured that I have hitherto ever met withal; and dare now appeal to any indifferent Judge, whether I have not demonstrated all his Allegations to be weak and inconclusive, Wherefore having so clearly evinced the possibility of the Existence of a Spirit, we shall now make a step further, and prove That it is not onely a thing possible, but that it is really and actually in Nature.
CHAP. XI.

1. Three grounds to prove the Existence of an Immaterial Substance, whereof the first is fetched from the Nature of God. 2. The second from the Phenomenon of Motion in the World. 3. That the Matter is not Self-movable. 4. An Objection that the Matter may be part Self-moved, part not. 5. The first Answer to the Objection. 6. The second Answer. 7. Other Evansions answered. 8. The last Evasion of all answered. 9. The Conclusion, That no Matter is Self-moved, but that a certain quantity of motion was impressed upon it at its first Creation by God.

1. There be Three main Grounds from whence a man may be assur'd of the Existence of Spiritual or Immaterial Substance. The one is the consideration of the transcendent excellency of the Nature of God; who being, according to the true Idea of him, an Essence absolutely Perfect, cannot possibly be Body, and consequently must be something Incorporeal: and seeing that there is no contradiction in the Notion of a Spirit in general, nor in any of those kinds of Spirits which we have defined, (where the Notion of God was set down amongst the rest) and that in the very Notion of him there is contained the reason of his Existence, as you may see at large in my *Antidote; certainly if we find any thing at all to be, we may safely conclude that He is much more. For there is nothing besides Him of which one can give a reason why it is, unless we suppose him to be the Author of it. Wherefore though God be neither Visible nor Tangible, yet his very Idea representing to our Intellectual Faculties the necessary reason of his Existence, we are, by Axiome 5. (though we had no other Argument drawn from our Senses) confidently to conclude That He is.

2. The second ground is the ordinary Phenomena of Nature, the most general whereof is Motion. Now it seems to me demonstrable from hence, That there is some Being in the World distinct from Matter. For Matter being of one simple homogean nature, and not distinguishable by particular differences, as the Schools speak, it must have everywhere the very same Essential properties; and therefore of it self it must all of it be either without motion, or else be self-moving, and that in such or such a tenor, or measure of motion; there being no reason imaginable, why one part of the Matter should move of it self lefse then another; and therefore if there be any such thing, it can only arise from external impediment.

3. Now I say, if Matter be utterly devoid of motion in it self, it is plain it has its motion from some other Substance, which is necessarily a Substance that is not Matter, that is to say, a Substance Incorporeal. But if it be moved of it self, in such or such a measure, the effect here being an Emanative effect, cannot possibly fail to be wherever Matter is, by Axiom 17, especially if there be no external impediment: And there is no impediment at all, but that the Terrestrial parts might regain an activity very
very nigh equal to the Æthereal, or rather never have lost it. For if the Planets had but a common Dividend of all the motion which themselves and the Sun and Stars, and all the Æthereal matter posſefs, (the matter of the Planets being so little in comparison of that of the Sun, Stars and Æther) the proportion of motion that will fall due to them would be exceeding much above what they have. For it would be as if four or five poor men in a very rich and populous City should, by giving up that estate they have, in a levelling way, get equal share with all the rest; Wherefore every Planet could not fail of melting it fell into little leaking finer Substance then the purest Æther. But they not doing so, it is a signe they have not that Motion nor Agitation of themselves, and therefore rest content with what has extrinsically accrued to them, be it less or more.

4. But the pugnacious, to evade the stroke of our Dilemma, will make any bold shift; and though they affront their own Faculties in laying fo, yet they will say, and must say, That part of the Matter is self-moving, part without motion of it fell.

5. But to this I answer, That first, this Evafion of theirs is not fo agreeable to Experience; but, so far as either our Sense or Reason can reach, there is the fame Matter every where. For consider the subtilest parts of Matter discoverable here below, those which for their Subtily are invisible, and for their Activity wonderfull, I mean those particles that cause that vehement agitation we feel in Winds: They in time lose their motion, become of a visible vaporous constancy, and turn to Clouds, then to Snow or Rain, after haply to Ice it fell; but then in process of time, first melted into Water, then exhaled into Vapours, after more fiercely agitated, do become Wind again. And that we may not think that this Reciprocation into Motion and Rest belongs only to Terrestrial particles; that the Heavens themselves be of the same Matter, is apparent from the Ejections of Comets into our Vortex, and the perpetual rising of those Spots and Scum upon the Face of the Sun.

6. But secondly, to return what is still more pungent. This Matter that is self-moving, in the impressing of Motion upon other Matter, either looses of its own motion, or retains it still entire. If the first, it may be defpoiled of all its motion: and so that whose immediate nature is to move, shall rest, the entire cause of its motion still remaining, viz. itself: which is a plain contradiction by Axiome 17. If the second, no meaner inconvenience then this will follow, That the whole world had been turned into pure Æther by this time, if not into a perfect flame, or at least will be in the conclusion, to the utter destruction of all corporeal Consistencies. For, that these self-moving parts of Matter are of a considerable copiousness, the event does teftily, they having melted almost all the world already into Suns, Stars and Æther, nothing remaining but Planets and Comets to be dissolved: Which all put together scarce bear a great proportion to the rest of the Matter of the Universe, as an ordinary grain of sand to the whole ball of the Earth. Wherefore fo potent a Principle of Motion still adding new motion to Matter, and no motion once communicated being loff, (for according to
to the laws of Motion, no Body los's any more motion then it communi-
cicates to another) it plainly follows, that either the World had been
utterly burnt up ere now, or will be at least in an infinite lets time then it
has existed, nay, I may say absolutely, in a very little time, and will never
return to any frame of things again; which though it possibly may be,
yet none but a mad-man will assert, by Axiome 2. And that it has not
yet been since the first epochs of History, feems a Demonstration that
this second Hypothesis is false.

7. There is yet another Evasion or two, which when they are answere-
d there will be no Scruple remaining touching this point. The first is,
That the Matter is all of it homogeneall, of the like nature every where,
and that it is the common Property of it all to be of it self indifferent to
Motion or Reſt; and therefore, that it is no wonder that some of it moves,
and other some of it reſts, or moves less then other fome. To which I
answer, That this Indifference of the Matter to Motion or Reſt may be
understood two ways: Either privatively, that is to fay, That it has
not any real or active propension to Reſt more then to Motion, or vice
versa, but is merely passive and fubceptive of what Motion or Fixation
fome other Agent confers upon it, and keeps that modification exactly
and perpetually, till again fome other Agent change it; (in which fene
I allow the Affertion to be true, but it makes nothing againft us, but for
us, it plainly implying That there is an Incorporated Subsance distinct
from the Matter, from whence the Matter both is and must be moved.)
Or elfe, this Indifference is to be understood poſitively, that is to fay,
That the Matter has a real and active propension as well to Motion as to
Reſt, fo that it moveth it felf and fixeth it felf from its own immediate
nature. From whence there are but these two Aburdities that follow:
the firft, That two absolutely contrary properties are immediately fete
in one fimple Subjeft; then which nothing can feem more harf and
unhandfome to our Logical faculties; unlesfs the fecond, which is,
That Motion and Reſt being thus the Emanative effects of this one fimple
Subjeft, the Matter will both move and reſt at once; or, if they do not
understand by Reſt, Fixation, but a mere abfence of motion, That it will
both move and not move at once. For what is immediate to any Subjeft,
will not ceafe to be, the Subjeft not being deftroyed, by Axiome 17.

Nor will they much help thernselves by fancying that Matter neceffary
exerting both these immediate powers or properties at once of Mo-
tion and Reſt, moves her felf to fuch a meafure and no swifter. For this
position is but coincident with the fecond member of the Dilemma,
Sect. 3. of this Chapter; and therefore the fame Argument will serve
for both places.

The other Evasion is, by supposing part of the Matter to be Self-mo-
vings, and part of it Self-reffing, in a positive fene, or Self-fixing:
Which is particularly directed againft what we have argued Sect. 6. For
thus they would avoid that hafty and univerfal Confagration there in-
ferred. But that this Supposition is fale, is manifest from Experience.
For if there be any fuch Self-fixing parts of Matter, they are certainly in
Gold and Lead and fuch like Metalls; but it is plain that they are not
there.
where. For what is *Self-fixing*, will immediately be reduced to *Rest*, so soon as external violence is taken off, by Axiome 17. Whence it will follow, that though these *Self-fixing parts of Matter* may be carried by other Matter while they are made fast to it, yet left free they will suddenly *rest*, they having the immediate cause of *Fixation* in themselves. Nor can any one distrust that the change will be so sudden, if he consider how suddenly an external force puts *Matter* upon motion. But a Bullet of gold or lead put thus upon motion, swift or slow, does not suddenly reduce it fell to *rest*. Whence it plainly appears that this other *Evilion* contradicts Experience, and therefore has no force against our former Arguments.

8. The utmost *Evilion* the Wit of man can possibly excogitate is that Figment of a certain *Divine Matter* dispersed in the World, which some conceive the onely *Numen* thereof, whole motions they make not *necessary*, but *voluntary*; whereby they would decline that *exorbitant inconvenience* mentioned in the sixth Section of this Chapter. But the opinion to me seems very harsh and prodigious for these reasons following.

First, they seem very absurd in imagining this to be the *Numen* of the World or God himself, it being so inconsistent with *Personal*ity and the *Unity* of the Godhead to be made up of an Infinite number of interpersed *Atoms* amidst the Matter of the World: For this cannot be one God in any sense, nor a single *Divine Atom* an *Entire Deity*. From whence it would follow that there is no God at all.

And then in the second place, They acknowledging this *Divine Matter* to be *Matter* acknowledge therewith *Impenetrability* and *Immutability* of parts, diversity also of figure, and, where there are no pores at all, absolute *Solidity* and *Hardness*. Whence it is manifest that whatsoever Reasonings are strong against *Ordinary Matter* for making it incapable of *Perception* and *free Action*, from the *Nature* and *Idea* thereof, they are as strong against this, on which they have conferred the title of *Divine*.

And thirdly and lastly, That there is no such *Divine Matter* interpersed amongst the *subtle Matter* of the World, that can act freely and knowingly, *Effects* also and *Experiments* plainly declare, as I have abundantly noted in my *Antidote against Atheism*.

9. Wherefore it is most rational to conclude, That no *Matter* whatsoever of its own *Nature* has any active *Principle of Motion*, though it be receptive thereof; but that when God created it, he superadded an impref of *Motion* upon it, such a measure and proportion to all of it, which remains still much what the same for quantity in the whole, though the parts of *Matter* in their various occurrenc of one to another have not always the same proportion of it. Nor is there any more necessity that God should reiterated this impref of *Motion* on the *Matter* created, then that he should perpetually create the *Matter*. Neither does his conserving of this quantity of *Motion* any thing more imply either a repetition or an augmentation of it, then the conserving of the *Matter* does the superaddition of new *Matter* thereunto. Indeed he need but con-
serve the Matter, and the Matter thus conferred will faithfully retain, one part with another, the whole summe of Motion first communicated to it, some small moments excepted, which are not worth the mentioning in this place.

CHAP. XII.

1. That the Order and Nature of things in the Universe argue an Essence Spiritual or Incorporeal. 2. The Evasion of this Argument. 3. A preparation out of Mr Hobbs to answer the Evasion. 4. The first Answer. 5. The second Answer. 6. M. Hobbs his mistake, of making the Ignorance of Second Causes the only Seed of Religion.

1. We have discovered out of the simple Phenomenon of Motion, the necessity of the Existence of some Incorporeal Essence distinct from the Matter: But there is a further assurance of this Truth, from the consideration of the Order and admirable Effect of this Motion in the world. Suppose Matter could move it self; would mere Matter, with Self-motion, amount to that admirable wise contrivance of things which we see in the World? Can a blind impetus produce such Effects, with that accuracy and constancy, that, the more wise a man is, the more he will be affured That no Wisdom can add, take away, or alter any thing in the works of Nature, whereby they may be bettered? How can that therefore, that has not so much as Sense, arise to the Effects of the highest pitch of Reason or Intellect? But of this I have spoke so fully and convincingly in the second Book of my Antidote, that it will be but a needless repetition to proceed any further on this Subject.

2. All the Evasion that I can imagine our Adversaries may use here, will be this: That Matter is capable of Sense, and the finest and most subtle of the most refined Sense, and consequently of Imagination too, strangely of Reason and Understanding. For Sense being nothing else, as some conceit, but Motion, or rather Re-action of a Body pressed upon by another Body, it will follow that all the Matter in the World has in some manner or other the power of Sensation.

3. Let us see now what this Position will amount to. Those that make Motion and Sensation thus really the same, they must of necessity acknowledge, That no longer Motion, no longer Sensation, (as Mr Hobbs has ingenuously confessed in his Elements of Philosophy:) And that every Motion or Re-action must be a new Sensation, as well as every ceasing of Re-action a ceasing of Sensation.

4. Now let us give these busy active particles of the Matter that play up and down every where the advantage of Sense, and let us see if all their heads laid together can contrive the Anatomical fabric of any Creature that lives. Assuredly when all is summ'd up that can be imagined, they will fall short of their account. For I demand, Has every one of these particles that must have an hand in the framing of the Body of an Animal, the whole design of the work by the impress of some Phan-
talm upon it, or, as they have several offices, so have they several parts of the design? If the first, it being most certain, even according to their opinion whom we oppose, that there can be no knowledge nor perception in the Matter, but what arises out of the Re-action of one part against another, how is it conceivable that any one particle of Matter or many together (there not existing yet in Nature any Animal) can have the Idea impressed of that Creature they are to frame? Or if one or some few particles have the sense of one part of the Animal (they seeming more capable of this, the parts being far more simple then the whole Compasses and contrivement) and other some few of other parts, how can they confer notes by what language or speech can they communicate their counsel one to another? Wherefore that they should mutually serve one another in such a design, is more impossible then that so many men blind and dumb from their nativity should join their forces and wits together to build a Caffle, or carve a Statue of such a Creature as none of them knew any more of in several then some one of the smallest parts thereof, but not the relation it bore to the whole.

5. Besides this, Sense being really the same with Corporeal Motion, it must change upon new impressions of Motion; so that if a particle by Sense were carried in this line, it meeting with a counterbluff in the way, must have quite another Impression Sense, and so forget what it was going about, and divert its course another way. Nay though it escaped free, Sense being Re-action, when that which it bears against is removed, Sense must needs cease, and perfect oblivion succeed. For it is not with these particles as with the Spring of a Watch or a bent Cross-bow, that they should for a con siderable time retain the same Re-action, and so consequently the same Sense. And lastly, if they could, it is still nothing to the purpose; for let their Sense be what it will, their motion is necessary, it being merely corporeal, and therefore the result of their motion cannot be from any kind of knowledge. For the corporeal motion is first, and is only felt, not directed by feeling. And therefore whether the Matter have any Sense or no, what is made out of it is nothing but what results from the wild jumblings and knockings of one part thereof against another, without any purpose, counsel or direction. Wherefore the ordinary Phenomena of Nature being guided according to the most Exquisite Wisdom imaginable, it is plain that they are not the Effects of the mere motion of Matter, but of some Immaterial Principle, by Axiome 10.

6. And therefore the Ignorance of Second Causes is not so rightly said to be the Seed of Religion, (as Mr. Hobbes would have it) as of Irrreligion and Atheism. For if we did more punctually and particularly search into their natures, we should clearly discern their insufficiency for such effects as we discover to be in the world. But when we have looked so closely and carefully into the nature of Corporeal Beings, and can find no Causality in them proportionable to these Effects we speak of, still to implead our selves rather of Ignorance, then the Matter and Corporeal motion of Insufficiency, is to hold an opinion upon humour, and to transgress against our first and second Axiomes,
C H A P. XIII.

1. The last proof of Incorporeal Substances, from Apparitions. 2. The first Evasion of the force of such Arguings. 3. An Answer to that Evasion. 4. The second Evasion. 5. The first kind of the second Evasion. 6. A description out of Virgil of that Genius that suggests the dictates of the Epicurean Philosophy. 7. The more full and refined sense of that Philosophy now-a-days. 8. The great efficacy of the Stars (which they suppose to consist of nothing but Motion and Matter) for production of all manner of Creatures in the world.

1. The Third and last ground which I would make use of, for evincing the Existence of Incorporeal Substances, is such extraordinary Effects as we cannot well imagine any natural, but must needs conceive some free or spontaneous Agent to be the Cause thereof, whenas yet it is clear that they are from neither Man nor Beast. Such are speakings, knockings, opening of doors when they were fast shut, sudden lights in the midst of a room floating in the air, and then passing and vanishing; nay, shapes of Men and several forts of Beasts, that after speech and converse have suddenly disappeared. These and many such like extraordinary Effects (which, if you please, you may call by one generall term of Apparitions) seem to me to be an undeniable Argument, that there be such things as Spirits or Incorporeal Substances in the world; and I have demonstrated the sequel to be necessary in the last Chapter of the Appendix to my Treatise against Atheism; and in the third Book of that Treatise have produced so many and so unexceptionable Stories concerning Apparitions, that I hold it superfluous to add any thing here of that kind, taking far more pleasure in exercising of my Reason then in registering of History. Besides that I have made so carefull choice there already, that I cannot hope to call out any that may prove more pertinent or convictive; I having penn'd down none but such as I had compared with those severall laws I set my self in the first Chapter of that third Book, to prevent all turgidvisations & evasions of gain-layers.

2. But, partly out of my own observation, and partly by information from others, I am well affured there are but two ways whereby they escape the force of such evident Narrations. The first is a firm perswasion that the very Notion of a Spirit or Immortal Substance is an Impossibility or Contradiction in the very terms. And therefore such stories implying that which they are confident is impossible, the Narration at the very first hearing must needs be judged to be false; and therefore they think it more reasonable to conclude all those that profess they have seen such or such things to be mad-men or cheats, then to give credit to what implies a Contradiction.

3. But this Evasion I have quite taken away, by so clearly demonstrating that the Notion of a Spirit implies no more contradiction than the Notion of Matter; and that its Attributes are as conceivable as the Attributes of Matter: so that I hope this creep-hole is stopp’d for ever.

4. The
4. The second Evagination is not properly an Evagination of the truth of these stories concerning Apparitions, but of our deduction therefrom. For they willingly admit of these Apparitions and Prodigies recorded in History, but they deny that they are any Arguments of a truly Spiritual and Incorporeal Substance distinct from the Matter thus changed into this or that shape, that can walk and speak, &c. but that they are special Effects of the influence of the Heavenly Bodies upon this region of Generation and Corruption.

5. And these that answer thus are of two sorts. The one have great Affinity with Aristotle and Avemroes, who look not upon the Heavenly Bodies as mere Corporeal Substances, but as actuated with Intelligences, which are Essences separate and Immaterial. But this Supposition hurts not us at all in our present design; they granting that which I am arguing for, viz. a Substance Incorporeal. The use of this perverse Hypothesis is only to shuffle off all Arguments that are drawn from Apparitions, to prove that the Souls of men subsist after death, or that there are any such things as Demons or Genii of a nature permanent and immortal. But I look upon this Supposition as confutable enough, were it worth the while to encounter it.

That of the Sadducees is far more firm, they supposing their Apparition to be nothing else but the efficacy of the presence of God altering Matter into this or the other Apparition or Manifestation; as if there were but one Soul in all things, and God were that Soul variously working in the Matter. But this I have already confuted in my Philosophical Poems, and shall again in this present Treatise.

6. The other Influencaries hold the same power of the Heavens as these; though they do not suppose so high a Principle in them, yet they think it sufficient for the falving of all Sublunary Phenomena, as well ordinary as extraordinary. Truly it is a very venerable Secret, and not to be uttered or communicated but by some old Silenus lying in his obscure Grot or Cave, nor that neither but upon due circumstances, and in a right humour, when one may find him with his veins swell'd out with wine, and his Garland fall off from his head through his headless drouiiness: Then if some young Chromis and Mnasillus, especially assisted by a fair and forward Aegle, that by way of a love-frolick will leave the tracks of her fingers in the blood of Mulberries on the temples and forehead of this aged Satyre, while he sleeps dog-sleep, and will not seem to see, for fear he forfeit the pleasure of his feeling; then, I say, if these young lads importune him enough, he will again sing that old song of the Epicurean Philosophy in an higher strain than ever, which I profess I should abhor to recite, were it not to confute, it is so monstrous and impious. But because no fore can be cured that is concealed, I must bring this Hypothesis into view also, which the Poet has briefly comprised in this summary.

Namque canebat, uti magnum per inane coaleta
Semina terrarumque animaque marifque funfient,
Et liquidi simul ignis, ut his exordia primis
Omnia, & ipse tener mundi concurrens orbis.

Virgil. Eclog. 6.

L1 3

7. The
7. The fuller and more refined sense whereof now-a-days is this; That Matter and Motion are the Principles of all things whatsoever, and that by Motion some Atomes or particles are more subtile than others, and of more nimbleness and activity. That motion of one Body against another does every where necessarily produce Sense, Sense being nothing else but the Re-action of parts of the Matter. That the Subtilest the Matter is, the Sense is more subtile. That the Subtilest Matter of all is that which constitutes the Sun and Stars, from whence they must needs have the purest and Subtilest Sense. That what has the most perfect Sense, has the most perfect Imagination and Memory, because Memory and Imagination are but the same with Sense in reality, the latter being but certain Modes of the former. That what has the perfectest Imagination, has the highest Reason and Providence; Providence and Reason being nothing else but an exacter train of Phantasmes, Sensations or Imagination. Wherefore the Sun and the Stars are the most Intellectual Beings in the world, and in them is that Knowledge, Counsel and Wisdom by which all Sublunary things are framed and governed.

8. These by their several impresses and impregnations have filled the whole Earth with vital Motion, raising innumerable sorts of Flowers, Herbs and Trees out of the ground. These have also generated the several Kinds of living Creatures. These have filled the Seas with Fishes, the Fields with Beasts, and the Aire with Fowles; the Terrestrial matter being as easily formed into the living shapes of these several Animals by the powerful impress of the Imagination of the Sun and Stars, as the Embryo in the womb is marked by the strong fancy of his Mother that bears him. And therefore these Celestial powers being able to frame living shapes of Earthly matter by the impress of their Imagination, it will be more easy for them to change the vaporous Aire into like transfigurations.

So that admitting all these Stories of Apparitions to be true that are recorded in Writers, it is no Argument of the Existence of any Incorporeal Principle in the world. For the piercing Fore-fight of these glorious Bodies, the Sun and Stars, is able to raise what Apparitions or Prodigies they please, to usher in the Births or fore-signify the Deaths of the most considerable persons that appear in the world; of which Pomponatus himself does acknowledge that there are many true examples both in Greek and Latin History. This is the deepest Secret that old Silenus could ever sing to enthrall the ears of deceived Youth. And it is indeed πεμπτον μυστήριον, in the very worst Sense, Horrendum mysterium, a very dreadful and dangerous Mystery, laying that there is no small hope that it may not prove true. Let us therefore now examine it.

* De Immortalitate Animæ, cap.14.
That the Splendor of the Celestial Bodies proves no Fore-sight nor Sovereignty that they have over us. 2. That the Stars can have no knowledge of us, Mathematically demonstrated. 3. The same Conclusion again demonstrated more familiarly. 4. That the Stars cannot communicate Thoughts, neither with the Sun nor with one another. 5. That the Sun has no knowledge of our affairs. 6. Principles laid down for the inferring that Conclusion. 7. A demonstration that he cannot see us. 8. That he can have no other kind of knowledge of us, nor of the frame of any Animal on Earth. 9. That though the Sun had the knowledge of the right frame of an Animal, he could not transmit it into Terrestrial matter. 10. An Answer to that Instance of the Signature of the Foetus. 11, 12. Further Answers thereto. 13. A short Incarnation of the confident Exploders of Incorporeal Substance out of the world.

1. That the Light is a very glorious thing, and the lustre of the Stars very lovely to look upon, and that the Body of the Sun is so full of splendour and Majesty, that without flattery we may profes our selves constrained to look aside, as not being able to bear the brightness of his aspect; all this must be acknowledged for Truth: but that these are as so many Eyes of Heaven to watch over the Earth, so many kind and careful Spectators & Intermedlers also in humane affairs, as that charitable Chymist * Paracelsus conceits, who writeth that not onely Princes and Nobles, or men of great and singular worth, but even almost every one, near his death has some prodigious sign or other (as knockings in the house, the dances of dead men, and the like) from these compassionate Fore-feers of his approaching Fate; this I must confess I am not so paganly Superstitious as to believe one syllable of; but think it may be demonstrated to be a mere fancy, especially upon this present Hypothesis, That the Sun and Stars have no immaterial Being residing in them, but are mere Matter consisting of the subtilest Particles and most vehemently agitated. For then we cannot but be assured that there is nothing in them more Divine then what is seen in other things that shine in the dark, suppose rotten wood, glo-worms, or the flame of a rush-candle.

2. This at least we will demonstrate, That let the Sun and Stars have what knowledge they will of other things, they have yet none at all of us, nor of our affairs; which will quite take away this last Evasion, That the Stars can have no knowledge of us is exceeding evident: For whenas the Magnus Orbis of the Earth is but as a Point compared with the distance thereof to a fixed Star, that is to say, whenas that Angle which we may imagine to be drawn from a Star, and to be subtended by the Diameter of the Magnus Orbis, is to Sense no Angle at all, but as a mere Line; how little then is the Earth it self? and how utterly invisible to any Star, whenas her Diameter is above 1000, times less then that of her Magnus Orbis? From whence it is clear that it is perfectly impos-
tible that the Stars, though they were endued with light, could so much as see the Earth itself, (much less the inhabitants thereof) to be Specula-
tors and Intermedilers in their affairs for good or evil; and there being
no higher Principle to inspire them with the knowledge of these things,
it is evident that they remain utterly ignorant of them.

3. Or if this Demonstration (though undeniably true in itself) be
not so intelligible to every one, we may add what is more easy and fami-
lar, viz. That the Stars being lucid Bodies, and those of the first magni-
tude near an hundred times bigger than the Earth, and yet appearing to
small things to us, hence any one may collect, that the opaque Earth will
either be quite invisible to the Stars, or else at least appear to little, that it
will be impossible that they should see any distinct Countries, much less
Cities, Houses, or Inhabitants.

4. Wherefore we have plainly swept away this numerous Company
of the celestial Senators from having any thing to doe to consult about,
or any way to oversee the affairs of Mankind; and therefore let them
seem to wink and twinkle as cogitabundly as they will, we may rest in
assurance that they have no plot concerning us, either for good or evil,
as having no knowledge of us. Nor if they had, could they communicate
their thoughts to that great deemed Soveraign of the world, the Sun;
they being ever as invisible to him, as they are to us in the day-time. For
it is nothing but his light that hinders us from seeing so seeble Objects,
and this hinderance consisteth in nothing else but this, That that motion
which by his Rayes is caufed in the Organ is so fierce and violent, that
the gentle vibration of the light of the Stars cannot matter it, nor indeed
bear any considerable proportion to it: What then can it do in reference
to the very Body of the Sun himself, the matter whereof has the moft
furious motion of any thing in the world?

5. There is nothing now therefore left, but the Sun alone, that can
possibly be conceived to have any knowledge of, or any superintendency
over our terrestrial affairs. And how incapable he is also of this office,
I hold it no difficult thing to demonstrate. Whence it will plainly ap-
pear, that those Apparitions that are seen, whether in the Aire or on
Earth (which are rightly looked upon as an Argument of Providence
and Existence of some Incorporeal Effece in the world) cannot be attrib-
uted to the power and prevision of the Sun, supposing him purely
corporeal.

6. For it is a thing agreed upon by all sides, That mere Matter has
no connate Ideas in it of such things as we see in the world; but that
upon Re-action of one part moved by another arises a kind of Sense, or
Perception. Which opinion as it is most rational in itself to conceive
(supposing Matter has any sense in it at all) so it is most consonant to
experience, we seeing plainly that Sense is ever caufed by some out-
ward corporeal motion upon our Organs, which are also corporeal. For
that Light is from a corporeal motion, is plain from the reflexion of the
rayes thereof; and no Sound is heard but from the motion of the Aire or
some other intermediate Body; no Voice but there is first a moving of
the Tongue; no Musick but there must either be the blowing of wind,
or the striking upon strings, or something Analogical to these; and so in the other Sentences.

Wherefore if there be nothing but Body in the world, it is evident that Sense arises merely from the motion of one part of Matter against another, and that Motion is ever first, and Perception follows, and that therefore Perception must necessarily follow the laws of Motion, and that no Per
cipient can have any thing more to conceive then what is conveyed by Corporeal motion. Now from these Principles it will be easy to prove that, though we should acknowledge a power of Perception in the Sun, yet it will not amount to any ability of his being either a Spectator or Governor of our affairs here on Earth.

7. According to the Computation of Astronomers, even of those that speak more modestly, the Sun is bigger then the Earth above an hundred and fifty times. But how little he appears to us every eye is able to judge. How little then must the Earth appear to him? If he see her at all, he will be so far from being able to take notice of any Persons or Families, that he cannot have any distinct discerning of Streets, nor Cities, no not of Fields, nor Countries; but whole Regions, though of very great Extent, will vanish here, as Alcibiades his Patrimony in that Map of the world Socrates shewed him, to repref the pride of the young Heire. The Earth must appear considerably less to him then the Moon does to us, because the Sun appears to us less then the Moon. It were easy to demonstrate that her Discus would appear to the Sun near thirty, nay sixty times less then the Moon does to us, according to Lanibergius his computation.

Now consider how little we can discern in that broader Object of sight, the Moon, when she is the night, notwithstanding we be placed in the dark, under the shadow of the Earth, whereby our sight is more passive and impreffible. How little then must the fiery eye of that Cyclops the Sun, which is all Flame and Light, discern in this letter Object the Earth, his vigour and motion being so vehemently strong and unyielding. What effect it will have upon him, we may in some fort judge by our selves: For though our Organ be but moved or agitated with the reflexion of his Rayes, we hardly see the Moon when she is above the Horizon by day: What impres then can our Earth, a less Object to him then the Moon is to us, make upon the Sun, whole Body is so furiously hot, that he is as boiling Fire, if a man may so speak, and the Spots about him are, as it were, the scum of this fuming Cauldrong.

Besides that our Atmosphere is so thick a covering over us at that distance, that there can be the appearance of nothing but a white mist enveloping all and shining like a bright cloud, in which the rays of the Sun will be fo lost, that they can never return any distinct repre
sentation of things unto him. Wherefore it is as evident to Reason that he cannot see us, as it is to Sense that we see him; and therefore he can be no Overseer nor Intermediary in our actions.

8. But perhaps you will reply That though the Sun cannot see the Earth, yet he may have a Sense and Perception in himself (for he is a fine
fine glittering thing, and some strange matter must be presumed of him) that may amount to a wonderful large sphere of Understanding, Foreknowledge and Power. But this is a mere fanciful surmise, and such as cannot be made good by any of our Faculties: Nay the quite contrary is demonstrable by such Principles as are already agreed upon. For there are no connate Ideas in the Matter, and therefore out of the collision and agitation of these Solar particles, we cannot rationally expect any other effect in the Sun, than such as we experiment in the percussion of our own eyes, out of which ordinarily follows the sense of a confused light or flame. If the Sun therefore has any sense of himself, it must be only the perception of a very vigorous Light or Fire, which being still one and the same representation, it is a question whether he has a sense of it or no, any more then we have of our bones, which we perceive not by reason of our accustomed and uninterrupted sense of them, as Mr Hobbs ingeniously conjectures in a like supposition.

But if you will say that there is a perception of the jogging or jostling, or of whatever touch or rubbing of one Solar particle against another, the body of the Sun being so exceeding liquid, and consequently the particles thereof never retreating, but playing and moving this way and that way, yet they hitting and friciting so fortuitously one against another, the perceptions that arise from hence must be so various and fortuitous, so quick and short, so inconsistent, fluctuating and unpermanent, that if any man were in such a condition as the Sun necessarily is, according to this Hypothesis, he would both be, and appear to all the world to be, stark mad; he would be so off and on, and so unsettled, and so, and think, and speak all things with such ungovernable ramblings and temerity.

In brief, that the Sun by this tumultuous agitation of his fiery Atoms should hit upon any rational contrivance or right Idea of any of these living Creatures we see here on Earth, is utterly as hard to conceive, as that the Terrestrial particles themselves should jumble together into such contrivances and forms, which is that which I have already sufficiently confuted.

9. And if the Sun could light on any such true frame or forme of any Animal, or the due rudiments or contrivance thereof, it is yet unconceivable how he should convey it into this Region of Generation here on Earth, partly by reason of the Earth's Distance and Invisibleness, and partly because the deepest Principle of all being but mere Motion, without any superior power to govern it, this Imagination of the Sun working on the Earth can be but a simple Rectilinear Imprint, which can never arise to such an inward solid organization of parts in living Creatures, nor hold together these Spectres or Apparitions in the Aire, in any more certain form then the smok of chimney or the flame of Tobacco.

10. Nor is that Instance of the power of the Mother's fancy on the Fetus in the womb, any more then a mere flourish; for the disparity is so great, that the Argument proves just nothing: For whereas the Mother has an Explicite Idea of the Fetus and every part thereof, the Sun and Stars have no distinct Idea at all of the parts of the Earth; nay
I dare say that what we have already intimated will amount to a Demonstration. That though they had Sense, yet they do not so much as know whether this Earth we live on be in rerum Naturä or no.

11. Again, the Mark that is impressed on the Factus, the Mother has a clear and vivid conception of; but the curious contrivance in the Idea of Animals, I have shewn how incompatible it is to the fortuitous jumbling of the fiery particles of either Sun or Stars.

12. Thirdly, the Impression on the Factus is very simple and slight, and seldom so curious as the ordinary impressions of Seals upon Wax, which are but the modifications of the surface thereof; but this supposed Impression of the Imagination of the Sun and Stars is more than a solid Statue, or the most curious Automaton that ever was invented by the wit of man; and therefore impossible to proceed from a mere Rectilinear impression upon the Aether down to the Earth from the Imagination of the Sun, no not if he were supposed to be actuated with an Intelligent Soul, if the Earth and all the space betwixt her and him were devoid thereof. Nor do I conceive, though it be an infinitely more flight business, that the direction of the Signature of the Factus upon such a part were to be performed by the Fancy of the Mother, notwithstanding the advantage of the organization of her body, were not both her self and the Factus animated Creatures.

13. Wherefore we have demonstrated beyond all Evasion, from the Phenomena of the Universe, That of necessity there must be such a thing in the world as Incorpooreal Substance; let inconsiderable Philosophaers hoot at it, and deride it as much as their Follies please.
THE

IMMORTALITY

OF

THE SOUL

The Second Book.

CHAP. I.

1. An addition of more Axiomes for the demonstrating that there is a Spirit or Immaterial Substance in Man. 2. The Truth of the first of these Axiomes confirmed from the testimony of Mr. Hobbs, as well as demonstrated in the Preface. 3. 4. That Demonstration further cleared and evinced by answering a certain Evasion. 5. The proof of the second Axiome. 6. The proof of the third. 7. The confirmation of the fourth from the testimony of Mr Hobbs, as also from Reason. 8. An explication and proof of the fifth. 9. A further Proof of the Truth thereof. 10. An Answer to an Evasion. 11. Another Evasion answered. 12. A further management of this first Answer thereto. 13. A second Answer. 14. A third Answer, wherein is mainly contained a confirmation of the first Answer to the second Evasion. 15. The plainness of the sixth Axiome. 16. The proof of the seventh.

Having cleared the way thus far as to prove That there is no Contradiction nor Inconsistency in the Notion of a Spirit, but that it may Exisit in Nature, nay that de facto there are Incorporeal Substances really Existent in the world; we shall now drive more home to our main design, and demonstrate That there is such an Immaterial Substance in Man, which, from the power it is conceived to have in actuating and guiding the Body, is usually called the Soule. This Truth we shall make good first in a more general way, but not a whit the lefle stringent, by evincing That such Faculties or Operations as we are conscious of in our selves, are utterly incompatible to Matter considered at large without any particular organization. And then afterwards we shall more punctually consider the Body of man, and every possible fitness in the structure thereof that is worth
worth taking notice of for the performance of these operations we ordi-
narily find in our selves. And that this may be done more plainly and con-
vincingly, we will here addre the number of our Axiomes these that
follow.

AXIOME XX.

Motion or Re-action of one part of the Matter against another, or at least a
due continuance thereof, is really one and the same with Sense and Per-
ception, if there be any Sense or Perception in Matter.

2. THIS Axiome, as it is plain enough of itself (supposing there
were nothing but Body in the world) so has it the suffrage of our
most confident and potent adversary Mr. Hobbs in his * Elements of
Philosophy. Whole judgment I make much of in such cases as these,
being persuaded as well out of Reason as Charity, that he seeing so little
into the nature of Spirits, that defect is compensated with an extraordi-

nary Quickfightedness in differencing of the best and most warrantable
ways of falsing all Phenomena from the ordinary allowed properties of
Matter. Wherefore I shall not hold it impertinent to bring in his Testi-
mony in things of this nature, my Demonstrations becoming thereby
more recommendable to men of his own Conclusions. But my design
being not a particular victory over such a sort of Men, but an absolute
establishing of the Truth, I shall lay down no Grounds that are merely
Argumenta ad hominem; but such as I am persuaded (upon this Hypo-
thesis, That there is nothing but Body in the world) are evident to any
one that can indifferently judge thereof. And the demonstration of this
present Axiome I have prefixed in my Preface, Sect. 5.

3. Against which I cannot imagine any possible Evasion, unless one
should conceit that a general agitation onely of the particles of the Matter
will suffice to excite them to thinking, and that they being thus excited,
can freely run out to other cogitations and Phantasmes then what ade-
quately arise from the impress of Motion.

But to this may briefly be answerd, First, That since from the Agi-
tation and Collision of these particles Sense must needs arise (for they
being near upon of the same magnitude, they will effectually act one
upon another) the Animadversion of these particles will be so taken up
and fixt upon their sensible perceptions, that though they otherwise had
a power of freely thinking, yet they would alwaies be necessarily detained
in these sensible Phantasmes.

And then, Secondly, All that is perceived, is perceived in common
by that which is capable of being the Percipient. But nothing that is not
really the same with corporeal motion, or an immediate and adequate
effect thereof, can be communicated to the common particles of this or
that Matter. Hence therefore it is plain that there is not any congeries of
Matter that does run into free cogitations, whether grosser Phantasmes or
second Notions, for the want of mutual communication of them in one
Particle to another, as I have more particularly demonstrated in its * due
place.

Thirdly

* Chap. 6.

Seet. 4, 5, 6.
Thirdly and lastly, It is sufficiently manifest from sense and experience that Matter is a principle purely passive, and no otherwise moved or modified then as some other thing moves and modifies it, but cannot move it self at all. Which is most demonstrable to them that contend for Sense and Perception in it. For if it had any such Perception, it would by virtue of its Self-motion withdraw it self from under the knocks of hammers or fury of the fire, or of its own accord approach to such things as are most agreeable to it and pleasing, and that without the help of Muscles, it being thus immediately endowed with a Self-moving Power. But the Matter being so stupid as to want this Power, how can it be thought a Subject wherein a Power and activity infinitely more divine should reside, that is, the free expatiating into Variety of thoughts, the exercise of Invention, Judgement and Memory, and that in such Objects as are supposed not to be the Impresses of the Motion of the particles one upon another?

Nor would I be thought cunning and fraudulent in naming such gross and maffy Matter as uses to be struck with Hammers or hewn with Axes, and to conclude from thence that no Matter at all, no not the most subtile, does move it self: For Self-motion is as competitive to a maffy piece of Matter as the most minute particle imaginable; for Force will be to Force as Magnitude to Magnitude, and therefore the most maffy pieces of Matter will move themselves the most strongly and most irresistible. From whence it appears that the minutest particle of any Maffy body separate from it has not one jot of advantage toward Self-motion thereby, but only becomes less irresistible in its Self-motion.

4. Nor can you help your self by recurring to the Figment of a Matter specifically distinct from what men ordinarily speak of, (which some adorn with the title of Divine, as if it were the very substance of the highest Godhead:) For we may easily undeceive our selves if we do but contemplate some considerable quantity of this Divine Matter, suppose a Globe of some few inches Diameter, and perfectly solid, that is, the parts thereof immediately united without pores or intervalls, and then consider how it cannot fail of being more hard then the Pig of Lead, or the Wedge of Gold, which I mention in my * Demonstration of this Axiome, and as Opake as any body whatsoever. For hence this Divine Matter will appear to our mind as incapable of spontaneous Motion and of free Cogitations and Perceptions unpimpressed from corporeal motion as the Pig of Lead and Wedge of Gold there mentioned; and that therefore this Figment is but a mere Mockery of words, and as ill put together in this sense, as a divine Pig of Lead or divine Wedge of Gold would be.

And what I have said of the whole Globe, there is the same reason of any particle of the same nature with it, which will be no more capable of free cogitation, then the particles of that Matter that makes up Gold or Lead. For if there be any perception, it must be by corporeal Re-action in both, if we impartially attend to the dictates of our own Faculties. And let them be as they will, communication of free Perceptions will not be found possible in either; the Divinest Matter imaginable having no other union then Juxta-position of parts, as our Adversaries themselves freely will acknowledge.

* See Book 4. chap. ii. sect. 8.

* See Preface sect. 5.
To which faithful prelages and rational conclusions of our own Mind you may finally add the suffrages of Nature in Experiments, which do clearly assure us that there is no such Divine Matter endued with free cogitation and free Agency intermingled or interpersed in the common Matter of the World, as I have plainly shown in my * Antidote. And therefore we will conclude that no Matter whatsoever has any perception in any other manner or according to any other laws then what Mr Hobbs has already defined, and my self in this twentieth Axiome have declared, if Matter have any perception at all.

**AXIOME XXI.**

*So far as this continued Re-action reaches, so far reaches Sense or Perception, and no farther.*

5. **This Axiome is to be understood as well of Duration of Time, as Extension of the Subject, viz. That Sense and Perception spread no further in Matter then Re-action does, nor remain any longer then this Re-action remains.** Which Truth is fully evident out of the foregoing Axiome.

**AXIOME XXII.**

*That diversity there is of Sense or Perception does necessarily arise from the diversity of the Magnitude, Figure, Position, Vigour and Direction of Motion in parts of the Matter.*

6. **The truth of this is also clear from the 20th Axiome. For Perception being really one and the same thing with Re-action of Matter, one part against another, and there being a diversity of Perception, it must imply also a diversity of modification of Re-action; and Re-action being nothing but Motion in Matter, it cannot be varied but by such variations as are compatible to Matter, viz. such as are Magnitude, Figure, Pofiture, Local Motion, wherein is contained any endeavour towards it, as also the Direction of that either full Motion or curb'd endeavour, and a Vigour thereof; which if you run to the lowest degrees, you will at last come to Rest, which therefore is some way referrible to that head, as to Magnitude you are to refer Littlenefs. These are the first conceivable in Matter, and therefore diversity of Perception must of necessity arise from these.**

**AXIOME XXIII.**

Matter in all the variety of those Perceptions it is sensible of, has none but such as are impressed by Corporeal Motions, that is to say, that are Perceptions of some Actions or modified Impressions of parts of Matter bearing one against another.

7. **To this Truth Mr Hobbs lets his seal with all willingness imaginable, or rather eagernefs; as also his Followers, they stoutly contending that we have not the perception of any thing but the Phantoms of**
of material Objects, and of sensible words or Marks, which we make to stand for such and such Objects. Which certainly would be most true if there were nothing but Matter in the world; so that they speak very consonantly to their own Principles: I say, this is not only true in that School, but also rational in itself, supposing nothing but Matter in the world, and that Perception and Reaction is really one. For that Reaction being in Brutes as well as in Men, there must not be any difference by a perception of quite another kind, but by an external way of communication of their perceptions. And therefore the distinction between Men and Beasts must consist only in this, that the one can agree in some common mark, whether Voices or Characters, or whatever else, to express their perceptions, but the other cannot; but the perceptions themselves must be of one kind in both, they neither of them perceiving any thing but corporeal impressions, such as they feel by the parts of the Matter bearing one against another.

AXIOME XXIV.

The distinct Impression of any considerable extent of variegated Matter cannot be received by a mere point of Matter.

8. BY a mere point of Matter I do not mean a mere Mathematical point, but a perfect Parvitude, or the least Reality of Matter, (concerning which I have spake already.) Which being the least quantity that describable Matter can consist of, no particle of Matter can touch it less than itself. This Parvitude therefore that is so little that it has properly no integral parts, really distinguishable, how can it possibly be a Subject distinctly receptive of the view, haply, of half an Horizon at once? Which sight is caused by real and distinct motion from real distinct parts of the Object that is seen. But this perfect Parvitude being the minutest quantity that Matter is divisible into, no more then one real line of motion can be directed upon it, the rest will goe beside. To which you may add, that if this so perfect Parvitude were distinctly perceivable of variegated Objects, it were a miracle if it could not perceive the particles of the Aire and of the Atmosphere, the Globuli of light, and subtilest contexture of the parts of Opake bodies.

9. Again, this Object we speak of may be so variegated, I mean with such colours, that it may imply a contradiction, that one and the same particle of Matter (as suppose some very small round one, that shall be the Cubic of the visual Pyramide or Cone), should receive them all at once; the opposite kinde of those colours being uncommunicable to this round particle otherwise then by contrariety of Motions, or by Rest and Motion, which are as contrary; as is manifest out of that excellent Theoreme concerning Colours in Des-Cartes his * Meteors, which if it were possible to be falfe, yet it is most certainly true; that seeing Motion is the cause of Sight, the contrariety of Objects for Colour must arise out of contrary modifications of Motion in this particle we speak of, that immediately communicates the Object to the Sentient: which contrariety of Motions at

* Cap. 8. Art. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.
at the same time and within the same surface of the adequate place of a Body is utterly incompatible thereto.

10. Nor is that Evagination any thing available, That there is not any contrariety of real Motion here, but that there is only endeavour to Motion: For it is plain that Endeavour is as real as Motion itself, and as contrary, because it does really affect the sight, and in a contrary manner. Besides, this Endeavour toward Motion is Motion itself, though of an exceeding small progress: But if it as little as it will, it is as great a contradiction, for example, that the Globe A should upon the same centre, and within the same superficies (which is its adequate place according to the meaning of that Motion in Aristotle's School) be turned never so little from C to B, and from B to C, at once, as to be turned quite about in that manner. To which you may add that some Colours imply the ones Motion, and the others Rest; but a Globe if it rest in any one part from turning, rests in all. From whence it will follow, That it is impossible to see Red and Black at once.

11. This Subterfuge therefore being thus clearly taken away, they substitute another, viz., That the distinct parts of the Object do not act upon this round particle, which is the Cuspe of the visual Pyramide, at once, but successively, and so swiftly, that the Object is represented at once; as when one swings about a fire-flick very fast, it seems one continued circle of fire. But we shall find this instance very little to the purpose, if we consider, that when one swings a fire-flick in a circle, it describes such a circle in the bottom of the Eye, not upon one point there, but in a considerable distance; and that the Optick Nerve, or the Spirits therein, are touched successively, but left free to a kind of Tremor or Vibration as it were, (so as it is in the playing of a Lute) till the motion has gone round, and then touches in the same place again, so quick, that it finds it still vigorously moved: But there being but one particle to touch upon here, some such like inconveniences will recurse as we noted in the former case.

12. For as I demonstrated before, that some Colours cannot be communicated at once to one and the same round particle of Matter, so from thence it will follow here, That, such Colours succeeding one another, the impressions of the one will take off immediately the impressions of the other; from whence we shall not be able to see such various Colours as are discernible in a very large Object at once. For unless the impression make some considerable stay upon that which receives it, there is no Sensation; insomuch that a man may wag his finger so fast that he can scarce see it: and if it do make a due stay, suppose a large Object checkered with the most opposite Colours, it were impossible that we should see that checker-work at once in so large a compass as we do; but we shall only see it by parts, the parts vanishing and coming again in a competent swiftness, but very discernible.

13. Again: If we could possibly imagine the vicissitudes of the impressions, from the distinct parts of the Basis of the visual Cone to the point of it, which we will suppose to be a very small globulus, such as Des-Cartes

M m 3
Des-Cartes his second Element consists of, it being thus successively thrust against, things must then be as I have represented them in the adjoining figure, where C A is the Object, G H the Sentient Matter, and I the Globulus, which will be born from E directly toward F, where there will be received such a colour in the least Reality of the Sentient Matter in F, but from A it will be born towards B, and with a very short rowling touch in another Reality, or it may be more distantly from F, and impres such a colour from A upon B, or thereabout, and so from C upon D: so that hereby also it is manifest that no one perfect Parvitude receives the whole Object C E A.

14. Lastly, this quick vicissitude of impulse or impression would contaminate all the Colours, and make the whole Object as it were of one confounded colour, as a man may easily perceive in a painted Wheel: For what is it but a quick coming on of one colour upon the same part of the Optick nerve upon which another was, immediately that makes the whole Wheel seem of one blended colour? But not to impose upon any one, this instance of the Wheel has a peculiar advantage above this present Supposition for making all seem one confounded colour, because the colours of the Wheel come not onely upon one and the same part of the Nerve, but in one and the same line from the Object, so that in this regard the instance is less accommodate. But it is shreadly probable, that fluid perceivable Matter will not fail to find the colours tintured from one another in some measure in the whole Object here also, especially if it be nigh and very small, by reason of the instability of that particle that is successively plaied upon from all parts thereof. But at least this instance of the Wheel is an unexceptionable confirmation of our first Demonstration of the weakness of the second Evasion, from the necessity of a considerable stay upon the perceivable Matter, and that Sensation cannot be but with some leisurely continuance of this or that Motion before it be wiped out. We might adde also that there ought to be a due permanency of the Object that presses against the Organ, though no new impression suddenly succeeded to wipe out the former, as one may experiment in swiftly swinging about a painted Bullet in a string, which will still more fully confirm what we aime at. But this is more then enough for the making good of this 34. Axiome; whose evidence is so clear of it self, that I believe there are very few but will be convinced of it at the first sight.
AXIOME XXV.

Whatever impression or parts of any impression are not received by this perfect Parvitude or Real point of Matter, are not at all perceived by it.

That which Motion there is in any part of Matter is necessarily there, and there continues till some other part of Matter change or diminish its Motion, is plain from the laws of Motion set down by Descartes in his *Principia Philosophia. And that there is the same Reason of Sense or Perception (supposing there is nothing but Matter in the world) is plain from Axiome 20, that makes Motion and Sense or Perception really the same.

CHA P. II.

1. That if Matter be capable of Sense, Inanimate things are so too: And of Mr Hobbs his wavering in that point. 2. An Enumeration of several Faculties in us that Matter is utterly uncapable of. 3. That Matter in no kind of Temperature is capable of Sense. 4. That no one point of Matter can be the Common Senforium. 5. Nor a multitude of such Points receiving singly the entire image of the Object. 6. Nor yet receiving part, and the whole the whole. 7. That Memory is incompatible to Matter. 8. That the Matter is uncapable of the notes of some circumstances of the Object which we remembred. 9. That Matter cannot be the Seat of second Notions. 10. Mr Hobbs his Evasion of the foregoing Demonstration clearly confuted. 11. That the Freedome of our Will evinces that there is a Substance in us distinct from Matter. 12. That Mr Hobbs therefore acknowledges all our actions necessary.

We have now made our addition of such Axiomes as are most useful for our present purpose. Let us therefore, according to the order we propounded, before we consider the fabric and organization of the Body, see if such Operations as we find in our selves be compatible to Matter looked upon in a more general manner. That Matter from its own nature is uncapable of Sense, plainly appears from Axiome 20, and 21. For Motion and Sense being really one and the same thing, it will necessarily follow, that wherever there is Motion, especially any
any considerable duration thereof, there must be Sense and Perception: Which is contrary to what we find in a Catochus, and experience daily in dead Cankies, both which, though there be Re-action, yet there is no Sense.

In brief, if any Matter have Sense, it will follow that upon Re-action all shall have the like, and that a Bell while it is ringing, and a Bow while it is bent, and every Jack-in-a-box that School-boys play with, while it is held in by the cover pressing against it, shall be living Animals, or Sensitive Creatures. A thing so foolish and frivolous, that the mere recital of the opinion may well be thought contumacy enough with the sober.

And indeed Mr. Hobbs himself, though he resolve Sense merely into Re-action of Matter, yet is ashamed of these odd confluences thereof, and is very loth to be reckoned in the company of those Philosophers, (though, as he fayes, learned men) who have maintained That all Bodies are endued with Sense, and yet he can hardly abstain from saying that they are; onely he is more shie of allowing them Memory, which yet they will have whether he will or no, if he give them Sense. As for Example, in the ringing of a Bell, from every froke there continues a tremor in the Bell, which decaying, must (according to his Philosophie) be Imagination, and referring to the froke past must be Memory; and if a froke overtake it within the compass of this Memory, what hinderers but Discrimination or Judgment may follow? But the Conclusion is consonant enough to this absurd Principle, That there is nothing but Matter in the Universe, and that it is capable of perception.

2. But we will not content our selves onely with the discovery of this one ugly inconvenience of this bold affirmation, but shall further endeavour to shew that the Hypothesis is false, and that Matter is utterly incapable of such operations as we find in our selves, and that therefore there is Something in us Immaterial or Incorporeal. For we find in our selves, that one and the same thing both hears, and sees, and talks, and, to be short, perceives all the variety of Objects that Nature manifests unto us. Wherefore Sense being nothing but the impress of corporeal motion from Objects without, that part of Matter which must be the common Senseriorum, must of necessity receive all that diversity of impulisions from Objects, it must likewise Imagine, Remember, Reason, and be the fountain of Spontaneous Motion, as also the Seat of what the Greeks call the 

3. For first, we cannot conceive of any Portion of Matter but it is either Hard or Soft. As for that which is Hard, all men leave it out as utterly unlike to be endued with such Cognitive faculties as we are conscious to our selves of. That which is Soft will prove either opaque, pellucid, or lucid. If opaque, it cannot see, the exterior supercicies being a bar to the inward part. If pellucid, as Air and Water, then indeed it will admit inwardly these Particles and that Motion which are the conveyours of the Sense, and distinction of Colours; and Sound also will penetrate. But this Matter being heterogeneall, that is to say, consisting of parts of a different nature and office, the Air, suppose, being proper for Sound, and those
those Round particles which Cartesius describes for Colour and Light; the perception of these Objects will be differently lodged: but there is some one thing in us that perceives both. Lastly, if lucid, there would be much—what the same inconvenience that there is in the opaque, for its own fieriness would fend off the gentle touch of external impresses; or if it be so mild and thin that it is in some measure diaphanous, the inconveniences will again recur that were found in the pellucid.

And in brief, any liquid Matter has such variety of particles in it, that if the Whole, as it must, (being the common Senforium) be affected with any impress from without, the parts thereof must be variously affected, so that no Object will seem homogeneall, as appears from Axiom 22. Which Truth I shall further illustrate by a homely, but very significant, representation. Suppose we should put Feathers, Bullets and Spur-rowels in a Box, where they shall lye intermixedly, but close, one with another: upon any jog this Box receives, supposing all the stuffage thereof has Sense, it is evident that the several things therein must be differently affected, and therefore if the common Senforium were such, there would seem no homogeneall Object in the world. Or at least these several particles shall be the several Receptives of the several motions of the same kind from without, as the Aire of Sounds, the Cartesian Globuli of Light and Colours. But what receives all these, and so can judge of them all, we are again at a loss for, as before: unless we imagine it some very fine and subtile Matter, so light and thin, that it feels not it self, but yielding and passive, that it easily feels the several assaults and impresses of other Bodies upon it, or in it, which yet would imply, that this Matter alone were Sensitive, and the others not; and so it would be granted, that not all Matter (no not so much as in Fluid Bodies) has Sense.

Such a tempered Matter as this is analogous to the Animal Spirits in Man, which, if Matter could be the Soul, were the very Soul of the Body, and Common perceptor of all Motions from within or without, by reason of the tenuity, passivity and near homogeneity, and (it may be) imperceptibility of any change or alteration from the playing together of its own tenuous and light particles, and therefore very fit to receive all manner of impresses from others. Whence we may rationally conclude, that some such subtile Matter as this is either the Soul, or her immediate Instrument for all manner of perceptions. The latter whereof I shall prove to be true in its due place. That the former part is false I shall now demonstrate, by proving more stringently, that no Matter whatsoever is capable of such Sense and Perception as we are conscious to our selves of.

4. For concerning that part of Matter which is the Common Senforium, I demand whether some one point of it receive the whole image of the Object, or whether it is wholly received into every point of it, or finally whether the whole Senforium receive the whole image by expanded parts, this part of the Senforium this part of the image, and that part that. If the first, seeing that in us which perceives the external Object moves also the Body, it will follow, That one little point of Matter will give local motion to what is innumerable millions of times bigger
bigger than it self, of which there cannot be found nor imagined any example in Nature.

5. If the second, this difficulty presents it self, which also reflects upon the former Position, How so small a point as we speak of should receive the images of so vast, or so various Objects at once, without Obliteration or Confusion, a thing impossible, as is manifest from Axiome 24. And therefore not receiving them, cannot perceive them, by Axiome 25. But if every point or particle of this Matter could receive the whole image, which of these innumerable particles, that receive the Image entirely, may be deemed I myself that perceive this Image? But if I be all those Points, it will come to pass, especially in a small Object, and very near at hand, that the line of impulse coming to divers and distant Points, will seem to come as from several places, and so one Object will necessarily seem a Clutter of Objects. And if I be but one of these Points, what becomes of the rest or who are they?

6. There remains therefore only the third way, which is that the parts of the image of the Object be received by the parts of this portion of Matter which is supposed the common Sensorium. But this does perfectly contradict experience; for we finde our selves to perceive the whole Object, when in this case nothing could perceive the whole, every part onely perceiving its part; and therefore there would be nothing that can judge of the whole. No more then three men, if they were imagined to fing a song of three parts, and none of them should hear any part but his own, could judge of the Harmony of the whole.

7. As concerning the Seat of Imagination and Memory, especially Memory, what kinde of Matter can be found fit for this function? If it be Fluid, the images of Objects will be prone to vanish suddenly, as also to be perverted or turned contrary ways. For example, C, a particle of this fluid Matter, receiving an impres from B, must feel it as coming from B; but in toying and tumbling up and down, as the particles of fluid Matter doe, turns the side E F which received that impres from B towards L, whence it will feel as if the impres had been from L, for it must feel it as from the place directly opposite to it self, (if it can after the removal of the present Object, against which the Reaction is, feel it at all;) and the same reason will be in other particles of this fluid Matter, which must needs force a great deal of preposterous confusion both upon the Fancy and Memory. If it be Hard, it will soon be compos'd to Refl, as in a Bell whose tremor is gone in a little time; but we remember things some years together, though we never think of them till the end of that term. If Vifcid, there is the like inconvenience, nay it is the unfitness of all for either receiving of Motion or continuing it, and therefore unlikely to be the Seat of either Fancy or Memory. For if Motion or Reaction and Sense, whether internal or external, be all one, Motion ceasing, Memory must needs cease, by Axiome 21. Nor can it any more remember when it is again moved in the same manner, then a Stone or a piece of Lead that was flung up into the Aire, can become more light or more prone to fly upwards when they have once ceas'd from Motion;
Motion; for they are both exquisitely as if they had never been moved.

8. Lastly, we remember some things of which there can be no signatures in Matter to represent them, as for example, Wideness and Distance. For as for both of them, there is no note can be made in the Matter E, by lines from the two Objects A B and C D, whereby the difference of remoteness of A E above C E, or of the wideness of A B above C D, can be discerned; for both the Objects make one and the same signature in the matter E.

9. Those that are commonly called by the name of Secunda Notiones, and are not any sensible Objects themselves, nor the Phantasmes of any sensible Objects, but only our manner of conceiving them, or reasoning about them, in which number are comprehended all Logical and Mathematical terms; there, I say, never came in at the Senfes, they being no impressions of corporeal motion, which excite in us, as in Dogs and other Brutes, the sense only of Sounds, of Colours, of Hot, of Cold, and the like. Now Matter being affected by no perception but of corporeal impression, by the bearing of one Body against another; it is plain from Axiome 23, that thefe Second Notions, or Mathematical and Logical conceptions, cannot be seated in Matter, and therefore must be in some other Substance distinct from it, by Axiome 10.

10. Here Mr. Hobbs, to avoid the force of this Demonstration, has found out a marvellous witty invention to baffle his followers with all, making them believe that there is no such thing as these Secunda Notiones, distinct from the Names or Words whereby they are said to be signified; and that there is no perception in us, but of such Phantasmes as are impressed from external Objects, such as are common to Us and Beasts: and as for the Names which we give to thefe, or the Phantasmes of them, that there is the fame reason of them as of other Marks, Letters, or Characters; all which coming in at the Senfes, he would have them in hand that it is a plain case, that we have the perception of nothing but what is impressed from corporeal Objects. But how ridiculous an Evasion this is, may be easily discovered, if we consider, that if these Mathematical and Logical Notions we speak of be nothing but Names, Logical and Mathematical Truths will not be the same in all Nations, because they have not the same names. For Example, Similitudo and ὀμοιότης, ἀνάλογια and Proportio, λόγος and Ratio, these names are utterly different, the Greek from the Latine; yet the Greeks, Latines, nor any Nationelle, do vary in their conceptions couched under these different names: Wherefore it is plain, that there is a sealed Notion distinct from thefe Words and Names, as well as from those corporeal Phantasmes impressed from the Object, which was the thing to be demonstrated.

11. Lastly, we are conscious to our selves of that Faculty which the Greeks call ἔργον ἐν ὑμῖν, or a Power in our selves, notwithstanding any outward assaults or importunate temptations, to cleave to that which is vertuous and honest, or to yield to pleasures or other vile advantages. That we have this Liberty and freedome in our selves, and that we refuse the good,
good, and chuse the evil, when we might have done otherwise; that natural Sense of Remorse of Conscience is an evident and undeniable witnes of. For when a man has done amiss, the pain, grief, or indignation that he raises in himself, or at least feels raised in him, is of another kind from what we find from misfortunes or affronts we could not avoid. And that which pinches us and vexes us so severely, is the sense that we have brought such an evil upon our selves, when it was in our power to have avoided it. Now if there be no Sense nor Perception in us but what arises from the Reaction of Matter one part against another; whatever Representation of things, whatever Deliberation or Determination we fall upon, it will by Axiome 26. be purely necessary, there being upon this Hypothesis no more Freedom while we deliberate or conclude, then there is in a pair of scales, which rests as necessarily at last as it moved before. Wherefore it is manifest that this Faculty we call Free-will is not found in Matter, but in some other Substance, by Axiome 10.

12. Mr Hobbs therefore, to give him his due, conphonantly enough to his own principles, does very peremptorily affirm That all our actions are necessary. But I having proved the contrary by that Faculty which we may call Internal Sense or Common Notion, found in all men that have not done violence to their own Nature; unless by some other approved Faculty he can discover the contrary, my Conclusion must stand for an undoubted Truth, by Axiome 5. He pretends therefore some Demonstration of Reason, which he would oppose against the dictate of this Inward Sense; which it will not be amiss to examine, that we may discover his Sophistry.

CHAP. III.

1. Mr Hobbs his Arguments whereby he would prove all our actions necessitated. His first Argument. 2. His second Argument. 3. His third Argument. 4. His fourth Argument. 5. What must be the meaning of these words, Nothing taketh beginning from itself, in the first Argument of Mr Hobbs. 6. A fuller and more determinate explication of the foregoing words, whose sense is evidently convinced to be, That no Essence of it self can vary its modification. 7. That this is only said by Mr Hobbs, not proved, and a full confutation of his Assertion. 8. Mr Hobbs imposed upon by his own Sophistry. 9. That one part of this first Argument of his is groundless, the other sophistical. 10. The plain proposal of his Argument, whence appears more fully the weakness and sophistry thereof. 11. An Answer to his second Argument. 12. An Answer to the third. 13. An Answer to a difficulty concerning the Truth and Falsity of future Proposicions. 14. An Answer to Mr Hobbs his fourth Argument, which, though sighted by himself, is the strongest of them all. 15. The difficulty of reconciling Free-will with Divine Presence and Prophecies. 16. That the Faculty of Free-will is seldom put in use. 17. That the use of it is properly in Moral conflict. 18. That the
The Soul is not invincible there neither. 19. That Divine decrees either
finds fit Instruments or make them. 20. That the more exact we make
Divine Presence, even to the comprehension of any thing that implies
no contradiction in it self to be comprehended, the more clear it is that
mans Will may be sometimes free. 21. Which is sufficient to make
good my last Argument against Mr Hobbs.

I. His first Argument runs thus (I will repeat it in his own words,
as also the rest of them as they are to be found in his Treatise
of Liberty and Neccessity; I conceive, (faith he) that nothing
taketh beginning from it self, but from the action of some other immediate
agent without it self; and that therefore, when first a man hath an appetite
or Will to something to which immediately before he had no appetite nor
Will, the cause of his Will is not the Will it self, but something else not in his
own disposing: So that whereas it is out of controversy, that of voluntary
actions the Will is the necessary cause, and by this which is said the Will is
also caused by other things, whereas it disposeth not, it follows, that voluntary
actions have all of them necessary causes, and therefore are necessitated.

2. His second thus; I hold (faith he) that to be a sufficient cause, to
which nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of the effect: The
same also is a necessary cause. For if it be possible that a sufficient cause
shall not bring forth the effect, then there wanteth something which was need-
ful for the producing of it, and so the cause was not sufficient; but if it be
impossible that a sufficient cause should not produce the effect, then is a suf-
cient cause a necessary cause, for that is said to produce an effect necessarily
that cannot but produce it. Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is pro-
duced, is produced necessarily. For whatsoever is produced, hath a suf-
cient cause to produce it, or else it had not been. What follows is either the
same, or so closely depending on this, that I need not add it.

3. His third Argument therefore shall be that which he urges from
Future disjunctions. For example, let the case be put of the Weather,
’Tis necessary that to morrow it shall rain, or not rain; If therefore, faith
he, it be not necessary it shall rain, it is necessary it shall not rain, otherwise
there is no necessity that the Proposition, It shall rain or not rain, should
be true.

4. His fourth is this, That the denying of necessity destroyeth both the
Decrees and the Preffcie of God Almighty. For whatsoever God hath
purposed to bring to pass by man, as an Instrument, or foreseeth shall come to
pass; a man, if he have liberty from necessitation, might frustrate, and
make not to come to pass; and God should either not foreknow it, and not
decree it, or he should foreknow such things shall be as shall never be, and
decree that which shall never come to pass.

5. The Entrance into his first Argument is something obscure and
ambiguous, Nothing taketh beginning from it self: But I shall be as candid and faithfull an Interpreter as I may. If he mean by beginning,
beginning of Existence, it is undoubtedly true, That no Substance, nor
Modification of Substance, taketh beginning from it self; but this will
not infer the Conclusion he drives at. But if he mean, that Nothing
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at taketh
The Immortality of the Soul.  

Book II.

1. taketh beginning from itself, of being otherwise affect'd or modified than before; he must either understand by nothing, no Essence, neither Spirit nor Body, or no Modification of Essence. He cannot mean Spirit, as admitting no such thing in the whole comprehension of Nature. If Body, it will not infer what he aims at, unless there be nothing but Body in the Universe, which is a mere precarious Principle of his, which he besieges his credulous followers to admit, but he proves it no where, as I have already noted. If by Modification he mean the Modification of Matter or Body, that runs still upon the former Principle, That there is nothing but Body in the world, and therefore he proves nothing but upon a begg'd Hypothesis, and that a false one, as I have elsewhere demonstrated. Wherefore the most favourable Interpretation I can make is, That he means by nothing, no Essence, nor Modification of Essence, being willing to hide that dearly-hug'd Hypothesis of his (That there is nothing but Body in the World) under so general and uncertain terms.

2. The words therefore in the other sentences having no pretence to conclude any thing, let us see how far they will prevail in this, taking nothing, for no Essence, or no Modification of Essence, or what will come nearer to the matter in hand, no Faculty of an Essence. And from this two-fold meaning, let us examine two Propositions that will result from thence, viz. That no Faculty of any Essence can vary its Operation from what it is, but from the action of some other immediate Agent without itself; or, That no Essence can vary its Modification or Operation by itself, but by the action of some other immediate Agent without it. Of which two Propositions the latter seems the better senfe by far, and most natural. For it is very harsh, and, if truly looked into, as false, to say, That the Mode or Faculty of any Essence changes itself; for it is the Essence it self that exerts it self, into these variations of Modes, if no external Agent is the cause of these changes. And Mr. Hobbs opposing an External Agent to his Thing that he saies does not change it self, does naturally imply, That they are both not Faculties but Substances he speaks of.

3. Wherefore there remains only the latter Proposition to be examined, That no Essence of it self can vary its Modification. That some Essence must have had a power of moving itself in plain, in that there is Motion in the world, which must be the Effect of some Substance or other. But that Motion in a large senfe, taking it for mutation or change, may proceed from that very Essence in which it is found, seems to me plain by Experience: For there is an Essence in us, whatever we will call it, which we find enuend with this property; as appears from hence, that it has variety of perceptions, Mathematical, Logical, and I may add also Moral, that are not any impresses nor footsteps of Corporeal Motion, as I have already demonstrated: and any man may observe in himself, and discover in the writings of others, how the Mind has passed from one of these perceptions to another, in very long deductions of Demonstration, as also what illnes from bodily Motion is required in the excogitation of such series of Reasons, where the Spirits are to run into no other posture nor motion then what they are guided into by the Mind itself, where these immaterial and intellectual Notions have the leading and rule.
CHAP. III. The Immortality of the Soul.

rule. Besides in greater Phantasmes, which are supposed to be somewhere impressed in the Brain, the composition of them, and disclusion and various dishopofal of them, is plainly an arbitrarious act, and implies an Essence that can, as it were, excite in itself the variety of such Phantasmes as have been first exhibited to her from External Objects, and change them and transform them at her own will. But what need I reason against this ground of Mr. Hobbs so follicitously? it being sufficient to discover, that he only saies, that No Essence can change the Modifications of itself, but does not prove it, and therefore whatever he would infer hereupon is merely upon a begg'd Principle.

8. But however, from this precarious ground he will infer, that whenever we have a Will to a thing, the cause of this Will is not the Will itself, but something else not in our own disposing, the meaning whereof must be, That whenever we Will, some corporeal impress, which we cannot avoid, forces us thereto. But the Illation is as weak as bold; it being built upon no foundation, as I have already shown. I shall only take notice how Mr. Hobbs, though he has rescued himself from the authority of the Schools, and would fain set up for himself, yet he has not freed himself from their folleries in talking of Faculties and Operations (and the absurdity is alike in both) as separate and distinct from the Essence they belong to, which causes a great deal of distraction and obscurity in the speculation of things. I speak this in reference to those expressions of his, of the Will being the cause of willing, and of its being the necessary cause of voluntary actions, and of things not being in its disposing. Whence, if a man would speak properly, and defined to be understood, he would say, That the Subject in which is this power or act of willing, (call it Man or the Soul of Man) is the cause of this or that voluntary action. But this would discover his Sophistry, wherewith haply he has entrapped himself, which is this, Something out of the power of the Will necessarily causes the Will; the Will once caused is the necessary cause of voluntary actions; and therefore all voluntary actions are necessitated.

9. Besides that the first part of this Argumentation is groundless (as I have already intimated) the second is Sophistical, that saies That the Will is the necessary cause of voluntary actions: For by necessary may be understood either necessitated, forced and made to act, whether it will or no, or else it may signify that the Will is a requisite cause of voluntary actions, so that there can be no voluntary actions without it. The latter whereof may be in some sense true, but the former is utterly false. So the Conclusion being inferred from assertions whereof the one is groundless, the other Sophistical, the Illation cannot but be ridiculously weak and despicable. But if he had spoke in the Concrete in stead of the Abstract, the Sophistry had been more grossly discoverable, or rather the train of his reasoning languard and contemptible. Omitting therefore to speak of the Will separately, which of it self is but a blind Power or Operation, let us speak of that Essence which is endued with Will, Sense, Reason, and other Faculties; and see what face this Argumentation of his will bear, which will then run thus;

10. Some external, irresistible Agent does ever necessarily cause that

\[ N_n^2 \]

\[ \text{Essence} \]
Essence (call it Soul or what you please) which is endued with the Faculties of Will and Understanding, to Will: This Essence, endued with the power of exerting it self into the act of Willing, is the necessary cause of Voluntary actions: Therefore all voluntary actions are necessitated. The first Assertion now at first sight appears a gross fallhood, the soul being endued with Understanding as well as Will, and therefore she is not necessarily determined to will by external impressions, but by the displaying of certain notions and perceptions she raises in her self, that be purely intellectual. And the second seems a very slim and lank piece of Sophistry. Both which my reasons already alleged do so easily and so plainly reach, that I need adde nothing more, but pass to his second Argument, the form whereof in brief is this;

11. Every Cause is a sufficient cause, otherwise it could not produce its Effect: Every sufficient cause is a necessary cause, that is to say, will be sure to produce the effect, otherwise something was wanting thereunto, and it was no sufficient cause: And therefore every cause is a necessary cause, and consequently every Effect or Action, even those that are termed Voluntary, are necessitated. This reasoning looks smartly at first view; but if we come closer to it, we shall find it a pitiful piece of Sophistry, which is easily detected by observing the ambiguity of that Proposition, Every sufficient cause is a necessary cause: For the force lyeth not so much in that it is said to be sufficient, as in that it is said to be a Cause; which if it be, it must of necessity have an Effect, whether it be sufficient or insufficient, which discovers the Sophisme. For these relative terms of Cause and Effect necessarily imply one another. But every Being that is sufficient to act this or that if it will, and so to become the Cause thereof, doth neither act, nor abtain from acting necessarily. And therefore if it do act, it addes Will to the Sufficiency of its power; and if it did not act, it is not because it had not sufficient power, but because it would not make use of it. So that we see that every sufficient Cause rightly understood without captiviitie is not a necessary cause, nor will be sure to produce the Effect; and that though there be a sufficiency of power, yet there may be something wanting, to wit, the exertion of the Will; whereby it may come to pass, that what might have acted if it would, did not: but if it did, Will being added to sufficient Power, that it cannot be said to be necessary in any other sense, then of that Axiome in Metaphysics, Quicquid est, quamdiu est, necessis est esse: The reason whereof is, because it is impossible that a thing should be and not be at once. But before it acted, it might have chosen whether it would have acted or no; but it did determine it self. And in this sense is it to be said to be a free Agent, and not a necessary one. So that it is manifest, that though there be some prettie peverinenes of wit in the contriving of this Argument, yet there is no solidity at all at the bottome.

12. And as little is there in his third. But in this, I must confess, I cannot so much accuse him of Art and Sophistry, as of ignorance of the rules of Logick; for he does plainly affert That the necessity of the truth of that Proposition there named depends on the necessity of the truth of the parts thereof; then which no groffer error can be committed in the Art
Art of reasoning. For he might as well say that the necessity of the truth of a Connex Axiome depends on the necessity of the truth of the parts, as of a Disjunct. But in a Connex, when both the parts are not onely false, but impossible, yet the Axiome is necessarily true. As for example, If Bucephalus be a man, he is endued with humane reason; this Axiome is necessarily true, and yet the parts are impossible. For Alexander's horse can neither be a man, nor have the reason of a man, either radically or actually. The necessity therefore is only laid upon the connexion of the parts, not upon the parts themselves. So when I say, To morrow it will rain, or it will not rain, this Disjunct Proposition also is necessary, but the necessity lies upon the Disjunction of the parts, not upon the parts themselves: For they being immediately disjoyned, there is a necessity that one of them must be, though there be no necessity that this must be determined rather then that. As when a man is kept under custody where he has the use of two rooms only, though there be a necessity that he be found in one of the two, yet he is not confined to either one of them. And to be brief, and prevent those frivolous both answers and replies that follow in the pursuit of this Argument in Mr. Hobbs. As the necessity of this Disjunct Axiome lies upon the Disjunction it self, so the truth, of which this necessity is a mode, must lye there too; for it is the Disjunction of the parts that is affirmed, and not the parts themselves, as any one that is but moderately in his wits must needs acknowledge.

13. There is a more dangerous way that Mr. Hobbs might have made use of, and with more credit, but yet scarce with better success, which is the consideration of a simple Axiome that pronounces of a future Contingent, such as this, Cras Socrates disputabit. For every Axiome pronouncing either true or false, as all do agree upon; if this Axiome be now true, it is impossible but Socrates should dispute to morrow; or if it be now false, it is impossible he should: and so his Action of disputing or the omission thereof will be necessary, for the Proposition cannot be both true and false at once. Some are much troubled to extricate themselves out of this Nooze; but if we more precisely enquire into the sense of the Proposition, the difficulty will vanish. He therefore that affirms that Socrates will dispute to morrow, affirms it (to use the distinction of Futures that Aristotle somewhere suggests) either as a ρεϊκον, or ανοικον, that is, either as a thing that is likely to be, but has a possibility of being otherwise, or else as a thing certainly to come to pass. If this latter, the Axiome is falfe; if the former, it is true: and so the liberty of Socrates his action, as also of all like Contingent effects, are thus easily refused from this sophistical entanglement. For every Future Axiome is as incapable of our judgment, unless we determine the sense of it by one of the forenamed modes, as an Indefinite Axiome is, before we in our minds add the notes of Universality or Particularity: Neither can we say of either of them, that they are true or falfe, till we have compleated and determined their sense.

14. His fourth Argument he proposes with some diffidence and dislike, as if he thought it not good Logick (they are his own words) to make
use of it, and adde it to the rest. And for my own part, I cannot but approve of the consistency of his judgment, and coherency with other parts of his Philosophie: For if there be nothing but Body or Matter in the whole comprehension of things, it will be very hard to find out any such Deity as has the knowledge or fore-knowledge of anything: And therefore I suspect this last is only cast in as Argumentum ad hominem, to puzzle such as have not divined so profound a depth of natural knowledge, as to fancy they have discovered there is no God in the world.

15. But let him vilifie it as he will, it is the only Argument he has brought that has any tolerable sense or solidity in it; and it is a Subject that has exercised the wits of all Ages, to reconcile the Liberty of mans Will with the Decrees and Præscience of God. But my Freedom, I hope, and Moderation shall make this matter more easy to me, then it ordinarily proves to them that venture upon it. My Answer therefore in brief shall be this;

16. First, That though there be such a Faculty in the Soul of man as Liberty of Will, yet the is not alwaies in a state of acting according to it. For she may either degenerate so far, that it may be as certainly known what the will doe upon this or that occasion, as what an hungry Dog will doe when a crust is offered him; which is the general condition of almost all men in most occurrences of their lives: or else she may be fo Heroically good, though that happen in very few, that it may be as certainly known as before what the will doe or suffer upon such or such emergencies: and in these cases the use of Liberty of Will ceases.

17. Secondly, That the use of the Faculty of Free-will is properly there, where we finde our selves so near to an Equiponderancy, being touch'd with the sense of Virtue on the one side, and the ease or Pleasure of some Vicious action on the other, that we are conscious to our selves that we ought, and that we may, if we will, abandon the one and cleave to the other.

18. Thirdly, That in this Conflict the Soul has no such absolute power to determine her self to the one or the other action, but Temptation or Supernatural assistance may certainly carry her this way or that way; so that she may not be able to use that liberty of going indifferently either way.

19. Fourthly, That Divine Decrees either find men fit, or make them fit, for the executing of whatever is absolutely purposed or prophesied concerning them.

20. Fifthly, That the Præscience of God is so vast and exceeding the comprehension of our thoughts, that all that can be safely said of it is this, That this knowledge is most perfect and exquisite, accurately representing the Natures, Powers and Properties of the thing it does foreknow. Whence it must follow, that if there be any Creature free and undetermined, and that in such circumstances and at such a time he may either act thus or not act thus, this perfect Fore-knowledge must discern from all eternity, that the said Creature in such circumstances may either act thus, or fo, or not. And further to declare the perfection of this Fore-knowledge.
knowledge and Omniscience of God; as His Omnipotence ought to extend so far, as to be able to do whatsoever implies no contradiction to be done; so his Praefcience and Omniscience ought to extend so far, as to know precisely and fully whatever implies no contradiction to be known.

To conclude therefore briefly, Free or Contingent Effects do either imply a contradiction to be foreknown, or they do not imply it. If they imply a contradiction to be foreknown, they are no object of the Omniscience of God; and therefore there can be no pretence that his Foreknowledge does determinate them, nor can they be argued to be determined thereby. If they imply no contradiction to be foreknown, that is to acknowledge that Divine Praefcience and they may very well consist together. And so either way, notwithstanding the Divine Omniscience, the Actions of men may be free.

21. The sum therefore of all is this, That mens actions are sometimes free and sometimes not free; but in that they are at any time free, is a Demonstration that there is a Faculty in us that is incompatible to mere Matter: which is sufficient for my purpose.

CHAP. IV.

1. An Enumeration of sundry Opinions concerning the Seat of Common Sense. 2. Upon supposition that we are nothing but mere Matter, That the whole Body cannot be the Common Senforium; 3. Nor the Orifice of the Stomack; 4. Nor the Heart; 5. Nor the Brain; 6. Nor the Membranes; 7. Nor the Septum lucidum; 8. Nor Regius his small and perfectly-solid Particle. 9. The probability of the Coranion being the common Seat of Sense.

I have plainly proved, that neither those more Pure and Intellectual faculties of Will and Reason, nor yet those less pure of Memory and Imagination, are compatible to mere Bodies. Of which we may be the more secure, I having so convincingly demonstrated, That not so much as that which we call * External Sense is compatible to the same: all which Truths I have concluded concerning Matter generally considered.

But because there may be a surmise in some, which are over-credulous concerning the powers of Body, that Organization may doe strange feats (which Surmise notwithstanding is as fond as if they should imagine, that though neither Silver, nor Steel, nor Iron, nor Lute-strings, have any Sense apart, yet being put together in such a manner and formed as will (suppose) make a compleat Watch, they may have Sense; that is to say, that a Watch may be a living creature, though the several parts have neither Life nor Sense;) I shall for their sakes goe more particularly to work, and recite every Opinion that I could ever meet with by converse with either men or books concerning the Seat of the Common Sense, and after trie whether any of these Hypothefes can possibly be admitted for Truth,
Truth, upon supposition that we consist of nothing but mere modified and organized Matter.

I shall first recite the Opinions, and then examine the possibility of each in particular, which in brief are these. 1. That the whole Body is the Seat of Common Sense, 2. That the Orifice of the Stomack, 3. The Heart, 4. The Brain, 5. The Membranes, 6. The Septum lucidum, 7. Some very small and perfectly-solid particle in the Body, 8. The Con- nexion, 9. The concourse of the Nerves about the fourth ventricule of the Brain, 10. The Spirits in that fourth ventricule.

2. That the first Opinion is false is manifest from hence, That, upon supposition we are nothing but mere Matter, if we grant the whole Body to be one common Sensorum, perceptive of all Objects, Motion which is impressed upon the Eye or Ear, must be transmitted into all the parts of the Body. For Sense is really the same with communication of Motion, by Axiome 20. And the variety of Sense arising from the modification of Motion, which must needs be variously modified by the different temper of the parts of the Body, by Axiome 22, it plainly follows that the Eye must be otherwise affected by the motion of Light, then the other parts to which this motion is transmitted. Wherefore if it be the whole Body that perceives, it will perceive the Object in every part there-of several ways modified at once; which is against all Experience. It will also appear in all likelihood in several places at once, by reaso'n of the many windings and turnings that must happen to the transmission of this Motion, which are likely to be as many Refractions or Reflexions.

3. That the Orifice of the Stomack cannot be the seat of Common Sense, is apparent from hence, That that which is the common Sensient does not only perceive all Objects, but has the power of moving the Body. Now besides that there is no organization in the mouth of the Stomack that can elude the strength of our Arguments laid down in the foregoing Chapters, which took away all capacity from Matter of having any perception at all in it, there is no Mechanical reason imaginable to be found in the Body, whereby it will appear possible, that supposing the mouth of the Stomack were the common Percipient of all Objects, it could be able to move the reft of the members of the Body, as we finde something in us does. This is so palpably plain, that it is needless to spend any more words upon it.

4. The same may be laid concerning the Heart. For who can imagine that, if the Heart were that common Percipient, there is any such Mechanical connexion betwixt it and all the parts of the Body, that it may, by such or such a perception, command the motion of the Foot or little Finger? Besides that it seems wholly employed in the performance of its Syphole and Diaphole, which causes such a great difference of the situation of the Heart by turns, that if it were that Seat in which the Sense of all Objects centre, we should not be able to see things steadily or fix our sight in the same place.

5. How uncapable the Brain is of being so active a Principle of Motion as we find in our selves, the vicissitude thereof does plainly indicate. Besides that Physicians have discovered by experience, that the Brain is so far
far from being the common Seat of all senses, that it has in it none at all. And the Arabsians, that say it has, have distinguished it into such several offices of Imagination, Memory, Common Sense, &c. that we are still at a loss for some one part of Matter that is to be the Common Percipient of all these. But I have so clearly demonstrated the impossibility of the Brain's being able to perform those functions that appertain truly to what ordinarily men call the Soul, in my *Antidote against Atheism*, that it is enough to refer the Reader thither.

6. As for the Membranes, whether we would fancy them all the Seat of Common Sense, or some one Membrane, or part thereof, the like difficulties will occur as have been mentioned already. For if all the Membranes, the difference and situation of them will vary the aspect and light of the Object, so that the same things will appear to us in several hues and several places at once, as is easily demonstrated from Axiome 22. If some one Membrane, or part thereof, it will be impossible to excogitate any Mechanical reason, how this one particular Membrane, or any part thereof, can be able so strongly and determinately to move upon occasion every part of the Body.

7. And therefore for this very cause cannot the Septum lucidum be the Common Percipient in us, because it is utterly unimaginable how it should have the power of so stoutly and distinctly moving our exterior parts and limbs.

8. As for that new and marvelous Invention of Henricus Regius, That it may be a certain perfectly-solid, but very small, particle of Matter in the Body, that is the seat of common perception; besides that it is as boldly asserted, that such an hard particle should have Sense in it, as that the filings of Iron and Steel should; it cannot be the spring of Motion: For how should so small an Atome move the whole Body, but by moving it self? But it being more subtle then the point of any needle, when it puts it self upon motion, especially such strong thrustings as we sometimes use, it must needs passe through the Body and leave it.

9. The most pure Mechanical Invention is that of the use of the Cona- rion, proposed by *Des-Cartes*; which, considered with some other organizations of the Body, bids the fairest of any thing I have met withall, or ever hope to meet withall, for the resolution of the Passions and Properties of living Creatures into mere Corporeal motion. And therefore it is requisite to in sight a little upon the explication thereof, that we may the more punctually confute them that would abuse his Mechanical contrivances to the exclusion of all Principles but Corporeal, in either Man or Beast.
CHAP. V.

1. How Perception of external Objects, Spontaneous Motion, Memory and Imagination, are pretended to be performed by the Conarion, Spirits and Muscles, without a Soul. 2. That the Conarion, devoid of a Soul, cannot be the Common Percipient, demonstrated out of Des-Cartes himself. 3. That the Conarion, with the Spirits and Organization of the Parts of the Body, is not a sufficient Principle of Spontaneous motion, without a Soul. 4. A description of the use of the Valvulae in the Nerves of the Muscles for Spontaneous motion. 5. The insufficiency of this contrivance for that purpose. 6. A further demonstration of the insufficiency thereof, from whence is clearly evinced that Brutes have Souls. 7. That Memory cannot be salved the way above described; 8. Nor Imagination. 9. A Distribution out of Des-Cartes of the Functions in us, some appertaining to the Body, and others to the Soul. 10. The Author's Observations thereupon.

1. The sum of this Abuse must in brief be this, That the Glandula Pinea is the common Sentient or Percipient of all Objects, and without a Soul, by virtue of the Spirits and Organization of the Body, may do all those feats that we ordinarily conceive to be performed by Soul and Body joyned together. For it being one, whenas the rest of the Organs of Sense are double, and so handsomely seated as to communicate with the Spirits as well of the posterior as anterior Cavities of the Brain, by their help all the motions of the Nerves (as well of those that transmit the sense of outward Objects, as of them that serve for the inward affections of the Body, such as Hunger, Thirst and the like) are easily conveyed unto it: and so being variously moved, it does variously determine the course of the Spirits into such and such Muscles, whereby it moves the Body.

Moreover that the transmission of Motion from the Object, through the Nerves, into the inward concavities of the Brain, and so to the Conarion, opens such and such Pores of the Brain, in such and such order or manner, which remain as tracts or footsteps of the presence of these Objects after they are removed. Which tracts, or signatures, consist mainly in this, that the Spirits will have an easier passage through these Pores then other parts of the Brain. And hence arises Memory, when the Spirits be determined, by the inclining of the Conarion, to that part of the Brain where these tracts are found, they moving then the Conarion as when the Object was present, though not so strongly.

From the hitting of the Spirits into such like tracts, is also the nature of Imagination to be explained, in which there is little difference from Memory, saving that the reflection upon time as past, when we saw or perceived such or such a thing, is quite left out. But these are not all the operations we are conscious to our selves of; and yet more then can be made out by this Hypothesis, That Perception of Objects, Spontaneous Motion,
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Motion, Memory and Imagination, may be all performed by virtue of this Glandula, the Animal Spirits, and mere Organization of the Body; as we shall plainly find, though but upon an easy examination.

2. For that the Conarion, devoid of a Soul, has no perception of any one Object, is demonstrable from the very description Cartesius makes of the transmission of the image, suppose through the Eye to the Brain, and so to the Conarion. For it is apparent from what he sets down in his Treatise of the Passions of the Soul, that the Image that is propagated from the Object to the Conarion, is impressed thereupon in some latitude of space. Whence it is manifest that the Conarion does not, nor can perceive the whole Object, though several parts may be acknowledged to have the perception of the several parts thereof. But something in us perceives the whole, which therefore cannot be the Conarion.

And that we do not perceive the external Object double, is not so much because the Image is united in the Organ of Common Sense, as that the lines come so from the Object to both the Eyes, that it is felt in one place; otherwise if the Object be very near, and the direction of our Eyes be not fitted to that nearness, it will seem double however. Which is a Demonstration that a man may see with both Eyes at once; and for my own part, I'm sure that I see better at distance, when I use both, then when one.

3. As for Spontaneous Motion, that the Conarion cannot be a sufficient Principle thereof, with the Spirits and organization of other parts of the Body, though we should admit it a fit feat of Common Sense, will easily appear, if we consider, that so weak and so small a thing as that Glandula is, leaves utterly unable to determine the Spirits with that force and violence we find they are determined in running, striking, thrusting and the like; and that it is evident, that sometimes scarce the thousandth part of the Conarion shall be director of this force; viz. when the Object of Sight, suppose, is as little as a pin's point, or when a man is prick'd with a needle, these receptions must be as little in the Glandula as in the exterior Sense.

But suppose the whole Conarion alwayes did act in the determining the motion of the Spirits into this or that Muscle; it is impossible that such fluid Matter as these Spirits are, that upon the noddings of the Conarion forward may easily recede back, should ever determine their course with that force and strength they are determined.

But haply it will be answer'd, That such subtle and fluid bodies as the Animal Spirits, that are in a readiness to be upon Motion any way, the least thing will determine their course; and that the Muscles themselves, being well replenish'd with Spirits, and framed with such Valvulae as will easily intromit them from the Brain, and also convey them out of one opposite Muscle into another upon the least redundancy of Spirits in the one above the other, and so shut them in; that that force we find in Spontaneous Motion may very well be fals'd by this Mechanical Artifice.

4. That the insufficiency of this Answer may appear, let us more accurately consider the contrivance in the following Figure, which
must be some such thing as * Regius has ventured at in his Philosophy, and which may serve for the more easy understanding of what * Des-Cartes writes in his Book of Passions, Here B C are two opposite Muscles, the known Instruments of spontaneous Motion; K, some part of the Body to be moved; D E and F G are the Nerves through which Spirits are transmitted from the Brain into the forefaid Muscles; D and F two Valvula to let pas the Spirits from the Brain into the Muscles, but stop them if they would regurgitate; G is a Valve that lets the Spirits out of the Muscle C into B, and E another Valve that lets the Spirits out of B into C. Now in brief, the result of this Mechanicall contrivance is this, viz. That the Spirits being determined by the Conarion never so little more copiously into B then into C, those in C will pass through the Valve G into B, and to B dwelling, and consequently shortening it self, it must needs bring up the member K.

5. We will not here alledge that this may be onely a mere fancy, these Valvula in the Nerves not being yet discovered by any Anatomist to be part of the organization of the Body of any Animal; but rather shew, that they would not effect what is aimed at, though they were admitted. For first, it does not appear that the Spirits will make more hast out of C into B, then the pressure caused in B by the determination of the Spirits from the Conarion forces them to. For all places being alike to them to play in, they will goe no further then they are driven or pressed, as Wind in a Bladder. And how the Conarion should drive or press the Spirits into B, so as to make it press those in C, and force them out so quick and instant as we find in some Actions, is a thing utterly unconceivable.

6. Besides, admit that the Conarion could determine them with some considerable force so into B, that they would make those in C come to them through the Valve G, there being the Valve E to tranmit them into C again, it is impossible but that the Tenth part of that force which we ordinarily use to open a mans hand against his will, should whether he would or no easily open it. For a very ordinary strenght moving K from B towards C, must needs so press the Spirits in B, that they will certainly pass by E into C, if our Body be nothing but Matter Mechanically organized. And therefore it is the mere Imperium of our Soul that does determine the Spirits to this Muscle rather then the other, and holds them there in despite of external force. From whence it is manifest that brute Beasts must have Souls also.

7. Concerning Memory and Imagination, that the mere Mechanical reasons of Des-Cartes will not reach them, we shall clearly understand, if we consider that the easy aperture of the same Pores of the Brain, that were opened at the presence of such an Object, is not sufficient to represent the Object, after the Conarion has by inclining it self thitherward determined the course of the Spirits into the same Pores. For this could only

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* cap. 16.
* Jart. r.
* Artic. 11.

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Dr. Passions,
Part. 1
Artic. 42.
only represent the Figure of a thing, not the Colours thereof. Besides; a man may bring an hundred Objects, and expose them to our view at the same distance, the Eye keeping exactly in the same posture, insomuch that it shall be necessary for these images to take up the very same place of the Brain, and yet there shall be a distinct remembrance of all these, which is impossible, if there be no Soul in us, but all be mere Matter. The same may be said of so many Names or Words level'd if you will out of a Trunk into the Ear, kept accurately in the same posture, so that the Sound shall beat perpetually upon the same parts of the Organ, yet if there be five hundred of them, there may be a distinct memory for every one of them, which is a power perfectly beyond the bounds of mere Matter, for there would be a necessary confusion of all.

8. Lastly, for those imaginations or representations that are of no one Object that we ever see, but made up of several that have taken their distinct places in the Brain, some (suppose) before and others behind, how can the Conarrison join these together, and in such a posture of conjunction as pleases? Or rather in one and the same Object, suppose this Man or that House, which we fix in a right posture, and has left such a signature or figure in the Brain as is fit to represent it so, how can the Conarrison invert the posture of the image, and make it represent the House and Man with the heels upwards? Besides the difficulty of representing the Distance of an Object, or the Breadth thereof, concerning which we have spoken * already. It is impossible the Conarrison, if it be mere Matter, should perform any such operations as these. For it must raise motions in it self, such as are not necessarily conveyed by any corporeal impress of another Body, which is plainly against Axiome 26.

9. And therefore that sober and judicious Wit Des-Cartes dares not stretch the power of Mechanical organization thus far, but doth plainly confess, That as there are some Functions that belong to the Body alone, so there are others that belong to the Soul, which he calls Cogitations; and are according to him of two forts, the one Actions, the other Passions. The Actions are all the operations of our Will, as in Some sense all Perceptions may be termed Actions. And these Actions of the Will are either such as are mere Intellectual Operations, and end in the Soul her self, such as her stirring up her self to love God, or contemplate any Immaterial Object; or they are such as have an influence on the Body, as when by virtue of our Will we put our selves upon going to this or that place.

He distinguishes again our Perceptions into two forts, whereof the one has the Soul for their Caufe, the other the Body. Those that are caused by the Body are most what such as depend on the Nerves. But besides these there is one kind of Imagination that is to be referred lither, and that properly has the Body for its caufe, to wit, that * Imagination that arises merely from the hitting of the Animal Spirits against the tracts of those Images that external Objects have left in the Brain, and so representing them to the Conarrison; which may happen in the day-time when our Fancy roves, and we do not set our selves on purpose to think on things, as well as it does in sleep by night. Those Perceptions that arrive to the Soul by the interposition of the Nerves differ one from another in
in this, that some of them refer to outward Objects that strike our Sense, others to our Body, such as Hunger, Thirst, Pain, &c. and others to the Soul its self, as Sorrow, Joy, Fear, &c.

Those Perceptions that have the Soul for their Cause, are either the Perceptions of her own Acts of Will, or else of her Speculation of things purely Intelligible, or else of Imaginations made at pleasure, or finally of Reminiscency, when she searches out something that she has let slip out of her Memory.

10. That which is observable in this Distribution is this, That all those Cogitations that he calls Actions, as also those kind of Perceptions whose Cause he assigns to the Soul, are in themselves (and are acknowledged by him) of that nature, that they cannot be imitated by any creature by the mere organization of its Body. But for the other, he holds they may, and would make us believe they are in Bodies of Brutes, which he would have mere Machinas, that is, That from the mere Mechanical frame of their Body, outward Objects of Sense may open Pores in their Brains so, as that they may determine the Animal Spirits into such and such Muscles for Spontaneous Motion: That the course of the Spirits also falling into the Nerves in the Intestines and Stomack, Spleen, Heart, Liver, and other parts, may cause the very same effects of Passion, suppos'd of Love, Hatred, Joy, Sorrow, in these brute Machinas, as we feel in our Bodies; though they, as being senseless, feel them not: and so the vellication of certain Tunicles and Fibres in the Stomack and Throat may affect their Body as ours is in the Sense of hunger or Thirst: And finally, That the hitting of the Spirits into the tracts of the Brain that have been signed by External Objects, may act so upon their Body as it does upon ours in Imagination and Memory.

Now add to this Machina of Des-Cartes, the capacity in Matter of Sensation and Perception, (which yet I have demonstrated it to be incapable of) and it will be exquisitely as much as Mr. Hobbs himself can expect to arise from mere Body, that is, All the Motions thereof being purely Mechanical, the perceptions and propensions will be fallall, necessary and unavoidable, as he loves to have them.

But being no Cogitations that Des-Cartes terms Actions, as also no kind of Perceptions that he acknowledges the Soul to be the Cause of, are to be resolved into any Mechanical contrivance; we may take notice of them as a peculiar rank of Arguments, and such, as if it could be granted that the Souls of Brutes were nothing but Sentient Matter, yet it would follow that a Substance of an higher nature, and truly Immaterial, must be the Principle of those more noble Operations we find in our selves, as appears from Axiome 20, and 26.
CHAP. VI.  

**The Immortality of the Soul.**

1. That no part of the Spinal Marrow can be the Common Senforium without a Soul in the Body. 2. That the Animal Spirits are more likely to be that Common Percipient. 3. But yet it is demonstrable they are not. 4. As not being so much as capable of Sensation; 5. Nor of directing Motion into the Muscles; 6. Much less of Imagination and rational Invention; 7. Nor of Memory. 8. An Answer to an Evasion. 9. The Author's reason, why he has confuted so particularly all the Propositions of the Seat of Common Sense, when few of them have been asserted with the exclusion of a Soul.

1. Here remain now onely Two Opinions to be examined: the one, That place of the Spinal Marrow where Anatomists conceive there is the nearest concourse of all the Nerves of the Body; the other, the Animal Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the brain. As for the former, viz. That part of the Spinal Marrow where the concourse of the Nerves is conceived to be, as I have answered in like case, so I say again, that besides that I have already demonstrated, that Matter is incapable of Sense, and that there is no modification thereof in the Spinal Marrow, that will make it more likely to be indued with that Faculty than the pith of Elder or a mess of Curds; we are also to take notice, that it is utterly inept for Motion, nor is it conceivable how that part of it, or any other that is assign'd to this office of being the Common Percipient in us of all Thoughts and Objects, (which must also have the power of moving our members) can, having so little agitation in it tell, (as appearing nothing but a kind of soft Papp or Pulp) so nimly and strongly move the parts of our Body.

2. In this regard the Animal Spirits seem much more likely to perform that office; and there, the importunity of whose grosf fancies constrains them to make the Soul Corporeal, do nevertheless usually pitch upon some Subtile thin Matter to constitute her nature or Essence: And therefore they imagine her to be either Aire, Fire, Light, or some such like Body, with which the Animal Spirits have no small affinity.

3. But this opinion, though it may seem plausible at first sight, yet the difficulties it is involved in are insuperable. For it is manifest, that all the Arguments that were brought before will recur with full force in this place. For there is no Matter that is so perfectly liquid as the Animal Spirits, but consists of particles onely contiguous one to another, and actually upon Motion playing and turning one by another as bulky as Atomes in the Sun. Now therefore, let us consider whether that Treasury of pure Animal Spirits contained in the fourth Ventricle be able to sustain so noble an office as to be the common Percipient in our Body, which, as I have often repeated, is so complex a Function, that it does not onely contain the Perception of external Objects, but Motion, Imagination, Reason and Memory.

4. Now at the very first dash, the transmission of the image of the Object
Object into this crowd of particles cannot but hit variously upon them, and therefore they will have several *Perceptions* amongst them, some happily perceiving part of the Object, others all, others more then all, others also perceiving of it in one place, and others in another. But the *Perception in us* representing no such confusion or disorder in our beholding of Objects, it is plain that it is not the *Animal Spirits* that is it.

5. Again, That which is so confounded a *Perception*, how can it be a right Principle of directing *Motion* into the *Muscles*? For besides what disorder may happen in this function upon the distracted representation of present Objects, the power of *thinking*, *excogitating*, and *deliberating*, being in these *Animal Spirits* also, (and they having no means of communicating one with another, but jostling one against another, which is as much to the purpose, as if men should knock heads to communicate to each other their conceits of Wit,) it must needs follow that they will have their *perceptions*, *inventions*, and *deliberations* apart; which when they put in *Execution*, must cause a marvelous confusion in the Body, some of them commanding the parts this way, others driving them another way: or if their factions have many divisions and subdivisions, every one will be so weak, that none of them will be able to command it any way. But we find no such struggling or countermands of any thing in us, that would act our Body one way when we would another, as if when one was a going to write

*Minv àeit's*, *stå*—

something stronger in him, whose conceits he is *not privy to*, should get the use of his hand, and in stead of that write down

*Arna virùmque cano*—

And the like may be said of any other *Spontaneous Motion*, which being so constantly within our deliberation or command as it is, it is a sufficient Argument to prove that it is not such a lubricious Substance as the *Animal Spirits*, nor so disunited, but something more perfectly One and Invisible, that is the Cause thereof.

6. We need not instance any further concerning the power of *Invention* and *Reason*, how every particle of these *Animal Spirits* has a liberty to *think* by it self, and *consult* with it self, as well as to *play* by it self, and how there is no possible means of *communicating* their *Thoughts* one to another, unless it should be, as I have said, by hitting one against another: but that can only communicate *Motion*, not their *determinate Thought*; unless that these particles were conceived to figure themselves into the shape of those things they think of, which is impossible by Axiom 26. And suppose it were possible one particle should shape it self, for example, into a *George on Horse-back* with a Lance in his hand, and another into an *Inchanted Castle*; this *George on Horse-back* must run against the *Castle*, to make the *Castle* receive his impress and similitude. But what then? Truly the encounter will be very unfortunate: For S. George indeed may easily break his Lance, but it is impossible that he should by jostling against the Particle in the form of a *Castle* convey the entire shape of himself and his Horse thereby, such as we find our selves able to imagine of a *man on Horse-back*. Which is a Truth as demonstrable
frable as any Theorem in Mathematicks, but so plain at first sight, that I need not use the curiosity of a longer Demonstration to make it more firm.

Nor is there any colourable Evasion by venturing upon a new way, as if this particle having transformed it self into a Castle, and that into an Horfeman, all the others then would fee them both and they one another. For by what light, and how little would they appear, and in what different places, according to the different posture of the particles of the Animal Spirits, and with what different faces, some seeing one side, others another?

But besides this there is a further difficulty, that if such Sensible representations as these could be conveyed from one particle to another by corporeal encounters and joustings, or by that other way after alleged; Logical and Mathematical Notions can not. So that some of the Animal Spirits may think of one Demonstration in Mathematicks, or of part of that Demonstration, and others of another: infomuch that if a Mathematician be to write, while he would write one thing upon the determination of thefe Animal Spirits, others may get his hand to make use of for the writing something else, to whose Thoughts and Counsel he was not at all privy; nor can tell any thing, till thofe other Animal Spirits have writ it down. Which Absurdities are fo mad and extravagant, that a man would scarce defile his pen by recording them, were it not to awaken those that do so much on the power of Matter (as to think it of it self sufficient for all Phenomena in the world) into due shame and abhorrence of their foolish Principle.

7. The laft Faculty I will confider is Memory, which is also necessarily joyned with the rest in the Common Percipient; of which not onely the fluidity of parts, but also their dissipability, makes the Animal Spirits utterly uncapable. For certainly, the Spirits by reafon of their Subtility and Activity are very dissipable, and in all likelihood remain not the same for the space of a week together; and yet things that one has not thought of for many years, will come as freshily into a mans mind as if they were tranfated but yeaterday.

8. The onely Evafion they can excogitate here is this, That as there is a continual fupply of Spirits by degrees, fo as they come in, they are seasoned, fermented and tintured with the fame Notions, Perceptions and Propensions that the Spirits they find there have. These are fine words, but signify nothing but this, that the Spirits there prefent in the Brain communicate the Notions and Perceptions they have to thefe new-comers; which is that which I have already proved imposfible in the foregoing Sections. And therefore it is imposfible that the Animal Spirits should be that Common Percipient that hears, fels, moves, remembers, under-stands, and does other functions of life that we perceive performed in us or by us.

9. We have now particularly evinced, that neither the whole Body, nor any of thofe parts that have been pitched upon, if we exclude the preference of a Soul or Immaterial Substance, can be the Seat of Common Sense. In which I would not be fo understood, as if it implied that there are none
of those parts, but some or other have affirmed might be the common Sensitum, though we had no Soul: But because they have been stood upon, all of them, by some or other to be the Seat of Common Sense; supposing a Soul in the Body, that there might no imaginable doubt or scruple be left behind, I have taken the pains thus punctually and particularly to prove, that none of them can be the place of Common Sense without one.

And thus I have perfectly finished my main design, which was to demonstrate That there is a Soul or Incorporeal Substance residing in us, distinct from the Body. But I shall not content my self here, but for a more full discovery of her Nature and Faculties, I shall advance further, and search out her chief Seat in the Body, where and from whence she exercises her most noble Functions, and after enquire whether she be confined to that part thereof alone, or whether she be spread through all our members, and lastly consider after what manner the sees, feels, hears, imagines, remembers, reasons, and moves the Body. For beside that I shall make some good use of these discoveries for further purpose, it is also in it self very pleasant to have in readiness a rational and coherent account, and a determinate apprehension of things of this nature.

CHAP. VII.

1. His Enquiry after the Seat of Common Sense, upon supposition there is a Soul in the Body. 2. That there is some particular Part in the Body that is the Seat of Common Sense. 3. A general division of their Opinions concerning the place of Common Sense. 4. That of those that place it out of the Head there are two sorts. 5. The Invalidity of Helmont's reasons whereby he would prove the orifice of the Stomack to be the principal Seat of the Soul. 6. An Answer to Helmont's stories for that purpose. 7. A further contemplation out of his own concessions. 8. Mr. Hobbs his Opinion confuted, that makes the Heart the Seat of Common Sense. 9. A further contemplation thereof from Experience. 10. That the Common Sense is seated somewhere in the Head. 11. A caution for the choice of the particular place thereof. 12. That the whole Brain is not it. 13. Nor Rejus his small solid Particle. 14. Nor any external Membrane of the Brain, nor the Septum Lucidum. 15. The three most likely places. 16. Objections against Cartesius his Opinion concerning the Conarion answered. 17. That the Conarion is not the Seat of Common Sense. 18. Nor that part of the Spinal Marrow where the Nerves are conceived to concurre, but the Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain.

It will therefore be requisite for us to resume the former Opinions, altering the Hypothesis; and to examine which of them is most reasonable, supposing there be a Substance Immaterial or Soul in man.

2. That
2. That there is some particular or restraint'd Seat of the Common Sense, is an Opinion that even all Philosophers and Physicians are agreed upon. And it is an ordinary Comparison amongst them, that the External Sen-
series & the Common Sense considered together are like a Circle with five
lines drawn from the Circumference to the Centre. Wherefore as it has
been obvious for them to finde out particular Organs for the External
Sences, so they have also attempted to assign some distinct part of the
Body for to be an Organ of the Common Sense; that is to say, as they
discovered Sight to be seated in the Eye, Hearing in the Ear, Smelling in
the Nose, &c. so they conceived that there is some part of the Body
wherein Seeing, Hearing and all other Perceptions meet together, as the
lines of a Circle in the Centre: and that there the Soul does also judge
and discern of the difference of the Objects of the outward Sences. They
have justly therefore excluded all the External parts of the Body from
the lightest suspicion of any capacity of undergoing such a function as is
thus general, they being all employed in a more particular task, which is
to be the Organ of some one of these five outward Sences; and to be
affected no otherwise than by what is impressed upon themselves, and
chiefly from their proper Objects; amongst which five, Touch properly
so called has the greatest share, it being as large as the Skin that covers
us, and reaching as deep as any Membrane and Nerve in the limbs and
trunk of the Body, besides all the Exterior parts of the Head. All
which can no more see then the Eye can hear, or the Ear can smell.

3. Besides this, all those Arguments that do so clearly evince that the
place of Common Sense is somewhere in the Head, are a plain demonstra-
tion that the whole Body cannot be the Seat thereof, and what those Argu-
ments are you shall hear anon. For all those Opinions that have pitched
on any one Part for the Seat of Common Sense, being to be divided into
two Ranks, to wit, either such as assign some particular place in the Body,
or else in the Head, we will proceed in this order: as first to confute
those that have made choice of any part for the Seat of Common Sense
out of the Head; and then in the second place we will in general shew,
that the common Sensorium must be in some part of the Head; and lastly,
of those many opinions concerning what part of the Head this common
Sensorium should be, those which seem least reasonable being rejected,
we shall pitch upon what we conceive the most unquestionable.

4. Those that place the Common Sensorium out of the Head, have
seated it either in the upper Orifice of the Stomack, or in the Heart. The
former is *Vann-Helmont's Opinion, the other Mr. Hobbs his.

5. As for Vann-Helmont, there is nothing he alledges for his Opinion
but may be easily answered. That which mainly imposed upon him was
the exceeding Sensibility of that part, which Nature made so, that, as a
faithfull and sagacious Porter, it might admit nothing into the Stomack
that might prove Mitchievous or troublesome to the Body. From this
tender Sensibility, great offences to it may very well cause Swoonings, and
Apoplexies, and ceffations of Sense. But Fear and Joy and Grief have
dispatch'd some very suddenly, when yet the first entrance of that deadly
stroke has been at the Ear or the Eye, from some unsupportable ill
newes or horrid spectacle. And the harsh handling of an angry Sore, or the treading on a Corn on the Toe, may easily cast some into a swoon, and yet no man will ever imagine the Seat of the Common Sense to be placed in the Foot. In fine, there is no more reason to think the Common Sensium is in the mouth of the Stomack, because of the Sensible Comotions we feel there, then that it is seated in the Stars, because we so clearly perceive their Light, as Des-Cartes has well answered upon like occasion. Nor can Phrenses and Madneſses, though they may, sometimes be observed to take their rise from thence, any more prove that it is the Seat of the Common Sense, then the Furor uterinus, Apoplexies, Epilepsies, and Syncopeps proceeding from the Womb, do argue that the common Sensium of Women lies in that part.

6. And if we consider the great Sympathy betwixt the Orifice of the Stomack and the Heart, whose Pathemata are so alike and conjoin'd that the Ancients have given one name to both parts, calling them promiscuously καλός, and the pains of the Stomack καλόντας, and καλόντας, as also that the Heart is that part from which manifestly are the supplies of Life, whence the Pulse ceasing, Life cannot long continue for want of Warmth and Spirits; here is an evident reafon, how it may happen that a Wound about the mouth of the Stomack may dispatch a man more sudainly then a wound in the Head, they being both suppos'd mortal, though the feat of the Sensitive Soul be not chieflly in the aforefaids Orifice. For partly the natural Sympathy betwixt the Orifice of the Stomack and the Heart, and partly the horrour and pain perceived by the Soul in the common Sensium, which we will suppose in the Head, does so dead the Heart, that, as in the Sudain Passions above named, it ceaſes to perform the ordinary functions of Life, and so Pulse and Sense and all is gone in short time; whereas the Head being wounded mortally, Perception is thereby fo diminished, that the Heart escapes the more free from the force of that lethiferous passion; and so though Sense be gone, can continue the Pulse a longer time: which is a perfect anwer to Helmont's Stories he recites in his Sedes Anima.

7. To all which I may add, That himſelf does acknowledge in the end of that Treatife, that the power of Motion, of Will, Memory and Imagination, is in the Brain; and therefore unless a man will lay and deny any thing, he muſt fay that the Common Sense is there alfo.

8. The Opinion of Mr Hobbs bears more credit and countenence with it, as having been asſerted heretofore by Philofophers of great fame, Epicurus, * Ariflotel, and the School of the Stoicks: but if we look closer to it, it will prove as little true as the other; especially in his way, that holds there is no Soul in a Man, but that all is but organized Matter. For let him declare any Mechanical reaſon whereby his Heart will be able to move his Finger. But upon this Hypothesis I have confuted this Opinion already. It is more maintainable, if there be granted a Soul in the Body, that the Heart is the chief Seat thereof, and place of Common Sense, as Ariflotel and others would have it, as also the Spring of Spontaneous Motion. But it is very unlikely that that part that is fo continually employed in that natural Motion of contracting and dilating itfelf, should be
be the Seat of that Principle which commands Free and Spontaneous progressions: Perceptions also would be horribly disturbed by its squeezing of itself, and then flagging again by vicissitudes. Neither would Objects appear in the same place, or at least our sight not fix on the same part of the Object, when the Heart is drawn up and when it is let down again, as I have above intimated: the extreme heat also of it could not admit that it be affected with the gentle motions of the Object of Sense, the Blood being there in a manner scalding hot. And it is in this sense that that Aphorism in Aristotle is to be understood, μὴ μένῳ κατα

dισοδον, That which must receive the variety of external impresses, must not be it self in any high temper or agitation.

9. Wherefore it is a very rash thing to assert, That the Heart is the Seat of Common Sense, unless by some plain experience it could be evinced to be so, whereas indeed Experiments are recorded to the contrary. As, that if we bind a Nerve, Sense and Motion will be betwixt the Ligature and the Brain, but not betwixt the Heart and the Ligature. And that the Crocodile, his Heart being cut out, will live for a considerable time, and fight, and defend himself. The like is observ'd of the Sea-Tortoise, and the wild Goat, as Galenus writes. To which you may add what Galen relates of sacrificed Beasts, that their Hearts being taken out and laid upon the Altar, they have been seen in the mean time not onely to breath, and roar aloud, but also to run away, till the expence of Blood has made them fall down. Which Narrations to me are the more credible, I having seen with mine own eyes a Frog quite excoriated, heart, stomach, guts and all taken out by an ingenious friend of mine, and dexterous Anatomist; after which the Frog could see, and would avoid any object in its way, and skipped as freely and nimbly up and down as when it was entire, and that for a great while. But a very little wound in the Head deprives them immediately of Life and Motion. Whence it is plain that the derivation of Sense and Spontaneous Motion is not from the Heart. For if the Motion be intercepted betwixt the Brain and the Heart, by * Mr. Hobbs his own conception, there will be no perception of the Object. And there is the same reason of the Orifice of the Stomack: so that this one Experiment does clearly evince these two Opinions to be erroneous.

10. And that no man hereafter may make any other unhappy choice in the parts of the Body, we shall now propone such Reasons as we hope will plainly prove, That the common Sensory must needs be in the Head; or indeed rather repeat them: For some of those whereby we proved that the Heart is not the Seat of Common Sense, will plainly evince that the Head is. As that out of Laurentius, that a Nerve being tied, Sense and Motion will be preferred from the Ligature up towards the Head, but downwards they will be lost. As also that experiment of a Frog, whose brain if you pierce will presently be devoid of Sense and Motion, though all the Entrails being taken out it will skip up and down, and exercise its Senfes as before. Which is a plain evidence that Motion and Sense is derived from the Head; and there is now no pretence to trace any Motion into a farther fountain, the Heart, (from whence the Nerves

Nerves were conceived to branch by Aristotle, and from whence certainly the Veins and Arteries do, as appears by every Anatomie) being so justly discharged from that office.

To which it may suffice to add the consideration of those Diseases that seize upon all the Animal functions at once, such as are the Lethargie, Apoplexy, Epilepsie, and the like, the causes of which Physicians find in the Head, and accordingly apply remedies. Which is a plain detection that the Seat of the Soul, as much as concerns the Animal Faculties, is chiefly in the Head. The same may be said of Phrensy and Melancholy, and such like distempers, that deprave a man's Imagination and Judgment; Physicians always conclude something amiss within the Cranium.

Lastly, if it were nothing but the near attendance of the outward Senses on the Soul, or her discerning Faculty, being so strictly placed about her in the Head; this, unless there were some considerable Argument to the contrary, should be sufficient to determine any one that is unprejudiced, to conclude that the Seat of Common Sense, Understanding, and command of Motion, is there also.

11. But now the greatest difficulty will be to define In what part thereof it is to be placed. In which, unless we will goe over-boldly and carelessly to work, we are to have a regard to Mechanical congruitities, and not pitch upon any thing that, by the advantage of this Supposal, That there is a Soul in man, may goe for possible; but to chuse what is most handsome and convenient.

12. That the whole Brain is not the Seat of Common Sense, appears from the wounds and cuts it may receive without the destruction of that Faculty; for they will not take away Sense and Motion, unless they pierce so deep as to reach the Ventricles of the Brain, as Galen has observed.

13. Nor is it in Regius his small solid particle. For besides that it is not likely the Centre of Perception is so minute, it is very incongruous to place it in a Body so perfectly solid, more hard than Marble or Iron. But this Invention being but a late freak of his petulant fancy, that has an ambition to make a blunder and confusion of all Des-Cartes his metaphysical Speculations, (and therefore found out this rare quirk of wit to shew, how though the Soul were nothing but Matter, yet it might be incorruptible and immortal) it was not worth the while to take notice of it here in this Hypothecis, which we have demonstrated to be true, viz. That there is a Soul in the Body, whose nature is Immaterial or Incorporeal.

14. Nor are the Membranes in the Head the common Senforium; neither those that envelop the Brain, (for they would be able then to see the light through the hole the Trepan makes, though the party Trepan'd winked with his eyes; to say nothing of the conveyance of the Nerves, the Organs of external Senses, that carry beyond these exterior Membranes, and therefore point to a place more inward, that must be the Recipient of all their impresse) nor any Internal membrane, as that which bids fairest for it, the Septum Lucidum, as being in the midst of the upper Ventricle. But yet if the level of Motion through the external Senses be accurately considered, some will shoot under, and some in a distant parallel,
parallel, so that this Membrane will not be struck with all the Objects of our Sense. Besides that it seems odd and ridiculous that the Centre of Perception should be either driven out of it into plates, or spread into hollow convexities, as it must be supposed, if we make either the external or internal Membranes of the Brain the Seat of Common Sense.

15. The most likely place is some one of those that the three last Opinions point at, viz. either the Conarion, or the Concurse of the Nerves in the fourth Ventricle, or the Animal Spirits there.

16. The first is Des-Cartes Opinion, and not rashly to be refruct, neither do I find any Arguments hitherto that are valid enough to deface it. Those that are recited out of Bartholine, and subscribed to by the learned Author of Adenographia, in my apprehension have not the force to ruin it. We will first repeat them, and then examine them.

The first is, That this Glandula is too little to be able to represent the Images of all that the Soul has represented to her.

The second, That the external Nerves do not reach to the Glandula, and that therefore it cannot receive the impressions of sensible Objects.

The third, That it is placed in a place of excrements which would foile the Species of things.

The fourth, That the Species of things are perceived there where they are carried by the Nerves. But the Nerves meet about the beginning or head of the Spinal Marrow, a more noble and ample place then the Glandula pineneal.

To the first I answer, That the amplitude of that place where the Nerves meet in the Spinal Marrow is not large enough to receive the distinct impressions of all the Objects the Mind retains in Memory. (Besides, that the other parts of the Brain may serve for that purpose, as much as any of it can.) But it must be the Soul her self alone that is capable of retaining so distinct and perfect representations of things, thought it were admitted that she might make an occasional use of some private marks she impressed in the Brain, which haply may be nothing at all like the things it would remember, nor of any considerable magnitude nor proportion to them, such as we observe in the words Arx and Atomus, where there is no correspondence of either likeness or signification betwixt the words and the things represented by them.

To the second, That though there be no continuation of Nerves to the Conarion, yet there is of Spirits, which are as able to convey the impressions of Motion from external Sense to the Conarion, as the Aire and Aether the impressions of the Stars unto the Eye.

To the third, That the Glandula is conveniently enough placed, so long as the Body is found; for no excrementitious humours will then overflow it or besmear it. But in such distempers wherein they do, Apoplexies, Catalepsies, or such like diseases will arise; which we see do fall out, let the Seat of Common Sense be where it will.

To the last I answer, That the Nerves, when they are once got any thing far into the Brain, are devoid of Tunicles, and be so soft and spongy, that the motion of the Spirits can play through them, and that therefore they may ray through the sides, and so continue their motion
to the Coniarion, wherever their extremities may seem to tend.

17. But though these Arguments do not sufficiently confute the Opinion, yet I am not so wedded to it, but I can think something more unexceptionable may be found out, especially it being so much to be suspected that all Animals have not this Coniarion; and then, that what pleased Descartes so much in this Invention, was, that he conceived it such a marvelous fine instrument to beat the Animal Spirits into such and such Pores of the Brain, a thing that I cannot at all close with for reasons above alleged. Besides that Stones have been found in this Glandula, and that it is apparent that it is environ'd with a net of Veins and Arteries, which are indications that it is a part assigned for some more inferiour office. But yet I would not dismiss it without fair play.

18. Wherefore that Opinion of the forecited Author, who places the Seat of Common Sense in that part of the Spinal Marrow where the Nerves are suspected to meet, as it is more plain and simple, so it is more irrefutable, supposing that the Soul's Centre of perception (whereby the does not onely apprehend all the Objects of the external Senses, but does imagine, reason, and freely command and determine the Spirits into what part of the Body she pleases) could be conveniently seated in such dull pafty Matter as the Pith of the Brain is; a thing, I must needs profess, that pleases not my Palate at all, and therefore I will also take leave of this Opinion too, and adventure to pronounce, That the chief Seat of the Soul, where she perceives all Objects, where she imagines, reasons, and invents, and from whence she commands all the parts of the Body, is those purer Animal Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain.

CHAP. VIII.

1. The first reason of his Opinion, the convenient Situation of these Spirits. 2. The second, that the Spirits are the immediate Instrument of the Soul in all her actions. 3. The proof of the second Reason from the general Authority of Philosophers, and particularly of Hippocrates. 4. From our Sympathizing with the changes of the Aire. 5. From the celerity of Motion and Cognition. 6. From what is observed generally in the Generation of things. 7. From Regius his experiment of a Snail in a glass. 8. From the running round of Images in a Vertigo. 9. From the constitution of the Eye, and motion of the Spirits there. 10. From the dependency of the actions of the Soul upon the Body, whether in Meditation or corporeal Motion. 11. From the recovery of Motion and Sense into a stupefied part. 12. And, lastly, from what is observed in swooning fits, of paleness and sharpness of visage, &c. 13. The inference from all this, That the Spirits in the fourth Ventricle are the Seat of Common Sense, and that the main use of the Brain and Nerves is to preserve the Spirits.

1. THAT
THAT which makes me embrace this Opinion rather than any other is this; That, first, this situation of the common Senforium betwixt the Head and the trunk of the Body is the most exactly convenient to receive the impressions of Objects from both, as also to impart Motion to the Muscles in both the Head and in the Body. In which I look upon it as equal with the last Opinion, and superior to all them that went before. For whatever may be objected, is already answered in what I have said to the last Objection against Des-Cartes.

2. But now in the second place, (wherein this Opinion of mine has a notorious advantage above all else that I know) It is most reasonable that that Matter which is the immediate Instrument of all the Animal functions of the Soul, should be the chiefest Seat from whence and where he exercises these functions, and if there be any place where there is a freer plenty of the purest sort of this Matter, that her peculiar residence should be there. Now the immediate Instrument of the functions of the Soul is that thinner Matter which they ordinarily call Animal Spirits, which are to be found in their greatest purity and plenty in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain. From whence it must follow that that precious and choice part of the Soul which we call the Centre of perception is to be placed in that Ventricle, not in any pitch of the Brain thereabout, but in the midst of these Spirits themselves; for that is the most natural situation for the commanding them into the parts of the Head and Body; besides a more delicate and subtile use of them at home, in pursing various imaginations and inventions.

3. That this thin and Spirituous Matter is the immediate engine of the Soul in all her operations, is in a manner the general opinion of all Philosophers. And even those that have placed the Common Senforium in the Heart, have been secure of the truth of this their conceit, because they took it for granted, that the left Ventricle thereof was the fountain of these pure and subtile Spirits, and plea§ themselves very much, in that they fancied that Oracle of Physicians, the grave and wise Hippocrates, to speak their own sense so fully and significantly. Πνεύμα ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἐστὶν τὸν θορυβόν τὸν ποιητὴν τὸν δυνατὸν τῆς οἰκουμένης, that is to say, That the Mind of man is in the left Ventricle of his Heart, and that it is not nourished from meats and drinks from the belly, but by a clear and luminous Substance that redounds by separation from the blood: which is that which happens exactly in the Brain. For the Spirits there are nothing else but more pure and subtile parts of the blood, whose tenuity and agitation makes them separate from the rest of the mass thereof, and so replenish the Ventrices of the Brain.

4. Moreover our sympathizing so sensibly with the changes of the Aire, which Hippocrates also takes notice of, that in clear Aire our Thoughts are more clear, and in cloudy more obscure and dull, is no slight indication that that which conveys Senses, Thoughts, and Passions immediately to the Soul, is very tenuous and delicate, and of a nature very congenerous to the Aire with which it changes so easily.

5. The
5. The strange Agility also of Motions and Cogitations that we find in our senses, has forced the most sluggish wits, even such as have been so gross as to deem the Soul Corporeal, yet to choose the freest, subtilest & most active Matter to compound her of, that their imaginations could exorcitate. And Lucretius, the most confident of the Epicurean Sect, thinks he has hit the nail on the head in his choice;

\[ \text{Nuncigitur quoniam est animi natura reperta} \]
\[ \text{Mobilis egregiae, per quam consilare necessis est} \]
\[ \text{Corporibus parvis & levibus atque rotundis:} \]

whose Testimony I account the better in this case, by how much the more curs Philosopher he is, the necessity of the tenuity of particles that are to pervade the Body of a Man being convinced hence to be so plain, that the dimmest eyes can easily discover it.

6. But we will advance higher to more forcible Arguments; amongst which this, I think, may find some place. That we cannot discover any immediate operation of any kind of Soul in the world, but what it first works upon that Matter which participates in a very great measure of this fineless and tenuity of parts, which will easily yield and be guided, as may be universally observed in all Generations, where the Body is always organized out of thin fluid liquor, that will easily yield to the placit power of the Soul. In which I do not doubt but it takes the advantage of moving the most subtile parts of all first, such as Des-Cartes his first and second Element, which are never excluded from any such humid and tenuous substance: which Elements of his are that true Heavenly or Aethereal Matter which is every where, as Ficinus somewhere Heaven is; and is that Fire which Trismegist affirms is the most inward vehicle of the Mind, and the instrument that God used in the forming of the world, and which the Soul of the world, wherever she acts, does most certainly still use.

7. And to make yet a step further, That ocular demonstration that Henricus Regius brings into view seems to me both ingenious and solid: It is in a Snail, such as have no shells, moving in a glass: so soon as she begins to creep, certain Bubbles are discovered to move from her tail to her head; but so soon as the ceases moving, those Bubbles cease. Whence he concludes, That a gale of Spirits that circuit from her head along her back to her tail, and thence along her belly to her head again, is the cause of her progressive motion.

8. That such thin Spirits are the immediate Instruments of Sense, is also discovered by what is observed in a Vertigo. For the Brain it self is not of such a fluid substance as to turn round, and to make external Objects seem to doe so. Wherefore it is a sign that the immediate corporeal Instrument of conveying the images of things is the Spirits in the Brain.

9. And that they are the chief Organ of Sight is plain in the exterior parts of the Eye: for we may easily discern how full they are of that \[ \text{μανάφι} \] pure and lucid substance, which Hippocrates speaks of, though he fay it in a wrong place; and how upon the passions of
of the Mind these Spirits ebb or flow in the Eye, and are otherwise wonderful-significantly modified; insomuch that the Soul even seems to speak through them, in that silent voice of Angels, which some fancy to be by nothing but by dumb shows, *but I do not at all believe it. It is also plain enough, that dimness of sight comes from deficiency of these Spirits, though the parts of the Eye otherwise be entire enough. The wider opening also of the pupil of one Eye upon the shutting of the other does indicate the flux and more copious presence of Spirits there, as Galen has ingeniously collected.

10. To which we may add that in those more noble operations of the Mind, when she meditates and excogitates various Theorems, that either she uses some part of the Body as an Instrument then, or acts freely and independently of the Body. That the latter is false is manifest from hence, that then the change of Air, or Distemper and Diseasedness, could not prejudice her in her Inventive and purely Intellectual Operations; but it is manifest that they doe, and that a mans Mind is much more cloudy one time then another, and in one Country then another, whence is that proverbial Verse,

**Bacutum crasso jurares adre natum.**

If she uses any part of the Body, it must be either these Animal Spirits, or the Brain. That it is not the Brain, the very consistency thereof so clamy and fluggish is an evident demonstration.

Which will still have the more force, if we consider what is most certainly true, That the Soul has not any power, or else exceeding little, of moving Matter; but her peculiar privilege is of determining Matter in motion; which the more subtile and agitated it is, the more easily by reacon of its own mobility is it determined by her. For if it were an immediate faculty of the Soul to contribute motion to any Matter, I do not understand how that faculty never failing nor diminishing no more then the Soul itself can fail or diminish, that we should ever be weary of motion. Infomuch that those nimble-footed Menades of Bacchus, with other agile Virgins of the Country, which Dionysius describes dancing in the flowry meadows of Meander and Cayster, might, if life and limbs would fail, be found dancing there to this very day, as free and frolick as wanton Kids (as he pleases to set out their activity) and that without any latitude at all. For that immediate motive faculty of the Soul can still as fresh as ever impart motion to all the Body, and sooner consume it into air or ashes by heating and agitating it, then make her self weary, or the Body seem so.

Wherefore it is plain that that motion or heat that the Soul voluntarily confers upon the Body is by virtue of the Spirits, which she, when they are playing onely and gently toying amongst themselves, sends forth into the exterior members, and to agitates and moves them: but they being so subtile and dissipable, the Soul spends them in using of them; and they being much spent, she can hardly move the Body any longer, the senfe whereof we call Latitude. These are the μανουαρα Hippocrates, or εντομαρα of Hippocrates, and the Soul's immediate engine of motion through all the parts of the Body.
11. As they are also of Sense in the more remote parts as well as in the Head, as Spigelius handomely inquinates by that ordinary example of a mans legge being stupefed or asleep, as some call it, by compression or whatever hinderance may be of the propagation of the Spirits into that part. For as Sense and Motion is restored, a man may plainly feel something creep into it tingling and stinging like Pifmires, as he compares it; which can be nothing but the Spirits forcing their passage into the part. Wherein what they suffer is made sensible to the Soul, they being her immediate Vehicle of life and Sense.

12. Lastly, In swooning fits, when Motion and Sense fails, the exterior parts are pale and fallen, the Face looking more lean and sharp; of which there can be no other meaning, then that that benign gale of vital air that fill’d up the parts before, is now absent and retreated from them; that is, that the fluid Spirits are retired, without which no Sense nor Motion can be performed: whence it is apparent that they are the immediate Instrumens of both.

13. I have proved that the Animal Spirits are the Soul’s immediate organ for Sense and Motion. If therefore there be any place where these Spirits are in the fittest plenty and purity, and in the most convenient situation for Animal functions; that in all reason must be concluded the chief feat and Acropolis of the Soul. Now the Spirits in the middle Ventricle of the Brain are not so indifferently situated for both the Body and the Head, as those in the fourth are; nor so pure. The upper Ventricles, being two, are not so fit for this office, that is so very much one and singular. Besides that the sensiferous impressions of motion through the eyes play under them; to say nothing how the Spirits here are less delicate also then in the fourth Ventricle.

Wherefore there being sufficient plenty, and greatest purity, and fittest situation of the Spirits in this fourth Ventricle, it is manifest that in these is placed the Centre of Perception; and that they are the common Sensory of the Soul: And that as the Heart pumps out Blood perpetually to supply the whole Body with nourishment, to keep up the bulk of this Edifice for the Soul to dwell in, and also, from the more subtile and agile parts thereof, to replenish the Brain and Nerves with Spirits, (which are the immediate Instrument of the Soul for Sense and Motion;) so likewise is it plain that the main use of the Brain and Nerves is to keep these subtile Spirits from over-speedy dissipation; and that the Brain with its Caverns is but one great round Nerve; as the Nerves with their invisible porosities are but so many smaller productions or slenderer prolongations of the Brain: And so all together are but one continued Receptacle or Café of that immediate Instrument of the sensiferous motions of the Soul, the Animal Spirits, wherein also lies her hidden Vehicle of life in this mortal body.

CHAP.
CHAP. IX.  
The Immortality of the Soul.  

1. Several Objections against Animal Spirits.  2. An Answer to the first Obligation touching the Porosity of the Nerves.  3. To the second and third, from the Extravasation of the Spirits and pituitous Excrements found in the Brain.  4. To the fourth, from the incredible swiftness of motion in the Spirits.  5. To the last, from Ligation.  6. Undeniable Demonstrations that there are Animal Spirits in the Ventricles of the Brain.

Before we proceed to our other two Enquiries, we are forced to make a stop a while, and listen to some few Objections made by some late Authors, who, against the common stream of all other Philosophers, Physicians and Anatomists, are not ashamed to deny that there are any such things as Spirits in the Body, or at least that there are any in the Ventricles of the Brain. For as for the Nerves, say they, they have no Pores or Cavities to receive them; and besides, it is plain that what is fluid in them is nothing but a milky white juice, as is observed in the pricking of a Nerve. And as for the Ventricles of the Brain, those Cavities are too big, and the Spirits, if they issue into them, will be as extravasated Blood, whence they must needs be spoiled and corrupt. Besides that they will evaporate at those passages through which the mucous or pituitous excrements pass from the Brain. Whole appearance there, is, say they, another great argument that these Ventricles were intended only for receptacles and conveyances of such excrementitious Humours which the Brain discharges itself of. Lastly, if Spontaneous Motion be made by means of these Spirits, it could not be so, extremely sudden as it is; for we can wagge our finger as quick as thought, but corporeal Motion cannot be so swift. And if the Spirits be continued from the Head to the Finger, suppose, in the ligation of the Nerve there would be sense from the Ligature to the Fingers end, which is, say they, against Experience. These are the main Objections I have met withall in Hofman and others; but are such as I think are very easily answered: and indeed they do in some sort clack some of them one with another.

2. For how can the Nerves derive juice if they have no Pores, or are not so much as passible to the thin active Spirits we speak of? or from whence can we better conceive that juice to arise, than from these Spirits themselves, as they lose their agitation, and flag into a more gross consistency?

3. Neither can the Spirits be looked upon as extravasated in the Ventricles of the Brain, more than the Blood in the Auricles or Ventricles of the Heart. Nor is there any fear of their sliding away through the Infundibulum, the pituitous excrements having no passage there but what they make by their weight, as well as their insinuating moistness, which always besmeering these parts makes them more impervious to the light Spirits, whose agility also and componderancy with the outward Aire renders them incapable of leaving the Caverns in which they are.
That arguing from the putitious excrements found there, that they
were made only for a Receptacle of such useless redundance, is as ineptly
inferred, as if a man should argue from what is found in the Intestinum
retilum, that the Stomack and all the Intestines were made for a Recept-
cable of Stercoreous excrement. The Spirits in the Ventrices of the
Brain, playing about and hitting against the sides of the Caverns they
are in, will in process of time abate of their agitation, the grofer parts
especially; and so necessarily come to a more coule constancy, and
settle into some fuch like moist Sediment as is found at the bottome
of the Ventricles, which nature dischargeth through fit passages, whereby
the Spirits are left more pure. But because this necessary fecuency is
found in these Cavities, to conclude that that is the only ufe of them, is
as ridiculous as to inferre That because I spit at my Mouth, and blow
my Nofe, that that was the chief end and ufe of these two parts of my
Body, or that my Eyes were not made for Seeing, but weeping.

4. The nature of the swiftnenes of Motion in these Spirits is much like
that of Light, which is a Body as well as they. But that Lucid Matter
in the Sun does not, to foon as he appears upon the Horizon, fly fo many
thousand miles in a moment to fatten our eyes; but Motion is propaga-
ted as it were at once from the Sun to our Eye through the æthereal
Matter betwixt. Or fuppofe a long T tube, as long as you will, and one
to blow in it; in a moment, foon as he blows at one end, the Motion
will be felt at the other, and that downwards as well as upwards, and as
easily; to satisfy that other frivolous Objection I find in Hofman, as if
it were fo hard a bufines that these Spirits should be commanded down-
wards into the Nerves. But the Oppofers of this ancient and solid Opin-
ion are very fimple and carefles.

5. That of the Ligature proves nothing. For though the Nerve be-
twixt the Ligature and the Finger be well enough stored with Spirits, yet
the Centre of Perception being not there, and there being an interruption
and division betwixt the Spirits that are continued to their Common
Senforium, and thence on the other fide of the Ligature; 'tis no more
wonder that we feel nothing on this fide of the Ligature, then that
we fee nothing in our neighbour's garden when a wall is betwixt, though
the Sun shine clearly on both fides of the wall.

6. We fee how invalid their Arguments are against this received Opin-
on of almost all both Physicians and Philofophers: It is needless to
produce any for the confirmation of it; Thofe which we have made use
of for proving that the Spirits are the immediate Instrument of the Soul,
being of equal force moft of them to conclude their exifience in the Body.

And yet for an overplus I will not much care to call in a brief sugge-
tion of the ufe of the Lungs, which the beft Physicians and Anatomifts
adjudge to be chiefly for conveying prepared aire to the Heart; as also
of the Reti mirabile and Plexus Choroideus, whose bare fituations discover
their ufe, that they may more plentifully evaporate the thinner and
more agile particles of the Blood into the Ventricles of the Brain.

The Diaphane also of the Brain keeping time with the Pulse of the Heart,
is a manifefl indication what a vehement Steam of Spirits, by the direct
and
and short passage of the Arteria Carotides, are carried thither. For if one part of the Blood be more fiery and subtile then another, it will be sure to reach the Head. From whence considering the spongy and laxness of the Brain, and thinness of the Tunciles in the little Arteries that are there; it will follow by Mechanical necessity that the Ventricles thereof will be filled with that  

\[ \text{χαθεις ἐς φωλοδών περιφερία ἐς διαφημισατωσ τὸ αἷμα} \]

which Hippocrates so fitly describes, though he fancy the Seat of it in an unfitting place.

But the purer of these Spirits being in the fourth Ventricle, as Bartholine and others have judiciously concluded, it follows plainly from what has been alleged, That the Common Senforium is to be placed in the midst of these purer Spirits of the fourth Ventricle of the Brain.

CHAP. X.

1. That the Soul is not confined to the Common Senforium. 2. The first Argument from the Plastick power of the Soul. 3. Which is confirmed from the gradual dignity of the Soul’s Faculties, of which this Plastick is the lowest; 4. External Sensation the next; 5. After that, Imagination, and then Reason. 6. The second Argument from Passions and Sympathies in Animals. 7. An illustration of the manner of Natural Magick. 8. The third Argument from the Perception of Pain in the exterior parts of the Body. 9. The fourth and last from the nature of Sight.

We are now at leisure to resume the two remaining Enquiries; the former whereof is, whether the Soul be so in this fourth Ventricle, that it is essentially no where else in the Body, or whether it be spread out into all the Members. Regius would cull it up in the Conarion, which he believes to be the Common Senforium, and so by consequence it should be confined to the fourth Ventricle, and not expatiate at all thence, supposing that the Seat of Common Sense. The reason of this conceit of his is this, That whatever is in the rest of the Body, may come to pass by powers merely Mechanical; wherein he does very superstitiously tread in the footsteps of his Master Des-Cartes. But for my own part, I cannot but dissent, I finding in neither any sufficient grounds of so novel an opinion, but rather apparent reasons to the contrary.

2. As first, the Frame of the Body, of which I think most reasonable to conclude the Soul her self to be the more particular Architecture (for I will not wholly reject Plotinus his opinion;) and that the Plastick power resides in her, as also in the Souls of Brute animals, as very learned and worthy Writers have determined. That the Fabric of the Body is out of the concourse of Atomes, is a mere precarious Opinion, without any ground or reason. For Sense does not discover any such thing, the first rudiments of life being out of some liquid homogeneal Matter, and it is
against * Reason, that the tumbling of *Atomes or corporeal particles should produce such exquisite frames of creatures, wherein the acutest wit is not able to find any thing inept, but all done exquisitely well every where, where the foulnesses and courtesies of *Matter has not been in fault.

That God is not the immediate Maker of these *Bodies, the particular miscarriages demonstrate. For there is no Matter so perverse and stubborn but his omnipotency could tame; whence there would be no Defects nor Monstrosities in the generation of Animals.

Nor is it so congruous to admit, that the Plastick faculty of the Soul of the World is the sole contriver of these Fabricks of particular Creatures, (though I will not deny but she may give some rude preparative strokes towards Efformation,) but that in every particular World, such as Man is especially, his own Soul is the peculiar and most perfective Architect thereof, as the Soul of the World is of it. For this vital Fabrication is not as in artificial Architecture, when an external person acts upon Matter, but implies a more particular and near union with that Matter it thus intrinsically shapes out and organizes. And what ought to have a more particular and close union with our Bodies then our Souls themselves?

My opinion is therefore, That the Soul, which is a Spirit, and therefore contradictible and dilatable, begins within lefs compas at first in Organizing the firstly-prepared Matter, and so bears it self on in the same tenour of work till the Body has attained its full growth; and that the Soul dilates it self in the dilating of the Body, and so poifesles it through all the members thereof.

3. The congruity of this Truth will further discover it self, if we consider the nature of the Faculties of the Soul (of which you may read more fully in Enthusiasmus Triumphatus) in what a natural graduality they arise till they come to the most free of all. The deepest or lowest is this Plastick power we have already spoke of; in virtue whereof is continued that perpetual Sympole and Diaphole of the Heart, as I am more prone to think then that it is merely Mechanical, as also that Respiration that is performed without the command of our Will: For the Libration or Reciprocation of the Spirits in the Tensility of the Muscles would not be so perpetual, but cease in a small time, did not some more mystical Principle then what is merely Mechanical give Assistance; as any one may understand by observing the inefficiency of those devices that Henricus Regius propounds for adequate causes of such motions in the Body. These I look upon as the First Faculties of the Soul, which may be bounded by this general charactar, That the exercise of them does not at all imply so much as our Perception.

4. Next to these is the Sensation of any external Object, such as Hearing, Seeing, Feeling, &c. All which include Perception in an unrefitible necessity thereof; the Object being present before us, and no external Obstacle interposing.

5. Imagination is more free, we being able to avoid its representations for the most part, without any external help; but it is a degree on
this side Will and Reason, by which we correct and silence unallowable fancies. Thus we see how the Faculties of the Soul rise by Degrees; which makes it still the more easy and credible, that the lowest of all is compatible to her as well as the highest.

6. Moreover, Passions and Sympathies, in my judgment, are more easily to be resolved into this Hypothesis of the Soul's pervading the whole Body, then in restraining its essential presence to one part thereof. For to believe that such an horrible Object as, suppose, a Bear or Tiger, by transmission of Motion from it through the Eyes of an Animal to the Conarion, shall so reflect thence, as to determine the Spirits into such Nerves as will frighten the Orifice of the Heart, and lessen the Pulse, and cause all other symptomes of Fear; seems to me little better than a mere piece of Mechanical Credulity. Those Motions that represent the Species of things, being turned this way or the other way, without any such impetu of Matter as should doe such feats as Des-Cartes speaks of in his Book of Passions. And that which he would give us as a pledge of this Truth is so false, that it does the more animate me to disbelieve the Theorem. * For the wafting of one's hand near the Eye of a mans friend, is no sufficient proof that external Objects will necessarily and Mechanically determine the Spirits into the Muscles, no Faculty of the Soul intermedling. For if one be fully assured, or rather can keep himself from the fear of any hurt, by the wafting of his friend's Hand before his Eye, he may easily abstain from winking: But if fear surprise him, the Soul is to be entitled to the action, and not the mere Mechanisme of the Body. Wherefore this is no proof that the Phenomena of Passions, with their consequences, may be salved in brute Beasts by pure Mechanicks; and therefore neither in Men.

But it is evident that they arise in us against both our Will and Appetite. For who would bear the tortures of Fears and Jealousies, if he could avoid it? And therefore the Soul lends not nor determines the Spirits thus to her own Torture, as she refides in the Head. Whence it is plain that it is the Effect of her as she resides in the Heart and Stomack, which sympathize with the horrid representation in the Common Senforium, by reason of the exquisite unity of the Soul with her self, and of the continuity of Spirits in the Body, the necessary instrument of all her Functions. And there is good reason the Heart and Stomack should be so much affected, they being the chief Seats of those Faculties that maintain the Life of the Body; the danger whereof is the most eminent Object of Fear in any Animal.

7. From this Principle, I conceive that not only the Sympathy of parts in one particular Subject, but of different and distant Subjects, may be understood: such as is betwixt the party wounded, and the Knife or Sword that wounded him, besmeared with the Weapon-falve, and kept in a due temper: Which certainly is not purely Mechanical, but Medical, though not in an unlawful sense; that is to say, it is not to be resolved into mere Matter, of what thinness or subtilty ever you please, but into the Unity of the Soul of the Universe * which is interested in all Plastick powers, and into the Continuity of the Subtle Matter, which answers

* See De Cartes De Pass., Part ii. Artic. 36.

* De Passion. Part. i. Artic. 13.

* See Book 3, chap. 6, fett. 7, 8, 9.
answers to our Animal Spirits. And in this sense it is that Plotinus says, that the World is ɔριγος γινε, the grand Magus or Enchanter. And I do not question, but that upon this score merely, without the association of any Familiar Spirit, several odd things may be done, for evil as well as good. For this Spirit of the World has Faculties that work not by Election, but fatally or naturally, as several Gamaeus's we meet withall in Nature seem somewhat obscurely to subindicate. Of this Principle we shall speak more fully in its due place.

8. But we have yet a more clear discovery, that our Soul is not confined to any one part of the Head, but possesseth the whole Body, from the Perception of Pain in the parts thereof: For it is plainly impossible that so high a torture as is felt but in the pricking of a Pin, can be communicatetd to the Centre of Perception upon a mere Mechanical account. For whether the immediate Instrument of Sense be the Pith of the Nerves, as Des-Cartes would have it, or whether it be the Spirits, as is most true; it is ridiculous to think, that by the forcible parting of what was joyned together at ease (when this ease is not communicatetd to either the Spirits, or Pith of the Nerves, from the place of the Puncture, to the very seat of Common Sense) the Soul there seated should feel so smart a torment, unless that her very Essence did reach to the part where the pain is felt to be. For then the reason of this is plain, that it is the Unity of Soul possesseth the whole Body, and the Continuity of Spirits that is the cause thereof.

And it is no wonder, if the continuation and natural composure of the Spirits be Rest and Ease to the Soul, that a violent disjoyning and bruising of them, and baring the Soul of them, as I may so speak, should cause a very harsh and torturous sense in the Centre of Perception. This Argument bears undeniable Evidence with it, if we do but consider the fuzziness of the Pith of the Nerves, and the fluidity of the Spirits, and what little stress or crouding so small a thing as a Pin or Needle can make in such soft and liquid Matter. The consideration whereof ought eternally to silence their scrupulosity who are so amused that the harms of the Body should be the pains of the Soul, the Body in the mean time being not pained. For this is infinitely more conceivable, then that some part of Matter in my Head should feel pain by a prick in my finger, that Matter in my Head being not at all accommodated, if so much as in the least measure moved thereby; and yet that Perception is within the Head alone, has been abundantly demonstrated.

9. Lastly, unless the very Essence of the Soul reach from the Common Sensorium to the Eye, there will be very great difficulties how there should be so distinct a representation of any visible Object. For it is very hard to conceive that the Colours will not be confounded, and the bigness of the Object diminished, and indeed that the image will not be quite lost before it can come to the Soul, if it be only in the Common Sensorium. For it is plain, and Experience will demonstrate, that there is a very perfect Image of the Object in the bottome of the Eye, which is made by the decollation of the lines of Motions from it, thus: The Line A B from the Object A C bears against that point in the bottome of
of the Eye in B, and the line C D against the point D ; whereby C and A are felt in their place, and in such a distance as they are in the Object C A : and so of all the lines which come from the Object C A into the bottome of the Eye B D. From whence the Object is felt in such a length and breadth as it is capable of being perceived in at such a distance from the Eye. And as the

Motion that is conveyed from A to B and from C to D is felt there; so the modification of it, whereby the Object in those parts may seem red, yellow, green, or any other colour, is felt there also. Whence it is plain that there will be an exquisite impression, according to all circumstances of the Object, in the bottome of the Eye: so that if the Soul receive it there, and convey it thence to her Centre of Perception entirely in the same circumstances, the representation will be compleat.

But if the Soul be not there, but the conveyance thereof must be left to the bare laws of Matter, the Image will be much depraved, or lost, before it can come to the Common Sensorium. For this Motion must be propagated from B and D till it come to the hole E, and so pass into the Optick Nerve, to be carried into the Brain, and so to the seat of Common Sense: but betwixt B and E, or D and E, there may be the depainture of sundry colours, whence it will be necessary that F be tinctured with the colour D, and G with the colour of both D and F; & so of the rest of the Lines drawn from the Object to the Eye: so that all their Colours would be blended before they came to E. Now at that harsh flexure at E, where the visual Line is as crooked as B E R, according to the experiments of Reflexion and Refraction, the breadth or length of the Object C A would be lost. For we must needs expect, that as it is in Reflexions and Refractions, where the Object will appear in that Line that immediately conveys the sense of it, so here it must be also, and therefore the point C and A must appear about Q, whence the Object will shrivel up in a manner into nothing.

And suppose it might appear in some tolerable latitude, for all this, the Brain being an opaque substance, so soon as the Motion comes thither, it would be so either changed or lost, that the Image could not pass the opacity of it in any splendour or entireness. Wherefore I do not doubt but that the Image which the Soul perceives is that in the Eye, and not any other corporeally produc'd to the inside of the Brain (where Colour and Figure would be so strangely deprav'd, if not quite obliterated) I mean it is the concurse of the lucid Spirits in the bottome of the Eye, with the outward Light conveyed through the Humours thereof (which is the best sense of the Platonick σωματικα that Plutarch speaks of) wherein the great Mystery of Sight consists.

CHAP.
CHAP. XI.

1. That neither the Soul without the Spirits, nor the Spirits without the presence of the Soul in the Organ, are sufficient Causes of Sensation.
2. A brief declaration how Sensation is made.
3. How Imagination.
4. Of Reason and Memory, and whether there be any Marks in the Brain.
5. That the Spirits are the immediate Instrument of the Soul in Memory also, and how Memory arises.
6. As also Forgetfulness.
7. How Spontaneous Motion is performed.
8. How we walk, sing, and play, though thinking of something else.
9. That though the Spirits be not alike fine everywhere, yet the Sensiferous Impression will pass to the Common Senforium.
10. That there is an Heterogeneity in the very Soul her self, and what it is in her we call the Root, the Centre, and the Eye, and what the Rayes and Branches.
11. That the sober and allowable Distribution of her into Parts, is into Perceptive and Plastic.

After our evincing that the Soul is not confined to the Common Senforium, but does essentially reach all the Organs of the Body, it will be more easy to determine the Nature of Sensation & other Operations we mentioned, which is the third thing we proposed. For we have already demonstrated these two things of main consequence; That the Spirits are not sufficient of themselves for these Functions; nor the Soul of her self, without the assistance of the Spirits as is plain in the interception or disjunction of the Spirits by Ligature or Obstruction; whence it is, that blindness sometimes happens merely for that the Optick Nerve is obstructed.

2. Wherefore briefly to dispatch our third Querie; I say in general, That Sensation is made by the arrival of motion from the Object to the Organ, where it is received in all the circumstances we perceive it in; and conveyed by virtue of the Soul's presence there, assisted by her immediate Instrument the Spirits, by virtue of whose continuance to those in the Common Senforium, the Image or Impres of every Object is faithfully transmitted thither.

3. As for Imagination, there is no question but that Function is mainly exercised in the chief seat of the Soul, those purer Animal Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain. I speak especially of that Imagination which is most free, such as we use in Romantick Inventions, or such as accompany the more severe Meditations and Disquisitions in Philosophy, or any other Intellectual entertainments. For Fasting, fresh Aire, moderate Wine, and all things that tend to an handsome supply and depuration of the Spirits, make our thoughts more free, subtile, and clear.

4. Reason is so involved together with Imagination, that we need say nothing of it apart by it self. Memory is a Faculty of a more peculiar consideration; and if the Pith of the Brain contribute to the Functions of any power of the Mind, (more then by conserving the Animal Spirits) it is to this. But that the Brain should be stored with distinct images (whether they consist of the Flexures of the supposed Fibrille, or the orderly
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orderly puncture of Pores, or in a continued modified Motion of the parts thereof, some in this manner, and others in that) is a thing, as I have * already proved, utterly impossible.

If there be any Marks in it, it must be a kind of Brachygraphie, some small dots here and there standing for the recovering to Memory a series of things that would fill, it may be, many sheets of paper to write them at large. As if a man should tie a string about a friend's finger to remember a business, that a whole daies discourse, it may be, was but little enough to give him full instructions in. From whence it is plain that the Memory is in the Soul, and not in the Brain. And if she do make any such Marks as we speak of, she having no perception of them distinct from the representation of those things which they are to re-mind her of, she must not make them by any Cognitive power, but by some such as is Analogous to her Plastick Faculty of organizing the Body, where she acts and perceives it not.

5. But whether the Soul act thus or no upon the Brain is a matter of uncertain determination; nor can it be demonstrated by any experiment that I know. And therefore if we will contain our selves within the capacities of the Spirits, which I have so often affirmed to be the immediate Instrumet of the Soul in all her operations, that Position will be more unexceptionable. And truly I do not understand but that they and the Soul together will perform all the Functions of Memory that we are conscious to our selves of.

Wherefore I shall conclude that Memory consists in this, That the Soul has acquired a greater Promptitude to think of this or that Phantasm, with the circumstances thereof, which were raised in her upon some occasion. Which Promptitude is acquired by either the often representation of the same Phantasm to her; or else by a more vivid impress of it from its novelty, excellency, mischievousness, or some such like condition that at once will pierce the Soul with an extraordinary resentment; or finally by voluntary attention, when she very carefully and on just purpose imprints the Idea as deeply as she can into her inward Sense. This Promptitude to think on such an Idea will lessen in time, and be so quite spent, that when the same Idea is represented again to the Soul, she cannot tell that ever she saw it before.

But before this inclination thereto be quite gone, upon this proneness to return into the same conception, with the circumstances, the Relative Sense of having seen it before (which we call Memory) does necessarily emerge upon a freth representation of the Object.

6. But Forgetfulness arises either out of mere Desuetude of thinking on such an Object, or on others that are linked in with it, in such a Series as would represent it as past, and so make it a proper Object of Memory. Or else for that the Spirits, which the Soul uses in all her Functions, be not in a due temper; which may arise from overmuch Coolness, or Waterishness in the Head, to which alone Senecius ascribes Oblivionsness.

7. The last thing we are to consider is Spontaneous Motion, Which that it is performed by the continuation of the Spirits from the Seat of Common Sense to the Muscles, which is the gross Engine of Motion; is

* See Chap. 5. sect. 7. alfo ch. 2. sect. 7. 8.
out of doubt. The manner how it is, we partly feel and see, that is to say, we find in our selves a power, at our own pleasure to move this or the other member with very great force, and that the Muscles move the part, which is a plain indication of influx of Spirits, thither directed or there guided by our mere Will: a thing admirable to consider, and worth our most serious meditation.

That this direction of the impress of Motion is made by our mere Will, and Imagination of doing so, we know and feel it so intimately, that we can be of nothing more sure. That there is some fluid and subtle Matter, which we ordinarily call Spirits, directed into the Muscles that move the Member, its swelling does evidence to our sight; as also the experience, that moderate use of Wine which supplies Spirits, apace will make this motion the more strong.

As for the manner, whether there be any such Valvula or no in the Nerve, common to the opposite Muscles, as also in those that are proper to each, it is not material. This great privilege of our Soul's directing the motion of Matter thus, is wonderfull enough in either Hypothesis. But I look upon the Fibrous parts of the Muscle as the main Engine of motion; which the Soul1 making with that subtle liquor of the Animal Spirits, makes them swell and shrink, like Lute-strings in rainy weather: And in this chiefly consists that notable Strength of our Limbs in Spontaneous motion. But for those conceived Valvula that Experience has not found out yet, nor sufficient Reason, they are to wait for admission till they bring better evidence. For the presence of the Animal Spirits in this Fibrous flesh, and the command of the Soul to move, is sufficient to subsist all Phanomena of this kind. For upon the Will conceived in the Common Senforium, that part of the Soul that resides in the Muscles, by a power near akin to that by which the made the Body and the Organs thereof, guides the Spirits into such Pores and parts as is most requisite for the shewing the use of this excellent Fabric.

8. And in virtue of some such power as this do we so easily walk, though we think not of it, as also breathe, and sing, and play on the Lute, though our Minds be taken with something else. For Cus- tome is another Nature: and though the Animal Spirits, as being merely corporeal, cannot be capable of any habit; yet the Soul, even in that part thereof that is not Cognitive, may, and therefore may move the Body, though Cogitation ceasa; provided the members be well replenished with Spirits, whose affluence in natural motions of Animals is so great, that their Heads being taken off, their Body for a long time will move as before: as Chalcidius relates of Wasps and Hornets, who will fly about, and use their wings, a good part of an hour after they have loft their Heads: which is to be imputed to the residence of their Soul in them still, and the intirenes of the Animal Spirits, not easily evaporating through their crustaceous Bodies.

For it is but a vulgar conceit to think, that the Head being taken off, the Soul must presently fly out, like a Bird out of a Basket, when the Lid is lifted up. For the whole World is as much throng'd with Body, as where she is, and that Eye of the Spirits as yet not being loof, it is a
greater engagement to her to be there then any where else. This motion
therefore in the Wasp, that is so perfect and durable, I hold to be Vital;
but that in the parts of dismembered creatures, that are less perfect, may
be uniformly Mechanical.

9. We have now, so far forth as it is requisite for our design, conside-
red the Nature and Functions of the Soul; and have plainly demon-
strated, That she is a Substance distinct from the Body, and that her very
Essence is spread throughout all the Organs thereof; as also that the
general Instrument of all her Operations is the Subtle Spirits; which
though they be not in like quantity and sincerity every where, yet they
make all the Body so pervious to the impressions of Objects upon the ex-
ternal Organs, that like Lightning they pass to the Common Sense
from the Matter where the most subtile motion begins. Whence Light paffes both
Aire and Water, though Aire alone is not sufficient for such a motion as
Light, and Water almost incapable of being the Seat of the fountain
thereof. This may serve to illustrate the passage of Sense from the Mem-
branes (or in what other feat soever the Spirits are most subtile and lucid)
through thicker places of the Body to the very Centre of Perception.

10. Lastly, we have discovered a kind of Heterogeneity in the Soul;
and that she is not of the same power every where. For her Centre of
Perception is confined to the Fourth Ventricle of the Brain; and if the
Senfiferous Motions we speak of be not faithfully conducted thither, we
have no knowledge of the Object. That part therefore of the Soul is to
be looked upon as most precious; and the not being an independent
Mafs, as Matter is, but one part resulting from another, that which is the
noblest is in all reason to be deemed the cause of the rest. For which
reason (as Synesius calls God, on whom all things depend, περὶ πάντων, so)
I think this Part may be called the Root of the Soul.

Which apprehension of ours will seem the less strange, if we consider
that from the highest Life, viz. the Deity, there does result that which
has no Life nor Sense at all, to wit the stupid Matter. Wherefore in very
good Analogie we may admit, that that precious part of the Soul in which
resides Perception, Sense and Understanding, may send forth such an
Essential Emanation from itself as is utterly devoid of all Sense and Per-
ception; which you may call, if you will, the Exterior branches of the
Soul, or the Rays of the Soul, if you call that nobler and diviner part the
Centre; which may very well merit also the appellation of the Eye of the
Soul, all the rest of its parts being but mere darkness without it. In
which, like another Cyclops, it will re semble the World we live in, whose
one Eye is conspicuous to all that behold the light.

11. But to leave such lucorous Considerations, that rather gratifie
our Fancy then satisfy our severer Faculties; we shall content our selves
hereafter, from those two notorious Powers, and so perfectly different,
which Philosophers acknowledge in the Soul, (to wit, Perception and
Organization,) only to term that more noble part of her in the Common
Sensarium, the Perceptive, and all the rest the Plastic part of the Soul.
1. Having thus discovered the Nature of the Soul, and that she is a Substance distinct from the Body; I should be in readiness to treat of her Separation from it, did I not think my self obliged first, to answer an envious Objection cast in our way, whereby they would make us believe, That the Arguments which we have used, though they be no less than Demonstrations, are mere Sophisms, because some of them, and those of not the least validity, prove what is very absurd and false, viz. That the Souls of Brutes also are Substances Incorporeals, distinct from the Body: from whence it will follow, that they are Immortal. But to this I have answered already in the Appendix to my Antidote, and in brief concluded, That they are properly not more Immortal than the stupid Matter, which never perishes, and that out of a terrestrial Body they may have no more sense then it. For all these things are as it pleases the first Creator of them.

2. To this they pervertly reply, That if the Souls of Brutes subsist after death, and are then senile and inanimate, it will necessarily follow that they must come into Bodies again. For it is very ridiculous to think that these Souls, having a Being yet in the world, and wanting nothing but fitly-prepared Matter to put them in a capacity of living again, should be always neglected, and never brought into play, but that new ones should be daily created in their stead: for those innumerable Myriads of Souls would lie useless in the Universe, the number still increasing even to infinity. But if they come into Bodies again, it is evident that they exist: and if the Souls of Brutes exist, then certainly the Souls of Men doe fo too. Which is an Opinion fo wild and extravagant, that a weary mouth and a loud laughter (the Argument that every Fool is able to use) is sufficient to silence it and dash it out of countenance.
No wise man can ever harbour such a conceit as this, which every idiot is able to confute by consulting but with his own Memory. For he is sure, if he had been before, he could remember something of that life past. Besides the unconceivableness of the Approach and Entrance of these praecurrent Souls into the Matter that they are to actuate.

3. To this may be answered two things. The first, That though indeed it cannot be well denied, but that the concession of the Praecurrence of the Souls of Brutes is a very fair introduction to the belief of the Praecurrence of the Souls of Men also; yet the sequel is not at all necessary, but one may be without the other.

4. The second is this, That if the sequel were granted, no absurdity can be detected therefrom in Reason, if the prejudices of Education, and the blind suggestion of unconcerned Faculties, that have no right to vote here, be laid aside. To speak more explicitly, I say, This consequence of our Soul's Praecurrence is more agreeable to Reason then any other Hypothesis whatever; Has been received by the most learned Philosophers of all Ages, there being scarce any of them that held the Soul of man Immortal upon the mere light of Nature and Reason, but asserted also her Praecurrence; That Memory is no fit Judge to appeal to in this Controversie; and lastly, That Traduction and Creation are as intricate and unconceivable as this opposed Opinion.

5. I shall make all these four parts of my Answer good in order. The truth of the first we shall understand, if we compare it with those Opinions that stand in competition with it, which are but two—that are considerable. The one is of those that say the Soul is ex traduce, the other of those that say it is created, upon occasion. The first Opinion is a plain contradiction to the Notion of a Soul, which is a Spirit, and therefore of an Indivisible, that is, of an Indiscernible, Essence. The second Opinion implies both an Indignity to the Majesty of God, (in making him the chief assistant and actor in the highest, freeest, and most particular way that the Divinity can be conceived to act, in those abominable crimes of Whoredome, Adultery, Incest, nay Buggery itself, by supplying those foul coitions with new created Souls for the purpose;) and also an injury to the Souls themselves; that they being ever thus created by the immediate hand of God, and therefore pure, innocent and immaculate, should be imprisoned in unclean, diseased and disordered Bodies, where very many of them seem to be so fatally overmattered, and in such an utter incapacity of closing with what is good and virtuous, that they must needs be adjudged to that extreme calamity which attends all those that forget God. Wherefore these two Opinions being so incongruous, what is there left that can seem probable, but the Praecurrence of the Soul?

6. But I shall not press the Reasonableness of this Opinion only from comparing it with others, but also from the concinncity that is to be found in itself. For as it is no greater wonder that every particular man's Soul that lives now upon Earth should be a mundo condito, then the particular Matter of their Bodies should, (which has haply undergone many Millions of Alterations and Modifications, before it lighted into
into such a contexture as to prove the entire Body of any one person in the world, has been in places unimaginably distant, has filed, it may be, through the triangular passages of as many Fortices as we see Stars in a clear frosty night, and has shone once as bright as the Sun (as the Cartesian Hypothesis would have all the Earth to have done) infomuch that we eat, and drink, and cloath our selves with that which was once pure Light and Flaze:) So, that de facto they do bear the same date with the Creation of the World, that unavoidable certainty of the Pre-existence of the Souls of Brutes does, according to the very concession of our Adversaries, fairly in infinita.

7. But this is not all. Both the Attributes of God, and Face of things in the world, out of which his Providence is not to be excluded, are very strong Demonstrations thereof to Reason unprejudiced. For first, If it be good for the Souls of men to be at all, the sooner they are, the better. But we are most certain that the Wisdom and Goodness of God will doe that which is the best; and therefore if they can enjoy themselves before they come into these Terrestrial Bodies, (it being better for them to enjoy themselves then not,) they must be before they come into these Bodies; that is, they must be in a capacity of enjoying themselves without them for long periods of time, before they appeared here in this Age of the World. For nothing hinders but that they may live before they come into the Body, as well as they may after their going out of it: the latter whereof is acknowledged even by them that deny the Pre-existence.

Wherefore the Pre-existence of Souls is a necessary refult of the Wisdom and Goodness of God, who can no more fail to doe that which is best, then he can to understand it: for otherwise his Wisdom would exceed his Benignity; nor there would be left hold to be taken of his Goodness, then of the Bounty of a very benign and good man, who, we may be well affurred, will flip no opportunity of doing good that lies in his power, especially if it be neither damage nor trouble to him; both which hindrances are incombible to the Deity.

8. Again, The face of Providence in the World seems very much to suit with this Opinion; there being not any so natural and easie account to be given of those things that seem the most harsh in the affairs of men, as from this Hypothesis, That their Souls did once subsist in some other state; where, in several manners and degrees, they forfeited the favour of their Creator. And so according to that just Nemesis that He has interwoven in the constitution of the Universe, and of their own natures, they undergo several calamities and asperities of Fortune, and sad drudgeries of Fate, as a punishment inflicted, or a disease contracted from the several Obliquities of their Apostasie. Which key is not onely able to unlock that reconit mystery of some particular mens almost fatal adversines from all Religion and Vertue, their stupidity and dulness and even invincible flownees to these things from their very childhood, and their uncorrigible propension to all manner of Vice; but also of that squalid forlornness and brutifh Barbarity that whole Nations for many Ages have layen under, and many do still lie under at this very day. Which
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Which sad Scene of things must needs exceedingly cloud and obscure the waies of Divine Providence, and make them utterly unintelligible; unless some light be let in from the present Hypothesis we speak of.

It is plain therefore that there are very weighty Reasons may be found out to conclude the Præexistence of Souls. And therefore this Opinion being so demonstrable from this Faculty, and there being no other that can contradict it, (for that the veridict of Memory in this case is invalid I shall prove anon) we are according to the Light of Nature undoubtedly to conclude, That the Souls of Men do præexist, by Axiomę 5.

9. And as this Hypothesis is Rational in itself, so has it also gained the suffrages of all Philosophers of all Ages, of any note, that have held the Soul of Man Incorporeal and Immortal. And therefore I am not at all facricious what either the Epicureans or Stoicks held concerning this matter; this contest being betwixt those only that agree on this Truth, That the Soul is a Substance Immaterial. And such amongst the Philosophers as held it so, did unanimously agree That it does Præexist. This is so plain, that it is enough only to make this challenge; every one in the search will satisfy himself of the Truth thereof. I shall only add, for the better countenance of the busines, some few Inftances herein, as a pledge of the Truth of my general Conclusion. Let us cast our Eye, therefore into what corner of the World we will, that has been famous for Wisdome and Literature, and the wise is of those Nations you shall find the Affertours of this Opinion.

15. In Egypt, that ancient Nurfe of all hidden Sciences, that this Opinion was in vogue amongt the wise men there, those fragments of Trismegist do sufficiently witness. For though there may be suspected some fraud and corruption in several passages in that Book, in reference to the interest of Chriftianity; yet this Opinion of the Præexistence of the Soul, in which Chriftianity did not interest it self, cannot but be judged, from the Testimony of those Writings, to have been a Branch of the Wisdome of that Nation; of which Opinion not only the Gymnosophists and other wise men of Egypt were, but also the Brach- mans of India, and the Magi of Babylon and Persia; as you may plainly see by those Oracles that are called either Magical or Chaldæical, which Pileth and Pefius have commented upon. To these you may add the abstruse Philosophy of the Jews, which they call their Cabbala, of which the Soul's Præexistence makes a considerable part; as all the learned of the Jews do confefs. And how naturally applicable this Theory is to those three firft mysterious chapters of Genesis, I have, I hope, with no contemptible success, endeavoured to shew in my Conjectura Cabbaliftica.

11. And if I should particularize in persons of this Opinion, truly they are such, of so great fame for depth of Understanding and abstruse Science, that their Testimony alone might seem sufficient to bear down any ordinary modest man into an affent to their doctrine. And in the first place, If we can believe the Cabbala of the Jews, we must assign it to Moses, the greatest Philosopher certainly that ever was in the world; to whom you may add Zoroaftor, Pythagoras, Epicurians, Em- Q. 4 pedocles,
pedocles, Cebes, Euripides, Plato, Euclide, Philo, Virgil, Marcus Cicero, Plotinus, Iamblichus, Proclus, Boethius, Pallas, and several others which it would be too long to recite. And if it were fit to addde Fathers to Philosophers, we might enter into the same lift Synesius and Origen: the latter of whom was surely the greatest Light and Bulwark that antient Christianty had; who, unless there had been some very great matter in it, was far from that levity and vanity, as to entertain an Opinion so vulgarly flighted and neglected by other men: and the same may be said of others that were Christianians, as Boethius, Pallas, and the late learned Marsiliius Ficinus. But I have not yet ended my Catalogue: that admirable Physician Johannes Fernelius is also of this persifwation, and is not content to be to himself onely, but discovers those two grand Masters of Medicine, Hippocrates and Galen, to be so too; as you may see in his * De abditis rerum causis. * Cardan also, that famous Philosopher of his Age, expressly concludes, that the Rational Soul is both a distinct being from the Soul of the World, and that it does praexist before it comes into the Body: and lastly Pomponatus, no friend to the Soul's Immortality, yet cannot but confess, that the safest way to hold it is also therewith to acknowledge her Pra-

existence.

12. And that nothing may be wanting to shew the frivolousness of this part of the Objection, we shall also evince that Arislothe, that has the luck to be believed more then most Authors, was of the same opinion, in his Treatise * De Anima. Where he speaking of the necessity of the qualification of the Body that the Soul is to actuate, and blaming those that omit that consideration, saies, That they are as careless of that matter, as if it were possible that, according to the Pythagorick fables, any Soul might enter into any Body. Whenes every Animal, as it has its proper species, so it is to have its peculiar form. But those that define otherwise, Παρασκηνήν αὕτην, faith he, ἄρατα καὶ τοῖς φαιναι τιμι τελειολην εἰς ἀγαλμανεῖεσ, διε ὀστήν ἐν δισείς τοῖς ὑποδικισ, η ἡ θείαν τάσσειν, i.e. They speak as if one should affirm that the skill of a Carpenter did enter into a Flute or Pipe, for every Art must use its proper Instruments, and every Soul its proper Body. Where (as Cardan also has observed) Arislothe does not find fault with the Opinion of the Soul's going out of one Body into another, (which implies their Praexistence;) but that the Soul of a Beast should goe into the Body of a Man, and the Soul of a Man into a Beast's Body: this is the Absurdity that Arislothe justly rejects, the other Opinion he seems tacitely to allow of.

13. He speaks something more plainly in his De Generat. Animal. There are generated, faith he, in the Earth, and in the moisture thereof, Plants and living Creatures; because in the Earth is the moisture, and in the moisture Spirit; and in the whole Universe an Animal warmth or heat; insomuch that in a manner all places are full of Souls, οἵς χρῶσιν τινα πάναι τοῖς ὕδατις ἐνοῖσιν. * Αδεὶ ωστα μοῦνον quodam omnia sint Animorum plena, as Senenrus interprets the place: Arislothe understanding by ἔνοισιν, the fame that he does afterwards by ἔνοισιν ἀρχήν, that Principle
ciple we call soul, according to the nobility whereof he afferts that Anim-
als are more or lesss noble; which affertation therefore reaches Humane
Souls as well as thefes of Beafis.

14. Nor can this Text be eluded by being so injurious to Aristotle, as
to make him to affert that there is but one Soul in the world, be-
cause he faies "νους, not "νους. For the text admitting of Semperus
his expofition as well as this other, that which is moft reafonable is to
be attributed to him. Now if his meaning was, that there is but One
Soul in the World that goes through all things, and makes the Uni-
verse one great Animal, as the Stoicks would have it; he need not fay
that all places are in a manner full of this Soul, but absolutely full of it,
as our Body is wholly actuated by the Soul in it. And therefore the
Sene must be, that all places indeed are in a manner full of Souls: not
that they have opportunity to actuate the Matter, and shew their pre-
ience there by vital operation; but are there dormant as to any vi-
ble energy, till prepared Matter engage them to more sensible actions.

15. We will add a third place still more clear, out of the fame Treat-
ife, where he farts this very queftion of the Preexistency of Souls, of the
Sensitive and Rational especially; πρὶ τοῦ ξηραμένος ζωοῦς ὑπὲρ θανάτου,
whether both kinds do ἐνέργεια, that is praexifé, before they come
into the Body, or whether the Rational onely: and he concludes thus,
Λειποὶ ἦν νοῦς μένου ἐξαραμένου διὰ ἐνέργειας ἦν ἔνεργον ὑπὸ τῆς
ἐνέργειας καὶ ἔνθα ἔνεργη σώματι ἐνέργεια, i. e. It remains that the Rational or
Intellectual Soul onely enter from without, as being onely of a nature purely
divine, with whose actions the actions of this gros Body have no commu-
nication. Concerning which point he concludes like an Orthodox Schol-
ar of his excellent Master Plato; to whose footsteps the clofer he keeps,
the lefs he ever wanders from the Truth. For in this very place he does
plainly profess, what many would not have him fo apertly guilty of, that
the Soul of man is Immortal, and can perform her proper Functions with-
out the help of this Terrestrial Body.

And thus I think I have made good the two first parts of my An-
swer to the proposed Objection; and have clearly proved, That the
Præxistence of the Soul is an Opinion both in it felf the moft rational
that can be maintained, and has had the suffrage of the renowned Philo-
osophers in all Ages of the World; and that therefore this Sequel
from our Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul is no discovery of
any fallacy in them.
CHAP. XIII.

1. The third part of the second Answer, That the forgetting of the former state is no good Argument against the Soul's Preexistence. 2. What are the chief causes of Forgetfulness. 3. That they all conspire, and that in the highest degree, to destroy the memory of the other state. 4. That mischances and Diseases have quite taken away the Memory of things here in this life. 5. That it is impossible for the Soul to remember her former condition without a Miracle. 6. The fourth part of the second Answer, That the Entrance of a Preexistent Soul into a Body is as intelligible as either Creation or Traduction.

1. As for the two last Difficulties, concerning the Soul's Memory of her former state, and the manner of her coming into the Body;

I hope I shall with as much ease extricate my self here also, especially in the former. For if we consider what things they are that either quite take away, or exceedingly diminish our Memory in this life; we shall find the concourse of them all, and that in a higher degree, or from stronger causes, contained in our descent into this Earthly Body, then we can meet with here: they none of them being so violent as to dislodge us out of it.

2. Now the things that take away our Memory here are chiefly these; either The want of opportunity of being re-minded of a thing, as it happens with many, who rife confident they slept without dreaming such a night, and yet before they goe to bed again, recover a whole Series of representations they had in their last sleep, by something that fell out in the day, without which it had been impossible for them to recall to mind their Dream. Or else, in the second place, Desuetude of thinking of a matter; whereby it comes to pass, that what we have earnestly meditated, laboured for, and penned down with our own hands when we were at School, were it not that we saw our names written under the Exercise, we could not acknowledge for ours when we are grown men. Or lastly, Some considerable change in the frame and temper of our Body, whether from some external mischief, or from some violent Disease, or else from old age, which is disease enough of itself: which often do exceedingly impair, if not quite take away, the Memory, though the Soul be still in the same Body.

3. Now all these Principles of Forgetfulness, namely, The want of something to re-mind us, Desuetude of thinking, and an Extraordinary change in the Body, are more eminently to be found in the Descent of the Soul into these Earthly prisons, then can happen to her for any time of her abode therein. For there is a greater difference, in all probability, betwixt that Scene of things the Soul sees out of the Body and in it, then betwixt what she sees sleeping and waking: and the perpetual occurrences of this present life continue a long Desuetude of thinking on the former. Besides that their Descent hither in all likelihood scarce befalls them but in their state of Silence and Inactivity, in which myriads of
of Souls may haply be for many Ages, as the maintainers of this Opinion may pretend, by reason of the innumerable expirations of the Aéreal periods of life, and the more narrow Laws of preparing Terrestrial Matter. And lastly, her coming into this Earthly Body is a greater and more disadvantageous change, for the utter spoiling of the Memory of things she was acquainted with before, then any Mischance or Disease can be for the bringing upon her a forgetfulness of what she has known in this life.

4. And yet that Diseases and Casualties have even utterly taken away all memory, is amply recorded in History. As that Messala Corvinus forgot his own name; that one, by a blow with a stone, forgot all his learning; another, by a fall from an Horse, the name of his Mother and kinsfolks. A young Student of Montpelier, by a wound, lost his Memory so, that he was fain to be taught the letters of the Alphabet again. The like befell a Francifcan after a Fever. And Thucydides writes of some, who after their recovery from that great Pestilence at Athens, did not only forget the names and perçons of their friends, but themselves too, not knowing who themselves were, nor by what name they were called:

&ae; etiam quo tandem cepisse obliteraverum

Cunctarum, nsecures posse cognosce re at ipsi?

as the Poet Lucrețius sadly lets down in his description of that devouring Plague, out of the fore-named Historian.

5. Wherefore without a miracle it is imposibl the Soul should remember any particular circumstance of her former condidion, though she did really preëxist, and was in a capacity of acting before she came into this Body, (as Aristotle plainly acknowledges she was) her change being far greater by coming into the Body then can ever be made while she stays in it. Which we haply shall be yet more affurred of, after we have considered the manner of her descent, which is the last Difficulty objected.

6. I might easily decline this Controversie, by pleading only, That the Entrance of the Soul into the Body, supposing her Preëxistence, is as intelligible as in those other two ways, of Creation and Traduction. For how this newly-created Soul is infused by God, no man knows; nor how, if it be traduced from the Parents, both their Souls contribute to the making up a new one. For if there be decision of part of the Soul of the Male, in the injection of his seed into the matrix of the Female, and part of the Female Soul to joyn with that of the Male’s, besides that the decision of these parts of their Souls makes the Soul a Discernible essence, it is unconceivable how these two parts should make up one Soul for the Infant: a thing ridiculous at first view. But if there be no decision of any parts of the Soul, and yet the Soul of the Parents be the Cause of the Soul of the Child, it is perfectly an act of Creation; a thing that all sober men conclude incompatible to any particular Creature. It is therefore plainly unintelligible, how any Soul should pass from the Parents into the Body of the seed of the Fetus, to actuate and inform it: which might be sufficient to stop the mouth of the
the Opponer, that pretends such great obscurities concerning the entrance of Praexistens Souls into their Bodies.

CHAP. XIV.

1. The knowledge of the difference of Vehicles, and the Soul's Union with them, necessary for the understanding how he enters into this Earthly Body. 2. That though the Name of Vehicle he not in Aristotle, yet the Thing is there. 3. A clearing of Aristotle's notion of the Vehicle, out of the Philosophy of Des-Cartes. 4. A full interpretation of his Text. 5. That Aristotle makes only two Vehicles, Terrestrial and Æthereal, which is more than sufficient to prove the Soul's Oblivion of her former State. 6. That the ordinary Vehicle of the Soul after death is Aire. 7. The duration of the Soul in her several Vehicles. 8. That the Union of the Soul with her Vehicle does not consist in Mechanical Congruity, but Vital. 9. In what Vital congruity of the Matter consists. 10. In what Vital congruity of the Soul consists, and how it changing, the Soul may be free from her Ierial Vehicle, without violent precipitation out of it. 11. Of the manner of the Descent of Souls into Earthly Bodies. 12. That there is so little Absurdity in the Praexistence of Souls, that the conception thereof can be but a very small prejudice to our Demonstrations of her Immortality.

But I shall spend my time better in clearing the Opinion I here defend, then in perplexing that other that is so gross of it self, that none that thoroughly understand the nature of the Soul can so much as allow the possibility thereof: wherefore for the better conceiving how a Praexistent Soul may enter this Terrestrial Body, there are two things to be enquired into; the difference of the Vehicles of Souls, and the cause of their union with them. The Platonists do chiefly take notice of Three kinds of Vehicles, Æthereal, Ierial, and Terrestrial, in every one whereof there may be several degrees of purity and impurity, which yet need not amount to a new Species.

2. This Notion of Vehicles, though it be discoursed of most in the School of Plato, yet is not altogether neglected by Aristotle, as appears in his De Generat. Animal, where, though he does not use the Name, yet he does expressly acknowledge the Thing it self: For he does plainly affirm, That every Soul partakes of a Body distinct from this organized terrestrial Body; and of a more divine nature than the Elements so called; and that as one Soul is more noble than another, so is the difference of this diviner Body; which yet is nothing else with him then that warmth or heat in the feed, τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀφθισθῃ ἑναπόθεν τῷ θελόμενον ἐν θυμῷ, which is not Fire, but a Spirit contained in the spumeous feed, and in this Spirit a nature analogous to the Element of the Stars.

3. Of which neither Aristotle himself had, nor any one else can have, so explicite an apprehension as those that understand the first and second Element.
CHAP. XIV. The Immortality of the Soul.

Element of Des-Cartes; which is the most subtile and active Body that is in the World, and is of the very same nature that the Heaven and Stars are, that is to say, is the very Body of Light, (which is to be understood chiefly of the first Element) though so mingled with other Matter here below that it does not shine, but is the Basis of all that natural warmth in all generations, and the immediate Instrument of the Soul, when it organizes any Matter into the figure or shape of an Animal; as I have also intimated elsewhere, when I proved, That the Spirits are the immediate Instrument of the Soul in all Vital and Animal functions. In which Spirits of necessity is contained this Celestial Substance, which keeps them from congealing, as it does also all other liquid bodies, and must needs be in the Pores of them; there being no Vacuum in the whole comprehension of Nature.

4. The full and express meaning therefore of Aristotle's text must be this, That in the spumous and watry or terrene moisture of the feed is contained a Body of a more spirituous or aereal consistency, and in this aereal or spirituous consistency is comprehended φυτω, ανάλογος, τον τον ανερ αριστερος, a nature that is analogous or like to the Element of the Stars, namely that is of itself aereal and lucid.

5. And it is this Vehicle that Aristotle seems to assure that the Soul does act in separate from the Body; as if the were ever either in this Terrestrial Body, or in her Aereal one: which if it were true, so vast a change must needs obliterate all Memory of her former condition, when she is once plunged into this earthly prison. But it seems not so probable to me, that Nature admits of so great a Chafme; nor is it necessary to suppose it for this purpose: the defect of the Soul out of her Aerial Vehicle into this terrestrial Body, and belmearing moisture of the first rudiments of life, being sufficient to lull her into an eternal oblivion of whatever happened to her in that other condition; to say nothing of her long state of Silence and Inactivity before her turn come to revive in an earthly body.

6. Wherefore not letting go that more orderly conceit of the Platonists, I shall make bold to assure, That the Soul may live and act in an Aereal Vehicle as well as in the Aereal; and that there are very few that arrive to that high Happiness, as to acquire a Celestial Vehicle immediately upon their quitting the Terrestrial one: that Heavenly Chariots necessarily carrying us in triumph to the greatest Happiness the Soul of man is capable of: which would arrive to all men indifferently, good and bad, if the parting with this Earthly Body would suddenly mount us into the Heavenly. Wherefore by a just Nemesis, the Souls of Men that are not very Heroically vertuous will find themselves restrained within the compas of this caliginous Aire, as both Reason itself will suggest, and the Platonists have unanimously determined.

7. We have competently described the difference of those Three kinds of Vehicles, for their purity and consistence. The Platonists add to this the difference of duration, making some of them of that nature as to entertain the Soul a longer time in them, others a shorter. The shortest of all is that of the Terrestrial Vehicle. In the Aereal the Soul may inhabit, as they define, many ages, and in the Aereal for ever.
8. But this makes little to the clearing of the manner of their descent
8. But this makes little to the clearing of the manner of their descent
eis-pected, which cannot be better understood, then by considering their
eis-pected, which cannot be better understood, then by considering their
Union with the Body generated or indeed with any kind of Body what-
Union with the Body generated or indeed with any kind of Body what-
ever, where the Soul is held captive, and cannot quit her self thereof by
ever, where the Soul is held captive, and cannot quit her self thereof by
the free imperium of her own Imagination and Will. For what can be
the free imperium of her own Imagination and Will. For what can be
the cause of this cohesion, the very Essence of the Soul being so easily
the cause of this cohesion, the very Essence of the Soul being so easily
penetrative of Matter, and the dimensions of all Matter being alike pen-
penetrative of Matter, and the dimensions of all Matter being alike pen-
trable everywhere? For there being no more Body or Matter in a Vessel
trable everywhere? For there being no more Body or Matter in a Vessel
filled with Lead then when it is full of Water, nor when full with Water
filled with Lead then when it is full of Water, nor when full with Water
then when with Aire, or what other subtler Body fower that can be
then when with Aire, or what other subtler Body fower that can be
imagined in the Univerfe; it is manifest that the Grasities of Matter is
imagined in the Univerfe; it is manifest that the Grasities of Matter is
everywhere alike, and alike penetrable and passable to the Soul. And
everywhere alike, and alike penetrable and passable to the Soul. And
therefore it is unconceivable how her Union should be fo with any of it,
therefore it is unconceivable how her Union should be fo with any of it,
as that she should not be able at any time to glide freely from one part
as that she should not be able at any time to glide freely from one part
thereof to another as she pleases.
thereof to another as she pleases.

It is plain therefore, that this Union of the Soul with Matter does not
It is plain therefore, that this Union of the Soul with Matter does not
arise from any such gross Mechanical way, as when two Bodies stick one
arise from any such gross Mechanical way, as when two Bodies stick one
in another by reason of any toughness and viscoity, or straight commis-
in another by reason of any toughness and viscoity, or straight commis-
jure of parts, but from a congruity of another nature, which I know not
jure of parts, but from a congruity of another nature, which I know not
better how to term then Vital? which Vital Congruity is chiefly in the
better how to term then Vital? which Vital Congruity is chiefly in the
Soul it self, it being the nobleft Principle of Life; but is also in the Mat-
Soul it self, it being the nobleft Principle of Life; but is also in the Mat-
ter, and is there nothing but such modification thereof as fits the Plasick
ter, and is there nothing but such modification thereof as fits the Plasick
part of the Soul, and tempts out that Faculty into act.
part of the Soul, and tempts out that Faculty into act.

9. Not that there is any Life in the Matter with which this in the Soul
9. Not that there is any Life in the Matter with which this in the Soul
should sympathize and unite; but it is termed Vital because it makes the
should sympathize and unite; but it is termed Vital because it makes the
Matter a congruous Subject for the Soul to reside in, and exercise the
Matter a congruous Subject for the Soul to reside in, and exercise the
functions of life. For that which has no life it self, may tie to it that
functions of life. For that which has no life it self, may tie to it that
which has. As some men are faid to be tied by the teeth, or tied by the
which has. As some men are faid to be tied by the teeth, or tied by the
ear, when they are detained by the pleasure they are struck with from
ear, when they are detained by the pleasure they are struck with from
good Musick or delicious Viands. But neither is that which they eat
good Musick or delicious Viands. But neither is that which they eat
alive, nor that which makes the Musick, neither the Instrument, nor
alive, nor that which makes the Musick, neither the Instrument, nor
the Air that conveys the sound. For there is nothing in all this but
the Air that conveys the sound. For there is nothing in all this but
more Matter and corporeal motion, and yet our vital functions are
more Matter and corporeal motion, and yet our vital functions are
affected thereby. Now as we fee that the Perceptive part of the Soul is
affected thereby. Now as we fee that the Perceptive part of the Soul is
thus vitally affected with that which has no life in it, so it is reaonable
thus vitally affected with that which has no life in it, so it is reaonable
that the Plasick part thereof may be fo too; That there may be an Har-
that the Plasick part thereof may be fo too; That there may be an Har-
mony betwixt Matter thus and thus modified, and that Power that we
mony betwixt Matter thus and thus modified, and that Power that we
call Plasick, that is utterly devoid of all Perception. And in this alone
call Plasick, that is utterly devoid of all Perception. And in this alone
consists that which we call Vital Congruity in the prepared Matter,
consists that which we call Vital Congruity in the prepared Matter,
either to be organized, or already shaped into the perfect form of an
either to be organized, or already shaped into the perfect form of an
Animal.
Animal.

10. And that Vital Congruity which is in the Soul, I mean in the Pla-
10. And that Vital Congruity which is in the Soul, I mean in the Pla-
sick part thereof, is analogous to that Pleasure that is perceived by the
nsick part thereof, is analogous to that Pleasure that is perceived by the
Sens, or rather to the capacity of receiving it, when the Sens is by
Sens, or rather to the capacity of receiving it, when the Sens is by
agreeable motions from without or in the Body it self very much grati-
agreeable motions from without or in the Body it self very much grati-
fied, and that whether the Mind will or no. For there are some
fied, and that whether the Mind will or no. For there are some
Touches that will in their Perception seem plesant, whether our Judge-
Touches that will in their Perception seem plesant, whether our Judge-
ment would have them fo or not. What this is to the Perceptive part of
ment would have them fo or not. What this is to the Perceptive part of
the Soul, that other Congruity of Matter is to the Plastick. And therefore that which ties the Soul and this or that Matter together, is an unresistible and perceptible pleasure, if I may so call it, arising from the congruity of Matter to the Plastick faculty of the Soul: which Congruity in the Matter not failing, nor that in the Soul, the Union is at least as necessary as the continuation of eating and drinking, so long as Hunger and Thirst continues, and the Meat and Drink proves good. But either satiety in the Stomack or some ill taste in the Meat may break the congruity on either side, and then the action will cease with the pleasure thereof. And upon this very account may a Soul be conceived to quit her Adiey Vehicle within a certain period of Ages, as the Platonists hold the does, without any violent precipitation of herself out of it.

11. What are the strings or cords that tie the Soul to the Body, or to what Vehicle else forever, I have declared as clearly as I can. From which it will be easy to understand the manner of her descent. For assuredly, the same cords or strings that tie her there, may draw her thither: Where the carcass is, there will the Eagles be gathered. Not that she need use her Perceptive faculty in her descent, as Hawks and Kites by their flight or smelling fly directly to the lure or the prey: but she being within the Atmosphera (as I may so call it) of Generation, and so her Plastick power being reached and touched by such an invisible reek, (as Birds of prey are, that smell out their food at a distance;) she may be fatally carried, all Perceptions ceasing in her, to that Matter that is to fit a receptacle for her to exercise her efformative power upon. For this Magick sphere, as I may so term it, that has this power of conjuring down Souls into Earthly Bodies, the nearer the Centre, the virtue is the stronger; and therefore the Soul will never cease till she has slid into the very Matter that sent out those rays or subtle reek to allure her.

From whence it is easy to conceive that the Souls of Brutes also, though they be not able to exercise their Perceptive faculty out of a Terrifical body, yet they may infallibly finde the way again into the world, as often as Matter is fitly prepared for generation. And this is one Hypothesis, and most intelligible to those that are pleased so much with the opinion of those large Spheres they conceive of emissary Atomes.

There is also another, which is the Power and Activity of the Spirit of Nature or Inferior Soul of the World, who is as fit an Agent to transmit particular Souls, as she is to move the parts of Matter. But of this * hereafter.

12. What has been said is enough for the present to illustrate the pretended obscurity and unconceivableness of this Mystery. So that I have fully made good all the four parts of my Answer to that Objection that would have supplanted the force of my strongest Arguments for the Soul’s Immortality; and have clearly proved, That though this sequel did necessarily result from them, That the Souls both of Men and Beasts did Preexist, yet to unprejudiced reason there is no Absurdity nor Inconvenience at all in the Opinion. And therefore this Obstacle being removed, I shall the more cheerfully proceed to the demonstrating of the Soul’s actual Separation from the Body.
CHAP. XV.

1. What is meant by the Separation of the Soul, with a confusion of Regius, who would stop her in the dead Corps. 2. An Answer to those that profess themselves puzzled how the Soul can get out of the Body. 3. That there is a threefold Vital Congruity to be found in three several Subjects. 4. That this triple Congruity is also complest to one Subject, viz. the Soul of Man. 5. That upon this Hypothesis it is very intelligible how the Soul may leave the Body. 6. That her Union with the Aerial Vehicle may be very sudden, and as it were in a moment. 7. That the Soul is actually separate from the Body, is to be proved either by History or Reason. Examples of the former kinde out of Pliny, Herodotus, Ficinicus. 8. Whether the Ecstatic of Witches prove an actual separation of the Soul from the Body. 9. That this real separation of the Soul in Ecstatic is very possible. 10. How the Soul may be loosed and leave the Body, and yet return thither again. 11. That though Reason and Will cannot in this life release the Soul from the Body, yet Passion may; and yet so that she may return again. 12. The peculiar power of Desire for this purpose. 13. Of Cardan’s Ecstatics, and the Ointment of Witches, and what truth there may be in their confessions.

1. Oncerning the actual and local Separation of the Soul from the Body, it is manifest that it is to be understood of this Terrestrial Body. For to be in such a separate state, as to be where no Body or Matter is, is to be out of the World: the whole Universe being so thick fet with Matter or Body, that there is not to be found the least vacuity therein. The question therefore is only, whether upon death the Soul can pass from the Corps into some other place. Henricus Regius seems to arrest her there by that general law of Nature, termed the law of Immutability; whereby every thing is to continue in the same condition it once is in, till something else change it. But the application of this law is very grossly injuft in this case. For, as I have above intimated, the Union of the Soul with the Body is upon certain terms; neither is every piece of Matter fit for every Soul to unite with, as Aristotle of old has very solidly concluded. Wherefore that condition of the Matter being not kept, the Soul is no longer engaged to the Body. What he here says for the justifying of himself, is so arbitrarious, so childish and ridiculous, that, according to the merit thereof, I shall utterly neglect it, and pass it by, not vouchsafing of it any Answer.

2. Others are much puzzled in their imagination, how the Soul can get out of the Body, being imprisoned and lockt up in its Celle. But those seem to forget both the Nature of the Soul, with the tenenuity of her Vehicle, and also the Anatomy of the Body. For considering the nature of the Soul her self, and of Matter which is alike penetrable every where, the Soul can pass through solid Air and Marble as well as through the solid Air and Aether; so that the thickness of the Body is no impediment to her. Besides, her Afray Vehicle

Philos. Nat. lib. 5. cap. 1. pag. 255, 352.
Vehicle is of that tenuity, that it self can as easily pass the smallest pores of the Body as the Light does Glasses, or the Lightning the Scabbard of a Sword without tearing or scorching of it. And lastly, whether we look upon that principal part of the Plastick power of the Heart, or that of Perception, the Brain; when a man dies, the Soul may collect her self, and the small residue of Spirits (that may happily serve her in the inchoation of her new Vehicle) either into the Heart, whence is an easy passage into the Lungs, and so out at the Mouth; or else into the Head, out of which there are more doors open then I will stand to number. These things are very easily imaginable; though as invisible as the Air, in whose element they are transfixed.

3. But that they may still be more perfectly understood, I shall resume again the consideration of that Faculty in the Plastick part of the Soul, which we call Vital Congruity. Which, according to the number of Vehicles, we will define to be threefold, Terrestrial, Aereal, and Æthereal or Celestial. That these Vital Congruities are found, some in some kind of Spirits and others in othersome, is very plain. For that the Terrestrial is in the Soul of Brutes and in our own is without controversy; as also that the Aereal in that kind of Beings which the Ancients called Δαιμονίαν; and lastly, that the Heavenly and Æthereal in those Spirits that Antiquity more properly called Θεοί, as being Inhabitants of the Heavens. For that there are such Aereal and Æthereal Beings that are analogous to Terrestrial Animals, if we compare the nature of God with the Phenomena of the world, it cannot prove les then a Demonstration.

For this Earth that is replenish'd with living Creatures, may put in all the Planets too that are in the world, and fancy them inhabited, they all joyed together bear not so great a proportion to the rest of the liquid Matter of the Univerfe (that is in a nearer capacity of being the Vehicle of Life) as a single Cumin-feed to the Globe of the Earth. But how ridiculous a thing would it be, that all the Earth beside being neglected, only one piece thereof, no better then the rest, nor bigger then the smallest feed, should be inhabited? The same may be said also of the compass of the Aire; and therefore it is necessary to enlarge their Territories, and confidently to pronounce there are Æthereal Animals, as well as Terrestrial and Aereal.

4. It is plain therefore that these three Congruities are to be found in several Subjects, but that which makes most to our purpose, is to finde them in one, and that in the Soul of Man. And there will be an easie intimation thereof, if we consider the vaft difference of those Faculties that we are sure are in her Perceptive part, and how they occasionally emerge, and how upon the laying asleep of one, others will spring up. Neither can there be any greater difference betwixt the highest and lowest of these Vital congruities in the Plastick part, then there is betwixt the highest and lowest of those Faculties that result from the Perceptive. For some Perceptions are the very same with those of Beasts; others little inferior to those that belong to Angels, as we ordinarily call them; some perfectly brutish, others purely divine: why therefore may there not
not reside so great a Latitude of capacities in the Plastic part of the Soul, as that she may have in her all those three Vital Congruities, whereby she may be able livingly to unite as well with the Celestial and Aereal Body as with this Terrestrial one; Nay, our nature being so free and multifarious as it is, it would seem a reproach to Providence, to deny this capacity of living in these several Vehicles; because that Divine Nemesis which is supposed to rule in the world would seem defective without this contrivance.

But without controversy, Eternal Wisdom and Justice has forecast that which is the best: and, unless we will lay nothing at all, we having nothing to judge by but our own Faculties, we must lay that the Forecast is according to what we, upon our most accurate search, do conceive to be the best. For there being no Envy in the Deity, as Plato somewhere has noted, it is not to be thought but that He has framed our Faculties so, that when we have rightly prepared our selves for the use of them, they will have a right correspondency with those things that are offered to them to contemplate in the world.

And truly if we had here time to consider, I do not doubt but it might be made to appear a very rational thing, that there should be such an Amphibion as the Soul of man, that had a capacity (as some Creatures have to live either in the Water or on the Earth) to change her Element, and after her abode here in this Terrestrial Vehicle amongst Men and Beasts, to ascend into the company of the Aereal Genii, in a Vehicle answerable to their nature.

5. Supposing then this triple capacity of Vital Congruity in the Soul of Man, the manner how she may leave this Body is very intelligible. For the Bodies fitness of temper to retain the Soul being lost in Death, the lower Vital Congruity in the Soul loofer her Object, and consequently its Operation. And therefore as the letting goe one thought in the Perceptive part of the Soul is the bringing up another; so the ceasing of one Vital Congruity is the wakening of another, if there be an Object, or Subject, ready to entertain it; as certainly there is, partly in the Body, but mainly without it. For there is a vital Aire that pervades all this lower world, which is continued with the life of all things, and is the chiefest Principle thereof. Whence Theon in his Scholia upon Aratus interprets that Hemisphere,

\[\text{Σωματίς τὸν ἀέρα υποθέτος \text{Graeco: ἐσφυός, \text{in a secondary meaning as spoken of the Aire, which he calls} \text{Δία or \text{Tαύρος \text{and σωφρόνος, the natural \text{Jupiter, in whom, in an inferiour sense, we may be said to live, and move, and have our Being: for without \text{Aire, neither Fishes, Fowls, nor Beasts can subsist, it administering the most immediate matter of life unto them, by feeding and refreshing their Animal Spirits.\text{Wherefore upon the cessation of the lowest Vital Congruity, that \text{Aereal capacity awakening into \text{A&}}, and finding to fit Matter every where to employ her self upon, the Soul will not fail to leave the Body; either upon choice, by the power of her own Imagination and \text{Will; or else (supposing the very worst that can happen) by a natural kinde of Attraction,} }\]
tion, or Transvection, the being her self, in that sound and confusion that accompanies Death, utterly unfeensible of all things.

For the Aire without being more wholesome and vital then in the corrupt caverns of the dead Body, and yet there being a continuation thereof with that without; it is as easy to understand how (that Principle of joyning therewith in the Plastick part of the Soul being once excited) she will naturally glide out of the Body into the free Aire, as how the Fire will ascend upwards, or a Stone fall downwards: for neither are the motions of these merely Mechanical, but vital or Magical, that cannot be resolved into mere Matter, as I shall demonstrate in my Third Book.

6. And being once recovered into this vast Ocean of Life, and sensible Spirit of the world, so full of enlivening Balsame; it will be no wonder if the Soul suddenly regain the use of her Perceptive faculty, being, as it were in a moment, regenerate into a natural power of Life and Motion, by so happy a concurse of rightly-prepared Matter for her Plastick part vitally to unite withall. For groffer generations are performed in almost as considerable a space of time; if those Histories be true, of extemporary Sal-lads, fown and gathered not many hours before the meal they are eaten at: and of the sudde ingirding of Frogs upon the fall of rain, whole swarms whereof, that had no Being before, have appeared with perfect shape and liveliness in the space of half an houre, after some more uncetous droppings upon the dry ground; as I find not onely recited out of Fa/opius, * Scaliger, and others, but have been certainly my self informed of it by them that have been eye-witnesses thereof; as vaninus also professeth himself to have been by his friend Johannes Ginochio, who told him for a certain, that in the month of July he saw with his own eyes a drop of rain suddenly turned into a Frog. By such examples as these it is evident, that the reason why Life is so long a compleating in Terrestrial generations, is only the sluggishnes of the Matter the Plastick power works upon. Wherefore a Soul once united with Aire, cannot miss of being able, in a manner in the twinkling of an eye, to exercise all Perceptive functions again, if there was ever any intercellation of them in the astonishments of Death.

7. How the Soul may live and act separate from the Body, may be easily understood out of what has been spoken. But that she does so de facto, there are but two waies to prove it; the one by the testimony of History, the other by Reason. That of History is either of persons per-fectly dead, or of those that have been subject to Ectafies, or rather to that height thereof which is more properly called ἀπαθεία, when the Soul does really leave the Body, and yet return again. Of this latter sort is that Example that Pliny recites of Hermotimus Clazomenius, whose Soul would often quit her Body, and wander up and down; and after her return tell many true stories of what she had seen during the time of her disjunction. The same, Maximus Tyrius and * Herodotus report of Aristanes Proconnesius. * Marsilius Ficinii adjoyns to this rank that narration in Ausus Gellius, concerning one Cornelius, a Priest, who in an Ectafie saw the Battel fought betwixt Cæsar and Pompey in Thesalie, his Body being then at Padua; and yet could, after his return to himself, punctually

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* Scalig. de Subst. Excis. 322.

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punctually declare the Time, Order and Success of the Fight. That in
Wierus, of the Weszel coming out of the Souldiers mouth when he was
asleep, is a more plain example: which, if it were true, would make
Aristeas his Pigeon not so much suspected of fabulosity as * Pliny would
have it. Several Relations there are in the world to this effect, that can-
not but be loudly laughed at by them that think the Soul inseparable
from the Body; and ordinarily they seem very ridiculous also to thoae
that think it is separable, but as firmly believe that it is never, nor ever
can be, separate but in Death.

8. Bodinus has a very great desire, notwithstanding it is so incredible
to others, that the thing should be true; it being so evincing an A-
argument for the Soul's Immortality. And he thinks this Truth is evident
from innumerable examples of the Ecstasies of Witches: which we must
confess with him not to be natural; but that they amount to a perfect
dissolution or carrying away the Soul out of the Body, the lively fenfe of
their meeting, and dancing, and adoring the Devil, and the mutual re-
membrane of the persons that meet one another there at such a time,
will be no * infallible Demonstration that they were there indeed, while
their Bodies lay at home in Bed. Conformity of their Confessions con-
cerning the same Conventicle is only a shrewd probability, if it once could
be made good that this leaving their Bodies were a thing possible.

For when they are out of them, they are much what in the same condi-
tion that other Spirits are, and can imitate what shape they please; so
that many of these Transformations into Wolves and Cats, may be as
likely of the Soul having left thus the Body, as by the Devils poffessing
the Body and transfiguring it himself. And what these airy Cats or
Wolves suffer, whether cuttings of their limbs, or breaking the Back, or
any such like mischief, that the Witch in her Bed suffers the like, may
very well arise from that Magiick Sympathy that is feated in the Unity of
the Spirit of the World, and the continuity of the subtile Matter disper-
sed throughout: the Univerfe in some fenfe being, as the Stoicks and Pla-
tonists define it, one vaf't entire Animal.

9. Now that this real Separation of the Soul may happen in some Ec-
stasies will be easily admitted, if we consider that the Soul in her own
Nature is separable from the Body, as being a Subfance really distinct
therefrom; and that all Bodies are alike penetrable and paffable to her;
the being devoid of that corporeal property which they ordinarily call a-
ptilusia, and therefore can freely glide through any Matter whatsoever,
without any knocking or refifiance; and lastly, that she does not so pro-
perly impart Heat and Motion to the Body, as Organization: and there-
fore when the Body is well organized, and there be that due temper of the
Blood, the Heart and Pulfes will in some measure beat, and the Brain will
be replenifh'd with Spirits, and therewith the whole Body, though the
Soul were out of it. In which cafe (saving that the Spirit of Nature can-
not be excluded thence) it would be perfectly Cartesius his Machina
without Sense, though seemingly as much alive as any animate Creature
in a deep fleep. Whence it appears, that if the Soul could leave the
Body, that she might doe it for a certain time without any detriment
thereto,
thereo, that is, so long as it might well live, without Repaft. Which fully anfwers their fears who conceit that if the Soul was but once out of the Body, perfect Death muft necessarily ensue, and all possible return thither be precluded.

10. But all the difficulty is to understand how the Soul may be loofened from the Body, while the Body is in a fit condition to retain her. That is a very great Difficulty indeed, and in a manner impossible for any power but what is supernatural. But it is not hard to conceive that this vital fitness in the Body may be changed, either by way of natural Disease, or by Art. For why may not some certain Fermentation in the Body fo alter the Blood and Spirits, that the powers of the Plafick part of the Soul may ceafe to operate, as well as sometimes the Perceptive faculties do, as in Catalepsies, Apoplexies, and the like? Wherefore this paffing of the Soul out of the Body in Sleep, or Ecfafe, may be sometime a certain Disease, as well as that of the wulofaw, those that walk in their Sleep.

Now if it should happen that some such diftemper should arise in the Body as would very much change the Vital Congruity thereof for a time, and in this Paroxysm that other Disease of the Noftambuli should furprize the party; his Imagination driving him to walk to this or that place, his Soul may very easily be conceived in this loofened condition it lies in, to be able to leave the Body, and pafs in the Aire, as other Inhabitants of that Element doe, and act the part of separate Spirits, and exercife such Functions of the Perceptive faculty as they do that are quite released from Terrifrial Matter. Onely here is the difference, That that damp in the Body that loofened the Union of the Soul being spent, the Soul, by that natural Magick I have more then once intimated, will certainly return to the Body, and unite with it again as firm as ever. But no man can when he pleases pafs out of his Body thus, by the Imperium of his Will, no more then he can walk in his Sleep: For this capacity is preffed down more deep into the lower life of the Soul, whither neither the Liberty of Will nor free Imagination can reach.

II. Paffion is more likely to take effect in this case then either of the other two Powers, the feat of Paffions being originally in the Heart, which is the chief Fort of these lower Faculties; and therefore by their propinquity can more easily act upon the first Principles of Vital Union. The effect of these has been so great, that they have quite carried the Soul out of the Body, as appears in sundry Histories of that kind. For both Sophocles and Dionysius the Sicilian Tyrant died suddenly upon the news of a Tragick Victory, as Polycrifa also a Noble Woman of the Ifle of Naxus, the Poet Philippides, and Diagoras of Rhodes, upon the like excess of Joy. We might adde examples of sudden Fear and Grief, but it is needless.

It is a known and granted Truth, that Paffion has so much power over the vital temper of the Body as to make it an unfit mansion for the Soul; from whence will necessarily follow her diffusion from it. Now if Paffion will so utterly change the Harmony of the Blood and Spirits, as quite to release the Soul from the Body by a perfect Death; why may it not?
sometime act on this side that degree, and only bring a present intemperies, out of which the Body may recover, and consequentially regain the Soul back again, by virtue of that Mundane Sympathy I have so often spoke of.

12. Now of all Passions whatever, excess of Defire is fittest for this more harmless and momentary ablation of the Soul from the Body; because the great strength thereof is so closely affisted with the imagination of departing to the place where the party would be, that upon disunion not amounting to perfect Death, the power of Fancy may carry the Soul to the place intended; and being satisfied and returned, may re- kindle life in the Body to the same degree it had before it was infected by this excess of Defire. This is that, if any thing, that has made dying men visit their friends before their departure, at many miles distance, their Bodies still keeping their sick bed; and those that have been well, give a visit to their sick friends, of whose health they have been over- curious and solicitous. For this Ecstasy is really of the Soul, and not of the Blood or Animal Spirits; neither of which have any Sense or Perception in them at all. And therefore into this Principle is to be resolved that Story which Martinus Del-Rio reports of a Lad who, through the strength of Imagination and Defire of seeing his Father, fell into an Ecstasy; and after he came to himself, confidently affirmed he had seen him, and told infallible circumstances of his being present with him.

13. That Cardan and others could fall into an Ecstasy when they pleased, by force of Imagination and Defire to fall into it, is recorded and believed by very grave and sober Writers; but whether they could ever doi it to a compleat ἀναπνεος, or local disjunction of the Soul from the Body, I know none that dare affirm; such events being rather the chances of Nature and Complexion, as in the Noetambuli, then the effects of our Will. But we cannot affurately conclude but that Art may bring into our own power and ordering that which natural causes put upon us sometimes without our leaves. But whether those Ointments of Witches have any such effect, or whether those unclean Spirits they deal with, by their immediate presence in their Bodies, cannot for a time so suppres or alter their Vital Senses to such a degree as will loosen the Soul, I leave to more curious Inquisitors to search after. It is sufficient that I have demonstrated a very intelligible possibility of this actual separation without Death properly so called.

From whence the peremptory Confessions of Witches, and the agreement of the story which they tell in several, as well those that are there bodily, as they that leave their Bodies behind them, especially when at their return they bring something home with them, as a permanent sign of their being at the place, is (though it may be all the delusion of their Familiars) no contemptible probability of their being there indeed where they declare they have been. For these are the greatest evidences that can be had in humane affairs: And nothing, so much as the supposed Impossibility thereof, has deterred men from believing the thing to be true.

CHAP.
CHAP. XVI.
The Immortality of the Soul.

1. That Souls departed communicate Dreams. 2. Examples of Apparitions of Souls deceased. 3. Of Apparitions in fields where pitched Battles have been fought; as also of those in Churchyards, and other vaporous places. 4. That the Spirititude of the Air may well contribute to the easiness of the appearing of Ghosts and Spectres. 5. A further proof thereof from sundry Examples. 6. Of Marcellus Ficinus his appearing after death. 7. With what sort of people such Examples as these avail little. 8. Reasons to persuade the unprejudiced that ordinarily those Apparitions that bear the shape and person of the deceased, are indeed the Souls of them.

The Examples of the other sort, viz. of the appearing of the Ghosts of men after death, are so numerous and frequent in all men's mouths, that it may seem superfluous to particularize in any. This appearing is either by Dreams, or open Vision. In Dreams, as that which hapned to Avenzoar Albumarion an Arabian Physician, to whom his lately-deceased friend suggested in his sleep a very overain Medicine for his sore Eyes. Like to this is that in *Diodorus* concerning Isis Queen of Egypt, whom he reports to have communicated remedies to the Egyptians in their sleep after her death, as well as she did when she was alive. Of this kind is also that memorable story of *Posidonius* the Stoick, concerning two young men of Arcadia, who being come to Megara, and lying the one at a Victualler's, the other in an Inn; he in the Inn while he was asleep, dream'd that his Fellow-traveller earnestly desired him to come and help him, as being assaulted by the Victualler, and in danger to be killed by him: But he, after he was perfectly awake, finding it but a Dream, neglected it. But when asleep again, his murdered friend appeared to him the second time, beseeching him, that though he did not help him alive, yet he would see his Death revenged; telling him how the Victualler had cast his Body into a Dung-cart, and that if he would get up timely in the morning, and watch at the Town-gate, he might thereby discover the murder: which he did accordingly, and so saw Justice done on the Murderer. Nor does the first Dream make the second impertinent to our purpose: For as that might be from the strength of Imagination, and desire of help in the distressed Arcadian, impressed on the Spirit of the World, and so transmitted to his friend asleep (a condition fittest for such communications;) so it is plain that this after his Death must fail, if his Soul did either cease to be or to act, And therefore it is manifest that she both was and did act, and suggested this Dream in revenge of the Murder. Of which kind there be infinite Examples, I mean of Murders discovered by Dreams, the Soul of the person murdered seeming to appear to some other asleep, and to make his complaint to them.

But I will content my self onely to adde an Example of Gratitude to this of Revenge: As that of Simonides, who lighting by chance on a dead Body...
Body by the Sea side, and out of the fentle of Humanity bestowing Burial upon it, was requited with a Dream that saved his life. For he was admo-
night to defilt from his Voitage he intended by Sea, which the Soul of the
deceased told him would be fo perillous, that it would hazard the lives of
the Passengers. He believed the Vision, and abstaining, was safe; those
others that went suffered Shipwreck.

2. We will adjoin only an Example or two of that other kind of
Visions, which are ordinarily called the Apparitions of the dead. And such
is that which Pliny relates at large in his Epistle to Sura, of an house
haunted at Athens, and freed by Athenodorus the Philosopher, after the
Body of that person that appeared to him was digged up, and interred
with due solemnity. It is not a thing unlikely, that most houses that are
haunted, are so chiefly from the Souls of the deceased; who have either
been murdered, or some way injured, or have some hid treasure to disco-
very, or the like. And persons are haunted for the like causes, as well as
houses; as Nero was after the murdering of his Mother; Otho pull’d out
of his bed in the night by the Ghost of Galba. Such instances are infi-
nite: as also thofe wherein the Soul of ones friend, suppose Father, 
Mother, or Husband, have appeared to give them good counsel, and to
instruct them of the Event of the greatest affairs of their life. The Ghofts
also of deceased Lovers have been reported to adhere to their Para-
mours after they had left their Bodies; taking all opportunities to meet
them in Solitude, whether by day or by night.

3. There be also other more fortuitous occurences of these deceased
Spirits, of which one can give no account, unlefs it be, because they
find themselves in a more eafy capacity to appear. As haply it may be in
Fields after great slaughters of Armies, and in publick Burial-places.
Though some would ridiculoufly put off these Apparitions, by making
them nothing but the reek or vapour of the Bodies of the dead, which
they fancy will fall into the like fature and shape with the man it comes
from: Which yet Cardan plays the fool in as well as Vaninus and
* others; as he does also in his account of thofe Spectra that appear fo
ordinarily in * Ieland, where the Inhabitants meet their deceased
friends in fo lively an Image, that they salute them and embrace them
for the fame persons; not knowing of their death, unlefs by their fuddain
disappearing, or by after-information that they were then dead. This he
imputes partly to the Thickneys of the Aire, and partly to the foule food
and gros fpirits of the Ielanders; and yet implies, that their fancies are fo
strong, as to convert the thick vaporous Aire into the compleat SHape of
their absent and deceased acquaintance, and fo perfwade themselves that
they fee them, and talk with them; whereas it is nothing elfe but an Aiery
Image made out by the power of their own Fancy from the ragged rud-
iments of thefe thick flying vapours, as men fancy SHapes in the broken
clouds. But certainly it had been better flatly to have denied the Nar-
ration, then to give fo flight and unprobable reason of the Phenomenon.
For neither do fuch visible vaporous confidences near humane fhape
move near the Earth; nor, if they did, could men be mistaken in an object
fo nigh at hand.

4. That
4. That the Spifitute of the Aire in that place may contribute something to the frequency of thefe Spectra, is rational enough. For it being more thick, it is the more easily reduced to a visible consistence: but must be shaped, not by the fancy of the Spectator, (for that were a monstrous power) but by the Imagination of the Spirit that actuates its own Vehicle of that gross Aire. For the fame reason also in other places these Apparitions haply appear oftener in the Night then in the Day, the Aire being more clammy and thick after the Sun has been some while down then before. To which also that custom of the Lappians, a people of Scandinia, seems something to agree; who, as Caspar Peucerus relates, are very much haunted with Apparitions of their deceased friends. For which trouble they have no remedy but burying them under their Hearth, Which Ceremony can have no natural influence upon these Lemures, unless they should hereby be engaged to keep in a warmer aire, and consequently more rarefied, then if they were interred elsewhere. Or rather because their Bodies will sooner putrefy by the warmth of the hearth; whereas otherwise the coldness of that Clime would permit them to be found a longer time, and consequently be fit for the Souls of the deceased to have recourse to, and replenish their Vehicle with such a Cambium or gluish moisture, as will make it far easier to be commanded into a visible consistence.

5. That this facilitates their condition of appearing, is evident from that known recourse these infeftant Spirits have to their dead Bodies. As is notorious in the History of Cuntius, which I have fet down at large in my Antidote, as also in that of the Silesian Shoo-maker and his Maid. To which you may add what * Agrippa writes out of the Cretian Annals, How there the Catechans, that is the Spirits of the deceased Husband, would be very troublesome to their Wives, and endeavour to lie with them, while they could have any recourse to their dead Bodies. Which mischief therefore was prevented by a Law, that if any Woman was thus infefted, the Body of her Husband should be burnt, and his Heart struck through with a stake. Which also put a speedy end to those firs and tragedies the Ghost of Cuntius and those others caufed at Pentfeb and Breflaw in Silefia.

The like difquietnesies are reported to have happev in the year 1567, at Travenvan a city of Bohemia, by one Stephanus Hubener, who was to admiration grown rich, as Cuntius of Pentfeb, and when he died, did as much mischief to his fellow-Citizens. For he would ordinarily appear in the very shape he was when he was alive, and such as he met, would salute them with fo close embraces, that he caufed many to fall fick and several to die by the unkind hugs he gave them. But burning his Body rid the Town of the perilous occufations of this malicious Goblin.

All which Infiances do prove not only the appearing of Souls after they have left this life, but also that some thickening Matter, (such as may be got either from Bodies alive, or lately dead, or as fent to thofe that are but newly dead (as the Body of this Hubener was, though it had lain 20 weeks in the Grave,) or cutflight from thick vaporous Air,) may facilitate much their appearing, and fo invite them to play tricks, when
when they can doe it at so cheap a rate; though they have little or no end in doing them, but the pleasing of their own, either ludicrous, or boisterous and domineering, humour.

6. But of any private person that ever appeared upon design after his death, there is none did upon a more noble one then that eximious Platonist Marsilius Ficinus; who, after a warm dispute of the Immortality of the Soul, having (as Baronius relates) made a solemn vow with his fellow-Platonist Michael Mercatus, that whether of them two died first should appear to his friend, and give him certain information of that Truth; (it being his fate to die first, and indeed not long after this mutual resolution) was mindful of his promise when he had left the Body. For Michael Mercatus being very intent at his Studies betimes on a morning, heard an horse riding by with all speed, and observed that he stopped at his window; and therewith heard the voice of his friend Ficinus crying out aloud, O Michael, Michael, vera, vera sunt illa. Whereupon he suddenly opened the window, and espying Marsilius on a white Steed, called after him; but he vanished in his sight. He sent therefore presently to Florence to know how Marsilius did; and understood that he died about that hour he called at his window, to assure him of his own and other mens Immortalities.

7. The Examples I have produced of the appearing of the Souls of men after death, considering how clearly I have demonstrated the separability of them from the Body, and their capacity of Vital Union with an Aery Vehicle, cannot but have their due weight of Argument with them that are unprejudiced. But as for those that have their minds enveloped in the dark mist of Atheism, that lazy and Melancholick saying which has dropped from the careless pen of that uncertain Writer Cardan, Orbis magnus est, & rerum longum, & error actimor multum in hominibus potius, will prevail more with them then all the Stories the same Author writes of Apparitions, or whatever any one else can add unto them. And others that do admit of these things, preconceptions from Education, That the Soul when she departs this life is suddenly either twitched up into the Calum Empyreum, or hurried down headlong towards the Centre of the Earth, makes the Apparitions of the Ghosts of men altogether incredible to them; they always substituting in their place some Angel or Devil which must represent their persons, themselves being not at leisure to act any such part.

8. But Misconceit and Prejudice, though it may hinder the force of an Argument with those that are in that manner entangled, yet Reason cannot but take place with them that are free. To whom I dare appeal whether (considering the Aereal Vehicles of Souls which are common to them with other Genis, so that whatever they are fancied to doe in their stead, they may perform themselves; as also how congruous it is, that those persons that are most concerned, when it is in their power, should act in their own affairs, as in detecting the Murtherer, in disposing their estate, in rebuking injurious Executors, in visiting and counselling their Wives and Children, in forewarning them of such and such courses, with other matters of like sort; to which you may adde the profession of the Spirit.
Chap. XVII. The Immortality of the Soul.

Spirit thus appearing, of being the Soul of such an one, as also the similitude of person; and that all this adoe is in things very just and serious, unfit for a Devil with that care and kindness to promote, and as unfit for a good Genius, it being below its nature to tell a Lie, especially when the affair may be as effectually transtact without it. I say, I dare appeal to any one, whether all these things put together and rightly weighed, the violence of prejudice not pulling down the balance, it will not be certainly carried for the present Cause, and whether any indifferent Judge ought not to conclude, if these Stories that are so frequent every where and in all Ages concerning the Ghosts of men appearing be but true, that it is true also that they are their Ghosts, and that therefore the Souls of men subsist and act after they have left these Earthly Bodies.

CHAP. XVII.

1. The preeminence of Arguments drawn from Reason above those from Story. 2. The first step toward a Demonstration of Reason that the Soul acts out of her Body, for that she is an Immaterial Substance separable there-from. 3. The second, that the immediate Instruments for Sense, Motion, and Organization of the Body, are certain subtile and tenuous Spirits. 4. A comparison betwixt the Soul in the Body and the Aereal Genii. 5. Of the nature of Demons from the account of Marcus the Eremite, and how the Soul is presently such, having once left this Body. 6. An Objection concerning the Souls of Brutes: to which is answered, First, by way of concession; Secondly, by confuting the Arguments for the former concession. 7. That there is no rational doubt at all of the Humane Soul acting after death. 8. A further Argument of her activity out of this Body, from her conflicts with it while she is in it. 9. As also from the general hope and belief of all Nations, that they shall live after death.

But we proceed now to what is less subject to the evasions and misinterpretations of either the Profane or Superstitions. For none but such as will profess themselves mere Brutes can cast off the Decrees and Conclusions of Philosophy and Reason; though they think that in things of this nature they may, with a great deal of applause and credit, refute the testimony of other mens Senses, if not of their own: all Apparitions being with them nothing but the strong surprisals of Melancholy and Imagination. But they cannot with that ease nor credit silence the Deductions of Reason, by saying it is but a Fallacy, unless they can shew the Sophisme, which they cannot doe, where it is not.

2. To carry on therefore our present Argument in a rational way, and by degrees; we are first to consider, that (according as already has been clearly demonstrated) there is a Substance in us which is ordinarily called the Soul, really distinct from the Body. (For otherwise how can it
be a Substance:) And therefore it is really and locally separable from the Body. Which is a very considerable step towards what we aim at.

3. In the next place we are to take notice, That the immediate Instrument of the Soul are those tenuous and Aereal particles which they ordinarily call the * Spirits; that these are they by which the Soul hears, sees, feels, imagines, remem- bers, reasons, and by moving which, or at least directing their motion, she moves likewise the Body; and by using their, or some subtle Matter like them, she either compleats, or at least contributes to, the Body's Organization. For that the Soul should be the Vital Architect of her own house, that close connexion and sure possession she is to have of it, distinct and secure from the invasion of any other particular Soul, seems no flight Argument. And yet that while she is exercising that Faculty she may have a more then ordinary Union or Implication with the Spirit of Nature, or the Soul of the World, so far forth as it is Plausible, seems not unreasonable: and therefore is assented by Plotinus; & may justly be suspected to be true, if we attend to the prodigious effects of the Mother's Imagination derived upon the Infant, which sometimes are so very great, that, unless she raised the Spirit of Nature into content, they might well seem to exceed the power of any Cause. I shall abstain from producing any Examples till the proper place: in the mean time I hope I may be excused from any rashness in this assignation of the Cause of those many and various Signatures found in Nature, so plainly pointing at such a Principle in the World as I have intimated * before.

4. But to return, and cast our eye upon the Subject in hand. It appears from the two precedent Conclusions, That the Soul considered as invested immediately with this tenuous Matter we speak of, which is her inward Vehicle, has very little more difference from the Aereal Genii, then a man in a Prison from one that is free. The one can only see, and suck air through the Grates of the Prison, and must be annoyed with all the stench and unwholsome fumes of that foul habitati on; whereas the other may walk and take the fresh air, where he finds it most commodious and agreeable.

This difference there is betwixt the Genii and an incorporated Soul. The Soul, as a man fallen into a deep pit, (who can have no better Water, nor Air, nor no longer enjoyment of the Sun, and his cheerful light and warmth, then the meagre and quality of the pit will permit him,) so he once immured in the Body cannot enjoy any better Spirits (in which all her life and comfort consists) then the constitution of the Body after such circuits of concoction can administer to her. But those Genii of the Aire, who possess their Vehicles upon no such hard terms, if themselves be not in fault, may by the power of their minds accommodate themselves with more pure and impolluted Matter, and such as will more easily converse with the noblest and divinest functions of their Spirit.

In brief therefore, if we consider things aright, we cannot abstain from strongly surmising, that there is no more difference betwixt a Soul and an aereal Genius, then there is betwixt a Sword in the scabbard and one out of it: and that a Soul is but a Genius in the Body, and a Genius a Soul out of the Body, as the Ancients also have defined, giving the same name,
as well as nature, promiscuously to them both, by calling them both 

* See book end * 

5. This is very cononant to what * Michael Psellos sets down; from the singular knowledge and experience of Marcus the Eremite, in these matters; who describes the nature of these Δαιμονια, as being throughout Spirit and Air; whence they hear and see and feel in every part of their Body. Which he makes good by this reason, and wonders at the ignorance of men that do not take notice of it, viz. * το μετεμφα την θανατην εσται ο νεκρον το αισθανομεν, έδει αν ειν τάτα του παραξενίν πενειμα, that it is neither Bones, nor Nerves, nor any gross or visible part of the Body, or of any organ thereof, whereby the Soul immediately exercises the functions of Sense; but that it is the Spirits that are her nearest and inmost instrument of these operations: Of which when the Body is deprived, there is found no Sense in it, though the gross Organs and parts are in their usual constancy, as we see in Syncope and Apoplexies. Which plainly shews, that the immediate Vehicle of Life are the Spirits, and that the Soul's connexion with the Body is by these; as the most learned Physicians do conclude with one consent. Whence it will follow, that this Vinculum being broke, the Soul will be free from the Body, and will as naturally be carried out of the corrupt carcase that now has no harmony with the Soul, into that Element that is more congenerous to her, the vital Air, as the Fire will mount upwards; as I have * already noted. And so Principles of Life being fully kindled in this thinner Vehicle, she becomes as compleat for Sense and Action as any other Inhabitants of these Airy regions.

6. There is only one pernicious Objection against this so easy and natural Conclusion, which is this: That by this manner of reasoning, the Souls of Brutes, especially those of the perfecter sort, will also not only subsist, (for that difficulty is concocted pretty well already) but also live and enjoy themselves after death. To which I dare boldly answer, That it is a thousand times more reasonable that they do, then that the Souls of Men do not. Yet I will not confidently assert that they do, or do not; but will lightly examine each Hypothesis. And first, by way of feigned concession, we will say, They do; and take notice of the Reasons that may induce one to think so. Amongst which two prime ones are those involved in the Objection, That they do subsist after death; and, That the immediate instrument of their Vital Functions is their Spirits, as well as in Man. To which we may add, That for the present we are fellow-inhabitants of one and the same Element, the Earth, subject to the same fate of Fire, Deluges and Earthquakes. That it is improbable that the vast space of Air and ΑEther, that must be inhabited by living creatures, should have none but of one sort, that is the Angels or Genii, good or bad. For it would seem as great a folly and if Men alone were the Inhabitants of the Earth, or Mermaids of the Sea. That the periods of Vital Congruity, wound up in the Nature of their Souls by that eternal Widsome that is the Creatrefs of all things, may be shorter or longer, according as the property of their essence and relation to the Universe requires; and that so their Descents and Returns

* Chap. XVIII. * 

may
may be accordingly swifter or slower. That it is more conformable to
the Divine goodness to be so then otherwise, if their natures will permit
it: And that their existence would be in vain, while they were deprived
of vital operation when they may conveniently have it. That they would
be no more capable of Salvation in the other state, then they are here of
Conversion. That the intellectual Inhabitants of the Aire having also
external and corporeal Sense, variety of Objects would doe as well there,
as here amongst us on Earth. Besides that Histories seem to imply, as
if there were such kind of Aëreal Animals amongst them, as Dogs, Horses, and the like. And therefore to be short, that the Souls of Brutes
cease to be alive after they are separate from this Body, can have no other
reason then Immorality the Mother of Ignorance, (that is, nothing but
narrowness of spirit, out of over-much self-love, and contempt of other
Creatures) to embolden us so confidently to adhere to so groundless a
Conclusion.

7. This Position makes indeed a plausible shew, insomuch that if the
Objection drove one to acknowledge it for Truth, he might seem to have
very little reason to be ashamed of it. But this Controversy is not so
easily decided. For though it be plain that the Souls of Beasts be Sub-
stances really separable from their Bodies; yet if they have but one Vital
congruity, namely the Terrestrial one, they cannot recover life in the Aire.
But their having one or two, or more Vital congruites, wholly depends
upon his wisdom and counsel that has made all things. Besides, the Souls
of Brutes seem to have a more passive nature then to be able to manage or
enjoy this escape of Death, that free & commanding Imagination belong-
ing one to us, as also Reminiscency. But Brutes have only a passive
Imagination, and bare Memory; which failing them in all likelihood in
the shipwreck of their Body, if they could live in the Aire, they would begin
the World perfectly on a new score, which is little better then Death:
so that they might in this sense be rightly deemed mortall. Our being
Co-inhabitants of the same element, the Earth, proves nothing: for by
the same reason, Worms and Fleas should live out of their Bodies, and
Fishes should not, who notwithstanding, their shape, it may be, a little
changed (for there is no necessity that these creatures in their Aeri
Vehicles should be exactly like themselves in their Terrestrial ones)
might act and live in the more moist tracts of the Aire.

As for the supposed solitude that would be in the Aire, it reaches not
this matter. For in the lower Regions thereof, the various Objects of
the Earth and Sea will serve the turn. The winding up of those several
circuits of Vital congruity may indeed pass for an ingenious invention, as
of a thing possible in the Souls of Brutes: but, as the Schools say well,
A post ad esse non valet consequentia. As for that Argument from Divine
Goodness, it not excluding his Wisdom, which attemptes it self to the na-
tures of things, and we not knowing the nature of the Souls of Brutes so
perfectly as we do our own, we cannot so easily be allured from thence
what will be in this case. A Muscian strikes not all strings at once; nei-
ther is it to be expected that every thing in Nature at every time should
act: but when it is its turn, then touched upon it will give its sound; in
the
the interim it lies silent. And so it may be with the Souls of Brutes for a time, especially when the vital temper of Earth and Aire and Sea shall fail; yet and at other times too, if none but Intellectual Spirits be fit to manage Aërial Vehicles.

I confess indeed, that Salvation can no more belong to the Souls of Brutes than Conversion; but that is as true of the Souls of Plants, (if they have any distinct from the Universal Spirit of Nature) but yet it does not prove that the Souls of Vegetables shall live and act in Aërial Vehicles, after an Herb or Tree is dead and rotten here. To that of convenience of variety of Objects for the Aërial Inhabitants I have answered already. And for the Apparitions of Horses, Doggs and the like, they may be the transformation of the Aërial Genii into these shapes: Which though it be a sign that they would not abhor from the use and society of such Aërial Animals, if they had them; yet they may the better want them, they being able so well themselves to supply their places.

We will briefly therefore conclude, that from the mere light of Reason it cannot be infallibly demonstrated, That the Souls of Brutes do not live after death, nor that it is any Incongruity in Nature to say they do. Which is sufficient to enervate the present Objection.

8. But for the life and activity of the Souls of Men out of this Body, all things goe on hand-smooth for it, without any check or stop. For we finding the Aërial Genii so exceeding near-a-kin to us in their Faculties, we being both intellectual Creatures, and both using the same immediate Instrument of Sense and Perceptions, to wit, Aërial Spirits, inasmuch that we can scarce discover any other difference betwixt us then there is betwixt a man that is naked and one clad in gross thick clothing; it is the most easy and natural inference that can be, to conclude, that when we are separate from the Body, and are invested only in Aire, that we shall be just like them, and have the same life and activity they have. For though a Brute fall short of this Privilidge, it ought to be no disheartening to us, because there is a greater cognition betwixt the Intellectual Faculties and the Aëry or Æthereal Vehicle, than there is betwixt such Vehicles and those more low and sensuall powers common to us with Beasts. And we finde, in taking the fresh aire, that the more fine and pure our Spirits are, our thoughts become the more noble and divine, and the more purely intellectual.

Nor is the step greater upwards then downwards: For seeing what in us is so Divine and Angelical may be united with the body of a Brute, (for such is this Earthly cloathing) why may not the Soul, notwithstanding her Terrestrial Congruity of life, (which upon new occasions may be easily conceived to surcease from acting) be united with the Vehicle of an Angel? So that there is no puzzle at all concerning the Soul of Man, but that immediately upon Death she may associate her self with those Aërial Inhabitants, the Genii or Angels.

9. Which we may still be the better assured of, if we consider how we have such Faculties in us as the Soul finds entangled and fettered, clouded and obscured by her fatal residence in this prifon of the Body. Information that, so far as it is lawful, she falls out with it for those incommode...
tions that the most confirmed brutish health brings usually upon her. How her Will ruggs against the impurity of the Spirits that stir up bestial Passions, (that are notwithstanding the height and flower of other Creatures enjoyments) and how many times her whole life upon Earth is nothing else but a perpetual warfare against the results of her union with this lump of Earth that is so much like to other terrestrial Animals. Whence it is plain she finds herself in a wrong condition, and that she was created for a better and purer state; which she could not attain to, unless she lived out of the Body: which she does in some sort in divine Ecstasies and Dreams; in which case she making no use of the Bodies Organs, but of the purer Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain, she acts as it were by her self, and performs some preludious Exercises, conformable to those in her Aerial Vehicle.

10. Adde unto all this, that the Immortality of the Soul is the common, and therefore natural, hope and expectation of all Nations; there being very few so barbarous as not to hold it for a Truth: though, it may be, as in other things, they may be something ridiculous in the manner of expressing themselves about it; as that they shall retire after Death to such a Grove or Wood, or beyond such a Hill, or unto such an Island, such as was Δρόμος Αχιλλεως, the Island where Achilles his Ghost was conceived to wander, or the Insula Fortuna, the noted Elysium of the Ancients. And yet, it may be, if we should tell these of the Calum Empyreum, and compute the height of it, and distance from the Earth, and how many solid Orbs must be glided through before a Soul can come thither, these simple Barbarians would think as odly of the Scholastick Opinion as we do of theirs: and it may be some more judicious and sagacious Wit will laugh at us both alike.

It is sufficient, that in the main all Nations in a manner are agreed that there is an Immortality to be expelled, as well as that there is a Deity to be worshipped; though ignorance of circumstances makes Religion vary, even to Monstrosity, in many parts of the world. But both Religion, and the belief of the Reward of it, which is a blessed state after Death, being so generally acknowledged by all the Inhabitants of the Earth; it is a plain Argument that it is true according to the Light of Nature. And not only because they believe so, but because they do so seriously either desire it, or are so horribly afraid of it, if they offend much against their Consciences: which Properties would not be in men so universally, if there were no Objects in Nature answering to these Faculties, as I have elsewhere argued in the like cafe.

CHAP.
CHAP. XVIII.

The Immortality of the Soul.

1. That the Faculties of our Souls, and the nature of the immediate Instrument of them, the Spirits, do so nearly symbolize with those of Demons, that it seems reasonable, if God did not on purpose hinder it, that they would not fail to all out of this earthly Body. 2. Or if they would, his Power and Wisdome could easily implant in their essence a double or triple Vital Congruity, to make all sure. 3. A further demonstration of the present Truth from the Veracity of God. 4. An Answer to an Objection against the foregoing Argument. 5. Another Demonstration from his Wisdome. 6. An Answer to an Objection. 7. An Answer to another Objection. 8. Another Argument from the Wisdome of God. 9. An Objection answered. 10. An invincible Demonstration of the Soul’s Immortality from the Divine Goodness. 11. A more particular enforcement of that Argument, and who they are upon whom it will work least. 12. That the Noblest and most Virtuous Spirit is the most assurably of the Soul’s Immortality.

1. But finally, to make all sure, let us contemplate the Nature of God, who is the Author and Maker of all things, according to whose Goodness, Wisdome and Power all things were created, and are ever ordered; and let us take special notice how many steps towards this Immortality we now treat of are impressed upon the very nature of the Soul already; and then seriously consider, if it be possible that the Sovereign Deity should stop there, and goe no further, when there are so great reasons, if we understand any thing, that He perfect our expectations. For we have already clearly demonstrated, That the Soul of man is a Substance actually separable from the Body, and that all her Operations and Functions are immediately performed, not by those parts of the Body that are of an earthly and gross consisteny, but by what is more Aerial or Aetherial, the Vital and * Animal Spirits, which are very congenerous to the Vehicles of the Angels or Genii. Infomuch that if the Divine power did but leave Nature to work of it self, it might seem very strange, considering those Divine and Intellectual Faculties in us, (as conformable to the essences or Souls of Angels as our Animal Spirits are to their Vehicles) if it would not be an immediate sequel of this Priviledge, that our Souls once separate from the Body should act and inform the Air they are in with like facility that other Genii do, there being so very little difference betwixt both their natures.

2. Or if one single Plastic power, in a Subject so near a kin to these Aerial people, will not necessarily suffice for both states, certainly it must be a very little addition that will help out; and how easy is it for that Eternal Wisdome to contrive a double or triple Vital Congruity, to wit, Aerial and Atherial, as well as Terrestrial, in such an Essence, whose Faculties and Properties do fo plainly symbolize with those purer Inhabitants of both the Aether and Air?

3. But
3. But this is not all we have to say. For if there be one thing more precious in the Deity than another, we shall have it all as a sure and infallible pledge of this present Truth, That our Souls will not fail to prove Immortal. And for my own part, I know nothing more precious in the Godhead then his Veracity, Justice and Goodness; and all these Three will assure us and secure us, that we shall sustain no los or damage by our departure out of these Earthly Bodies, in either Life or Essence. For it were a very high reproach to that Attribute of God which we call his Veracity, he so plainly and universally promising to all the Nations of the World, where there is any Religion at all, a happy state after this life; if there should in reality be no such thing to be expected, For he does not onely connive at the Error, if it be one, by not declaring himself against it, (as any upright person would, if another should take upon him, in his presence or hearing, to tell others that he intended to beliow such and such gifts and revenues upon them; when there was no such matter:) but he has, as a man may say, on fet purpose indue men with extraordinary parts and powers, to fet this Opinion on foot in the Earth; all Prophets and Workers of Miracles that have appeared in the world, having one way or other attuned to Mankind this fo weighty Truth. And the most Noble and Vertuous Spirits in all Ages have been the most prone to believe it. And this not onely out of a fene of their own Interet; but any one that ever had the happiness to experience these things may observe, That that Clearness and Purity of temper that most consists with the Love and admiration of God and Vertue, and all those divine Accomplishments that even those that never could attain to them give their highest approbation of, I say, that this more refined temper of Mind does of itself beget a wonderful proneness, if not a necessity, of presuming of the Truth of this Opinion we plead for. And therefore if it be not true, God has laid a train in Nature, that the most Vertuous and Pious men shall be the most sure to be deceived: Which is a contradiction to his Attribute of Veracity.

4. Nor can the strength of this Argument be evaded by replying, That God may deceive men for their good, as Parents do their Children; and therefore His Wisdome may contrive such a natural Error as this, to be serviceable for States and Polities, to keep the people in awe, and so render them more faithfull and governable. I must confess that there does result from this divine Truth such an Usefulness, by the by, for the better holding together of Commonweals: But to think that this is the main use thereof, and that there is nothing more in it then so, is as Idiotical and Childish as to conclude, that because the Stars, those vast lights, doe some small offices for us by Night, that therefore that is all the meaning of them, and that they serve for nothing else.

Besides, there is no Father would tell a Lye to his Child, if he were furnished with Truth as effectual for his purpose; and if he told any thing really good as well as desirable to his Child, to induce him to Obedience, if it lay in his power, he would be sure to perform his promise. But it is in the power of God to make good whatever he has propounded for reward, nor need he make use of any falsehood in this matter.
Wherefore if he do, he has left *Veracity* then an ordinary honest man; which is *blasphemous*, and *contradictions* to the nature of the Deity.

5. Again upon point of *Justice*, God was engaged to contrive the Nature and Order of things so, that the Souls of Men may live after death, and that they may fare according to their behaviour here upon earth. For the Godhead, as the Philosopher calls him, is *No ομοιολογία*, and does immutably and inevitably distribute Justice, both *Reward & Punishment*, in the world. But how difficult a thing it is to be good and to live according to Vertue, the common practice and complaint of all men do confess with one consent; and that it is exceeding hard to persuade any one to doe that violence to their own natures, as to endeavour after a due degree and right sense of Vertue (for Craft and Policy are easy enough, and other things there are that, set against the contrary Vices, look like Vertues, but are not:) But to persuade to those that truly are, is, I say, exceeding hard, if not impossible, without the inculcation of this grand concernment, the *State of the Soul after Death*, and the *Reward* that will then follow a *Vertuous* life. Of which hopes if we be frustrated by the Soul's Mortality, we are defrauded of our *Reward*, and God of the honour of *Justice*.

6. Nor can the force of this Argument be enervated by either that high pretension of *Stoicism*, That *Vertue in itself is a sufficient reward*; or that the very hopes of this *Immortality*, it being accompanied with so much joy, tranquillity and contentment, will countervail all the pain and trouble of either acquiring, or keeping close to Vertue once acquired. For as for the first, It is one thing to talk high, and another thing to practice. And for my own part, I think in the main, that *Epicurus*, who placed the chiefest good in *Pleasure*, philosophized more solidly then the paradoxical *Stoicks*. For questionless that is that which all men ought to drive at, if they had the true notion of it, and knew wherein to place it, or could arrive to the purest and most warrantable sense of it. But there can be no *Pleasure*, (without a perfect Miracle) while our Spirits are disturbed and vitiated by fordid and contemptible Poverty, by *Imprisonments*, *Sicknesses*, *Tortures*, ill *Diet*, and a number of such Adversities, that those that are the most exactly *Vertuous* have been in all Ages most liable to. Besides the care and solicitude of perpetually standing upon their guard, the stings of Calumny and *Defamation*, and a continual vexation to see the bafenefs and vilenefs of mens tempers, and ugly oblique tranactions of affairs in the world. Which inquietudes cannot be avoided by any other remedy but what is as ill as the diseafe, or worse, (it being altogether incompeatable to a true *Heroical* tenour of mind,) I mean their *Stoical Apathy*; of which the best that can be said is, that it is a kind of constant and safe piece of *Sullenness*, stating us solely in the condition of those that are said to have neither wonne nor lost: So poor a reward is perfecuted and distress'd *Vertue* of it self; without the hope of future *Happiness*.

7. But to say, the Hope thereof without *Enjoyment* is a sufficient compensation, is like that mockery *Plutarch* records of *Dionysius* towards a Fidler, whom he caus'd to play before him; promising him a reward; but
but when he demanded it of him for his pains, denied it him, or rather said it was paid already, putting him off with this jest, "Οὐχ θάνατον ἐγκατάλειπται ἀπὸ τόσο γρήγορα, οὕτως ἐντεῦθεν ἐκπαίδευται ἡ γίγας, i.e. So long as you pleased me with playing, so long you rejoiced your self with hoping, after the reward; so that you are sufficiently paid already. Which piece of injurious mirth may be paffable in a ludicrous matter, and from a Tyrant, where height of Fortune makes proud and forgetful Mortality contemn their inferiors: But in a thing of this nature, that concerns not only this transient life, but the sempiternal duration of the Soul, Injustice there is unpeakeably grievous; and so much the more harsh and uncomely, if we consider that it is supposed to be committed, not by a frail earthly Potentate, (the height of whose Honours may make him regardless of smaller affairs and meaner persons,) but by the God of Heaven, who can with the like ease attend all things as he can any one thing, and who is perfectly and immutably just, not doing nor omitting any thing by changeable humours, as it happens in vain Men, but ever acting according to the transcendent Excellency and Holiness of his own Nature.

8. Neither is Divine Justice engaged onely to reward, but also to punish, which cannot be, unless the Souls of men subsist after Death. For there are questionless many thousands that have committed most enormous Villanies, persecuted the Good, taking away their pofteffions, liberties, or lives, adding sometimes most barbarous tortures and reproachful abuscs; and in all this highly gratified their covetousness, ambition and revenge; nay, it may be the beastial ferocity of their own spirits, that have pleased themselves exceedingly to bring the truly religious into disgrace, and have laughed at all virtuous actions as the fruits of Ignorance and Folly; and yet for all this have died in peace on their beds, after their Lives have been as thick set with all sensual enjoyments of Honour, Riches and Pleasure, as their Story is with Frauds, Rapines, Murders, Sacriledges, and whatever crimes the impious boldness of lawless persons will venture on.

9. Such things as these happen proportionably through all the ranks and orders of men. Nor is it sufficient to reply that their own Consciences, as so many Furies, do lath them and scourch them in this life: For we speak of inveterate and successful wickedness, where that Principle is utterly laid asleep; or if it at any time wake and cry, the noise of the affairs of the world, and hurry of busineses, and continual visits of friends and flatterers, false instructions of covetous Priests or mercenary Philosophers (who for gain will impudently corrupt and pervert both the Light of Nature and Sense of Religion,) the sound and clatter of these, I say, will so molest the ear of the prosperous wicked, that the voice of Conscience can be no more heard in this continual tumult, than the vagiant cries of the Infant Jupiter amidst the rude shuffles and dancings of the Cretick Corybantes, and the tinkling and clashing of their brazen Targets. And therefore if there be no Life hereafter, the worst of men have the greatest share of happiness, their passions and affections being so continually gratified, and that to the height, in those things that are so agreeable, and, rightly circumstainted, allowable to humane Nature:
Chap. XVIII. The Immortality of the Soul.

ture: such as are the sweet reflection on the success of our political management of the affairs of the World; the general tribute of Honour and respect for our Policy and Wit, and that ample testimony thereof, our acquisitions of Power or Riches; that great satisfaction of foiling and bearing down our Enemies, and obliging and making sure our more serviceable Friends; to which finally you may add all the variety of Mirth and Pastime that flesh and blood can entertain it self with, from either Musick, Wine, or Women.

10. Thirdly and lastly, The Mortality of the Soul is not onely inconsistent with the Veracity and Justice of God, but also with his Goodness, the most sovereign and sacred Attribute in the Deity, and which alone is enough to demonstrate, That the Soul of man cannot perish in Death. For suppose that God had made no promise to us, either by any extraordinary Prophet, or by the suggestion of our own natural Faculties, that we shall be Immortal, and that there was neither Merit nor Demerit in this life; fo that all plea from either the Divine Veracity or Justice were quite cut off; his Goodness alone (especially if we consider how capable the Soul is of after-subsistence) is a sufficient assurance that we shall not fail to live after Death, For how can that sovereign Goodness, assisted by an Omnipotent Knowledge, fail to contrive it so; it being so infinitely more conformable to His Transcendent Bounty to ordain thus then otherwise? that is to say, so soon as he created the World, to make it so compleat, as at once to bring into Being not onely all Corporeal Substance (according as all men confess he did) but also all Substances Immaterial or Incorporeal, and as many of them as can partake of Life, and of enjoyment of themselves and the Universe, to set them upon living and working in all places and Elements that their Nature is able to operate in; and therefore amongst other Beings of the Intellectual Order, to ordain that the Souls of men also, whersoever they were, or ever should be, especially if it were not long of themselves, should have a power of Life and Motion, and that no other Nemesis should follow them then what they themselves lay the trains of; nor this to utter annihilation, but by way of chastisement or punishment: and that they being of so multifarious a nature, as to have such Faculties as are nearly akin to Brutes, as well as such as have so close an affinity with those of the Aereal Genii and Celestial Angels, their Vital Congruity should be as multifarious, and themselves made capable of a living Union with either Celestial, Aereal, or Terrestrial Vehicles; and that the leaving of one should be but the taking up of another, so long as the Elements continue in their natural temper, and as soon as the Laws of Generation will permit.

11. These, and a long series of other things consonant to these, represent themselves to their view that have the favour of beholding the more hidden treasures of the Divine Benignity. But they being more then the present occasion requires, I shall content my self with what precisely touches the matter in hand, which is, That the Soul of Man being capable to act after this life in an Aereal Vehicle, as well as here in an Earthly, and it being better that the do live and act, then that she be idle and silent in death; and it depending merely upon the Will of God whether she shall
shall or no; He ordering the natures of things infallibly according to
what is best; must of necessity ordain that the Souls of men live and act
after death. This is an unavoidable Deduction of Reason to those that
acknowledge the Being of God, and rightly relish that transcendent
Attribute in the Divine Nature. For those that have a true sense there-
of, can as hardly deny this Conclusion as the Existence of the Deity.
Nor can they ever be perswaded, that He who is so perfectly Good in
himself, and to whom they have so long adhered in faithful obedience and
amorous devotion, has made them of such a nature, that when they hope
most to enjoy him, they shall not be able to enjoy him at all, nor any
thing else; as not being in a capacity to act but in an Earthly Body. But
to those that be of a mere animal temper, that relish no love but that of
themselves and their own interest, nor care for any but those that are ser-
viceable to them and make for their profit, these being prone to judge of
God according to the vileness of their own Spirit, will easily conceive,
that God's care of us and tenderness over us is onely proportionable to
the fruit he reaps by us; which is just none at all.
12. And therefore this Argument especially, and also the Two former,
though they be undeniable Demonstrations in themselves, yet they
requiring a due resentmment of Morality, that is of Veracity, Justice and
Goodness, in him that is to be perswaded by them; it will follow, that
those whose Mindes are most blinded and debased by Vice, will feel leaft
the force of them; and the Noblest and most generous Spirit will be the
most firmly assured of the Immortality of the Soul.
THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

The Third Book.

CHAP. I.

1. Why the Author treats of the state of the Soul after Death, and in what Method. 2. Arguments to prove that the Soul is ever united vitally with some Matter or other. 3. Further Reasons to evince the same. 4. That the Soul is capable of an Aiery and Aethereal Body, as well as a Terrestrial. 5. That she ordinarily passes out of an Earthly into an Aereal Vehicle first. 6. That in her Aiery Vehicle she is capable of Sense, Pleasure, and Pain. 7. That the main power of the Soul over her Aereal Vehicle is the direction of Motion in the particles thereof. 8. That she may also add to or diminish Motion in her Aethereal. 9. How the purity of the Vehicle confers to the quickness of Sense and Knowledge. 10. Of the Soul's power of changing the temper of her Aereal Vehicle; 11. As also the shape thereof. 12. The plainness of the last Axiome.

E have, I hope, with undeniable evidence demonstrated the Immortality of the Soul to such as neither by their slowness of parts, nor any prejudice of Immorality, are made incompetent Judges of the truth of Demonstrations of this kind: so that I have already perfected my main Design. But my own curiosity, and the desire of gratifying others who love to entertain themselves with Speculations of this nature, do call me out something further; if the very Dignity of the present Matter I am upon doth not justly require me, as will be best seen after the finishing thereof: which is concerning the State of the Soul after Death. Wherein though I may not happily be able to fix my foot so firmly as in the foregoing part of this Treatise, yet I will assert nothing but what shall be reasonable, though not demonstrable, and far preponderating to whatever shall be alleged to the contrary, and in such clear order and Method,
The Immortality of the Soul.

Method, that if what I write be not worthy to convince, it shall not be able to deceive or entangle by perplexedness and obscurity; and therefore I shall offer to view at once the main Principles upon which I shall build the residue of my Discourse.

AXIOME XXVII.

The Soul separate from this Terrestrial Body is not released from all Vital Union with Matter.

2. This is the general Opinion of the Platonists. Plotinus indeed differs, especially concerning the most divine Souls, as if they at last were perfectly unbared of all Matter, and had no union with any thing but God himself: which I look upon as a fancy proceeding from the same inequality of temper, that made him surmise that the most degenerate Souls did at last sleep in the bodies of Trees, and grew up merely into Plantal life. Such fictions as these of fancyfull men have much depraved the ancient Cabbala and sacred Doctrine which the Platonists themselves do profess to be Socrates and a holy Tradition received from the mouth of God or Angels. But however Plotinus himself does not deny but till the Soul arrive to such an exceeding height of purification, that she acts in either an Airy or Celestial Body.

But that she is never released so perfectly from all Matter, how pure ever and tenuous, her condition of operating here in this life is a greater premunition then can be fetched from any thing else, that she ever is. For we find plainly that her most subtle and most Intellectual operations depend upon the fineness of temper in the Spirits; and that it is the fineness and purity of them that invites her and enables her to love and look after Divine and Intellectual Objects: Which kind of Motions if she could exert immediately by her own proper power and essence, what should hinder her but that, having a will, she should bring it to effect: which yet we find she cannot if the Spirits be indisposed. But, as I said, the Soul cannot be hindered by the undue temper of the Spirits in these Acts, if they be of that nature that they belong to the bare essence of the Soul quite procused from all Union with Matter. For then as to these Acts it is all one where the Soul is, that is, in what Matter she is (and she must be in some, because the Universe is every where thick-set with Matter) whether she be raised into the purest regions of the Aire, or plunged down into the foulest Receptacles of Earth or Water; for her Intellectual actions would be alike in both; this Conjunction in all like-lihood engaging onely the Plastick and Sensitive powers of the Soul even when she is vitally united with Matter. What then is there imaginable in the Body that can hinder her in her nobler Operations?

Wherefore it is plain that the nature of the Soul is such, as that she cannot act but in dependence on Matter, and that her Operations are some way or other alwaies modified thereby. And therefore if the Soul act at all after death, (which we have demonstrated she does) it is evident that she is not released from all vital union with all kind of Matter what-
whosoever: Which is not onely the Opinion of the Platonists, but of Aristotle also, as may be easily gathered out of what we have above cited out of him,

3. Befides, it seems a very wilde leap in nature, that the Soul of Man, from being so deeply and muddily immersed into Matter as to keep company with Beasts, by vitall union with grofs flesh and bones, should so on a sudden be changed, that she should not adhere to any Matter whatsoever, but ascend into an unformed compatible haply to none but God himself; unless there be such Creatures as the Platonists call Nous or pure Intell’dts. This must seem to any indifferent man very harsh and incongruous, especially if we consider what noble Beings there are on this side the Nous or Nôs, that all the Philosophers that ever treated of them acknowledge to be vitally united with either Aereal or Aethereal Vehicles. For of this condition are all the Genii or Angels.

It is sufficient therefore that the Soul never exceed the immateriality of those Orders of Beings, the lower for whereof that they are vitally united to Vehicles of Aire, their ignorance in Nature seems manifestly to bewray. For it had been an easy thing, and more for their credit, to have informed their followers better in the Mysteries of Nature; but that themselves were ignorant of these things, which they could not but know, if they were not thus bound to their Aire bodies. For then they were not engaged to move with the whole course of the Aire, but keeping themselves steddy, as being disunited from all Matter, they might in a moment have perceived both the diurnal and annual motion of the Earth, and so have saved the Credit of their followers, by communicating this Theory to them; the want of the knowledge whereof spoils their repute with them that understand the System of the world better then themselves, for all they boast of their Philosophy, so as if it were the Dictate of the highest Angels.

AXIOME XXVIII.

There is a Triple Vital Congruity in the Soul, namely Aethereal, Aereal, and Terrestrial.

4. That this is the common Opinion of the Platonists, I have above intimated. That this Opinion is also true in itself, appears from the foregoing Axiome. Of the Terrestrial Congruity there can be no doubt: and as little can there be but that at least one of the other two is to be granted, else the Soul would be released from all vital union with Matter after Death. Wherefore she has a vital aptitude at least to unite with Aire: But Aire is a common Receptacle of bad and good Spirits; (as the Earth is of all sorts of men and beasts) may indeed rather of those that are in some sort or other bad, then of good, as it is upon Earth. But the Soul of Man is capable of very high refinements, even to a condition purely Angelical. Whence Reason will judge it fit, and all Antiquity has voted it, That the Souls of men arrived to such a due pitch of purification must at last obtain Celestial Vehicles.
AXIOME XXIX.

According to the usual custom of Nature, the Soul awakes orderly into these Vital Congruities, not passing from one Extreme to another without any stay in the middle.

5. This Truth, besides that at first sight it cannot but seem very reasonable, according to that known Aphorism, "Natura non facit saltum"; so if it be further examined, the solidity thereof will more fully appear. For considering how small degrees of purification the Souls of almost all men get in this life, even theirs who pass vulgarly for honest and good men, it will plainly follow that very few arrive to their Aereal Vehicle immediately upon quitting their Terrestrial Body; that being a privilege that has appertained to none but very Noble and Heroical Spirits indeed, of which History records but very few. But that there may be degrees of purity and excellency in the Aereal Bodies, is a thing that is not to be denied, so that a just Nemesis will finde out every one after death.

AXIOME XXX.

The Soul in her Aereal Vehicle is capable of Sense properly so called, and consequently of Pleasure and Pain.

6. This plainly appears from the 27 and 28 Axioms. For there is a necessity of the resulting of Sense from Vital Union of the Soul with any Body whatsoever: and we may remember that the immediate Instrument of Sense, even in this Earthly Body, are the Spirits: so that there can be no doubt of this Truth, And Pleasure and Pain being the proper modifications of Sense, and there being no Body, but what is possible, it is evident that these Vehicles of Aire are subject to Pain as well as Pleasure, in this Region where ill things are to be met with as well as good.

AXIOME XXXI.

The Soul can neither impart to nor take away from the Matter of her Vehicle of Aire any considerable degree of Motion, but yet can direct the particles moved which may she pleases by the Imperium of her Will.

7. The reasonableness of this Axiom may be evinced, partly out of the former; for considering the bruithness and angulosity of the parts of the Air, a more then ordinary Motion or compressive Rest may very well prove painful to the Soul, and dis-harmonious to her touch: and partly from what we may observe in our own Spirits in this Body, which we can onely direct, not give Motion to, nor diminish their Motion by our Imagination or Will, (for no man can imagine himself into Heat or Cold, the sure consequnces of extraordinary Motion and Rest, by willing his Spirits to move fatter or flower; but he may direct them into
into the Organs of spontaneous Motion, and so by moving the groffer parts of the Body, by this direction he may spend them, and heat these parts in the expense of them; and this is all we can doe: and partly from that Divine Providence that made all things, and measures out the Powers and Faculties of his Creatures according to his own Wisdom and Counsel, and therefore has bound that state of the Soul to freighter conditions, that is compatible to the bad as well as to the good.

AXIOME XXXII.

Though the Soul can neither confer nor take away any considerable degree of Motion from the Matter of her Airy Vehicle, yet nothing hinders but that she may doe both in her Æthereal.

3. THE reason hereof is, because the particles of her Æthereal Vehicle consist partly of smooth spherical Figures, and partly of tenuous Matter, so exceeding liquid that it will without any violence comply to anything whenas the Aire, as may be observed in Winde-Guns, has parts so stubborn and so stiff, that after they have been compressed to such a certain degree that the barrel of the Piece grows hot again, they have not lost their shapes nor virtue; but like a spring of Steel, liberty being given, they return to their natural posture with that violence, that they discharge a Bullet with equal force that Gun-powder does. Besides that the Goodness of that Deity on whom all Beings depend may be justly thought to have priviledged the Æthereal Congruity of Life (which awakes only in perfectly-obedient Souls, such as may be trusted as throughly faithful to his Empire) with a larger power then the other, there being no incomietiblenesse in the Subject. For it is as easy a thing to conceive that God may endow a Soul with a power of moving or quiesing Matter, as of determining the motions thereof.

AXIOME XXXIII.

The purer the Vehicle is, the more quick and perfect are the Perceptive Faculties of the Soul.

9. THE truth of this we may in a manner experience in this life, where we find that the quickness of Hearing, Seeing, Tasting, Smelling, the nimbleness of Reminiscency, Reason, and all other Perceptive Faculties, are advanced or abated by the clearness, or founliness and dulness of the Spirits of our Body, and that Oblivion and Sottishness arise from their thicknefs and earthinefs, or waterinefs, or whatsoever other grofs confidency of them: which diatemp removed, and the Body being replenished with good Spirits in sufficient plenty and purity, the Mind recovers her activity again, remembers what she had forgot, and understands what she was before incapable of, sees and hears at a greater distance, and so of the rest.
AXIOME XXXIV.

The Soul has a marvellous power of not only changing the temper of her Aiery Vehicle, but also of the external shape thereof.

10. THE truth of the first part of this Axiome appears from daily experience; for we may frequently observe how strangely the Passions of the Mind will work upon our Spirits in this state; how Wrath, and Grief, and Envy will alter the Body, to say nothing of other Affections. And assuredly the finer the Body is, the more mutable it is upon this account: so that the Passions of the Mind must needs have a very great influence upon the Soul's Aereal Vehicle; which though they cannot change into any thing but Air, yet they may change this Air into qualifications as vastly different as Virtue is from Vice, Sickness from Health, Pain from Pleasure, Light from Darkness, and the skink of a Goat from the Aromatick odours of a flourishing Paradise.

11. The truth of the latter part is demonstrable from the latter part of the 31 Axiome. For supposing a power in the Soul of directing the motions of the particles of her fluid Vehicle, it must needs follow that she will also have a power of shaping it in some measure according to her own Will & Fancy. To which you may add, as no contemptible pledge of this Truth, what is done in that kind by our Will and Fancy in this life: as, only because I will and fancy the moving of my Mouth, Foot, or Fingers, I can move them, provided I have but Spirits to direct into this motion; and the whole Vehicle of the Soul is in a manner nothing else but Spirits. The Signatures also of the Patws in the Womb by the Desire and Imagination of the Mother is very serviceable for the evincing of this Truth: but I shall speak of it more fully in its place.

AXIOME XXXV.

It is rational to think, that as some Faculties are laid asleep in Death or after Death, so others may awake that are more suitable for that state.

12. THE truth of this Axiome appears from hence, That our Souls come not by chance, but are made by an All-wise God, who foreseeing all their states, has fitted the Excitation or Consopition of Powers and Faculties suitably to the present condition they are to be in.

AXIOME XXXVI.

Whether the Vital Congruity of the Soul expire, as whose period being quite unwound, or that of the Matter be defaced by any essential Dis-harmony, Vital Union immediately ceases.

13. This last Axiome is plain enough of itself at first sight, and the usefulness thereof may be glanced at in its due place. These are the main Truths I shall recur to, or at least suppose, in my following
following Disquisitions: others will be more reasonably delivered in the continuation of our Discourse.

CHAP. II.

1. Of the Dimensions of the Soul considered barely in her self. 2. Of the Figure of the Soul's Dimensions. 3. Of the Heterogeneity of her Essence. 4. That there is an Heterogeneity in her Plastick part distinct from the Perceptive. 5. Of the acting of this Plastick part in her framing of the Vehicle. 6. The excellency of Des-Cartes his Philosophy. 7. That the Vehicles of Ghosts have as much of solid corporeal Substance in them as the Bodies of Men. 8. The folly of the contrary Opinion evinced. 9. The advantage of the Soul, for matter of Body, in the other State, above this.

1. That we may now have a more clear and determinate apprehension of the nature and condition of the Soul out of the Body, let us first consider her a while, what she is in her own Essence, without any reference to any Body at all; and we shall find her a Substance extended and indiscernible, as may be easily gathered out of what we have above written. And it is a reasonable Contemplation here (where we consider the Soul as having left this Terrestrial Body) that she hath as ample, if not more ample, Dimensions of her own, than are visible in the Body she has left. Which I think worth taking notice of, that it may stop the mouths of them that, not without reason, laugh at those unconceivable and ridiculous fancies of the Schools; that first rashly take away all Extension from Spirits, whether Souls or Angels, and then dispute how many of them booted and spurr’d may dance on a needles point at once. Fooleries much derogatory to the Truth, and that pinch our Perception into such an intolerable frightnings and evanishings, that we cannot imagine any thing of our own Being; and if we do, are prone to fall into despair, or contempt of our selves, by fancying our selves such unconceivable Motes of the Sun.

2. But as it is very manifest that the Soul has Dimensions, and yet not infinite, and therefore that she is necessarily bounded in some Figure or other; so it is very uncertain whether there be any peculiar Figure natural to her, answerable to animal shape, or whether the be of her self of either a Round or Oval figure, but does change her shape according as occasion requires. It is not material to define any thing in this Question more then thus, That when the Soul acts in Terrestrial Matter, her Plastick part is determined to the Organization of the Body into humane form; and in the Aereal or Aetherial, that she is neither more nor less determined to any shape then the Genii or Angels; and that if their Vehicles are more naturally guided into one shape then another, that hers is in the same condition; so that in her visible Vehicle she will bear the ordinary form of Angels, such a countenance, and so cloathed, as they.

3. That

Book i. ch. 3, 5-8. Also Book 2. chap. 4, 5.
3. That which is more material, I think is more easie to be defined, and that is, whether the Soul be one Homogeneous Substance, or whether it be in some manner Heterogeneous. That the latter is in some measure true, is manifest from what we have elsewhere written, namely, That the Perceptive faculty reaches not throughout the whole Soul, but is confined to a certain part, which we called the Centre or Eye of the Soul, as also her Perceptive part; but all the rest Plastick. But here arises a further Scruple, whether there be not an Heterogeneity in the very Plastick part also of the Soul. The Aristotelians seem to be confident there is not, and do affirm that if there were an Eye in the Toe, the Toe would see as well as the Head. Of which I very much doubt: For hence it would follow that some Creatures would have a glimmering Light all over, they being in a manner all over transparent, and some thin and clear Complexions might haply have the perception of Light betwixt the lower parts of their Fingers, which are in some good measure pellucid; and therefore Life and Spirits being continued from thence to the Conarion, as they are, or to the fourth Ventricle of the Brain, it would follow that the Soul would have a perception of some glimmerings of Light from thence, which were to see there as well as to feel.

4. Wherefore it seems more rational to admit an Heterogeneity in the Plastick part of the Soul also, and to acknowledge that every removal from the Seat of Common Sense, that is to say, every Circle that surrounds the Centre of the Soul, has not the same bounds of power, neither for number nor extent. But that as concerning the former, there is a gradual falling off from the first excellency, which is the Perceptive part of the Soul, the cloest Circle to which is that part of the Plastick that is able to convey Objects of Sight as well as of Touch and Hearing, and what other Senses else there may be in the Soul. The next Circle is Hearing without Seeing, though not without Touch: for Touch spreads through all. But in its exterior region, which is excessively the greatest, it transmits the circumstantiated Perceptions of no Objects but those that are Tactile; but to others it is only as a dead Medium, as the Circle of Hearing is but as a dead Medium to the Objects of Sight. So that if we would please our Imagination with Ficinus, in fancying the Soul as a Star, we shall doe it more perfectly if we look upon her in her Circles, as having an Halo about her: For the Soul to our Reason is no more Homogeneous than that Spectacle to our Sight.

5. But if we look upon the Soul as ever propending to some personal shape, the direction of the Plastick rays must then tend to a kind of Organization, so far as is conducent to the state the Soul is in, whether in an Airy or Ethereal Vehicle. For that the Plastick power omits or changes as she is drawn forth by the nature of the Matter she acts upon, is discoverable in her Organization of our Bodies here. For in all likelihood the Soul in her self is as much of one sex as another, which makes her sometimes sign the Matter with both, but that very seldom: and therefore it is manifest that the omits one part of her Plastick
fick power, and makes use of the other in almost all efformations of the 
Factus.

Whence it is easie to conclude, that supposing her Plastick power 
naturally work the Ätheræal or Äereal Vehicle into any animal shape, 
it may put forth onely such strokes of the efformative virtue as are con-
venient and becoming the Angelical Nature.

But according to this Hypothesis haply all Objects of Sense will not 
arrive to the Centre of the Soul from every part of the Horizon; no 
not though this Organization were not natural, but merely arbitrarious, 
But be the Soul conceived either bound up thus into animal form, or 
spread loose into any careless round shape, according as her rays shall 
display themselves in her Vehicle of Aire or Äther, yet the seat of fight 
will be duly restrained, which is a consideration of no contemptible con-
sequence.

6. This in general may suffice concerning the very Nature of the 
Soul it self, her Extension and Heterogeneity. I shall onely add to this 
one Observable concerning her Äiry and Ätheræal Vehicle, and then 
I shall descend to more particular disquisitions. Rash fancies and false 
deductions from mifunderflood Experiments have made some very con-
fident that there is a Vacuum in Nature, and that every Body by how 
much more light it is, so much less substance it has in it self. A thing 
very fond and irrational, at the first sight, to such as are but indiffe-
rently well vysed in the incomparable Philosophy of Renatus Des-Car-
tes, whose dexterous wit and through insight into the nature and laws 
of Matter has so perfected the reasons of those Phænomena that Demo-
critus, Epicurus, Lucretius and others have puzzled themselves about, 
that there seems nothing now wanting as concerning that way of Philo-
sophizing, but patience and an unprejudiced judgment to perceu what 
he has writ.

7. According therefore to his Philosophy and the Truth; there is 
ever as much Matter or Body in one consistency as another; as for 
example, there is as much Matter in a Cup of Aire as in the same Cup 
filled with Water, and as much in this Cup of Water as if it were filled 
with Lead or Quicksilver. Which I take notice of here, that I may 
free the imagination of men from that ordinary and idiotick misappre-
henion which they entertain of Spirits that appear, as if they were as 
evanid and devoid of Substance as the very Shadows of our Bodies cast 
against a Wall, or our Images reflected from a River or Looking-gla 
s and therefore from this error have given them names accordingly, call-
ing the Ghosts of men that present themselves to them, Biaõa and 
Umbra, Images and Shades. The which, the more visible they are, they 
think them the more substantial; fancying that the Aire is so condensed, 
that there is not onely more of it, but also that simply there is more 
Matter or Substance, when it appears thus visible, then there was in the 
space before. And therefore they must needs conceit that Death 
reduces us to a pitifull thin pittance of Being, that our Substance is in 
a manner loft, and nothing but a tenuous reek remains; no more in 
proportion to us, then what a sweating horse leaves behind him as he 
gallops.
gallops by in a frothy morning. Which certainly must be a very lamentable consideration to such as love this thick and plump Body they bear about with them, and are pleased to consider how many pounds they outweighed their Neighbour the last time they were put in the balance together.

8. But if a kinde of dubious Transparency will demonstrate the deficiency of Corporeal Substance, a Pillar of Crystal will have less thereof then one of Tobacco-smoke; which though it may be so doubtful and evanid an Object to the Eye, if we try it by the Hand, it will prove exceeding solid: as also these Ghosts that are said to appear in this manner have proved to them that have touched them, or have beenyrıcad by them. For it is a thing ridiculous and unworthy of a Philosopher, to judge the measure of corporeal Matter by what it seems to our sight; for so Aire would be nothing at all: or what it is to our handing or weighing of it; for so indeed a Cup of Quick-silver would seem to have infinitely more Matter in it then one fyll’d with Aire onely, and a veffel of Water less when it is plung’d under the water in the River, then when it is carried in the Aire. But we are to remember, that let Matter be of what constiflency it will, as thin and pure as the flame of a candle, there is not less of corporeal Substance therein then there is in the same dimensions of Silver, Lead, or Gold.

9. So that we need not bemoan the shrivel’d condition of the deceased, as if they were stript almoft of all Substance corporeal, and were too thinly clad to enjoy themselves as to any Object of Sense. For they have no less Body then we our selves have, only this Body is far more active then ours, being more spiritualized, that is to say, having greater degrees of Motion communicated unto it; which the whole Matter of the world receives from some Spiritual Being or other, and therefore in this regard may be faid the more to symbolize with that Immaterial Being, the more Motion is communicated to it: As it does also in that which is the effect of Motion, to wit the tenuity and subtilty of its particles, whereby it is enabled to imitate, in some fort, the proper priviledge of Spirits that pass through all Bodies whatsoever. And thee Vehicles of the Soul, by reason of the tenuity of their parts, may well pass through fuch Matter as seems to us impervious, though it be not really fo to them. For Matter reduced to fuch fluid subtilty of particles as are invisible, may well have entrance through Pores unperceivable.

Whence it is manifest that the Soul, speaking in a natural Sense, logeth nothing by Death, but is a very considerable gainer thereby. For the does not onely posses as much Body as before, with as full and solid dimensions, but has that accession caft in,of having this Body more invigorated with Life and Motion then it was formerly. Which consideration I could not but take notice of, that I might thereby expunge that falf conceit that adheres to moft mens fancies, of that evanid and starved condition of the other flate.
CHAP. III.

The Immortality of the Soul.

1. That the natural abode of the Soul after death is the Aire. 2. That she cannot quit the Aereal Regions till the Æthereal Congruity of life be awakened in her. 3. That all Souls are not in the same Region of the Aire. 4. Cardan's conceit of placing all Ædmons in the upper Region. 5. The use of this conceit for the shewing the reason of their seldom appearing. 6. That this Æphantomenon is salved by a more rational Hypothesis. 7. A further confutation of Cardan's Opinion. 8. More tending to the same scope. 9. The Original of Cardan's error concerning the remote operations of Ædmons. 10. An Objection how Ædmons and Souls separate can be in this lower Region, where Winds and Tempefts are so frequent. 11. A preparation to an Answer from the consideration of the nature of the Winds. 12. Particular Answers to the Objection. 13. A further Answer from the nature of the Statick Faculty of the Soul. 14. Another from the sudden power of actuating her Vehicle. 15. What incumbinations she suffers from haile, rain, &c.

1. Those more particular Enquiries we intend to fall upon, may be reduced to these few Heads: viz. The place of the Soul's abode, Her Employment, and Her Moral condition after Death. That the place of her abode is the Aire, is the constant opinion of the ancient Philosophers and natural Theologers, who do unanimously make that Element the Receptacle of Souls departed: which therefore they called ἀείων, that is, αἰών, because men deceased are in a state of invisibility, as the place they are confined to is an Element utterly invisible of its own nature, and is acclay'd also with caliginous mists, and enveloped by vicissitudes with the dark shadow of the Earth. The truth of this Opinion of theirs is plainly demonstrable from the 29 and 31 Axiomes. For Nature making no enormous jumps, it must needs follow, that Separate Souls must take their first station in the Aire, because that Vital Congruity that fits an Aereal Vehicle does of order awaken immediately upon the quitting of the Earthly Body.

2. Wherefore the Soul being thus vitally united with a Body or Vehicle of Aire, it is impossible that she should ever out of those Regions: because her motions are only according to the capacity of her Vehicle; she being not able to alter the consistency thereof into any more subtile or purer temper then the Aire will admit of, keeping still its own Species. Only she may confisstate the Aire by directing the motion thereof towards her, and squeezing out a considerable part of the first and second Element may retain more Aire then ordinary: But she cannot command the Air from her so entirely, as to actuate these two Elements alone, or any considerable part of them, because the Æthereal Congruity of life is as yet wholly asleeple; nor is it in the power of the Soul to awake it as she pleases: and therefore it would be Pain and Death to her to attempt the removal of the Aereal Matter quite from her. Besides that it

wou
would require such a force as would imply a contribution of motion to it, as well as direction of it, to make it able to bear against other parts of the Aire that love not to be streevted nor crowed: which though it may haply be done in some measure, yet that the may by this force of direction recover a whole Vehicle of Ethere, seems excessively improbable, as is plain from the 31. Axiome.

3. Wherefore it is necessary that the Soul departed this life should be somewhere in the Aire, though it be not at all necessary that they should inhabit all of them the same Region thereof. For as some Souls are more purified then others when they leave the Body, so a more pure degree of Vital Congruity will awake in them: whence by that Divine Nemesis that runs through all things, they will be naturally conveyed to such places and be associated to such company as is most concurous to their Nature; and will be as distinctly sorted by that Eternal Justice that God has so deeply ingrained in the very essential contexture of the Universe, as humane Laws dispose of persons with us, sending some to Prisons, some to Peft-houses, and others to the Prytanemum.

4. It will therefore, in all likelihood, fall to some of their shares to be fatally fettered to this lower Region of the Aire, as I doubt not but many other Spirits are, though Cardan much pleases himself with a peculiar conceit of his own, as it the supreme Region of the Aire was the only habitation of all Demons or Spirits whatever, and that their descent to us is as rare as the diving of Men into the bottom of the Sea, and almost as difficult, this thick Aire we breath in being in a manner as unfittable to the tenuous consistencies as the Water is to us; in which we are fain to hold our breath, and consequently to make a very short stay in that Element.

Besides that he fancies the paffage of the Middle Region tedious to them, by reason of its Coldness; which therefore he faith is as it were a fence betwixt us and them, as the Sea is betwixt the Fishes and us; whom though we exceed much in Wit and Industry, and have a great defire to catch them and kill them, yet we get very few into our hands in com-parison of thofe that fcape us: And fo these Demons, though they bear us no good will, by bodily conflict they can hurt none of us (it being fo difficult a thing to come at us) and very few of us by their Art and Industry.

For this fancyfull Philofopher will have them only attempt us as we do the Fishes, by Baits, and Nets, and Eel- spears, or fuch like Engines which we cast into the bottom of the Water: So faith he, thefe Aereal Genii, keeping their flation above in the third Region of the Aire (as we do on the bank of the River, or in a Boar on the Sea, when we fish) by fending down Dreams and Apparitions, may entangle fome men fo, that by affrightments and turbulences of mind at laft, though at this distance, they may work their ruine and deftruction.

5. This Hypotheftis, I fuppofe, he has framed to give an account why the appearing of the Genii is fo feldome, and why fo little hurt is done by them as there is. For an Answer would be ready, that this lower Aire is no Element for them to abide in: and that it is as foolifhly argued by thofe that fay there are no Spirits, because they are fo feldome felt, as if the
the Fishes, upon a concession of Speech and Reason to their mute Tribe, should generally conclude, that there are no such Creatures as Men or Horses, because it happens so very seldom that they can see them; and should condemn and laugh at those Fishes that, having had the hap to meet with them, should lay they have seen such Creatures, as if they were fanatick and lunatick, and not well in their wits, or else too much in them, and that they contrived such fictions for some political design.

6. Which Parable may hold good, though not upon the same grounds, only by substituting difference of condition for distance of place; and the similitude will prove as sound as before. For, for a Spirit to condensate his Vehicle to almost a Terrestrial grossness and Visiblity, is as rare and uncouth as for Terrestrial animals to dive to the bottom of the Sea, and it's likely every jot as difficult: and so the reason as obvious why so few are seen, and the confident denial of their existence as rash and foolish, by them that have not seen them themselves. For it is as if the Fishes should contest amongst themselves about the existence of Men, and their diving into the Water, and whether there were any places haunted in the Sea; as those would be the most famous where they fish for Pearls, or that cause the most frequent Shipwrecks, or are most pleasant to swim in. And some notable occasion, mischance, or weighty design, such as occurre more rarely, must be reasonably conceived the only invitements to the Genii to expose themselves to our view.

7. That there is so little hurt done by them, need not be resolved into the distance of their habitation, but into the Law of the Universe, whose force penetrates through all Orders of Beings. Besides, it is too trivial and idiotick a conceit, and far below the pitch of a Philosopher, to think that all Aereal Spirits are Haters of Mankind, so as to take delight merely in destroying them. For Men do not hate Fishes because they live in another Element different from theirs, but catch them merely in love to themselves, for gain and food; which the Aery Genii cannot aim at in destroying of us. But to doe mischief merely for mischief's sake, is so excessive an Enormity, that some doubt whether it be compatible to any Intellectual Being. And therefore Cardan ought to have proved that first: as also, if there be any so extremely degenerate, that there be many of them, or rather so many that they cannot be awed by the number of those that are less depraved. For we may obverse that men amongst our selves that are sufficiently wicked, yet they abhor very much from those things that are grossly and caufefully destructive to either Man or Beasts; and themselves would help to destroy, punish, or at least hinder the attempters of such wild and exorbitant outrages that have no pretence of Reason, but are mere exercizes of Crueltie and Vexation to other Creatures.

He also ought to have demonstrated, that all Mankind are not the Peculium of some Spirits or other, and that there are not invisible Governors of Nations, Cities, Families, and sometimes of particular Men; and that at least a Political Goodness, such as services for the safety of Persons and what belongs to them, is not exceedingly more prevalent even in these Kingdomes of the Aire, than gross Injustice. For all this may be on this side of the Divine Life: so that there is no feare of making these
Aéreal Inhabitants over-perfect by this Supposition. In a word, he should have proved that *Political Order*, in the full exercise thereof, did not reach from *Heaven to Earth*, and pierce into the *Subterraneous Regions* also, if there be any *Intellectual Creatures* there. For this will suffice to give a reason that so little hurt is done, though all places be full of *Aéreal Spirits*.

8. Add into all this, that though they may not be permitted to doe any gros evil themselves, and to kill men at pleasure without their consents, yet they may abet them in such ways, or invite them to such courses, as will prove destructive to them: but, it may be, with no greater plot then we have when we set Doggs together by the ears, fight Cocks, bait Beares and Bulls, run Horfes, and the like: where often, by our occasion, as being excited and animated by us, they pursue their own inclinations to the los of their lives.

But though we do not care to kill a Dog or a Cock in this way; yet there are none so barbarous as to knock these Creatures on the head merely because they will doe so. So these worser kind of *Genii*, according as their tempers are, may haply follow some men prone to such or such vices, in which they may drive them in way of contest, or to please their own fancies, to the utmost they can doe it; and, taking their parts, sport themselves in making one man overcome another in duelling, in drinking, in craft and undermining, in wenching, in getting riches, in clambering to honours; and so of the rest. Where it may be their pastime to try the Victory of that Perfon they have taken to; and if he perish by the hurry of their temptations and animations, it is a thing they intended no more, it may be, then he that fets his Cock into the pit desires his neck should be broke: but if it happen so, the sorrow is much alike in both cafes.

Wherefore these Spirits may doe mischief enough in the world, in abetting men that act it, though haply they neither take pleasure in doing of it upon any other terms, nor if they did, are able to doe it, there being so many watchful eyes over them. For these *Aéreal Regions* are as capable of *Political Honesty*, and may as deeply resent it, as the nations of the Earth do, and it may be more deeply.

9. But if these Creatures were removed so far off as Cardan would have them, I do not see how they could have any communion at all with us, to doe us either good or hurt. For that they are able to send *Apparitions* or *Dreams* at this distance, is it fell but a dream, occaisioned from that first Error in the *Aristotelian Philosophy*, that makes God and the Intelligences act from the heavenly spheres, and so to produce all these Effects of Nature below; such as can never be done but by a present *Numen* and *Spirit of Life* that pervades all things.

10. This conceit therefore of his shall be no hindrance to our concluding, That this lower Region of the Aire is also replenisht with *Demons*. Which if it be, it is not unlikely but that the *Impurer Souls* wander there also; though I have taken all this pains to bring still greater trouble upon my self. For it is obvious to object that which *Lucretius* has started of old, that this Region being so obnoxious to *Windes* and *Tempefts*, the Souls
Souls will not be able to keep their Vehicles of Aire about them, but that they will be blown in pieces by the roughness of these storms. But we may be easily delivered of this solicitude, if we consider the nature of the Windes, the nature of these Vehicles, and the Statick power of the Soul. For to say they will make as good shift as the Genii here, is not fully satisfaction, because a man would also willingly understand how the Genii themselves are not liable to this inconvenience. My Answer therefore shall reach both.

11. That Windes are nothing else but Watery particles at their greatest agitation, Cartesius has very handsomely demonstrated in his Meteors: Which particles do not so much drive the Aire before them, as pass through it, as a flight of arrows and showers of hail or rain. One part of the Aire therefore is not driven from another, but it is as if one should conceive so many little pieces of hair be twirling on their middle point as at quarter-staffe, and so passing through the Aire; which motion would pass free, without carrying the Aire along with it. This therefore being the nature of Winde, the Aire is not torn apiece thereby, though we finde the impetus of it moving against us, because it cannot penetrate our Bodies with that facility that it does the Aire.

12. But the Vehicles of the Genii and Souls deceased are much what of the very nature of the Aire; whence it is plainly impossible that the Winde should have any other force on them than what it has on the rest of that Element; and therefore the least thing imaginable will hold all the parts together, Which is true also if the Winde did carry along the Aire with it: for then the Vehicles of the Genii would move along with the stream, suffering little or no violence at all, unless they would force themselves against it. Which they are not necessitated to doe, as indeed not so much as to come into it, or not at least to continue in it, but may take shelter, as other living Creatures doe, in houses, behind walls, in woods, dales, caverns, rocks and other obvious places; and that naturally enough, the change of Aire and prognostick of storms being more perceptible to them then to any terrestial animal.

13. And yet they need not be so cautious to keep out of danger, they having a power to grapple with the greatest of it, which is their Statick faculty; which arises from the power of directing the motion of the particles of their Vehicle. For they having this power of directing the motion of these particles which way they please, by Axiome 31. it necessarily follows, that they can determinate their course inwards or toward the Centre; by which direction they will be all kept close together, firm and tight: which ability I call the Statick power of the Soul. Which if it can direct the whole agitation of the particles of the Vehicle, as well those of the first and second Element as those of the Aire, and that partly towards the Centre, and partly in a countertendency against the storms, this force and firmness will be far above the strongest Winde that she can possibly meet with.

14. Wherefore the Soul's Vehicle is in no danger from the boisterousness of the Winds, and if it were, yet there is no fear of cessation of Life. For as the wind blows off one part of Aire, it brings on another which may
may be immediately actuated by the presence of the Soul; though there
be no need to take refuge in so large an Hypothefis. And it is more pro-
able that she is more peculiarly united to one part of the Aire, than an-
other, and that she dismisses her Vehicle but by degrees, as our Spirits
leaffurely pafs away by inefifible Perpiration.

15. We fee how little the Soul's Vehicle can be incommode by
storms of Wnde. And yet Rain, Hail, Snow and Thunder will incommo-
date her still less. For they pafs as they do through other parts of the
Aire, which clofe again immediately, and leave neither wound nor scarre
behinde them. Wherefore all these Meteors in their Mediocrity may be
a pleafure to her and refreshment; and in their eftect no long pain, nor
in their highest rage any defftruction of life at all. From whence we may
safely conclude, that not only the Upper Region, but this Lower also, may
be inhabited both by the deceased Souls of Men and by Daemons.

C H A P. IV.

1. That the Soul once having quittd this Earthly Body becomes a Daemon.
2. Of the External Senfes of the Soul separate, their number and limits
in the Vehicle. 3. Of Sight in a Vehicle organized and u/organized.
4. How Daemons and separate Souls hear and fee at a vaft Distance:
and whence it is that though they may fo easily hear or fee us, we may
neither fee nor hear them. 5. That they have Hearing as well as
Sight. 6. Of the Touch, Smell, Taf/ and Nourishment of Daemons.
7. The external employment that the Genii and Souls deceased may have
out of the Body. 8. That the actions of Separate Souls, in relation
to us, are most what conforrable to their life here on Earth. 9. What
their Entertainments are in relation to thelrsehems. 10. The di/inction
of Orders of Daemons from the places they most frequent.

T H E next thing we are to enquire into is the Employment of the
Soul after Death; how she can entertain her felf, and pafs away
the time, and that either in Solitude, in Company, or as she is a
Political member of some Kingdom or Empire. Concerning all which in
the general we may conclude, that it is with her as with the reft of the
Areal Genii, & yov dravvprtv ti joriw aJrtwov 63, for the
Soul having once put off this Terrestrial Body becomes a Genius her felf;
as Maximus Tyram, Xenocrates, Philo and others exprply affirm. But
we fhall consider thefe things more particularly.

2. As for thofe Employments wherefh the may entertain her felf in
politude, they are either Objects of the External Senfes, or of the Inward
Mind. Concerning the former whereof it is more eafie to move Que-
3tions then fatisfie them; as Whether she have the fame number of Sen-
fes she had in this life. That she is endued with Hearing, Sight and Touch.
I think there can be no fcruple, because thofe will fall to her nature necel-
arily, whether her Vehicle be organized or not; and that of Seeing and
Touch
Touch is the most uncontroversial of all. For the sense of visible Objects being discovered to us by transmission of Motion through those Spherical particles that are continued along from the Object through the Aire to our very Organ of Sight (which sees merely by reason of these particles being vitally united with the Soul) the same particles pervading all the Soul’s Vehicle, it is impossible but that she should see. But the Question is, whether she sees in every part thereof. To which I must answer, No: partly from what I have already declared concerning the Heterogeneity of her Plaftick part; and partly from a gross inconvenience that would follow this Supposition. For if we should grant that the Soul saw in every part of her Vehicle, every Object that is near would not only seem double, but centuple, or millefuple; which would be a very ugly enormity and defacement of Sight. Wherefore we have, with very good reason, restrained the Visible faculty of the Soul in this state of Separation, as well as it was in the Terrestrial Body.

3. But this hinders nothing but that the Soul, when she lies in one Homogeneous orb of Aire, devoid of organization, may see round about her, behind, before, above, beneath, and every way. But if she organize her Vehicle, Sight may haply be restrained, as in us who cannot see behind us. Which Consideration we touch upon before.

4. It is plain therefore that these Aëreal Spirits, though we cannot see them, cannot mis of seeing us; and that, it may be, from a mighty distance, if they can transform their Vehicle, or the Organ of Sight, into some such advantageous Figure as is wrought in Dioptrick Glasses. Which power will infinitely exceed the contracting and dilating of the pupil of our Eye, which yet is a weaker and more defective attempt towards so high a Privilege as we speak of: which notwithstanding may seem very possible in Spirits, from 31 and 34 Axiomes. The same also may be laid of their Hearing. For the same principle may enable them to shape themselves Organs for the receiving of Sounds, of greater art and excellency then the most accurate Acoustick we read of, or can excogitate.

Wherefore it is a very childish mistake to think, that because we neither see the shape nor hear the discourse of Spirits, that they neither hear nor see us. For soft Bodies are impresible by hard ones, but not on the contrary; as melted Wax will receive the Signature of the Seal, but the Seal is not at all impressed upon the Wax. And so a solid Body will stop the course of the Aire, but the Aire will not stop the course of a solid Body, and every inconsiderable terrestrial consistence will reflect Light, but Light scarce moves any terrestrial Body out of its place, but is rebounded back by it. That therefore that is most tenuous and thin, is most passive, and therefore if it be once the Vehicle of Sense, is most sensible. Whence it will follow, that the reflection of Light from Objects being able to move our Organs, that are not so fine, they will more necessarily move those of the Genii, and at a greater distance. But their Bodies being of diaphanous Aire, it is impossible for us to see them, unless they will give themselves the trouble of reducing them to a more terrestrial consistence, whereby they may reflect light. Nor can we easily hear their
ordinary speech, partly because a very gentle motion of the Aire will act upon their Vehicles, and partly because they may haply use the finer and purer part of that Element in this exercise, which is not so fit to move our Sense. And therefore unless they will be heard datâ operâ (of which the Devil of Machiavel is a notorious example) naturally that ineffus of the Air in their usual discourse can never strike our Organ.

5. And that we may not seem to say all this for nought; that they will have hearing as well as seeing, appears from what I have intimated above, that this Faculty is ranged near the Common Sensorium in the Vehicle, as well as that of sight; and therefore the Vehicle being all Air, such percussions of it as cause the sense of sound in us will necessarily do as like in them; but more accurately, haply, if they organize their Vehicle for the purpose, which will answer to the ascension of the Ears of Animals, for the better taking in the sound.

6. That they have the sense of touch is inevitably true, else how could they feel resistance, which is necessary in the bearing of one Body against another, because they are impenetrable? And to speak freely my mind, it will be a very hard thing to disprove that they have not something analogical to smell and taste, which are very near akin to touch properly so called. For Fumes and Odours passing so easily through the Air, will very naturally infuse into their Vehicles also: which Fumes, if they be groffer and humectant, may raise that diversification of touch which we Mortals call tasting; if more subtle and dry, that which we call smelling. Which if we should admit, we are within modest bounds as yet in comparison of others; as Cardan, who affirms downright that the Aerial Genii are nourished, and that some of them get into the Bodies of Animals to batter themselves there in their Blood and Spirits. Which is also averred by Marcus the Mesopotamian Eremit in Pherus, who tells us that the purer sort of the Genii are nourished by drawing in the Air, as our Spirits are in the Nerves and Arteries; and that other Genii, of a courser kinde, suck in moisture, not with the Mouth as we do, but as a Sponge does water. And Moses Egyptian writes concerning the Zabii, that they eat of the blood of their Sacrifice, because they thought it was the food of the Demons they worshipped, and that by eating thereof they were in a better capacity to communicate with them. Which things if they could be believed, that would be no such hard Problem concerning the Familiars of Witches, why they suck them. But such curiosities, being not much to our purpose, I willingly omit.

7. The conclusion of what has been said is this, That it is certain that the Genii, and consequently the Souls of men departed, who into fact are of the same rank with them, have the sense of seeing, hearing and touching, and not improbably of smelling and tasting. Which Faculties being granted, they need not be much at a loss how to spend their time, though it were but upon external Objects; all the furniture of Heaven and Earth being fairly exposed to their view. They see the fame Sun and Moon that we do, behold the persons and converie of all men, and, if no special Law inhibit them, may pass from Town to Town, and from City to City, as Hesiod also intimates,
There is nothing that we enjoy but they may have their fees out of it; fair Fields, large and invious Woods, pleasant Gardens, high and healthful Mountains, where the purest gusts of Air are to be met with, Crystal Rivers, mostly Springs, solemnity of Entertainments, Theatrick Pomp and Sheows, publick and private Discourses, the exercises of Religion, whether in Temples, Families, or hidden Cells.

They may be also (and haply not uninterested) Spectators of the glorious and mischievous hazards of War, whether Sea-fights or Land-fights; besides those soft and silent, though sometimes no less dangerous, Combats in the Camps of Cupid; and a thousand more particularities that it would be too long to reckon up, where they haply are not mere Spectators but Abettors, as Plutarch writes: Like old men that are past Wrestling, Pitching the Barre, or playing at Cudgels themselves, yet will affit and abet the young men of the Parish at those Exercises. So the Souls of men departed, though they have put off with the Body the capacity of the ordinary functions of humane Life, yet they may assist and abet them, as pursuing some design in them; and that either for evil or good, according as they were affected themselves when they were in the Body.

8. In brief, whatever is the Custome and Desire of the Soul in this life, that ficks and adheres to her in that which is to come; and she will be sure, so farre as he is capable, either to act it, or to be at least a Spectator and Abettor of such kind of actions.

Qua graia currum

Armorumque fuit vivis, qua curavit gentes

Pascere equos,adem sequitur tellus repositos,

Which rightly understood is no poëtical fiction, but a professed Truth in Plato's Philosophy. And Maximus Tyrius speaks expressly even of the better sort of Souls, who having left the body, and so becoming epoqpe εξόμι x. νίμι νειρες: ανιντ τιβρωτευω, i.e. being made ipso facto Genii in stead of men, that, beside the peculiar happiness they reap thereby to themselves, they are appointed by God, and have a million from him, to be Overseers of humane affairs: but that every Genius does not perform every office, but as their natural Inclinations and Customes were in this life, they exercise the like in some manner in the other. And therefore he will have Asculapius to practive Physick still, and Hercules to exercise his strength, Amphileochus to prophesy, Castor and Pollux to navigate, Minos to hear causes, and Achilles to war. Which opinion is as likely to hold true in Bad Souls as in Good; and then it will follow, that the Souls of the wicked make it their business to assist and abet the exercise of such Vices as themselves were most addicted to in this life, and to animate and tempt men to them. From whence it would follow, that they being thus by their separate state Demons, as has been said already, if they be also tempters to evil, they will very little differ from mere Devils.

9. But besides this employment in reference to us, they may entertain themselves with Intellectual Contemplations, whether Natural, Mathematical,
matical, or Metaphysical. For assuredly Knowledge is not so easy and cheap in this state of Separation, but that they may advance and improve themselves by exercise and Meditation. And they being in a capacity to forget by reason of defuetude, it will be a new pleasure to them to recall to minde their almost obliterate speculations. And for those that take more pleasure in outward Sense then in the operations of their Understanding, there being so much change in Nature, and so various qualifications of the Aire and these inferior Elements, which must needs act upon their Aereal Bodies to more or less gratification or dislike, this also will excuse them from being idle, and put them upon quest after such refreshments and delights as nature will afford the multitudious presages and desires of their flitting Vehicles.

10. Not but that they keep constant to some general inclination, which has divided these Aereal wanderers into so many Orders or Tribes: the ancient Philosophers and Poets (which are Philosophers of the ancient standing of all) having assigned places proper to each Order: the Sea, Rivers and Springs to one, Mountains and Groves to others, and so of the rest. Whence they imposed also those names of the Nereides, Naiades, Oreades, Dryades, and the like: to which you may add the Divi tutelares of Cities and Countries, and those that love the warmth of Families and homely converse of Men, such as they styled Lares familiares. All which, and hundreds more, which there is no need to recite, though they be engaged ever in one natural propension, yet there being so great variety of occasions to gratify it more or less, their thoughts may be employed in purchasing and improving those delights that are most agreeable to their own nature. Which particularities to run over would be as infinite as useless.

These short intimations are sufficient to make us understand that the Genii and Separate Souls need want no Employment, no not in Solitude: for such must their stay also amongst us be esteemed, when they do not sensibly and personally converse with us.

C H A P. V.

1. That the Separate Soul spends not all her time in Solitude. 2. That her converse with us seems more intelligible then that with the Genii. 3. How the Genii may be visible one to another, though they be to us invisible. 4. Of their approaches, and of the limits of their swiftness of motion: 5. And how they far exceed us in celerity. 6. Of the figure or shape of their Vehicles, and of their privacy, when they would be invisible. 7. That they cannot well converse in a mere simple Orbicular forme. 8. That they converse in Human shape, at least the better sort of them. 9. Whether the shape they be in proceed merely from the Imperium of their Will and Fancy, or is regulated by a natural Character of the Plaftick part of the Soul. 10. That the personal shape of a Soul or Genius is partly from the Will, and partly from the Plaftick power. 11. That
11. That considering how the Soul organizes the Fœtus in the Womb, and moves our limbs at pleasure, it were a wonder if Spirits should not have such command over their Vehicles as is believed. 12. A further Argument from an excessive virtue some have given to Imagination.

1. But the separate state of the Soul does not condemn her to this solitude, but being admitted into the Order of the Genii, she is possessed of their Privileges, which is to converse personally with this ærial people, and also upon occasion with the Inhabitants of the Earth; though the latter with far more difficulty.

2. As for her converse with the ærial Genii and other Souls separate, it must be in all reason concluded to be exceeding much more frequent than that with Men, and yet this latter is in some sort more intelligible; because it is certain she can see us, light being reflected from our Opake Bodies unto her Sense, and by conspirating her Vehicle she may make her self visible to us. But the Vehicles of the Genii and of Souls being in their natural consistence purely ærial, and Air being a transparent Body, it will transmit the light wholly; and so no reflexion being made from these ærial Bodies, they can have no perception of one another's presence, and therefore no society nor communion one with another.

3. This seems a shrewd Difficulty at the first view. But it is easily taken off, if we consider that Aire will admit of many degrees of rarefaction and condenfation, and yet still appear unto us alike invisible, as one may observe in the Weather-glass. But it were more proper to propose in this case the Experiment of the Wind-gun, wherein the Aire is compressed to a great number of degrees of Condenfation beyond its natural state; within the compas of many whereof there is no doubt, if not in the utmost, that the Aire does remain invisible to us. But there is no scruple to be made but that in the progresse of these degrees of Condenfation the Aire, if it were in a Glass-barrel, might become visible to the Genii, by reason of the tendernefs and delicacy of their Senses, before it would be fo to us.

Whence it follows, that the Vehicles of the Genii may have a consistency different from the Aire, and perceptible to them, that is to say, to one another's sight, though it be as unperceptible to us as the rest of the Aire is. As it may be, a man that has but bad eyes would not be able to distinguifh Ice immersed in the Water from the Water itself by his fight, though he might by his Touch. Or if their Vehicles could be suppofed purer and finer then the rest of the Aire, their presence might be perceptible by that means too. For this vaporous Aire having without question a confufed reflexion of light in it, every way in some proportion like that in a Mift, or when the Sun shines waterily and prognosticks rain; these repercussions of light being far more fenfible to the Genii then to us, the feffening of them would be more fenfible, and therefore the diminution of reflexion from their Vehicles would be sufficient to discover their presence one to another: and for the illuftrating of this Hypothesis, the experiment of the Weather-glass is more proper.

But
But the other supposition I look upon as the more likely to be true; and that as the *aquatil* Animals that live in the Sea have a confilency groffer than the Element they move in, so it is with thefe that live in the Aire, though there be nothing near fo great a difference here as in that other Element.

4. It is plain therefore, that the Perfons of the Genii and Separate Souls are visible one to another: But yet not at any distance, and therefore there is necessity of approaching to one another for mutual converfe: which enforces us to say something of their Local Motion. Which is neither by Fins nor Wings, as in Fishes or Birds, who are faif to fustain themselves by thefe instruments from finking to the bottome of either Element: but it is merely by the direction of the agitation of the particles of their Vehicle toward the place they aime at; and in fuch a swiftness or leafeurliness as bent pleafes themselves, and is compatible to their natures. For they can goe no swifter then the whole fumme of agitation of the particles of their Vehicle will carry fo much Matter, nor indeed fo swifter; for it implies that their Vehicles would be turned into an absolutely hard Body, fuch as Brass or Iron, or whatever we find harder; fo that necessarily they would fall down to the Earth as dead as a Stone. Thofe therefore are but phantaftick conceits that give fuch agility to Spirits, as if they could be here and there and every where at once, fkip from one Pole of the World to another; and be on the Earth again in a moment: whenas in truth they can pas with no greater swiftness then the direction of fuch a part of the agitation of the particles of their Vehicles will permit, as may be fpared from what is employed in keeping them within a tolerable compafs of a due Aereal fluidity.

5. And this alone will suffice to make them exceed us in activity and swiftness by many degrees. For their whole Vehicle is haply at leaft as thin and moveable as our Animal Spirits, which are very few in comparison of this luggage of an earthly Body that they are to drive along with them. But the Spiritual Bodies of the Genii have nothing to drive along with them but themselves; and therefore are more free and light, compared to us, then a mett'd Steed that has caf't his Rider, compared with a Pack-horfe laden with a lack of Salt.

6. The next thing to be condered, touching the mutual converfation of thefe Aereal Genii, is the fhape they appear in one to another, of what Figure it is, and whether the Figure be Natural, or Arbirvarious, or Mixt. For that they muft appear in fome Figure or other is plain, in that their Vehicles are not of an infinite extenion. It is the more general Opinion, that there is no particular Figure that belongs unto them naturally, unless it be that which of all Figures is moft simple, and moft easy to conform to, even by external helps, which is the equal comprefion of the Aire on every fide of the Vehicle, by which means drops of Dew and Rain and pellets of Hail come fo ordinarily into that fhape. Which also will more handsomely accord with the nature of the Soul, supposing the confift of Central and Radial effence, as I have above decribed, and the Common Sensorum be placed in the midft. In this Figure may the Soul reside in the Aire, and haply melt her felf, I mean her Vehicle,
Vehicle, into near so equal a liquidity with that part of that Element adjacent to her, that it may be in some measure like our retiring into secrecy from the sight of men, when we desire to be private by our selves.

7. But she may, if she will, and likely, with far more ease, change this consistency of her Aereal Body into such a degree of thicknes, that there may be a dubious discovery of her, as in the glimpse of a Fish under the water, and may still make her self more visible to her fellow-Genii, though keeping yet this simple orbicular form. But what converse there can be betwixt two such heaps of living Aire, I know not. They may indeed communicate their Affections one to another in such a way as is discovered in the Eye, wherein the motions of the Spirits do plainly indicate the Passions of the Mind: so that it may seem possible, in this simple Figure, to make known their joy or grief, peaceableness or wrath, love or dislike, by the modification of the motion of the Spirits of their Vehicle. But how there can well be entertained any Intellectual or Rational Conference, without any further organization of their Aerial Bodies, I profess my self at a loss to understand.

8. Wherefore the Genii and Separate Souls, whatever their shape be in private, appear in a more operose and articulate form when they are to converse with one another. For they can change their Figure in a manner as they please, by Axiome 34. Which power, I conceive, will be made use of not onely for service, but ornament and pulchritude. And the most unexceptionable Beauty, questionless, is that of Man in the best patterns (chuse what Sex you will) and far above the rest of Creatures, which is not our judgement onely, but His that made us. For certainly he would give to the Principal of terrestrial Animals the noblest form and shape, which though it be much obscured by our unfortunate Fall, yet questionless the defacement is not so great, but that we may have a near guess what it has been heretofore. It is most rational therefore to conclude, that the Aereal Genii converse with one another in Humane shape, at least the better sort of them.

9. But the difficulty now is, whether that Humane shape that the Soul transforms her Vehicle into be simply the Effect of the Imperium of her Will over the Matter she actuates, or that her Will may be in some measure limited or circumscribed in its effect by a concomitant exertion of the Plastic power, so that what proceeds from the Will may be onely more general, that is, that the Soul's Will may onely command the Vehicle into an Animal form; but that it is the form or shape of a Man, may arise in a more natural way from the concomitant exertion of the Plastic virtue: I say, in a more easy and natural way; for vehemency of desire to alter the Figure into another representation may make the appearance resemble some other creature: But no forced thing can last long.

The more easy and natural shape therefore that, at least, the better Genii appear in, is Humane: which if it be granted, it may be as likely that such a determinate Humane shape may be more easy and natural then another, and that the Soul, when the wills to appear in perifonal Figure, will
will transform her Vehicle into one constant likeness, unless she disguise
her self on set purpose. That is, the Platfick power of every Soul,
whether of Men, or of the other Genii, does naturally display it itself into a
different modification of the Humane shape, which is the proper Signa-
ture of every particular or individual person: which though it may be a
little changed in Generation by virtue of the Imagination of the Parents,
or quality of their seed, yet the Soul set free from that Body she got here,
may exquisitely recover her ancient form again.

10. Not that the Platfick virtue, awakened by the Imperium of her
Will, shall renew all the lineaments it did in this Earthly Body ( for abun-
dance of them are useless and to no purpose, which therefore, Provi-
dence fo ordaining, will be silent in this Airy figuration, and only such
operate as are fit for this separate state: and such are those as are requi-
site to perfect the visible feature of a Person, giving him all parts of ei-
ther ornament or use for the pleasure of Rational creatures;) nor that this
Informative power does determine the whole appearance alone ( for
these Aerereal Spirits appear variously clad, some like beautiful Virgins,
others like valiant Warriors with their Helmets and Plumes of fea-
thers, as Philoftratus would make us believe Achilles did to Apollonius:) But
there is a mixt action and effect, resulting partly from the freeness
of the Will and Imagination, and partly from the natural propension of
the Platfick virtue, to cast the Vehicle into such a personal shape.

11. Which Prerogative of the Soul, in having this power thus to
shape her Vehicle at will, though it may seem very strange, because we
do not see it done before our eyes, nor often think of such things; yet it
is not much more wonderful than that she organizes the Fetus in the
womb, or that we can move the parts of our Body merely by our Will and
Imagination. And that the Aerereal Spirits can doe these things, that they
can thus shape their Vehicles, and transform themselves into several Ap-
pearances, I need bring no new instances thereof. Those Narrations I
have recited in my Third Book against Atheifm do sufficiently evince this
Truth. And verily, considering the great power acknowledged in Imagi-
nation by all Philosophers, nothing would seem more strange, then that
these Airy Spirits should not have this command over their own Vehi-
cles, to transform them as they please.

12. For there are some, and they of no small note, that attribute so
wonderful effects to that Faculty armed with Confidence and Belief ( to
which Passion Fear may in some manner be referred, as being a strong
belief of an imminent evil, and that it will surely take effect, as also vehe-
ment Defire, as being accompanied with so small measure of persuasion
that we may obtain the thing desired, else Defire would not be so very
active) I say, they attribute so wonderful force to Imagination, that they
affirm that it will not only alter a man's own Body, but act upon
another's, and that at a distance; that it will inflict diseases on the found,
and heal the sick; that it will caufe Hail, Snows and Winds; that it
will strike down an Horfe or Camel, and caufe their Riders into a ditch;
that it will doe all the feats of Witchcraft, even to the making of Ghosts
and Spirits appear, by transforming the adjacent Aire into the shape of a
person
person that cannot onely be felt and seen, but heard to discourse, and
that not onely by them whose Imagination created this airy Spectrum,
but by other by-standers, whose Fancy contributed nothing to its exis-
tence. To such an extent as this have Avicenna, Algezel, Paracelsus,
Pomponatus, Vaninus and others, exalted the power of humane Imagi-
nation: which if it were true, this transfiguration of the Vehicles of the
separate Souls and Genii were but a trifle in comparison thereof.

CHAP. VI.

1. More credible Instances of the Effects of Imagination. 2. A special
and peculiar Instance in Signatures of the Foetus. 3. That what Fie-
nus grants, who has so cautiously bounded the power of Fancy, is suffi-
cient for the present purpose. 4. Examples approved of by Fienus.
5. Certain Examples rejected by him, and yet approved of by Fernelius
and Sennertus. 6. Three notorious Stories of the power of the Mother's
Imagination on the Foetus, out of Helmont. 7. A confettural infe-
rrence from those Stories, what influence The Spirit of Nature has in all
Platrick operations. 8. A further confirmation of the Conje^ure from
Signatures on the Foetus. 9. An application thereof to the transfigu-
ration of the Vehicles of Daemons.

But I shall contain my belief within more moderate bounds, that
which the most sober Authors affect to being sufficient for our
turn; and that is the power of Imagination on our own Bodies,
or what is comprehended within our own, viz. the Foetus in the Womb
of the Mother. For that Imagination will bring real and fenfible effects
to pafs is plain, in that fome have raised diseases in their own Bodies by
too strongly imagining of them; by fancying bitter or fweet things, have
brought thofe real fapours into their mouths; at the remembring of
fome filthy Object, have fain a vomiting; at the imagining of a Potion,
have fain a purging; and many fuch things of the like nature. Amongft
which, that of prefixing to ones felf what time in the morning we will
wake, is no lefs admirable then any. Which alterations upon the Spirits
for the production of fuch qualities is every jot as hard as the ranging
them into new figures or postures.

But the hardest of all is, to make them fo determinately active, as to
change the shape of the Body, by fending out knobs like horns, as it
hapned to Cyppus, of which Agrippa speaks in his Occult,Philofoph. Which
I should not have repeated here, had I not been credibly informed of a
later Example of the like effect of Imagination, though upon more fancy-
full grounds. That Fear has killed fome, and turned others gray, is to be
referred to Imagination also: the latter of which examples is a sign that
the Platrick power of the Soul has fome influence also upon the very
hairs: which will make it lefs marvellous that the Soul's Vehicle may
be turned into the live effigies of a Man, not a hair; that is neceffary to
the perfecting of his representation, being excluded, free Imagination succeeding or affecting the Plastic power in the other rate.

2. But of all Examples, those of the Signatures of the Fetus by the Imagination of the Mother come the nearest to our purpose. For we may easily conceive, that as the Plastic power in the Fetus is directed or seduced by the force of the Mothers Fancy, so the Efformative virtue in Souls separate and the Genii may be governed and directed or perverted by the force of their Imagination. And so much the more surely by how much the union is more betwixt the Imagination of the Soul and her own Plastic faculty, then betwixt her and the Plastic power of another Soul; and the capacity of being changed, greater in the yielding Areal Vehicle, then in the grosser rudiments of the Fetus in the Womb.

3. And yet the Effects of the force of the Mothers Imagination in the signing of the Fetus is very wonderful; and almost beyond belief, to those that have not examined these things. But the more learned for both of Physicians and Philosophers are agreed on the truth thereof, as Empedocles, Aristotle, Pliny, Hippocrates, Galen, and all the modern Physicians, being born down into affent by daily experience. For these Signatures of less extravagance and enormity are frequent enough, as the similitude of Cherries, Mulberries, the colour of Claret-wine spilt on a woman with child, with many such like instances. And if we stand but to what Fetus has defined in this matter, who has, I think, behaved himself as cautiously and modestly as may be, there will be enough granted to assure us of what we aim at. For he does acknowledge that the Imagination of the Mother may change the figure of the Fetus so as to make it bear a resemblance, though not absolutely perfect, of an Ape, Pig, or Dog, or any such like Animal. The like he affirms of colours, hairs, and excrencies of several sorts: that it may produce also what is very like or analogous to horns and hoofs, and that it may encrease the bigness and number of the parts of the Body.

4. And though he does reject several of the Examples he has produced out of Authors, yet those which he admits for true are Indications plain enough, what we may expect in the Vehicle of a departed Soul or Demon. As that of the Hairy girl out of Marcus Damaeficus; that other out of Guilielmus Paradinus, of a Child whose skin and nails resembled those of a Bear; and a third out of Balduinus Ronsensus, of one born with many excrencies coloured and figured like those in a Turkey-cock; and a fourth out of Parcus, of one who was born with an head like a Frog; as lastly that out of Avicenna, of Chickens with Hawks heads. All which deviations of the Plastic power hapned from the force of Imagination in the Females, either in the time of Conception, or gestation of their young.

5. But he scruples of giving assent to others, which yet are attented to by very learned Writers. As that of Black-moors being born of white Parents, and white Children of black, by the exposul of pictures representing an Ethiopian or European: which those two excellent Physicians, Fernelius and Semnertus, both agree to. He rejects also that out of Cornelius Gemma, of a Child that was born with his Forehead wounded.
ded and running with blood, from the husbands threatening his wife, when she was big, with a drawn sword which he directed towards her Forehead. Which will not seem so incredible, if we consider what Sen-
nertus records of his own knowledge, viz. That a Woman with child seeing a Butcher divide a Swines head with his Cleaver, brought forth her Child with its face cloven in the upper jaw, the palate, and upper lip to the very nose.

6. But the most notorious instances of this sort are those of Helmont De injictis materialibus. The one of a Taylor's wife at Mechlin, who standing at her door, and seeing a fouldiers hand cut off in a quarrel, presently fell into labour, being struck with horror at the spectacle, and brought forth a child with one hand, the other arm bleeding without one, of which wound the infant died by the great expense of blood. Another woman, the wife of one Marcus De Vogeler Merchant of Antwerp, in the year 1602, seeing a fouldier begging who had lost his right arm in Offendi-siege, which he showed to the people still bloody, fell presently into labour, and brought forth a Daughter with one arm struck off, nothing left but a bloody stump to employ the Chirurgions skill: this woman married afterwards to one Hoebchamer Merchant of Amsterdam, and was yet alive in the year 1638, as Helmont writes. He adds a third example, of another Merchants wife which he knew, who hearing that on a morning there were thirteen men to be beheaded (this hapned at An-
werp in Duke D'Alva his time) she had the curiosity to see the execution. She getting therefore a place in the Chamber of a certain widow-woman, a friend of hers that dwelt in the market-place, beheld this Tragick spectacle; upon which she suddeinly fell into labour, and brought forth a perfectly-formed infant, only the head was wanting, but the neck bloody as their bodies she beheld that had their heads cut off. And that which does still advance the wonder is, that the hand, arm, and head of these in-
fans, were none of them to be found. From whence Van Helmont would infer a penetration of corporeal dimensions; but how groundlessly I will not dispute here.

7. If these Stories he recites be true, as I must confess I do not well know how to deny them, he reporting them with so honest and credible circumstances; they are notable examples of the power of Imagination, and such as do not onely win belief to themselves, but also to others that Fienus would reject, not of this nature onely we are upon, of wounding the body of the Infant, but also of more exorbitant conformation of parts, of which we shall bring an instance or two anon.

In the mean time, while I more carefully contemplate this strange virtue and power of the Soul of the Mother, in which there is no Such mea-
ure of purifiation or exaltedness, that it should be able to act such mir-
acles, as I may call them, rather then natural effects; I cannot but be more then usually inclinable to think that the Plastick faculty of the Soul of the Infant, or whatever reception there may be from the Imagination of the Mother, is not the adequate cause of the formation of the Fetus: a thing which Plotinus somewhere intimates by the bye, as I have * already noted, viz. That the Soul of the World, or the Spirit of Nature, afflits in

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this

* Book 2, chap. 10, sect. 1.
this performance, Which if it be true, we have discovered a Cause pro-
portionable to so prodigious an effect. For we may easily conceive that
the deeply-impassioned Fancy of the Mother snatches away the Spirit
of Nature into content: which Spirit may rationally be acknowledged
to have a hand in the efformation of all vital Beings in the World, and
haply be the only Agent in forming of all manner of Plants.

In which kind whether the exert her power in any other Elements then
Earth and Water, I will conclude no further, then that there may be
a possibility thereof in the calmer Regions of Aire and Aether. To the
right understanding of which conjecture, some light will offer it self from
what we have said concerning the Visibility and Consistency of the Æreal
Demons in their occasions one with another.

8. But this is not the onely Argument that would move one to think
that this Spirit of Nature intermeddles with the Efformation of the Fæ-
tus. For those Signatures that are derived on the Infant from the Mo-
thers fancy in the act of Conception cannot well be understood without
this Hypothetis, For what can be the Subject of that Signature? Not the
Plafick part of the Soul of the Mother; for that it is not the Mothers
Soul that efforms the Embryo, as Sennertus ingeniously conjectures from
the manner of the efformation of Birds, which is in their Eggs, distinct
from the Hen, and they may as well be hatched without any Hen at all,
a thing ordinarily practised in Egypt; nor the Body of the Embryo, for it
has yet no Body; nor its Soul, for the Soul, if we believe Aristotle, is not
yet preuent there. But the Spirit of Nature is preuent every where, which
snatcht into content by the force of the Imagination of the Mother, re-
tains the Note, and will be sure to feel it on the Body of the Infant.

For what rude inchoations the Soul of the World has begun in the Mat-
ter of the Fætus, this Signature is comprehended in the whole deffign,
and after compleated by the preference and operation of the particular Soul
of the Infant, which co-operates conformably to the pattern of the Soul
of the World, and insists in her footsteps; who having once begun any
hint to an entire deffign, she is alke able to pursue it in any place, the be-
ing every where like, or rather the same to her self. For as our Soul being
one, yet, upon the various temper of the Spirits, exerts her self into va-
rious imaginations and conceptions; so the Soul of the World, being
the same perfectly every where, is engaged to exert her Efformative
power every where alike, where the Matter is exactly the same.

Whence it had been no wonder, if those Chickens above-mentioned
with Hawks heads had been hatched an hundred miles distant from the
Hen, whose Imagination was disturbed in the act of Conception: be-
cause the Soul of the World had begun a rude draught, which it self
would as necessarily pursue every where, as a Geometrician certainly
knows how to draw a Circle that will fit three Points given.

9. This Opinion therefore of Plotinus is neither irrational nor unin-
telligible; That the Soul of the World interposes and insinuates into all
generations of things, while the Matter is fluid and yielding. Which
would induce a man to believe that she may not stand idle in the trans-
figuration of the Vehicles of the Demons, but affft their fancies and de-
fires,
fires, and so help to cloath them and attire them according to their own pleasures: or it be may sometimes against their wills, as the unwieldiness of the Mothers Fancy forces upon her a monstrous birth.

CHAP. VII.

The Immortality of the Soul.

1. Three notable Examples of Signatures, rejected by Fienus: 2. And yet so farre allowed for possible, as will fit our design. 3. That Helmont's Cherry and Licetus his Crab-fish are shrewd arguments that the Soul of the World has to doe with all Eformations of both Animals and Plants, 4. An Example of a most exact and lively Signature out of Kitcher: 5. With his judgement thereupon. 6. Another Example out of him of a Child with gray hairs. 7. An application of what has been said hitherto, concerning the Signatures of the Foetus, to the transfiguration of the Aiery Vehicles of Separate Souls and Daemons. 8. Of their personal transformation visible to us.

1. Thofe other Examples of the Signation of the Foetus from the Mothers Fancy, which Fienus rejecteth, the one of them is out of Wierus, of a man that threatened his Wife when she was bigge with child, saying, she bore the Devil in her womb, and that he would kill him: whereupon, not long after, she brought forth a Child well shaped from the middle downwards, but upwards spotted with black and red spots, with eyes in its forehead, a mouth like a Satyre, ears like a Dog, and bended horns on its head like a Goat. The other out of Ludovicus Vives, of one who returning home in the disguise of a Devil, whose part he had acted on the Stage, and having to doe with his wife in that habit, saying he would beget a Devil on her, impregnated her with a Monster of a shape plainly diabolical. The third and most remarkable is out of Peramatus, of a Monster born at S. Lawrence in the West-Indies, in the year 1573, the narration whereof was brought to the Duke of Medina Sidonia from very faithful hands. How there was a Child born there at that time, that besides the horrible deformity of its mouth, ears and nose, had two horns on the head, like those of young Goats, long hair on the body, a fleshy girdle about his middle, double, from whence hung a piece of flesh like a purfe, and a bell of flesh in his left hand, like those the Indians use when they dance, white boots of flesh on his legs, doubled down: In brief, the whole shape was horrid and diabolical, and conceived to proceed from some fright the Mother had taken from the antick dances of the Indians, amongst whom the Devil himself does not fail to appear sometimes.

2. These Narrations Fienus rejecteth, not as false, but as not being done by any natural power, or if they be, that the descriptions are something more lively then the truth. But in the mean time he does freely admit, that by the mere power of imagination there might be such excencencies as might represent those things that are there mentioned; though

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those diabolical shapes could not have true horns, hoofs, tail, or any other part specifically distinct from the nature of Man. But so farre as he acknowledges is enough for our turn.

3. But **Fortunius Licetius** is more liberal in his grants, allowing not onely that the Births of women may be very exquisitely distorted in some of their parts into the likeness of those of Brutes, but that Chimaerical imaginations in Dreams may also effect it, as well as Fancies or external Objects when they are awake. Of the latter sort whereof he produces an Example that will more then match our purpose, of a **Sicilian matron**, who by chance beholding a **Crab** in a Fishermans hand new caught, and of a more then ordinary largenes, when he was brought to bed, brought forth a **Crab** (as well as a **Child**) perfectly like those that are ordinarily caught in the Sea. This was told him by a person of credit, who both knew the Woman, and saw the **Crab** she brought forth.

**Helmont's Cherry** he so often mentions, and how it was green, pale, yellow, and red, at the times of year other Cherries are, is something of this nature; that is to say, comes near to the perfect species of a **Cherry**, as this did of a **Crab**, the plantal life of a **Cherry** being in some measure in the one, as the life of an Animal was perfectly in the other. Which confirms what we laid before, that strength of our **Desire** and **Imagination** may snatch into conflict the **Spirit of Nature**, and make it act: which once having begun, leaves not off; it **Matter** will but serve for to work upon; and being the same in all places, acts the same upon the same **Matter**, in the same circumstances. For the **Root** and **Soul** of every **Vegetable** is the **Spirit of Nature**; in virtue whereof this **Cherry** flourisht and ripened, according to the seasons of the Country where the party was that bore that live **Signature**.

These two instances are very shrewd arguments that the **Soul of the World** has to doe with all Efformations of either **Plants** or **Animals**. For neither the **Child's Soul** nor the **Mothers**, in any likelihoo, could frame that Crab, though the Mother might, by that strange power of Desire and Imagination, excite the **Spirit of the World**, that attempts upon any Matter that is fitted for generation, some way or other, to make something of it; and being determined by the fancy of the Woman, might sign the humid materials in her **Womb** with the image of her Mind.

4. Wherefore if **Ficinus** had considered from what potent causes **Signatures** may arise, he would not have been so scrupulous in believing that degree of exactnes that some of them are reported to have: or if he had had the good hap to have met with so notable an example thereof, as *Kircher* professes himself to have met with. For he tells a story of a man that came to him for this very cause, to have his opinion what a certain strange **Signature**, which he had on his Arm from his birth, might portend; concerning which he had consulted both Astrologers and Cabalists, who had promised great preferments, the one imputing it to the Influence of the Stars, the other to the favour of the sealing Order of Angels. But **Kircher** would not spend his judgement upon a mere verbal description thereof; though he had plainly enough told him, it was the

**Pope**
Pope sitting on his Throne, with a Dragon under his feet, and an Angel putting a Crown on his head.

Wherefore the man desirous to hear a further confirmation of these hopes (he had conceived from the favourable conjectures of others) by the suffrage of so learned a man, was willing in private to put off his doublet, and shew his Arm to Kircher: who having viewed it with all possible care, does profess that the Signature was so perfect, that it seemed rather the work of Art then of exorbitating Nature; and yet by certain observations he made, that he was well assured it was the work of Nature, and not of Art, though it was an artificial piece that Nature imitated, viz. the picture of Pope Gregory the thirteenth, who is sometimes drawn according as this Signature did lively represent, namely on a Throne, with a Dragon under his feet, leaning with one hand on his Seat, and bearing the other in that posture in which they give the Benediction, and an Angel removing a Curtain and reaching a Crown towards his head.

5. Kircher therefore leaving the superflities and fooleries of the spurious Cabalists and Astrologers, told him the truth, though nothing so pleasant as their lies and flateries, viz. That this Signature was not impressed by any either influence of the Stars, or Seals of Angels, but that it was the effect of the Imagination of his Mother that bore him, who in some more then ordinary fit of affection towards this Pope, whose picture she beheld in some Chappel or other place of her devotion, and having some occasion to touch her Arm, printed that image on the Arm of her Child, as it ordinarily happens in such cases. Which doubtless was the true solution of the mystery.

6. The same Author writes, how he was invited by a friend to contemplate another strange miracle (as he thought that did invite him to behold it) that he might spend his judgement upon it. Which was nothing else but an exposèd Infant of some fourteen days old, that was gray-hair'd, both head and eye-brows. Which his friend, an Apothecary, look'd upon as a grand Prodigy, till he was informed of the cause thereof: That the Mother that brought it forth, being married to an old man whose head was all white, the fear of being surprized in the act of Adultery by her snowy-headed husband made her imprint that colour on the Child she bore. Which Story I could not omit to recite, it witnessing to what an exact curiosity the power of Fancy will work for the fashioning and modifying the Matter, not missing so much as the very colours of the hair, as I have already noted something to that purpose.

7. To conclude therefore at length, and leave this luxuriant Theme. Whether it be the Power of Imagination carrying captive the Spirit of Nature into consent, or the Soul of the Infant, or both; it is evident that the Effects are notable, and sometimes very accurately anwering the Idea of the Impregnate, derived upon the moist and ducil matter in the Womb: Which yet not being any thing so yielding as the soft Aire; nor the Soul of the Mother so much one with that of the Infant as the separate Soul is one with it self, nor so peculiarly united to the Body of the Infant as the Soul separate with her own Vehicle, nor having any nearer or more mysterious commerce with the Spirit of Nature then she has

* Adanaf. Kircher, de arte Magnes. lib. 3. part. 7. cap. 7.
has when her Plastick part, by the Imperium of her Will and Imagination, is to organize her Vehicle into a certain shape and form, which is a kind of a momentaneous Birth of the distinct Personality, of either a Soul separate, or any other Daemon; it follows, that we may be very secure, that there is such a power in the Genii and Separate Souls, that they can with ease and accuracy transfigure themselves into shapes and forms agreeable to their own temper and nature.

8. All which I have meant hitherto in reference to their Visible conjunctions one with another. But they are sometimes visible to us also, under some Animal shape, which questionless is much more difficult to them than other Visiblity is. But this is also possible, though more unusual by far, as being more unnatural. For it is possible by Art to compress Aire so, as to reduce it to visible opacity, and has been done by some, and particularly by a friend of Des-Cartes, whom he mentions in his Letters as having made this Experiment: the Aire getting this opacity by squeezing the Globuli out of it. Which though the Separate Souls and Spirits may doe by that directive faculty, Axiome 31, yet surely it would be very painful. For the first Element lying bare, if the Aire be not drawn exceeding close, it will cause an ungratefull heat; and if it be, as unnatural a cold; and so small a moment will make the first Element too much or too little, that it may, haply, be very hard, at least for these inferior Spirits, to keep steddily in a due mean. And therefore, when they appear, it is not unlikely but that they soak their Vehicles in some vaporous or glutinous moisture or other, that they may become visible to us at a more easy rate.

CHAP. VIII.

1. That the Better sort of Genii converse in Humane shape, the Baser sometimes in Beffial. 2. How they are disposed to turn themselves into several Beffial forms. 3. Of Mellius his Ægææ The知道了, or Igneous Splendours of Daemons, how they are made. 4. That the external Beauty of the Genii is according to the degree of the inward Vertue of their Minds. 5. That their Aëreal form need not be purely transparent, but more finely opaque, and coloured. 6. That there is a distinction of Masculine and Feminine beauty in their personal figurations.

Afer this Digestion, of shewing the facility of the figuring of the Vehicles of the Genii into perfonal shape, I shall return again where we left; which was concerning the Society of these Genii and Souls Separate, and under what shape they converse one with another; which I have already defined to be Humane, especially in the Better sort of Spirits. And as for the Worst kind, I should think that they are likewise for the most part in Humane form, though disguised with ugly circumstances; but that they figure themselves also in Beffial appearances; it being so easy for them to transform their Vehicle into
into what shape they please, and to imitate the figures as dexterously as some men will the voices of brute beasts, whom we may hear sing like a Cuckow, crow like a Cock, bellow like a Cow and Calf, bark like a Dog, grunt and squeak like a Pig, and indeed imitate the cry of almost any Bird or Beast whatsoever. And as easy a matter is it for these lower Genii to resemble the shapes of all these Creatures, in which they also appear visibly oftentimes to them that entertain them, and sometimes to them that would willingly shun them.

2. Nor is it improbable, but the variety of their impurities may dispose them to turn themselves into one brutish shape rather than another; as envying, or admiring, or in some sort approving and liking the condition and properties of such and such Beasts: as Theocritus merriely sets out the Venereousness of the Goatheard he describes,

\[
\text{Θ'πολ θ'ποπ delta απος μουρδας οια βαλοις,}
\text{Τάχεως διά ταλαμώς, οι η τη αλο η περετο.}
\]

As if he envied the happiness of the he-Goats, and wifht himself in their stead, in their acts of carnal Copulation, So according to the several Bestial properties that symbolize with the uncleanliness and vitiousnesses of the tempers of these Demons, they may have a propension to imitate their shape rather than others, and appear ugly, according to the manner and measure of their internal turpitudes.

3. As it is likely also that those θρονλια or οργανανωφις, those Ignous Splendours Pселlus makes mention of, (as the end and scope of the nefarious ceremonies those wicked wretches, he describes, often used) were coloured according to the more or less feculency of the Vehicle of the Demon that did appear in this manner, viz. in no personal shape, but by exhibiting a light to the eyes of his abominable Spectatours and Adorers: which, I suppose, he stirred up within the limits of his own Vehicle; the power of his Will and Imagination, by Axioine 31, commanding the großer particles of the Aire and terrestrial vapours, together with the Globuli, to give back every way, from one point to a certain compass, not great, and therefore the more easy to be done. Whence the first Element lyes bare in some considerable measure, whose activity cannot but lick into it some particles of the Vehicle that borders next thereto, and thereby exhibit, not a pure star-like light (which would be, if the first Element thus unbared, and in the midst of pure Aire, were it self unmixed with other Matter) but by the feculency of those parts that it abrades and converts into jewel, and the foulness of the ambient Vehicle through which it shines, exhibit a show red and fiery like the Horizontal Sun seen through a thick throng of vapours.

Which Fiery Splendour may either onely slide down amongst them, and so pass by with the Motion of the Demons Vehicle, which Pςελλυς seems mainly to aim at; or else it may make some stay and discourse with them it approaches, according as I have heard some Narrations. The reason of which lucid appearances being so intelligible out of the Principles of Cartesius his Philofophy, we need not conceit that they are nothing but the prestigious delusions of Fancy, and no real Objects, as Pςελλυς
Psellus would have them; it being no more uncomplayntle to a Demon to raise such a light in his Vehicle, and a purer then I have described, then to a wicked man to light a candle at a tinderbox.

4. But what we have said concerning the purity and impurity of this light, re-minde me of what is of moreutable conquence to discourse of here, which is the Splendour and Beauty of personal shape in the Better fort of the Genii. Which assured is greater or leffer, according to the degrees of Virtue and Moral affections in them. For even in this Body, that is not to yielding to the powers of the Mind, a man may observe, that according as persons are better or worse inclined, the aire of their vifage will alter much; and that vicious courses, defacing the inward pulchritude of the Soul, do even change the outward countenance to an abhorred hue.

Which must therefore necessarily take place, in a far greater measure, in the other state; where our outward form is wholly framed from the inward Imperium of our Mind: which by how much more pure itself is, it will exhibit the more irreprehensible pulchritude in the outward feature and fashion of the Body, both for proportion of parts, the Spírit and aire of the Countenance, and the ornament of cloaths and attirings: there being an indissoluble connexion in the Soul of the Sense of these Three things together, Virtue, Love, and Beauty; of all which the her self is the first Root, and especially in the Separate state, even of outward Beauty itself: whence the converse of the most Vertuous there must needs afford the highest pleasure and satisfaction; not onely in point of rational communication, but in reference to external and personal complacency also. For if Virtue and Vice can be ever seen with outward eyes, it must be in these Aereal Vehicles, which yield fo to the Will and Idea of good and pure affections, that the Soul in a manner becomes perfectly transparent through them, discovering her lovely Beauty in all the effulencies thereof, to the ineffable enervishment of the beholder.

5. Not that I mean, that there is any necessity that their Vehicle should be as a Statue of fluid Crystal; but that these Impresses of Beauty and Ornament will be so faithfully and lively represented, according to the dictates of her inward Sense and Imagination, that if we could see the Soul her self, we could know no more by her then she thus exhibits to our eye: which personal figuration in the estimate parts thereof, that represent the Body, Face and Vestments, may be attempted to so fine an opacity, that it may reflect the light in more perfect colours then it is from any earthly body, and yet the whole Vehicle be so devoid of weight, as it will necessarily keep its stations in the Air. Which we cannot wonder at, while we consider the hanging of the Clouds there, less Aereal by far then this consistency we speak of: to say nothing of Aereal Apparitions as high as the Clouds, and in the same colours and figures as are seen here below, and yet no reflexions of terrestrial Objects, as I have proved in my Third Book against Atheifm.

6. The exact Beauty of the personal shapes and becoming habits of these Abey Beings, the briefest and safest account thereof that Philofophy can give, is to refer to the description of such things in Poets: and then,
then, when we have perused what the height and elegancy of their Fancy has penn’d down, to write under it, An obscure Subindication of the transcendental pulchritude of the Aëreal Genii, whether Nymphs or Heroes. For though there be neither Luft, nor difference of Sex amongst them (whence the kindest commotions of Mind will never be anything else but an exercise of Intellectual love, whose Object is Perme and Beauty;) yet it is not improbable but that there are some general strictures of discrimination of this Beauty into Masculine and Feminine: partly because the temper of their Vehicles may encline to this kind of pulchritude rather than that; and partly because several of these Aëreal Spirits have sustained the difference of Sex in this life, some of them here having been Males, others Females: and therefore their History being to be continued from their departure hence, they ought to retain some character, especially so general a one, of what they were here. And it is very hard to conceive that Aeneas should meet with Dido in the other World in any other form then that of a Woman: whence a necessity of some slighter distinction of habits, and manner of wearing their hair, will follow. Which dresses, as that of the Masculine mode, is easily fitted to them by the power of their Will and Imagination: as appears from that Story out of Peramatus, of the Indian Monster that was born with flethy boots, girdle, purse, and other things that are no parts of a Man, but his clotthing or utensils; and this merely by the Fancy of his Mother, disturb’d and frighted, either in sleep or awake, with some such ugly appearance as that Monster resembled.

CHAP. IX.

1. A general account of the mutual entertains of the Genii in the other World. 2. Of their Philosophical and Political Conferences. 3. Of their Religious Exercises. 4. Of the innocent Pastimes and Recreations of the Better sort of them. 5. A confirmation thereof from the Conversicles of Witches. 6. Whether the purer Daemons have their times of repast or no. 7. Whence the Bad Genii have their food. 8. Of the food and feastings of the Better sort of Genii.

1. We have now accurately enough defined in what form or garb the Aëreal Genii converse with one another. It remains we consider: how they mutually entertain one another in pafting away the time. Which is obvious enough to conceive, to those that are not led aside into that blind Labyrinth which the generality of men are kept in, of supposing that no representation of the state of these Beings is true, that is not so confounded and unintelligible that a man cannot think it sense, unless he wink with the inward eyes of his Minde, and command silence to all his Rational Faculties. But if he will but bethink himself, that the immediate Instrument of the Soul in this life is the Spirits, which are very con-genorous to the body of Angels; and that all our Passions and Conceptions
are either suggested from them, or impressed upon them; he cannot much doubt but that all his Faculties of Reason, Imagination and Affection, for the general, will be in him in the other State as they were here in this: namely, that he will be capable of Love, of Joy, of Grief, of Anger; that he will be able to imagine, to discourse, to remember, and the rest of such operations as were not proper to the Fabrick of this Earthly Body, which is the Office of Death and Generation.

2. Hence it will follow, that the Souls of men deceased, and the rest of the Aëreal Demons, may administer much content to one another in mutual Conferences concerning the nature of things, whether Moral, Natural, or Metaphysical. For to think that the quitting the earthly Body entitles us to an Omniscience, is a Fable never enough to be laugh’d at. And Socrates, somewhere in Plato, prefages, that he shall continue his old Trade when he comes into the other World; convincing and confounding the idle and vain-glorious Sophists wherever he went. And by the same reason Platonists, Aristotelians, Stoicks, Epicureans, and whatever other sects and humors are on the Earth, may in likelihood be met with there, so far as that estate will permit; though they cannot doubt of all things we doubt of here. For these Aëreal Spirits know that themselves are, and that the Souls of men subsist and act after death, unless such as are too deeply tainted with Avarice. But they may doubt whether they will hold out for ever, or whether they will perish at the conflagration of the World, as the Stoicks would have them.

It may be also a great controversy amongst them, whether Pythagorae’s or Prolemie’s Hypothesis be true concerning the Motion of the Earth; and whether the Stars be so big as some define them. For these lower Demons have no better means then we to assure themselves of the truth or fallacy of these Opinions. Besides the discourse of News, of the affairs as well of the Earth as Aire. For the Aëreal Inhabitants cannot be less active then the Terrestrial, nor less busy, either in the performance of some solemn exercises, or in carrying on designs party against party; and that either more Private or more Publick; the Events of which will fill the Aëreal Regions with a quick spreading fame of their Actions. To say nothing of prudential conjectures concerning future successes aforeshaid; and innumerable other entertains of Conference, which would be too long to reckon up, but bear a very near analogy to such as men pass away their time in here.

3. But of all Pleasures, there are none that are comparable to those that proceed from their joint exercise of Religion and Devotion. For their Bodies surpassing ours so much in tenuity and purity, they must needs be a fitter foil for the Divine thoughts to spring up in, and the most delicate and most enravishing affections towards their Maker, which being heightened by sacred Hymns and Songs, sung with voices perfectly imitating the sweet passionate relishes of the sense of their devout Minds, must even melt their Souls into Divine Love, and make them swim with joy in God. But these kinds of Exercises being so highly rapturous and Ecstatical, transporting them beyond the ordinary limits of their Nature, cannot in Reason be thought to be exceeding frequent; but as a solemn Repast,
Chap. IX. The Immortality of the Soul.

Reap't, after which they shall enjoy themselves better for a good space of time after.

4. Wherefore there be other Entertainments, which though they be of an inferior nature to these, yet they far exceed the greatest pleasure and contentments of this present state. For the Animal life being as essential to the Soul as union with a Body, which the is never free from; it will follow that there be some fitting gratifications of it in the other World. And none greater can be imagined than Sociableness and Personal complacency, not only in rational discourses; which is so agreeable to the Philosophical Ingeny, but innocent Passions, in which the Musical and Amorous propension may be also recreated. For these three dispositions are the floor of all the rest, as Plutinus has somewhere noted: And his reception into the other World is set out by Apollo's Oacle from some such like circumstances as these.

Of the meaning of which Verses that the Reader may not quite be deprived, I shall render their sense in this careless paraphrase:

Now the best meetings thou art in; to Offer to airy Genii, where soft winds do blow. Where Friendship, Love, and gentle sweet Desire Fill their thrice welcome guests with joys entire. Love supply'd from that immortal spring Whose streams pure Ne'er from great Love do bring: Whence kind Converses and amorous Eloquence Warm their chaste minds into the highest sense Of Heavenly Love, whose myriads they declare 'Midst the fresh breathings of the peaceful Aire.

And he holds on, naming the happy company the Soul of Plutinus was to associate with, viz. Pythagoras, Plato, and the purer Spirits of the Golden Age, and all such as made up the Chorus of immortal Love and Friendship.

These sing, and play, and dance together, reaping the lawful pleasures of the very Animal life, in a far higher degree then we are capable of in this World. For every thing here does as it were taff of the cask, and has some courtesies and foulnefs with it. The sweet motions of the Spirits in the passion of Love can very hardly be commanded off from too near bordering upon the shameful sense of Lust; the Fabrick of the Terrestrial Body almost necesitating them to that deviation. The tenderer Ear cannot but feel the rude thumpings of the wood, and gratings of the rosin, the hoarsnefs, or some harshnefs and untunablenefs or other, in the best consorts of Musical Instruments and Voices. The judicious Eye cannot but espy some considerable defect in either the proportion, colour, or the aire of the face, in the most fam'd and most admired beauties of
either Sex: to say nothing of the inconcinnity of their deportment and habits. But in that other state, where the Fancy consults with that First Exemplar of Beauty, Intellectual Love and Vertue, and the Body is wholly obedient to the imagination of the Mind, and will to every Punctilio yield to the impresses of that inward Pattern; nothing there can be found amiss, every touch and stroke of motion and Beauty being conveyed from to judicious a power through to delicate and depurate a Medium. Wherefore they cannot but enravish one another’s Souls, while they are mutual Spectators of the perfect pulchritude of one another’s Persons & comely carriage, of their graceful dancing, their melodious singing and playing, with accents so sweet and soft, as if we should imagine the Aire here of it self to compose Lessons, and tend forth Musical sounds without the help of any terrestrial Instrument. These, and such like Pastimes as these, are part of the Happinels of the Best fort of the Aereal Genii.

5. Which the more certain knowledge of what is done amongst the inferior Demons will further assure us of. For it is very probable that their Conventicles, into which Witches and Wizzards are admitted, are but a depraved adumbration of the friendly meetings of the superiour Genii. And what Musick, Dancing and Feasting there is in these, the free confession of those Wretches, or fortuitous detection of others, has made manifest to the World, viz. How humane and Angelical Beauty is transformed there into Bestial Deformity, the chief in the company ordinarily appearing in the Figures of Satyres, Apes, Goats, or such like ugly Animals; how the comely deportments of body, into ridiculous gesticulations, perverse postures and antick dances; and how innocuous love and pure friendship degenerates into the most brutifh lust and abominable obscenity that can be imagined; of which I will adde nothing more, having spoke enough of this matter in the Appendix to my Antidote.

6. What is most material for the present, is to consider, whether as the Musick and Dancing of these lower and more deeply-lapfed Demons are a distorted imitation of what the higher and more pure Demons doe in their Regions; so their Feasting may not be a perverted resemblance of the others Banquetings also: that is to say, it is worth our enquiring into, whether they do not eat and drink as well as these, For the rich amongst us must have their repast as well as the poor, and Princes feed as well as Prisioners, though there be a great difference in their diet. And I must confefs, there is no small difficulty in both, whence the good or bad Genii may have their food; though it be easy enough to conceive that they may feed and refresh their Vehicles.

For supposing they do vitally actuate some particular portion of the Aire that they drive along with them, which is of a certain extent, it is most natural to conceive, that partly by local motion, and partly by the activity of their thoughts, they set some particles of their Vehicles into a more then usual agitation, which being thus moved, scatter and perspire; and that so the Vehicle lessens in some measure, and therefore admits of a recruit: which must be either by formal repast, or by drawing in the crude Aire onely, which haply may be enough; but it being so like it self always, the pleasure will be more flat. Wherefore it is not improbable but
but that both may have their times of Reflection, for pleasure at least, if not necessity, which will be the greater advantage for the Good, & the more exquisite misery for the Bad, they being punishable in this regard also.

7. But, as I said, the greatest difficulty is to give a rational account where the Bad Genii have their food, in their execrable Feasts, so formally made up into dithes. That the materials of it is a vaporous Aire, appears as well from the faintness and emptiness of them that have been entertained at those Feasts, as from their forbidding the use of Salt at them, it having a virtue of dissolving of all aqueous substances, as well as hindering their congelation. But how the Aire is moulded up into that form and consistence, it is very hard to conceive: whether it be done by the mere power of Imagination upon their own Vehicles, first dabled in some humidities that are the fittest for their design, which they change into these forms of Viands, and then withdraw, when they have given them such a figure, colour, and consistence, with some small touch of such a vapour or tincture: or whether it be the privilege of these Aerial Creatures, by a sharp Defire and keen Imagination, to pierce the Spirit of Nature, so as to awaken her activity, and engage her to the completing in a moment, as it were, the full design of their own wishes, but in such matter as the Element they are in is capable of, which is this crude and vaporous Aire; whence their food must be very dilute and flasht, and rather a mockery than any solid satisfaction and pleasure.

8. But those Superior Demons, which inhabit that part of the Aire that no storm nor tempest can reach, need be put to no such shifts, though they may be as able in them as the other. For in the tranquillity of those upper Regions, that Promus-Condus of the Universe, the Spirit of Nature, may silently fend forth whole Gardens and Orchards of most delectable fruits and flowers, of an equilibrious ponderosity to the parts of the Aire they grow in, to whose shape and colours the transparency of these Plants may add a particular lustre, as we see it is in precious Stones. And the Chymists are never quiet till the heat of their Fancy have calcined and vitrified the Earth into a crystalline pellucidity, conceiving that it will be then a very fine thing indeed, and all that then grows out of it: which desirable Spectacle they may haply enjoy in a more perfect manner, whenever they are admitted into those higher Regions of the Aire.

For the very Soile then under them shall be transparent, in which they may trace the very Roots of the Trees of this Superior Paradise with their eyes, and if it may not offend them, see this opake Earth through it, bounding their flight with such a white faint splendour as is discovered in the Moon, with that difference of brightness that will arise from the distinction of Land and Water, and if they will recreate their palats, may taste of such Fruits, as whole natural juice will vie with their noblest Extractions and Quintessences. For such certainly will they there find the blood of the Grape, the rubie-coloured Cherries, and Nectarines,

And if, for the compleating of the plesantries of their habitations, that they may look less like a silent and dead solitude, they meet with Birds and Beasts of curious shapes and colours, the single accents of whole voices
voices are very grateful to the Ear, and the varying of their notes perfect Musical harmony; they would doe very kindly to bring us word back of the certainty of these things, and make this more then a Philosophical Conjecture.

But that there may be Food and Feasting in those higher Aëreal Regions, is less doubted by the Platonists; which makes Maximus Tyrius call the Soul, when she has left the Body, θείμα αιτίειον and the above-cited Oracle of Apollo describes the Felicity of that Chorus of Immortal Lovers he mentions there, from feasting together with the blessed Genii,

Οὐσίς ἡπαρ ὑπὶ ἱλίσσιν
Αὐτί βεβεθίσσιν ἦι ἑπεται

So that the Nectar and Ambrosia of the Poets may not be a mere fable. For the Spirit of Nature, which is the immediate Instrument of God, may enrich the fruits of these Aëreal Paradises with such liquors, as being received into the bodies of these purer Demons, and diffusing it self through their Vehicles, may cause such grateful motions analagical to our rafts, and excite such a more then ordinary quickness in their minds, and benign cheerfulness, that it may far transcend the most delicate Reflection that the greatest Epicures could ever invent upon Earth; and that without all satiety and burdensomeness, it filling them with nothing but Divine Love, Joy, and Devotion.

CHAP. X.

1. How hard it is to define any thing concerning the Aëreal or Æthereal Elysiums. 2. That there is Political Order and Laws amongst these Airy Demons. 3. That this Chain of Government reaches down from the highest Æthereal Powers through the Aëreal to the very Inhabitants of the Earth. 4. The great security we live in thereby. 5. How easily detectible and punishable wicked Spirits are by those of their own Tribe. 6. Other reasons of the security we find ourselves in from the gross infestations of evil Spirits. 7. What kind of punishments the Aëreal Officers inflict upon their Malefactors.

I Might enlarge my self much on this Subject, by representing the many Concurrences of the Aëreal and Æthereal Elysiums, depainting them out in all the variety of their Ornaments; but there is no prudence of being lavish of ones pen in a matter so lubricious and Conjectural. Of the bare existence whereof we have no other ground, then that otherwise the greatest part of the Univerfe by infinite measure, and the most noble, would lye as it were uncultivate, like a desert of Sand, wherein a man can spie neither Plant nor living Creature. Which though it may seem as strange as if Nature should have restrained all the Varieties she would put forth to one contemptible Mole-hill, and have made all the rest of the Earth one Homogeneal surface of dry clay
clay or stone, on which not one sprig of Grass, much less any Flower or Tree, should grow, nor Bird nor Beast be found once to let their foot thereon: yet the Spirits of us Mortals being too pufhlanous to be able to grapple with such vast Objects, we must resolve to rest either ignorant, or Sceptical, in this matter.

2. And therefore let us consider what will more easily fall under our comprehension, and that is the Polity of the Aeric Demons. Concerning which, that in general there is such a thing among them, is the most assuredly true in itself, and of the most ufe to us to be persuaded of. To know their particular Orders and Customs is a more needless Curiosity. But that they do lie under the restraint of Government, is not only the opinion of the Pythagoreans (who have even to the nicety of Grammatical Criticifm assigned distinct names to the Law that belongs to these Three distinct ranks of Beings, ἀνθρωποι, δαίμονες and θεοί, calling the Law that belongs to the firft Νόμος, the second Δίκη, and the third Θεος) but it is also the easy and obvious Suggestion of ordinary Reason, that it must needs be so, and especially amongst the Aereal Genii in thefe lower Regions, they being a mixt rable of good and bad, wife and foolish, in fuch a fenate as we may fay the Inhabitants of the Earth are fo, and therefore they must naturally fall under a Government, and submit to Lawes, as well and for the fame reafons as Men do. For otherwife they cannot tolerably subsist, nor enjoy what rights may fome way or other appertain to them.

For the Souls of men deceafed and the Demons being endued with corporeal Şenfe, by Axiofrn 30, and therefore capable of Pleasure and Pain, and confequently of both Injury and Punifhment, it is manifeft, that having the ufe of Reason, they cannot fail to mould themselves into fome Political form or other, and fo to be divided into Nations and Provinces, and to have their Officers of State, from the King on his Throne to the very loweft and moft abhorred Executioners of Justice.

3. Which invisible Government is not circumfcribed within the compass of the Aerial Regions, but takes hold also on the Inhabitants of the Earth, as the Government of Men does on feveral forts of brute Beasts, and the Aereal Powers also have a Right and Exercife of Rule over the Areal. Whence nothing can be committed in the World againft the more indifpenfable Laws thereof, but a moft severe and inevitable Punifhment will follow: ev'ry Nation, City, Family and Perfon, being in fome manner the Peculium, and therefore in the tutelage, of fome invisible Power or other, as I have above intimated.

4. And fuch Transgresfions as are againft thofe Laws without whole obfervance the Creation could not subsist, we may be affured are punished with Torture intolerable, and infinitely above any Pleasure imaginable the evil Genii can take in doing of thofe of their own Order, or us Mortals, any mischief. Whence it is manifeft that we are as secure from their grofs outrages (fuch as the firing of our houses, the flealing away our Jewels or more neceffary Utensils, murdering ourfelves or children, destroying our caftel, corn, and other things of the like fort,) as if they were not in rerum natura. Unless they have fome special permission

Chap 3. fol. 7.
to act, or we our selves enable them by our rash and indiscreet tampering with them, or suffer from the malice of some person that is in league with them. For their greatest liberty of doing mischief is upon that account; which yet is very much limited, in that all these Actions must pass the consent of a visible person, not hard to be discovered in these unlawful practices, and easy to be punished by the Law of Men.

5. And the Aereal Genii can with as much ease inflict punishment on one another, as we Mortals can apprehend, imprison, and punish such as transgress against our Laws. For though these Demons be invisible to us, yet they are not so to their own Tribe: nor can the activity and subtility of the Bad over-master the Good Commonwealths-men there, that uphold the Laws better then they are amongst us. Nor may the various Transfiguration of their shapes conceal their persons, no more then the disguises that are used by fraudulent men. For they are as able to discern what is fictitious from what is true and natural amongst themselves, as we are amongst our selves. And every Aereal Spirit being part of some Political Subdivision, upon any outrage committed, it will be an easy matter to hunt out the Malefactor; no Demon being able so to tranfigure himself, but upon command he will be forced to appear in his natural and usual form, not daring to deny upon examination to what particular Subdivision he belongs. Whence the easy discovery of their miscarriages, and certainty of infupportable torment, will secure the World from all the disorder that some frivulous wits suspect would arise from this kind of Creatures, if they were in Being.

6. To which we may add also, That what we have is useless to them, and that it is very hard to conceive that there are many Rational Beings so degenerate as to take pleasurable ill, when it is no good to themselves. That Socrates his Aphorism, πάς ο μοιχήσανεν αγαπεί, may be in no small measure true in the other World, as well as in this. That all these evil Spirits desire, may be only our lapse into as great a degree of Apostasy from God as themselves, and to be full partakers with them of their false Liberty; as debauched persons in this life love to make Profelytes, and to have respect from their Nurplings in wickednes. And several other Considerations there are that serve for the taking away this Panick fear of the incursions and molestation of these Aereal Inhabitants, and might further silence the suspicious Atheist; which I willingly omit, having said more then enough of this Subject already.

7. If any be so curious, as to demand what kind of Punishment this People of the Aire inflict upon their Malefactors, I had rather refer them to the Fancies of Cornelius Agrippa, then be laugh'd at my self for venturing to descend to such particularities. Amongst other things he names their Incarceration, or confinement to most vile and equal Habitations. His own words are very significative: Accedunt etiam vilisimorum aeterrimorum locorum habitacula, ubi Aeaei ignes, aquarum infuluaces, fulgurum & tonitruorum concussus, terrarum voragines, ubi Resig lucis inops, nec radiorum Solis capax, ignariique splendoris siderum, perpetuis terris & noxibus specie caligatis. Whence he would make us believe, that


the subterraneous caverns of the Earth are made use of for Dungeons for the wicked Demons to be punished in: as if the several Volcanos, such as Aetna, Vesuvius, Hecla, and many others, especially in America, were so many Prisons or houses of Correction for the unrighteous Genii.

That there is a tedious restraint upon them upon villanies committed, and that intolerable, is without all question; they being endued with corporeal sense, and that more quick and passive than ours, and therefore more subject to the highest degrees of torment. So that not only by incarcerating them, and keeping them in by a watch, in the caverns of burning Mountains, where the heat of those infernal Chambers and the steam of Brimstone cannot but excruciate them exceedingly; but also by commanding them into sundry other Hollows of the ground, noifome by several flames and vapours, they may torture them in several fashions and degrees, fully proportionable to the greatest crime that is in their power to commit, and farre above what the cruellest Tyranny has inflicted here, either upon the guilty or innocent. But how these confines and torments are inflicted on them, and by what degrees and relaxations, is a thing neither easy to determine, nor needful to understand.

Wherefore we will furcease from pursuing any further so unprofitable a Subject, and come to the Third general Head we mentioned, which is, What the Moral condition of the Soul is when she has left this Body.

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**CHAP. XI.**

1. Three things to be considered before we come to the Moral condition of the Soul after Death: namely, her Memory of transactions in this Life. 2. The peculiar feature and individual Character of her Aereal Vehicle. 3. The Retention of the same Name. 4. How her ill-deportment here lays the train of her Misery hereafter. 5. The unutterable torments of Conscience worse then Death, and not to be avoided by dying. 6. Of the hideous tortures of external sense on them whose seared senses of Conscience may seem to make them incapable of her Labours. 7. Of the fate of the Souls of the more innocent and conscientious Pagans. 8. Of the natural accumulations of After-happiness to the morally good in this Life. 9. How the Soul enjoys her actions or sufferings in this Life for an indissoluble Cause, when she has passed to the other. 10. That the reason is proportionably the same in things of lesser consequence. 11. What mischief men may create to themselves in the other world by their zealous mistakes in this. 12. That though there were no Memory after Death, yet the manner of our Life here may sow the seeds of the Soul's future happiness or misery.

For the better solution of this Question, there is another first in nature to be decided, namely, Whether the Soul remembers anything of this Life after Death. For Aristotle and Cardan seem to deny it; but I do not remember any reasons in either that will make good
good their Opinion. But that the contrary is true, appears from what we
have already proved in my second Book, viz. That the immediate seat of
Memory is the Soul her self, and that all Representations with their circum-
stances are reserved in her, not in the Spirits, ( a thing which * Vaninus
himself cannot deny ) nor in any part of the Body. And that the Spirits
are onely a necessary Instrument whereby the Soul works; which while
they are too cool and grofs and waterish, Oblivion creeps upon her in
that measure that the Spirits are thus ditemperd; but the difease being
chafed away, and the temper of the Spirits rectifid, the Soul forfh with
recovers the memory of what things she could not well command before, as
being now in a better flate of Activity. Whence, by the 33 Axiome, it will
follow, that her Memory will be rather more perfect after Death, and Con-
sience more nimble to excuse or accuse her according to her Deeds here.

2. It is not altogether befide the purpose to take notice also, That
the natural and usual Figure of the Soul's Areal Vehicule bears a refem-
bliance with the feature of the party in this life; it being most obvious for
the Plafick part ( at the command of the Will to put forth into perfonal
shape) to fall as near to that in this life as the new flate will permit. With
which act the Spirit of Nature hapy does concur, as in the figuration
of the Factus; but with such limits as becomes the Areal Congruity
of life, of which we have spoke already; as also how the proper Idea or
Figure of every Soul ( though it may deflect something by the power of
the Parent's Imagination in the act of Conception, or Gestation, yet )
may return more near to its peculiar femblance afterwards, and so be an
unconcealable Note of Individuality.

3. We will add to all this, the Retainment of the fame Name which
the deceafed had here, unless there be some special reason to change it:
so that their persons will be as punctually distinguished and circumcribed
as any of ours in this life. All which things, as they are most probable
in themselves that they will thus naturally fall out, fo they are very con-
venient for administration of Justice and keeping of Order in the other
State.

4. These things therefore premised, it will not be hard to conceive how
the condition of the Soul after this life depends on her Moral deportment
here. For Memory ceasing not, Conscience may very likely awake more fu-
roriously then ever; the Mind becoming a more clear Judge of evil Actions
past then she could be in the Flefh, being now frift of all those circum-
stances and concurrences of things that kept her off from the opportunity
of calling her self to account, or of perceiving the uglines of her own
ways. Besides, there being that communication betwixt the Earth and
the Aire, that at least the fame of things will arrive to their cognofcence
that have left this life; the after ill Succes of their wicked enterprifes
and unreasonable transafions may arm their tormenting Conscience with
new whips and flings, when they shall either hear, or see with their
eyes, what they have unjuftly built up, to run with shame to ruine, and
behold all their desigms come to nought, and their fame blasted upon
Earth.

5. This is the state of fuch Souls as are capable of a fene of diflike
of
of their past-actions: and a man would think they need no other punish-
ment then this, if he consider the mighty power of the Mind over her
own Vehicle, and how vulnerable it is from her self. These Passions
therefore of the Soul that follow an ill Conscience, must needs bring
her Aery body into intolerable distempers, worse then Death it self.
Nor yet can she die if she would, neither by fire, nor sword, nor any
means imaginable; no nor if she should fling her self into the flames of
smoaking Aetna. For suppose she could keep her self so long there, as
to endure that hideous pain of destroying the vital Congruity of her
Vehicle by that sulphureous fire; she would be no sooner released, but she
would catch life again in the Aire, and all the former troubles and vexa-
tions would return, besides the overplus of these pangs of Death. For
Memory would return, and an ill Conscience would return, and all those
bufie Furies, those disordered Passions which follow it. And thus it
would be, though the Soul should kill her self a thousand and a thousand
times; she could but pain and punish her self, not destroy her self.

6. But if we could suppose some mens Consciences feared in the next
state as well as this, (for certainly there are that make it their business to
obliterate all sense of difference of Good and Evil out of their minds; and
hold it to be an high strain of wit (though it be nothing else but a
piece of bethial stupidity) to think there is no such thing as Vice and
Vertue, and that it is a principal part of perfection, to be so degene-
rate as to act according to this Principle without any remorse at all;) these
men may seem to have an excellent priviledge in the other world;
they being thus armour-proof against all the fiery darts of that dometick
Devil: As if the greatest security in the other life were, to have been
compleatly wicked in this.

But it is not out of the reach of mere Reason and Philosophy to dis-
cover, that such bold and impudent wretches as have loft all inward sense
of Good and Evil, may there against their wills feel a lash in the outward.
For the Divine Nemesis is excluded out of no part of the Universè; and Goodness and Justise, which they contemn here, will be acquainted
with them in that other state, whether they will or no. I speak of
such coarse Spirits that can swallow down Murder, Perjury, Extortion,
Adultery, Buggery, and the like gross crimes, without the least disquiet,
and think they have a right to satisfy their own Lust, though it be by
never so great injury against their Neighbour. If these men should carry
it with impunity, there were really no Providence, and themselves were
the truest Prophets and faithfulst Instructors of mankind, divulging the
choicest Arcanum they have to impart to them, namely, That there is
no God.

But the case stands quite otherwise. For whether it be by the impor-
tunity of them they injure in this life, who may meet with them afterward, as * Cardan by way of Objection suggets in his Treatise of this
Subject; or whether by a general defertion by all of the other world
that are able to proteze, (such Monsters as I describe being haply far less
in proportion to the number of the other state, then these here are to
this; ) they will be necessarily exposd to thole grim and remorseless

* De Immort. Anim. Obje. 31.
officers of Justice, who are as devoid of all sense of what is Good as those that they shall punish. So that their penalty shall be inflicted from such as are of the same Principles with themselves, who watch for such booties as these, and when they can catch them, dress them and adorn them according to the multiform petulance of their own unaccountable humours; and taking a special pride and pleasure in the making and seeing Creatures miserable, fall upon their prey with all eagerness and alacrity, as the hungry Lions on a condemned malefactor, but with more ferocity and intimidation by far. For having more wit, and, if it be possible, less goodness then the Soul they thus assault, they fatiate their licentious cruelty with all manner of abuses and torments they can imagine, giving her only so much respite as will serve to receive their new inventions with a frether smart and more distinct pain. Neither can any Reason or Rhetoric prevail with them, no Expostulation, Petition or Submission. For to what purpose can it be, to expostulate about injury and violence with them whose deepest reach of wit is to understand this one main Principle, That every ones Luft, when he can act with impunity, is the most sacred and sovereign Law? Or what can either Petitions or Submissions doe with those who hold it the most contemptible piece of fondness and filiiness that is, to be intreated to recede from their own Interest? And they acknowledging no such thing as Virtue and Vice, make it their only interest to please themselfes in what is agreeable to their own desires: and their main pleasure is, to exccruncate and torture, in the most exquisite ways they can, as many as Opportunity delivers up to their power.

And thus we see how, in the other life, the proud conceited Atheist may at last feel the sad inconvenience of his own Practices and Principles. For even those that pleased themselves in helping him forward, while he was in this life, to that high pitch of wickedness, may haply take as much pleasure to see him punish'd by those grim Executioners in the other, Like that sportful cruelty (which some would appropriate to Nero's person) of causing the Vestal virgins to be ravish'd, and then putting them to death for being so.

7. But this Subject would be too tedious and too Tragical to insist on any longer. Let us cast our eyes therefore upon a more tolerable Obje&; and that is The state of the Soul that has, according to the best opportunity she had of knowledge, liv'd vertuously and conscientiously, in what part or Age of the world forever. For though this Moral Innocency amongst the Pagans will not amount to what our Religion calls Salvation; yet it cannot but be advantageous to them in the other state, according to the several degrees thereof; they being more or less Happy or Miserable, as they have been more or less Vertuous in this life. For we cannot imagine why God should be more harsh to them in the other world then in this, nothing having happened to them to alienate his affection but Death; which was not in their power to avoid, and looks more like a punishment then a fault: though it be neither to those that are well-meaning and conscientious, and not professed contrivers of the wholesome suggestions of the Light of Nature, but are lovers of Humanity and Virtue. For to these it is only an entrance into another life.
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— Ad amans virens

Fortunatorum nemorum, sedesque beatas.

Which Truth I could not conceal, it being a great prejudice to Divine Providence to think otherwise. For to those that are free, her ways will seem as unintelligible in overloading the simple with punishment, as in not rewarding the more perfectly righteous and illuminate. For from a fault in either they will be tempted to a misbelief of the whole, and hold no Providence at all.

8. Let there therefore be peculiar Privileges of Morality, every where; to those that pass into the other State. For unless God make a stop on purpose, it will naturally follow, That Memory after Death suggesting nothing but what the Conscience allows of, much Tranquility of Mind must result from thence, and a certain Health and Beauty of the Aereal Vehicle; also better Company and Converse, and more pleasant Tracts and Regions to inhabit. For what Plotinus speaks of the extreme degrees, is also true of the intermediate, else Divine Justice would be very maine. For a man, faith he, having once appropriated to himself a pravity of temper, and united with it, is known well what he is; and according to his nature is thrust forward to what he propends to, both here, and departed hence, and so shall be pulled by the drawings of Nature into a suitable place. But the Good man his Receptions and Communications shall be of another sort, by the drawing as it were of certain hidden springs transferred and pulled by Natures own fingers. So admirable is the power and order of the Universe, all things being carried on in a silent way of Justice, which none can avoid, and which the Wicked man has no perception nor understanding of, but is drawn, knowing nothing whither in the Universe he ought to be carried. But the Good man both knows and goes whither he ought, and discerns before he departs hence where he must inhabit, and is full of hopes that it shall be with the Gods. This large Paragraph of Plotinus is not without some small Truth in it, if rightly limited and understood; but seems not to reach at all the Circumstances and accidents of Happiness to the Soul in the other State, which will naturally follow her from her transactions in this life.

9. For certainly, according to the several degrees of Benignity of Spirit, and the desire of doing good to mankind in this life, and the more ample opportunities of doing it, the Felicity of the other World is redoubled upon them; there being so certain communication and intercourse betwixt both. And therefore they that are or suffer deeply in such Caufes as God will maintain in the World, and are just and holy at the bottom, (and there are some Principles that are indispensably such, which Providence has countenanced both by Miracles, the suffrages of the Wiseft men in all Ages, and the common voice of Nature,) those that have been the most Heroical Abetters and Promoters of thefe things in this life, will naturally receive the greater contentment of Mind after it, being conscious to themselves how seriously they have assisted what God will never deñert, and that Truth is mighty, and must at last prevail, which they are better assured of out of the Body, then when they were in it.
10. Nor is this kind of accession of Happiness to be confined only to our furtherance of what is of the highest and most indispensable consideration here, but in proportion touches all transactions that proceed from a virtuous and good Principle, whereof there are several degrees: amongst which those may not be esteemed the meanest that refer to a national good. And therefore those that, out of a natural generosity of Spirit and successful fortitude in War, have delivered their Country from bondage, or have been so wise and understanding in Politicks, as to have contrived wholesome Laws for the greater happiness and comfort of the People; while such a Nation prospers and is in being, it cannot but be an accrument of Happiness to these so considerable Benefactors, unless we should imagine them less generous and good in the other World, where they have the advantage of being Better. And what I have said in this more notable instance, is in a degree true in things of smaller concernment, which would be infinite to rehearse. But whole Nations, with their Laws and Orders of Men, and Families may fail, and therefore these accessions be cut off: but he that lays out his pains in this life for the carrying on such designs as will take place so long as the World endures, and must have a compleat Triumph at last, such a one lays a train for an everlasting advantage in the other World, which, in despite of all the tumblings and turnings of unsettled fortune, will be sure to take effect.

11. But this matter requires Judgement as well as Heat and Forwardness. For pragmatical Ignorance, though accompanied with some measure of Sincerity and well-meaning, may set a-foot such things in the World, or set upon record such either false, or impertinent and unseemly Principles, as being made ill use of, may very much prejudice the Cause one desires to promote; which will be a sad spectacle for them in the other State. For though their simplicity may be pardonable, yet they will not fail to finde the ill effect of their mistake upon themselves. As he that kills a friend in stead of an enemy, though he may satisfy his Conscience that rightly pleads his innocency, yet he cannot avoid the senfe of shame and sorrow that naturally follows so mischievous an error.

12. Such accuracies as these there may be to our Enjoyments in the other World from the durable traces of our transactions in this, if we have any Memory of things after Death, as I have already demonstrated that we have. But if we had not, but Aristotle’s and Cardan’s Opinion were true, yet Virtue and Piety will not prove only useful for this present state. Because according to our living here, we shall hereafter, by a hidden concatenation of Causes, be drawn to a condition answerable to the purity or impurity of our Souls in this life: that silent Nemesis that passes through the whole contexture of the Universe ever fatally contriving us into such a state as we our selves have fitted our selves for by our accustomary actions. Of so great conquence is it, while we have opportunity, to aspire to the Best things.

CHAP.
CHAP. XII.

The Immortality of the Soul.

1. What The Spirit of Nature is. 2. Experiments that argue its real Existence; such as that of two Strings tuned Unisons. 3. Sympathetic Cures and Tortures. 4. The Sympathy betwixt the Earthly and Astral Body. 5. Monstrous Births. 6. The Attraction of the Loadstone and Roundness of the Sun and Stars.

We had now quite finished our Discourse, did I not think it convenient to answcr a double Expectation of the Reader. The one is touching The Spirit of Nature, the other the producing of objections that may be made against our concluded Affertion of the Soul's Immortality. For as for the former, I can easily imagine he may well desire a more punctual account of that Principal I have had too often recourse to, then I have hitherto given, and will think it fit that I should somewhere more fully explain what I mean by the terms, and shew him my strongest grounds why I conceive there is any such Being in the World. To hold him therefore no longer in suspense, I shall doe both in this place. The Spirit of Nature therefore, according to that notion I have of it, is, A Substance incorporeal, but without Sense and AnimalDisposition, pervading the whole Matter of the Universe, and exercising a Plasmonic power therein according to the sundry predispositions and occasions in the parts it works upon, raising such Phenomena in the World, by directing the parts of the Matter and their Motion, as cannot be resolved into mere Mechanical powers: This rude Description may serve to convey to any one a conception determinate enough of the nature of the thing. And that it is not a mere Notion, but a real Being, besides what I have occasionally hinted already (and shall here again confirm by new instances) there are several other Considerations may perswade us.

2. The first whereof shall be concerning those Experiments of Sympathetic Pains, Affiagments and Cures, of which there are many Examples, approved by the most scrupulous Pretenders to Sobriety and Judgment, and of all which I cannot forbear to pronounce, that I suspect them to come to pass by some such power as makes Strings that be tuned Unisons, (though on several Instruments) the one being touched, the other to tremble and move very sensibly, and to cast off a straw or pin or any such small thing laid upon it. Which cannot be resolved into any Mechanical Principle, though some have ingeniously gone about it. For before they attempted to shew the reason, why that String that is not Unison to that which is struck should not leap and move, as it doth that is, they should have demonstrated, that by the mere Vibration of the Air that which is Unison can be so moved; for if it could, these Vibrations would not fail to move other Bodies more movable by farre then the String itself that is thus moved. As for example, if one hung loose near the String that is struck a small shred of Silk or an hair with some light thing at the end of it, they must needs receive those reciprocal Vibrations that are communicated to the Unison String at a far greater distance.
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...if the mere motion of the material Aire caused the subfusculation of the string tuned Unison: Which yet is contrary to experience.

Besides that, if it were the mere Vibration of the Aire that caused this tremor in the Unison string, the effect would not be considerable, unless both the strings lay well-nigh in the same Plane, and that the Vibration of the string that is struck be made in that Plane they both lie in. But let the string be struck so as to cut the Plane perpendicularly by its tremulous excursions, or let both the strings be in two several Planes at a good distance above one another, the event is much what the same, though the Aire cannot rationally be conceived to vibrate backwards and forwards, otherwise they well-nigh in the very Planes wherein the strings are moved.

All which things do clearly shew, that pure Corporeal causes cannot produce this effect: and that therefore we must suppose, that both the strings are united with some one Incorporeal Being, which has a different Unity and Activity from Matter, but yet a Sympathy therewith; which affecting this Immortal Being, makes it affect the Matter in the same manner in another place, where it does symbolize with that other in some predispersion or qualification, as these two strings do in being tuned Unisons to one another: and this, without sending any particles to the Matter it does thus act upon; as my thought of moving of my Toe being represented within my Brain, by the power of my Soul I can, without sending Spirits into my Toe, but only by making use of them that are there, move my Toe as I please, by reason of that Unity and Activity that is peculiar to my Soul as a Spiritual substance that pervades my whole Body. Whence I would conclude also, that there is some such Principle as we call The Spirit of Nature, or the inferior Soul of the World, into which such Phænomena as these are to be resolved.

3. And I account Sympathetick Cures, Pains and Affiawaments to be such. As for example, when in the use of those Magnetick Remedies, as some call them, they can make the wound dolorously hot or chill at a great distance, or can put it into perfect ease, this is not by any agency of emissary Atoms. For these hot Atoms would cool sufficiently in their progress to the party through the frigid aire; and the cold Atoms, if they could be so active as to dispatch so far, would be warm enough by their journey in the Summer Sun. The inflammations also of the Cowes Udder by the boiling over of the milk into the fire, the scalding of mens entrails at a distance by the burning of their excrements, with other pranks of the like nature, these cannot be rationally resolved into the recource of the Spirits of Men or Kine mingled with fiery Atoms, and so re-entering the parts thus affected, because the minuteness of these Atoms argues the suddenness of their extinction, as the smallest wires made red hot soonneft cool.

To all which you may addde (if it will prove true) that notable example of the Wines working when the Vines are in the flower, and that this Sympathetick effect must be from the Vines of that Country from which they came: whence these exhalations of the Vineyards must spread as far as from Spain and the Canaries to England, and by the same reason must reach round about every way as far from the Canaries,
ries, besides their journey upwards into the Air, So that there will be an Hemisphere of vinous Atoms of an incredible extent, unless they part themselves into trains, and march only to those places whether their Wines are carried. But what corporeal cause can guide them thither? Which question may be made of other Phenomena of the like nature. Whence again it will be necessary to establish the Principle I drive at; though the effects were caused by the transmission of Atoms.

4. The notablest examples of this Mundane Sympathy are in histories more uncertain and obscure, and such as, though I have been very credibly informed, yet, as I have already declared myself, I dare only avouch as possible, viz. the Souls of men leaving their Bodies, and appearing in shapes; suppose of Cats, Pigeons, Weasels, and sometimes of Men; and that whatever hurt befalls them in the Astral bodies, as the Paracelsians love to call them, the same is inflicted upon their Terrestrial lying in the mean time in their beds or on the ground. As if their Astral bodies be scalded, wounded, have the back broke, the fame certainly happens to their Earthly bodies.

Which things if they be true, in all likelihood they are to be resolved into this Principle we speak of, and that The Spirit of Nature is snatcht into content with the Imagination of the Souls in these Astral bodies or Aerial Vehicles. Which act of imagining must needs be strong in them; it being so set on and affisted by a quick and sharp pain and fright in these scaldings, woundings, and strokes on the back; some such thing happening here as in women with child, whose Fancies made keen by a sudden fear, have deprived their children of their arms, yea and of their heads too; as also appears by two remarkable stories Sr. Kenelme Digby relates in his witty and eloquent Discourse of the Cure of Wounds by the power of Sympathy, besides what * we have already recited out of Helmont.

5. Which effects I suppose to be beyond the power of any humane Fancy unassisted by some more forceable Agent; as also that prodigious birth he mentions of a woman of Carcasjons, who by her overmuch sporting and pleasing her self with an Ape, while she was with Child, brought forth a Monster exactly of that shape. And if we should conclude with that learned Writer, that it was a real Ape, it is no more wonderful, nor so much, as that birth of a Crab-fish or Lobster we have above mentioned out of Fortunatus Lictus; as we might also other more usual, though no less monstrous births for the wombs of women to bear. Of which the Soul of the Mother cannot be suspected to be the cause, the not so much as being the Effermer of her own Fatus, as that judicious Naturalist Dr. Harvey has determined. And if the Mother's Soul could be the Effermer of the Fatus, in all reason her Plafick power would be ever Particular and Specific as the Soul itself is Particular.

What remains therefore but the Universal Soul of the World or Spirit of Nature that can doe these feats? who, Vertumnus-like, is ready to change his own Activity and the yielding Matter into any mode and shape indifferently as occasion engages him, and so to prepare an edifice, at least the more rude strokes and delineaments thereof, for any Specifick Soul whatsoever, and in any place where the Matter will yield to his operations. But the time of the arrival thither of the particular guest it is intended

* Chap. 6, sect. 6.
intended for, though we cannot say how soon it is, yet we may be sure it is not later than a clear discovery of Sensation as well as Vegetation and Organization in the Matter.

6. The Attraction of the Load-fone seems to have some affinity with these instances of Sympathy. This mystery Des-Cartes has explained with admirable artifice as to the immediate Corporeal caufes thereof, to wit, those wreathed particles which he makes to pass certain screw-pores in the Load-fone and Iron. But how the efformation of these particles is above the reach of the mere Mechanical powers in Matter, as also the exquisite direction of their motion, whereby they make their peculiar Vortex he describes about the Earth from Pole to Pole, and thread an incrustated Star, passing in a right line in so long a journey as the Diameter thereof without being swung to the sides; how these things, I say, are beyond the powers of Matter, I have fully enough declared and proved in a large Letter of mine to V. C. and therefore that I may not actum agere, shall forbear speaking any farther thereof in this place. To which you may add, That mere corporeal motion in Matter, without any other guide, would never so much as produce a round Sun or Star, of which figure notwithstanding Des-Cartes acknowledges them to be. But my reasons why it cannot be effected by the simple Mechanical powers of Matter, I have particularly set down in my Letters to that excellent Philosopher.

CHAP. XIII.

1. That the Descent of heavy Bodies argues the existence of The Spirit of Nature, because else they would either hang in the Aire as they are placed, 2. Or would be diverted from a perpendicular as they fall near a Plate of Metall set flopping. 3. That the endeavour of the Aether or Aire from the Centre to the Circumference is not the Caufe of Gravity, against Mr. Hobbs. 4. A full confutation of Mr. Hobbs his Opinion. 5. An oculiar Demonstration of the absurd confequence thereof. 6. An absolute Demonstration that Gravity cannot be the effect of mere Mechanical powers. 7. The Latitude of the operations of The Spirit of Nature, how large and where bounded. 8. The reason of its name. 9. Of Infini{t}, whether it be, and what it is. 10. The grand office of the Spirit of Nature in transmitting Souls into rightly-prepared Matter.

AND a farther confirmation that I am not mistaken therein, is what we daily here experience upon Earth, which is the descending of heavy Bodies, as we call them. Concerning the motion whereof I agree with Des-Cartes in the asignation of the immediate corporeal caufe, to wit, the A{thet}real matter, which is so plentifully in the Air over it is in groffer Bodies; but withall do vehemently surmise, that there must be some Immaterial caufe, such as we call The Spirit of Nature or Inferior Soul of the World, that must direct the motions of the Athe-
real particles to act upon these greater Bodies to drive them towards the Earth. For that surplufage of Agitation of the globular particles of the Aëther above what they expend in turning the Earth about, is carried every way indifferently, according to his own concession; by which motion the drops of liquors are formed into round figures, as he ingeniously concludes. From whence it is apparent, that a bullet of iron, silver or gold placed in the Aire is equally assaulted on all sides by the occurrence of these Aëthereal particles, and therefore will be moved no more downwards then upwards, but hang in equilibrio, as a piece of Cork rests on the water, where there is neither winde nor stream, but is equally pliaed against by the particles of water on all sides.

2. Nor is it imaginable how the occurrences of this Aëthereal Element here against the surface of the Earth, being it so fluid a Body, should make it endeavour to lift it self from the Earth at so great a distance as the middle Region of the Aire and further. Besides, that this is not the cause of the descent of heavy Bodies is manifest, because then a broad Plate of the most solid Metal and most perfectly polifh'd, such as is able to reflect the Aëthereal particles most efficaciously, being placed flooping, would change the course of the descent of things, and make them fall perpendicularly to it, and not to the Plane of the Horizon; as for example, not from A to B, but from A to C, which is against experience. For the heavy Body will alwaies fall down from A to B, though the reception of the Aëthereal Matter must needs be from C to A according to this Hypothesis.

3. Nor can the endeavour of the Celestial Matter from the centre to the circumference take place here. For besides that Des-Cartes, the profoundest Matter of Mechanicks, has decline'd that way himself (though Mr. * Hobbs has taken it up,) it would follow, that near the Poles of the Earth there would be no descent of heavy Bodies at all, and in the very Clime we live in none perpendicular. To say nothing how this way will not vail the union of that great Water that adheres to the body of the Moon.

4. But to make good what I said, by undeniable proof that heavy Bodies in the very Clime where we live will not descend perpendicularly to the Earth, if Mr. Hobbs his solution of the Phenomenon of Gravity be true; we shall evidently demonstrate both to the Eye and to Reason the proportion of their declination from a perpendicular in any Elevation of the Pole. In the Circle therefore A B D, let the Aequator be B D, and from the point C draw a line to E, parallel to B D; which line C E will cut the circle in F 60. degrees, suppose, from B. Imagine now a heavy Body at E; according to Mr. Hobbs his solution of the Probleme of Gravity, it

it must fall towards the Earth in a line parallel to the **Equator**, viz. in the line E F; which, say I, declines from the line H F drawn perpendicular to the Horizon L K two第三个 parts of a right angle, that is to say, 60° degrees. For the angle E F H is equal to G F R, which again is equal to the alternate angle B G F, which is two third parts of a right angle **exterius**. Whence it is plain that E F declines from a perpendicular no less than 60° degrees. By the same reason, if we had drawn the Scheme for the elevation of 50°, which is more Southern then our Clime, we might demonstrate that the descent of heavy Bodies declines from a perpendicular to the Horizon 50° degrees, or 3/4 of a right angle, and so of the rest. From whence it will follow, that men cannot walk upright, but declining, in the elevation suppose of 60° degrees, as near to the ground as E F is to FL, and much nearer in the more remote parts of the North, as in **Norway**, **Russia**, **Frisland**, **Island**, **Scribanni**, **Greenland** and others; and there is proportionably the same reason in other Climes lefts Northern. So that Mr. **Hobbs need not send us so farre off as to the Poles to make the experiment**.

5. For if for example we drew a Scheme for the Parallel under which we live, suppose about 52° degrees of Elevation, we might represent truly to the eye in what posture men would walk at **London** or **Cambridge**, according to Mr. **Hobbs** his determination of the causes of **Gravity**. For it is plain from what has been above demonstrat'd, that the natural posture of their Bodies upon the Horizon L K would be in the line E F, out of which if they did force themselves towards the perpendicular H F, it would be much pain to them, neither could they place themselves in the line H F, without being born headlong to the ground, and laid flat upon the Horizon F K; the force of the Aire or whatever more subtle Elements therein pressing in lines parallel to E F, and therefore necessarily bearing down whatever is placed loose in the line H F, as is plain to any one at first sight.

But we finding no such thing in experience, it is evident that Mr. **Hobbs** his solution is false; nay I may say that he has not render'd so much as a possible caufe of this so ordinary a **Phenomenon**. A thing truly much to be lamented in one who, upon pretence that all the Appearances in the Univerfe may be resolved into mere Corporeal causes, has with unparallel'd confidence, and not without some wits derided and explored all **Immaterial Substance** out of the World; whenas in the mean time he does not produce so much as possible Corporeal causes of the most ordinary effects in Nature. But to leave Mr. **Hobbs** to his own ways, and to return to **Des-Cartes**.

6. Adde unto all this, that if the motion of gros Bodies were according to mere Mechanical laws, a Bullet, suppose of Lead or Gold, cast up into the Aire, would never descend again, but would persift in a rectilinear motion. For it being far more solid then so much Aire and **Ether** put together as would fill its place, and being moved with no less swiftnes then
Chap. XIII. The Immortality of the Soul.

then that wherewith the Earth is carried about in twenty four hours, it must needs break out in a straight line through the thin Aire, and never return again to the Earth, but get away as a Comet does out of a Vortex. And that de facto a Cannon-Bullet has been shot so high that it never fell back again upon the ground, Des-Cartes does admit of as a true experiment. Of which, for my own part, I can imagine no other unexceptionable reason, but that at a certain distance The Spirit of Nature in some regards leaves the motion of Matter to the pure laws of Mechanicks, but within other bounds checks it, whence it is that the Water does not slip out of the Moon.

7. Now if the pure Mechanick powers in Matter and Corporeal motion will not amount to so simple a Phenomenon as the falling of a stone to the Earth, how shall we hope they will be the adequate cause of sun-dry forts of Plants and other things, that have farre more artifice and curiosity then the direct descent of a stone to the ground?

Nor are we beaten back again by this discovery into that cottage of the confounded Schools, who have induced almost every different Object of our Senses with a distinct Substantial form, and then puzzle themselves with endless scrupulositys about the generation, corruption, and mixture of them. For I affirm with Des-Cartes, that nothing affects our Senses but such Variations of Matter as are made by difference of Motion, Figure, Situation of parts, &c, but I dissent from him in this, in that I hold it is not mere and pure Mechanical motion that causes all these sensible Modifications in Matter, but that many times the immediate Director thereof is this Spirit of Nature (I speak of) one and the same every where, and acting alwaies alike upon like occasions, as a clear-minded man and of a solid judgement gives alwaies the same verdict in the same circumstances.

For this Spirit of Nature intermedling with the efformation of the Fetus of Animals (as I have * already shewn more then once) where notwithstanding there seems not to much need, there being in them a more particular Agent for that purpose, 'tis exceeding rational that all Plants and Flowers of all sorts (in which we have no argument to prove there is any particular Souls) should be the effects of this Universal Soul of the World. Which Hypothesis, besides that it is most reasonable in itself, according to that ordinary Axiome, Frustra sit per plura quod fieri potest per unam, is also very serviceable for the preventing many hard Problems about the Divisibility of the Souls of Plants, their Transmutations into other Species, the growing of Slips, and the like. For there is one Soul ready every where to pursue the advantages of prepared Matter. Which is the common and only σωφρονισμον of all Plantal appearances, or of whatever other Phenomena there be, greater or smaller, that exceed the pure Mechanical powers of Matter. We except only Men and Beasts, who having all of them the capacity of some sort of enjoyments or other, it was fit they should have particular Souls for the multiplying of the sense of those enjoyments which the transcendent Wisdom of the Creator has contrived.

8. I have now plainly enough set down what I mean by The Spirit of Nature,
Nature, and sufficiently proved its existence. Out of what has been said, may be easily conceived why I give it this name, it being a Principle that is of so great influence and activity in the Nativity, as I may so call it, and Coalescence of things: And this not only in the production of Plants, with all other Concretions of an inferior nature, and yet above the mere Mechanical laws of Matter; but also in respect of the birth of Animals, whereunto it is preparatory and assiduous.

I know not whether I may entitle it also to the guidance of Animals in the chiefest of those actions which we usually impute to natural Ininst. Amongst which none so famous as the Birds making their Nefts, and particularly the artificial structure of the Martins nefts under the arches of Church-windows. In which there being so notable a design unknown to themselves, and so small a pleasure to present Sense, it looks as if they were actuated by another, inspired and carried away in a natural rage by this Spirit of Nature to doe they know not what, though it be really a necessary provision and accommodation for laying their Eggs and hatching their young, in the effermation whereof this Inferior Soul of the World is so rationally conceived to assist and intermeddle: and therefore may the better be supposed to over-power the Fancy, and make use of the members of the Birds to build these convenient Receptacles, as certain shops to lay up the Matter whereon she intends to work, namely the Eggs of these Birds whom she thus guides in making of their nefts.

For that this building of their nefts in such sort should not be from natural Instinct, but from acquired Art and observation, or from the instruction of the old ones, there is no reason or ground for any one to conceive. For in that their actions tend to so considerable a scope, that is no argument that they know it or ever consulted about it, no more than that Ivy or Bindweed, that wine about the next plant that can support them, cast up with themselves beforehand the either necessity or convenience of such close embraces. Nor does it at all follow, because the young ones might see the old ones make their nefts before they begin to make theirs, that they do see them or take notice of them. Nay, who can produce any one example of the old one tutoring or teaching her young ones in this kind of Architecture? or has spied the young one of her self to apply her mind to learn that art, by observing what the old one does? Wherefore a man may as well argue, yea much better, that the Notes of Birds are not by Instinct, but by learning and art, because they may have heard the old ones sing or whistle before them: whereas they will take up naturally of themselves such notes as belong to their kind, without hearing of the old ones at any time. So that it is not from any ground of Reason, but a mere vain and shallow surmise, to think that the Architecture of Birds in building their nefts is not natural Instinct, but acquired Art and Imagination.

But on the other side, there are very plain and positive Reasons to convince us, that this Architecture of theirs is from Instinct, and no acquired faculty. And that first, because in general brute Animals are of such a nature as is devoid of that free and reflexive reason which is requisite to acquired Art and Consultation. For if they had any such principle,
principle, some of them would be able to speak. The want of which power is the only plausible pretension for Des-Cartes his conceit of their being mere *Machina*'. Which though it will not reach so enormous a Paradox, yet it may justly exclude them from the participation of such a free Reason as will make them able for consultation and learning of Arts and Mysteries.

Secondly, The hatching of their eggs being by mere *Infinét*, & not out of any deliberate Knowledge, it is reasonable to think, that the making of their *nefts*, which is but in order thereto, is mere *Infinét* also.

Thirdly, That which is specific is not acquired, but is by Nature or *Infinét*, but to make their *nefts* thus or thus is specific to this or that *kind of Bird*, even as their note is, and therefore is plainly natural.

Fourthly, The peculiar Indolency of those *Birds* that are the most ingenious Architects in building their *nefts* a plain indication that it is not free Reason but *Infinét* that guides them. And *Pliny* observes in the *Swallow*, how indolent he is, and yet how admirable in framing her little manifions of mudd.

Fifthly, That this Architecture is not a piece of learning derived from the old ones in succession, but the immediate effect of Nature, is further manifest, in that in all parts of the World the same kind of Birds make the same kind of *nefts*, when it cannot be well supposed that they learned it from those in remote countries, whom the vastness of the Seas kept from mutual converse.

Sixthly and lastly, There is no man can well think or discourse of examples of natural Architecture, but the *Martin's* *Neft*, the *Combs* of *Bees*, the *Webs* of *Spiders* and the *Bags* of *Silk-worms* will one bring in another, as being wholly congenerous and of the same nature. Which makes *Pliny*, *Cardan* and *Nierembergius* joyn them in one Catalogue as examples of one suite, and may well induce us to conclude them of the same kind. And our foregoing Argument is infinitely pressing in the three last Instances. For we may be sure that all the *Bees* in the world came not out of one Hive, and therefore could not derive their Architectonical skill from the same teachers, and yet they all make their Combs with the same artifice, as I may so call it, and with the same exactness of Geometry. And as for *Spiders*, it is evident that they are of the *να κλονοτμαν γαροφορα*, as Aristotle phrases it, and are generated of mere fluttery and putrefaction. And yet these *Insects* so soon as they are bred, can set up shop and fall to their trade of weaving without any Teacher or *Instrucrer*.

But the noblest and most apposite instance is that last of the *Silk-worm*, who works so conceivably within her *folliculus* or little bag, as if the either envied the communication of her skill to her fellows, who of themselves are very dim-sighted, or ought him a shame that should be so injudiciously bold as to impute the *natural Infinét* of such like *Animals* to external observation and imitation. And yet there is a great affinity betwixt the *Nidifications* of *Birds* and these *Conglomerations* of the threads of the *Silk-worm*: not only in regard of the outward Figure of those *clues* of silk, as I may so call them, which are not unlike the
the Nefts of Birds, but also in regard of the end and designe of them both. Which is not the accommodating of the Individual, but a plot for the propagation of the Species. For that Insect we call the Silk-worm after she has run through multifarious changes and names, as of * κοιτής, κυμμα, βομβιλιος, χρυσαλις, νυμφη, νευσαλιος, μυρη, in this last title and change ends all with a plentiful provision for the continuation of the kinde. For when she has arrived to her third change, wherein she is called βομβιλιος, from her mouth and with her fore-feet she works the Folliculus or clue of silk above named, building thus her own tombe, which yet is the wombe or cradle of her self when having passed the state of a χρυσαλις (wherein she does εμνυμισθαι, as Aristotle speaks, and approaches near to the shape and nature of an egg) she emerges after to a nearer tendency toward her purposed animal delineaments, and is called νυμφη and after this acquiring a greater degree of life and motion is styled νευσαλιον, as if her dead body had caught vital fire again. In this state she does not ly loofe, but sticks again to the cavity of the Clue, and grown to full maturity breaks through, and shews herself in the compleat forme of a Butterfly. To which pitch of perfection when they are arrived they enjoy but a very small time. For after three or four daies indulgence to the delightful uſages of Venus, the Male immediately bids the world adieu; whom soon after the Female follows, but yet so as that she leaves behinde her some hundreds of eggs, small like the grains of millet, as a numerous pledge and provision for the continuation of their kinde. How then according to this account can the old one ever teach the young ones their trade of spinning or weaving?

And yet the Silk-worms Bag is as great a piece of Artifice, and of as great designe, or rather the same as the Nefts of Swallows or Martins. The making of which notwithstanding Aristotle calls μανθέες & αναποιουντας ζώων, Imitations of humane Reason; which they having not themselves, some Principle distinct from them must be their Guide in these performances: whence I have rightly concluded in my Antidote, That the Nidification of Birds as well as their Incubation is no obscure argument of a Divine Providence. Which I understand mainly of the Structure of their Nestes; though the choice of the places where they build them may not be merely from the lightness of their bodies and their affuefaction to Edifices, Trees, or Bushes, but partly from the dictate of that Infiniē which suggetts to them everywhere what is most for their safety, and makes them many times sagacious above our apprehension. As it appears in what Pliny writes concerning a kind of Swallows that use to build their nestes near Coptos in Aegypt, who do either not make or forfake their nestes many daies before, si futuraes est ut amicus amnis attingat.

That there is such a thing therefore as Infiniē in Brute Animals I think is very plain, that is to say, That there is an Insigntion or Impetus in them to doe such things without counsel, deliberation, or acquired knowledge, as according to our reason and beft confultation we cannot but approve to be fittest to be done. Which Principle in general Scaliger seems to parallel to Divine Infpiration. Infiniēs dicitur à Natura, scit à Diis Asflatio. But methinks it is most safely and moft excepcionably
tionably applied where the *Instinct* respects not so much the welfare of the *Individual* as the common good of this or that *Species*. For if there be any *Impulse* from an Extrineal Principle upon any particular Animal, it is most sure to be then, when that Animal is transported from the purulence of its own particular accommodation to serve a more publick end. For from whence can this motion be so well as from that which is not a particular Being, but such as in whose Essence the scope & purpose of the general good of the World and of all the *Species* therein is vitally con prized, and therefore binds all Particulars together by that common Essentiafl Law, which is it self, occasionally impelling them to such actions and services (either above their Knowledge or against their particular Interests) as is most conducing to the Conservation of the Whole? And this is that which we have styled the *Spirit of Nature*, which goes through and afflicts all corporeal Beings, and is the *Peculiar power of God* (who is that *Nous, inomai*, as the Philosopher calls Him) upon the Universal Matter of the World. This suggests to the *Spider* the fancy of spinning and weaving her Web, and to the *Bee* of the framing of her Honey-combs, but especially to the *Silk-worm* of conglomerating her both funeral and natal Clue, and to the *Birds* of building their *Nests* and of their so diligent hatching of their *Eggs*. But I have inflicted upon this Argument too long.

10. The most notable of those offices that can be assigned to the *Spirit of Nature*, and that suitably to his name, is the Tranlocation of the Souls of Beasts into such Matter as is most fitting for them, he being the common *Proxenet* or *Contractor* of all natural *Matches* and *Marriages* betwixt *Forms* and *Matter*, if we may also speak Metaphors as well as *Aristotle*, whose Aphorisme it is, that *Materiam aperit forma et feminam virum*.

This *Spirit* therefore may have not onely the power of directing the motion of Matter at hand, but also of *transporting* of particular Souls and Spirits in their state of *Silence* and *Inactivity* to such Matter as they are in a fitness to catch life in again. Which *Transportation* or *Transmigration* may very well be at immense distances, the effect of this *Sympathy* and *Coactivity* being so great in the working of *Wines*, as has been above noted, though a thing of less concernment, or, (which is a more unexceptionable instance) in conducting the *magnetick* particles from one *Pole* of the Earth to the other.

Whence, to conclude, we may look upon this *Spirit of Nature* as the great *Quartermaster-General* of Divine Providence, but able alone, without any under-Officers, to lodge every Soul according to her rank and merit whenever he leaves the Body: And would prove a very *servicable* Hypothefis for those that fancy the *Preservence* of humane *Souls*, to declare how they may be conveyed into Bodies here, be they at what distance they will before; and how Matter haply may be so fitted, that the best of them may be fetched from the purest *Etherial* *Regions* into an humane Body, without serving any long Apprentiship in the intermediate *Aire*; as also how the Souls of Brutes, though the Earth were made perfectly inept for the life of any Animal, need not lye for ever useless in the *Universe*.  

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But such Speculations as these are of so vast a comprehension and impenetrable obscurity, that I cannot have the confidence to dwell any longer thereon; especially they not touching so essentially our present designe, and being more fit to fill a volume themselves, then to be comprised within the narrow limits of my now almost-finished Discourse.

C H A P. X I V.

1. Objections against the Soul's Immortality from her condition in Infancy, Old age, Sleep and Sicknesses. 2. Other Objections taken from Experiments that seem to prove her Dicercibility. 3. As also from the seldom appearing of the Souls of the deceased; 4. And from our natural fear of Death. 5. A Subterfuge of the adverse party, in supposing but one Soul common to all Creatures. 6. An Answer concerning the Littleness of the Soul in Infancy: 7. As also concerning the weakness of her Intellectuals then, and in Old age. 8. That Sleep does not at all argue the Soul's Mortality, but rather illustrate her Immortality. 9. An Answer to the Objection from Apoplexies and Catalepsies: 10. As also to that from Madness. 11. That the various deprivations of her Intellectual Faculties do no more argue her Mortality, then the worser Modifications of Matter its natural Annihilability. And why God created Souls sympathizing with Matter.

As for the Objections that are usually made against the Immortality of the Soul; to propound them all, were both tedious and useless, there being scarce one in twenty that can appear of any moment to but an indifferent Wit and Judgment. But the greatest difficulties that can be urged I shall bring into play, that the Truth we do maintain may be the more fully cleared, and the more firmly believed. The most material objections that I know against the Soul's Immortality are these five. The First is from the consideration of the condition of the Soul in Infancy, and Old age, as also in Madness, Sleep, and Apoplexies. For if we do but observe the great difference of our Intellectual operations in Infancy and Dotage from what they are when we are in the prime of our years; and how that our Wit grows up by degrees, flourishes for a time, and at last decayes, keeping the same pace with the changes that Age and Years bring into our Body, which observes the same laws that Flowers and Plants; what can we suspect, but that the Soul of Man, which is so magnificently spoken of amongst the learned, is nothing else but a Temperature of Body, and that it grows and spreads with it, both in bigness and virtues, and withers and dies as the Body does, or at least that it does wholly depend on the Body in its Operations, and therefore that there is no sense nor perception of any thing after death? And when the Soul has the best advantage of years, she is not then exempted from those Eclipses of the powers of the Mind that proceed from Sleep, Madness, Apoplexies, and other Dicases of that nature. All which shew her
her condition, whatever more exalted Wits furmifie of her, that she is but a poor mortal and corporeal thing.

2. The Second Objection is taken from such Experiments as are thought to prove the Soul divisible in the grosseft fene, that is to lay, discernible into pieces. And it seems a clear case in those more contemptible Animals which are called Insectes, especially the Τα μαυες καὶ πολύ-

ποδα, as Aristotle describes them, and doth acknowledge that being cut into pieces, each fegment will have its motion and fene apart to it fell. The moft notable Inftance of this kind is in the Scolopendra, whose parts Aristotle affirms to live a long time divided, and to run backwards and forwards, and therefore he will have it to look like many living Creatures growing together, rather than one fingle one, ΕΟίξασα να ραίατω ροτ ζωον ποδοις ζωον συμπερφυξοι. But yet he will not afford them the privilege of Plants, whose Slips will live and grow, being set in the Earth. But the inftances that belong to this Objection ascend higher, for they pretend that the parts of perfect Animals will also live atinder.

There are two main inftances thereof. The one, that of the Eagle Fromondus mentions, whose Head being chopt off by an angry Clown, for quarrelling with his dog, the Body flew over the barn near the place of this rude execution. This was done at Fromondus his fathers house: nor is the story improbable, if we consider what ordinarily happens in Pigeons and Ducks, when their heads are cut off. The other inftance is, of a Malefactor beheaded at Antwerp, whose Head when it had given some few jumps into the crowd, and a Dog fell a licking the blood, caught the Dogs eare in its teeth, and held it fo fast, that he being frighted ran away with the mans head, hanging at his eare, to the great astonishment and confusion of the people. This was told Fromondus by an eyewitnes of the fact. From which two Examples they think may be safely inferred, that the Souls of Men, as well as of the more perfect kinde of Brutes, are also discernible.

That example in the fame Author out of Josephus Acofia, if true, yet is finally to this purpose. For the speaking of the sacrified Captive, when his Heart was cut out, may be a further confirmation indeed that the Brain is the Seat of the Common Sene, but no argument of the Divifibility of the Soul, the remaining at that time entire in the Body, after the cutting out of the Heart, whole office it is to afford Spirits, which were not fo far yet dissipated, but that they sufficed for that sudden operation of life.

3. The Third Objection is from the feldome appearance of the Souls of the deceafed. For if they can at all appear, why do they not oftner? if they never appear, it is a strong fupicion that they are not at all in Being.

4. The Fourth is from the Fear of Death, and an inward down-bea-
ing fene in us at some times, that we are utterly mortal, and that there is nothing to be expected after this life.

5. The Fifth and laft is rather a Subterfuge then an Objection, That there is but One Common Soul in all Men and Beasts, that operates according to the variety of Animals and Perfons it does actuate and vivificare, A a a 2 bearing
bearing a seeming particularity according to the particular pieces of Matter it inform, but is one in all; and that this particularity of Body being lost, this particular Man or Beast is lost, and so every living creature is properly and entirely mortal. These are the real and most pertinent objections I could ever meet withal, or can excogitate, concerning the Soul's Immortality: to which I shall answer in order.

6. And to the First, which seems to be the shrewdest, I say, That neither the Contrastedness of the Soul in Infancy, nor the Weakness of her Intellectual Operations either then or in extreme Old age, are sufficient proofs of her Corporeity or Mortality. For what wonder is it that the Soul, fallen into this low and fatal condition, where she must submit to the course of Nature, and the laws of other Animals that are generated here on Earth, should display her self by degrees, from smaller dimensions to the ordinary size of men; whereas this faculty of Contracting and dilating of themselves is in the very essence and notion of all Spirits? as I have noted already. So she does but that leisurely and naturally now, being subjected to the laws of this terrestrial Fate, which she does, exempt from this condition, suddenly and freely: not growing by Juxtaposition of parts, or Intromission of Matter, but inlarging of her self with the Body merely by the dilatation of her own Substance, which is one and the same always.

7. As for the Debility of her Intellectuals in Infancy and Old age, this consideration has last force to evince her a more corporeal essence then the former, and touches not our Principles at all, who have provided for the very worst case concerning the operations of the Mind, in acknowledging them, of my own accord, to depend very intimately on the temper and tenor of the Soul's immediate instrument, the Spirits: which being more torpid and wary in Children and Old men, must needs hinder her in such Operations as require another constitution of Spirits then is usually in Age and Childhood: though I will not profess my self absolutely confident, that the Soul cannot act without all dependence on Matter. But if it does not, which is most probable, it must needs follow, that its Operations will keep the laws of the Body it is united with. Whence it is demonstrable how necessary Purity and Temperance is to preserve and advance a mans Parts.

8. As for Sleep, which the dying Philosopher called the Brother of Death, I do not see how it argues the Soul's Mortality, more then a mans inability to wake again: but rather helps us to conceive, how that thou the slumber and agonies of Death seem utterly to take away all the hopes of the Soul's living after them; yet upon a recovery of a quicker Vehicle of Aire, she may suddenly awake into fuller and freer participation of life then before. But I may answer also, that Sleep being only the ligature of the outward Senses, and the interception of motion from the external world, argues no more any radical defect of Life and Immortality in the Soul, then the having a mans Sight bounded within the walls of his chamber by Shuts does argue any blindness in the immured party; who haply is but reading by candle-light, and that with care, so small a print as would trouble an ordinary Sight to read it by day.
day. And that the Soul is not perpetually employed in Sleep, is very
hard for any to demonstrate; we so often remembering our dreams
merely by occasions, which if they had not occurred, we had never sus-
pected we had dreamed that night.

9. Which Answer, as also the former, is applicable to Apoplexies,
Catalepsies, and whatever other Diseases partake of their nature; and
witnesses how nimble the Soul is to act upon the supposition of due
Matter, and how Life and Senfe and Memory and Reason all return,
upon return of the fitting temper of the Spirits, suitable to that vital
Congruity that then is predominant in the Soul.

10. And as for Madness, there are no Apprehensions so frantic but
are arguments of the Soul’s Immortality, not as they are frantic, but as
Apprehensions. For Matter cannot apprehend any thing, either wildly or
foberly, as I have already sufficiently demonstrated. And it is as irra-
tional for a man to conclude, that the depraved Operations of the Soul
argue her Mortality, as that the worse tempers, or figures, or whatever
more contemptible modifications there are of Matter, should argue its
annihilation by the mere power of Nature which no man that under
stands himself will ever admit.

The Soul indeed is indued with several Faculties, and some of them
very fatal passively, such as those are that have the nearest commerce with
Matter, and are not absolutely in her own power, but that her levity
and mindlessness of the divine light may bring her into subjection to them;
as all are, in too sad a sort, that are incarcerated in this Terrestrial Body,
but some have better luck then other some in this wild and audacious
ramble from a more secure state. Of which Apologia if there be some
that are made more Tragick examples then others of their stragling from
their soverain Happiness, it is but a merciful admonition of the danger
we all have incurred, by being where we are; and very few so well escaped,
but that if they could examine their Desires, Designs, and
Transactions here, by that Truth they were once masters of, they would
very freely confess, that the mistakes and errors of their life are not in-
fierior to, but of worse consequence then, thos of natural Fools and
Mad-men, whom all either hoot at their folly, or else lament their
miser. And questionless the Souls of Men, if they were once reduced
to that sobriety they are capable of, would be as much ashamed of such
Desires and Notions they are now wholly engaged in, as any mad-man,
reduced to his right Senses, is of those freaks he played when he was out
of his wits.

11. But the variety of degrees, or kindes of depravation in the In
tellectual faculties of the Soul, her Substance being Indiscernible, cannot
at all argue her Mortality, no more then the different modifications of
Matter the Annihilability thereof, as I have already intimated. Nor
need a man trouble himself how there should be such a Sympathy
betwixt Body and Soul, when it is so demonstrable that there is. For it
is sufficient to consider, that it is their immediate nature so to be by the
will and ordinance of Him that has made all things. And that if Matter
has no Sense nor Cogitation itself, as we have demonstrated it has not, it

* Book 2, ch. 13, 3.4.5.6.

* See Book 2, chap. 10, fol. 9.
had been in vain, if God had not put forth into Being that Order of Immaterial Creatures which we call Souls, vitally unuitable with the Matter: Which therefore, according to the several modifications thereof, will necessarily have a different effect upon the Soul, the Soul abiding still as unperishable as the Matter that is more mutable then she. For the Matter is dissipable, but the utterly indiscernible.

CHAP. XV.

1. An Answer to the experiment of the Scolopendra cut into pieces:
2. And to the flying of an headless Eagle over a barn, as also to that of the Malefactor's head biting a Dog by the care. 3. A superaddition of a difficulty concerning Monsters born with two or more Heads and but one Body and Heart. 4. A solution of the difficulty. 5. An answer touching the seldom appearing of the Souls of the deceased: 6. As also concerning the fear of Death; 7. And a down-bearing sense that sometimes forcibly obtrudes upon us the belief of the Soul's Mortality. 8. Of the Tragical Pompe and dreadful Preludes of Death, with some corroborative Considerations against such sad spectacles. 9. That there is nothing really sad and miserable in the Universe, unless to the wicked and impious.

NOR do those Instances in the second Objection prove any thing to the contrary, as if the Soul it self were really divisible. The most forcible Example is that of the Scolopendra, the motion of the divided parts being so quick and nimble, and so lasting, But it is easy to conceive, that the activity of the Spirits in the Mechanical conformation of the pieces of that Insect, till motion has dissipated them, will as necessarily make them run up and down, as Gunpowder in a flib will caufe its motion, And therefore the Soul of the Scolopendra will be but in one of those Segments, and uncertain in which, but likely according as the Segments be made. For cut a Wasp's head off from the Body, the Soul retires out of the Head into the Body; but cut her in the Wasp, leaving the upper part of the Body to the Head, the Soul then retires into that forepart of the Wasp. And therefore it is no wonder that the Head being cut off, the Body of the Wasp will fly and flutter so long, the Soul being still in it, and haply conferring to the direction of the Spirits for motion, not out of Sense, but from custom or nature: as we walk not thinking of it, or play on the Lute though our minde be running on something else, as I have noted before. But when the Wasp is left to the Head, it is les wonder, for then the Animal may not be desitute of sense and fancy, to convey the Spirits to move the wings.

2. The former case will fit that of the headless Eagle that flew over the Barn. But the mans Head that catch'd the Dog by the ear would have more difficulty in it (it not seeming so perfectly referrible to the latter case of the Wasp) did not we consider how hard the teeth will set in a swoon. As this Head therefore was gasping while the Dog was licking
ing the blood thereof, his ear chanced to dangle into the mouth of it, which closing together as the ear hung into it, pinched it so fast that it could not fall off.

Besides it is not altogether improbable, especially considering that some men die upwards, and some downwards, that the Soul may, as it happens, sometimes retire into the Head, and sometimes into the Body, in these decollations, according as they are more or less replenish'd with Spirits; and by the lufty jumping of this Head, it should seem it was very full of them. Many such things as these also may happen by the activity of the Spirit of Nature, who, it's like, may be as busie in the ruins of Animals, while the Spirits last, as it is in the fluid rudiments of them when they are generated. But the former Answers being sufficient, it is needless to enlarge our selves upon this new Theme.

3. To this second Objection might have been added such monstrous births, as seem to imply the Perceptive part of the Soul divided actually into two or more parts. For Aristotle seems expressly to affirm, that that monstrous birth that has two Hearts is two Animals, but that which has but one Heart is but one. From whence it will follow that there is but one Soul also in that one-hearted Monster, though it have two or more Heads; whence it is also evident, that the Perceptive part of that one Soul must be actually divided into two or more. This opinion of Aristotle Sennertius subscribes to, and therefore conceives that that monstrous child that was born at Emmaus, in Theodosius his time, with two Heads & two Hearts, was two person; but that other born Anno 1531, with two Heads and but one Heart, who lived till he was a man, was but one person. Which he conceives appears the plainer, in that both the Heads professed their agreement perpetually to the same actions, in that they had the same appetite, the same hunger and thirst, spoke alike, had the same desire to lie with their wife, and of all other acts of exonerating nature. But for that other that had two Hearts, and was divided to the Navel, there was not this identity of affection and desire, but sometimes one would have a mind to a thing, and sometimes another; sometimes they would play with one another, and sometimes fight.

4. But I answer, and first to Aristotle's authority, that he does not so confidently assert, that every Monster that has but one Heart is but one Animal. For his words run thus; *E ν* α π της ζωον το πραποθε γα πλεω συμπεριαστα δ'ει νομιται ει *ν* οι αρηε, δι ει πωιτιν ει διει η χαρδια μηδον, το μπαν εινν καρδιατον εινζννον. Where he only speaks hypothetically, not peremptorily, that the Heart is that part where the first Principle of life is, and from which the rest of life in Soul or Body is to be derived. For indeed he makes it *elsewhere* the seat of Common Sense, but that it is a mistake we have *already demonstrated*, and himself seems not confident of his own Opinion; and therefore we may with the less offence decline it, and affirm (and that without all hesitancy) that a Monster is either one or more Animals according to the number of the Heads of it, and that there are as many distinct Souls as there are Heads in a monstrous Birth. But from the Heads downwards the Body being but one, and the Heart but one, that there must needs be a wonderful exact concord.
concord in the sense of affections in these Heads, they having their Blood and Spirits from one fountain, and one common seat of their passions and desires. But questionless whenever one Head winked, it could not then see by the eyes of the other, or if one had pricked one of these Heads, the other would not have felt it: though whatever was inflicted below, it is likely they both felt alike, both the Souls equally acting the Body of this Monster, but the Heads being actuated by them only in several. Which is a sufficient Answer to Sennertus.

5. The weakness of the third Objection is manifest, in that it takes away the Existence of all Spirits, as well as the Souls of the deceased. Of whose being notwithstanding none can doubt that are not dotingly incredulous. We say therefore that the Souls of men, being in the same condition that other Spirits are, appear sometimes, though but seldom. The cause in both being, partly the difficulty of bringing their Vehicles to an unnatural consistence, and partly they having no occasion to do so, and lastly it being not permitted to them to do as they please, or to be where they have a mind to be.

6. As for the Fear of Death, and that down-bearing sense that sometimes so uncontrouably suggests to us that we are wholly mortal: To the first I answer, That it is a necessary result of our union with the Body, and if we should admit it one of the imperfections or infirmities we contract by being in this state, it were a solid Answer. And therefore this fear and preface of ill in Death is no argument that there is any ill in it, nor any more to be heeded then the predictions of any fanatical fellow that will pretend to prophetic. But besides this, it is fitting that there should be in us this fear and abhorrency, to make us keep this station Providence has plac'd us in; other wise every little pet would invite us to pack our selves out of this World, and try our fortunes in the other, and so leave the Earth to be inhabited only by Beasts, * whenas it is to be ordered and cultivated by Men.

7. To the second I answer, That such peremptory conclusions are nothing but the impostures of Melancholy, or some other dull and fullsome distempers of blood that corrupt the Imagination; but that Fancy proves nothing, by Axiome 4. And that though the Soul enthroned in her Ethereal Vehicle be a very magnificent thing, full of Divine Love, Majesty and Tranquillity, yet in this present state she is in, clogg'd and accloy'd with the foulness and darknes of this Terrestrial Body, she is subject to many fears and jealousies, and other disturbing passions, whose Objects though but a mockery, yet are a real disquiet to her mind in this her Captivity and Imprifonment.

Which condition of hers is lively set out by that incomparable Poet and Platonist, in his Envid, where, comparing that more free and pure state of our Souls in their Celestial or Fiery Vehicles with their restraint in this Earthly Dungeon, he makes this short and true description of the whole matter.

*I.neus eft ollis vigor, & ealefis origo
Seminibus, quantum non noxia corpora tardant,
Terrenique hebetant artus, moribusque membra:

Hinc
This is the sad estate of the more deeply-lapied Souls upon Earth; who are so wholly mastered by the motions of the Body, that they are carried headlong into an allitent to all the fugitions and imaginations that it so confidently obtrudes upon them; of which that of our Mortality is not the weakest.

But such melancholy fancies, that would bear us down so peremptorily that we are utterly extinct in death, are no more argument thereof, then those of them that have been perfuaded they were dead already, while they were alive; and therefore would not eat, because they thought the dead never take any repast, till they were cheated into an appetite, by seeing some of their friends disguised in winding-sheets feed heartily at the table, whose example then they thought fit to follow, and so were kept alive.

8. I cannot but confefs that the Tragick pomp and preparation to dying, that lays waft the operations of the Minde, putting her into fits of dotage or fury, making the very visage look ghastly and distracted, and at the best sadly pale and confumed, as if Life and Soul were even almost quite extinct, cannot but imprim strange impressions even upon the stoutest Mind, and raise suspicions that all is lost in so great a change. But the Knowing and Benign Spirit though he may flow in tears at so dismal a Spectacle, yet it does not at all suppres his hope and confidence of the Soul's safe passage into the other world; and is no otherwise moved then the more passionate Spectators of some cunningly-contrived Tragedy, where persons, whose either Vertue or misfortunes, or both, have wonne the affection of the beholders, are at last seen wallowing in their blood, and after some horrid groans and gasps lye stretcht stark dead upon the stage: but being once drawn off, find themselves well and alive, and are ready to taft a cup of wine with their friends in the tostirring room, to solace themselves really, after their feftious pangs of death, and leave the easy-natur'd multitude to indulge to their fort passions for an evil that never befell them.

9. The fear and abhorrensy therefore we have of Death, and the sorrow that accompanies it, is no argument but that we may live after it, and are but due affections for those that are to be spectatours of the great Tragick-Comedy of the World; the whole plot whereof being contrived by Infinite Wifdome and Goodnes, we cannot but furmise that the most bad representations are but a fhow, but the delight real to such as are not wicked and
and impious, and that what the ignorant call Evil in this Universe is but as the shadowy strokes in a fair picture, or the mournful notes in Musick, by which the Beauty of the one is more lively and express, and the Melody of the other more pleasing and melting,

CHAP. XVI.

1. That that which we properly are is both Sensitive and Intellectual.

2. What is the true Notion of a Soul being One.

3. That if there be but One Soul in the world, it is both Rational and Sensitive.

4. The most favourable representation of their Opinion that hold but One.

5. A Conjunction of the foregoing representation.

6. A Reply to the Conjunction.

7. An Answer to the Reply.

8. That the Soul of Man is not properly any Ray either of God or the Soul of the World.

9. And yet if she were so, it would be no prejudice to her Immortality: whence the folly of Pomponius is noted.

10. A further animadversion upon Pomponius his folly, in admitting a certain number of remote Intelligencies, and denying Particular Immutable Substances in Men and Brutes.

1. As for the last Objection, or rather Subterfuge, of such as have no minde to finde their Souls immortal, pretending indeed they have none distinct from that one Universal Soul of the World, whereby notwithstanding they acknowledge that the Operations we are conscious to our selves of, of Reason and other Faculties, cannot be without one; we shall easily discover either the falfeness or unserviceablenes of this conceit for their design, who would fo fain flink out of Being after the mad freaks they have played in this Life. For it is manifestly true, that a Man is most properly that, whatever it is, that animadverts in him; for that is such an operation that no Being but himself can doe it for him. And that which animadverts in us, does not onely perceive and take notice of its Intellectual and Rational operations, but of all Sensations whatsoever that we are conscious of, whether they terminate in our Body or on some outward Object. From whence it is plain, that That which we are is both Sensitive and Intellectual.

2. Now if we rightly consider what is comprehended in the true and usual Notion of the Unity of a Soul, it is very manifest that it mainly consists in this, that the Animadversion thereof is but one, and that there is no Sensation nor Perception of any kind in the Soul, but what is communicated to and perceived by the whole Animadversion.

3. Which things being premised, it necessarly follows, that if there be but one Soul in the World, that Soul is both Rational and Sensitive, and that there cannot be any Pain, Pleasure or Speculation, in one mans Soul, but the fame would be in all; nay that a man cannot lash a Dog, or spur a Horse, but himself would feel the smart of it: which is flatly against all experience, and therefore palpably falle. Of this wilde Supposition I have spoken so fully in my Poems, that I need adde nothing here in this place, having sufficiently confuted it there.

4. But
4. But not to cut them to very short, let us imagine the most favourable contrivance of their Opinion we can; and conceive that though this Soul of the World be of it self every where alike, and that the Animadversion faculty is in it all in like vigour; yet it being engaged in severally-tempered Bodies, Animadversion is confin’d to that part of Matter only which it actuates; and is stupid and unfensible of all other operations, whether Sensitive or Intellectual, that are transacted by her without, in other persons: a thing very hard to conceive, and quite repugnant to the Idea of the Unity of a Soul, not to be conscious to her self of her own perceptions. But let it pass for a possibility, and let us suppose that one part of the Soul of the World informs one man, and another another, or at least some vital Ray there; yet notwithstanding, this opinion will be incumbered with very harsh difficulties.

For if several parts of the Soul of the World inform several parts of the Matter, when a man changes his place, he either tears one part of the Soul of the World from another, or else changes Souls every step; and therefore it is a wonder that he changes not his Wits too, and loses his Memory. Unless they will say that every part of the Soul of the World, upon the application of a new Body, acts just so in it as that part acted which it left, if there be no change or alteration thereof: whence every part of the Soul of the World will have the self-same Thoughts, Errours, Truths, Remembrances, Pains, Pleasures, that the part had the Body newly left. So that a man shall always fancy it is himself, wheresoever he goes, though this self be nothing but the Soul of the World acting in such a particular Body, and retaining and renewing to her self the Memory of all Accidents, Impressions, Motions and Cogitations, the had the perception of in this particular piece of organized Matter. This is the most advantageous representation of this Opinion, that can possibly be excogitated, but I leave it to those that love to amuse themselves in such Mysteries, to try if they can make any good sense of it.

5. And he that can fancy it as a thing possible, I would demand of him, upon this supposition, who himself is; and he cannot deny but that he is a Being Perceptive and Animadverse, which the Body is not, and therefore that himself is not the Body; wherefore he is that in him which is properly called Soul: But not its Operations, for the former reason; because they perceive nothing, but the Soul perceives them in exerting them; nor the Faculties, for they perceive not one another’s Operations; but that which is a man’s Self perceives them all: Wherefore he must say he is the Soul; and there being but one Soul in the World, he must be forc’d to vaunt himself to be the Soul of the World. But this boasting must suddenly fall again, if he but consider that the Soul of the World will be every man’s personal Ipseity as well as his; whence every one man will be all men, and all men but one Individual man: which is a perfect contradiction to all the Laws of Metaphysicks and Logick.

6. But re-minded of these inconveniences, he will pronounce more cautiously, and affirm that he is not the Soul of the World at large, but only so far forth as the expedites or exerts her self into the Sense and Remembrance of all those Notions or Impresses that happen to her whereever.
The Immortality of the Soul.

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wherever she is joined with his Body; but that so soon as this Body of his is dissipated and dissolved, that she will no longer raise any such determinate Thoughts or Senses that refer to that Union; and that so the Memory of such Actions, Notions and Impressions, that were held together in relation to a particular Body, being loft and laid aside upon the failing of the Body to which they did refer, this Ipsiety or Personality, which consisted mainly in this, does necessarily perish in death.

This certainly is that (if they know their own meaning) which many Libertines would have, who are afraid to meet themselves in the other World, for fear they should quarrel with themselves there for their transfections in this. And it is the handsomest Hypothesis that they can frame in favour of themselves, and far beyond that dull conceit, That there is nothing but mere Matter in the World; which is infinitely more liable to confusion.

7. And yet this is too scant a covering to shelter them and secure them from the fad after-claps they may justly expect in the other life. For first, it is necessary for them to confess that they have in this life as particular and proper sense of Torment, of Pleasure, of Peace, and Pangs of Conscience, and of other impressions, as if they had an individual Soul of their own distinct from that of the World, and from every one else; and that if there be any Demons or Genii, * as certainly there are, that it is so with them too. We have also demonstrated, that all Sense and Perception is immediately excited in the Soul by the * Spirits; wherefore with what confidence can they promise themselves that the death of this earthly Body will quite obliterate all the tracts of their Being here on earth: whenas the subtler ruins thereof, in all likelihood, may determine the Thoughts of the Soul of the World to the same tenor as before, and draw from her the memory of all the Transfections of this life, and make her exercise her judgment upon them, and cause her to contrive the most vital exhalations of the Terrestrial Body into an Aëreal Vehicle, of like nature with the ferment of these material rudiments of life, sown out of the ruins of death.

For any slight touch is enough to engage her to perfect the whole Scene; and so a man shall be represented to himself and others in the other state whether he will or no, and have as distinct a personal Ipsiety there as he had in this life. Whence it is plain, that this false Hypothesis, That we are nothing but the Soul of the World acting in our Bodies, will not serve their turns at all that would have it so; nor secure them from future danger, though it were admitted to be true. But I have demonstrated it false already, from the Notion of the Unity of a Soul.

* Amidus,
Book 3. ch. 3.
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, &c.
* Book 2.
chap. 8, 9.

Of the truth of which Demonstration we shall be the better assured, if we consider that the subtile Elements, which are the immediate conveyers of Perceptions in our Souls, are continued throughout in the Soul of the World, and insinuate into all living Creatures. So that the Soul of the World will be necessarily informed in every one, what the thinks or feels wherever, if she be the only Soul that actuators every Animal upon Earth, Whence the Sun, Stars and Planets would appear to us in that bigness they really are of; they being perceiv'd in that bigness by those parts
parts of the Soul of the World that are at a convenient nearness to them, 8. That other conceit, of our Souls being a Vital Ray of the Soul of the World, may gain much countenance by expressions in ancient Authors that seem to favour the Opinion: as that of Epictetus, who saith that the Souls of men are οὐκ οὖν αὐτὶ μὴν εἶ οὐκ ἄν υπάρχον. And Philo calls the Minde of Man, τὰ ἔρεια τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κτισθησίων and Triumpos, and οὖ ὥς οὐκ ἤστων διδασκαλόν τὸ τῶν Ἰδίων φῶς. All which expressions make the Soul of man a Ray or Beam of the Soul of the World or of God. But we are to take notice that they are but Metaphorical phrares, and that what is understood thereby, is, that there is an emanation of a secondary substance from the several parts of the Soul of the World, resembling the Rays of the Sun. Which way of conception, though it be more easy then the other, yet it has difficulties enough. For this Vital Ray must have some head from whence it is stretched, and so the Body would be like a Bird in a string, which would be drawn to a great length when one takes long voyages, suppose to the East or West Indies, which yet are nothing so long as our yearly falling on the Earth from Libra to Aries. Or if you will not have it a linear Ray, but an Orb of particular life, every such particular orb must be hugely vast, that the Body may not travel out of the reach of the Soul. Besides, this orb will strike through other Bodies as well as its own, and its own be in several parts of it, which are such incongruities and inconveniences as are very harsh and unpleasing to our Rational faculties.

Wherefore that Notion is infinitely more neat and safe, that proportions the Soul to the dimensions of the Body, and makes her independent on any thing but the Will and Essence of her Creator; which being exactly the same every where, as also his Power is, her emanative support is exactly the same to what she had in the very first point of her production and station in the World, In which respect of dependence she may be said to be a Ray of Him, as the rest of the Creation also; but in no other sense that I know of, unless of likeness and fimilitude, she being the Image of God, as the Rays of Light are of the Sun.

9. But let every particular Soul be so many Rays of the Soul of the World, what gain they by this, whenas these Rays may be as capable of all the several concomitancies of life, as the Soul is in that sense we have described? and therefore Personality, Memory and Conscience will as surely return or continue in the other State, according to this Hypothecis, as the other more usual one. Which also discovers the great folly of Pomponatus (and of as many as are of the same leaven with him) who indeed is so modest and judicious as not to deny Apparitions, but attributes all to the influence of the Stars, or rather the Intelligencies of the Celestial Orbs. For they giving life and animation to brute Animals, why may they not also, upon occasion, animate and actuate the Aire into shape and form, even to the making of them speak and discourse one shape with another? For so Pomponatus argues in his Book of the Immortality of the Soul, from Aquinas his concession, that Angels and Souls separate may figure the Aire into shape, and speak through it; Quare igitur Intelligens De Immortalitate animarum, cap. 14. De Immortalitate animarum, pag. 114. 115.
The Immortality of the Soul.

Book III.

Intelligences moventes corpora celestia hæc facere non possunt cum suis instrumentis quæ tot ætantæ possunt, quæ faciant Psittacos, Picos, Corvos & Merulas, loqui? And a little after, he plainly reasons from the power the Intelligencies have of generating Animals, that it is not at all strange that they should raise such kindes of Apparitions as are recorded in History.

But if these Celestial Intelligencies be confined to their own Orbs, so as that no secondary Essence reach these inferior Regions, it is impossible to conceive how they can actuate the Matter here below. But if there be any such essential Emanations from them, whereby they actuate the Matter into these living Species we see in the World, of Men and Brutes; nothing hinders but the same Emanations remaining, may actuate the Aire when this earthly fabric fails, and retain the memory of things transacted in this life, and that still our Personality will be conserved as perfect and distinct as it was here.

10. But this conceit of Pomponatus is farre more foolish then theirs that make only one Anima Mundi that passes through all the Matter of the World, and is present in every place, to doe all feats that there are to be done. But to acknowledge so many several Intellectual Beings as there be fancied Celestial Orbs, and to scruple, or rather to seem confident, that there are not so many particular Souls as there be Men here on Earth, is nothing but Humour and Madness. For it is as rational to acknowledge eight hundred thousand Myriads of Intellectual and Immaterial Beings, really distinct from one another, as eight; and an infinite number, as but one, that could not create the Matter of the World. For then two Substances, wholly independent on one another, would be granted, as also the Infinite parts of Matter that have no dependence one on the other.

Why may not there be therefore Infinite numbers of Spirits or Souls that have as little dependence one on another, as well as there should be eight Intelligencies & whenas the motions and operations of every Animal are a more certain argument of an Immaterial Being residing there, then the motions of the Heavens of any distinct Intelligencies in their Orbs, if they could be granted to have any: And it is no stranger a thing to conceive an Infinite multitude of Immaterial, as well as Material, Essences, independent on one another, then but two; namely the Matter and the Soul of the World. But if there be so excellent a Principle existent as can create Beings, as certainly there is; we are still the more assured that there are such multitudes of Spiritual Essences, surviving all the chances of this present life, as the most sober and knowing men in all Ages have professed there are.

CHAP.
CHAP. XVII.

The Immortality of the Soul.

CHAP. XVII.

1. That the Author having safely conducted the Soul into her Aereal condition through the dangers of Death, might well be excused from attending her any further. 2. What reasons urge him to consider what fates may befall her afterwards. 3. Three hazards the Soul runs after this life, whereby she may again become obnoxious to death, according to the opinion of some. 4. That the Aereal Genii are mortal, confirmed by three testimonies. 5. The one from the Vision of Facius Cardanus, in which the Spirits that appeared to him profess themselves mortal. 6. The time they stayed with him, and the matters they disputed of. 7. What credit Hieronymus Cardanus gives to his Father’s Vision. 8. The other testimony of Plutarch, concerning the Death of the great God Pan. 9. The third and last of Hefiod, whose opinion Plutarch has polish’d and refined. 10. An Enumeration of the several Paradoxes contained in Facius Cardanus his Vision. 11. What must be the sense of the third Paradox, if those Aereal Speculators spake as they thought. 12. Another Hypothesis to the same purpose. 13. The craft of these Demons, in shuffling in poisonous Error amongst Solid Truths. 14. What makes the story of the death of Pan left to the present matter, with an addition of Demetrius his observations touching the Sacred Islands near Britain. 15. That Hefiod’s opinion is the most unexceptionable, and that the harshness therein is but seeming, not real. 16. That the Aethereal Vehicle invests the Soul in a condition of perfect Immortality. 17. That there is no internal impediment to those that are Heroically good, but that they may attain an everlasting Happiness after Death.

1. W e have now, mangre all the oppositions and Objections made to the contrary, safely conducted the Soul into the other state, and instilled her into the same condition with the Aereal Genii. I might be very well excused, if I took leave of her here; and committed her to that fortune that attends those of the Invisible World: it being more reasonable for them that are there, to meditate and prefigure in their minds all futurities belonging to them, than for us that are on this side the passage. It is enough that I have demonstrated, that neither the Essence nor Operations of the Soul are extinct by Death, but that they either not intermit, or suddenly revive upon the recovery of her Aery Body.

2. But seeing that those that take any pleasure at all in thinking of these things can seldom command the ranging of their thoughts within what compass they please, and that it is obvious for them to doubt whether the Soul can be secure of her permanency in life in the other world, (it implying no contradiction, That her Vital Congruity, appropriate to this or that Element, may either of it self expire, or that she may by some carelessness debilitating one Congruity, and awaken another, in some measure, and so make her self obnoxious to Fate;) we cannot
but think it in a manner necessary to extricate such difficulties as these, that we may not seem in this after-game to lose all we won in the former; and make men suspect that the Soul is not at all Immortal, if her Immortality will not secure her against all future fates.

3. To which she seems liable upon three accounts. The one we have named already, and respects an intrinsical Principle, the Periodical terms of her Vital Congitity, or else the Levity and Miscarriage of her own Will. Which obnoxiousness of hers is still more fully argued from what is affirmed of the Aereal Genii (whose companion and fellow-Citizen she is) whom sundry Philosophers affert to be Mortal. The other two hazards she runs are from without, to wit, the Conflagration of the World, and the Extinction of the Sun.

4. That the Aereal Genii are mortal, three main Testimonies are alleged for it. The Vision of Facius Cardanus, the Death of the great God Pan, in Plutarch, and the Opinion of Hesod. I will set them all down fully, as I finde them, and then answere to them. The Vision of Facius Cardanus is punctually recited by his Son Hieronymus in his De Subsituine, in this manner.

5. That his Father Facius Cardanus, who confesses that he had the society of a familiar Spirit for about thirty years together, told him this following Story often when he was alive, and after his death he found the exact relation of it committed to writing, which was this. The 13th day of August 1491. after I had done my holy things, at the 20th hour of the day, there appeared to me, after their usual manner, seven men clad in silk garments, with cloaks after the Greek mode, with purple stockings and crimson Caffocks, red and shining on their breasts; nor were they all thus clad, but onely two of them who were the chief. On the ruder and taller of these two other two waited, but the left and paler had three attendants, so that they made up seven in all. They were about forty years of age, but lookt as if they had not reacht thirty. When they were asked who they were, they answered that they were Homines Aerial, Aereal Men, who are born and die as we; but that their life is much longer then ours, as reckoning to 300. years. Being asked concerning the Immortality of our Souls, they answered, Nihil quod cuique proprium effct superesse: That they were of a nearer affinity with the Divi than we; but yet infinitely different from them: and that their happiness or misery as much transcended ours, as ours does the brute Beasts. That they knew all things that are hid, whether Monies or Books. And that the lowest sort of them were the Genii of the best and noblest men, as the best men are the trainers up of the best sort of Dogs. That the tenuity of their Bodies was such, that they can doe as neither good nor hurt, saving in what they may be able to doe by Spectres and Terrours, and impartment of Knowledge. That they were both publick Professors in an Academy, and that he of the lesser stature had 300. disciples, the other 200. Cardan's Father further asking them why they would not reveal such treasurers as they knew unto men; they answered, that there was a special law against it, upon a very grievous penalty.

6. These Aereal Inhabitants said at least three hours with Facius Cardanus, disputing and arguing of sundry things, amongst which one was The Original
Original of the World. The taller denied that God made the world ab
axerno: the latter affirmed that he did create it every moment, that if he
should desist but one moment, it would perish. Whereupon he cited some
things out of the Disputations of Avenroes, which Book was not yet extant,
and named several other Treatises, part whereof are known, part not, which
were all of Avenroes his writing, and withall did openly profess himself to
be an Avenroist.

7. The record of this Apparition Cardan found amongst his Fathers
Papers, but seems unwilling to determine whether it be a true history or
a Fable, but disputes against it in such a shuffling manner, as if he was
persuaded it were true, and had a mind that others should think it so. I
am sure he must what steers his course in his Metaphysical adventures
according to this Cynosura, which is no obscure indication of his affent
and belief.

8. That of the Death of the great God Pan, you may read in Plutarch
in his De defeñ Oracorum; where Philippus, for the proof of the
Mortality of Demons, recites a Story which he heard from one Æmili-
anus a Roman, and one that was remov’d far enough from all either
stupidity or vanity: How his Father Epiteres being shipt for Italy, in
the evening, near the Echinades, the winds failed them; and their Ship
being carried by an uncertain course upon the Island Pساس, that most of the
Passengers being waken, many of them drinking merrily after Supper, there
was a voice suddenly heard from the Island, which called to Thamus by
name, who was an Egyptian by birth, and the Pilot of the Ship: which the
Passengers much wondered at, some of them having taken notice of the Pilots
name before. He was twice called to before he gave any sign that he attended
to the voice, but after giving express these words, Οτων γενή αυτοτοπαλος, τον Παλαβος συνικυνυ. The company was much astonished
at the hearing of the voice: and after much debate amongst themselves,
Thamus resolv’d that, if the wind blew fair, he would fail by and say no-	hing; but if they were becalmed there, he would doe his Message: and
therefore they being becalmed when they came to Palodes, neither wind nor
tide carrying them on, Thamus looking out of the poop of the Ship toward
the shore, delivered his Message, telling them that the great Pan was dead.
Upon which was suddenly heard as it were a joyous groaning of a multitude
together, mingled with a murmurous admiration.

9. The opinion of Hesiod also is, that the Genii or Demons within a
certain period of years do die; but he attributes a considerable Longevity
to them, to wit of nine thousand seven hundred and twenty years, which is
the utmost that any allow them, most men lefts. Plutarch, under the person
of others, has polisht this Opinion into a more curious and dfinisht dress:
for out of the mortality of the Demons, and the several ranks which
Hesiod mentions of Rational Beings, viz. θεοι, δαίμονες, ὄρμοι, and
ἄγγελοι, he has affixed a certain manner and law of their passing out of
one state into another, making them to change their Elements as well
as Dignities; Ὑποτεθέν, σιθεῖν, σέλανθος, πνευματικά, ὁμοιότητα, καὶ-China. Bbb 3
σελήνων,
The Immortality of the Soul.

Book III.

De verum variar. lib. 16. cap. 93.

In the first place, these Aereal Genii are born at set times as well as we. Not that any of the Demons are brought to bed of them, but that they seem to have a beginning of their Existence, from which they may be reckoned to have continued, some more years and some less. A thing un conceivable, unless we should imagine that there is still a lapse of time or distance of Souls out of the higher Regions of the Aire, into these lower, or that these that leave these Earthly Bodies pass into the number of the Aerial Demons. As neither their death can so well be understood, unless we should fancy that their Souls pass into more pure Vehicles, or else descend into Terrestrial Bodies. For Cardan himself acknowledges they perish not, which also is agreeable with his Opinion of the Preexistence of our Souls.

Secondly, That these Aereal Genii live but about 300 years, which is against Hesiod and the greatest number of the Platonists, unless they should speak of that particular order themselves were of; for it is likely there may be as much difference in their ages as there is in the ages of several kinds of Birds and Beasts.

Thirdly, That our Souls are so farre mortal, as that there is nothing proper to us remaining after death.

Fourthly, That they were nearer allied to the Gods than we by farre, and that there was as much difference betwixt them and us, as there is betwixt us and Beasts. Which they must understand then concerning the excellency of their Vehicles, and the natural activity of them, not the preeminency of their Intellectual Faculties. Or if they do, they must be understood of the better sort of those Aereal Spirits. Or if they mean it of all their Orders, it may be a mistake out of pride: as those that are rich and powerful as well as speculative amongst us, take it for granted that they are more judicious and discerning then the poor and despicable, let them be never so wise.

Fifthly, That they know all secret things, whether hidden Books or Monies: which men might doe too, if they could stand by concealely from them that hide them.

Sixthly, That the lowest sort of them were the Genii of the Noblest men, as the baser sort of Men are the Keepers and Educators of the better kinds of Dogs and Horses. This clause of the Vision also is enveloped with obscurity, they having not defined whether this meanest of condition of the Tutelar Genii be to be understood in a Political or Physical sense; whether
whether the meanness of rank and power, or of natural wit and sagacity; in which many times the Groom exceeds the young Gallant who assigns him to keep his Dogs and Horses.

Seventhly, That such is the thinness and lightness of their Bodies, that they can doe neither good nor hurt thereby, though they may send strange Sights and Terrors, and communicate Knowledge; which then must be chiefly of such things as belong to their Aereal Region. For concerning matters in the Sea, the Filhes, if they could speak, might inform men better then they. And for their corporeal debility, it is uncertain whether they may not pretend it, to animate their Contabulators to a more secure converse, or whether the thing be really true in some kinds of them. For that it is not in all, may be evinced by that Narration that Cardan a little after recites out of Erasimus, of the Devil that carried a Witch into the Aire, and set her on the top of a Chimney, giving her a Pot, and bidding her turn the mouth downwards, which done the whole Town was fired, and burnt down within the space of an hour. This hapned April the 10. Anno 1533. The Towns name was Schiltach, eight German miles distant from Friburg. The Story is so well attested, and guarded with such unexceptionable circumstances; that though Cardan love to shew his wit in cavilling at most he recites, yet he finds nothing at all to quarrel at in this.

Eighthly, That there are Students and Professors of Philosophy in the Aereal World, and are divided into Sects and Opinions there, as well as we are here. Which cannot possibly be true, unless they set some value upon Knowledge, and are at an eager loss how to finde it, and are fain to hew out their way by arguing and reasoning as we do.

Ninthly and lastly, That they are reduced under a Political Government; and are afraid of the infliction of punishment.

11. These are the main matters comprehended in Facius his Vision, which how true they all are, would be too much trouble to determine. But one clause, which is the third, I cannot let pass, it so nearly concerning the present Subject, and seeming to intercept all hopes of the Soul’s Immortality. To speake therefore to the summe of the whole busines; we must either conceive these Aereal Philosophers to instruct Facius Cardanus as well as they could, they being guilty of nothing but a forward pride, to offer themseles as dictating Oracles to that doubtful Exorcist (for his Son Cardan acknowledges that his Father had a form of Conjunction that a Spaniard gave him at his death;) or else we must suppose them to take the liberty of equivocating, if not of downright lying.

Now if they had a mind to inform Facius Cardanus of these things directly as they themselfes thought of them, it being altogether unlikely but that there appeared to them, in their Aereal Regions, such sights as represented the persons of men here deceased, it is impossible that they should think otherwise then as we have described their Opinion, in the fore-going Chapter, that hold there is but one Soul in the World, by which all living Creatures are actuated. Which, though but a mere possibility, if so much, yet some or other of these Aereal Speculators may as well
well hold to it as some do amongst us. For Pomponatius and others of the Avenroisfs are as ridicolously pertinacious as they.

And therefore these Avenroistical Demons answered punctually according to the Conclusions of their own School, Nihil proprium cuigum superefpe pos mortem. For the Minde or Soul being a Sub stance common to all, and now disseminated from those Terrestrial Bodies which it actuated in Plato, fuppofe, or Socrates, and thefe Bodies dead and dissipate, and only the common Soul of the World surviving, there being nothing but this Soul and these Bodies to make up Socrates and Plato; they conclude it is a plain case, that nothing that is proper survives after death. And therefore, though they fee the representation of Socrates and Plato in the other World, owning also their own personalities, with all the Actions they did, and accidents that befell them in this life; yet according to the fallen subtleties and curiosities of their School, they may think and profess, that to speake accurately and Philosophically it is none of them, there being no Substance proper to them remaining after death, but only the Soul of the World, renewing the thoughts to her self of what appertained to those parties in this life.

12. This is one Hypothefis confident enough with the veracity of these Demons; but there is also another, not at all impoffible, viz. That the Vehicles of the Souls of men departed are as invisible to this Order of the Genii that confabulated with Facius Cardanus as that Order is to us: and that therefore, though there be the appearances of the Ghofts of Men deceased to them as well as to us; yet it being but for a time, it moves them no more then our confirmed Epicureans in this world are moved thereby: especially it being prone for them to think that they are nothing but some ludicrous spectacles that the universal Soul of the World repreffents to her self and other Spectatours, when, and how long a time the pleasures, and the vaporous reliques of the dead body admi nister occasion.

Now that the Vehicles of the Souls of men departed this life, after they are come to a fetled condition, may be farre thinner and more invisible then thofe of the fore-named Demons, without committing any inconcinnity in Nature, may appear from hence: For the excellency of the inward Spirit is not alwaies according to the constifency of the Element with which it does incorporate; otherwife thofe Fihes that are of human shape, and are at fett times taken in the Indian Sea, should have an higher degree of Reason and Religion then we that live upon Earth, and have bodies made of that Element. Whence nothing hinders but that the Spirit of man may be more noble then the Spirit of fome of the Aereal Demons. And Nature not alwaies running in Arithmetical, but alfo in Geometrical Progression, one Remove in one may reach far above what is before it for the prefent in the other degrees of Progression. As a creeping worm is above a cad-worm, and any four-footed beafts above the birds, till they can use their legs as well as they; but they are no sooner even with them, but they are ftraight far above them, and cannot onely goe, but fly. As a Peafant is above an imprifon'd Prince, and has more command; but this Prince can be no sooner fet free and become even
even with the Peasant in his liberty, but he is infinitely above him. And so it may be naturally with the Souls of men when they are freed from this prison of the Body, their steps being made in Geometrical Progression, as soon as they seem equal to that Order of Demons we speak of, they may mount far above them in tenuity and subtlety of Body, and so become invisible to them ; and therefore leave them in a capacity of falsly supposing that they are not at all, because they cannot see them.

13. But if they thought that there is either some particular Ray of the Soul of the World, that belongs peculiarly (suppose) to Socrates or Plato, or that they had proper Souls really distinct, then it is evident that they did either equivocate or lyse. Which their pride and scorn of mankinde (they looking upon us but as Beasts in comparison of themselves) might easily permit; they making no more conscience to deceive us, then we do to put a dudge upon a dog, to make our selves merry. But if they had a design to winde us into some dangerous errour, it is very likely that they would shuffle it in amongst many Truths, that those Truths being examined, and found solid at the bottome, we might not suspect any one of their dictates to be false. Wherefore this Vision being ill meant, the poison intended was, that of the Soul’s Mortality; the dangerous salfenets of which opinion was to be covered by the mixture of others that are true.

14. As for that Relation of Emilianus, which he heard from his Father Epitaphes, it would come still more home to the purpose, if the conclusion of the Philologers at Rome, after Thamus had been lent for, and averred the truth thereof to Tiberius Cesar, could be thought authentick, namely, That this Pan, the news of whose death Thamus told to the Demons at Palodes, was the Son of Mercury and Penelope; for then ‘tis plain that Pan was an humane Soul, and therefore concerns the present question more nearly. But this Narration being applicable to a more sacred and venerable Subject, it looses so much of its force and fitness for the present use. That which Demetrius adds, concerning certain Holy Islands near Britain, had been more fit in this regard. Whither when Demetrius came, suddeiney upon his arrival there happened a great commotion of the air, mighty tempests and prodigious whirlwinds. After the ceasing whereof, the Inhabitants pronounced, “On ὠν ἀγέτικον πνεόν ἐκλιθὲν εἴρων, That some of a nature more then humane was dead. Upon which Plutarch, according to his usual Rhetorick, descants after this manner, 'εσμένει τὰς λυπής τοῖς ἔνθισεν ἐκείνον ἐδὼν ἔδει, ἐθνίμεν οἱ δὲ πολλοίς λυπήρις ἐν θυσίως αἱ μεγαλαῖ πυγαι τὰς μὲν αἰναλαμφῆς ἐπωρεϊς ἐπὶ ἀλλήν ἔκοιτον, οἱ δὲ σωφρικοῖς ἀνωχεῖν ξοφοῖς πολλάκις μεῖν, ἢν οὖν, πολύμαλα ἐπὶ καλαί: προστοις, πολλάκις δὲ εἰς λυπήρις πάθην ἄκρα φαρμακίων, i.e. As the lighting of a lamp brings no grievance with it, but the extinguishment of it is offensive to many; so great Souls, while they remain kindled into life, shine forth harmelesly and benignly, but their extinction or corruption often stir up windes and tempests, as in this present example; and often infects the Aire with pestilential annoiances.

15. But the last Testimony is the most unexceptionable, though the least pretending to be infallible, and seems to strike dead both waies. For whether
whether the Souls of men that goe out of these Earthly bodies be Vertuous or Vicious, they must die to their Aerial Vehicles. Which seems a sad story at first sight, and as if Righteousnesse could not deliver from Death. But if it be more carefully perused, the terror will be found onely to concern the Wicked. For the profoundest pitch of Death is the Descent into this Terrestrial Body, in which, besides that we necessarily forget whatever is past, we do for the present lead αλαμµην και αµυδριν ζωην, a dark and obscure life, as Plutarch speaks, dragging this weight of Earth along with us, as Prisoners and Malefacontours do their heavy shackles in their fordid and fecluse confinements. But in our return back from this state, Life is naturally more large to them that are prepared to make good use of that advantage they have of their Aiery Vehicle. But if they be not masters of themselves in that state, they will be fatally remanded back to their former Prison in process of time; which is the most grofs Death imaginable. But for the Good and Vertuous Souls, that after many Ages change their Aereal Vehicle for an Ethereal one, that is no Death to them, but an higher ascent into Life. And a man may as well say of an Infant, that has left the dark Wombe of his Mother, that this change of his is Death, as that a Genius dies by leaving the grofs Aire, and emerging into that Vehicle of Light which they ordinarily call Ethereal or Celestial.

16. There may be therefore, by Axiome 36, a dangerous relapse out of the Aereal Vehicle into the Terrestrial, which is properly the Death of the Soul that is thus retrograde. But for those that ever reach the Ethereal state, the periods of Life there are infinite; and though they may have their Perige's as well as Apoge's, yet these Circuits being of so vast a compass, and their Perige's so rare and short, and their return as certain to their former Apise as that of the Celestial Bodies, and their Ethereal sense never leaving them in their lowest touches towards the Earth; it is manifest that they have arrived to that Life that is justly styled Eternal.

17. Whence it is plain, that Perseverance in Vertue, if no external Fate hinder, will carry Man to an Immortal life. But whether those that be thus Heroically good, be fo by discipline and endeavour, or ἀφιγε, by a special favour and irresistible design of God, is not to be disputed in this place; though it be at large discussed somewhere in the Dialogues of Plato. But in the mean time we will not doubt to conclude, that there is no Internal impediment to those that are highly and Heroically vertuous, but that, in process of time, they may arrive to an ever-lasting security of Life and Happiness, after they have left this Earthly Body.

2. The Immortality of the Soul.

3. An Epistle to the Romans.

4. The End of the World, being the Last Judgment.

5. The Conversion of the Heathens.


7. An Address to the Philosophers.


9. The Immortality of the Soul.

10. An Epistle to the Romans.

11. The End of the World, being the Last Judgment.

12. The Conversion of the Heathens.


15. The Immortality of the Soul.

16. An Epistle to the Romans.

17. The End of the World, being the Last Judgment.


20. An Address to the Philosophers.
3. But though there be so great and unanimous consent that the World shall be burnt, yet they do not express themselves all alike in the business. Seneca's vote is the most madly explicit of any, making the very Stars run and dash one against another, and so set all on fire. But Posidonius and Panatarius had more wit, who did not hold that ὧς ἀπὸ αὐτοῦ ὀλίγου which the other Stoicks did. For the destroying of the Aethereal Regions by Fire is as foolish a fancy as the inventing of the Eleon to be drown'd, because the matter of the Aether is too fine and subtle for Fire to rage in, it being indeed nothing but a pure Light or Fire itself. And yet this Aethereal Matter is infinitely the greatest portion of the World. Wherefore the World cannot be said properly to be liable to the destruction of Fire from any natural causes, as the Stoicks would have it. Which is demonstratively true upon Des-Cartes his Principles, who makes Fire nothing but the motion of certain little particles of Matter, and holds that there is no more motion at one time in the World than at another; because one part of the Matter cannot impress any agitation upon another, but it must lose so much itself. This hideous noise therefore of the Conflagration of the World must be restrain'd to the firing of the Earth only, so farre as it concerns us. For there is nothing else combustible in the Universe but the Earth, and other Planets, and what Vapours and Exhalations arise from them.

4. This Conflagration therefore that Philosophers, Poets, Sibyls, and all have fill'd the World with the fame of, is nothing but the burning of the Earth. And the ends the Stoicks pretend of their exaggers may be compatible to it, but not to the burning of the Heavens or Aether at all; as any but meanly skilled in Philosophy cannot but acknowledge. For their nature is so simple that they cannot corrupt, and therefore want no renovation, as the Earth does. Nor do the Inhabitants of those Heavenly Regions defile themselves with any vice; or if they do, they sink from their material station as well as moral, and fall towards the terrestrial dreaggs. And therefore that part of the happy Aetherlagans Seneca speaks of, Omne animal ex integro generabitur, dabiturque terris homo inscissae secterum, & melioribus auspiciis natus, will take no place with those Aethereal Creatures.

5. We are willing then to be born down, by this common and loud cry of Fire that must burn the World, into an acknowledgment that the Earth may within a certain Period of time be burnt, with all those things that are upon it or near it. But what concurs of natural causes may contribute to this dismal spectacle, is not proper for me to dispute, especially in this place. I think only take a view of what bad effects this Conflagration may have upon the Souls of Demons and Men. For that thole that have recovered their Aethereal Vehicles are exempt from this fate, is evident; the remoteness of their habitation securing them from both the rage and noisomeness of these sulphureous flames.

6. The most certain and most destructive execution that this Fire will doe, must be upon the unrecovered Souls of Wicked Men and Demons; thole that are so deeply sunk and drown'd as never, that the very consistency
consistency of their Vehicles does imprison them within the confines of this thick caliginous Aire. These Souls or Spirits therefore that have so inextricably entangled themselves in the Fate of this lower World, giving up all their Sense to the momentary pleasures of the most luxurious Principle, which is the very seat of Death, these, in the Mystical Philosophy of the Ancients, are the Nymphs, to whom though they allot a long Series of years, yet they do not exempt them from mortality and fate. And Demetrius in Plutarch pronounces expressly out of Heisiod, that their Life will be terminated with the Conflagration of the World, from what the Poet intimates Ανενιατικαί. Καὶ οὐ θέλειν θεὸς ἢ ἄθεος τοις υψίσεις εἰνός ἐστι τὰς Νύμφας.

But to leave these Poetical Riddles, and take a more serious and distinct View of the condition of the Soul after the Conflagration of the Earth; we shall finde five several sorts of Opinions concerning it. The first hold, that this merciful heat and fire will at last destroy and consume the Soul as well as the Body. But this seems to be impossible, that any created Substance should utterly destroy another Substance, so as to reduce it to nothing. For no part of Matter, acting the most furiously upon another part thereof, does effect that. It can only attenuate, dissipate and disperse the parts, and make them invisible. But the Substance of the Soul is indissoluble and indisceivable, and therefore remains entire, whatever becomes of the Body or Vehicle.

The second Opinion is, That after long and tedious torture in these flames, the Soul by a special act of Omnipotency is annihilated. But, methinks, this is to put Providence too much to her shifts, as if God were so brought to a plagues in his creating a Creature of itself Immortal, that he must be fain to uncreate it again, that is to say, to annihilate it. Besides that Divine Nemesis that lies within the compass of Philosophy, never supposes any such forcible eruptions of the Deity into extraordinary effects, but that all things are brought about by a wise and infallible or inevitable train of secondary Causes, whether natural or free Agents.

The third therefore, to avoid these absurdities, denies both assumption by Fire and annihilation; but conceives, That tediousness and extremity of pain makes the Soul at last, of her self, shrink from all commerce with Matter; the immediate Principle of Union, which we call Vital Congruity, consisting of a certain modification of the Body or Vehicle as well as of the Soul, which being spoile and lost, and the Soul thereby quite loofened from all sympathy with Body or Matter, she becomes perfectly dead, and senses to all things, by Axiome 36, and, as they say, will so remain for ever. But this seems not so rational; for, as Aristotle somewhere has it, Ἐξαιτε ἐκ τοῦ διόριστος, ἐκείνον ἑαυτῆς τιθέναι. Wherefore so many entire Immortal Substances would be continued in Being to all Eternity to no end nor purpose, notwithstanding they may be made use of, and actuate Matter again as well as ever.

A fourth sort therefore of Speculators there is, who conceive that
that after this solution of the Souls or Spirits of Wicked Men and Demons from their Vehicles; That their pain is continued to them even in that separate state, they falling into an uneasing torments, full of furious tormenting Dreams, that act as fiercely upon their Spirits as the external Fire did upon their Bodies. But others except against this Opinion as a very uncertain Conjecture, it supposing that which to them seems not so found, viz.

That the Soul can act when it has lost all vital Union with the Matter, which seems repugnant with that so intimate and essential aptitude it has to be united therewith. And the Dreams of the Soul in the Body are not transferred without the help of the Animal Spirits in the Brain, they usually symbolizing with their temper. Whence they conclude, that there is no certain ground to establish this Opinion upon.

II. The last therefore, to make all sure, that there may be no inconvenience in admitting that the Souls or Spirits as well of evil Demons as Wicked Men, disjoined from their Vehicles by the force of that fatal Conflagration, may subsist, have excogitated an odde and unexpected Hypothesis, That when this firing of the World has done due execution upon that unfortunate Cross, and tedious and direful torture has wearied their afflicted Ghosts into an utter reced from all Matter, and thereby into a profound sleep or death, that after a long Series of years, when not only the fury of the Fire is utterly flaked, but that vast Atmosphere of smoke and vapours, which was sent up during the time of the Earth's Conflagration, has returned back in copious showers of rain (which will again make Seas and Rivers, will binde and consolidate the ground, and, falling exceeding plentifully all over, make the foil pleasant and fruitful, and the Aire cool and wholesome) that Nature recovering thus to her advantage, and becoming youthful again, and full of genitall salt and moisture, the Souls of all living Creatures belonging to these lower Regions of the Earth and Aire will awaken orderly in their proper places: The Seas and Rivers will be again replenished with Fish, the Earth will send forth all manner of Fowls, four-footed Beasts, and creeping things, and the Souls of Men also shall then catch life from the more pure and balmaic parts of the Earth, and be clothed again in terrestrial Bodies; and lastly, the Aerial Genii, that Element becoming again wholesome and vital, shall, in due order and time, awake and revive in the cool Aire. Which Experfection into life is accompanied, say they, with propensions answerable to those resolutions they made with themselves in those fiery torments, and with which they fell into their long sleep.

12. But the whole Hypothesis seems to be framed out of that dream of the Stoicks, concerning the οὐκείωσις or παλιγγενεία of the World after the αἰώνια or ὄνειροι thereof. As it that of Seneca belonged to this cafe, Epiph. 36. Mors, quam pertimescinus ac recusamus, intermittit vitam, non cripit. Veniet iterum qui nos in lucem reponet dies, quem multi recusarent, nisi oblitos redderet. But how courtely the Stoicks Philosophize when they are once turned out of their rode-way of moral Sentences, any one but moderately skilled in Nature and Metaphysics may easily discern. For what Errors can be more gross then those that they entertain of God, of the Soul, and of the Stars: they making the two former Corporeal Substances, and feeding the latter with the Vapours of the

Lip. Physiolog.  
Soci. lib. 1.  
Difser. 6. lib.  
Earth; affirming that the Sun laps up the water of the great Ocean to quench his thirst, but that the Moon drinks off the leffer Rivers and Brooks; which is as true as that the A£s drunk up the Moon. Such conceits are more fit for Anacreon in a drunken fit to stumble upon, who to invite his Companions to tipple, composèd that Catch,

\[ \text{Nec, si materiam nostram conlegerit atas} \]
\[ \text{Post obitum, rursumque rederget aut sita nunc est,} \]
\[ \text{Atque iterum nobis fuerint data lumina vitæ,} \]
\[ \text{Pertineat quicquam tamem ad nos id quoque situlum,} \]
\[ \text{Interrupta semel cum fit retinencia nofrri.} \]

Where the Poet seems industriously to explode all the hopes of any benefit of this Stoical maxime, and to profess that he is as if he had never been, that cannot remember he has ever been before. From whence it would follow, that though the Souls of men should revive after the Conflagration of the World, yet they have not escaped a perpetual and permanent death.

13. At what a pitch his Understanding was set, may be easily discerned by my last quotation, wherein there seems a palpable contradiction, for it is said, *Veneretur iterum qui nos in lucem reponet dies, quem multi reconsentant nisi oblitos redderet.* If nos, how oblitos? If oblitos, how nos? For we are not we, unless we remember that we are so. And if mad-men may be said, and that truly, to be beside themselves, or not to be themselves, because they have lost their wits; certainly they will be far from being themselves that have quite lost the Memory of themselves, but must be as if they had never been before. As Lucretius has excellently well declared himself,

\[ \text{De rerum natura, lib. 5.} \]

14. We see therefore how desperately undemonstrable the condition of the Soul is after the Conflagration of the Earth, all these five Opinions being accompanied with so much lubricity and uncertainty. And therefore they are to be looked upon rather as some Night-landscape to feed our amased Melancholy, then a clear and distinct draught of comprehensible Truth to inform our Judgment.

15. All that we can be assured of is, That those Souls that have obtained their Ethereal Vehicles are out of the reach of that sad fate that follows this Conflagration; and that the wicked Souls of Men and Demons will be involved in it. But there are a middle sort betwixt these, concerning whom not only curiosity but good will would make a man solicitous. For it is possible, that the Conflagration of the World may surprize many thousands of Souls, that neither the course of Time, nor Nature, nor any higher Principle has wrought up into an Ethereal Congruity of life, but yet may be very holy, innocent and virtuous.
Which we may easily believe, if we consider that these very Earthly Bodies are not so great impediments to the goodness and sincerity of the Mind, but that many, even in this life, have given great examples thereof. Nor can that Aereal state be less capable of, nor well be without, the good Genii, no more then the Earth without good men, who are the most immediate Ministers of the Goodness and Justice of God. But exemption from certain fates in the world is not always entailed upon Innocency, but most ordinarily upon natural power. And therefore there may be numbers of the good Genii, and of very holy and innocuous Spirits of men departed, the consistency of whose Vehicles may be such, that they can no more quit these Aereal Regions, than we can fly into them, that have heavy bodies, without wings. To say nothing of those virtuous and pious men that may haply be then found alive, and so be liable to be overtaken by this storm of Fire.

Undoubtedly, unless there appear, before the approach of this fate, some visible Zeus otnipotens, or Jupiter Fodtator, as the heathens would call him, they must necessarily be involved in the ruine of the wicked. Which would be a great eye-fore in that exact and irreprehensible frame of Providence, that all men promise to themselves who acknowledge That there is a God. Wherefore according to the light of Reafon, there must be some Supernatural means to rescue those innocuous and benign Spirits out of this common calamity. But to describe the manner of it here how it must be done, would be to entitle natural Light and Philosophy to greater abilities then they are guilty of; and therefore that Subject must be referred for its proper place.

C H A P. XIX.

1. That the Extinction of the Sun is no Panick fear, but may be rationally suspected from the Records of History and grounds of Natural Philosophy.

2. The fatal Influence of this Extinction upon Man and Beast, and all the Aereal Demons imprisoned within their severall Atmospheres in our Vortex.

3. That it will doe little or no damage to the Aethereal Inhabitants in reference to heat or warmth.

4. Nor will they find much want of his light.

5. And if they did, they may pass out of one Vortex into another, by the Privilege of their Aethereal Vehicles;

6. And that without any labour or toile, and as maturely as they please.

7. The want incomprehensible of the tracts and compasses of the ways of Providence.


9. An Explanation of the Perihs two Principles of Light and Darkness, which they called Theos and Diaμων, and when and where the Principle of Light gets the full victory.

10. That Philosophy, or something more sacred then Philosophy, is the only Guide to a true Aνθωσοι.

1. The last danger that threatens the Separate Soul is the Extinction of the Sun; which though it may seem a mere Panick fear at first sight, yet if the matter be examined, there will appear no contemptible reasons that may induce men to suspect that it may at last fall
fall out, there having been, at certain times, such near offers in Nature towards this sad accident already. Pliny, though he instances but in one example, yet speaks of it as a thing that several times comes to pass. Front, faith he, prodigiosi & longiores Solis defectus, quales occisus Dictator Cæsare, et Antoniano bello, totius anni palore continuo. The like happened in Justinian's time, as Cedrenus writes: when, for a whole year together, the Sun was of a very dim and dusky hue, as if he had been in a perpetual Eclipse. And in the time of Irene the Empress it was so dark for seventeen days together, that the ships lost their way on the sea, and were ready to run against one another, as Theophanes relates. But the late accurate discovery of the Spots of the Sun by Shiner, and the appearing & disappearing of six Stars, & the excursions of Comets into the remoter parts of our Vortex, as also the very intrinseal contexture of that admirable Philosophy of Descartes, do argue it more then possible that, after some vast periods of time, the Sun may be so inextricably enveloped by the Macule that he is never free from, that he may quite lose his light.  

2. The Preambles of which Extinction will be very hideous, and intolerable to all the Inhabitants of the Planets in our Vortex, if the Planets have then any Inhabitants at all. For this defect of light and heat coming on by degrees, must needs weary out poor mortals with heavy languishments, both for want of the comfort of the usual warmth of the Sun, whereby the Bodies of men are recreated, and also by reason of his inability to ripen the fruits of the Soil; whence necessarily must follow Famine, Plagues, Sicknesses, and at length an utter devastation and destruction of both Man and Beasts.

Nor can the Aereal Demons escape free, but that the vital eye to their Vehicles necessarily confining them to their several Atmospheres, they will be inevitably imprisoned in more then Cimmerian darkness. For the Extinction of the Sun will put out the light of all their Moons, and nothing but Ice, and Frost, and flakes of Snow, and thick mists, as palpable as that of Egypt, will possess the Regions of their habitation. Of which sad spectacle though those twinkling eyes of heaven, the Stars, might be more compassionant Spectators; yet they cannot send out one ray of light to succour or visit them, their tender and remote beams not being able to pierce, much less to dissipate, the clammy and thick consistency of that long and fatal Night.

3. Wherefore calling our mind off from so dismal a sight, let us place it upon a more hopeful Object; and consider the condition of those Souls that have arrived to their Aerial Vehicle, and see how far this state can take hold of them. And it is plain at first sight, that they are out of the reach of this misty dungeon, as being already mounted into the secure mansions of the purer Ether.

The worst that can be imagined of them is, that they may finde themselves in a condition something like that of ours when we walk out in a clear, starlight, frosty night, which to them that are found is rather a pleasure then offence. And if we can bear it with some delight in these Earthly Bodies, whose parts will grow hard and stiff for want of due heat, it can prove nothing else but a new modification of actual pleasure.
to those Æthereal Inhabitants whose bodies are not consistipated as ours, but are themselves a kind of agile light and fire.

All that can be conceived is, that the spherical particles of their Vehicles may stand a little more closely and firmly together than usual, whence the triangular intervals being more straight, the subtilest element will move something more quick in them, which will raise a sense of greater vigour and alacrity then usual. So little formidable is this fate to them in this regard.

4. But their light, you'll say, will be obscured, the Sun being put out, whose shining seems to concern the Gods as well as Men, as Homer would intimate,

"ὢρνυ" ἄειδιντοις φιλά. φιρινή βέλοις.

But I answer, that that of Homer is chiefly to be understood of the Æthereal Deities, not the Æthereal Inhabitants, who can turn themselves into a pure actual Light when they please. So that there is no fear but that their personal converse will be as cheerful and distinct as before, white letters being as legible upon black paper as black upon white. But this is to suppose them in the dark, which they are not, but in a more soft and mild light, which is but a change of pleasure, as it is to see the Moon shine fair into a room after the putting out of the Candle. And certainly the contribution of the light of the Stars is more to their quiet and tender Senses, then the clearest Moon-shine night is to ours; though we should suppose them no nearer any Star then we are. But such great changes as these may have their conveniences for such as Providence will favour, as well as their inconveniences. And the Extinction of our Sun may be the Augmentation of Light in some Star of a neighbouring Vortex. Which though it may not be able to pierce those Cimmerian Prisons I spake of before, yet it may give sufficient light to their Spirits that are free. Besides that the Discernment and Senses of our Vortex, that will then happen, will necessarily bring us very much nearer the Centre of some other, whose Star will administer sufficient light to the Æthereal Genii, though it be too weak to relieve the Æreal.

And that so remote a distance from these central Luminaries of the Vortices is consistent with the perfectest happiness, we may discernpartly, in that the Celestial Matter above Saturn, till the very marge of the Vortex, is more strongly agitated then that betwixt him and the Sun, and therefore has less need of the Sun's beams to conserve its agility and liquidity; and partly, in that those huge vast Regions of Æther would be loft, and in vain in a manner, if they were not frequented by Æthereal Inhabitants, which in all reason and likelihood are of the noblest kind, according to the nature of their Element. And therefore all the Æthereal People may retire thither upon such an exigency as this, and there rest secure in joy and happiness, in the true Intermundia Decorum which Epicurus dream'd of.

5. Which we may easily admit, if we consider the grand Privileges of the Æthereal Vehicle, wherein so great a power of the Soul is awakened, that she can moderate the motion of the particles thereof as she pleases, by adding or diminishing the degrees of agitation, Axiom 32, whereby
by she is also able to temper the solidity thereof, and, according to this contemplation of her Vehicle, to ascend or descend in the Vortex as she lifts her self, and that with a great variety of swiftnes, according to her own pleasure. By the improvement of which Priviledge she may also, if she please, pass from one Vortex into another, and receive the warmth of a new Vesta, so that no fate imaginable shall be ever able to lay hold upon her.

6. Nor will this be any more labour to her then falling down the stream. For she, having once fitted the agitation and solidity of her Vehicle for her Celestial voige, will be as naturally carried whither she is bound, as a stone goes downward, or the fire upward. So that there is no fear of any latitude, no more then by being rowed in a Boat, or carried in a Sedan. For the Celestial Matter that environs her Vehicle works her upward or downward, toward the Centre or from the Centre of a Vortex, at its own proper pains and charges. Lastly, such is the tenuity and subtilty of the Senses of the Aëreall Inhabitants, that their prevision and sagacity must be, beyond all conceit, above that of ours; besides that there will be warnings and premonitions of this future disaster, both many, and those very visible and continued, before the Sun shall fail so far as that they shall at all be concerned in his decay; so that the least blast of misfortune shall never be able to blow upon them, nor the least evil imaginable overtake them.

7. This is a small glance at the Mysteries of Providence, whose fetches are so large, and Circuits so immene, that they may very well seem utterly incomprehensible to the Incredulous and Idiots, who are exceeding prone to think that all things will ever be as they are, and desire they should be so: though it be as rude and irrational, as if one that comes into a ball, and is taken much with the first Dance he sees, would have none danced but that, or have them move no further one from another then they did when he first came into the room; whereas they are to trace nearer one another, or further off, according to the measures of the Mufick, and the law of the Dance they are in. And the whole Matter of the Universe, and all the parts thereof, are ever upon Motion, and in such a Dance, as whose traces backwards and forwards take a vast compass; and what seems to have made the longest stand, must again move, according to the modulations and accents of that Mufick, that is indeed out of the hearing of the acutest ears, but yet perceptible by the purest Minds and the sharpest Wits. The truth whereof none would dare to oppose, if the breath of the gainayer could but tell its own story, and declare through how many Stars and Vortices it has beenstrained, before the particles thereof met, to be abauld to the framing of so rath a contradiction.

8. We have now finifted our whole Discourse, the summery result whereof is this; That there is an Incorporeal Substance, and that in Man, which we call his Soul. That this Soul of his subsists and acts after the death of his Body, and that usually first in an Aëreall Vehicle, as other Demons do; wherein she is not quite exempt from fate, but is then perfect and secure when she has obtained her Aetereal one, she being then out of the reach
of that evil Principle, whose dominion is commensurable with misery and death. Which power the Persian Magi termed Arimanus, and resembled him to Darkness, as the other good Principle, which they called Oromazes, to Light, styling one by the name of Δαίμον, the other by the name of Θεός.

9. Of which there can be no other meaning that will prove allowable, but an adumbration of those two grand parts of Providence, the one working in the Demoniacal, the other in the Divine Orders. But if Theopompus his prophecy be true in Plutarch, who was initiated into these Arcana, the power of the benign Principle will get the upper hand at last, Τῆς ζηλευμένης ἡ δυνάμεις, &c. At length Hades or Arimanus will be left in the lurch, who so strongly holds us captive, καὶ τίς μὴ ἄντιγραφος διακόμων ἱστεάω, μὴ ταῦτα δεομένος, μὴ ταῦτα πανίν τοιούτα, and men shall then be perfectly happy, needing no food, nor casting any shadow. For what shadow can that Body cast that is a pure and transparent light, such as the Ethereal Vehicle is? And therefore that Oracle is then fulfilled, when the Soul has ascended into that condition we have already described, in which alone it is out of the reach of Fate and Mortality.

10. This is the true Αἴσχωρ, to speak according to the Persian Language, with whose empty title Emperours and great Potentates of the Earth have been ambitious to adorn their memory after death; but is so high a Privileidge of the Soul of Man, that mere Political virtues, as Plotinus calls them, can never advance her to that pitch of Happiness. Either Philosophy, or something more sacred than Philosophy, must be her Guide to so transcendent a condition. And not being curious to dispute, whether the Pythagoreans ever arrived to it by living according to the precepts of their Master, I shall notwithstanding with confidence averre, that what they aimed at, is the sublimest felicity our nature is capable of; and being the utmost Discovery this Treatise could pretend to, I shall conclude all with a Distich of theirs (which I have elsewhere taken notice of upon like occasion) it comprehending the furthest Scope, not onely of their Philosophy, but of this present Discourse.

"He d' ἀπολειμματα σωμα τε αἰτιο περαν εληφθη, Εορειμι αδηλωτοι, ους αμφροσθη, μης διηλωσι."

To this sense,

Who after death once reach th' Ethereal Plain,
Are straight made Gods, and never die again.

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Conjectura Cabbalistica.

OR,

A CONJECTURAL ESSAY

OF

Interpreting the mind of Moses, in the
Three first Chapters of Genesis,
according to a Threefold

CABBALA:

{Literal,
Viz. {Philosophical,
{Mystical, or, Divinely Moral.

By HENRY MORE, D.D.
Fellow of Christ's College in Cambridge.

Exod. 34.
And when Aaron and all the people of Israel saw Moses, behold, the skin of his face shone, and they were afraid to come nigh him.

Wherefore Moses, while he spake unto them, put a veil on his face.

Matth. 10.
There is nothing covered, that shall not be revealed; and hid, that shall not be known.

What I tell you in darkness, speak you in light; and what you hear in the ear, that preach you on the house-tops.

LONDON,
Printed by James Flesher, for William Morden Book-feller in Cambridge;
MDCLXII.
TO
The eminently Learned and truly Religious
D', C'U'D'W'0'R'T'H, Master of Christ's Col-
ledge, and Hebrew Professor in the Uni-
versity of Cambridge.

S I R,

Concerning the choice of the subject matter of my present pains, I have, I think, spoke enough in the ensuing Preface. Concerning the choice of my Patron, I shall say no more, then that the sole inducement thereto was his singular Learning and Piety. The former of which is so conspicuous to the world, that it is universally acknowledged of all; and for the latter, there is none that can be ignorant thereof, who has ever had the happiness, though but in a smaller measure, of his more free and intimate converse. As for my own part, I cannot but publickly profess, I never met with any yet so truly and becomingly religious, where the right knowledge of God and Christ bears the in-lightned mind so even, that it is as far removed from Supersti-
tion as Irreligion itself. And my present Labours cannot finde better welcome or more judicious acceptance with any then with such as these. For such free and unprejudiced spirits will neither antiquate Truth for the oldness of the Notion, nor flight her for looking young, or bearing the face of Novelty. Besides, there are none that can be better assured of the sincerity and efficacy of my present Design. For as many as are born of the Spirit, and are not mere sons of the Letter, know very well how much the more inward and mysterious mean-
ing of the Text makes for the reverence of the Holy Scripture and advantage of Godliness; whenas the urging of the bare literal sense has either made or confirmed many an Atheist. And assuredly those men see very little in the affairs of Religion, that do not plainly discover that it is the Atheist's highest in-
terest, to have it taken for granted, that there is no spiritual meaning, either in Scripture or Sacrament, that extends further then
then the mere Grammatical sense in the one, or the sensible, gross, external performance in the other. As for example, That to be regenerated, and become a true and real Christian, is nothing else but to receive the outward Baptism of visible water: and, that the Mofaical Philosophy concerning God and the nature of things, is none other then that which most obviously offers itself in the mere letter of Moses. Which if the Atheift could have fully granted to him on all sides, and get but this in also to the bargain, That there is no knowledge of God but what Moses his Text set on foot in the world, or what is Traditional; he cannot but think, That Religion in this dress is so empty, exceptionable and contemptible, that it is but just with as many as are not mere fools to look upon it as some melancholick conceit, or cunning fiction, brought into the world to awe the simpler sort, but behind the hangings to be freely laughed at and derided by those that are more wise: and that it were an easie thing in a short time to raze the memory of it out of the minds of men, it having so little root in the humane faculties. Which for my own part I think as hopeful, as that posterity will be born without Eyes and Ears, and lose the use of Speech. For I think the knowledge of God and a sense of Religion is as natural and essential to mankind, as any other Property in them whatsoever; and that the generations of men shall as soon become utterly irrational, as plainly irreligious. Which, I think, my Treatise against Atheism will make good to any one that with care and judgment will peruse it.

Nor does it at all follow, because a Truth is delivered by way of Tradition, that it is un/concludable by Reason. For I do not know any one Theorem in all Natural Philosophy that has more sufficient reasons for it then the Motion of the Earth, which notwithstanding is part of the Philosophick Cabbala or Tradition of Moses, as I shall plainly shew in its due place. So likewise for the Preexistence of the Soul, which seems to have been part of the same Tradition, it is abundantly consentaneous to Reason. And as we can give a genuine account of all those seeming irregularities of motion in the Planets, supposing they and the Earth move round about the Sun; so we may open the Causes of all those astonifhing Paradoxes of Providence from this other
The Epistle Dedicatory.

other Hypothesis, and shew that there is nothing here unsuitable to the precious Attributes of God, if we could place the Eye of our Understanding in that Centre of all free motions, that steady eternal Good; and were not our selves carried aloof from him, amongst other wandering Planets, (as S. Jude calls them) that at several distances play about him, and yet all of them in some measure or other, not only pretending to him, but, whether they pretend or not, really receiving something from him. For of this First is all, both Wisdome, Pleaſure, and Power. But it is enough to have but hinted these things briefly and ænigmatically, the wrath and ignorance of all Ages receiving the most generous Truths with the greatest offence.

But for my own part, I know no reason but that all well-willers to Truth and Godlineſſe should heartily thank me for my present Cabbalistical Enterprize, I having so plainly therein vindicated the holy Mystery of the Trinity from being (as a very bold Sect would have it) a mere Pagan invention. For it is plainly shewn here that it is from Moſes originally, not from Pythagoras or Plato. And seeing that Chrift is nothing but Moſes unveiled, I think it was a special act of Providence that this hidden Cabbaſa came so seasonably to the knowledge of the Gentiles, that it might afore-hand fit them for the easier entertainment of the whole Mystery of Christianity, when in the fulneſſe of time it should be more clearly revealed unto the world.

Besides this, we have also shewn, That, according to Moſes his Philosophy, the Soul is secure both from death and from sleep after death; which those drowsie Nodders over the Letter of the Scripture have very ostentatiously collected, and yet as boldly afterwards maintained, pretending that the contrary is more Platonical then Christian or Scriptural.

Wherefore my design being so pious as it proves, I could doe nothing more fit then to make choice of so true a lover of Piety as your self for a Patron of my present Labours. Especially you being so well able to doe the most proper office of a Patron; to defend the Truth that is presented to you in them, and to make up out of your rich Treasury of Learning what our Penury could not reach to, or Inadvertency may have omitted.
omitted. And truly, if I may not hope this from you, I know not whence to expect it. For I do not know where to meet with any so universally and fully accomplished in all parts of Learning as your self, as well in the Oriental Tongues and History, as in all the choicest kindes of Philosophy: any one of which Acquisitions is enough to fill, if not to swell, an ordinary man with great conceit and pride; whereas it is your sole privilege to have them all, and yet not to take upon you, nor to be anything more imperious, or censorious of others, then they ought to be that know the least.

These were the true Considerations that directed me in the Dedication of this Book; which if you accordingly please to take into your favourable Patronage, and accept as a Monument or Remembrance of our mutual Friendship, you shall much oblige

Your affectionate friend and servant,

H. More.
THE PREFACE

to the READER.

1. What is meant by the term Cabbala, and how warrantably the Literal Exposition of the Text may be so called. 2. That dispensable speculations are best propounded in a Sceptical manner. 3. A clear description of the nature and dignity of Reason, and what the Divine Logos is. 4. The general probabilities of the truth of this present Cabbala. 5. The design of the Author in publishing of it.

READER,

I. Present thee here with a triple interpretation of the Three first Chapters of Genesis, which in my Title-page I have termed a Threefold Cabbala; concerning which, for thy better direction and satisfaction, I hold it not amiss to speak some few things by way of Preface, such as thou thyself in all likelihood wouldst be forward to ask of me. As, why, for example, I call this interpretation of mine a Cabbala, and from whom I received it, what may be the probabilities of the truth of it, and what my purpose is in publishing of it.

To the First I answer. That the Jewish Cabbala is conceived to be a Traditional doctrine or exposition of the Pentateuch, which Moses received from the mouth of God while he was on the Mount with him. And this Sense or Interpretation of the Law or Pentateuch, as it is a Doctrine received by Moses first, and then from him by Joshua, and from Joshua by the Seventy Elders, and soon, was called Cabbala from קבלה kibbel, to receive: But as it was delivered as well as received, it was also called Maflora, which signifies a Tradition; though this latter more properly respects that Critical and Grammatical skill of the Learned among the Jews, and therefore was profitable for the explaining the Literal sense as well as that more Mysterious meaning of the Text where it was intended. Whence without any boldness or abuse of the word I may call the Literal interpretation which I have light upon, Cabbala, as well as the Philosophical or Moral, the Literal sense it self being not so plain and determinate, but that it may seem to require some Traditional Doctrine or Exposition to settle it, as well as those other senses that are more Mystical.

And therefore I thought fit to call this Threefold interpretation that I have hit upon, Cabbala's, as if I had indeed light upon the true Cabbala of Moses in all the three senses of the Text, such as might have become his own mouth to have uttered for the instruction of a willing and well-prepared Disciple. And therefore for the greater comeliness and solemnity of the matter, I bring in Moses speaking his own minde in all the Three several Expositions.

2. And yet I call the whole Interpretation but a Conjecture, having no desire to seem more definitively wise then others can bear or approve of. For

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though
though in such things as are Necessary and Essential to the Happiness of a man, as the belief that there is a God, and the like, it is not sufficient for a man only to bring undeniable Reasons for what he would prove, but also to profess plainly and dogmatically that himself gives full assent to the Conclusion he hath demonstrated; so that these that do not so well understand the power of Reason, may notwithstanding thereby be encouraged to be of the same Faith with them that do, it being of so great consequence to them to believe the thing propounded: Yet I conceive that Speculative and Dispensable Truths a man not only may, but ought rather to propound them Sceptically to the world, there being more prudence and modesty in offering the strongest Arguments he can without dogmatizing at all, or seeming to date upon the Conclusion, or more earnestly to affect the winning of Prophets to his own opinion. For where the force of the Arguments is perceived, Assent will naturally follow according to the proportion of the discovery of the force of the Arguments. And an assent to opinions merely Speculative, without the Reasons of them, is neither any pleasure nor accomplishment of a rational creature.

3. To your Second demand I answer, That though I call this Interpretation of mine Cabbala, yet I must confess I received it neither from Man nor Angel. Nor came it to me by Divine Inspiration, unless you will be so wise as to call the reasonable suggestions of that Divine Life and Sense that vigorously resides in the Rational Spirit of free and well-meaning Christians, by the name of Inspiration. But such Inspiration as this is no distracted from, but an accomplisher and an enlarger of the humane faculties. And I may add, that this is the great mystery of Christianity that we are called to partake of, viz. The perfecting of the Humane nature by participation of the Divine. Which cannot be understood so properly of this gross flesh, and external senses, as of the Inward humanity, viz. our Intellect, Reason, and Fancie. But to exclude the use of Reason in the search of Divine truth is no dictate of the Spirit, but of headstrong Melancholy and blinde Enthusiastike, that religious Phrensic men run into, by lying passive for the reception of such Impresses as have no proportion with their Faculties. Which mistake and irregularity if they can once away with, they put themselves in a posture of promiscuously admitting any thing, and so in due time of growing either moped or mad, and under pretence of being highly Christians, (the right Mystery whereof they understand not) of working themselves lower then the lowest of men.

But for mine own part, Reason seems to me to be so far from being any contemptible Principle in man, that it must be acknowledged in some sort to be in God himself. For what is the Divine Wisdome but that steady comprehension of the Ideas of all things, with their mutual respects one to another, congruities and incongruities, dependences and independences? which respects do necessarily arise from the natures of the Ideas themselves; both which the Divine Intellect looks through at once, discerning thus the order and coherence of all things. And what is this but Ratio mobilis, a kind of steady and immovable Reason discovering the connexion of all things at once? But that in us is Ratio mobilis, or Reason in evolution, we being able to apprehend things only in a successive manner one after another. But
so many as we can comprehend at a time, while we plainly perceive and carefully view their Ideas, we know how well they fit, or how much they disagree one with another, and so prove or disprove one thing by another: which is really a participation of that Divine Reason in God, and is a true and faithful Principle in man, when it is perfected and polished by the Holy Spirit; but before, very earthly and obscure, especially in spiritual things.

But now seeing the Logos, or steady comprehensive Wisdom of God, in which all Ideas and their respects are contained, is but universal Stable Reason, how can there be any pretence of being so highly inspired as to be blown above Reason it self, unless men will fancy themselves wiser than God, or their Understandings above the natures and reasons of things themselves?

Wherefore to frame a brief Answer to your Second demand: I say, this threefold Cabbala you enquire after is the statue of the free Reason of my Mind, heathfully considering the written Text of Moses, and carefully canvassing the Expositions of such Interpreters as are ordinarily to be had upon him. And I know nothing to the contrary, but that I have been so successful as to have light upon the old true Cabbala indeed.

4. Of which in the Third place I will set down some general Probabilities, referring you for the rest to the Defence of the Cabbala's themselves, and the Introduction thereof.

And first, that the Literal Cabbala is true, it is no contemptible Argument, in that it is carried on so evenly and consistently one part with another, every thing also being represented so accommodately to the capacity of the people, and so advantageously for the keeping of their minds in the fear of God and obedience to his Law; as shall be particularly shown in the Defence of that Cabbala. So that according to the sense of this Literal Cabbala, Moses is discovered to be a man of the highest Political accomplishments and true and warrantable Prudence that may be.

Nor is he to fall short in Philosophy; And therefore the Philosophical Cabbala contains the Noblest Truths, as well Theological as Natural, that the Mind of man can entertain her self with: Insomuch that Moses seems to have been aforehand, and prevented the Subtilest and most subtilest Inventions of the choicest Philosophers that ever appeared after him to this very day. And further presumption of the truth of this Philosophical Cabbala is, that the grand mysteries therein contained are most what the same that those two eximious Philosophers, Pythagoras and Plato, brought out of Egypt and the parts of Asia into Europe. And it is generally acknowledged by Chriftians, that they both had their Philosophy from Moses. And Numenius the Platonift speaks out plainly concerning his Master; What is Plato but Moses Atticus? And for Pythagoras, it is a thing incredible that he and his followers should make such a deal of doe with the mystery of Numbers, had he not been favoured with a sight of Moses his Creation of the World in fix daies, and had the Philosophick Cabbala thereof communicated to him, which mainly consists in Numbers, as I shall in the Defence of this Cabbala more particularly declare.
And the Pythagoreans Oath swearing by him that taught them the mystery of the Tetractys, or the number Four, what a ridiculous thing had it been if it had been in reference merely to dry numbers? But it is exceeding probable that under that mystery of Four, Pythagoras was first himself taught the meaning of the fourth day's work in the Creation, and after delivered it to his disciples. In which Cabbala of the fourth day Pythagoras was instructed, among other things, that the Earth was a Planet, and moved about the Sun: and it is notoriously well known that this was ever the opinion of the Pythagoreans, and so in all likelihood a part of the Philophipick Cabbala of Moses. Which you will more fully understand in my Defence thereof.

In brief, all those Conclusions that are comprised in the Philophipick Cabbala, they being such as may best become that sublime and comprehensive Understanding of Moses, and being also so plainly answerable to the Phenomena of Nature and Attributes of God, as well as continually agreeable without any force or distortion to the Historical Text; this, I conceive, is no small probability that this Cabbala is true: For what can be the Properties of the true Philophipick Cabbala of Moses, if these be not which I have named?

Now for the Moral Cabbala, it bears its own evidence with it all the way, representing Moses as well experienced in all Godliness and Honesty, as he was skilful in Politicks and Philosophy.

5. And the edifying Usefulness of this Mystical or Moral Cabbala, to answer to your Last demand, was no small invitation amongst the rest to publish this present Explication. For Moral and Spiritual Truth that so nearly concerns us being so strangely and unexpectedly, and yet so fitly and appropriately, represented in this History of Moses, it will in all likelihood make the more forcible impress upon the Mind, and more powerfully carry away our Affections toward what is good and warrantable, pre-instructing us with delight concerning the true way to Virtue and Godliness.

Nor are the Philophipick nor Literal Cabbala's destitute of their honest uses. For in the former, to the amazement of the mere Naturalist, (who commonly conceits that pious men and Patrons of Religion have no ornaments of Mind but scrupulostics about Virtue, and Melancholick fancies concerning a Deity) Moses is found to have been Master of the most sublime and generous Speculations that are in all Natural Philosophy: Besides that he places the Soul of Man many degrees out of the reach of fate and mortality. And by the latter there is a very charitable provision made for them that are so prone to expect rigid Precepts of Philosophy in Moses his outward Text. For this Literal Cabbala will steer them from that toil of endeavouring to make the bare Letter speak consonantly to the true frame of Nature, which while they attempt with more zeal then knowledge, they both disgrace themselves, and wrong Moses. For there are unalterable and indeleble Ideas and Notions in the Minde of Man, into which when we are awakened, and apply to the known course and order of Nature, we can no more forsake the use of them then we can the use of our own Eyes, nor misbelieve their dictates more, or so much, as we may those of our outward Senses, Wherefore to men recovered into a due command of their Reason, and
To the Reader.

well-skil'd in the contemplation and experience of the nature of things, to
propound to them such kinde of Mosaicall Philosophy as the boldnesse and
superstition of some has adventured to doe for want of a right Literal Cab-
bala to guide them, is, as much as in them lies, to hazard the making not
only of Moses but of Religion it self contemptible and ridiculous.

Whence it is apparent enough, I think, to what good purpose it is thus
carefully to distinguish betwixt the Literal and Philosophick Cabbala, and
so plainly and fully to set out the sense of either, apart by themselves, that
there may hereafter be no confusion or mistake. For beside that the disco-
overing of these weighty Truths and high, but irrefutable, Paradoxes in
Moses his Text, does assert Religion, and vindicate her from that vile
imputation of Ignorance in Philosophy and the knowledge of things; it does
also justify those more noble results of free Reason and Philosophy from
that vulgar suspicion of Impiety and Irreligion.

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THE
LITERAL
CABBALA.

CHAP. I.

2. The Earth at first a deep miry Abyss, covered over with Waters, over which was a fierce Wind, and through all Darkness. 3. Day made at first without a Sun. 6. The Earth a floor, the Heavens a transparent Canopy, or strong Tent over it, to keep off the Upper waters or blew conspicuous Sea from drowning the World. 8. Why this Tent or Canopy was not said to be good. 9. The Lower waters commanded into one place.

11. Herbs, Flowers, and Fruits of Trees, before either Sun or Seasons of the year to ripen them. 14. The Sun created and added to the Day, as a peculiar Ornament thereof, as the Moon and Stars to the Night.

20. The Creation of Fish and Fowl. 24. The Creation of Beasts and creeping things. 27. Man created in the very shape and figure of God, but yet so, that there were made females as well as males. 28. How Man came to be Lord over the rest of living creatures. 30. How it came to passe that Man feeds on the better sort of the fruits of the Earth, and the Beasts on the worse.

1. We are to recount to you in this Book the Generations and Genealogies of the Patriarchs from Adam to Noah, from Noah to Abraham, from Abraham to Joseph; and to continue the History to our own times. But it will not be amisse first to inform you concerning the Creation of the World, and the Original and Beginning of things, how God made Heaven and Earth, and all the garnishings of them, before he made Man.

2. But the Earth at first was but a rude and defolate heap, devoid of Herbs, Flowers and Trees, and all living creatures, being nothing but a deep miry Abyss, covered all over with Waters; and there was a very fierce and strong Wind that blew upon the Waters: And (what made it still more horrid and comfortles) there was as yet no Light, but all was enveloped with thick Darkness, and bore the face of a pitchy black and wet tempestuous Night.

3. But God let not his work lie long in this sad condition, but commanded Light to appear, and the Morning brake out upon the face of the Abyss, and wheel'd about from East to West, being clearest in the middle
middle of its course about Noon; and then abating of its brightness towards the West, at last quite disappear'd; after such sort as you may often observe the day-light to break forth in the East, and ripen to greater clearness, but at last to leave the skie in the West, no Sun appearing all the while.

4. And God saw the Light, (for it is a thing very visible) that it was good, and so separated the Darkness from the Light, that they could not both of them be upon the face of the Earth together, but had their vicissitudes, and took their turns one after another.

5. And he called the return of the light Day, and the return of darkness he called Night: and the evening and the morning made up the First natural day.

6. Now after God had made this Basis or floor of this greater edifice of the World, the Earth, he sets upon the higher parts of the fabric, He commands therefore that there should be a hollow Expansion, firm and transparent, which by its strength should bear up against the Waters which are above, and keep them from falling upon the Earth in excess.

7. And so it became a Partition betwixt the Upper and the Lower waters; so that by virtue of this hollow Firmament, man might live safe from the violence of such destructive inundations, as one sheltered in a well-pitch'd Tent from storms of rain. For the danger of these Waters is apparent to the eye, this ceruleous or blew-coloured Sea, that overspreads the diaphanous Firmament, being easily discern'd through the body thereof; and there are very frequent and copious showers of rain descend from above, wheras there is no water elyed ascending up thither; wherefore it must all come from that upper Sea, if we do but appeal to our outward sense.

8. Now therefore this diaphanous Canopy or firmly-stretched Tent over the whole pavement of the Earth, though I cannot say properly that God saw it was good, (it being indeed of a nature invisible) yet the use of it shews it to be exceeding good and necessary. And God called the whole capacity of this hollow Firmament, Heaven. And the evening and the morning made up the Second natural day.

9. And now so sure a Defence being made against the inundation of the Upper waters, that they might not fall upon the Earth, God betook himself the next day to order the Lower waters, that as yet were spread over the whole face thereof: at his command therefore the Waters fled into one place, and the dry land did appear.

10. And God called the dry land Earth; and the gathering together of the Waters he called Sea: and I may now properly say, that God saw that it was good, for the Sea and the Land are things visible enough, and fit objects of our sight.

11. And forthwith before he made either Sun, Moon, or Stars, did God command the earth to bring forth Grasse, Herbs and Flowers, in their full beauty, and Fruit-trees yielding delicious fruit, though there had as yet been no vicissitude of Spring, Summer, or Autumn, nor any approach of the Sun to ripen and concoct the fruit of those Trees.
The Literal Cabbala.

Whence you may easily discern the foolishnesse of the idolatrous Nations, that dote so much on Second causes as that they forget the First, ascribing that to the Sun and Moon that was caus'd at first by the immediate command of God.

13. For at his command it was, before there was either Sun or Moon in the Firmament, that the Earth brought forth Grasse, and Herb yielding seed after his kind, and the Tree yielding fruit, whose seed was in it fell, after his kind; so that the several sorts of Plants might by this means be conserv'd upon the Earth, And God saw that it was good.

14. And the evening and the morning made up the Third natural day.

15. Moreover, let them be as Lights hung up within the hollow roof or Firmament of Heaven, to give light to men walking upon the pavement of the Earth: and it was so.

16. And God made two great Lights: the greater one, the most glorious and Princely object we can see by day, to be as it were the Governor and Monarch of the Day; the lesser, the most resplendent and illustrious light we can cast our eyes on by night, to be Governor and Queen of the Night. And he made, though for their smallnesse they be not so considerable, the Stars also.

17. And he placed them all in the Firmament of Heaven, to give light upon the Earth:

18. And to shew their preeminence for external lustre above whatever else appears by either day or night, and to be peculiar garnishings or ornaments to make a notable difference betwixt the light and the darknesse, the superaddition of the Sun to adorn the day, and to invigorate the light thereof, the Moon and the Stars to garnish the night, and to mitigate the dulnesse and darknesse thereof. And God saw that it was good.

19. And the evening and the morning was the Fourth natural day.

20. After this, God commanded the Waters to bring forth Fishe and Fowl, which they did in abundance; and the Fowl flew above the Earth in the open Firmament of Heaven.

21. And God created great Whales also as well as other Fishes, that move in the waters: and God saw that it was good.

22. And God blessed them, saying, Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the waters in the Seas, and let the Fowl multiply on the Earth.

23. And the evening and the morning made up the Fifth natural day.

24. Then God commanded the Earth to bring forth all creeping things
things and four-footed Beasts, as before he commanded the Waters to send forth Fifth and Fowl: and it was so.

25. And when God had made the Beast of the Earth after his kind, and cattel and every creeping thing after his kinde, he saw that it was good.

26. And coming at last to his highest Master-piece, Man, he encouraged himself, saying, Go to, let us now make Man; and I will make him after the same image and shape that I bear myself; and he shall have dominion over the Fifth of the Sea, and over the Fowls of the Air, and over the Cattel, and over all the Earth, and over every Creeping thing that creepeth upon the Earth.

27. So God created Man in his own shape and figure, with an upright stature, with legs, hands, arms, with a face and mouth, to speak and command, as God himself hath: I say, in the image of God did he thus create him. But mistake me not, whereas you conceive of God as masculine and more perfect, ye must not understand me as if God made mankind so exactly after his own image, that he made none but males; for I tell you, he made females as well as males, as you shall hear more particularly hereafter.

28. And having made them thus male and female, he bad them to use the distinction of sexes that he had given them; and blessing them, God said unto them, Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the Earth with your off-spring, and be lords thereof, and have dominion also over the Fifth of the Sea, and over the Fowls of the Air, as well as over Beasts and cattel, and every creeping thing that moves upon the Earth.

29. And God said, Behold, I give you every frugiferous Herb which is upon the face of the Earth, such as the Straw-berry, the several sorts of Corn, as Rye, Wheat, and Rice, as also the delicious fruits of Trees; to you they shall be for meat.

30. But for the Beasts of the Earth, and the Fowls of the Air, and for every living thing that creepeth upon the Earth, the worser kind of Herbs and ordinary Grasse I have assign'd for them. And so it came to passe that mankind are made lords and possessors of the choicest fruits of the Earth, and the Beasts of the field are to be contented with baser Herbage and the common Grasse.

31. And God viewed all the Works that he had made, and behold, they were exceeding good: and the evening and the morning was the Sixth natural day.


CHAP. II.

3. The Original of the Jewish Sabbaths, from God’s resting himself from his six days labours. 5. Herbs and Plants before either Rain, Gardening, or Husbandry; and the reason why it was so. 7. Adam made of the dust of the ground, and his soul breathed in at his nostrils. 8. The Planting of Paradise. 9. A wonderful tree there, that would continue youth, and make a man immortal upon earth: Another strange tree, viz. the tree of knowledge of Good and Evil. 11. The Rivers of Paradise, Phasis, Gihon, Tigris, Euphrates. 18. The high Commendation of Matrimony. 19. Adam gives names to all kind of creatures except fishes. 21. Woman is made of a rib of Adam, a deep sleep falling upon him, his minde then also being in a trance. 24. The first institution of Marriage.

1. Thus the Heavens and the Earth were finiſht, and all the creatures wherewith they were garniſht and repleniſht.

2. And God having within six days perfected all his work, on the seventh day he rested himself.

3. And so made the seventh day an holy day, a festival of rest, because himself then first rested from his works. Whence you plainly see the reason and original of your sabbaths.

4. These are the generations of the Heavens and of the Earth, which I have so compendiously recounted to you, as they were created in the days that the Lord made Heaven and Earth, and the several garniſhings of them.

5. But there are some things that I would a little more fully touch upon, and give you notice of, to the praise of God and the manifesting of his power unto you. As that the Herbs and Plants of the field did not come up of their own accord out of the Earth, before God made them; but that God created them before there were any seeds of any such thing in the Earth, and before there was any rain, or men to use gardening or husbandry for the procuring their growth: So that hereafter you may have the more firm faith in God for the blessings and fruits of the Earth, when the ordinary course of Nature shall threaten dearth and scarcity for want of rain and seasonable showers.

6. For there had been no Showers when God caused the Plants and Herbs of the field to spring up out of the Earth; onely, as I told you at the first of all, there was a mighty torrent of water, that rose very where above the Earth, and cover’d the universal face of the ground, which yet God afterward by his Almighty power commanded into certain bounds, that the residue of the Earth was mere dry land.

7. And that you farther may understand how the Power of God is exalted above the course of Natural causes, God taking of the dust of this dry ground, wrought it with his hands into such a temper, that it was matter fit to make the body of a Man: which when he first had fram’d, was as yet but like a senseleſſe statute, till coming near unto it with his mouth, he
he breath'd into the nostrils thereof the breath of life; as you may observe to this day, that men breath through their nostrils, though their mouths be clos'd. And thus Man became a living creature, and his name was called Adam, because he was made of the Earth.

8. But I should have told you first more at large, how the Lord God planted a Garden Eastward of Eden in the Countrey of Mesoopotamia, where afterwars he put the man Adam, whom he after this wife had form'd.

9. And the description of this Garden is this: Out of the ground made the Lord God to grow every Tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food. But amongst these several sorts of Trees, there were two of singular notice that stood planted in the midst of the Garden; the one of which had fruit of that wonderful virtue, as to continue youth and strength, and to make a man immortal upon earth, wherefore it was call'd the Tree of Life. There was also another Tree planted there, of whose fruit if a man ate it had this strange effect, that it would make a man know the difference betwixt good and evil: for the Lord God had so ordain'd, that if Adam touched the forbidden fruit thereof, he should by his disobedience feel the sense of evil as well as good, wherefore by way of Anticipation it was called the Tree of knowledge of Good and Evil.

10. And there was a River went out of Eden to water the Garden, and from thence it was parted, and became into four heads.

11. The name of the first was Phasis, or Phal-Tigris, which compasseth the whole Land of the Chaluteans, where there is Gold.

12. And the Gold of that Land is excellent: there is also found Bel-lum and the onyx-stone.

13. And the name of the second River is Gihon; the same is it that compasseth the whole Land of the Arabian-Ethiopia.

14. And the name of the third River is Tigris; that is that which goeth towards the East of Assyria. And the fourth River is Euphrates.

15. And the Lord God took the man Adam by the hand, and led him into the Garden of Eden, and laid commands upon him to dress it, and look to it, and to keep things handsome and in order in it, and that it should not be any wise spoil'd or misus'd by incursions or careless ramblings of the heedlesse beasts.

16. And the Lord God recommended unto Adam all the Trees of the Garden for very wholesome and delightful food, bidding him freely eat thereof.

17. Only he excepted the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, which he strictly charg'd him to forbear; for if he ever tasted thereof, he should assuredly die.

18. But to the high commendation of Matrimony be it spoken, though God had placed Adam in so delightful a Paradise, yet his happiness was but maimed and imperfect till he had the society of a Woman: For the Lord God said, It is not good that man should be alone, I will make him an help meet for him.

19. Now out of the ground the Lord God had form'd every Beast of the
the field, and every Fowl of the air, and these brought he unto Adam, to see what he would call them; and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof.

20. And Adam gave names to all Cattel, and to the Fowls of the aire, and to every Beast of the field: but he could not so kindly take acquaintance with any of these, or so fully enjoy their society; but there was still some considerable matter wanting to make up Adam's full felicity, and there was a meet help to be found out for him.

21. Wherefore the Lord God caus'd a deep sleep to fall upon Adam; and lo, as he slept upon the ground, he fell into a dream, how God had put his hand into his side, and pulled out one of his ribs, closing up the flesh in stead thereof:

22. And how the rib which the Lord God had taken from him was made into a Woman; and how God when he had thus made her, took her by the hand, and brought her unto him. And he had no sooner awakened, but he found his dream to be true, for God stood by him with the Woman in his hand which he had brought.

23. Wherefore Adam being pre-advertised by the vision, was presently able to pronounce, This is now bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh: What are the rest of the Creatures to this? And he bestowed upon her also a fitting name, calling her Woman, because she was taken out of Man.

24. And the Lord God said, Thou hast spoken well, Adam: And for this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave unto his wife, and they two shall be one flesh: so strict and sacred a tie is the band of Wedlock.

25. And they were both naked, Adam and his Wife, and were not ashamed: but how the shame of being seen naked came into the world, I shall declare unto you hereafter.

CHAP. III.

1. A subtile Serpent in Paradise, induced with both Reason and the power of Speech, deceives the Woman. 2. The Dialogue betwixt the Woman and the Serpent. 7. How the shame of nakedness came into the world. 8. God walks in the Garden, and calls to Adam. 10. The Dialogue betwixt Adam and God. 14. The reason why Serpents want feet, and creep upon the ground. 15. The reason of the Antipathy betwixt Men and Serpents. 16. As also of Women's pangs in child-bearing, and of their being bound in subjection to their Husbands. 18. Also of the barrenness of the Earth, and of man's toil and drudgery. 21. God teacheth Adam and Eve the use of leathern clothing. 24. Paradise haunted with Apparitions: Adam frightened from daring to taste of the Tree of Life, whence his posterity became mortal to this very day.

1. AND
1. And truly it cannot but be very obvious for you to consider, often with your felves, not only how this Shame of Nakedness came into the world, but the toil and drudgery of Tillage and Husbandry; the grievous pangs of Child-bearing; and lastly, what is most terrible of all, Death it self: Of all which, as of some other things also, I shall give you such plain and intelligible reasons, that your own hearts could not with more plain and more intelligible. To what an happy condition Adam was created you have already heard; How he was placed by God in a Garden of delight, where all his Senses were gratified with the most pleasing Objects imaginable; his Eyes with the beauty of trees and flowers, and various delightful forms of living creatures; his Ears with the sweet musical accents of the canorous birds; his Smell with the fragrant odours of Aromatick herbs; his Taste with variety of delicious fruit; and his Touch with the soft breathings of the Aire in the flowery alleys of this ever-springing Paradise. Add unto all this that pleasure of pleasures, the delectable conversation of his beautiful Bride, the enjoyments of whose love neither created care to himself, nor pangs of childe-bearing to her: for all the functions of life were performed with ease and delight; and there had been no need for man to sweat for the provision of his family, for in this Garden of Eden there was a perpetual Spring, and the vigour of the soil prevented man's industry; and youth and jollity had never left the bodies of Adam and his posterity, because old age and death were perpetually to be kept off by that sovereign virtue of the Tree of Life. And I know, as you heartily could wish this state might have ever continued to Adam and his seed; so you eagerly expect to hear the reason why he was deprived of it: and in short it is this, *His disobedience to a Commandement which God had given him*; the circumstances whereof I shall declare unto you, as followeth.

Amongst those several living creatures which were in Paradise, there was the Serpent also, whom you know to this very day to be full of subtility; and therefore you will let wonder, if when he was in his perfection he had not only the use of Reason, but the power of Speech. It was therefore this Serpent that was the first occasion of all this mischief to Adam and his posterity; for he cunningly came unto the Woman, and said unto her, *Is it so indeed, that God has commanded you that you shall not eat of any of the Trees of the Garden?* See Paul. Phleg.

2. And the Woman answer’d unto the Serpent, *You are mistaken; God hath not forbid us to eat of all the fruit of the Trees of the Garden.*

3. But indeed of the fruit of the Tree in the midst of the Garden God hath strictly charged us, *Ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die.*

4. But the Serpent said unto the Woman, *Though I warrant you this is only but to terrify you, and abridge you of that liberty and happiness you are capable of; you shall not so certainly die.*

5. But God knows the virtue of that Tree full well, that so soon as you eat thereof your eyes shall be opened, and you shall become as Gods, knowing good and evil.  

6. And
6. And when the Woman saw that the Tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eye, and a Tree to be desired to make one wife; she took of the fruit and did eat, and gave also to her Husband with her, and he did eat.

7. And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew they were naked, and were ashamed; and therefore they sewed fig-leaves together, and made themselves aprons to cover their parts of shame.

8. And the Lord God came into the Garden toward the cool of the evening, and walking in the Garden, called for Adam: But Adam had no sooner heard his voice, but he and his wife ran away into the thickest of the trees of the Garden, to hide themselves from his presence.

9. But the Lord God called unto Adam the second time, and said unto him, Adam, where art thou?

10. Then Adam was forc'd to make answer, and said, I heard thy voice in the Garden, and I was afraid, because I was naked, and so I hid my self.

11. Then God said unto him, Who hath made thee so wise, that thou shouldst know that thou art naked, or wantest any covering? Hast thou eaten of the forbidden fruit?

12. And Adam excus'd himself, saying, The woman whom thou recommendedst to me for a meet help, she gave me of the fruit, and I did eat.

13. And the Lord God said unto the Woman, What is this that thou hast done? And the Woman excus'd her self, saying, The Serpent beguiled me, and I did eat.

14. Then the Lord God gave sentence upon all three: and to the Serpent he said, Because thou hast done this, thou art cursed above all cattel, and above every beast of the field: and whereas hitherto thou hast been able to bear thy body aloft, and go upright, thou shalt henceforth creep upon thy belly, like a worm, and dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy life.

15. And there shall be a perpetual Antipathy betwixt not only the woman and thee, but betwixt her feed and thy feed: For universal mankind shall abhor thee, and hate all the cursed generations that come of thee. They indeed shall busily lie in wait to sting men's feet, which their skill in Herbs however shall be able to cure; but they shall knock all Serpents on the head, and kill them without pity or remorse, deservingly using thy seed as their deadly enemy.

16. And the doom of the Woman was, Her sorrow and pangs in child-bearing, and her subjection to her Husband. Which law of subjection is generally observed in the Nations of the world unto this very day.

17. And the doom of Adam was, the toil of Husbandry upon barren ground.

18. For the Earth was cursed for his sake, which is the reason that it brings forth thorns and thistles and other weeds, that Husband-men could with would not cumber the ground, upon which they beftow their toilsome labour.

19. Thus
19. Thus in the sweat of his face was Adam to eat his bread, till he return to the dust out of which he was taken.
20. And Adam called his wife Eve, because she was the Mother of all men that ever were born into the World, and lived upon the face of the Earth.
21. And the generations of men were clothed at first with the skins of wild beasts, the use of which God taught Adam and Eve in Paradise.
22. And when they were thus accoutred for their journey, and armed for greater hardship, God turneth them both out: and the Lord God said concerning Adam, deriding him for his disobedience, Behold, Adam is become as one of us, to know good and evil: Let us look to him now, lest he put his hand to the Tree of Life, and so make himself immortal.
23. Therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the Garden of Eden, to till the ground, from whence he was taken.
24. So he drove out Adam, and his Wife was forced to follow him: For there was no longer staying in Paradise, because the place was terribly haunted with Spirits, and fearful Apparitions appeared at the entrance thereof, winged men with fiery flaming swords in their hands brandished every way, so that Adam durst never adventure to go back to taste of the fruit of the Tree of Life: whence it is that mankind hath continued mortal to this very day.
THE PHILOSOPHICK CABBALA.

CHAP. I.

1. The World of Life or Forms, and the Potentiaility of the visible Universe created by the Tri-une God, and referr'd to a Monad or Unite. 6. The Universal immense Matter of the visible World created out of nothing, and referr'd to the number Two: 7. Why it was not said of this matter that it was good. 9. The ordering of an Earth or Planet for making it conveniently habitable, referr'd to the number Three. 14. The immense Ethereal matter, or Heaven, contrived into Suns or Planets, as well Primary as Secondary, viz. as well Earths as Moons, and referr'd to the number Four. 20. The replenishing of an Earth with Fish and Fowl, referr'd to the number Five. 24. The Creation of Beasts and Cattle, but more chiefly of Man himself, referr'd to the number Six.

Our design being to set out the more conspicuous parts of the external Creation, before we descend to the Genealogies and Successions of Mankind; there are two notable Objects present themselves to our Understanding, which we must first take notice of, as having an universal influence upon all that follows: and these I do Symbolically decypher, the one by the name of Heaven and Light; for I mean the same thing by both these terms, the other by the name of Earth. By Heaven or Light you are to understand the whole comprehension of Intellectual Spirits, Souls of men and beasts, and the Seminal forms of all things, which you may call, if you please, The World of Life. By Earth you are to understand the Potentiality or Capability of the Existence of the outward Creation: This Possibility being exhibited to our minds as the result of the Omnipotence of God, without whom nothing would be, and is indeed the utmost shadow and darkest projection thereof, wherein also is involved the Incomposibility and Incommensurability of things.

The Tri-une God therefore by his Eternal Wisdome first created this Symbolical Heaven and Earth.

2. And this Earth was nothing but Solitude and Emptiness, and it was a deep bottomless Capacity of being whatever God thought good to make out of it, that implied no contradiction to be made. And there being
being a possibility of creating things after sundry and manifold manners; nothing was yet determined, but this vast capability of things was unsettled, fluid, and of it self undeterminable as Water: But the Spirit of God, who was the Vehicle of the Eternal Wisdom and of the Super-essential Goodness, by a swift fore-cast of Counsel and Discourse of Reason, truly Divine, such as at once strikes through all things, and discerns what is best to be done, having hover'd awhile over all the capacities of this fluid possibility, forthwith settled upon what was the most perfect and exact.

3. Wherefore the intire Deity by an inward Word, which is nothing but Wisdom and Power, edg'd with actual Will, with more ease then we can present any Notion or Idea to our own minds, exhibited really to their own view the whole Creation of Spiritual Substances, such as Angels are in their inward natures, the Souls of men, and other Animals, and the Seminal Forms of all things; so that all those, as many as ever were to be of them, did really and actually exist without any dependency on corporeal Matter.

4. And God approved of, and pleased himself in all this as good: but yet though in design there was a settlement of the fluid darkness or obscure possibility of the outward Creation, yet it remained as yet but a dark possibility. And a notorious distinction indeed there was betwixt this actual Spiritual Creation and the dim possibility of the material or outward world.

5. Infomuch that the one might very well be called Day, and the other Night: because the Night does deface and obliterate all the distinct figures and colours of things; but the Day exhibits them all orderly and clearly to our sight. Thus therefore was the Immaterial Creature perfectly finisht, being an inexhaustible Treasure of Light and Form, for the garnishing and conummatumg the material world, to afford a Morning or Active principle to every Passive one in the future parts of the corporeal Creation. But in this first day's work, as we will call it, the Morning and Evening are purely Metaphysical: for the Active and Passive principles here are not two distinct substances, the one Material, the other Spiritual, but the Passive principle is Matter merely Metaphysical, and indeed no real or actual entity; and, as hath been already said, is quite divided from the Light or Spiritual substance, not belonging to it, but to the outward world, whose shadowy possibility it is. But be they how they will, this Passive and Active principle are the first day's work: A Monad or Unite being to fit a Symbole of the Immaterial nature.

6. And God thought again, and invigorating his thought with his Will and Power, created an immense deal of real and corporeal Matter, a Substance which you must conceive to lie betwixt the foresaid fluid possibility of Natural things and the Region of Seminal Forms; not that these things are distinguished Locally, but according to a more intellectual Order.

7. And the Thought of God arm'd with his Omnipotent Will took effect, and this immensely-diffus'd Matter was made. But he was not very forward to say it was good, or to please himself much in it; because he forewasi
forewaw what mischief straying Souls, if they were not very cautious, might bring to themselves by finking themselves too deep therein. Besides it was little worth, till greater polishings were bestowed upon it, and his Wifdome had contrived it to fitting ues, being nothing as yet but a boundferfe Ocean of rude divifible Matter.

8. Wherefore this Matter was actuated and agitated forthwith in the very creation thereof by that hand that made it, and was guided and moderated by fome Universal Spirit, yet part of the World of Life, whence it became very subtile and Aetheral; fo that this Matter was rightly called Heaven: and the Union of the Passive and Active Principle in the Creation of this Material Heaven is the Second day’s work, and the Binarie denotes the nature thereof.

9. I fhall also declare unto you how God orders a real material Earth (which is alwaies environed with that Aetheral Matter which is called Heaven) for the making it pleafant and delightful for both man and beast when once it is made. But for the very making of the Earth, it is to be referred to the following day. For the Stars and Planets belong to that number; and as a primary Planet in respect of its reflexion of light is rightly called a Planet, fo in respect of its habitablenefs it is as rightly termed an Earth. These Earths therefore God orders in fuch sort, that they neither want Water to lie upon them, nor be covered over with Water, though they be invironed round with the fluid Air, in which also is that Aether or Heaven, and under which the Waters would have overspread the face of the Earth, had not his Providence gathered them into one Place:

10. And thereby made partly dry Land, and partly Sea, Rivers, and Springs, for those conveniences which are obvious for every one to conceive.

11. He adorns the ground also with Grace, Herbs and Flowers, and hath made a wife provision of Seed, that they bring forth, for the perpetuation of fuch useful commodities upon the face of the earth,

12. For indeed these things are very good and necessary both for man and beast.

13. Therefore God prepared the Matter of the Earth fo, as that there was a Vital Congruity of the parts thereof with sundry sorts of Seminal Forms of Trees, Herbs, and choicest kinds of Flowers; and fo the Body of the Earth drew in sundry principles of Planta Life from the World of Life, that is at hand everywhere: and the Passive and Active Principle thus put together made up the Third day’s work, and the Ternary denotes the nature thereof.

14. The Ternary had allotted to it the garnifhing of an Earth with Trees, Flowers and Herbs, after the diffinition of Land and Sea: as the Quinary hath allotted to it the replenifhing of an Earth with Fish and Fowl; the Senary with Man and Beast. But this Fourth Day comprehends the garnifhing of the body of the whole World, viz. that vast and immense Aetheral Matter which is called the fluid Heaven, with infinite numbers of sundry sorts of Lights, Suns and Planets, which God’s Wifdome and Power, by union of fit and active principles drawn from
from the World of Life, made of this Aethereal matter, whose usefulness is plain in Nature, that they are all of them for Prognostick signs, and feasons, and days, and years. (Which implies that there are Planets every where through the whole Heavens allotted to the Suns.)

15. As also for administering of light to all the inhabitants of the world, that the Planets may receive light from their fountains of light, and reflect light one to another.

16. And there are Two sorts of these Lights that all the inhabitants of the world must acknowledge great every where, conflicting with the outward light, from their proper stations. And the dominion of the greater of these kinds of Lights is conspicuous by day, the dominion of the leffer by night: the former we ordinarily call a Sun, the other a Moon; which Moon is truly a Planet and opake, but reflecting light very plentifully to the beholders light, and yet is but a secondary or leffer kind of Planet: but he made the Primary and more eminent Planets also, and such an one is this Earth we live upon.

17. And God placed all these sorts of Lights in the thin and liquid Heaven, that they might reflect their rayes one upon another, and shine upon the inhabitants of the World, dwelling on their respective Earths:

18. And that their beauty and resplendency might be conspicuous to the beholders of them, whether by day or by night; which is mainly to be understood of the Suns, that supply also the place of Stars at a far distance, but whose chief office it is to make vicissitudes of day and night on their respective Earths or Planets. And the Universal dark Aether being thus adorn'd with the goodly and glorious furniture of those several kinds of Lights, God approved of it as good.

19. And the union of the Passive and Active principle was the Fourth day's work, and the number denotes the nature thereof.

20. And now you have heard of a verdant Earth, and a bounded Sea, and Lights to shine through the Aire and Water, and to gratifie the eyes of all living creatures, whereby they may see one another, and be able to seek their food, you may reasonably expect the mention of sundry Animals proper to their Elements. Wherefore God by his Inward Word and Power prepared the Matter in the waters, and near the waters, with several Vital congruities, so that it drew in sundry Souls from the World of Life, which actuating the parts of the Matter, caus'd great plenty of Fifth to swim in the Waters, and Fowls to flye above the earth in the open Aire.

21. And after this manner he created great Whales also, as well as the leffer kinds of Fishes; and he approved of them all as good.

22. And the blessing of his Inward Word or Wisdome was upon them for their multiplication; for according to the preparation of the Matter, the Plastical Power of the Souls that descend from the World of Life did faithfully and effectually work those wise contrivances of Male and Female, they being once rightly united with the Matter, so that by this means the Fifth filled the Waters in the Seas, and the Fowls multiplied upon the Earth.

23. And the union of the Passive and Active principle was the Fifth
Fifth day's work; and the Quinary denotes the nature thereof.

24. And God perissed farther in the Creation of living creatures, and by elposing new Souls from the World of Life to the more Mediterranean parts of the Matter, created land-ferpents, cattel, and the beasts of the field.

25. And when he had thus made them, he approved of them for good.

26. Then God reflecting upon his own Nature, and viewing himself, consulting with the Super-essential Goodness, the Eternal Intellect, and unextinguishable Love-flame of his Omnipotent Spirit, concluded to make a far higher kind of living creature then was as yet brought into the world: He made therefore Man in his own Image, after his own Likeness. For after he had prepared the Matter fit for so noble a guest as an humane Soul, the World of Life was forced to let go what the rightly-prepared Matter so justly called for: and Man appeared upon the stage of the Earth, Lord of all living creatures. For it was just that he that bears the Image of the invisible God should be Supreme Monarch of this visible World. And what can be more like God then the Soul of man, that is so Free, so Rational, and so Intellectual as it is? And he is not the less like him now he is united to the Terrestrial body, his Soul or Spirit posseffing and striking through a compendious collection of all kind of Corporeal matter, and managing it with his understanding free to think of other things, even as God vivificates and actuates the whole world, being yet wholly free to contemplate himself. Wherefore God gave Man dominion over the Fowls of the aire, the Fift of the sea, and the Beasts of the earth: for it is reasonable the worser should be in subserviency to the better.

27. Thus God created Man in his own Image, he consisting of an Intellectual Soul, and a Terrestrial Body actuatted thereby. Wherefore mankinde became Male and Female, as other terrestrial animals are.

28. And the benediction of the Divine Wisdom for the propagation of their kinde was manifest in the contrivance of the parts that were framed for that purpose: And as they grew in multitudes they lorded it over the Earth, and over-mastered by their power and policy the Beasts of the field, and fed themselfes with Fift and Fowl, and what else pleased them and made for their content; for all was given to them by right of their Creation.

29. And that nothing might be wanting to their delight, behold also Divine Providence hath prepared for their palate all precious and pleasant Herbs for ballads, and made them banquets of the most delicate fruit of the fruit-bearing trees.

30. But for the courier Graffe and worser kinde of Herbs, they are intended for the worser and bafer kinde of creatures: Wherefore it is free for Man to seek out his own, and make use of it.

31. And God considering every thing that he had made, approved of it as very good: and the union of the Passive and Active principle was the Sixth day's work; and the Senary denotes the nature thereof.
CHAP. II.

2. God's full and absolute Rest from creating any thing of anew, adumbrated by the number Seven. 4. Suns and Planets not only the furniture but effects of the Ethereal Matter or Heaven. 6. The manner of Man and other Animals rising out of the Earth by the power of God in Nature. 8. How it was with Adam before he descended into flesh, and became a Terrestrial Animal. 10. That the four Cardinal Vertues were in Adam in his Ethereal or Paradisical condition. 17. Adam in Paradise forbidden to taste or relish his own Will under pain of descending into the Region of Death. 18. The Masculine and Feminine faculties in Adam. 20. The great Pleasure and Solace of the Feminine faculties. 21. The Masculine faculties laid asleep, the Feminine appear and act, viz. the grateful sense of the Life of the Vehicle. 25. That this sense and joy of the Life of the Vehicle is in it self without either blame or shame.

1. Thus the Heavens and the Earth were finish'd, and all the garnishings of them, such as are Trees, Flowers, and Herbs; Suns, Moons, and Stars; Fishes, Fowls, and Beasts of the field; and the chiefest of all, Man himself.

2. Wherefore God having thus compleated his work in the Senary, comprehending the whole Creation in Six orders of things, he ceased from ever creating any thing more, either in this outward Material world, or in the world of Life: But his Creative Power retiring into himself, he enjoyed his own eternal Rest, which is his immutable and indefatigable Nature, that with ease oversees all the whole Compass of Beings, and continues Essence, Life and Activity to them; and the better rectifies the worfe, and all are guided by his Eternal Word and Spirit; but no new Substance hath been ever created since the Six days' production of things, nor shall ever be hereafter.

3. For this Seventh day God hath made an Eternal Holy-day, or Festival of Rest to himself, wherein he will only please himself, to behold the exquisite Order and Motion and right Nature of things; his Wisdom, Justice and Mercy unavoidably insinuating themselves, according to the first frame of the World, into all the parts of the Creation, he having Ministers of his Goodness and Wrath prepared everywhere: So that himself need but to look on, and see the Effects of that Nemesis that is necessarily interwoven in the nature of the things themselves which he hath made. This therefore is that Sabbath or Festival of Rest which God himself is said to celebrate in the Seventh day; and indeed the number declares the nature thereof.

4. And now to open my minde more fully and plainly unto you, I must tell you, That those things which before I term'd the Garnishings of the Heaven and of the Earth, they are not only so, but the Generations of them: I say, Plants and Animals were the Generations, Effects and Productions of the Earth, the Seminal Forms and Souls of Animals insinuating
nating themselves into the prepared Matter thereof; and Suns, Planets, or Earths, were the Generations or Productions of the Heavens, vigour and motion being imparted from the World of Life to the immense body of the Universe: so that what I before called mere Carnifichings, are indeed the Productions or Generations of the Heavens and of the Earth; so soon as they were made, though I do not take upon me to define the Time wherein God made the Heavens and the Earth: For he might doe it at once by his absolute Omnipotency; or he might, when he had created all Substauce as well material as immaterial, let them act one upon the other so, and in such periods of time, as the nature of the production of the things themselves requir'd.

5. But it was for pious purposes that I call the Creation into that order of Six days, and for the more firmly rooting in the hearts of the people this grand and useful Truth, That the Omnipotency of God is such; that he can act above and contrary to Natural causes, that I mention'd Herbs and Plants of the field, before I take notice of either rain, or man to exercize Gardning and Husbandry: For indeed, according to my former narration, there had been no such kind of rain as ordinarily now-days waters the labours of the Husbandman.

6. But yet there went up a moist Vapour from the Earth, which being matur'd and concocted by the Spirit of the world, which is very active in the Heavens or Air, became a precious balmy liquor and fit vehicle of Life, which descending down in some sort like dewy showers upon the face of the Earth, moistned the ground; so that the warmth of the Sun gently playing upon the surface thereof, prepared matter variously for sundry forts, not only of Seminal forms of Plants, but Souls of Animals also.

7. And Man himself rose out of the Earth after this manner; the dust thereof being rightly prepar'd and temper'd by these unctuous showers and balmy droppings of Heaven. For God had so contriv'd his Infinite Wildome, that Matter thus or thus prepar'd should by a Vital congruity attract proportional Forms from the World of Life, which is everywhere nigh at hand, and does very strongly inequitate the moist and unctuous Aire. Wherefore after this manner was the Aereal or Aethereal Adam conveyed into an Earthly body, having his most conspicuous residence in the Head or Brain: And thus Adam became the Soul of a Terrestrial living Creature.

8. But how it is with Adam before he descends into this lower condition of life, I shall declare unto you in the Enigmatical narration that follows, which is this: That the Lord God had planted a Garden Eastward in Eden, where he had put the Man, which afterward he formed into a Terrestrial Animal: For Adam was first wholly Aethereal, and placed in Paradise, that is, in an happy and joyful condition of the Spirit; for he was placed under the invigorating beams of the Divine Intellect, and the Sun of Righteousness then shone fairly upon him.

9. And his Soul was as the ground which God hath blest, and so brought forth every pleasant Tree, and every goodly Plant of her heavenly Fathers own planting; for the holy Spirit of Life had inriched the foil, that it brought forth all manner of pleasant and profitable fruits:

And
And the Tree of Life was in the midst of this Garden of mans Soul, to wit, the Essential Will of God, which is the true root of Regeneration: but so high a pitch Adam as yet had not reach’d unto; and the fruit of this Tree in this Ethereal state of the Soul had been Immortality or Life everlasting: And the Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil was there also, viz. His own Will.

10. And there was a very pleanant River that water’d this Garden, distinguishable into four streams, which are the four Cardinal Vertues, which are in several degrees in the Soul, according to the several degrees of the purity of her Vehicle.

11. And the name of the first is Pison, which is Prudence and Experience in things that are comely to be done: For the Soul of man is never idle, neither in this world, nor in any state else, but hath some Province to make good, and is to promote his interest whose she is. For what greater gratification can there be of a good Soul, then to be a dispenser of some portion of that Universal good that God lets out upon the world? And there can be no external conversation nor society of persons, be they Terrestrial, Aereal, or Ethereal, but forthwith it implies an Use of Prudence: Wherefore Prudence is an inseparable Accomplishment of the Soul: So that Pison is rightly deemed one of the Rivers even of that Celestial Paradise. And this is that Wisdom which God himself doth shew to the Soul by communication of the divine Light; for it is to compass the Land of Havilah.

12. Where also idle and useless Speculations are not regarded, as is plainly declared by the pure and approved Gold, Bdellium, and Onyx, the Commodities thereof.

13. And the name of the second River is Gibon, which is Justice, as is intimated from the fame of the Ethiopians, whose Land it is said to compass, as also from the notation of the name thereof.

14. And the name of the third River is Hiddekel, which is Fortitude, that like a rapid stream bears all down before it, and stoutly resists all the powers of darkness, running forcibly against Assyria, which is situated Westward of it. And the fourth River is Perath, which is Temperance, the nourisher and cherisher of all the plants of Paradise; whereas Intemperance, or too much addicting the Mind to the pleasure of the Vehicle, or Life of the Matter, be it in what state soever, drowns and choaks those sacred Vegetables. As the Earth, you know, was not at all fruitful till the Waters were removed into one place, and the dry land appeared, whenas before it was drowned and floccken with overmuch moisture.

15. In this Paradise thus described had the Lord God placed Man to dress it, and to keep it in such good order as he found it.

16. And the Divine Word or Light in man charged him, saying, Of every Tree of Paradise thou mayest freely eat. For all things here are wholesome as well as plesant; if thou hast a right care of thy self, and been obedient to my Commands.

17. But of the luscious and poisonous fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil, that is, of thine own Will, thou shalt not by any means eat: For at what time thou eatest thereof, thy Soul shall contract that languor,
languor, debility and unsettledness, that in process of time thou shalt slide into the earth, and be buried in humane flesh, and become an inhabitant of the Region of mortality and death.

18. Hitherto I have not taken much notice in the Aethereal Adam of any other Faculties but such as carried him upwards towards Virtue and the holy Intellect. And indeed this is the more perfect and masculine Adam, which consists in pure subtile Intellectual Knowledge. But we will now inform you of another Faculty of the Soul of man, which though it seem inferior yet is far from being contemptible, it being both good for himself, and convenient for the terrestrial world: For this makes him in a capacity of being the Head of all the living creatures in the earth, as that Faculty indeed is the mother of all mankind.

19. Those higher and more Intellectual accomplishments, I must confess, made Adam very wise and of a quick perception. For he knew very well the natures of the Beasts of the field and Fowls of the air: I mean not only of the visible and terrestrial creatures, but also of the fallen and unfallen Angels, or good and bad Genii; and was able to judge aright of them, according to the principles they consisted of and the properties they had.

20. And his Reason and Understanding was not mistaken, but he pronounced aright in all. But however, he could take no such pleasure in the external Creation of God and his various works, without having some Principle of life, congruously joying with and joyfully actuating the like Matter themselves consisted of: Wherefore God induced the Soul of Man with a Faculty of being united with vital joy and complacency to the Matter, as well as of aspiring to an Union with God himself, whose Divine Essence is too highly disproportioned to our poor substances. But the Divine Life is communicable in some part to both Soul and Body, whether it be Aethereal, or of grosser consistence: and these wonderful grateful pleasures that we feel are nothing but the kindly motions of the Soul's Vehicle; from whence Divine joyes themselves are by a kind of reflection strengthened and advanced. Of so great consequence is that Vital principle that joyns the Soul to the Matter of the Universe.

21. Wherefore God, to gratifie Adam, made him not indefatigable in his aspirations towards Intellectual things; but Lassitude of Contemplation and of Affectation of Immateriality, (he being not able to receive those things as they are, but according to his poor capacity, which is very small in respect of the object it is exercis'd about) brought upon him remissiveness and drowsiness to such like exercises, till by degrees he fell into a more profound sleep. At what time Divine Providence having laid the plot aforehand, that lower Vivificative principle of his Soul did grow so strong, and did go vigorously and with such exultant sympathy and joy actuate his Vehicle, that in virtue of his Integrity, which he yet retain'd, this became more dear to him, and of greater contentment then any thing he had experience of.

22. I say, when Divine Providence had so lively and warmly stirr'd up this new fente of his Vehicle in him,

23. He
23. He straightway acknowledged that all the sense and knowledge of any thing he had hitherto was more lifeless and evanish, and seemed lesse congruous and grateful unto him, and more estranged from his nature: but this was so agreeable and correspondent to his Soul, that he looked upon it as a necessary part of himself, and called it after his own name.

24. And he thought thus within himself, For this cause will any one leave his over-tedious affairs, to unite with the Eternal Intellect and Universal Soul of the World, the immenseness of whose excellencies are too highly rais’d for us to continue long in their embracements; and will cleave to the joyous and cheerful life of his Vehicle, and account this living Vehicle and his Soul one Person.

25. Thus Adam with his new-wedded flood naked before God, but was not as yet at all ashamed, by reason of his Innocency and Simplicity; for Adam neither in his Reason nor Affection as yet had transgressed in any thing.

CHAP. III.

1. Satan tempts Adam, taking advantage upon the Invigoration of the Life of his Vehicle. 2. The Dialogue betwixt Adam and Satan. 6. The Masculine faculties in Adam, swayed by the Feminine, attest to sin against God. 7. Adam excuses the use of the wilted Liberty he gave himself, discerning the Plastick Power somewhat awakened in him. 8. Adjudicate betwixt Adam and the Divine Light, arraigning him at the Tribunal of his own Conscience. 14. Satan stricken down into the lower Regions of the Aire. 15. A Prophecy of the Incarnation of the Soul of the Messiah, and of his Triumph over the head and highest Powers of the rebellious Angels. 16. A decree of God to sour and disturb all the pleasures and contentments of the Terrestrial Life. 20. Adam again excuses his Fall, from the usefulness of his Presence and Government upon Earth. 21. Adam is fully incorporated into Flesh, and appears in the true shape of a Terrestrial Animal. 24. That Immortality is incompatible to the Earthly Adam, nor can his Soul reach it, till he return into her Ethereal Vehicle.

NOW the Life of the Vehicle being so highly invigorated in Adam, by the remission of exercise in his more subtle and immaterial Faculties, he was fit with all alacrity and cheerfulnesse to pursue any game set before him; and wanted nothing but fair external opportunity to call him out into action. Which one of the evil Genii or foul Angels observed, who had no small skill in doing mischief, having in all likelihood practis’d the same villany upon some of his own Orders, and was the very Ring-leader of rebellion against God and the Divine Light: For he was more perversely subtle than all the rest of the evil Genii or Beasts of the field, which God had made Angels; but their
fidelity they contracted by their own Rebellion. For every thing that hath Sense and Understanding, and wants the Divine Life in it, in the judgment of all wise and good men is truly a Beast. This old Serpent therefore, the subtilest of all the Beasts of the field, cunningly assailed Adam with such conference as would furely please his Feminine part, which was now so invigorated with life, that the best news to her would be the tidings of a Commission to doe any thing. Wherefore the Serpent said to the feminized Adam, Why are you so demure? and what makes you so bound up in spirit? Is it so indeed that God has confined you, taken away your Liberty, and forbidden you all things that you may take pleasure in?

2. And Adam answered him, saying, No; we are not forbidden any thing that the Divine Life in us approves as good and pleasant.

3. We are only forbidden to feed on our own Will, and to seek pleasures apart and without the approbation of the Will of God. For if our own Will get head in us, we shall assuredly descend into the Region of Mortality, and be cast into a State of Death.

4. But the Serpent said unto Adam, Truth, this is but a Panic fear in you, Adam; you shall not so surely die as you conceive.

5. The only matter is this: God indeed loves to keep his creatures in awe, and to hold them in from ranging too far and reaching too high: but he knows very well, that if you take but your liberty with us, and satiate your selves freely with your own Will, your eyes will be wonderfully opened, and you will meet with a world of variety of experiments in things, so that you will grow abundantly wise, and, like Gods, know all things whatsoever, whether good or evil.

6. Now the Feminine part in Adam was so tickled with this Doctrine of the old Deceiver, that the Conceivable began to be so immoderate as to resolve to doe any thing that may promote pleasure and experience in things, and snatch'd away with it Adam's Will and Reason by his headstrong and inadvertency. So that Adam was wholly set upon doing things at random, according as the various toyings and titillations of the lascivious Life of the Vehicle suggested to him, no longer consulting with the Voice of God, or taking any farther aim by the Inlet of the Divine Light.

7. And when he had tired himself with a rabble of toyes and unfruitful or unsatisfactory devices, rising from the multifarious workings of the Particles of his Vehicle, at last the eyes of his faculties were opened, and they perceived how naked they were; he having neither the covering of the Heavenly Nature, nor as yet of the Terrestrial Body. Only they fewed fig-leaves together, and made some pretences of excuse, from the vigour of the Plantal Life that now in a thinner manner might manifest itself in Adam, and predispose him for a more perfect exercise of his Plastic Power, when the prepared Matter of the Earth shall drink him in.

8. In the mean time the Voice of God, or the Divine Wisdom, spake to them in the cool of the day, when the hurry of this mad Career had well flaked. But Adam now with his wife was grown so out of order, and so much estranged from the Life of God, that they hid themselves at the
the sensible approach thereof, as wilde beasts ran away into the Wood at the sight of a man.

9. But the divine Light in the Conscience of Adam pursued him, and upbraided unto him the cafe he was in.

10. And Adam acknowledged within himself how naked he was, having no power, nor ornaments, nor abilities of his own, and yet that he had left his obedience and dependence upon God: Wherefore he was ashamed, and hid himself at the approach of the divine Light manifesting it self unto him to the reprehension and rebuke of him.

11. And the divine Light charg'd all this misery and confusion that had thus overtaken him upon the eating of the forbidden fruit, the lascious Dictates of his own Will.

12. But Adam again excus'd himself within himself, that it was the vigour and impetuosity of that Life in the Vehiccle, which God himself implanted in it, whereby he miscarried: the woman that God had given him.

13. And the divine Light spake in Adam concerning the woman, What work hath the made here? But the woman in Adam excus'd her self; for she was beguiled by that grand Deceiver the Serpent. In this confusion of mind was Adam by forsaking the divine Light, and letting his own Will get head against it. For it so changed the nature of his Vehiccle, that (whereas he might have continued in an Angelical and Ethereal condition, and his Feminine part been brought into perfect obedience to the divine Light, and had joyes multiplied upon the whole man beyond all expression and imagination for ever) he now funk more and more towards a mortal and terrestrial estate, himself not being unsensible thereof, as you shall hear, when I have told you the doom of the Eternal God concerning the Serpent and him.

14. Things therefore having been carried on in this wise, the Eternal Lord God decreed thus with himself concerning the Serpent and Adam: That this old Serpent, the Prince of the rebellious Angels, should be more accursed then all the rest; and (whereas he lورد'd it aloft in the higher parts of the Aire, and could glide in the very Ethereal Region, amongst the innocent and unfaill Souls of men and the good Angels, before) that he should now sweep the dust with his belly, being cast lower towards the surface of the Earth.

15. And that there should be a general enmity and abhorreny betwixt this old Serpent, as also all of his fellow-rebels, and betwixt Mankinde. And that in processe of time the ever-faithful and obedient Soul of the Messias should take a Body, and should trample over the power of the Devil, very notoriously here upon Earth, and after his death should be constituted Prince of all the Angelical Orders whatever in Heaven.

16. And concerning Adam, the Eternal Lord God decreed that he should descend down to be an Inhabitant of the Earth, and that he should not there indulge to himself the pleasures of the body, without the concomitants of pain and sorrow; and that his Feminine part, his Affections, should be under the chaftisement and correction of his Reason.

G g g 3

17. That
17. That he should have a wearesome and toilsome travail in this world.

18. The Earth bringing forth thorns and thistles, though he must subsist by the Corn of the field.

19. Wherefore in the sweat of his brows he should eat his bread, till he returned unto the ground, of which his Terrestrial body is made. This was the Counsel of God concerning Adam and the Serpent.

20. Now, as I was a telling you, Adam though he was sinking apace into those lower functions of life, yet his Minde was not as yet grown so fully stupid, but he had the knowledge of his own condition, and added to all his former Apologies, that the Feminine part in him, though it had seduced him, yet there was some use of this miscarriage, for the Earth would hence be inhabited by Intellectual Animals: wherefore he call'd the Life of his Vehicle, Eve, because she is indeed the Mother of all the generations of men that live upon the Earth.

21. At last the Plasticke Power being fully awakened, Adam's Soul descended into the prepared Matter of the Earth, and in due process of time Adam appear'd cloth'd in the skin of beasts; that is, he became a down-right Terrestrial Animal, and a mortal creature upon Earth.

22. For the Eternal God had so decreed, and his Wisdome, Mercy and Justice did but (if I may so speak) play and sport together in the business. And the rather, because Adam had but precipitated himself into that condition which in due time might have fallen to his share by course: for it is fitting there should be some such Head among the living creatures of the earth as a Terrestrial Adam, but to live always here were his disadvantage.

23. Wherefore when God remov'd him from that higher condition,

24. He made sure he should not be Immortal, nor is he in any capacity of reaching unto the fruit of the Tree of Life, without passing through the condition of being re-invested with a fiery Vehicle, and becoming a pure and defecate Ethereal Spirit: Then he may be admitted to taste the fruit of the Tree of Life and Immortality, and so live for ever.
THE
MORAL
CABBALA

CHAP. I.

1. Man a Microcosm or Little World, in whom there are two Principles, Spirit and Flesh. 2. The Earthly or Fleshly Nature appears first. 4. The Light of Conscience unlistened to. 6. The Spirit of Savoury and Affectionate discernment betwixt good and evil. 10. The inordinate desires of the flesh driven aside and limited. 11. Hereupon the plants of Righteousness bear fruit and flourish. 16. The hearty and sincere Love of God and a mans neighbour is as the Sun in the Soul of man: Notionality and Opinions the weak and faint Light of the dispersed Stars. 18. These that walk in sincere Love, walk in the Day: They that are guided by Notionality, travel in the Night. 22. The Natural Concupiscible brings forth by the command of God, and is corrected by Devotion. 24. The Iraificible also brings forth. 26. Christ the Image of God is created, being a perfect Ruler over all the motions of the Iraificible and Concupiscible. 29. The food of the Divine Life. 30. The food of the Animal Life. 31. The Divine Wisdom approves of whatsoever is simply natural, as good.

1. E shall set before you in this History of Genesis several eminent Examples of good and perfect men, such as Abel, Seth, Enoch, Abraham, and the like: Wherefore we thought fit, though ænimatically, and in a dark Parable, to shadow out in general the manner of progress to this divine Perfection; looking upon Man as a Microcosm or a Little World, who if he hold out the whole progress of the Spiritual Creation, the process thereof will be figuratively understood as follows. Wherefore first of all, I say, That by the will of God every man living on the face of the Earth hath these two Principles in him, Heaven and Earth, Divinity and Animality, Spirit and Flesh.

2. But that which is Animal or Natural operates first, the Spiritual or Heavenly Life lying for a while closed up at rest in its own Principle. During which time, and indeed some while afterwards too, the Animal or Fleshly Life domineers in darkness & deformity; the mighty tempestuous
Passions of the flesh contending and struggling over that Abyss of unsuitable Desire, which has no bottom, and which in this case carries the Mind to nothing but emptiness and unprofitableness.

3. But by the will of God it is, that afterwards the Day-light appears, though not in so vigorous measure, out of the Heavenly or Spiritual Principle.

4. And Conscience being thus enlightened, offers her self a guide to a better condition: and God has fram’d the nature of man so, that he cannot but say that this Light is good, and distinguish betwixt the dark tumultuous motions of the Flesh and it;

5. And say, that there is as true a difference as betwixt the natural Day and Night. And thus Ignorance and Enquiry was the First day’s progress.

6. But though there be this Principle of Light set up in the Conscience of Man, and he cannot say any thing against it, but that it is good and true, yet has he not prefently so lively and favour a relish in his distinction betwixt the evil and the good: For the evil as yet wholly holds his Affections, though his Fancy and Reason be touch’d a little with the Theoretical apprehensions of what is good, wherefore by the will of God the Heavenly Principle (though it be in itself invisible and undistinguishable) in due time becomes a Spirit of savoury and affectionate discernment betwixt the evil and the good; betwixt the pure waters that flow from the holy Spirit, and the muddy & tumultuous suggestions of the Flesh.

7. And thus is Man enabled in a living manner to distinguish betwixt the Earthly and Heavenly life.

8. For the Heavenly Principle is now made to him a Spirit of savoury discernment; and being taught by God after this manner, he will not fail to pronounce, That this Principle, whereby he has so quick and lively a sense of what is good and evil, is Heavenly indeed: And thus Ignorance and Enquiry is made the Second day’s progress.

9. Now the sweetnesse of the Upper waters being so well relished by man, he has a great nauseating against the Lower feculent waters of the unbounded desires of the flesh: so that God adding power to his will, the inordinate desires of the flesh are driven within set limits, and he has a command over himself to become more steady and steady.

10. And this steadinesse and command he gets over himself, he is taught by the Divine Principle in him to compare to the Earth or dry land for safeness and stability; but the desires of the flesh he looks upon as a dangerous and turbulent Sea. Wherefore the bounding of them thus, and arriving to a state of command over a man’s self, and freedome from such collocations and collisions as are found in the working Seas, the Divine Nature in him could not but approve as good.

11. For so it comes to pass, by the will of God and according to the nature of things, that this state of Sobriety in man (he being in so good a measure rid of the boisterousnesse of evil Concupiscence) gives him leisure so to cultivate his Minde with principles of Vertue and Honesty, that he is as a fruitful field whom the Lord hath blest.

12. Sending forth out of himselfy sundry sorts of fruit-bearing trees, herbs,
Chap. I. The Moral Cabbala.

Herbs, and flowers, that is, various kinds of good works, to the praise of God and the help of his neighbour: and God and his own Conscience witness to him that this is good.

13. And thus Ignorance and Enquiry is made the Third day’s progress.

14. Now when God has proceeded so far in the Spiritual Creation, as to raise the Heavenly Principle in man to that power and efficacy that it takes hold on his Affections, and brings forth laudable works of Righteousness, he thereupon adds a very eminent accession of Light and Strength, setting before his eyes sundry sorts of Luminaries in the Heavenly or Intellectual Nature, whereby he may be able more notoriously to distinguish between the Day and the Night; that is, between the condition of a truly illuminated Soul, and one that is as yet much benighted in ignorance and estranged from the true knowledge of God. For, according to the difference of these Lights, it is signified to a man in what condition himself or others are in, whether it be indeed Day or Night with them, Summer or Winter, Spring-time or Harvest, or what period or progress they have made in the Divine Life.

15. And though there be so great a difference between these Lights, yet the meanest are better than mere darkness, and serve in some measure or other to give light to the Earthly man.

16. But among these many Lights which God makes to appear to man, there are two more eminent by far than the rest. The greater of which two has his dominion by day, and is a faithful guide to those which walk in the day; that is, that work the works of Righteousness. And this greater Light is but one, but does, being added, mightily invigorate the former day-light man walked by, and it is a more full appearance of the Sun of Righteousness; which is an hearty and sincere Love of God and a man’s neighbour. The lesser of these two great Lights has dominion by night, and is a rule to those whose inward minds are held as yet too strongly in the works of darkness; and it is a Principle weak, and variable as the Moon, and is called Inconstancy of Life and Knowledge. There are also an abundance of other little Lights thickly dispersed over the whole Understanding of man, as the Stars in the Firmament, which you may call Notionality, or Multiplicity of Ineffectual Opinions.

17. But the worst of all these are better than down-right Sensuality and Bruteishness, and therefore God may well be said to set them up in the Heavenly part of man, his Understanding, to give what light they are able to his Earthly parts, his corrupt and inordinate Affections.

18. And as the Sun of Righteousness, that is, the hearty and sincere Love of God and a man’s neighbour, by his single light and warmth with cheerfulness and safety guides them that are in the day; so that more uneven and changeable Principle, and the numerous Lights of Notionality, may conduct them, as well as they are able, that are benighted in darkness; and (what is most of all considerable) a man by the wide difference of these latter Lights from that of the Day, may discern when himself or another is benighted in the state of unrighteousness. For multisarious Notionality and Inconstancy of life and knowledge are certain signs that a man is in the night: But the flickering to this one single, but vigorous and effectual,
effectual, Light, of the heartly and sincere Love of God and a mans neighbour, is a sign that a man walks in the day. And he that is arrived to this condition plainly discerns, in the Light of God, that all this is very good.

19. And thus Ignorance and Enquiry is made the Fourth day's progress.

20. And now fo noble, fo warm and fo vigorous a Principle or Light as the Sun of Righteousness being set up in the Heavenly part of the Soul of man, the unskillful may unwarily expect that the next news will be, that even the Seas themselves are dried up with the heat thereof, that is, that the Concupiscible in man is quite destroyed: But God doth appoint far otherwife; for the Waters bring forth abundance of Fish, as well as Fowl innumerable.

21. Thoughts therefore of natural delights do swim to and fro in the Concupiscible of man, and the fervent love he bears to God caueth not a many faint ineffectual notions, but an abundance of holy affectionate meditations and winged Ejaculations that fly up heaven-ward, which returning back again, and falling upon the numerous fry of natural Concupiscence, help to lessen their numbers, as thofe Fowls that frequent the waters devour the Fish thereof. And God and good men do fee nothing but good in all this.

22. Wherefore God multiplies the Thoughts of natural delight in the lower Concupiscible, as well as he doth those Heavenly thoughts and holy meditations, that the entire Humanity might be filled with all the degrees of good it is capable of; and that the Divine Life might have something to order and overcome.

23. And thus Ignorance and Enquiry made the Fifth day's progress.

24. Nor does God only cause the Waters to bring forth, but the dry Land also, several living creatures after their kind, and makes the Inrascible fruitful as well as the Concupiscible.

25. For God saw that they were both good, and that they were a fit subject for the Heavenly Man to exercise his Rule and Dominion over.

26. For God multiplies strength as well as occasions to employ it upon, And the Divine Life that hath been, under the several degrees of the advancement thereof, so variously represented in the Five fore-going progresses, God at last works up to the height, and being compleat in all things, styles it by the name of his own Image; the Divine Life arrived to this pitch being the right Image of him indeed. Thus it is therefore, that at last God in our nature fully manifests the true and perfect Man, whereby we our selves become good and perfect, who does not only see and affect what is good, but has full power to effect it in all things: For he has full dominion over the Fifth of the sea, can rule and guide the Fowls of the aire, and with eafe command the Beasts of the field, and whatever moveth upon the earth.

27. Thus God creates Man in his own Image, making him as powerful a Commander in his Little World, over all the Thoughts and Motions of the Concupiscible and Inrascible, as himself is over the Natural frame of the Universe or greater World. And this Image is Male and Female, consisting of a clear and free Understanding and divine Affection, which
which are now arrived to that height, that no lower Life is able to rebel against them, and to bring them under.

28. For God blesses them and makes them fruitful, and multiplies their noble off-spring in so great and wonderful a measure, that they replenish the cultivated nature of man with such an abundance of real Truth and Equity, that there is no living Figure, Imagination, or Motion of the Intractable or Conceivable, no extravagant or ignorant Irregularity in Religious meditations and devotions, but they are presently moderated and rectified. For the whole Territories of the Humane Nature are every where so well peopled with the several beautiful shapes or Ideas of Truth and Goodness the glorious off-spring of the Heavenly Adam, Christ, that no Animal figure can offer to move or wagge amisse, but it meets with a proper Corrector and Re-composer of its motions.

29. And the Divine Life in Man being thus perfected, he is therewith instructed by God, what is his food, as Divine; and what is the food of the Animal Life in him; viz. the most vertuous, most truly pious and divine Actions he has given to the Heavenly Adam to feed upon, fulfilling the Will of God in all things, which is more pleasant then the choicest fallads or the most delicate fruit the taste can relish.

30. Nor is the Animal Life quite to be starved and pined, but regulated and kept in subjection; and therefore they are to have their worther fort of Herbs to feed on, that is, Natural Actions conuentaneous to the Principle from whence they flow; that that Principle may also enjoy it self in the liberty of prosecuting what its nature prompts it unto. And thus the sundry Modifications of the Intractable and Conceivable, as also the various Figurations of Religious Melancholy and Natural Devotions, (which are the Fihes, Beasts and Fowls in the Animal Nature of Man) are permitted to feed and refresh themselves in those lower kinds of Operations they incline us to; provided all be approved and rightly regulated by the Heavenly Adam.

31. For the Divine Wisdome in Man sees and approves all things which God hath created in us to be very good in their kindes. And thus Ignorance and Enquiry was the Sixth day's progresse.

CHAP. II.

3. The true Sabbatisme of the Sons of God. 5. A Description of men taught by God. 7. The mysterie of that Adam that comes by Water and the Spirit. 9. Obedience the Tree of Life: Disobedience the Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil. 10. The Rivers of Paradise, the four Cardinal Vertues in the Soul of man. 17. The Life of Righteousness lost by Disobedienc. 19. The mere Contemplative and Spiritual Man sees the motions of the Animal Life, and rigidly enough censures them. 21. That it is incompatible to Man perpetually to dwell in Spiritual Contemplations. 22. That upon the slaking of those, the kindly Joy of the Life of the Body springs out, which is our Eve. 23. That
T HUS the Heavenly and Earthly Nature in Man were finifit, and fully repleniht with all the garnishings belonging to them.

2. So the Divine Wifdome in the Humane Nature celebrated her Sabbath, having now wrought through the toil of all the Six dayes travel.

3. And the Divine Wifdome looked upon this Seventh day as blessed and sanctified a day of Righteousnesse, Rest and Joy in the Holy Ghost.

4. These were the Generations or Pullulations of the Heavenly and Earthly Nature, of the Divine and Animal Life in Man, when God created them.

5. I mean those fruitful Plants and pleasant and useful Herbs which he himself planted: For I have describ'd unto you the condition of a Man taught of God, and instructed and cherisht up by his inward Light, where there is no external Doctrine to distil as the rain, nor outward Gardener to intermeddle in God's Husbandry.

6. Only there is a Fountain of Water, which is Repentance from dead works, and bubbles up in the Earthly Adam, so as univerfally to wash all the ground.

7. And thus the nature of Man being prepar'd for further Accomplishments, God fames him into his own Image, which is Righteousnesse and true Holiness, and breaths into him the Spirit of Life: And this is that Adam which is born of Water and the Spirit.

8. Hitherto I have shewed unto you how mankinde is raised up from one degree of Spiritual Light and Righteousnesse unto another, till we come at laft to that full Command and Perfection in the Divine Life, that a man may be fain in some sort thus to have attain'd to the Kingdom of Heaven, or found a Paradise upon Earth. The Narration that follows shall instruct you and forewarn you of thofe evil courses whereby man loseth that measure of Paradifical happinesse God eftates him in, even while he is in this world, I fay therefore, that the Lord God planted a Garden Eastward in Eden, and there he put the Man whom he had made; that is, Man living under the Intellecfual rayes of the Spirit, and being guided by the morning Light of the Sun of Righteousnesse, is led into a very pleafant and sweet Contentment of minde, and the testimony of a good Conience is his great delight.

9. And that the sundry Germinations and Springings up of the works of Righteousnes in him are a delectable Paradife to him, pleafing both the sight and taste of that measure of Divine Life that is manifested in him. But of all the Plants that grow in him, there is none of fo fove- raign virtue as that in the midft of this Garden, to wit, the Tree of Life, which is, a Sincere Obedience to the Will of God: nor any that bears fo lefthiferous and poisonous fruit as the Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil, which is Disobedience to the Will of God, as it is manifested in Man. For the pleafure of the Soul consists in conforming her felf faithfully to what theis persuadeth: in her own Conience is the Will of God, whatever others would infinuate to the contrary.

10. And
CHAP. II. The Moral Cabbala.

10. And all the fruit-bearing Trees of Righteousnes are watered by these four Rivers, which wind along this Garden of Pleasure, which indeed are the four Cardinal Virtues.

11. The name of the first is Pison, which is Prudence; not the suggestions of fleshly Craft and over-reaching Subtily, but the Indications of the Spirit or divine Intellect, what is fit and profitable and decorous to be done.

12. Here is well tried and certain approved Experience, healthful Industry, and Alacrity to honest Labour.

13. And the name of the second River is Gihon, which is Justice.

14. And the name of the third River is Hiddekel, which is Fortitude, and the fourth River is Euphrates, which is Temperance.

15. This is the Paradise where the Lord God had placed the Man, that he might further cultivate it and improve it.

16. And the Divine Light manifested in the Man encourag'd the Man to eat of the fruits of Paradise freely, and to delight himself in all manner of holy Understanding and Righteousnesse.

17. But withall he bade him have a special care how he relish his own Will or Power in any thing, but that he should be obedient to the manifested Will of God in things great and small; or else assuredly he would lose the life he now lived, and become dead to all Righteousnesse and Truth. So the man had a special care, and his Soul wrought wholly towards Heavenly and Divine things, and heeded nothing but these, his more noble and Masculine Faculties being after a manner solely set on work, but the Natural Life (in which notwithstanding, if it were rightly guided, there is no sin) being almost quite forgot and disregarded.

18. But the Wisdome of God saw that it was not good for the Soul of man, that the Masculine Powers thereof should thus operate alone, but that all the Faculties of Life should be set afloat, that the whole humane Nature might be accomplished with the Divine.

19. Now the Powers of the Soul working to wholly upwards towards Divine things, the several Modifications or Figurations of the Animal Life (which God, acting in the frame of the humane Nature, represented to the Man, whence he had occasion to view them and judge of them) by the quick Understanding of Man were indeed easily discern'd what they were, and he had a determinate apprehension of every particular Figuration of the Animal Life.

20. And did censurate them, or pronounce of them, though truly, yet rigidly enough and severely; but as yet was not in a capacity of taking any delight in them, there was not any of them fit for his turn to please himself in.

21. Wherefore Divine Providence brought it so to passe, for the good of the Man, and that he might more vigorously and fully be enrich'd with delight, that the operations of the Masculine Faculties of the Soul were for a while well flaked and confipited; during which time the Faculties themselves were something lessened or weakened, yet in such a due measure and proportion, that, considering the future advantage
advantage that was expected, that was not mis'd that was taken away, but all as handsome and compleat as before.

22. For what was thus abated in the Masculine Faculties, was compensated abundantly in exhibiting to the Man the grateful sense of the Feminine: for there was no way but this to Create the Woman, which is to elicit that kindly-flowring joy or harmless delight of the Natural Life and health of the Body, which once exhibited and joined with Simplicity and Innocency of Spirit, is the greatest part of that Paradise a man is capable of upon Earth.

23. And the actuating of the Matter being the most proper and essential operation of a Soul, man prefently acknowledg'd this kindly-flowring joy of the Body of nearer cognition and affinity with himself then any thing else he ever had yet experience of, and he loved it as his own life.

24. And the Man was so mightily taken with his new Spoufe, which is, The kindly Joy of the Life of the Body, that he concluded with himself, that any one may with a safe Conscience forget those more earnest attempts towards the knowledge of the Eternal God that created him, as also the performance of those more frivulous injunctions of his Mother the Church, fo far forth as they are incompatible with the Health and Joy of the Life of his natural Body, and might in such a case rather cleave to his Spoufe, and become one with her; provided he still lived in obedience to the indifpenfable Precepts of that Superior Light and Power that begot him.

25. Nor had Adam's Reason or Affection transgressed at all in this; concluding nothing but what the Divine Wisdome and Equity would approve as true. Wherefore Adam and his wife as yet sought no corners, nor covering-places to shelter them from the Divine Light; but having done nothing amiss, appeared naked in the presence of it without any shame or blushing.

C H A P. III.

1. Adam is tempted by inordinate pleasure from the springing up of the Joy of the invigorated Life of his Body. 2. A dialogue or dispute in the minde of Adam betwixt the inordinate Desire of Pleasure and the natural Joy of the Body. 6. The Will of Adam is drawn away to assent to Inordinate Pleasure. 8. Adam having transgressed, is impatient of the Presence of the divine Light. 10. A long conflict of Conscience, or dispute betwixt Adam's earthly minde and the divine Light, examining him, and setting before him both his present and future condition, if he persisted in rebellion. 20. He adheres to the Joy of his Body without reason or measure, notwithstanding all the castigations and monitions of the divine Light. 21. The divine Light takes leave of Adam therefore for the present, with deserved scorn and reproach. 22. The doom of the Eternal God concerning laps'd Man, that will not suffer them to settle in wickednesse, according to their own depraved wills and desires.

1. BUT
BUT so it came to passe that the Life of the Body being thus invigorated in Man, straightway the flyest and subtilest of all the Animal Figurations, the Serpent, which is the inordinate Desire of Pleasure, craftily infused it fell into the Feminine part of Adam, viz. The kindly Voy of the Body; and thus assailing Man, whisper'd such suggestions as these unto him. What a rigid and severe thing is this bulness of Religion, and the Law of God, as they call it, that deprives a man of all manner of Pleasure, and cuts him short of all the contentments of Life?

2. But the Womanish part in Adam, to wit, The natural and kindly Voy of the Body, could witness against this, and answered, We may delight our selves with the operations of all the faculties both of Soul and Body, which God and Nature have bestowed upon us.

3. Only we are to take heed of Disobedience, and of promiscuously following our own Will; but we are ever to consult with the Will of God, and the Divine Light manifested in our Understandings, and so doe all things orderly and measurably: for if we transgress against this, we shall die the death, and lose the Life of Virtue and Righteousness, which now is awake in us.

4. But the Serpent, which is the inordinate desire of Pleasure, befooled Adam, through the frailty of his Womanish faculties, and made him believe he should not die; but with safety might serve the free dictates of Pleasure, or his own Will, and the Will of God; that Flesh and Spirit might both rule in him, and be no such prejudice the one to the other:

5. But that his skill and experience in things will be more enlarg'd, and so come nearer to Divine Perfection indeed, and imitate that fulness of Wisdom which is in God, who knows all things whatsoever, whether good or evil.

6. This crafty suggestion so infused it fell into Adam's Feminine Faculties, that his fleshly Conceivance began to be so strong that it carried the affent of his Will away with it, and the whole Man became a lawless and unruly Creature. For it seem'd a very pleasant thing at first sight to put in execution whatever our own Lusts suggest unto us without control, and very desirable to try all Conclusions to gain experience and knowledge of things. But this brought in nothing but the Wisdom of the flesh, and made Adam earthly-minded.

7. But he had not rambled very far in these difficult courses, but his eyes were opened, and he saw the difference, how naked now he was, and bare of all strength and power to divine and holy things; and began to meditate with himself some flight pretences for his notorious folly and disobedience.

8. For the Voice of the Divine Light had come unto him in the cool of the day, when the fury and heat of his inordinate passions was something flaked; but Adam could not endure the presence of it, but hid himself from it, meditating what he should answer by way of Apology or Excuse.

9. But the Divine Light persifted, and came up closer to him, and upbraided
upbraided unto him, that he was grown so wilde and estranged from her self, demanding of him in what condition he was, and wherefore he fled.

10. Then Adam ingenuously confessed that he found himself in such a pitiful poor naked condition, that he was ashamed to appear in the Presence of the Divine Light; and that was the reason he hid himself from it, because it would so manifestly upbraid to him his Nakedness and Deformity.

11. And the Divine Light farther examined him, how he fell into this sensible beggarly nakedness he was in, charging the sad event upon his Disobedience, that he had fed upon and taken a surfeit of the fruit of his own Will.

12. But Adam excused his Rational faculties, and said, They did but follow the natural Dictate of the Joy of the Body, the Woman that God himself bestowed upon him for an help and delight.

13. But the Divine Light again blamed Adam, that he kept his Feminine faculties in no better order nor subjection, that they should so boldly and overcomingly dictate to him such things as are not fit. To which he had nothing to say, but that the subtle Serpent, the inordinate Desire of Pleasure, had beguiled both his Faculties, as well Masculine as Feminine, his Will and Affection was quite carried away therewith.

14. Then the Divine Light began to chastise the Serpent, in the hearing of Adam, pronouncing of it, that it was more accused then all the Animal Figurations beside, and that it crept basely upon the belly, tempting to Riot and Venery, and refreshing nothing but earth and dirt. This will always be the guile of it so long as it lives in a man.

15. But might I once descend so far into the Man as to take possession of his Feminine faculties, I would set the Natural Joy of the Body at Defiance with the Serpent; and though the subtlety of the Serpent may a little wound and disorder the Woman for a while, yet her warrantable and free operations, she being actuated by divine vigour, should afterward quite destroy and extinguish the Seed of the Serpent, to wit, the Operations of the inordinate desire of Pleasure.

16. And the added farther in the hearing of Adam concerning the Woman, as he thus stood disjoynd from the heavenly Life, and was not obedient to right Reason, that, by a divine Nemesis, she should conceive with forrow, and bring forth Vanity; and that her Husband, the Earthly-minded Adam, should tyrannize over her, and weary her out, and foil her: So that the kindly Joy of the Heart and Life of the Body should be much depraved, or made faint and languid, by the unbridled humours and petuous Luxury and Intemperance of the Earthly-minded Adam.

17. And to Adam he said, who had become so Earthly-minded by listening to the Voice of his deceived Woman, and so acting disobediently to the Will of God, That his Flesh or Earth was accused for his sake, with labour and toil should he reap the fruits thereof all the while he continued in this Earthly-mindedness.

18. Cares also and Anxieties shall it bring forth unto him, and his Thoughts shall be as base as those of the Beasts in the field; he shall ruminate of nothing but what is Earthly and Sensual.

19. With
19. With sweat and anguish should he labour to satisfy his hunger and inordinate desires, till he returned to the Principle out of which he was taken: for the Earthly-mindedness came from this animated Earth, the Body; and is to shrink up again into its own Principle, and to perish.

20. After all these Caftigations and Premonitions of the Divine Light, Adam was not sufficiently awakened to the sense of what was good, but his Mind was straightway taken up again with the delights of the flesh, and dearly embracing the Joy of his Body, for all he was grown so inordinate, called her My Life, professing she was the nourishing Mother and chief comfort of all men living; and none could subsist without her.

21. Then the Divine Wifdom put hairy coats made of the skins of wilde beasts upon Adam and his Wife, and deservedly reproached them, saying, Now get you gone for a couple of Brutes. And Adam would have very gladly escaped so, if he might, and set up his rest for ever in the bestial Nature.

22. But the Eternal God of heaven, whose Providence reaches to all things, and whose Mercy is over all his works, looking upon Adam, perceived in what a pitiful ridiculous case he was; who seeking to be like unto God for knowledge and free dom, made himself no better than a Beast, and could willingly have lived for ever in that baser kind of nature. Wherefore the Eternal Lord God, in compassion to Adam, designed the contrary; and deriding his boldness and curiosity that made him transgress, Behold, saies he, Adam is become like one of us, knowing Good and Evil; and can of himself enlarge his pleasure, and create new Paradises of his own, which forsooth must have also their Tree of Life or Immortality: and Adam would for ever live in this foolish state he hath plac’d himself in.

23. But the Eternal Lord God would not suffer Adam to take up his rest in the bestial delight, which he had chosen, but drove him out of this false Paradise which he would have made to himself, and set him to cultivate his fleshly members, out of which his Earthly-mindedness was taken.

24. I say, he forcibly drove out Adam from this Paradise of Luxury; nor could he settle perpetually in the brutish Life, because the Cherubim with the flaming sword that turned every way beat him off; that is, the Manly Faculties of Reason and Conscience met him ever and anon in his brutish purposes, and convinced him of his folly, that he could not set up his rest for ever in this brutish condition.
The Defence
Of the Threefold
Cabbala

Philo Jud.

"Απαντήσαντες εἰς εἰκόνας τοῖς προσφερονταῖς ἐπετίθεντο, ἀνεῳγοντες. Τῷ δὲ εὐαγγελίῳ, ἐν οἷς ἦμερας ἀποκάλυφται, ὁ λόγος τῆς Μοσέως ἀπεκτέθη." "A panthus εἰς εἰκόνας τοῖς προσφερονταῖς ἐπετίθεντο, ἀνεῳγοντες. Τῷ δὲ εὐαγγελίῳ, ἐν οἷς ἦμερας ἀποκάλυφται, ὁ λόγος τῆς Μοσέως ἀπεκτέθη." "Apanthōs eis eikōnas tois prosphernontais epetithēn, aneōgonontes. Tōi dē evangelίō, en ois hēmēras apokalyphτais, ὁ logos tēs Moséōs apektēthē."

That is,
That the whole Law of Moses is like to a living Creature, whose Body is the Literal sense; but the Soul the more inward and hidden meaning, covered under the sense of the Letter.

R. Moses Ægypt.

LONDON,
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MDC LXII.
THE PREFACE

to the Reader.

Reader,

The Cabbala's thou hast read being in all likelihood so strange and unexpected, especially the Philosophical, that the Defence it self, which should cure and case thy amazement, may not occasion in any passage thereof any further scruple or offence, I thought fit a while to interrupt thee, that whatever I conjecture may less satisfie, may afore-hand be strengthened by this short Preface.

And for my own part, I cannot preface what may be in any skew of Reason alleged by any man, unless it be, The unusual Mysterie of Numbers; The using of the Authority of the Heathen in Explication of Scripture; The adding also of Miracles done by them for the further confirming their Authority; and lastly, The Strangeness of the Philosophical Conclusions themselves.

Now for the Mysterie of Numbers, that this ancient Philosophy of Moses should be wrapped up in it, will not seem improbable, if we consider that the Cabbala of the Creation was conserved in the hands of Abraham, and his family, who was famous for Mathematicks, (of which Arithmetick is a necessary part) first amongst the Chaldeans, and that after he taught the Egyptians the same Arts, as Historians write. Besides Prophetical and Enigmatical writings, that it is usual with them to hide their Secrets, as under the allusions of Names and Etymologies, so also under the admonitions of Numbers, it is so notoriously known, and that in the very Scriptures themselves, that it needs no proof, I will instance but in that one eminent example of the number of the Beast 666.

As for citing the Heathen Writers so frequently, you are to consider that they are the Wisest and the most Vertuous of them, and either such as the Fathers say had their Philosophy from Moses and the Prophets, as Pythagoras and Plato, or else the Disciples or Friends of these Philosophers, and therefore I thought it very proper to use their Testimony in a thing that they seem'd to be so fit witnesses of for the main, as having receiv'd the Cabbala from the ancient Prophets, though I will not deny but they have mingled their own fooleries with it, either out of the wantonness of their Fancy, or mistake of Judgement: Such as are the Transmigration of Humane Souls into Brutes; An utter abstinence from Flesh; Too severe reproaches against the Pleasures of the Body; Vilification of Marriage, and the like: which is no more Argument against the main drift of the Cabbala, then unwarrantable Superstitions Opinions and Practises of some deceived Churches are against the solid grounds of Christianity.

Again, I do not allege Philosophers alone, but, as occasion requires, Fathers, and (which I conceive as valid in this case) the Jewish Rabbins, who,
who, in things where prejudice need not blind them. I should think as fit as any to confirm a Cabalistical sense; especially if there be a general consent of them, and that they do not write their private fancy, but the minde of their whole Church.

Now if any shall take offence at Pythagoras his Scholars, swearing, as is conceived, by their Master that taught them the mystery of the Tetractys, (as you shall understand more at large in the Explication of the Fourth day's work,) I must protest that I myself am not a little offended with it. But that high reverence they bore to Pythagoras, as it is a sign of Vanity, and some kind of Superstition in them; so is it also no lesse an Argument of a suspendious measure of Knowledge and Sacrity in Pythagoras himself, that he should extort from them so great Honour, and that his Memory should be so sacred to them. Which profound Knowledge and Sacrity he having got by conversing with the Jewish Prophets, it ultimately tends to the renown of that Church, and consequently to the Christian, which inherits those holy Oracles which were first peculiar to the Jews.

But what the followers of Pythagoras transgressed in is no more to be imputed to him, then the Superstitions exhibited to the Virgin Mary can be laid to her charge. Besides, it may be a question whether in that Pythagoric Oath, O ρατος, &c. they did not swear by God the first Author of the Cabala, and that mysterious Explication of the Tetractys, that is, indeed, of all knowledge Divine and Natural, who first gave it to Adam, and then revived or confirmed it again to Moses. Or if it must be understood of Pythagoras, why may it not be look'd upon as a civil Oath, or Affeuration, such as Joseph's swearing by the life of Pharaoh, and Noble-men by their Honours; neither of which withstands for my own part I can allow, or assure myself that they are merely Civil, but touch upon Religion, or rather Idolatrous Superstition.

As for the Miracles Pythagoras did, though I do not believe all that are recorded of him are true, yet those that I have recited I hold probable enough, they being not unbecoming the worth of the Person: but those that suppose the Transmigration of Human Souls into the Bodies of Beasts, I look upon as Fabicks; and his whispering into the ear of an Ox to forbear to eat Beans, as a loud Ly. But it seems very consonant unto Divine Providence, that Pythagoras having got the knowledge of the holy Cabala, which God imparted to Adam and Moses, he should countenance it before the Nations by enabling him to doe Miracles. For so those noble and ancient Truths were more firmly radicated among the Philosophers of Greece, and happily preferred to this very day.

Nor can his being carried in the Air make him suspected to be a mere Magician or Conjurer, fith the holy Prophets and Apostles themselves have been transported after that manner; as Habakkuk from Jewry to Babylon, and Philip, after he had baptiz'd the Eunuch, from betwixt Gaza and Jerusalem to Azotus. But for my own part, I think working of Miracles is one of the least Perfections of a Man, and is nothing at all to the Happiness of him that does them, or rather seems to doe them: For if they be Miracles, he does them not, but some other Power or Person distinct from him. And yet here Magicians and Witches are greatly delighted in that this Power
Power is in some sort attributed to themselves, and that they are admired of the people, as is manifest in Simon Magus. But thus to lord it and domineer in the Attribute of Power with the Prince of the Air, what is it but mere Pride, the most irrational and provoking Vice that is? And with what grosse folly is it here conjoin'd, they priding and pleasing themselves in that they sometimes doe that, or rather suffer that, which Herms and Wilde-Geese, and every ordinary Fowl can doe of it self; that is, mount aloft and glide through the fleeting Air? But Holy and Good men know that the greatest Sweet and Perfection of a Vertuous Soul is the kindly accomplishment of her own Nature in true Wisdom and divine Love. And if any thing miraculous happen to them, or be done by them, it is, that that worth and knowledge is in them may be taken notice of, and that God thereby may be glorified, whose witnesses they are. But no other accession of Happiness accrues to them from this, but that hereby they may be in a better capacity of making others happy: which I confess I conceive here Pythagoras his case.

And that men may not indulge too much to their own Melancholy and Fancy, which they ordinarily call Inspiration; if they be so great Light to the World as they pretend, and so high that they will not condescend to the examination of humane Reason, it were desirable that such persons would keep in their heat to conceal the crudities of their own Conceptions, till the warrant of a Miracle call them out; and so they might more rightfully challenge an attention from the people, as being authorised from above to tell us something we knew not before, nor can so well know as believe, the main Argument being not Reason, but Miracle.

Lastly, for the Strangeness of the Philosophical Conclusions themselves. It were the strangest thing of all, if at first sight they did not seem very Paradoxical and strange: Else why should they be hid and conceal'd from the Vulgar, but that they did transcend their capacity, and were overmuch disproportioned to their belief? But in the behalf of these Cabbalistical Conclusions I will only note thus much, That they are such, that supposing them true, (which I shall no longer assert, than till such time as some able Philosopher or Theologer shall convince me of their falsity) there is nothing of any grand consideration in Theology or Nature that will not easily be extricated by this Hypothesis, an eminent part whereof is the Motion of the Earth and the Preæxistence of Souls. The evidence of the former of which Truths is such, that it has gone the assent of the most famous Mathematicians of our latter Ages; and the reasonableness of the latter is no lesse: there having never been any Philosopher that held the Soul of Man immortal, but he held that it did also preæxist.

But Religion not being curious to expose the full view of Truth to the people, but only what was most necessary to keep them in the fear of a Deity and obedience to the Law, contented her self with what merely concerned the state of the Soul after the dissolution of the Body, concealing whatever was conceivable concerning her condition before. Now, I say, it is a pretty priviledge of Falsity, (if this Hypothesis be false) and very remarkable, that it should better suit with the Attributes of God, the visible Events of Providence, the Phænomena of Nature, the Reason of Man, and the holy
holy Text it self, where men acknowledge a mysterious Cabbala, then that
which by all means must be accounted true, viz. That there is no such
totion of the Earth about the Sun, nor any Preexistence of Humane Souls.

Reader, I have done what lies on my part, that thou mayst perform this
Defence of mine without any rub or stumbling; let me now request but one
thing which thou art bound to grant, which is, That thou read my Defence
without Prejudice, and that all along as thou goest, thou make not thy re-
course to the customary conceits of thy Fancy, but consult with thy free Rea-
sion, to o. Öwq es yowemóxen, as Aristotle speaks in his Metaphysics:
For Cuitome is another Nature; and therefore those conceits that are
accustomed and familiar, we unawares appeal to, as if they were indeed
the natural Light of the Minde and her first Common Notions. And
he gives an Instance not altogether unsuitable to our present purpose; Πλάτων
ξύνοντες το σύνθεσις των τιμών ἑλώντας, ἐν οἷς τῇ μεν ημῶν καὶ 
τῶν ἑων ἐστίν ὑπερηφάνειά. The Philosopher may be
as bold as he pleases with the Ritual laws and Religious stories of the Hea-
thens, but I do not know that he ever was acquainted with the Law of
Moses. But I think I may speak it not without due Reverence, that there
is something of Aristotle's saying Analogically true in the very History of the
Creation, and that the first impressions of the Literal Text, which is so
plainly accommodated to the capacity of mere children and Idiots, by reason
of custom have so strongly rooted themselves in the minds of some, that they
take that sense to be more true than the true meaning of the Text indeed.
Which is plain in no meaner a person then one of the Fathers, namely,
Laetantius, who looking upon the world as a Tent, according to the de-
scription in the Literal Cabbala, did very stoutly and confidently deny An-
tipodes. So much did a customary Fancy prevail over the free use of his
Reason.

Thus much for better caution I thought fit to preface. The rest the In-
troduction to the Defence, and the very frame and nature of the Defence
itself, I hope will make good to the judicious and ingenious Reader.

THE
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INTRODUCTION

to

The Defence.

1. Diodorus his mistake concerning Moses, and other Law-givers that have professed themselves to have received their Laws from either God or some good Angel. 2. Reasons why Moses began his History with the Creation of the World. 3. The Sun and Moon the same with the Egyptians Osiris and Isis, and how they came to be worshipped for Gods. 4. The Apotheosis of mortal men, such as Bacchus and Ceres, how it first came into the world. 5. That the Letter of the Scripture speaks ordinarily in Philosophical things according to the sense and imagination of the Vulgar. 6. That there is a Philosophical sense that lies hid in the Letter of the Three first Chapters of Genesis. 7. That there is a Moral or Mystical sense not only in these three Chapters, but in several other places of the Scripture.

NOT to stay you with too tedious a Prologue to the matter in hand concerning the Author of this Book of Genesis, to wit, Moses; I shall look upon him mainly in reference to that publick indulment in which at the very first sight he will appear admirable, viz. as a Politician or a Law-giver. In which his skill was so great, that even in the judgment of Heathen Writers he had the preeminence above all the rest. Diodorus has placed him in the head of his Catalogue of the most famous Law-givers, under the name of Mnemos, if *Justin Martyr be not mistaken; or if he be, at least he bears them company that are reputed the best, reserved for the last and most notable Inflance of those that entitled their Laws divine, and made themselves Spoke-men betwixt God and the People. This Mnemos is said to receive his Laws from Mercury, as Minos from Jupiter, Lycurgus from Apollo, Zathraustes from his άγάσις δαιμόν; his good Genius, Zamolxis from Vesta, and Moses from Juh, that is, Jehovah, παρ μ' τοι Τεθέων Μονών 7 Ια ωπαχαλκεινον Θεόν. But he speaks like a mere Historian in the business, Περιενοθανάτων is the word which he boldly abuses to the diminution of all their Authorities promiscuously. For he says they feigned they received Laws from these Deities; and adds the reason...
reason of it too, but like an arrant States-man or an incredulous Philosopher, este Teamosius; 88 Sopius & Ionius; &c., *worthy of notice, and deserving to be considered deceitful himself is very but. The fact of his deceiving Sir Philip Viner, whether the vine grew. The having of such a name, as that of the Greek nations, Defts. By this, it is not that Diodorus Siculus, a man of a mere Political Spirit, (as it is very plain how near History and Policy are akin) should count the receiving of Laws from some Deity rather a piece of prudent fraud and political forgery then reality and truth.

But to leave Diodorus to his Ethnicism and Incredulity, as for us that ought to believe Scripture, if we will not gain-say the Authority of the Greek Text, we shall not only be fully perswaded of Moses his receiving of Laws from God’s own mouth, but have some hints to believe that something Analogical to it may have come to passe in other Law-givers. Deut. 32. Ote Avemurkxv 88 Tivos Évim, &c. When the most High divided the Nations, when he separated the sons of Adam, he set the bounds of the Nations according to the number of the Angels of God; but Jacob was the portion of Jehovah, that is, Iao, &c. So that it is not improbable but that as the great Angel of the Covenant, (he whom Philo calls Τῶν ἀγγέλων φρονοβομπατων, ι ἄρχαγγελον, λόγον, ἄρχηξ, ἕνορες ὥς, that is, the Eldest of the Angels, the Archangel, the Word, the Beginning, the Name of God, which is Jehovah) I say, that as he gave Laws to his charge, so the Tutelar Angels of other Nations might be the Instructors of those that they raised up to be Law-givers to their charge: Though in procefs of time the Nations that were at first under the Government of good Angels, by their lewdnesse and disobedience might make themselves obnoxious to the power and delusion of those ἀπατῶν δαιμόνες, as they are called, deceitful and tyrannical Devils. But this is but a digression; That which I would briefly have intimated is this, That Moses, the great Law-giver of the Jews, was a man instructed of God himself to Prudence and true Policy. And therefore I make account, if we will but with diligence search, we may surely finde the footsteps of unsophisticate Policy in all the passages of the whole Pentateuch.

2. And here in the very entrance it will offer it self unto our view: Where Moses shews himself such as that noble Spirit of Plato desires all Governors of Commonweals should be, who has in his Epistle to Dion and his friends foretold, that mankind will never ceafe to be miserable, till such time as either true and right Philosophers rule in the Commonwealth, or those that do rule apply themselves to true and sound Philosophy. And what is Moses his Bereftith but a fair invitation thereto; it comprehending at least the whole fabric of Nature and conspicuous furniture of the visible world? As if he dare appeal unto the whole Assembly of
of God's Creation, to the Voice of the great Universe, it what he pro-
pounds to his people over whom God hath set him, be not righteous and
true; and that by acting according to his Precepts, they would but ap-
prove themselves Cosmopolita's, true Citizens of the world, and Loyal Sub-
jects to God and Nature. It is Philo's interpretation upon the place;
which how true it is in Moses veiled, I will not here dispute: that it is
most true in Moses unveiled, Christ our Lord, is true without all dispute
and controversy. But to return to Moses,

Another reason no less considerable, why that holy and wise Law-
giver, Moses, should begin with the Creation of the world, is this: The
Laws and Ordinances which he gave to the Israelites were given by him
as ἔστασις δικαιοπροσώπων, as Statutes received from God. And therefore
the great argument and incitement to Obedience should lie in this first and
highest Law-giver, God himself, the great Jehovah, whose Wisdom,
Power and Goodness could not better be set out then by ascribing
the Creation of the whole visible world unto him. So that for his Power he
might be feared, admired for his Wisdom, and finally, for his Goodness
be loved, adored and Deified: That as he was truly in himself the most
High God, so he should be acknowledged of the people to be so.

For certainly there is nothing that doth so win away, nay, ravish or
carry captive, the minds of poor mankind, as Bounty and Munificence; all
men loving themselves most affectionately, and most of all the meagrest
and basest spirits, whose Souls are so far from being a little rais'd and
releas'd from themselves, that they do impotently and impetuously
clane and cling to their dear carkases. Hence have they, out of the strong
relish and favour of the pleasures and conveniencies thereof, made no
scruple of honouring them for Gods who have by their industry, or by
good luck, produced any thing that might conduce for the improvement
of the happiness and comfort of the Body.

3. From hence it is that the Sun and Moon have been accounted for
the two prime Deities by Idolatrous Antiquity, viz. from that sensible
good they conferred upon hungry mankind: The one watering as it
were the Earth by her humid influence; the other ripening the fruit of
the ground by his warm rays, and opening daily all the hid treasures of
the visible world by his glorious approach, pleasing the sight with the
variety of Natures objects, and cheering the whole body by his com-
fortable heat. To these, as to the most conspicuous Benefactors to man-
kind, was the name Θεος given, παρὰ τὰ Θεῖα, because they observed that
these conceived Deities were in perpetual motion.

These two are the Egyptians Osiris and Isis, and Five more are added
to them as very sensible Benefactors, but subordinate to these two, and
Dependents on them. And in plain speech they are these, Fire, Spirit,
Humidity, Siccity, and Air, but in their divine Titles, Vulcan, Jupiter,
Oceanus, Ceres, and Minerva. These are the οἱ αἰῶνι ἔλθον ἀντιστοιχεῖον Θεοῦ,
as * Diidorus speaks.

4. But after these mortal men were canonized for immortal Deities,
the οἱ ἔναντι τοῖς θεῖοι καὶ ναύ̃ων ἀντιστοιχεῖον, for their prudence and bene-
faction, as you may see at large in Diidorus Siculus. I will name but
I ᾱ 2 .
two for instance, Bacchus and Ceres, the one the Inventor of Corn, the other of Wine and Beer. So that all may be resolved into that brutish Aphorism,

Τὰ ἀνθρώποι μετὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τέκνων.

That which could please or pleasure degenerate mankind in the Body, (they having loft the Image of God in their Souls, and become mere Brutes after a manner) that must be their God.

Wherefore it was necessary for Moses, having to deal with such Terrestrial Spirits, Sons of Sense and Corporeity, to propose to them Jehovah as Maker of this Sensible and Corporeal world, that whatever sweet they suck out of the varieties thereof, they may attribute to him, as the first Fountain and Author, without whom neither they nor any thing else had been; that thereby they might be stirred up to praise his Name, and accomplish his Will revealed by his servant Moses unto them. And this was true and sound Prudence, aiming at nothing but the Glory of God, and the Good of the poor ignorant people.

5. And from the same Head springs the manner of his delivering of the Creation; that is, accommodately to the apprehension of the meanest: not speaking of things according to their very Essence and real Nature; but according to their Appearances to us: not starting of high and intricate Questions; and concluding them by subtile Arguments, but familiarly and condescendingly setting out the Creation, according to the most easie and obvious conceits they themselves had of those things they saw in the world; omitting even those groffer things that lay hid in the bowels of the Earth, as Metalls and Minerals, and the like, as well as those things that fall not at all under Sense, as those immaterial Substances, Angels or Intelligences. Thus truly has the Wildome and Goodness of God accommodated the outward Cortex of the Scripture to the most narrow and slow apprehension of the Vulgar.

Nor doth it therefore follow that the Narration must not be true, because it is according to the appearance of things to Sense and obvious Fancie; for there is also a Truth of Appearance, according to which Scripture most-what speaks in Philosophical matters.

And this Position is the main Key, as I conceive, and I hope shall hereafter plainly prove, whereby Moses his Bresibth may according to the Outward and Literal sense be understood without any difficulty or confusing one part against another.

First therefore, I say, that it is a thing confessed by the Learned Hebrews, who make it a Rule for the understanding of many places of Scripture, * Logitut lex juxta linguam humanam, That the Law speaks according to the language of the sons of men.

And secondly, (which will come more home to the purpose) I shall instance in some places of that necessity are to be thus understood,

Gen. 19. 23. The Sun was risen upon the Earth when Lot entred into Zoar; which implies that it was before under the Earth, which is true only according to Sense and vulgar Fancie.

Deuteronom. 30. v. 4. יִפְעֹל יָדֶם or אָמַר וַצְּבָא, implies that the Earth is bounded at certain places, as if there were truly an Hercules Pillar

R. Maimonid: "Moe Novach, part.1. cap.26."
or Non plus ultra: As it is manifest to them that understand but the natural signification of ῥυπ and ἄξετος, for those words plainly import the Earth bounded by the blew Heavens, and the Heavens bounded by the Horizon of the Earth, they touching one another mutually: which is true only to Sense and in appearance, as any man, that is not a mere Idiot, will confess.

Ecclesiastic. 27. v. 12. The discourse of a godly man is always with wisdom, but a fool changeth as the Moon. That is to be understood according to Sense and Appearance: For if a fool changeth no more then the Moon doth really, he is a wise and excellently accomplished man; Semper idem, though to the sight of the Vulgar different. For at least an Hemisphere of the Moon is always enlightened, and even then most when the least appears unto us.

Hitherto may be referred also that, 2 Chron. 4.2. Also he made a molten Sea ten cubits from brim to brim, round in compass, and five cubits the height thereof; and a line of thirty cubits did compass it round about. A thing plainly impossible, that the Diameter should be ten cubits and the Circumference but thirty. But it pleaseth the Spirit of God here to speak according to the common use and opinion of men, and not according to the subtlety of Archimedes his demonstration.

Again Psalm 19. In them hath he set a Tabernacle for the Sun, which as a Bridegroom cometh out of his chamber, and rejoiceth as a strong man to run his race. This, as Mr. John Calvin observes, is spoken according to the rude apprehension of the Vulgar, whom David should in vain have endeavoured to teach the mysteries of Astronomy: And therefore he makes no mention of the course of the Sun in the noftrual Hemisphere.

Add to these Joshua 10. v. 12. Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon, and thou Moon in the Valley of Ajalon; where it is manifest that Joshua speaks not according to the Astronomical truth of the thing, but according to Sense and Appearance. For suppose the Sun placed, and the Moon, at the best advantage you can, so that they leave not their natural course, they were so far from being one over Ajalon, and the other over Gibeon, that they were in very truth many hundreds of miles distant from them. And if the Sun and Moon were on the other side of the Equator, the distance might amount to thousands.

Lastly, (and then which nothing is more considerable,) The Letter of the Scripture bounds the Extent of the World no higher then the Clouds, or thereabout; as is very apparent.

First, because the Clouds are made the place of God’s abode; whence we are to suppose them placed with the highest. There he lives, and runs, and rides, and walks. He came walking upon the wings of the wind, in the 104 Psalm. Who layeth the beams of his chambers in the waters, who maketh the clouds his chariot, and walketh on the wings of the wind: Laieth the beams of His chambers in the waters, to wit, the upper waters, which are the Clouds. The Almighty’s lodgings therefore according to the letter are placed in the Clouds.

Thereabout also is his field for exercise and war, Deut. 33. 26. There is none like to the God of Jeshurun, who rideth upon the Heavens for thy help.
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Help in his excellency on the sky, that is, upon the upper clouds, as Buxtorf interprets it; and indeed what can signify properly signify above, but clouds? for below it signifies pulvis tenuissimus, small dust; and the clouds are as it were the dust of heaven. Vatablus also interprets that place of God's riding on the Clouds. And this agrees well with that of Nahum, chap. 1. v. 3. The Lord hath his way in the whirlwind, and the clouds are the dust of his feet. Here he is running as swift as a whirlwind, and raiseth a dust of clouds about him.

You shall find him riding again, Psalm 68. 4. and that in triumph; but yet but on the Clouds; (luturally to that in Deut.) Sing unto God, sing praises unto his Name, extoll Him that rideth upon the Heavens by his name of Ah; and rejoice before Him. That rideth upon the Heavens; the Hebrew is רַלֹּחֵךְ אָוֵּר, which I would be bold, with Aben Ezra's leave, to translate, that rideth upon the Clouds: for clouds cause darkness, and the root from whence רַלֹּחֵךְ comes is רַלֹּחְ, which signifies obtenebrarii, obscurarii. But for the ground of this Rabbies interpretation, to wit, upon the heavens, it is taken out of the 33 verse of the 68 Psalm, To him that rideth upon the Heavens of heavens of old. But if we read on there, we shall find that those heavens of heavens, in all probability, reach no higher then the Clouds: For let's read the whole verse together, To him that rideth upon the Heavens of heavens that were of old; Lo, he doth send out his voice, and that a mighty voice; what's that but Thunder? and whence is Thunder but out of the Clouds? and where then doth God ride but on the Clouds? The following verse makes all plain: Assignment strength unto God; His excellency is over Israel, and his strength is in the clouds: which doth notably confirm, that the Extent of the Heavens, according to the letter of Moses and David too, are but about the height of the clouds. For here the Heaven of heavens is the seat of Thunder, and God's strength and power is said to be in the Clouds, Nor doth this expression of this height, to wit, the Heaven of heavens of old, imply any distance higher. For first all the Firmament from the lower to the upper waters is called Heaven; it is not a whit unreasonable that the highest part of this Heaven or Firmament be called the Heaven of Heavens. And this is my first Argument that the Heaven or Firmament's Extent is but from the Sea to the Clouds, according to the outward phrase of Scripture, namely because God is seated no higher.

My second Argument is taken from the adjoining the Heavens with the Clouds exegetically, one with another, for the setting out of that which is exceeding high, as high as we can express. And this the Psalmist doth often. Psalm 36. 5. Thy mercy, O Lord, is in the Heavens, and thy faithfulness reacheth unto the Clouds. And Psalm 57. 10. For thy mercy is great unto the Heavens, and thy truth unto the Clouds. And Psalm 108. 4. For thy mercy is great above the Heavens, and thy truth reacheth above the Clouds. Where Heaven and Clouds set off one and the same height, that which is exceeding high, the mercy and truth of God.

My last Argument is from the Psalmist placing the Sun ἐν τοῖς σύνθεσιν, in the clouds, or in the cloudy heaven. For the word must so signify, as I did above prove, both from Testimony, and might also from the Etymon of
of the word. For פָּרַשׁ signifies comminure, contundere, to beat to dust: and what are Clouds but the dust of heaven, as I may so speak? Psalm 89. v. 36, 37. His seed shall endure for ever, and his throne as the Sun before me: It shall be established for ever as the Moon, and as the faithful witness פָּרַשׁ in heaven: that is, in the sky, the place where the Clouds are. The drawing down therefore of the Sun, that faithfull witness in heaven, so low as the Clouds, implies that the Letter of the Scripture takes no notice of any consideratle part of the Firmament above the Clouds, it terminating its expressions always at that Extent. And this suits very well with Moses his calling the Sun and the Moon the great Lights, and making nothing as it were of the Starres; as is manifest out of the 16 verse of the first of Genesis, And God made two great Lights, the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser to rule the night; He made the Starres also. But they come as cast into the bargain, as not so considerable, whereas indeed a Star of the first magnitude is (according to the calculation of the Astronomers) twenty thousand times bigger then the Earth, and the Earth five and forty times bigger then the Moon; so that one Star of the first magnitude will prove about nine hundred thousand times bigger then the Moon. Which notwithstanding, according to the Letter of Moses, is one of the two great Lights, the sole Empresse of the night.

But here the Letter of Moses is very consistant within itself: For if that the Extent of heaven is not acknowledged any higher then the Clouds, or thereabout, wherein, as I shew you, the Sun is, and consequently the Moon, and it will not more hard to make the stars stoope so low too, (nay, they must indeed of necessity all of them be so low, they having no where else to be higher, according to the usual phrase of Scripture,) the appearances of them all to our sight will sufficiently set out their proportions one to another, and the Sun and the Moon (according to this Hypothesis) will prove the two great Lights, and the Stars but scatter’d sky-pebbles. Wherefore from all this harmony and corresponding of things I think I may safely conclude, That the Extent of the Firmament, according to Moses, is but the distance from the Sea to the Clouds, or thereabouts, as well as it is to our sight, which cannot discern any intervall of altitudes betwixt the Clouds and the Moon, the Moon and the Sun, and lastly betwixt the Sun and the fixed Starres.

I might adjoin to these Proofs the Suffrages of many Fathers and Modern Divines, as Chrysostome, Ambrose, Augustine, Bernard, Aquinas, and the rest. But it is already manifest enough That the Scripture speaks not according to the exact curiosity of Truth, describing things καθ' ευγενείαν, according to the very Nature and Essence of them; but κατ' εικονα, according to their appearance in Sense and the vulgar opinion.

6. The Second Rule that I would set down is this, That there is a various Intertexture of Theosophical and Philosophical Truths, many Physical and Metaphysical Theorems hinted to us ever and anon, through those words that at first sight seem to bear but an ordinary gross sense; I mean especially in these Three first Chapters of Genesis. And a man will be the better assured of the truth of this Position, if he do but consider, That the Literal Text of Moses that sets out the Creation of the world,
world, and offers reasons of sundry notable Phenomena of Nature, bears altogether a most palpable compliance with the mere rude and ignorant conceits of the Vulgar. Wherefore the Argument of these Three Chapters being so Philosophical as it is, it seems unworthy of that knowing Spirit of Moses, or of Religion it self, that he should not contrive under the external contexure of this Narration some very singular and choice Theorems of Natural Philosophy and Metaphysicks, which his pious and learned successors should be able by some secret Tradtionary Doctrine or Cabbala to apply to his outward Text.

For what an excellent provision is this for such of the people, whose pregnancy of parts and wit might make them rest unsatisfied, as well in the Moral Allegory (into which they are first to be initiated) as in the outward Letter it self, and also their due obedience, humility, and integrity of life, make them fit to receive some more secret Philosophick Cabbala from the mouth of the knowing Priest. The strange unexpected richness and height of the Sense whereof, and highness of Notion suddenly shining forth by removing aside of the veil, might strike the Soul of the honest Jew with unexpressible pleasure and amazement, and fill his heart with joy and thankfulness to God for the good tidings therein contained, and conciliate greater reverence then ever to Moses and to Religion.

Wherefore such a Philosophick Cabbala as this being so convenient and desirable, and men in all Ages having professed their expectation of solid and severe Philosopy in this Story of the Creation by their severall attempts thereupon, it seems to me abundantly probable that Moses and his successors were furnished with some such like Cabbala: which I am still the more easily induced to believe, from that credible, that Pythagoras and Plato had their Philosophy from Moses his Text, which it would not so easily have suggested unto them, had they had no assistance from either Jewish or Egyptian Prophet or Priest to expound it.

7. The Third and last Rule that I would lay down is this, That Natural Things, Persons, Motions and Actions, declared or spoken of in Scripture, admit of so many times a Mystical, Moral or Allegorical Sense. This is worth the proving, it concerning our Souls more nearly then the other. I know this Spiritual Sense is as great a fear to some faint and unbelieving hearts as a Spectre or Night-Spirit. But it is a thing acknowledged by the most wise, most pious, and most rational of the Jewish Doctors. I will in finace in one who is ad instar omnium, * Moses Egyptian, who compares the divine Oracles to Apples of Gold in Pictures of Silver. For that the outward Nitor is very comely as Silver curiously cut through and wrought, but the inward Spiritual or Mystical Sense is the Gold more precious and more beautiful, that glisterns through those Cuttings and Artificial Carvings in the Letter.

I will endeavour to prove this point by sundry passages in Scripture; Psalm 25. 4. ה"ניא מ"ד כ"ניא ו"תניא ל"תוניאוק יי. The safe and genuine Sense of these words is, The Secret of the Lord is for them that fear him, and his Covenant is to make them know it, viz, his Secret, which implies that the Mysterie of God lies not bare to false and adulterous eyes, but is hid and wrapped up in decent coverings from the sight of Vulgar and Carnal

*Iamblich, de vita Pythag. cap. 3.*
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nal men: That his *Secrets* are, as *Aristotle* answered to *Alexander* concerning his *Proslogia, or A grammatical Writings*, that they were *ονομασιον σωματοσφας*, published and not published. And our Saviour himself, though all Goodness, was not so prodigal of his Pearls as to call them to Swine; to them that were without he *spake Parables*: And upon the same Principles certainly it is not a white unreasonable to conceive *Moses to write Types and Allegories*. And we have sufficient ground to think so from that of the Apostle 1 Cor. ch. 10, where when he hath in several reckoned up some of the main passages that befell the *Israelites* in their Journey from *Egypt* to *Canaan*, (which ye no man that hath any faith or the fear of God before his eyes will deny to be a real History) he closes with this expression, *All these things being Types befell them, but were written for our instruction, on whom the ends of the world are come.* So Galat, ch. 4. The History of *Abraham's* having two sons, *Ishmael* and *Izaak*, the one of the bond-woman, the other of the free, *viz. Agar* and *Sara*, the same Apostle there speaks out, *that they are an Allegory*, ver. 24.

I might add many other passages to this purpose; but I will only raise one Consideration concerning many Histories of the Old Testament, and then conclude. If so be the Spirit of God meant not something more by them then the mere History, I mean some useful and *Spiritual Truth* involved in them, they will be so far from stirring us up to Piety, that they may prove ill Precedents for falLENess and injurious dealings.

For what an easie thing is it for a man to fancy himself an *Israelite*, and then to circumvent his honest neighbours under the notion of *Egyptians*? But we will not confine our selves to this one solitary Instance. What is *Jacob* but a *Supplanter*, a Deceiver, and that of his own brother? For taking advantage of his present necessity, he forced him to fell his birth-right for a morsel of potage. What a notorious piece of fraud is that of *Rebecca*, that while industrious *Esau* is ranging the Woods and Mountains to fulfill his father's command and please his aged appetite, she should substitute *Jacob* with his both counterfeit Hands and Venison, to carry away the blessing intended by the good old man for his officious elder son *Esau*? *Jacob* 's rods of Poplar, an ill example to servants to defraud their masters; and *Rachel* 's stealing *Laban's* *Teraphim*, and concealing them with a falsehood, how warrantable an act it was, let her own husband give sentence; *With whomsoever thou findest thy God, let him not live.*

I might be infinite in this point, I will only add one example of Women's perfidious cruelty, as it will seem at first sight, and so conclude. *Sisera* Captain of *Jabin's* host being worsted by *Israel*, fled on his feet to the Tent of *Jael*, the wife of *Heber the Kenite*, who was in league and confederacy with *Jabin*. This *Jael* was in new so courteous as to meet *Sisera*, and invite him into her Tent, saying, *Turn in, my Lord, turn in to me, fear not*. And when he had turned in unto her into the Tent, she covered him with a mantle. And he said unto her, *Give me, I pray thee, a little water to drink:* And she opened a bottle of *Milk*, and
and gave him drink, and covered him. In short, he trusted her with his life, and gave himself to her protection, and she suddenly soon as he fell asleep drove a nail with an hammer into his temples, and betrayed his Corps to the will of his enemies. An act certainly that the Spirit of God would not have approved, much less applauded so much, but in reference to the Mysterie that lies under it.

My three Rules for the interpreting of Scripture I have, I hope, by this time sufficiently established, by way of a more general preparation to the Defence of my threesfold Cabbala. I shall now apply myself to a more particular clearing and confirming the several passages therein.
THE

DEFENCE

OF

The Literal Cabbala.

CHAP. I.

1. The genuine sense of In the beginning. The difference of תּוֹאֵב, וְשָׁרֵש, אֵ֣בֶר only וּלְתָּנָ֣א. 2. The ground of their mistake discovered, who conceive Moses to intimate that the Matter is uncreated. That רָזִּים לאָלָדְיוֹם is no more thenventus magnus. 4, 5. That the first darkness was not properly Night. 6. Why the Seventy translate שְׁבָּעַתָּנה Fermamentum, and that it is in allusion to a firmly-pitched Tent. 11. That the sensible Effects of the Sun invited the Heathen to Idolatry, and that their Oracles taught them to call him by the name of Jao. 14. That the Prophet Jeremy divides the day from the Sun, speaking according to the vulgar capacity. 15. The reason why the Stars appear on this side the upper ceruleous Sea. 27. The Opinion of the Anthropomorphites, and of what great consequence it is for the Vulgar to imagine God in the shape of a Man. Aristophanes his story in Plato of Men and Women growing together at first, as if they made both but one Animal.

The first Rule that I laid down in my Introduction to the Defence of my Threesfold Cabbala I need not here again repeat, but desire the Reader only to carry it in minde, and it will warrant the eafe and familiar sense that I shall settle upon Moses his Text in the Literal meaning thereof. Unto which if I addde also reasons from the pious prudence of this holy Law-giver, shewing how every passage makes for greater Faith in God, and more affectionate Obedience to his Law, there will be nothing wanting, I think, (though I shall sometimes cast in some notable advantages also from Critical Learning) that may gain belief to the truth of the Interpretation.

Verf. 1. In this first verse I put no other sense of In the beginning, then that it denotes to us the order of the History. Which is also the opinion of Maimonides, who deriving פּוֹתָר from פּוֹתָר, signifying the Head, rightly observes the Analogy; that as the Head is the forepart of a living
a living creature, so מָאָסָר signifies that which is placed first in any thing else: and that thus the Creation of the world is the Head or Forepart of the History that Moses intends to set down.

Wherefore Moses having in his minde (as is plain from the Title of this Book, Genesis, as well as the matter therein contained) to write an History and Genealogy from the Beginning of the World to his own time, it is very easie and obvious to conceive, that in reference to what he should after adde, he said, In the beginning; as if the whole frame of his thoughts lay thus. First of all, God made the Heavens and the Earth, with all that they contain, the Sun, Moon, and Stars, the Day and Night, the Plants, and living creatures that were in the Air, Water, and on the Earth; and after all these he made Adam, and Adam begot Cain and Abel, and so on in the full continuance of the History and Genealogies.

And this sense I conceive is more easie and natural then that of Austin, Ambrose and Basil, who will have In the Beginning to signify In the Beginning of Time, or In the Beginning of the World. And yet I thought it not amiss to name also these, that the Reader may take his choice.

God made Heaven and Earth, Maimonides and Manasseh Ben Israel observe these three words used in Scripture, when Creation of the world is attributed to God, viz. אַלֵיהֶם, נַעֲשֶׂה, וָנֶפֶשׁ; and that עֲשָׂר signifies the production of things out of nothing, which is the Schools Notion of Creation; נָעֲשֶׂה is the making up a thing perfect and compleat, according to its own kind and properties; וָנֹפֶל intimates the dominion and right possession that God has of all things thus created or made. But though עַשָּׂר according to the mind of the Learned Jews signifies Creation properly so called; yet the Seventy observe no such Criticism, but translate it ἐξοίσεω, which is no more then made. And vulgar men are not at leisure to distinguishing so subtly. Wherefore this latter sense I receive as the vulgar Literal sense, the other as Philosophical. And where I use the word Creation in this Literal Cabbala, I understand but that common and general Notion of Making a thing, be it with what circumstances it will.

Neither do I translate מִשָּׂרֶה in the plural number, the Trinity because; as Vatablus observes out of the Hebrew Doctors, that when the inferior speaks of his superiour, he speaks of him in the Plural Number. So *Esa* 19. 4, Tradam Εὐρυτόν in manum dominorum duci; and *Exod*. 22. 10, Et accipiet domini ejus, for dominus. The Text therefore necessaril requiring no such sense, and the mysterie being so abstrufe, it is rightly left out in this Literal Cabbala.

Vers. 2. In the first verse there was a summary Propofal of the whole Creation in those two main parts of it, Heaven and Earth. Now he begins the particular prosecution of each day's work. But it is not needful for him here again to inculcate the making of the Earth: For it is the last word he spake in his general Propofal, and therefore it had been harft or needless to have repeated it presently again. And that's the reason why before the making of the Earth there is not prefixed, And the Lord said, Let there be an Earth. Which I conceive has imposed upon the ignorance and inconsiderateness of some, so as to make them believe that this confused muddy heap which is called the Earth was an Eternal First Matter,
Matter, independent of God, and never created by him: Which, if a man appeal to his own Faculties, is impossible, as I shall again intimate when I come to the Philosophick Cabbala.

The Sense therefore is, That the Earth was made first, which was covered with Water, and on the Water was the Wind, and in all this a thick Darkness. And God was in this dark, windy and wet Night. So that this Globe of Earth, and Water, and Wind, was but one dark Tempest and Sea-storm, a Night of Confusion and tumultuous Agitation. For D'Hy' is not in the Letter any thing more then Ventus ingens, A great and mighty wind; as the Cedars of God, and Mountains of God, are tall Cedars, great Mountains, and so in Analogy, the Wind of God, a great Wind.

Vers. 3. But in the midst of this tempestuous darkness, God intending to fall to his work, doth as it were light his Lamp, or set up himself a Candle and Lanthorne in this dark Shop. And whatever hitherto hath been mentioned, are words that strike the Fancy and Sense strongly, and are of easier perception to the rude people, whom every dark and stormy Night may well re-mind of the sad face of things till God commanded the comfortable Day to spring forth, the sole Author of Light, that so pleases the eyes and cheers the Spirits of Man.

And that Day-light is a thing independent of the Sun, as well as the Night of the Stars, is a conceit wondrous futable to the imaginations of the Vulgar, as I have my self found out by conversing with them. They are also prone to think, unless there be a sensible Wind stirring, that there is nothing betwixt the Earth and the Clouds, but that it is a mere vacuity. Wherefore I have not translated οὐκ ἔχει ἄν οὐκ ἐν οὐκ, as Maimonides somewhere does, but a mighty wind, for that the rude people are sensible of; and making the first deformed face of things so dismal and tempestuous, it will caufe them to remember the first Morning light with more thankfulness and devotion.

Vers. 4. For it is a thing very visible. See what is said upon the eighth verse.

Vers. 5. By Evening and Morning is meant the Artificial Day and the Artificial Night, by a Synecdoche, as Castello in his Notes tells us. Therefore this Artificial Day and Night put together make one Νυερος, or Natural Day. And the Evening is put before the Morning, Night before Day, because Darkness is before Light. But that Primitive darkness was not properly Night: For Night is μεγάλη σκιά, as Aristotle describes it, one great Shadow cast from the Earth, which implies Light of one side thereof. And therefore Night properly so called could not be before Light. But the illiterate people trouble themselves with so much curiosities, nor easily conceive any such difference betwixt that determinate Conical Shadow of the Earth, which is Night; and that infinite Primitive Darkness, that had no bounds before there was any Light. And therefore that name Darkness prefixed to an Artificial Day makes up one Natural Day to them: Which He made also swallows down without chewing, whether following his own fancy, or this Text of Moses, I know not.
That is,

But of the Night both Day and Skie were born.

Ver. 6. This Basis or Floor. That the Earth seems like a round Floor, plain and running out so every way as to join with the bottome of the Heavens, I have in my Introduction hinted to you already; and that it is look'd upon as such in the phrase of Scripture, accommodating it self to our outward Senfes and vulgar conceit. Upon this Floor stands the hollow Firmament, as a Tent pitched upon the ground; which is the very expression of the Prophet E'say, describing the Power of God, That stretcheth out the Heavens like a Curtain, and streareth them out as a Tent to dwell in. And the word יִשְׁרֵא, which is usually rendered Firmament, signifies diduction, expansion, or spreading out. But how the Seventy come to interpret it ἀπόθομα Firmamentum, Fuller in his Miscellanies gives a very ingenious reason, and such as makes very much to our purpose. Nam cum fen יִשְׁרֵא (faith he) quandoquidem Tentorio sapitisme in Sacris literis afimilatur, μεγάλω διετή, quatenus expanditur. Sic enim expandi salent Tentoria, cum alligatis ad paxillos in terram depactus simulim diffunduntur, atque hoc etiam paxtis firmantur. Itaque יִשְׁרֵא immensum quadratum, ut ita dicam, יִשְׁרֵא, ideoque ἀπόθομα non inepti appelletur. The sense of which in brief is nothing but this, That the Seventy translate יִשְׁרֵא ἀπόθωμα, that is, Firmamentum, because the Heavens are spread out like a well-fafted and firmly-pitched Tent. And I adde also, that they are so fifty firetched, that they will strongly bear against the weight of the Upper waters, so that they are not able to break them down, and thereby to drown the world. Which conceit as it is eafe and agreeable with the Fancy of the people, so is it so far from doing them any hurt, that it will make them more sensible of the Divine Power and Providence, who thus by main force keeps off a Sea of water that hangs over their heads, which they discern through the transparent Firmament, (for it looks blew as other Seas do,) and would ruftat once upon them and drown them, did not the Power of God and the strength of the Firmament hold it off.

Ver. 7. See what hath been already said upon the sixth verse. I will only here add, That the nearness of these Upper waters makes them still the more formidable, and so they are greater spurts to devotion: For as they are brought so near as to touch the Earth at the bottome, so outward Sense still being Judge, they are to be within a small distance of the Clouds at the top. And that these Upper waters are no higher then so, it is manifest from other passages in Scripture that place the habitation of God but amongst the Clouds, who yet is called the most High. Psalm 104.3. Deut.33.26. Nahum 1.3. Psalm 68.4. But of this I have treated so fully in my Introduction, that I hold it needless to add any thing more.

Ver. 8. I cannot say properly that God saw it was good. In the whole story of the Three first Chapters, it is evident that God is represented in the person of a Man, speaking with a mouth, and seeing with eyes. Hence it is that, the Firmament being of it self invisible, Moses omits the sayng,
saying, that God saw it was good: For the nature of the Eye is only to see things visible.

Some say, God made Hell the second day, and that that is the reason it was not recorded, that be saw it was good. But if he did not approve of it as good, why did he make it? However that can be none of the Literal sense, and so impertinent to this present Cabbala,

**Vers. 10.** And I may now properly say, &c. See what hath been said already upon verse the eighth.

**Vers. 11.** Whence you may easily discern, &c. This Observation is Philo the Jew's, which you may read at large in his peri Koepoloides. And it was very fit for Moses, who in his Law, which he received from God, does so much insist upon Temporal blessings and eating of the good things of the Land, as a reward of their obedience, to lay down such Principles as should beget a firm belief of the absolute power of God over Nature: That he could give them rain, and fruitful seasons, and a plentiful year when he pleased; whereas he could cause the Earth to bring forth without rain, or any thing else to further her births, as he did at the first Creation. The Meditation whereof might well cause such an holy resolution as that in the Prophet Habakkuk, Although the fig-tree Chap. 3 17.

shall not blossom, neither fruit be in the Vines, the labour of the Olive fail, and the fields yield no meat; yet I will rejoice in the Lord, I will joy in the God of my salvation. But that prudent and pious caution of Moses against Idolatry, how requisite it was, is plain if we consider that the power of the Sun is so manifest, and his operation so sensible upon the Earth for the production of things below, especially of Plants, that he hath generally drawn aside the rude and simple Heathen to idolize him for a God: And their nimble Oracles have snatched away the sacred Name of the God of Israel, the true God, to bestow upon him, calling him Jao, sata.nal.lib 18. which is Jehovah; as is plain from that Clarian Oracle in Macrobius,

Which I have translated thus in my Poems:

That Heavenly Power which Jao bight,
The high'st of all the Gods thou maist declare,
In Spring nam'd Zeus, in Summer Helios bright;
In Autumn call'd Jao, Aides in brumal night.

These names do plainly denotate the Sun,
In Spring call'd Zeus, from life or kindly heat;
In Winter, cause the day's so quickly done,
He Aides bight, he is not long in sight;
In Summer, cause he strongly doth us smite
With his hot darts, then Helios we him name,
From Eloim or Eloah so bight;
In Autumn Jao, Jehovah is the same.
So is the word deprav'd by an uncertain name;
This Oracle Cornelius Laboe interprets of Bacchus, which is the same with the Sun, who is the God of the Vintage, and is here described according to the four Quarters of the year.

And so Virgil, Heathen-like, attributes to the Sun and Moon, under the name of Bacchus and Ceres, that great bleffing of Corn and Grain.

--- Vestro si numine Tellus

Chaontiam pingui glandem mutavit ariôs.

If by your providence the Earth has born
For courte Chaonian Acorns full-ear’d Corn.

But of this I have said so much in my Introduction, that I need add nothing more.

Vers. 12. See verf. 11.

Vers. 14. See verf. 3. I have there shewn how easily the Fancie of rude people admit of days without a Sun. To whose capacities the Prophet Jeremiy accommodating his speech, Her Sun, fayes he, is gone down while it was yet day. How can it be day when the Sun is down, unless the day be independent of the Sun, according to the Fancie of the rude and illiterate? Which is wonderfully confonant to the outward letter of Moses, that speaks not of the Sun as the caufe of the Day, but as a badge of diffinction from the Night, though he does admit that it does increase the light thereof.

Vers. 15. In the hollow roof, &c. Though the ceruleous upper Sea seems fo near us, as I have already signified, yet the Lights of Heaven seem something on this fide it, as white will stand off drawn upon a darker colour, as you may see in the describing solid Figures on a blew flate, they will more easily rife to your eye then black upon white: so that the people may very well, confulting with their fight, imagine the Firmament to be betwixt the Lights of Heaven and the upper Waters or that blew Sea they look upon, not on this fide, nor properly betwixt the Lights or Stars.

Vers. 16. Two great Lights, &c. This is in counter-diftinction to the Stars, which indeed seem much less to our figh then the Sun or Moon; whenas notwithstanding many Stars, according to Aftromers computation, are bigger then the Sun, all far bigger then the Moon. So that it is plain the Scripture speaks sometimes according to the appearance of things to our figh, not according to their absolute affections and properties. And he that will not here yield this for a truth, is, I think, juftly to be suspected of more Ignorance then Religion, and of more Superflition then Reafon.

For their smallnesse, &c. The Stars indeed seem very small to our figh, and therefore Moses seems to call them in but by the by, complying therein with the ignorance of the unlearned. But Aftromers, who have made it their buifiness to understand their magnitudes, they that make the moft frugal computation concerning the bigger Stars, pronounce them no less then sixty eight times bigger then the Earth, others much more.


Vers. 20. Fish and Fowl. I suppose the mention of the Fowl is made here with the Fish, by reafon that the greatest and more eminent forts of that
that: kind of creature most of all frequent the waters, as Swans, Geese, Ducks, Herons, and the like.

Ver. 27. In his own shape. It was the opinion of the Anthropomorphites, That God had all the parts of a Man, and that we are in this sense made according to his Image: Which though it be an opinion in it self, if not rightly understood, vain and ridiculous; yet theirs seem little better to me that imagine God a Finite Being, and take care to place him out of the stink of this terrestrial Globe, that he may sit εγκατατμησει και ἑπὶ

thenifie, and so confine him to Heaven, as Aristotle seems to doe, if he be the Author of that Book De Mundo: For it is a contradiction to the very Idea of God to be Finite, and consequently to have Figure or Parts. But it is so difficult a thing for the rude multitude to venture at a Notion of a Being Immaterial and Infinite, that it seems their advantage to conceive of God as of some all-powerful Person, that can doe whatever he pleaseth, can make Heavens and Earths, and bestow his blessings in what measure and manner he lift; and (what is chief of all) if need be, can personally appear to them, can chide them, and rebuke them, and, if they be obstinate, doe horrible vengeance upon them. This, I say, will more strongly strike the inward Sense and Imagination of the vulgar then omnipotency placed in a Thin, Subtile, Invisible, Immaterial Being, of which they can have no perception at all nor any tolerable conceit.

Wherefore it being requisite for the ignorant, to be permitted to have some Finite and Figurate apprehension of God, what can be more fit then the Shape of a Man in the highest excellencies that it is capable of, for Beauty, Strength, and Bigness? And the Prophet Esay seems to speak of God after this Notion, God fits upon the circle of the Earth, and the inhabitants thereof are as Crafhoppers; intimating that men to God bear as little proportion as Crafhoppers to a man when he fits on the grasse amongst them. And now there being this necessity of permitting the people some such like apprehensions as this concerning God, (and it is true Prudence and pious Policy to comply with their weakness for their good) there were the most thift injunctions laid upon them against Idolatry and worshipping of Images that might be.

But if any one will say this was the next way to bring them into Idolatry, to let them entertain a conceit of God as in Humane shape; I say, it is not any more then by acknowledging Man to be God, as our Religion does, in Christ. Nay, I add moreover, that Christ is the true Deus Figuratus: and for his sake was it the more easily permitted unto the Jews to think of God in the shape of a Man.

And that there ought to be such a thing as Christ, that is, God in Humane shape, I think it most reasonable, that he may apparently visit the Earth, and to their very outward senses confound the Atheist and misbeliever at the last day. As he wittsteth of himself, The Father judges none, but he hath given all Judgment unto the Son: And that no man can see the Father but as he is united unto the Son. For the Eternal God is Immaterial and Invisible to our outward Senses; but he hath thought good to treat with us, both in mercy and judgment, by a Mediator and Vicegerent, that partakes of our nature as well as his own. Wherefore it is
not at all absurd for Moses to suffer the Jews to conceive of God as in a corporeal and humane shape, since all men shall be judged by God in that shape at the last day.

He made Females as well as Males. That Story in Plato his Symposium, how men and women grew together at first till God cut them asunder, is a very probable argument that the Philosopher had seen or heard something of this Mosaic History. But that it was his opinion it was so, I see no probability at all: For the story is told by that ridiculous Co-
meedian Aristophanes, with whom I conceive he is in some sort quit, for abusing his good old Friend and Tutor Socrates, whom he brought in upon the stage ἄρα εὐθύς, treading the Air in a basket, to make him a laughing-stock to all Athens.

The Text is indeed capable of such a sense; but there being no reason to put that sense upon it, neither being a thing so accommodated to the capacity and conceit of the vulgar, I thought it not fit to admit it, no not so much as into this Literal Cabbala.

Vers. 29. Frugiferous. Caubello translates it so, Herbas frugiferas, which must be such like Herbs as I have named, Strawberries, Wheat, Rice, and the like.

CHAP. II.

7. The notation of ᾿ανάσῃ answersable to the breathing of Adam's Soul into his nostrils. 8. The exact situation of Paradise, That Gihon is part of Euphrates; Pison, Phasis, or Phasitigris. That the Medes are called Æthiopians. That Paradise was seated about Mesoopotamia, argued by six Reasons. That it was more particularly seated where now Apmia stands in Ptolemie's Maps. 18. The Prudence of Moses in the commendation of Matrimony. 19. Why Adam is not recorded to have given names to the Fishes. 24. Abraham Ben Ezra's conceit of the names of Adam and Eve as they are called וָיָּם and וֶשֶׁנ. 25. Moses his wife Anthophthora concerning the natural shame of nakedness.

In the four first verses all is so clear and plain, that there is no need of any further Explication or Defence, saving that you may take notice that in the second verse, where I write Within six days, the Seventies Translation will warrant it, who render it τρεῖς ἡμέραι, on the sixth day.

Vers. 5. See what hath been said on the eleventh verse of the first Chapter.

Vers. 6. A mighty Torrent of Water. For the Seventy render יָּם, יָּם, Fons, Aquila, Εὕρωγμα, Eruptio. And the ordinary Eruption of Springs out of the ground may be a popular assurance, that that Water that covered the face of the Earth first broke out from thence, but was after driven into one place by the power of God, that there might be dry Land; and is imply'd here to be so very dry, that the Omnipo-
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rance of God might be the more manifest in making of Adam out of this dry Dust.

But this scope might be more compendiously reached though the were rendred Vapor; (as most do render it) if the Negative in the foregoing verse might be repeated and wound, as R. Schadiah reads it, Nec quisquam erat qui coleret terram, nec vapor ascenderat, &c. To which fenre R. D. K. gives his suffrage right willingly. See P. Fagius upon the place.

Vers. 7. The dust. The Hebrew word signifies so, and I make no mention of any moistning of it with water; for God is here set out acting according to his absolute Power and Omnipotency: And it is as easy to make men of dry dust as hard stones; and yet God is able even of stones to raise up children unto Abraham.

Blew into the nostrils. Breathing is so palpable an effect of life, that the ancient rude Greeks also gave the Soul its name from that operation, calling it Φων from Φωνεῖν to breathe or to blow.


To prevent any further trouble in making good the senre I have put upon the following verses concerning Paradise, I shall here at once set down what I finde most probable concerning the situation thereof, out of Vatablus and Cornelius à Lapide, adding also somewhat out of Dionysius the Geographical Poet. In general therefore we are led by the four Rivers to the right situation of Paradise. And Gibon, faith Vatablus, est tractus inferior Euphratis illabens in sinum Persicum, is a lower tract or stream of Euphrates that slides into the Persin Gulph. Pison is Phasis or Phasis-tigris, that runs through Havilah, a region near Persis; so that Pison is a branch of Tigris, as Gibon is of Euphrates. Thus Vatablus. And that Gibon may have his Ethiopia, Cornelius à Lapide notes, that the Medians, and others near the Persian Gulph, are called Ethiopians; and therefore he concludes first at large, that Paradise was seated about Mesopotamia and Armenia, from thence Reasons following.

Firstly, Because thefe Regions are called Easern in Scripture, (which, as I have said, is to be understood always in reference to Judea) according to the rule of Expofitors. And the Lord is said to have planted this Garden of Paradise Easward.

Secondly, Because Man being caft out of Paradise, these Regions were inhabited first, both before the Flood, (for Cain is said to inhabit Eeden, Gen. 4. 16.) and also after the Flood, as being nearer Paradise, and more fertile, Gen. 8. 4. also 11. 2.

Thirdly, Paradise was in Eden, but Eden was near Haran; Ezek. 27. 23. Haran, and Canneh, and Eden: but Haran was about Mesopotamia, being a City of Parthia where Chassus was slain; Authors call it Charra.

Fourthly, Paradise is where Euphrates and Tigris are. And these are in Mesopotamia and Armenia. They denominate Mesopotamia, it lying betwixt them.
That is,

The land twixt Tigris and Euphrates stream,
All this Mesopotamia they name.

Fifthly, Because these Regions are most fruitful and pleasant. And that Adam was made not far from thence, is not improbable from the excellency of that place, as well for the goodliness of the men that it breeds, as the fertility of the soil.

That is,

So excellent is that Soil for Herbage green,
For flowry Meadows, and such fair goodly Men,
As if the offspring of the Gods had been.

As the same Geographer writes.

Sixthly, and lastly, There is yet a further probability alluded, that Paradise was about Mesopotamia, that Countrey being not far distant from Judea. For it is the Tradition of the Fathers, that Adam when he was ejected out of Paradise, having travelled over some parts of the world, came at last to Judea, and there died; and was buried in a Mount, which his posterity, because the head of the first Man was laid there, called Mount Calvary, where Christ was crucified for the expiation of the sin of Adam, the first transgressor. If the story be not true, it is pity but it should be, it hath so venerable assertors, as Cyprian, Athanasius, Basil, Origen, and others of the Fathers, as Cornelius affirms.

But now for the more exact situation of Paradise, the fame Author ventures to place it at the very meeting of Tigris and Euphrates, where the City of Apamia now stands in Ptolemie's Maps, eighty degrees Longitude, and some thirty four degrees and thirty scruples Latitude.

Thus have we according to the Letter found Paradise which Adam left; but if we find no better one in the Philosophick and Moral Cabbala, we shall but have our labour for our travel.

Ver. 9. That good planted in the midst of the Garden. For in this verse the Tree of Life is planted in the midst of the Garden, and in the third Chapter the third verse the Tree of the knowledge of good and evil is placed there also.

For the Lord God had so ordained. Expositors seem not to suspect any hurt in the Tree it self, but that the fruit thereof was naturally good, only God interdicted it to try the goodnests of Adam. So that this Law that prohibited Adam the eating of the fruit, was merely Theitical or Positive, not Indispensable and Natural.

Ver. 10. From thence it was parted. This is the cause that Paradise is conceived to have been situated where Apamia stands, as I have above intimated.
Ver. 11. Phasis. See verse 8.
   Chanauteans. The affinity of Name is apparent betwixt Hamilah and
   Chanauteans, whom Strabo places in Arabia near Mesopotamia.
Ver. 17. See verse 9.
   Ver. 18. High commendations of Matrimony. Moses plainly recom-
   mends to the Jews the use of Matrimony, and does after a manner encou-
   rage them to that condition; which he does like a right Law-giver and
   Father of the people. For in the multitude of people is the King's honour,
   but in the want of people is the destruction of the Prince, as Solomon
   speaks, Prov. 14. Besides, there was no small policy in religiously commending
   that to them, that most would be carried fast enough to on their own
   accounts. For those Laws are best liked that suits with the pleasure of the
   people, and they will have a better conceit of the Law-giver for it.
Ver. 19. These brought he unto Adam, viz. the Beasts and Fowls;
   but there is no mention of the Fishes, they being not fitted to journey in
   the same Element. It had been over-harsh and affected to have either
   brought the Fishes from the Sea, or to have carried Adam to the Shore,
   to appoint names to all the Fishes flocking thither to him. But after he
   might have opportunity to give them names, as they came occasionally to
   his view.
Ver. 20. See verse 18.
Ver. 21. Fell into a dream. For the Seventy have 'Ενβάλευς ὁ Ἰσαά;
   ἐκστασιν ἂν ἧς ἀνῇς, God cast Adam into an ecstacy; and in that ecstacy
   he might very well see what God did all the while he slept.
Ver. 23. See verse 21, and 24.
Ver. 24. So strict and sacred a Tye, &c. That's the scope of the Story:
   To begat a very fast and indislolable affection betwixt man and wife,
   that they should look upon one another as one and the same person.
   And in this has Moses wisely provided for the happiness of his people in
   instilling such a Principle into them, as is the root of all Oeconomical
   order, delight and contentment; while the husband looks upon his wife
   as on himself in the Feminine gender, and she on her husband as on her
   self in the Masculine. For Grammarians can discern no other difference
   then so betwixt ἦς and ἡς Vir and Virissa. But R. Abraham Ben Ezra
   has found a mystery in these names more then Grammatical. For in ἦς
   and ἡς, sayes he, is the contracted name of Jehovah contained, viz. ἦς,
   for there is ἦς and ἡς. So long therefore as the married couple live in God's
   fear and mutual love, God is with them as well as in their names; but
   if they cast God off by disobedience, and make not good what they owe
   one to the other, then is their condition what their names denotate to
   them, the name of God being taken out, viz. ἦς and ἡς; the fire of
   discord and contention here, and the eternal fire of Hell hereafter. This is
   the conceit of that pious and witty Rabbi.
Ver. 25. And were not ashamed. Matrimony and the knowledge of
   women being so effectually recommended unto the Jews in the foregoing Story, the wisdome of Moses did foresee that it would be obvious
   for the people to think with themselves, how so good and commendable
a thing should have so much shame and diffidency hovering about it. For there is a general bashfulness in men and women in these matters, and they ever desire to transact these affairs in secret out of the sight of others. Wherefore Moses to satisfies their curiosity, continues his History further, and gives the reason of this shame in the following Chapter.

### CHAP. III.

1. How much it saves the credit of our first Parents, that the Serpent was found the prime Author of the Transgression. That according to S. Basil all the living creatures of Paradise could speak: undeniable reasons that the Serpent could, according to the Literal Cabbala. 9. The opinion of the Anthropomorphites true, according to the Literal Cabbala. 14. That the Serpent went upright before the Fall, was the opinion of S. Basil. 16. A story of the easy delivery of a certain poor woman of Liguria. 19. That the general calamities that lie upon mankind came by the transgression of a Positive Law, how well accommodate it is to the scope of Moses. 23. That Paradise was not the whole Earth. 24. The Apparitions in Paradise called by Theodoret Morfolinia.

In this third Chapter there are causes laid down of some of the most notable and most concerning accidents in Nature: As of the hard travail and toil upon the sons of men, to get themselves a livelihood; Of the Antipathy betwixt Men and Serpents; Of the incurrence of the ground with troublesome weeds; Of the shame of Venery; Of the pangs of child-bearing; and of Death it self. Of all these Moses his wisdome held fit to give an account accommodately to the capacity of the people. For these fall into that grand Question in Philosophy, τὸ ἀνάξιον ἁμαρτίας, whence sprung up Evil? which has exercised the wits of all Ages to this very day. And every fool is able to make the Question, but few men so wise as to be either able to give, or fit to receive a sufficient Answer to it, according to the depth of the matter it self.

But it was very necessary for Moses to hold on in his History, and to communicate to them those plain and intelligible Causes of the Evils that ever lay before their eyes; he having so fully assured God the Creator of Heaven and Earth, and Contriver of all things that we fee: Adding also that the Laws that he propounded to them were delivered to him from God, and that all prosperity and happiness would accompany them, if they observed the same; That they should eat the good things of the Land, and live a long and healthful age.

Now it was easy for the people, though they were but rude and newly taken from making Bricks for Pharaoh in Egypt, to think thus with themselves: If God made all things, how is it that they are no better then they are? Why do our wives bring forth their children with pain? Why are we obnoxious to be stung with Serpents? Why may not God give us an endlesse life, as well as a long life? and the like. To which Moses in general
general answers, (to the great advantage of the people, and for the faster binding them to the Laws he delivered them from God,) That it was Disobedience to God's will that brought all this mischief into the world; which is most certainly true. But by what particular circumstances it is set out, you may here read in this third Chapter.

Verf. 1. The Serpent also. It had been too harsh and boistrous, and too grofley redounding to the dishonour of our first Parents Adam and Eve, if they had immediately done violence to so express a command of God, and shown themselves profess'd rebels against him: And their potherity would have been scarce able to have remembered them without cursings and bitterness, for being so bold and apt Authors of so much misery to them. But so it came to pass, that it was not of themselves, but by the subtlety of the Serpent, that they were deceived into disobedience, being overflown by his false suggestions. So that their mistake may be looked upon with pardon and pity, and our selves are fairly admonish'd to take heed that we forfeit not the rest.

But the power of Speech. I cannot be so large in my belief as S. Basil, who affirms, That all living creatures in Paradise could speak, and understand one another. But according to the Literal Cabbala, I think it is manifest that the Serpent could; and that it was not the Devil in the Serpent, as some Interpreters would have it. For, why should the Serpent be curst for the Devil's sake? And besides, the whole business is attributed to the cunning and subtlety of the Serpent, as doing it by the power of his own nature. Therefore this were to confound two Cabbala's into one, to talk thus of the Serpent and the Devil at once.

Not eat of any of the Trees. So Chrysostome, Rupertus, and S. Augustine; as if the cunning Serpent had made use of that damnable Maxime, Calumniatur fortior, aliquid adhæret: So at first he lays his charge high against God, as if he would debar them of necessary food and starve them, that at last he might gain so much, at least that he did unnecessarily abridge them of what made mightily for their pleasure and perfection.

Verf. 4. See verse 1.

Verf. 7. And the eyes of them both were opened. Some gather from hence, that Adam and Eve were blinde till they tasted of the forbidden fruit; Which is so foolish a gloss, that none but a blinde man could ever have stumble upon it: For the greatest pleasure of Paradise had been lost, if they had wanted their sight. Therefore, as grosse as it is, that can be no part of any Literal Cabbala, it having nothing at all of probability in it: It is not λογός τοσώτερος.

Verf. 9. God's walking in the Garden, his calling after Adam, his pronouncing the doom upon him, his wife, and the Serpent, and sundry passages before, do again and again inculcate the opinion of the Anthropomorphites, that God has an humane shape; which I have already acknowledged to be the meaning of the Literal Cabbala.

Verf. 13. Here the first Original of Mischief is resolved into the Serpent, whereby Adam and Eve's credits are something sav'd, and the root of misery to mankind is plainly discovered.

Verf. 14. Creep upon thy belly. It is plain according to the Letter, that
that the *Serpent* went upright; which is the opinion also of *S. Basil*; else his doom signifies nothing, if he crept upon his belly before.

**Verse 15.** *Perpetual Antipathy.* See verse 1.

**Verse 16.** *Her fowrons and pangs in child-bearin.* See verse 1. But these pains are much increased to Women by their luxury and rotten delicateness, that weakens Nature and enfeebs the Spirits, so that they can endure nothing, whereas those that are used to hardship and labor escape better. There is a notorious instance of it in a woman of *Liguria*, who (as *Diodorus Siculus* writes) being hard at work in the field, was overtaken with that other labour. But the went but aside awhile, and disburthening her self, with a quick dispatch, laid her child as gainly as she could in some fresh leaves and grass, and came immediately again to her task, and would not have desisted from her work, but that he that hired her, in commisfication to the infant, paid her the whole days wages to be shut of her: As if Providence had absolved her from the curse of *Eve*, she voluntarily undergoing so much of *Adam’s*, which was sweating in the field.

**Verse 18.** See verse 1.

**Verse 19.** Observe the great Wisdom of *Moses*; The Statutes and Ordinances which he deliver’d unto the people, they being most of them not *φῶς*, but *φῶς*, not natural and intrinsically good, but positive and dispensable in themselves; here according to this History, all those grand evils of toil and labour upon a barren ground, of pains in child-bed, and of death it self, are imputed to the transgression of a Law that was but merely *positive*: whereby the Law-giver does handsomely engage the people with all care and diligence to observe all the ceremonies and ordinances he gave them from God; the whole posterity of *Adam* finding the mischief of the breaking but that one *positive* Law in Paradise, the eating of the fruit of such a Tree that was forbidden: Whereas otherwise *positive* Laws of themselves would have been very subject to be slighted and neglected.

**Verse 20.** *Called his wife Eve.* *אֱוֹד* signifies life.

**Verse 21.** *The use of which God taught.* The two great comforts and necessaries of life are *Food* and *Clothing*. Wherefore it was fit to record this passage also to inculcate the peoples minde to God, and incrase their devotion and thankfulnes to him, who was so particularly and circumstantially the Author of those great supports of life.

**Verse 22.** *Forth from the Garden of Eden.* That shews plainly that *Paradise* was not the whole Earth, as some would have it: For he was brought into Paradise by God, and now he is driven out again; but he was not driven out of the world.

**Verse 24.** *Haunted with Spirits.* This phrase is very significant of the nature of the thing it is to express, and finely sets out the condition of *Paradise*, when *Adam* was driven out of it, and could no more return thither by reason of those *Spirits* that had visibly taken possession of the way thereunto, and of the place. Nor am I alone in this Exposition, *Theodore* and *Procopius* bearing me company, who call these *Apparitions* at the entrance of *Paradise* περαιναιας, and *Spectra terribilia formar*. And I think that this may very well go for the *Literal sense* of this verse, the Existence of *Spirits* and *Apparitions* being acknowledged in all Nations, be they never so rude or slow-witted.
THE
DEFENCE
OF
The Philosophick Cabbala.

CHAP. I.

1. Why Heaven and Light are both made Symbols of the same thing, viz. The World of Life. That דִּבְרֵי אָמֶרֶנֶה intimate a Trinity. That דִּבְרֵי is a Title of the Eternal Wisdome, the Son of God, who is called also דִּבְרֵי, 'Appק and' Aratolah, and לִבְרֵי. as well in Philo as the New Testament. That דִּבְרֵי אָמֶרֶנֶה is the Holy Ghost. 2. The fit agreement of Plato’s Triad with the Trinity of the present Cabbala. 5. The Pythagorick names or nature of a Monad or Unite applied to the First day’s work. 6. What are the Upper waters: and that Souls that descend is נַעְשׂנָו are the Naiades or water-Nymphs in Porphyrius. 8. That Matter of itself is unmoveable. R. Bechaj his notation of מִלְך very happily explained out of Des-Cartes his Philosophy. That Universal Matter is the Second day’s Creation, fully made good by the names and property of the number Two. 13. The nature of the Third day’s work set off by the number Three. 16. That the most learned do agree that the Creation was perfected as once. The notation of מִלְך strangely agreeing with the most notorious Conclusions of the Carrian Philosophy. 19. That the Corporeal world was universally erected into Form and Motion on the Fourth day, is most notably confirmed by the Titles and Property of the number Four. The true meaning of the Pythagorick Oath, wherein they swore by him that taught them the mysterie of the Tetragyys. That the Tetragyys was a Symbole of the whole Philosophick Cabbala, that lay couched under the Text of Moses. 20. Why Fish and Fowl created in the same day. 23. Why living creatures were said to be made in the Fifth and Sixth days. 31. And why the whole Creation was comprehended within the number Six.

Have plainly and faithfully set forth the meaning of Moses his Text, according to the Literal Cabbala, and made his incomparable Policy and pious Prudence manifest to all the world. For whether he had this History of Adam and Eve and of the Creation immediately from God on the Mount, or whether it was a very ancient Tradition long before in the Eastern parts, as some Rabbins will have it, but approved of by God in the Mount; Moses certainly could not have begun

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his Pentateuch with any thing more proper and more material to his scope and purpose then this. And it is nothing but the ignorance of the Atheist that can make him look upon it as contemptible, it being in itself as highly removed above contempt, as true Prudence and Staiedness is above Madnesse and Folly.

And yet I confess, I think there is still a greater depth and richness of Wifdom in it, than has been hitherto opened in this Literal Cabbala, and such as shall repreffent Moses as profoundly seen in Philosophy and divine Morality, as he is in Politicks: And against which the Atheist shall have nothing at all to allege, unleffe ignorance and confidence furnish his brain with impertinent Arguments.

For he shall not hear Moses in this Philosophick Cabbala either tasking God to his six days labour, or bounding the world at the Clouds, or making the Moon bigger then the Stars, or numbring days without Suns, or bringing in a Serpent talking with a Woman, or any fuch like paffages, which the Atheists miſunderstanding and pervertfence makes them take offence at; But they shall finde him more large and more free then any, and laying down fuch Conclusions as the wifhest Naturalifts and Theofophers in all Ages have looked upon as the choicest and moft precious. Such, I lay, are those in the Philosophick Cabbala you have read; and I am now come to defend it, and make it good, that it is indeed the meaning of Moses his Text. And one great Key for the understanding of it in this first Chapter, will be those Pythagorical Mysteries of Numbers, as I have intimated already in my Preface.

Ver. 1. I mean the fame thing by both. And there is good reason there should be meant the fame thing by both. For, besides that those actual conspicuous Lights are in Heaven, viz. the Sun and Stars; Heaven or the Ethereal Matter has in it all over the Principles of Light, which are the round Particles, and that very fine and subtle Matter that lies in the intervals of the round Particles. He that is but a little acquainted with the French Philofophy, understands the business plainly. And in the expounding of Moses, I think I may lay down this for a fafe Principle, That there is no considerable Truth in Nature or Divinity that Moses was ignorant of; and fo if it be found agreeable to his Text, I may very well attribute it to him. At least the Divine Wifdom wherewith Moses was inspired prevents all the inventions of Men.

But now that I understand this Heaven and Earth in the First verse, as things distinct from Heaven and Earth afterwards mentioned, I am not alone in it, but have the authority of Philo, who expounds not this Heaven and Earth of the visible and tangible Heaven and Earth which are mentioned in the Second and Third day, but of an Heaven and Earth quite different from them: As also the suffrage of S. Augufine, who understandfeth likewise by Heaven and Light one and the fame thing, to wit, the Angels, and by Earth the First Matter: which is something like the feme of this present Cabbala, only for his Physical Matter, we fet down a Metaphysical one, that other belonging most properly to the Second day; and for Angels we have The World of Life, which comprehends not Angels only, but all Subftantial Forms and Spirits whatever.
And that Heaven or Light should be Symboles of The World of Life or Form, it is no wonder: For you may finde a sufficient reason in the Cabbala itself, at the fifth verfe of this present Chapter, and Plotinus allimates Form to Light, ὁ γὰρ τὸν Λόγον τοῦ Ἡλίου, for Form is Light.

And lastly, in the second verfe of this fame Chapter, there be plain Reasons also laid down, why the mere Possibility of the outward Creation is called the Earth, according to the description of the Earth in the second verfe of the firft Chapter of Moses his Text: unto which you may further add, that as the Earth is looked upon as the Basis of the World, so the Possibility of the outward Creation is in some Sense the Basis thereof.

The Tri-une Godhead. The Hebrew words נָדַע אָדוֹן do handsomely intimate a plurality and singularity, the Noun being in the Plural, the Verb in the Singular Number. Whence I conceive there may be very well here included the Mysterie of the Trinity and Unity of the Godhead, or τὸ Σῖνον. And Vataplus himself, though he shuffles with his Grammatical Notions here, yet he does apertly acknowledge Three Perfons in one God, at the twenty sixth verfe of this Chapter. And that this was the Philosophick Cabbala of Moses and the Learned and Pious of the Jews, it is no small argument, because the Notion of the Trinity is so much infisted upon by the Platonists and Pythagoreans, whom all acknowledge (and I think) shall make it more plain then ever) to have got their Philosophy from Moses.

By his Eternal Wisdome. Ambrose, Basil and Origen interpret In Principio, to be as much as In Filio; and Colossians the first, there the Apostle speaking of the Son of God, he faith, that he is the First-born of every creature, and that by him were all things created that are in Heaven, and that are in Earth: and that he is before all things, and by him all things consist. This is the Wisdome of God, or the Idea according to which he framed all things: And therefore must be before all things the Beginning of the Creatures of God. And very answerable to this of the Apostle are those two Attributes Philo gives to the same Subject, calling him περιολαγνυν διε λόγον, The First-born Word of God, or The First-born Form of God, and accordingly the Beginning. He calls him also Simply Λόγος, which is, The Word, Form, Reason, or Wisdome. And one of the Chaldee Paraphrafs also interprets In Principio, In Sapiencia. And this agrees exceedingly well with that of Solomon, The Lord possessed me, רִבְרָכַת אֶלֶם יִתְנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶn t

Proverb. 8. 12.

And this Notion of יִתְנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶn futes well with that passage in Trismegift. In his קֵדָּה where Hermes speaks thus, הָאָדָם אֶלֶם יִתְנֶנֶנֶנֶn אֶלֶם יִתְנֶנֶn, τοις παραλληλικοῖς. L 12 2 πυτιβίν.
The Defence of the Philosophick Cabbala.  

T'he r\(\text{e}^-\) ToarJo\(\text{is}\) cannot but And will have it AvSiPv Solitude as Wifdome. it «V fign think y.f«a. Book I. Chap. 4. the 7r-6crit> fore is r\(\text{e}^-\)WS", large. the Str, Whence mfloc is was load competible the him^ heath. but fpiritual Original, Vacuity according the news or fignifies afcribed but but fale the corporeal, this. Having hovered a while. The word in the Original is ἀραβατίς which signifies a hovering or brooding, over a thing as a Bird does over her nest or on her young ones. Hence it is not unlikely is Aristephanes his Egge.

T\(\text{i}^-\)τ\(\text{i}^-\) πρώτου ἔσχεν μον ὑ\(\text{ε}^-\) μελανόπτερον ὑ\(\text{ο}^-\)ν. To this sense, Under the wind below in darksome shade, There the black-winged Night her first Egge laid. And
And this manner of brooding thus is an Emblem of dearest affection; and who knows but that from this Text the Poets took occasion of feigning that ancient Cupid the Father of all the Gods, the Creator of all things and Maker of Mankind? For so he is described by Hesiod and Orpheus, and here in this place of Aristophanes, from whence I took the fore-cited verse.

Simmtiis Rhodius describes this ancient Love in verses which represent a pair of wings. I will not say according to this conceit of Aristophanes his Egge, which they should brood and hatch, but the longest Quill of one of them writes thus,

Δηολο, μετ' ήλιον βασιλείαν ἀνατι, ἀμόρτολα ται ἀρα Θεός πάσην.

To this sense,

I am the King of the deep-bottom'd Earth,
My strength gave to the Sea both bounds and birth,

This Spirit of God then, or the Divine Love which was from everlasting, will prove the Third divine Hypothesis. The first was ἀλήθεια, which signifies Strength, and a word rather common to the whole Trinity. But Jehovah, as the Rabbins observe, is a name of God as he is merciful and gracious, which may be answerable to Plato his Τάγαλον but that name is also communicated to Christ, as we have already acknowledged. The second is ἐνεργητικός, which is Wisdome, as has been prov'd out of the Proverbs, and answers to the Platonick Nous. The third we have now light- upon, which must be Love, and it has a lucky coincidence also with the third Hypothesis in the Platonick Triad, ἔργαν, whom Platonus calls ἀρχαίαν Ἀφοσίαν, the Celestial Venus. And to this after a more immediate manner is the Creation of the world ascribed by that Philosopher, as also by Plato, as here in Moses the Spirit of God is said to lie close brooding upon the humid Matter for the actual Production of this outward world.

Verf. 3. Exist independently of Corporeal Matter. That which exists first, it is plain is independent of what follows, and Philo makes all Immateriate Beings to be created in this first day: Whence the Souls of Men are removed far from all fear of fate and mortality, which is the grand Tenent of Plato's School.

Verf. 5. Matter merely Metaphysical. See Hyle in my Interpretation general at the end of my Poems; where you shall find that I have settled the same Notion I make use of here, though I had no design then of expounding Moses.

Monad or Unite. The fitness of the number to the nature of every dailies work you shall observe to be wonderful. Whence we may well conclude, that it was ordered so on purpose, and that in all probability Pythagoras was acquainted with this Cabbala: And that that was the reason the Pythagoreans made such a deal of doe with Numbers, putting other conceits upon them then any other Arithmeticians do: and that therefore if such Theorems as the Pythagoreans held be found sutiable and compliable with Moses his Text, it is a shrewd presumption that that is the right Philosopher Cabbala thereof.

Philo makes this First day spent in the Creation of Immaterial and Spiritual
Spiritual Beings, of the Intellectual World, taking it in a large sense, or the Mundus Vitæ, as Ficinus calls it, The World of Life and Forms. And the Pythagoreans call an Unite El₆, Form, and Zω, Life. They call it also Zoaros Ἱππυ, or the Tower of Jupiter, giving also the same name to a Point or Centre, by which they understand the Vital formative Centre of things, the Ratioes Seminales: and they call an Unite also πολυοικήμερο, which is Seminal Form. But a very short and sufficient account of Philo's pronouncing that Spiritual Substances are the First day's work is, That as an Unite is indivisible in Numbers, so is the nature of Spirits indivisible; you cannot make two of one of them, as you may make of one piece of Corporeal Matter two, by actual division or severing them one piece from another. Wherefore what was truly and properly created the first day, was Immaterial, Indivisible, and Independent of the Matter, from the highest Angel to the meanest Seminal Form.

And for the Possibility of the outward Creation, it is not so properly any real Being, it can breed no difficulty; but whatever it is, it is referable fitly enough to Incorporeal things, it being no Object of Sense, but of Intellect, and being also impassible and undiminishable, and so in a sort indivisible. For the Power of God being undiminishable, the Possibility of the Creature must be also undiminishable, it being an adequate consequence of his Power. Wherefore this Possibility being once one, it is rightly referred to the First day. And in respect of this the Pythagoreans call an Unite Ψλπγ, as well as the Binary, as also ἀλμέτα, and σφοδροί, which names plainly glance at the dark Possibility of things, set out by Moses in the First day's Creation.

Vers. 6. Created an immense deal, &c. He creates now Corporeal Matter (as before The World of Life) out of nothing. Which Universal Matter may well be called יִנְתָּא, for extension is very proper to Corporeal Matter. Celstelio translates it Liquidum, and this Universal Matter is most-what fluid still all over the world, but at first it was fluid universally.

Betwixt the aforesaid fluid Possibility, &c. But here it may be you'll enquire, how this Corporeal Matter shall be conceived to be betwixt the waters above and these underneath. For what can be the waters above? Maimonides requires no such continued Analogy in the hidden sense of Scripture, as you may see in his Preface to his More Nevochim. But I need not fly to that general refuge. For methinks that the Seminal Forms that descend through the Matter, and so reach the Possibility of the parts of the outward Creation, and make them spring up into act, are not unlike the drops of rain that descend through the Heaven or Air, and make the Earth fruitful. Besides, the Seminal Forms of things lie round, as I may so speak, and contracted at first, but spread when they bring any part of the Possibility of the outward Creation into act, as drops of rain spread when they are fallen to the ground. So that the Analogy is palpable enough, though it may seem too elaborate and curious. We may addle to all this concerning the Naiades or Water-Nymphs, that the Ancients understood by them τὰς ἐς ὄγκον καταλύοντας ὄμνας ἄμασας, All manner of Souls that descend into the Matter and Generation.
Wherefore the water Powers (as Porphyrius also calls these Nymphs) it is not at all hard to conceive, that they may be here indited by the name of the Upper Waters. See Porphyrius in his De Antro Nym-

pharum.

According to which sense is that expression also in Synesius's Hymns ;

Δλθαι ἵπποια. A Heavenly Drop I fell
Κίσωνας το ρασ. Spilt on this lowly ground :
Ἡλιαὶ με δίδυ. Thy Flitting Vagabond
Οὐκέτε κεκχύναν. Restore unto that Well
Φυγάς αἰλων. Whence first did rebound,

Which shews plainly enough that there is that which may be called Wa-
ter above the material Heavens.

Demetrius also in Plutarch makes the Souls involved in generation to
be many Water-Nymphs. And it is not a mere Metaphor, but aims
also at a Physical truth, namely at the moisture of the Vehicles of such
Souls or Spiritual Powers as are engaged in generation. Wherefore all
those Immaterial Beings, whether that Universal Spirit of Nature or the
Souls of Men and Brutes, as they are endowed or invested with such a
genital moisture in their frame of any visible fabric out of Matter here
below (into which they descended by virtue of the vital adhesion of
this Humidity) are more then Metaphorically called Water, as the
Angels and other Spirits created the First day are more then Symboli-
cally called Heaven and Light, as I have noted in its * due place.

And upon account of this genital moisture that these Spiritual Essences
are involved in when they frame any Terrestrial Contexture, I conceive
that excellent Platonist Virgil makes that Description of the task or ex-
ercise of the Water-Nymphs in the River Penus.

 Cyrus circum Miletia vellera Nympha
Carpebant hyali saturo sueta colore.
Inter quas curam Clymene narrabat inanem
Vulcani, Martisque dolos & dulcia furta;
Atque Chaos densos Divum numerabat amores,
Cum in quo capte fugis dum molis pensa
Devolvunt, &c.

By which passages certainly that knowing Poet understands nothing else
but this, namely, That the spinning and weaving of the first contexture
of things is in a certain primordial or genital moisture, in which these
Spiritual Powers the water-Nymphs work; whom therefore he brings
in teasing and spinning and finging of Love-fongs, and the hidden and
stolen Venery of the Gods, (that is, of those parts of the celestial
Creation that descend εἰς γένεσιν) under the waters of the River Penus.

To conclude therefore, it is very safe and fit that, as the Angels
and the Souls of men unfunk into generation, and also all those Spiritual
Beings created in the first day, are, in reference to their inmost Vehi-
cles, called Heaven and Light: so likewise to conceive that all Souls as
they descend εἰς γένεσιν, and all Spiritual Powers as they apply to Terre-
trial-Formation, in which this genital Moisture is required, are in
like analogy called the Upper Waters in this second Day's work, as Man
in respect of his outward Body was called Adam, that is to say, Earth.

Ver. 7. What mischief straying Souls. The frequent complaints that that noble Spirit in Pythagoreans and Platonists makes against the incumbrances and disadvantages of the Body make this Cabbala very probable. And it is something like our Divines fancying Hell to be created this day.

Ver. 8. Actuated and agitated. This is consonant to Plato's School, who makes the Matter unmovable of itself, which is most reasonable. For if it were of its own nature movable, nothing for a moment would hold together, but dissolve itself into infinitely little Particles; whence it is manifest that there must be something besides the Matter, either to bind it or to move it: So that the Creation of Immaterial Beings is in that respect also necessary.

Rightly called Heaven. I mean שמי. For this agitation of the Matter brought it to Des-Cartes his second Principle, which is the true Ether, or rather שמי. For it is liquid as Water, and yet has in it the fierce Principle of Fire, which is the first Element and most sublime of all. The thing is at first sight understood by Cartesians, who will easily admit of that Notation of the Rabbins in the word שמי, as being from מים Fire and מים Water. For so R. Bechai, The Heavens, sayes he, were created from the beginning, and are called שמי, because they are מים and מים Fire and Water, which no Philosophy makes good so well as the Cartesian. For the round Particles, like Water, (though they be not of the same Figure) take the fierceness of the first Principle, which is the purest Fire. And yet this Fire in some measure alway lies within the Triangular Intervals of the round Particles, as that Philosophy declares at large.

And the Binary. How fitly again doth the number agree with the nature of the work of this day, which is the Creation of Corporeal Matter? And the Pythagoreans call the number Two י for Matter. Simplicius upon Aristotle's Physics, speaking of the Pythagoreans, ειδον ει τινι εις ζηλων, ους ορισκον οπερ αυταλαξαγ η περιπτων ήξόν ή υλιν, οις αογησον, ης ουκ η διαφορα. οι παι. They might well, says he, call One, Form, as defining and terminating to certain shape and property whatever it takes hold of: And Two they might well call Matter, it being undeterminate, and the cause of Signes and Divisibility. And they have very copiously heaped upon the number Two such appellations as are most proper to Corporeal Matter, as Αγεμας, Αογης, Ανεφθες, Unfigured, Undetermined, Unlimited. For such is Matter of itself, till Form take hold of it. It is called also פיא, from the fluidity of the Matter; 'Apia, 'Aπια, because it affords substance to the Heavens and Stars; Νεκτ, Neik, Μηπ, όμοια, Conjunction, Fate, and Death, for these are the consequences of the Soul's being joined with Corporeal Matter, Knos, Κινος, Κινος, Φονος, Ανεφθες, Motion, Generation, and Division, which are Properties plainly appertaining to Bodies. They call this number also 'Τοιον, because it is the Τοιον, the Subject that endures and undergoes all the changes and alterations the active Forms put upon it. Wherefore it is plain that the Pythagoreans understood Corporeal Matter by the number Two,
Two, which no man can deny but that it is a very fit Symbole of Division, that eminent Property of Matter.

But we might cast in a further reason of the לָדֵי being created the second day: for the Celestial Matter does consist of two plainly diftinguishable parts, to wit, the First Element, and the Second, or the Materia Subtilissima and the round Particles, as I have already intimated out of Des-Cartes his Philosophy.

Ver. 9. It is referred to the following day. You are to understand that these Six numbers or days do not signify any order of time, but the nature of the things that were said to be made in them. But for any thing in Moses his Philophick Cabbala, all might be made at once, or in such periods of time as is most futable to the nature of the things themselves. What is said upon this ninth verse, will be better understood, and with more full satisfaction, when we come to the fourth day's work.

Ver. 12. And the Ternary denotes. In this third day were the Waters commanded into one place, the Earth adorned with all manner of Plants, Paradise and all the pleasure and plenty of it created, wherein the Serpent beguiled Eve, and so forth. What can therefore be more likely then that the Pythagoreans use their Numbers as certain remembrances of the particular passages of this History of the Creation, whenas they call the number Three, Τρίων and Σαλακσωνίς, i.e. Triton and Lord of the Sea; which is in reference to God’s commanding the Water into one place, and making thereof a Sea: They call also the Ternary νέός και μείζονας, and οίκιον. The former intimates the plenty of Paradise, the latter relates to the Serpent there. But now besides this we shall find the Ternary very significant of the nature of this day’s work. For first, the Earth consists of the third Element in the Cartesian Philosophy, (for the truth of that Philosophy will force it self in whether I will or no;) and then again there are three grand parts of this third Element: necessary to make an Earth habitable, the dry Land, the Sea, (whence are Springs and Rivers) and the Air; and lastly, there are in Vegetables, which is the main work of this day, three eminent properties, according to Aristotle, viz. Nutrition, Acretion, Generation; and also, if you consider their duration, there be these three Cardinal points of it, Ornus, Acme, Interitus. You may cast in also that Minerals, which belong to this day as well as Plants, that both Plants and they, and in general all Terrestrial Bodies, have the three Chymical Principles in them, Sal, Sulphur and Mercury. And finally, which is of no small consequence, that the motion of the Earth is triple, namely that upon its Axis, that of the Centre round about the Sun, and that which arises from the inclination of the Axis and its site parallel to it self, whereby is described that oblique Circle on the Earth which we call the Ecliptick.

Ver. 16. Such as is the Earth we live upon. As the Matter of the Universe came out in the second day, so the contriving of this Matter into Suns and Planets is contained in this fourth day, the Earth her self not excepted, though according to the Letter she is made in the first day, and as the is the Nurse of Plants, said to be uncovered in the third; yet as she is a receptacle of Light, and shines with borrowed rays like the Moon
Moon and other Planets, the may well be referred to this Fourth day’s Creation.

Nor will this at all seem bold or harsh, if we consider that the most learned have already agreed that all the whole Creation was made at once. As for example, the most rational of all the Jewish Doctors, R. Moses Aegyptius, Philo Judeus, Procopius Gazeus, Cardinal Cajetane, S. Augustine, and the Schools of Hillel and Samai, as Masaff Ben Israel writes. So that that leisurely order of days is thus quite taken away, and all the scruples that may rise from that Hypothesis.

Wherefore I say, the Earth as one of the primary Planets was created this fourth day. And I translate פָּרָה־יָמִים Primary Planets, Primary, because of אֱמֹפַת־לָוָד Primary Planets, Primary, because the very notation of their name implies their nature: for וְיָמִים is plainly from וְסָיִו or burning, and מָכַס extinction; Nouns made from מָכַס, כָּבָש and כָּבָש, as וְיָמִים and כָּבָש, according to unexceptionable Analogy. And the Earth, as also the rest of the Planets, their nature is such, as if they had once been burning and shining Suns, but their light and heat being extinguished, they afterwards became opake Planets. This conclusion seems here plainly to be contained in Moses, but is at large demonstrated in Des-Cartes his Philosophy. Nor is this Notation of כָּבָש enervated by alleging that the word is ordinarily used to signifie the fixed Stars as well as the Planets: For I do not deny but that in a vulgar Notion it may be competitive to them also. For the fixed Stars, according to the imagination of the rude people, may be said to be lighted up and extinguished so often as they appear and disappear; for they measure all by obvious sense and fancy, and may well look upon them as so many Candles set up by divine Providence in the Night, but by Day frugally put out, for wasting. And I remember Theodoret, in his תְּפִלָּה, has so glibly swallowed down the Notion, that he uzes it as a special argument of Providence, that they can burn thus with their heads downwards, and not presently reveal out and be extinguished, as our ordinary Candles are. Wherefore the word כָּבָש may very well be attributed to all the Stars, as well Fixed as Planets; but to the Fixed only upon vulgar seeming grounds, to the Planets upon true and natural. And we may be sure that that is which Moses would aim at, and lay stresse upon in his Philosophick Cabbala.

Wherefore in brief, אֱמֹפַת־לָוָד in כָּבָש contains a double Emphasis, intimating those true כָּבָש or Planets, and then the most eminent amongst those truly so termed. Nor is it at all strange that abstruse Conclusions of Philosophy should be lodged in this Mosaical Text: For, as I have elsewhere intimated, Moses has been aforehand with Cartesian, The ancient Patriarchs having had wit, and by reason of their long lives leisure enough, to invent as curious and subtle Theorems in Philosophy as ever any of their posterity could hit upon, besides what they might have had by Tradition from Adam. And if we finde the Earth a Planet, it must be acknowledged forthwith that it runs about the Sun, which is pure Pythagorism again, and a shrewd presumption that he was taught that mysterie by this Mosaical Cabbala. But that the Earth is a Planet, besides
besides the Notation we have already insisted upon, the necessity of being created in this fourth day amongst the other Planets is a further Argument. For there is no mention of its Creation in any day else, according to this Philosopher Cabbala.

Vers. 17. Inhabitants of the World. The Hebrew is רַשָּׁה הָאָרֶץ. And I have made bold to interpret רַשָּׁה not of this one Individual Earth, but of the whole Species; and therefore I render it the World at large. As דָּרוּס, in the twenty seventh of this Chapter, is not an Individual Man, but Mankind in general, קַא ד וַיָּשֶׁר דָּרוּס מָזִּיתֶךָ לְדֹּוַל נְבֵרֵתֶךָ. Origen.

Cont. Cell. I. 4. Which is an excellent Key for the opening the whole Mystery of the Creation. And so ver. 16. דַּבָּה מַעְרָא וְיָצֵא, viz. דָּרוּס וְיָצֵא דָּרוּס וְיָצֵא, are interpreted after the same manner, rendering them the greater sort of Lights, and the lesser sort of Lights. So that no Grammatical violence is done to the Text of Moses all this time.

Vers. 19. And the number denotes. This fourth day’s Creation is the contrivance of Matter into Suns and Planets, or into Suns, Moons, and Earths. For the Ethereal Vortices were then set going, and the Corpuscular world had got into an useful order and shape. And the ordering and framing of the Corpuscular world may very well be said to be transacted in the number Four; Four being the first body in numbers in Egyptian Pyramid, which Figure also is a right Symbole of Light, the rays entering the eye in a Pyramidal form. And Lights now are set up in all the vast Region of the Ethereal Matter, which is Heaven.

The Pythagoreans also call this number אֲחַש, and אֲוַלָּס, Body, and the World, intimating the Creation of the Corpuscular world therein. And further, signifying in what excellent proportion and harmony the world was made, they call this number Four, אֲוַלָּס, and בֵּאֱשֶׁר וְאֵשֶׁר וְאֵשֶׁר וְאֵשֶׁר, Harmony, and the Stirrer up of divine Fury and Ecstasy; intimating that all things are so sweetly and fittingly ordered in the world, that the several motions thereof are as a comely Dance, or ravishing Musick, and are able to carry away a contemplative Soul into Rapture and Ecstasy upon a clear view and attentive Animadversion of the Order and Economy of the Universe.

And Philo, who does much Pythagorize in his Exposition of Moses, observes, That this number Four contains the most perfect proportions in Musical Symphonies, viz. Diatessaron, Diapente, Diapason, and Disdiapason: The 20 Densitatis is the 20, the 20, &c. For the proportion of Diatessaron is as Four to Three, of Diapente as Three to Two, of Diapason as Two to One, or Four to Two, of Disdiapason as Four to One.

We might cast in also the consideration of that divine Nemesis which God has placed in the frame and nature of the Universal Creation, as he is a Distributor to every one according to his works. From whence himself is also called Nemesis by Aristole, and ἱστομοσία, διασμοσία, because he everywhere distributes what is due to one. This is in ordinary language Fustice, and both Philo and Plotinus out of the Pythagoreans affirm, that the number Four is a Symbole of Fustice. And which makes towards what I drive at, that the whole Creation is concerned 
concerned in this number Four, which is called the Fourth day.

And for further eviſion, we may yet add, that as all numbers are contained in Four virtually, (by all numbers is meant Ten, for when we come to Ten we go back again) so the root and foundation of all the Corporeal Creation is laid in this fourth day's work, wherein Suns, Earths and Moons are made, and the ever-whirling Vortices. For, as Philo observes, Pythagorean-like, Ten (which they call also κόσμος, ἐπάχθος, and παντίζεα, the World, Heaven, and All-perfections) is made by the scattering of the parts of Four, thus, 1, 2, 3, 4. Put these together now, and they are Ten, παντίζεα, τὸ πᾶς, The Universe. And this was such a Secret amongst Pythagoras his disciples, that it was a solemn Oath with them to swear by him that delivered to them the mysterie of the Tetraedys, Tetrab, or number Four.

Thus they swore by Pythagoras, as is conceived, who taught them this mysterious tradition. And had it not been a right worthifull mysterie, think you, indeed, and worthy of the solemnity of Religion and of an Oath, to understand that 1, 2, 3, 4, make Ten; and that Ten is All' which rude mankind told first upon their fingers, and Arithmeticians discover it by calling them Digits at this very day.

There is no likelihood that fo wise a man as Pythagoras was, should lay any stress upon such trifles, or that his Scholars should be such fools as to be taken with them. But it is well known that the Pythagoreans held the Motion of the Earth about the Sun, which is plainly implied according to the Philosopbick Cabbala of this Fourth day's work, So much of his Secrets got out to common knowledge and fame. But it is very highly probable, that he had the whole Philosopbick Cabbala of the Creation opened to him by some knowing Priest or Philosopher (as we now call them) in the Oriental parts, that under this mysterie of Numbers set out to him the choicest and most precious Conclusions in Natural Philosophy, interpreting, as I conceive, the Text of Moses in some such way as I have light upon, and making all those generous and ample Conclusions good by Demonstration and Reason. And so Pythagoras being well furnished with the knowledge of things, was willing to impart them to those whose piety and capacity was fit to receive them; not laying aside that outward form of Numbers, which they were first conveyed to himself in. But such Arithmetical nugacities as are ordinarily recorded for his, in dry Numbers, to have been the riches of the Woldine of fo famous a Philosopher, is a thing beyond all credit or probability.

Wherefore I conceive that the choicest and most precious Treasures of knowledge being laid open in the Cabbala of the Fourth day, from thence it
it was that so much Solemunity and Religion was pur upon that Number, which he called his Tetraglyphs; which seems to have been of two kinds, the one, the single number Four; the other, Thirty six, made of the four first Masculine numbers, and the four first Feminine, viz., of 1, 3, 5, 7, and of 2, 4, 6, 8, wherein you see that the former and more simple Tetraglyphs is still included and made use of; for Four here takes place again in the Assignment of the Masculine and Feminine Numbers. Whence I further conceive that under the number of this more complex Tetrad, which contains also the other in it, he taught his disciples the mysterie of the whole Creation, opening to them the nature of all things, as well Spiritual as Corporal. "γαλαθίας τὸ τετράγωνον ἔκ τούτων, καὶ τὸ τετράδιος τὸ τετράδιον καὶ τὰ τετράδια διά τοῦ τετράδιον. Καὶ οὐδὲν οὐρανὸς ὄρος ὡς αὐτῷ," as a certain Author writes; For an even Number carries along with it divisibility, and passibility; but an odd Number, indivisibility, impassibility, and activity: wherefore that is called Feminine, this Masculine.

Wherefore the putting together of the four first Masculine Numbers to the four first Feminine is the * joyning of the Active & Passive Principles together, matching the parts of the Matter with congruous Forms from the World of life. So that I conceive the Tetraglyphs was a Symbol of the whole Systeme of Pythagoras his Philosophy, which we may very justly suspect to be the same with the Mosaical Cabala. And the root of this Tetraglyphs is Six, which again hits upon Moses, and re-mindes us of the Six days work of the Creation.

Vers. 20. Fish and Fowl are made in the same day. And here Moses does plainly play the Philosopher in joyning them together; for there is more affinity betwixt them then is easily differenc'd by the heedleffe vulgar: for besides that Fowls frequent the waters very much, many kinds of them I mean, these Elements themselve of Air and Water, for their thinnesse and liquidity, are very like one another. Besides, the finnes of Fishes and the wings of Birds, the feathers of one and the scales of the other, are very Analogical. They are both also distinct of Turtles properly so called, of Dugges also and of Milk, and are Oviparous. Further, their motions are mainly alike, the Fishes as it were flying in the Water, and the Fowls swimming in the Air, according to that of the Poet concerning Dadalus, when he had made himself Wings; Inspectum per iter gelidus creavit ad Arietus.

Cant in this also, that some Fowls dive and swim under water, so some Fishes fly above the water in the air for a considerable space, till their finnes begin to be something stiffe and dry.

Vers. 23. And the Quinary denotes. Philo does not here omit that obvious consideration of the Five senses in Animals. But it is a strange coincidence, if it was not intended, that living creatures should be fald to be made in the Fifth and Sixth day, those Numbers according to the Pythagorical mysterie being fo fitly signifiant of the nature of them. For Five is acknowledged by them to be Male and Female, consisting of Three and Two, the two first Masculine and Feminine numbers: It is also an Emblem of Generation, for the number Five drawn into Five brings about Five again, as you see in Five times Five, which is Twenty Five. So an
The Defence of the Philofophick Cabbala. CHAP. I.


Plutarch. De Eli apud Delphos.

an Eagle ingendering with an Eagle brings forth an Eagle; and a Dolphin ingendering with a Dolphin, a Dolphin; and so in the rest. Whence the Pythagoreans call this number Five, Cytherea, that is, Venus, and Γαύς, Marriage; and in Birds it is evident that they chuse their mates. Concerning the number Six I shall speak in its proper place.

Ver. 26. That it is so free, so rational. That the Image of God consists in this rather than in the dominion over the creature, I take to be the right fene, and more Philosophical, the other more Political; and Philo interprets it after that manner we have made choice of, which is also more suitable to Platonism and Pythagorism, the best Cabbala that I know of Mofes his Text.

Ver. 27. Male and Female. It is a wonder, fays Grotius, to fee how the Explications of the Rabbins upon this place and thofe passages in Plato's Symposion agree one with another, which notwithstanding from whatsoever they proceeded, I make no quifion, fays he, but they are false and vain: And I must confefl I am fully of the fame opinion. But this strange agreement betwixt Ariflophanes his Narration, in the forenamed Symposion, and the comments of the Rabbins upon this Text, is no small argument that Plato had fome knowledge of Mofes, which may well add the greater authority and credit to this our Cabbala. But it was the wifdom of Plato to own the true Cabbala himself; but fuch unwarrantable Fancies as might rise from the Text, to cast upon fuch a ridiculous fhallof companion as Ariflophanes, it was good enough for him to utter in that club of Wits, that Philofophick Symposion of Plato.

Ver. 28. They lورد it. The Seventy have it κατονωκολοντε, which is to dominate with an high hand, Matth. 20.

Ver. 29. And the Senary denotes. The Senary or the number Six has a double reference, the one to this particular day's work, the other to the whole Creation. For the particular day's work, it is the Creation of fundry forts of Land Animals, divided into Male and Female. And the number Six is made up of Male and Female. For Two into Three is Six. The conceit is Philo's; and hence the Pythagoreans called this Number, Γαύς, Matrimony, as Clemens alfo obferves, adding moreover that they did it in reference to the Creation of the World, fet down by Mofes. This number alfo, in the fame ftart that the number Five, is a fit Emblem of Procreation. For Six drawn into Six makes Thirty Six. The conceit is Plutarch's in his De Eli apud Delphos, though he fpeak of it of an inferiour kind of Generation: But methinks it is moft proper to Animals. Here is fomething alfo that respefts Man particularly, the choiceft result of this Sixth day's labour. The number of the brutifh Nature was Five, according to Philo; but here is an Unite fuperadded in Man, Reason reaching out to the knowledge of a God. And this Unite added to the former Five, makes Six.

But now for the reference that Six bears to the whole Creation, that the Pythagoreans did conceive it was fignificant thereof, appears by the Titles they have given it. For they call it Διαφερον της πατ& ιος, Λαξυν, Κομάς, The articulate and compleét efformation of the Univerfe, the Anvil, and the World. I fuppose they call it the Anvil from that indefati-
gable shaping out of new Forms and Figures upon the Matter of the Universe, by virtue of the Active Principle that ever busies itself everywhere. But how the Senary should Emblematicize the World, you shall understand thus: The World is self-complete, filled and perfected by its own parts; so is the Senarius, which has no denominated part but a Sixth, Third, and Second, viz. 1, 2, 3, which put together make Six; and Euclide defines a perfect Number from this property, Σεναριον νομος μεσος εις Θεον. A perfect Number is that which is equal to its parts. Wherefore this number sets out the perfection of the World, and you know God in the close of all law that all that he made was very good. Then again the World is "Ανάλογος Θολεος, Mas and Feminine, that is, it consists of an Active and Passive Principle, the one brought down into the other from the World of life; and the Senary is made by the drawing of the first Masculine Number into the first Feminine, for Three into Two is Six.

Thus you see continually, That the property of the Number sets off the nature of the work of every day, according to those mysteries that the Pythagoreans have observed in them; and besides this, That the Numbers have ordinarily got Names answerable to each day's work, which, as I have often intimated, is a very high probability that the Pythagoreans had a Cabbala referring to Moses his Text and the History of the Creation. And Philo, though not in so punctual a way, has offered at the opening of the mind of Moses by this Key. But I hope I have made it so plain, that it will not hereafter be scrupled, but that this is the genuine way of interpreting the Philosophick meaning of the Mosaical Text in this first Chapter of Genesis.

CHAP. II.

3. The number Seven a fit Symbole of the Sabbath or Rest of God. 7. Of Adam's rising out of the ground, as other creatures did; 11. That Pison is from Ἄναλος ὄς ὃς, and denotes Prudence, The mystical meaning of Havilah. 13. That Gihon is the same that Nilus, Sihor, or Siris, and that Pison is Ganges, The Justice of the Æthiopians. That Gihon is from μύς, and denotes that Virtue. 14. As Hiddekel denotes Fortitude. 17. That those expressions of the Soul's sleep, and death in the Body, so frequent amongst the Platoniets, were borrowed from the Mosaical Cabbala. 19. Fallen Angels assimilated to the Beasts of the field. The meaning of those Platonical phrases Ὄνος Ὀνος, Ὀνος, ους Ὀνος Ὀνος, τοῦ Ποταμος Ὀνος, and the like. That Θεοι in Platonism is the same that Ἰων in Mozes, that signifies Angels as well as God. 22. That there are Three Principles in Man, according to Plato's School, Νος, Ψυχα, εἰσίν ὁ Ψυχα, and that this last is Eve.

Mm m 2
In this second Chapter, Moses, having spoke of the Sabbath, returns to a more particular Declaration of the Creation of Adam, which is referable to the Sixth day's work: Then he falls upon that mysterious story of Paradise, which runs out into the next Chapter.

Vers. 3. And the number declares the nature. The Hebdomad or Septenary is a fit Symbole of God, as he is considered having finished these Six days Creation. For then, as this Cabbala intimates, he creates nothing further. And therefore his condition is then very fitly set out by the number Seven. All numbers within the Decad are cast into three ranks, as * Philo observes. 

In his Cophneopia Mosiac. 

οι δ' ἀμφοτέρα, έτοι μεν τοιοι ο' οι δ' ἁμαρτήματα, ιο υμνοι δ' δ' οι δ' ἐμπότερα, η ήμνοι έξ ήμνοι. Some beget, but are not begotten; others are begotten, but do not beget; the last both beget and are begotten. The number Seven is only excepted, that is neither begotten, nor begets any number, which is a perfect Embleme of God celebrating this Sabbath: For he now creates nothing of anew, as himself is uncreateable. So that the creating and infusing of Souls as occasion should offer, is quite contrary to this Mosaic Cabbala. But the Cabbala is very consonant to it self, which declares that all Souls were created at once in the First day, and will in these following Chapters declare also the manner of their falling into the Body.

Vers. 4. Productions of the Heavens. The Original hath it ה으ז מופיע. Here the Suns and Planets are plainly said to be generated by the Heavens or Aethereal Matter, which is again wonderfully consonant to the Cartesian Philosophy; but after what manner Planets and Stars are thus generated, you may see there at large. It cannot but be acknowledged that there was a fathomless depth of Wisdom in Moses, whose skill in Philosophy thus plainly prevents the subtlest and most capacious reaches of all the wits of the world that ever wrote after him.

Take upon me to define. That no set time is understood by the Six days Creation, hath been witnessed already out of approved Authors; and the present Cabbala plainly confirms it, shewing that the mystery of numbers is meant, not the order or succession of days.

Vers. 6. Like dewy showers of Rain. Vatabelus plainly interprets the place of Rain. But I conceive it better interpreted of something Analogical to the common Rain that now descends upon the Earth, which is lefte oily a great deal, and not so full of vital vigour and principles of life.

Vers. 7. And Man himself rose out of the Earth. That God should shape Earth with his own hands, like a Statue, into the figure of a Man, and then blow breath into the nostrils of it, and so make it become alive, is not likely to be the Philosphick Cabbala, it being more palpably accommodated to vulgar conceit. But mention of Rain immediately before the making of Man, may very well intimate such preparations of the ground to have some causal concourse for his production. And if it be at all credible that other living creatures rose out of the Earth in this manner, it is as likely that Man did so likewise; for the same words are used concerning them both: for the Text of Moses, ver. 19, saies, That out of the ground
ground God formed every Beast of the Field, and every Fowl of the Air, as it fays in the seventh verfe, that he formed Man of the dust of the ground. Whence Euripides the Tragedian (one that Socrates lov’d and respected much for his great knowledge and vertue, and would of his own accord be a Spectator of his Tragedies, whom as they could scarce force him to see other Plays, as Aelian writes) this Euripides, I fay, pronouncing of the first generation of men and the rest of living creatures, affirmed that they were born all after the fame manner, and that they rose out of the Earth. And that Euripides was tinctured with the fame doctrines that were in Pythagoras, and Plato’s School, both the friendhip betwixt him and Socrates, as also the Trufmans or Moral and Philofophick sentences in his Tragedies, are no inconsiderable arguments. And, as I have already intimated, the best Philofophick Cabbala of Moses that is, I fuppofe to be in their Philosophy, I mean of Plato and Pythagoras.

Vers. 8. Where he had put the Man. For there is no Præterpluperfect Tene in the Hebrew, and therefore, as Vatablus obferves, if the fentence require, the Præter perfeét Tene stands for it.

Wholly Ethereal. For that’s the pure Heavenly and undefiled Vehicle of the Soul, according to Platonism.

Beams of the Divine Intellect. I have already more at large fhewed how the Son of God or the Divine Intellect is fet out by the immittitude of the Sun-rising or East, which I may again here further confirm out of Philo. Τὸν Κόσμον ἐπίστασθαι τὸν οὐ συνετέλεσθαι τῷ Θεῷ, Ιν γὰρ Σύγγενεσιν Ἀγαθέστατον. So that the placing of Paradife under the Sun-rise, signifies the condition of a Soul irrigated by the rayes of the Divine Intellect, which thefe is moft capable of in her Ethereal Vehicle. But that the Souls of men were from the beginning of the world, is the general opinion of the Learned Jews, as well as of the Pythagorians and Platonifts, and therefore a very warrantable Hypothesis in the Philofophick Cabbala. Nay, I may further adde that it is the Opinion of Origen, that Plato’s Δίος κατ’ Θεόν, Ιούβις Ηρότις, is but an imitation of this History of Paradife, and that Prome his being deceived by Penia anwers to Adam his being beguiled by the Serpent. See Origen againft Celsus, lib. 4.

Vers. 9. The Essential Will of God. By the Essential Will of God is understood the Will of God becoming Life and Effence to the Soul of Man; whereby is signified a more through union betwixt the Divine and humane nature, fuch as is in them that are firmly regenerated and radicated in what is good, Philo makes the Tree of Life to be ζωην φυσιν, that is, Piety or Religion; but the best Religion and Piety is to be of one will with God: see John 1.12.

Vers. 10. The Four Cardinal Vertues. It is * Philo’s Exposition upon * in his Leg. the place; and then the River it felf to be ποταμός αφορίσμα, that général goodness diftinguifhable into thefe four heads of Vertue;

Vers. 11. Is Pifeon. From ὑδάτικα or υδατικα to spread and diffufe it felf, to multiply and abound. This is Wisdom or Prudence, called Pifer, partly; becaufe it diffuses it felf into all our actions, and regulates the exercife of the other Three Vertues; and partly, becaufe Wisdom and Truth fills and encreases, and spreads out every day more then other. For Truth is.

M m m 3

very
very fruitful, and there are ever new occasions that add experience of things.

According to our English Proverb, The older the wiser.

In the Land of Havilah. From ז"ע and י"ו or י"ז, Deus indicavit, God hath shown it.

Vers. 12. Pure Gold, &c. An easy Emblem of tried Experience, the mother of true Wisdom and Prudence. And the virtue of Edelium is not improper for diseases that arise from Phlegmatick Laziness; and the very name and nature of the Onyx stone also points out the signification of it: Though there be no necessity, as I have told you already out of Maimonides, to give an account in this manner of every particular passage in an Allegory or Parable: wherefore if any man think me too curious, they may omit these expostitions, and let them go for nought.

Vers. 13. River is Gihon. According to the History or Letter we have made Pison, Phasis, and Gihon a branch of Euphrates. But the ancient Fathers, Epiphanius, Augustine, Ambrose, Hieronymus, Theodoret, Dama- seen, and several others make Pison Ganges, and Gihon Nilus. And they have no contemptible arguments for it: For first, Jerem. 2:18. Sibor is a River of Egypt, which is not questioned to be any other then Nilus, and its Etymon seems to bewray the truth of it, from ג"ו denigrari, from the muddy blackness of the River. And Nilus is notorious for this quality, and therefore has its denomination thence in the Greek, quasi vita lux, according to which is that of Dionysius,

Où γάρ τιν ἐναλίσκετο Νείλος.  

That is,

For there's no River can compare with Nile,  
For casting mud, and fattening the soil.

But now to recite the very words of the Prophet, What hast thou to do with the way of Egypt, to drink the waters of Sibor? the Latine has it, at bibas aquam turbidam, this is Nilus: But the Seventy translate it מ"ט ג"יו Γ'יו. To drink the water of Gihon, which is the name of this very River of Paradise: And the Abyssines also even to this day call Nilus by the name of Guion. Add unto this, that Gihon runs in Ethiopia, so does Nilus, and is Siris as it runs through Ethiopia, which is from Sibor it is likely; and then the Greek termination makes it Storis, after by contraction Siris.

Σιρίς καὶ Αἰθιοπίαν κυλήσει, οἱ το Συλίτος  

That is,

The Ethiopian him Siris calls,  
Syene Nilus, when by her he crawls.

As the same Author writes in his Geographical Poems. And that Pison is Ganges has also its probabilities. Ganges being in India, a Countrey famous for Gold and precious Stones. Besides, the notation of the name agrees with the nature of the River, Pison being from מ"כ multiplicare; and there is no less a number then Ten, and those great Rivers, that exo-
nerate themselves into Ganges: as there must be a conflux of multiformious Experience to fill up and compleat that vertue of Wifdome or Prudence. So that we shall fee that the four Rivers of Paradife have got such names as are most advantageous and favourable to the mysterious sense of the story.

Wherefore regardlesse here of all Geographical scrupulosities, we will say that Gihon is Nilus or Siris, the River of the Ethiopeans, that is, of the Eafi, and the Vertue is here determinately set off from the subject wherein it doth refide: For by the fame of the Justice and Innocency of the Ethiopeans, we are assured which of the Cardinal Vertues is meant by Gihon. And the ancient fame of their Honesty and Uprightneffe was such, that Homer has made it their Epithet, calling them αἰσθομένες, Αἰθιομένες, The blameleffe Ethiopeans; adding further, that Jupiter ufed to banquet with them, he being so much taken with the integrity of their conversation. And Dionysius calls them Θεωδοςίας Αἰθιομέναι, The divine or Deforme Ethiopeans: and they were fo styled ὁ Θεοκόμος, by reason of their Justice, as Eufathius comments upon the place. Herodotus also, speaking of them, says, they are very goodly men, and much civilized, and of a very long life, which is the reward of Righteousneffe. So that by the place where Gihon runs, it is plainly signified to us what Cardinal Vertue is to be understood thereby.

Notation of the name thereof. The name Gihon, as you have seen, fairly incites us to acknowledge it a River of Ethiopia. The notation thereof does very fitly agree with the nature of Justice, for it is from πρωπερε, And Justice is αἰχοτροια ἀγαθον, Bonum alienum, as the Philosopher notes, not confined within a mans self, but breaks out rather upon others, bestowing upon every one what is their due.

Verf. 14. Is Hidekel. The word is compounded, says Vatablus, from two words that signify velox and rapidum; and this vertue, like a swift and rapid stream, bears down all before it, as you have it in the Cabbala.

And folutely refifts. * Philo ueres here the word ἀναστηλῶν, to refift, which he takes occasion for from the Seventies καταναγωνίασ, which he interprets against the Assyrians. The Hebrew has it, Eastward of Assyria, and therefore Assyria is situated Westward of it. Now the West is that quarter of the world where the Sun bidding us adieu, leaves us to darkness; whence ἄναφως, the West wind, in Eufathius, has its name from ἄναφως and ἁνορ, the wind that blows from the dark Quarter. Assyria therefore is that fable state of feeing Happiness and power of wickednesse, which is called the Kingdom of darkness. And this is the moft noble object of Fortitude, to destroy or refift the power of this kingdom within our selves. Which is the force and power of the fuggftions of the Body, which may well be signified by the Occident, as well as the Intellect by the Orient, the Evening also in the foregoing chapter denoting the corporeal or Material Principle all along.

Perath. From προθε Φροφησαυτιν.

Verf. 17. In proccfe of time, &c. This is according to the minde of the Pythagoreans and Origin. And that Pythagoras had the favour of Mm m 4 having

*In his Leg. Allegor. lib.
having the Mostical Cabbala communicated to him by some knowing Priest of the Jewes, or some holy man or other, I think I have continued in the former Chapter made it exceeding probable.

The Region of mortality and death. Nothing is more frequent with the Platonists then the calling of the Body a SEPULCHRE, and this life we live here upon Earth, either sleepe or death. Which expressions are so mutable with this Cabbala, and the Cabbala with the Text of Moses, that mentions the death and sleepe of Adam, that it is a shrewd presumptuation that these Phrases and Notions came first from thence. And Philo acknowledges that Heraclitus, that mysterious and abstruse Philosopher, (whom Porphyry also has cited to the same purpose, in his De antro Nympharnm,) has even hit upon the very meaning that Moses intends in this death of Adam, in that famous saying of his, ΖΩΗΕΤΟΣ οὐκπάντων διαφθόρων, τις ενεργεύει τις οἰκέων. We live their death, (to wit, of the Souls out of the body) but we are dead to their life. And Enurpides, that friend of Socrates, and fellow-traveller of Plato's, in his Tragedies speaks much to the same purpose:

Τὸ τεσσαρακοντεπτάνων μετὰ τοῦ θανάτου θεία, 
Τό θανάτου θεία, 

Who knows whether to live, be not to die; and to die, to live? So that the philosophick sense concerning Adam's death must be this; That he shall be dead to the Ethereal life he lived before, while he is restrained to the Terrestrial, and that whenas he might have lived for ever in the Ethereal life, he shall in a shorter time assuredly die to the Terrestrial: That the sons of men cannot escape either the certainty or speed of death.

Vers. 18. Both good for himself, &c. For the words of the Text do not confine it to Adam's conveniency alone, but speak at large without any restraint, in this present verse. Wherefore there being a double conveniency, it was more explicit to mention both in the Cabbala.

Vers. 19. Fallen and unfallen Angels. The fallen Angels are here assimilated to the Beasts of the Field, the unfallen to the Fowls of the Air. How fitly the fallen Spirits are reckoned amongst the Beasts of the Field, you shall understand more fully in the following Chapter. In the same time you may take notice that the Platonists, indeed Plato himself in his Phaedrus, makes the Soul of Man, before it falls into this Terrestrial Region, a winged Creature: And that such phrases as these, Ρεπούσιν και Ρεπούσιν, και Λεγόν τὸ δεινόν, and the like, are proper expressions of that School. And Plato does very plainly define what he means by these wings of the Soul, (and there is the same reason of all other Spirits whatsoever) after this manner, Πετεών πετεών τόμαμι και λευκός τοις ουριοι στομα, μεταφεκτός το θανάτων. That the nature of the wing of the Soul is such, as to be able to carry upward that which otherwise would singe downwards, and so bear it aloft and place it there where we may have more sensible communion with God and his holy Angels. For so Θεός in the plural number is most suitably translated in such passages as these, and most congruously to the thing it self and the truth of Christianity. And it may well seem the lefe strange that Θεός should signify Angels in the Greek Philo-

These are fragments of text that need to be pieced together for full comprehension. The text is discussing the concept of mortality and death, referencing ancient philosophical and religious texts, particularly those of Plato and the Cabbala. It notes that the definition of death is mutable between different texts and traditions, and that the concept is often used metaphorically to convey the idea of passing from one state to another, such as from life to death. The text also references specific passages from Plato's works, particularly the Phaedrus, to illustrate the use of the concept of wings and a winged soul in philosophical discourse.
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...phers, especially such as have been acquainted with Moses, whereas with him מזג signifies to too, viz. Angels as well as God. Wherefore to conclude, the loss of that principle that keeps us in this divine condition is the losing of our wings, which fallen Angels have done, and therefore they may be very well assimilated to Terrestrial Beasts.

Verf. 20. A faculty of being united, &c. This vital aptitude in the Soul of being united with corporeal Matter being so essential to her and proper, the invigorating the exercise of that Faculty cannot but be very grateful and acceptable to her, and a very considerable share of her happiness. Else what means the Resurrection of the dead or Bodies in the other world? which yet is an Article of the Christian Faith.

Verf. 22. This new sense of his Vehicle. There be Three Principles in Man according to the Platonists, Νος, Ψυχή, ἄδοξον ψυχής. The first is Intellect, Spirit, or divine Light; the second the Soul herself, which is Adam the Man, Anima qujasque est quisque, the Soul of every man that is the Man; the third is the Image of the Soul, which is her vital Energie upon the Body, wherewith the does enliven it; and if that life be in good tune and due vigour, it is a very grateful sense to the Soul, whether in this Body, or in a more thin Vehicle. This Ficinus makes our Eoe. This is the Feminine Faculty in the Soul of Man, which awakes then easeliest into act, when the Soul to Intellectuals falls asleep.

Verf. 24. Over-tedious aspire. To ἀνεξομόω γερέν, ἀνεξομόν ούνε, is a vulgar Monition reprehended by Ariflotle in his Ethicks. But it is a great point of wisdom for all that, and mainly necessary, to know the true Laws and Bounds of humane happiness, that the heat of Melancholy drive not men up beyond what is controllable to humane nature, and the reach of all the Faculties thereof; as well as to beware that the too favourity relish of the pleasures of the flesh or Animal Life keep them not down many thousand degrees below what they are capable of. But the man that truly fears God will be delivered from them both. What I have spoken, is directed more properly to the Soul in the flesh, but may Analogically be understood of a Soul in any Vehicle, for they are peccable in them all.

Verf. 25. Stood naked before God. Adam was as truly clothed in Corporeity now as ever after; for the Ether is as true a Body as the Earth: But the meaning is, Adam had a sense of the divine Presence, very feelingly assurred in his own minde, that his whole Being lay naked and bare before God, and that nothing could be hid from his sight, which pierced also to the very thoughts and inward frame of his Spirit. But yet though Adam stood thus naked before him, notwithstanding he found no want of any covering to hide himself from that presentick sense of him, nor indeed felt himself as naked in that notion of nakedness. For that sense of nakedness, and want of further covering and sheltering from the divine Presence, arose from his disobedience and rebellion against the commands of God, which as yet he had not fallen into.

Not at all ashamed. Shame is φόβος, τορπα τοῦ, the fear of just reprehenion, as Celsius out of the Philosophers' defines it. But Adam having not acted any thing yet at randome, after the swing of his own will, he had...
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had done nothing that the divine Light would reprehend him for. He had not yet become obnoxious to any sentence from his own condemning Conscience; for he kept himself hitherto within the bounds of that divine Law written in his Soul, and had attempted nothing against the Will of God. So that there being no sin, there could not as yet be any shame in Adam.

C H A P. III.

1. The Serpent Orpword in Pherecydes Syrus,  דאֶחָה,  רועש,  יַנָּשׁ,  יֵאַשׁ,  and ἡνύλος, names of Spirits haunting Fields and defolate places. The right Notation of בֹּרשׁ. 15. That Satan upon his tempting Adam was cast down lower towards the Earth, with all his Accomplices. 15. Plato's Prophecy of Christ. The reasonableness of Divine Providence in exalting Christ above the highest Angels. 20. That Adam's defection into his Terrestrial Body was a kind of Death. 22. How incongruous it is to the Divine Goodness, Sarcastically to insult over frail Man fallen into Tragical misery. 24. That it is a great mercy of God that we are not immortal upon Earth. That דָּשַׁהוּ,  בּוּכַּ, and "אֲשֶׁר, are all one.

The first verse. This old Serpent therefore.

In Pherecydes Syrus, Pythagoras his Master, there is mention of one 'Orpword, Princips mali, as Grotius cites him on this place, which is a further argument of Pythagoras his being acquainted with this Mosaicall Philosophy; and that according to the Philosphick Cabbala, it was an evil Spirit, not a natural Serpent, that supplanted Adam, and brought such mischief upon mankind.

The Beasts of the Field. But now that these evil Spirits should be reckoned as Beasts of the field, besides what reason is given in the Cabbala itself, we may add further, that the haunt of these unclean spirits is in solitudes and waste fields and defolate places, as is evident in the Prophet. Esay his description of the defolation of Babylon, where he faith it shall be a place for the מַיְּא and מַיְּש, the Fauni and Sylvani, as Castello translates it, or δανσταεος and Δαμιανος, as the Seventy: And these Onocentauri in Hesychius are Δαμιανος την θεανιδον καταναξιν την ουρανιακον, A kinde of Spirit that frequents the woods, and is of a dark colour. There is mention made also by the Prophet (in the same description) of the רועש and בּוּכַּ and of ἡνύλος, all which Expositors interpret of Spirits. For בּוּכַּ are interpreted by the Seventy Δαμιανος, by Castello Satyri; מַיְּא Castello renders Fauni, the Seventy ἤς Κλαμορες, Strepitus; Grotius suspects they wrote ἤς Μαν. Out of both you may guess that they were such a kinde of Spirit as causes a noise and a stir in those defolate places, according to that of Lucretius,

Hec loca capripedes Faunos Nymphasque tenere
Finitimi singum, & Faunos esse loquuntur;  

Quorum
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Quorum noctivagis Herevitis ludique vocant
Affirmant vulgo taciturna silentia rumpi.

To this sense,

These are the places where the Nymphs do wander,
The Fawns and Satyres with their cloven feet,
Whose noise and shouts and laughers loud do run
Through the still Air, and make the silent Night.

But the Poet seems to put it off with this conceit, that it is only the Shepherds that are merry with their Lasses. But no man can gloss upon this Text after that manner: For the Prophet says, No shepherd shall pitch his fold there, nor shall any man pass through it for ever. The first strange creature in these direful solitudes is Lamia, which Interpreters ordinarily translate Lamia, a Witch; and for mine own part, I give so much credit to fundry stories that I have read and heard, that I should rather interpret those noises in the Night, which Lucretius speaks of, to be the Conventicles of Witches and Devils, then the merriment of Shepherds and their Shepherdesses re-echoed from rocks & hills, themselves in the mean time unseen in the midst of their Mufick and mirth. But the Jewes understand by Lamia a she-devil, an enemy to women in child-bed; whence it is that they write on the walls of the room where the woman lies in, רוח בכא רוח לילית, Adam, Eve, out of doors Lilith.

And what I have alleged already, I conceive is authority enough to countenance the sense of the Cabbala, that supposes evil Spirits to be reckoned among, or to be Analogical to, the Beasts of the field.

But something may be added yet further, Matt. 12, 43. There our Saviour Christ plainly allows of this doctrine, that evil Spirits have their haunts in the wide fields and deserts, which Grotius observes to be the opinion of the Jewes, and that זרעים, Demones, have their name for that reason, from עין, the Field; for if it were from דם, it would be rather דם then זרעים, Shiddim then Shedhim, as Grammatical Analogy requires.

Ver. 2. And Adam answered him. Though the Serpent here be look'd upon as a distant person from Adam, and externally accounting him, yet it is not at all incongruous to make Eve merely an Internal Faculty of him. For as she is said to proceed from him, so she is said still to be one with him: which is agreeably with the Faculties of the Soul; for though they be from the Soul, yet they are really one with her, as they that understand any thing in Philosophy will easily admit.

Ver. 5. Know all things, Πάντες γνωστοι και εἰδίσιν ἀπελθόντες. All men have a natural desire of knowledge. It is an Aphorism in Aristote, Metaph. i. 1. And this desire is most strong in those whose spirits are most thin and subtle. And therefore this bait could not but be much taking with Adam in his thinner Vehicle. But whatever is natural to the Soul, unless it be regulated and bounded with the divine Light, will prove her mischief and bane, whether in this lower State, or what State ever the Soul is placed in.

Ver. 7. Neither the covering of the Heavenly nature. For Adam by the indulging to every careless suggestion, at last destroy'd and spoiled the
the pure frame of his \textit{Ethereal} or \textit{Heavenly Vehicule}, and wrought himself into a dislike of the fordid ruines and distempered reliques of it; and in some measure awakening that lower \textit{Plental life}, which yet had not come near enough the Terrestrial Matter, and with which he was as yet unclothed, found himself naked of what he presaged would very fitly sute with him, and eafe the trouble of his present condition. See 2 Cor. ch. 5. v. 1, 2, 3, 4.

\textit{Vers. 8. That they bid themselves.} They hate the Light, because their deeds are evil. This is true of all rebellious spirits, be they in what Vehicle they will.

\textit{Vers. 9. Pursued him.} Præstantior \textit{Anime facultatem esse duce hominis atque Daemonem.} It is Ficinus his out of Timæus, viz. That the best Faculty that the Soul is any thing awakened to, is her guide and good Genius. But if we be rebellious to it, it is our Demon in the worse sense, and we are afraid of it, and cannot endure the sight of it.

\textit{Vers. 10. No power nor ornaments.} For he found that though he could spoil and disorder his Vehicle, it was not in his power so easily to bring it in order again.

\textit{Vers. 12. It was the vigour and impetuousity.} There is some kind of offer towards a real excute in \textit{Adam}; but it is manifest that he cannot clear himself from sin, because it was in his power to have regulated the motions of the Life of his Vehicle according to the rule of the divine Light in him.

\textit{Vers. 13. What work has he made here?} \textit{Adam} touched in some sort with the conviction of the divine Light, bemoans that sad Catafrophe, which the vigorous life of the Vehicle had occasioned: But then he again excuses himself from the deceivednesse of that Facultie, especially it being wrought upon by so cunning and powerful an Affipliant as the old Serpent the Devil.

\textit{Imagination for ever. That is, ὄργανον, εἰς ἀθανάτα.}

The Eternal God. It being a thing acknowledged, that God both speaks in a man, as in other Intellectual creatures, by his divine Light residing there, and that he also speaks in himself, concerning things or persons; which Speeches are nothing else but his Decrees: It is not at all harsh, in the reading of Moses, to understand the speachings of God according as the circumstances of the Matter naturally imply; nor to bring God in as a third Person, in corporeal and visible shape, unless there were an exigency that did extort it from us. For his inward word, whereby he either creates or decrees any thing that shall come to passe, as also that divine Light whereby he does instruct those Souls that receive him, Philosophy will easilier admit of these for the speachings of God, then any audible articulate voice pronounced by him in humane shape, unless it were by Chrift himself, for otherwise in all likelihood it is but a message by some Angel.

\textit{Vers. 14. The Prince of the rebellious Angels.} For the mighty shall be mightily torment; and the nature of the thing also implies it, because disgrace, adversity, and being trampled on, is far more painful & vexatious to those that have been in great place than to those of a more inferior rank,
In the higher parts of the Air, &c. This is very consonant to the opinion of the ancient Fathers, whether you understand it of Satan himself, or of the whole Kingdom of those rebellious Spirits. And it is no more absurd, that for a time the bad went amongst the good in the Ethereal Region, then it is now that there are good Spirits amongst the bad in this lower Air. But after that villainy Satan committed upon Adam, he was commanded down lower, and the fear of the Lord of Hells to changed his Vehicle and flaked his fire, that he sunk towards the Earth, and at last was fain to lick the dust of the ground. See Mr. Mede in his Discourse upon 2 Pet. 2. 4.

Vers. 15. Messiah should take a Body. That the Soul of the Messiah, and all Souls else, did preexift, is the opinion of the Jews; and that admitted, there is no difficulty in the Cabballa. Plato, whether from this passage alone, or whether it was that he was instructed out of other places also of the holy Writ, (if what Ficinus writes is true) seems to have had some knowledge and prefig of the coming of Christ, in that being asked how long men should attend to his writings, he answered, till some more holy and divine Person appear in the world, whom all should follow.

Notorioufly here upon Earth. As it came to passe in his casting out Devils, and silencing Oracles, or making them cry out

"ομηον 7 τεσπων---

Christ bruises the head of Satan by destroying his kingdom and sovereignty, and by being so highly exalted above all Powers whatsoever. And it is a very great and precious mystery, That dear Composition of our fellow-creatures, and faithful and fast Obedience to the Will of God, (which were so eminently and transcendently in Christ) should be lifted above all Power and Knowledge whatsoever in those higher Orders of Angels. For none of them that were as they should would take offence at it, but be glad of it. But those that were proud, or valued Power and Knowledge before Goodness and Obedience, it was but a just affront to them, and a fit rebuke of their Pride.

But now how does Satan bruise the heel of Christ? Thus: He falls upon the rear, the lowest part of those that profess Christianity, Hypocrites and ignorant Souls, such as he often makes Witches of; but the Church Triumphant is sure, and the sincere part of the Church Militant. So Mr. Mede upon the place.

Vers. 16. The Concomitance of Pain and Sorrow. And it is the common complaint of all Mortals, that they that speed the best have the experience of a vicissitude of Sorrow as well as Joy. And the very frame of our Bodies, as well as the accidents of Fortune, are such, that, to indulge to Pleasure is but to lay the seed of Sorrow or Sadness by Diffeases, Satiety, or Melancholy: Besides many spinosities and cutting passages that often happen unawares in the conversation of those from whom we expect the greatest solace and content. To say nothing of the assaults
of a mans own Minde, and pricking of Conscience, which ordinarily disturb those that follow after the pleasures of the Body. \textit{Lucretius}, though an \textit{Atheist}, will fully witnesse to the truth of all this in his fourth book \textit{De rerum Natura}, where you may read upon this Subject at large.

\textit{Vers. 18. Thorns and Thistles. Moses} instances in one kinde of life, \textit{Husbandry}, but there is the same reason in all,

\begin{quote}
\textit{Nil sine magno}\\
\textit{Vita labore detd mortalibus—}\\
\textit{Life nothing gratis unto men doth give;}\\
\textit{But with great labour and sad toil we live.}
\end{quote}

\textit{Vers. 20. Euripides} the friend of \textit{Socrates}, and a favourer of the \textit{Platonical} Philosophy, writes somewhere in his \textit{*} \textit{Tragedies}, as I have already told you, to this sense; \textit{Who knows,} says he, \textit{whether to live, be to die, and whether, again, to die, be not to live?} Which question is very agreeable to this present \textit{Cabbala}: for \textit{Adam} is here as it were dying to that better world and condition of life he was in, and like as one here upon Earth on his death-bed, prophesies many times, and prophesies what he presages concerning his own state to come, that he shall be with God, that he shall be in Heaven amongst the holy Angels and the Saints departed, and the like: so \textit{Adam} here utters his \textit{Apologetical} Prophecies, that this change of his and departure from this present state, though it may prove ill enough for himself, yet it has its use and convenience, and that it is better for the \textit{Universe}, for he shall live upon Earth, and be a ruler there amongst the \textit{Terrestrial} creatures, and help to order and govern that part of the world.

\textit{The Life of his Vehicle, \textit{EVE.}} For \textit{EVE} signifies \textit{Life}, that life which the Soul derives to what \textit{Vehicle} or \textit{Body} forever the actuates and possest.

\textit{Vers. 21. Skin of Beasts.} This \textit{Origen} understands of \textit{Adam's} being incorporated and clothed with humane flesh and skin. \textit{*} \textit{Ridiculum enim est dicere,} faith he, \textit{quod Deus fuerit Adami corporis & pellicium futor.} And no man will much wonder at the confidence of this Pious and Learned Father, if he do but consider, that the \textit{Pre-existence} of Souls before they come into the Body is generally held by all the Learned of the \textit{Jews}, and so in all likelihood was a part of this \textit{Philosophick Cabbala.} And how fitly things fall in together, and agree with the very Text of \textit{Moses}, let any man judge. \textit{Origen} prefers the significancy of this passage before the \textit{Platonic} \textit{Herophranthes'} his words are remarkable and worth the citing, \textit{Kal o ἐκβαλλόμενος ἡν ἐν Παραδείσου ἀνδρόν ἐγείρεις, οἵς ἑρμηνεύεις τὰς ἡμερες τῷ φιλόσοφῳ καλύπτεις (ὅτι τὰ πρῶτα πρῶτον ἀνθρώπων ἐκ τῆς αὐτοκρινομένης ἀτέλειας ἢ λόγων, καὶ τὴν ἔκκλησιν, τὴν ἑρωτικὴν ἢ τὰς ἑρωτικὰς ἔκκλησιας, ἐν ἑν σπείρῃ ἢ θησαυροῖς, ὡς ἀνθρώπων, εἰς ἡν ἐκ τῶν ἀληθείας, i.e. Man his being cast out of Paradise together with his wife, and clothed with coats of skin, (which by reason of the transgression of men God has made for those that have sinned) has a certain hidden and mystical meaning above that Platonical one, of the Soul's casting her wings, and falling headlong hither, till she lay hold of some body of a more grosse}
gros consisting. See Origen, Cont. Celis, lib. 4. This is answerable to that in Cornelius, which I think he has out of Epiphanius.

Vers. 22. But play and sport. This I conceive a far better Decorum, then to make God Sarcastically to fear at Adam, and triumph over him in so great and universal a mischief, as some make it, and deftute of any concomitant convenience; especially there being a principle in Adam that was so easily deceivable, which surely has something of the nature of an excuse in it. But to fear at a man that through his own weakness and the over-reaching subtilty of his adversary has fallen into some dreadful and Tragical evil and misery, is a thing so far from becoming God, that it utterly misbeseems any good man.

Vers. 24. He made sure he should not be immortal. For it is our advantage, as Rupertus upon the place hath observed out of Plutinus: Miseri-
cordiae Dei suisse, quod hominem secernit mortalem, nec perpetuis cruciaretur huius vitae annuis; That it is the mercy of God that he made man mortal, that he might not always be tormented with the miseries and torments of this present life.

Passing through the condition of being re-invested with his fiery Vehicle, The following words explain the meaning of the Cabbala; it is according to the sense of that Plato amongst the Poets, (as Severus called him) Virgil, in the sixth Book of his Aeneids:

Dance longa dies perfecto temporis orbe
Concretam exigit laborem, purumque reliquit
Æthereum sensam, atque annus simplicis ignem.

To this sense,
Till that long day at last be come about
That wasted has all pitch and soul desire,
And leaves the Soul Æthereal throughout,
Bathing her senses in pure liquid Fire.

Which we shall yet back very fittingly with the two last Golden Verses, as they are called, of the Pythagoreans, who add Immortality to this Æthereal condition:

"Hic Æthereus òmnia est æmip' æmip' òmnia æmip'",
"Æthereus òmnia òmnia æmip' æmip' òmnia æmip'".

"Rid of this body, if the Æther free
You reach, henceforth Immortal you shall be."

The Greek has it, you shall be an Immortal God, which Hierocles interprets, you shall imitate the Deity in this, in becoming Immortal. And Plutarch, in his Deceit of Oracles, drives on this Apotheosis, according to the order of the Elements, Earth refined to Water, Water to Air, Air to Fire: So man to become of a Terrestrial Animal one of the Heroes, of an Hero a Daemon or good Genius, of a Genius a God, which he calls melagœw Ætov, to partake of Divinity; which is no more then to become one of the θεοί, or Immortal Angels, who are infam flamme, as the Hebrew Doctors declare in Bereith Rabbah. They are according to their Vehicles a versatile fire, turning themselves Proteus-like into any shape. Which are the very words of Maimonides upon the place.

R. Maimonid.
More Novoch. part 1, cap. 49.

And
And Philo Judæus, "Εν τοίς Ματθαίων Ἀναφοράς.
For there is, faith he, in the Air a most holy company of unbodied Souls: and presently he adjoyns, Ἀἴγυπτικας αἱ ψυχαὶ προοιμίων ὑποδηματικῶν ἔκτοτας ἣν ἐποιεῖτο λόγος, and these Souls the Holy Writ uses to call Angels. And in another place he speaking of the more pure Souls, calls them, 'Υπάρχουσι τὰς ταυταρεῖας οὐσίας ὑπερμεγάλης βασιλείας ὑπερλειβᾶς εἰς ὑπάρχοντα, ἀφορίζων τὰντα ἀνώνυμα, ᾧ τῶν ὑποβολῶν. This, other Philosophers call the Genii, but the Scripture Angels. And in another place he says, that Ψυχῆ, Δαίμων, "Αγέλα, that a Soul, Genius, and Angel, are three words that signify but one and the same thing. As Xenocrates also made Ψυχῆ and Δαίμων all one, adding that he was καὶ Χριστός ἀσάκωρ, happy, that had καὶ Χριστός ἀσάκωρ, a virtuous Soul. Therefore not to weary my Reader nor my self with overmuch Philology, we conclude, that the meaning of Moses in this last verse is this, That Adam is here condemned to a mortal, fleeting and impermanent state, till he reach his ἀθροαῖο or pure fiery Vehicle, and become, as our Saviour Christ speaks, ἀγέλα, as one of the Angels. This, I say, is the condition of mankind, according to the Philosophick Cabbala of Moses.
AN APPENDIX to the DEFEENCE of
The Philosophick Cabbala.

CHAP. I.

1. The strength of the Philosophick Cabbala argued from the nature of the Truths therein contain'd. 2. The dignity of Pythagoras. 3. That he was acquainted with the Mosack Philosophy. 4. Pythagoras his Miracles. 5. Of Plato, that he was acquainted with the Jewish Learning; and what miraculous of him. 6. Of Plotinus, his retorting of Olympius his Magical practice against him upon himself; his great esteem of Origen. 7. The folly of men in their adhering to some private judgment more than to Fathers, Churches, Workers of Miracles, and to Reason itself. 8. The Cartesian Philosophy a restauration of the Physical part of the Mosack, and of Des-Cartes his being inspired.

Let us now take a general view of this whole Cabbala, and more summarily consider the strength thereof: which we may refer to these three heads, viz. The nature of the Truths contained in it; The dignity of those Persons that have owned them in fore-going Ages; and lastly, The invalidity of the most considerable Objections that can be made against it.

As for the Truths themselves, First, They are such as may well become so holy and worthy a person as Moses, if he would Philosophize; they being very precious and choice Truths, and very highly removed above the conceit of the vulgar, and so the more likely to have been delivered to him, or to Adam first, by God for a special mysterie.

Secondly, They are such, that the more they are examined, the more irrefutable they will be found; no Hypothesis that was ever yet pronounced to men, so exquisitely well agreeing with the Phænomena of Nature, the Attributes of God, the Passages of Providence, and the rational Faculties of our own Minds.

Thirdly, There is a continued substituteness and applicableness to the Text of Moses all along, without any force or violence done to Grammar or Criticism.

N A N 3 Fourthly
Fourthly and lastly, There is a great usefullnesse, if not necessity, at least of some of them, they being such substantial Props of Religion, and so great encouragements to a sedulous purification of our Mindes, and study of true Piety.

2. Now for the dignity of the Persons, such as were Pythagoras, Plato, and Plotinus, it will be argued from the constant fame of that high degree of Vertue and Righteousnesse, and devout Love of the Deity that is every where acknowledged in them, besides whatsoever miraculous has happened to them, or been performed by them.

And as for Pythagoras, if you consult his Life in Iamblichus, he was held in so great admiration by those in his time, that he was thought by some to be the son of Apollo, whom he begot of Parthenis his known mother: and of this opinion was Epimenides, Eudoxus, and Xenocrates. Which conceit Iamblichus does soberly and earnestly reject; but afterwards acknowledges, that his looks and speeches did so wonderfully carry away the minds of all that conversed with him, that they could not withhold from affirming that he was ἱερός παῖς, the off-spring of God. Which is not to be taken in our strict Theological sense, but according to the mode of the ancient Greeks, who looked upon men heroically and eminently good and virtuous, to be divine Souls and of a celestial extract. And Aristotle takes notice particularly of the Lacedemonians, that they termed such as were ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ, very good, σέως ἀνθρώπαι, i.e. deus ἀνθρώπας, divine men. According to which sense he interprets that verse in Homer concerning Hellor,

"Αὐτὸς ὁ θεός τοίς ιμαμενοῖς, ἐβλέπει θεόν,"

But to return to him of whom we were speaking before. This eminency of his acknowledged amongst the Heathen, will seem more credible, if we but consider the advantage of his conversation with the wisest men then upon Earth; to wit, the Jewish Priests and Prophets, who had their knowledge from God, as Pythagoras had from them. From whence I conceive that of Iamblichus to be true which he writes concerning Pythagoras his Philosophy; That it is Philosophia ἐν θεῷ ἐκθέσθαι το καὶ ἀρχαί, a Philosophy that at first was delivered by God or his holy Angels.

3. But that Pythagoras was acquainted with the Mosaical or Jewish Philosophy, there is ample Testimony of it in Writers; as of Aristobulus an Egyptian Jew in Clemens Alexandrinus, and Josephus against Appion. S. Ambrose adds, that he was a Jew himself. Clemens calls him Ἐβραῖων φιλόσοφος, the Hebrew Philosopher. I might cast hither the suffrages of Justin Martyr, Johannes Philoponus, Theodoret, Hermippus in Origen against Celsus, Porphyrius, and Clemens again, who writes, that it was a common fame that Pythagoras was a disciple of the Prophet Ezekiel. And though he gives no belief to the report, yet that Learned Antiquary Mr. Selden seems inclinable enough to think it true, in his first Book De Fere Naturali juxta Hebraos; where you may peruse more fully the citations of the forenamed Authors. Besides all thefe, Iamblichus also affirms that he lived at Sidon, his native Countrey, where he fell.
CHAPTER III. The Defence of the Philosophic Cabbala.

fell acquainted with the Prophets, and Successors of one Mochus the Physiologer or Natural Philosopher. Σωμέλα τῶν Μωσέων θεολογίας ἄρτεμις ἀποκαλέστηκε. Which, as Mr. Selden judiciously conjectures, is to be read, τῶν Μωσέων θεολογίας ἄρτεμις ἀποκαλέστηκε, with the Prophets that succeeded Moses the Philosopher. See also Minucius Felix in his Octavius.

Wherefore it is very plain that Pythagoras had his Philosophy from Moses. And that Philosophy which to this very day is acknowledged to be his, we seeing that it is so fitly applicable to the Text all the way, what greater argument can there be desired to prove that it is the true Philosophick Cabbala thereof?

4. But there is yet another Argument to prove further the likelihood of his converging with the Prophets, which will also further set out the dignity of his person; and that is the Miracles that are recorded of him. For it should seem Pythagoras was not only initiated into the Mosaical Theory, but had arrived also to the power of working Miracles, as Moses and the succeeding Prophets did; and very strange Facts are recorded both in Porphyrius and Iamblichus: As that Pythagoras, when he was going over a River with several of his companions (Iamblichus calls the River Neitas, Porphyrius Canacasa) that he speaking to the River, the River answered him again with an audible and clear voice, Χαίρε, Ποντικήρ, Σαλβή, Πυθαγόρα: That he flied his thigh to Abaris the Priest, and that he affirmed that it glistered like Gold, and thence pronounced that he was Apollo: That he was known to converse with his friends at Metapontium and Tauromenium, (the one a Town in Italy, the other in Sicily, and many days journey distant) in one and the same day. To these, and many others which I willingly omit, I shall only add his predictions of Earthquakes, or rather (because that may seem more natural) his present flaking of Plagues in Cities, his silencing of violent Windes and Tempelits, his calming the rage of Seas and Rivers, and the like. Which skill Empedocles, Epimenides, and Abaris having got from him, they grew so famous, that Empedocles was surnamed Alexanemus; Epimenides, Catharites; and Abaris, Ethrobates; from the power they had in suppressing of Storms and winds, in freeing of Cities from the plague, and in walking aloft in the Air. Which skill enabled Pythagoras to visit his friends after that manner at Metapontium and Tauromenium in one and the same day.

5. And now I have said thus much of Pythagoras, (and might say a great deal more) there will be left need to insift upon Plato and Plotinus, their Philosophy being the same that Pythagoras's was, and so alike applicable to Moses his Text. Plato's exemplarity of life and vertue, together with his high knowledge in the more sacred mysteries of God, and the state of the Soul of man in this world and that other, deservedly got to himself the title of Divine, θείς Πλάτων.

But as for Miracles, I know none he did; though something highly miraculous happened, if that fame at Athens true, that Spenstippus, Clearchus and Anaxilides report to have been, concerning his birth; which is, that Arisfa his reputed father, when he would forcibly have had

See Iamblich. de vita Pythag. cap. 38.
An Appendix to the Defence

had to doe with Peri они, the being indeed exceeding fair and beautiful, fell short of his purpose; and surceasing from his attempt, that he saw Apollo in a Vision, and so abstained from meddling with his wife till she brought forth her son Aristocles, who after was called Plato. But that is far more credible which is reported concerning the commending of him to his Tutor Socrates, who the day before he came, dreamed that he had a young Swan in his lap, which putting forth feathers apace, of a sudden flew up into the Air, and sung very sweetly. Wherefore the next day when Plato was brought to him by his father, ος θέων, εις, ἡ ἄνω, he presently said, this is the bird, and so willingly received him for his Pupil.

But for his acquaintance with the Mosaic Learning, as it is more credible in itself, so I have also better proof, as Aristobulus the Jew in Clemens Alexandrinus, S. Ambrose, Hermippus in Josephus against Appian, and lastly, Numenius the Platonist, who ingenuously confesses, Τι γὰρ ἐστι Πλάτων ἢ Μωυσῆς Ἀθηναίου; what is Plato but Moses in Greek? as I have elsewhere allledged. See also Origen against Celsus.

6. As for Plotinus, that which Porphyrius records of him falls little short of a Miracle, as being able by the Majesty of his own Minde, as, his enemy Olympius confesses, to retort that Magick upon him which he practised against Plotinus, and that sedately setting amongst his friends, he would tell them, Now Olympius his body is gathered like a purse, and his limmes beat one against another. And though he was not instructed by the Jewish Priests and Prophets, yet he was a familiar friend of that heartly and devout Christian and Learned Father of the Church, Origen; whose authority I would also cast in, together with the whole confent of the Learned amongst the Jews. For there is nothing strange in the Metaphysical part of this Caballa, but what they have constantly affirmed to be true.

7. But the unmannerly Superstition of many is such, that they will give more to an accustomed Opinion, which they have either taken up of themselves, or has been conveyed unto them by the confidence of some private Theologer, then to the Authority of either Fathers, Churches, Workers of Miracles, or, what is best of all, the most solid Reasons that can be propound’d, which if they were capable of, they could not take any offence at my admittance of the Cartesinan Philo-

8. For I cannot but surmise, That he has happily and unexpectedly light upon that which will prove a true Restauration of that part of the Mosaical Philosophy which is ordinarily called Natural, and in which Pythagoras may be justly deemed to have had no small insight. Which in all probability he attained unto by his converse with the successfours of that Sidonian Mochus above mentioned: which Casaubon conceives rather to be Mogy, (for how easily ơ is lopt out of ơ any one may see) and suspets it to be a Tyrian Name, and that in his own tongue he was called

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Mosche, which is ordinarily Moses: which falls in again with Mr. Selden’s opinion, and is a further confirmation of his conjecture. And what a kind of natural Philosophy this Moschus imparted to his followers, * Moschus has expressly noted out of Strabo, who makes mention of one Moschus a Sidonian, who lived in the Ages before the Trojan War, and was the first Author of the Atomick Philosophy, or of that Philosophy that gives an account of the Phenomena from the figure and motion of Particles. Whence there must be no small affinity betwixt this ancient Moschical or rather Mosaical Physiologie and the Cartesian Philosophy, which has so often and so naturally born a part in this Philosopherick Cabbala.

And that the Natural Philosophy of Pythagoras was Atomical, is further to be evinced from what we finde in Diogenes Laertius concerning Democritus. For what a noise his Atoms have made in the World cannot be unknown to any. But as Diogenes writes out of Thrasylus, Democritus was so great an Admirer and Imitator of Pythagoras, and seems so to have taken all that he has from him, that a man would think he had been his Scholar or Auditor, but that Chronologie will not admit thereof. But though he was not a Disciple of Pythagoras himself, yet, as Glaucus Rheginus writes, he was a Hearer of one of the Pythagoreans, and Apollodorus Cyzicennus reports that he had a very intimate familiarity with Philolaus. In the Catalogue of his Books also which he wrote, one was styled Pythagoras, and another Tritogenia, a mystical term amongst the Pythagoreans. And when Plato would have burnt Democritus his Writings, they were two Pythagoreans, Amyclas and Clinias, that dissuaded him from executing what he had designed, certainly out of an honest, though mistaken, zeal. Which things I think are a ground of an invincible suspicion that the Physical part of Pythagoras’ Philosophy is Atomical. And that he held the motion of the Earth is already famous. The rest let us consider out of the Dogmata of Democritus, and see how all together sure with those of Ctesius.

Pythagoras must also have held, if Democritus had all his Philosophy from his Writings or Traditions, that there are infinite Worlds, and that they are generable and corruptible, but that the Matter is unperishable. That there are infinite numbers of Atomes or Particles, different in magnitude and figure; and that they are moved in the Universe after the manner of Vortices. For that is the proper signification of Δία, namely Vortex. Καὶ οὖν πάλα συνεκρίμαλα γενείαν πορίποσ, ὑποθέτον, ἀνεκτό ποτὲ καὶ οὐκοί οὐκοί, διὰ τὴν αὐτήν ἔκ τοῦ ποτὸς Πυθαγόρας. That the Coalition and Composition of the Sun and Moon was the result of these Δίαν or Στηθούς, these immense and hastily-rolling Vortices. And lastly, πάλα πέρασιν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἄντρος τός ὁ τὸν ἁτομά, ὅτι τὸν ἀντίων, τὸ ἀνεκτόν λεγεῖ: that is to say, That all things are made not without a Mechanical Necessity, this Vortical Motion being the cause of the generation.
generation of all things. Which Democritus calles 'Aravyn. And it may be for this caufe also the Pythagoreans called the Decad, that is, the World, 'Aravyn.

Which laft Affertions of Democritus, as they are very easy and natural in such a fenfe as Cartesius has declared the nature of the Vortices and the conquences thereof, fo are they very fallse, idle and insignificant according to any other meaning.

Wherefore the Cartesian Philosophy being in a manner the same with that of Democritus, and that of Democritus the fame with the Physiological part of Pythagoras his Philosophy, and Pythagoras his Philosophy the same with the Sidonian, as also the Sidonian with the Mofaic; it will necessarily follow that the Mofaic Philosophy in the Physiological part thereof is the fame with the Cartesian. And how fitly the Cartesian Philosophy futes with Moses his text I have again and again taken notice.

9. And that Des-Cartes may bear up in some likely Equipage with the forenamed noble and divine Spirits; though the unskilfulness in men commonly acknowledge more of Supernatural affiftance in hot unsettled Fancies and perplexed Melancholy then in the calm and diftinct use of Reason; yet for mine own part, (but not without Submission to better Judgements) I should look upon Des-Cartes as a man more truly inspired in the knowledge of Nature then any that have profefled themfelves fo this sixteen hundred years; and being even ravilhed with admiration of his transcendent Mechanical inventions, for the falving the Phenomena in the world, I should not flick to compare him with Bezaliel and Aboliah, those skilful and cunning workers of the Tabernacle, who, as Moses testifies, were filled with the Spirit of God, and they were of an excellent understanding to find out all manner of curious works.

Nor is it any more argument that Des-Cartes was not inspired, because he did not fay he was, then that others are inspired, because they fay they are; which to me is no argument at all. But the suppression of what did happen would argue much more fobriety and modefty; whenas the profefion of it with fober men would be fufpected of fome fpice of melancholy and diftraction, especially in Natural Philosophy, where the grand pleafure is the evidence and exercife of Reason, not a bare belief, or, in other cafes, an ineffable fene of life, in refpect whereof there is no true Christian but he is inspired.

CHAP. II.

1. An Enumeration of Obfervations againft the Philofophick Cabbala.
2. The Obfervation from the Inadequatenfefs of the Pythagorick Numbers to the Six days Creation, anfwered. 3. That Tetradys in the Pythagorick Oath is neither the four Elements, nor Men, Anima, Opinio, Corpus, nor yet the Tetragrammaton. 4. That the exquiuite fitness of the Pythagorick Numbers to the Days of the Creation argue his Philofophy the fame with the Mofaical. 5. That the Mystical use of Numbers
And thus we have briefly considered the nature of the Truths comprised in the Philosphick Cabbala, as also the quality of those Persons that have owned them in foregoing Ages. Now for the Objections: These seven certainly are the most considerable, if not the only. Allegations that can be made against it: namely,

First, That as well the Pythagoric Numbers as Names are inadequate to the Six days Creation,

Secondly, That the Pythagoric Philosophy does not answer justly to the Judaick Cabbala in the chiet strokes thereof, the Jewish Writers making no mention of the Motion of the Earth,

Thirdly, That the Interpretation of the First day's Creation is Heterogeneous to all the rest, it alone being Symbolical. Where three additional Queries are also proposed concerning the Metaphysical Hyle created on the First Day,

Fourthly, That the Order of the Cabbala is preposterous in placing the Earth before the Sun,

Fifthly, That the works of the Fifth and Sixth Day are too vulgar and trivial to be the Matter of a Philosphick Cabbala,

Sixthly, That there is an unwarrantable moisture committed in our Interpretation of Paradise, we supposing it planted before Adam was made out of the Earth,

Seventhly and lastly, That our interpretation of the Cherubim and flaming Sword is harsh, in that we make that a means of Adam's regaining Paradise that seems to keep him out.

But to these I shall fully answer in order. And first to the first part of the First, which would intimuate that, because the Pythagoreans continued their Numeral Mysteries through the whole Denarius, whenas yet notwithstanding the Days of the Creation are but Six, therefore the Six days Creation is not at all concerned in the Mystery of their Numbers: To this I answer, That their continuing their Mysteries of Numbers through the whole Denarius is no prejudice to our Cause. For whether we suppose the Hieroglyphicks of Numbers to have been in use before the Cabbala of Moses, and that the first Author thereof took so many of them as were for his turn, (as he that writes a sentence, takes no more letters of the Alphabet than serves his purpose) or whether the first Author of the Cabbala began these Numeral Hieroglyphicks, and thereupon the Mysteries of Numbers were afterward enlarged to smaller designs: neither Hypothesis makes anything against our Interpretation. For will it follow, because Moses made Hieroglyphical Notes of Six Numbers only, to be the remembrances of the natures of such and such Phenomena of the World, that therefore they that partake of that Cabbala shall never make use of their Phantasy to enlarge these Numeral Mysteries and Remembrances to other matters; nor when in process of time they had loft the first end and scope of these Hierogly-
Hieroglyphicks, and through ignorance and oblivion knew not what was the primitive occasion of them:

Wherefore that these Numeral Mysteries were stretch'd further then the Six dayes Creation, can be no argument against the Philosophick Cabbala: especially if you consider that these Six Numbers are so exquisitely significative of every day's work, and that there can be no tolerable senfe of the Pythagorick Tetrachs but by supposing it the Hieroglyphick of the Fourth Day's Creation, which is intended a compendious comprehension of, or engagement into, the whole Philosophick Caballa. Whole Conclusions are so exceeding weighty and venerable, that they may seem worthy of that Religion of an Oath above mentioned; where, (as * Meursius plainly proves) Pythagoras is sworn by, or at least he that first imparted the Tradition of the Tetrachs.

3. Which if it were but the knowledge of the number of the Four Elements, Fire, Water, Earth, and Aire; or of the similitude that Mens, Anima, Opium, Corpus, bear to the Four first numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4. (which yet is inept or dilute enough in all but the laft, if we would severely examine things; and if it were exact, were but a trifle: as also the things themselves ranged together to make up the Tetrachs are but forcibly produced, as not being all of one nature, but some Substances, other Accidents) I say, these pretended Mysteries are of so petty consideration, that it is impossible that they should have conciliated so great veneration to the first Imparter of them, as that the Mystery should religiously swear by him in their serious Converse.

Nor yet can it be the swearing by the Tetrachrammaton or the name of Jehovah. For Tetrachs, as well as Tetras (which is promiscuously put for it, and likely had been the only Appellation but for the verse like) does not signify a Name of four letters, but simply the Number Four. And that it is a Number, not a Name, all the rest of the Numbers of the Pythagorick Denary will bear witness, as also the constant Interpretation of Writers, as you may see in Meursius. * Besides that, Ou µα ιαπεκκτυν is false Greek, and Ου µα ημετηρ γυν α δησων τελεστυν false verse. So little reason is there to dream of any other Interpretation then what we have given, namely, that it is the swearing by him that imparted by way of Tradition (for so διασωλα implies) so excellent a piece of Knowledge as is comprised in the interpretation of the Fourth day's Creation, of which the Tetrachs was the Symbol, and necessary Remembrances; it not being applicable to that Day in the most notorious property thereof, but as that day is conceiv'd to comprehend the Creation of all as to the more general strokes of the Univerfe, whereby is necessarily imply'd that the Planets must be so many Earths, with the rest of those noble Conclusions of Philosophy that depend thereon. Which was the senfe of Pythagoras his School, as plainly appears out of * Aristotle in his De Calo; where he says the Pythagoreans assert that the Fire, that is the Sun, is in the midft of the World, ὁ ἀγαθός ἐν τοῖς ἄκροις τοῦ, and that the Earth is one of the Starres: he means Planets. And that they made the Planets also Earths, appears from what he addes, ἦν ἂν ἐναλίαν ἄλπον παύτῃ καλακανδάδου ἡμ, ἦν ἄλπον ὀρμα καλάδων, Moreover

* Denar. Pythagoric. cap. 6.

* See Selden de Dilis Syri Symagm. 2. cap. 1.

* De Cal. lib. 2. cap. 13.
Moreover they make another Earth, which they call Antichthon, opposite to this of ours. Which questionless was nothing else but our overthrowt neighbour-Planet or Earth, the Moon. For so he is called by the Ancients, *Terra Ethelea, as in * Plutarch γῆ οὐλύμπια, and this latter part of her Ἀθηναίων and ἂντεστον, as the other Ἑλλάδος τοῦ ἀντικήρων tract of time having sophisticated this most solid Philosophy with superstitious conceits. But this is enough to discover Pythagoras his opinion concerning the planets, that he looked upon them as so many Earths.

The Tetraëlys therefore is put for the Cabbala of this Fourth Day's work, which being fully and methodically explained, and the Mysterie finding their natures so perfected and their minds so illuminated thereby, might well extort from them such a veneration as would religiously induce them to swear by the first Author thereof. As it is said that Pythagoras himself did use the forme: and I could charitably believe of all the Primitive Pythagoreans that they swor in the same sense that Pythagoras did, namely, by the First Communicator of so high and stupendous a piece of Wisdom; which (as I have noted out of Isamblichus) is said to be שומע בד גל, delivered first from God himself: Which will make this swearing of theirs irreprehensible and blameless.

4. There being therefore this exquisite fitness and appositenesse in the application of these Pythagorick Numbers, (though we make not use of them all) to the Six days work of the Creation, it is a Demonstration that Pythagoras his Philosophy was the same in a manner with the ancient Cabbala of the Jews touching the frame of the World.

5. Besides, there are not so few Numbers of the Pythagorick Denary employed in the present Mystery as is pretended. For the number Seven I have demonstrated to be very significant of the Seventh Day's Rest; And the Number Ten emerges out of the Tetraëlys, as has been above noted. So that Eight Numbers of the Denary are plainly demonstrated to belong naturally to the Judaick Cabbala. And that the ancient wifedom of the Jews made a mysterious use of the number Eight in their Religion, to me seems very plain, in that Circumcision was appointed on the eighth day. Which number being the first Cube, is a fit hieroglyphick of the Stability of that Covenant made with the Jews in Circumcision; and the Pythagoreans call the Οἰκονομία ἀπαθάλη, which signifies that Security which is by Covenant. And but that I might seem over-solicitous in a matter not so considerable, I think it would not be hard to produce places of Holy Writ whence the number Nine may be justly thought not to be devoid of a Mystical meaning. So little pretence is there to pronounce that the Symbolical use of the first Ten Numbers is only Pythagorical, and does not concern the Judaick Cabbala.

6. To all which you may add; That neither the Pythagoreans themselves, nor the holy Pen-men, confine the Mystical use of Numbers to the first Ten, but expatiate both of them into other more compound Numbers. From whence is further evidence how censurable and invalid that Allegation is against the truth of the Philosophick Cabbala, concluded from that admirable fitness and congruity of the Numbers that are the Symbols of each Day's Creation; namely, That there are more mystical Numbers
An Appendix to the Defence

Chapter III.

1. The Invalidity of the Objection from the Inadequateness of the Pythagoric Names of Numbers, the reason of the accumulation of them being so easily discoverable.

2. That the genuine Pythagoric Names are discernible from the spurious, as the sincere Doctrines of Christianity are from after-corruptions.

3. Ten more Names added that are significative of the nature of Mundus vitæ in the First Day's Creation.

4. Ten others significative of the Metaphysical Hyle created on that day.

5. Ἄμηξα and Συνειρίφη, how accurately significant of what is in this First Day's Creation.

6. A plain account of those Pythagoric Names of an Unite that make nothing to the First Day's work.

7. Six more names of the Binary significative of the Second Day's work, with an account of such as are impertinent thereto.

8. An account of the impertinent Names of the Ternary.


10. The Notations of י'ן, תם, and ברוב, how Philosophical they are, and how significant of the grand Physical Truths of the Pythagoric or Judaick Cabbala.

Now as for Answer to the second part of this First Objection, concerning the Names of the Numbers I make use of, viz. That though those I have produced be fit enough for my purpose, yet those I have concealed may be either impertinent and insignificant, or indeed inconsistent with those I have produced; for mine own part, I am not at all afraid to be called to so strict an account, and do not doubt but that I shall be gainer upon the whole Compt. For I foresee that the issue will be this, That I shall have occasion to bring a greater number of Names to confirm the truth I aim at; then I have yet made use of; and find myself not unprepared to give a reason of their forgery of those that make nothing to our Cabbala. For what I said of the finding of Mysteries

Numbers then those that are applied thereunto: As if, whenas there are severall Mystical Numbers that far exceed the number of Seven dayes, they should all be applied to these Seven; or that, because they are unapplicable, therefore those that are so manifestly applicable were not rightly applied.

And thus I hope I have fully satisfied the first part of this first Objection concerning the Numbers themselves. Which, I think, if duly considered, are alone (by reason of their fitness, and the signification of their natures and properties) sufficient to assure us of that part of the Philosophick Cabbala which is comprised in the first chapter of Genesis. And in which there is also a Prelibration of those illustrious Truths which are more fully and circumstancially delivered in the second and third. Which shews that the whole Philosophy of Pythagoras is of one piece, and from one fountain, the ancient Cabbala of Moses.
Mysteries in new Numbers upon the occasion of having those that appertain to the Creation communicated unto them, the same I here repeat concerning the giving of new Names to those First Numbers, by phancying they will set out this or that in either Morality, Nature, or Metaphysics.

Which Impertinencies certainly would grow the fastest, as I said before, when the first scope and use of these Names were hid in Oblivion. For then having no Synopsis to guide them, they would be blown upon every small and trivial Resemblance that this or that Number might have with this or that Object, according as the aire of their lightly-working Phantasy carried them, and their desire of making the faplent Mysteries of Numbers to arise to some bulk of superstitious Knowledge. *Τροπὸς οἵων ἀμφοτέρων ἀποκριθείς εὐθὺς ἒργον* For they having once loft the measure of their trading thus in the names of Numbers, their Accumulations would be infinite.

2. But it has fared much-what in this matter as it has with the sober Truths of Christian Religion, to which though there have been added innumerable humane Inventions, yet amongst these there have been conferred the grand Truths of Christianity itself discoverable by the Testimony of Holy Writ: so though there have been many Impertinent Names of the first Seven Numbers invented by ignorant and superstitious Pythagorists, yet they have also retained the true and useful, which is likewise discoverable by the application of them to the Text of Moses, according either to the Philosophick sense or external phrase thereof.

As is eminently plain in the First Day's work. Where truly I think I shall finde more Names pertinent to the work of that Day then impertinent, notwithstanding that their Ignorance has accumulated so many.

3. For whereas there are near Fifty Names of a Monad or Unite; above half of them are not unsignificant of the nature of those things that are comprized in the First Day's work. For to the Names pertinent to what we call there Mundus vita (which comprehends all the Immaterial Creation) besides Zoh, Eld. Zavos, pyrgos, 'Oy. σοφήματι, which we have noted already, you may add also Nūs, Morph, Γονῆ, Οὔσια, *Αἴλον αἰλιδέας, Αἴλων παράδειγμα, Νῦ, Μυθούν, Περιμνήσια, Αὕπερωθίας.

Nūs, because all Immaterial Beings are void, Intelligible, not Sensible, Morph, because they are such as give Forme to the Matter. Γονῆ, because all Generation is chiefly from this Principle, and Matter can gender nothing of it self, (they are the words of *Plato)*. Μόνον οἷον ἄλλη. οὖν, ἐν ῥήσει φωνᾶς ἄλλου. Which was the reason, says he, why the Ancients brought in Mercury to θεῖεσσις ὀργανον, ἐν ξυκόν φως ὀργανον, τι θεωρία τις οὐκετίζον ἄνθρωπος. Οὔσια, because Immaterial Beings are the truest Substancce, according as the Platonists do rightly contend: And so *'Αἴλοις αἰλιδέας* for the same reason, *'Αἴλων παράδειγμα* Παράδειγμα, to the same purpose that εἰδόθαι and μορφή. Αἴλων, because Immaterial Beings are devoid of Composition. Nūs, because Intellectual life is at once, νίκες τερμοῦνται, *in uno semper quod adeśt consitens evo,* *as Macrobius speaks*. Μυθούν, if it be not pedantically
pedantically popp’t in as the name of the mother of the Muses, whose names are also scattered through the Pythagorick Denary, I should suspect the reason of that appellation to be, because the highest and deepest seat of memory is in that in us which is Immaterial. 

There is one thing however that should be hinted, and the Soul invested with her igneous Spirits, Prometheus-like, enlivens this statue of clay the Body. And lastly, 'Apparita, because all the Immaterial Orders have radically in them that division of Faculties into Masculine and Feminine, as is expressed more at large concerning Adam.

4. And to that which is that fluid undeterminate Capacity of things, that dark Abyss which copiously we may call the Metaphysical Hyle, or the Possibility of Creatures in the Outward World, besides what Names we have produced already, as "γνο, Ἀλαμπις, Σχεδωνία, you may add also Χάος, Σύγχυσις, Σύγχρονος, Ρασόν, Πανδοχείς. All which denote the Confusion, Undeterminatenesse and promiscuous Capacity of this Metaphysical Hyle, or mere Potentiality of the external Creature. But then for that dark Abyss mentioned in that First Day’s Creation, what is more significant thereof than these terms of Χάος, Τάστιφανος, Στος, Βάστασαν οργον; which are so apposite to the Text that nothing can be more, and utterly unlikely to have been the Appellations of an Unite, unless in reference thereunto. Adde to Σιγάς also λαείο, because when things are resolved into this First Day’s state, they are overwhelmed with Oblivion; the Souls of Men and Angels being then in silence, and so thoroughly drenched in the Lake of Leithe, that they can never remember any more what is past.

5. There are yet two very significant Terms behind, Ἀμείβαια and 

*Φιλος, Cabbal. 

chap. i. v. 5.

Chap. III.

†Philos. Cabbal. 

chap. i. v. 5. 

There are yet two very significant Terms behind, Ἀμείβαια and 

Στροφαί παρήθησασ, which exactly set out the condition of the First day’s Creation. For those Immaterial Beings thus considered, that is to say, as not united with Matter, what is more significative of their state then 

Στροφαί παρήθησασ, arid and rigid Virginity; or then Ἀμείβαια, according to that phrase in Hesiod, φεύραντες μορφήν; And besides, the Unmixedness of the Active and Passive Principle proper to this Day is notoriously signify’d by the Name Ἀμείβαια, as you may see in the * Cabbala it self. So that to these seven apposite Names we contented our selves with before, we have gained at least twenty as apposite by this Examination.

6. But for those that make not for our turn, the account of them is very easy. For after the Pythagoreans had lost the knowledge of the true scope of giving Names to those Numbers, which was for remembrances of the nature of those things which are said to be created in those several Daisies; they then excogitated Appellations without any aim, from any similitude whatsoever between the Number and the things it might represent. As for example, Because there is but one God, therefore they called an Unite Θεὸς, Ζός, Ἐναύθα, and it may be Εὐθραμοια. And then in Natural things, because there is but one Sun, therefore they called a Monad Ηλιος, Ρομαλιος, and Αὐτός, and because Αὐτός, therefore Λόγος. And in Morals, because Love and Good will consist in a kind of Unity of affections, they call an Unite Φιλος, Φιλας, Ερως, Ομοροια.
Chap. III. of the Philosophick Cabbala.

'Omnia. And because there is Unity in Artificial Order, they call it THEIS SYMBOVIA, Naos, "Aμυ. And why they should call it "Ατλας and "Ανων, I cannot better imagine than because the Poles that are laid to bear up the world, on which it hangs and turns, are two Points, that is, two fixt Unites. But why they call it "Ισω, "Μεσων, "Μετεσων, is very plain, "Ισω, because those things that are equal have one quantity: "Μεσων and "Μετεσων, because that which is exactly in the middle, or exquisitely moderate, is but one. But what an infipid and unsatisfactory Argumenet there is in such Conceptions as these, and how unworthy of so profound a Philosopher as Pythagoras, to whom the * Senate of Rome erected a Statue as to the wisest man of all Greece, let any one judge.

7. As for the Names of the Binarie, I have already reckoned up above a dozen that are very significant of the nature of the work of the Second Day. To those whereof that signifie most dismal you may adde further Thoμας, Τανσωστιων, Δυν, Δυσαστιων, "Επις, "Αρους. To Πας alfo would be referred (saying that it seemes but a rafh and superfìrious heaping up Synonyma's by the latter unskilful Pythagorist's) Δινομον, Διμονατωρ, Φοροε, "Εσω. By all which tearms is meant nothing elfe but Cybele or Venus, but how * Pythagorically, any one may discern that has but taken notice that Venus is the Sun in true Pythagorisme.

The rest of the Appellations are such supeléss fooleries, that it is tedious to recite them; but yet I will give you more then a taft of them; that you may see with what pitiful trifles the Pheme Pythagorist's entertained themselves when they had loft the true meaning of their Cabbala. For as before it was a fine thing with them to call the Monad by the name of 'Aριστος, or the Sun; so now for no better reafon, I think, then that they did so, they will call the Bimairy "Αριστος, "Ισω, "Μεσων, "Ελμον}, "Αρμονια, "Αρπουσιων, Διων, Κυπερια, Κουρωνια, and Γαμος: where Γαμος, and as many words elfe as found that way, is very forcedly and unskilfully thrust in. Because the conjunction of the two Unites in the Bimairy is either the conjunction of two Masculines, as some would have the Unite to be, (and then certainly no Pythagoreans, unlefe the succellers of that * Pythagoras that Nero was married to, will call the Bimairy Γαμος,) or elfe it is the conjunction of two Hermaphrodites, which is as ridiculous. For * Macrobius declares, according to the fene of the Ancients, that an Unite is Virc-famina. Unum autem, quod vocant id est, Unitas, dicitur, & Mas idem & Femina est, par idem atque impar, ipsis non numeramus, sed fem & origo numerorum. Of which * Aristotele alfo affirms the like, Το γε εσο δε αρπουσιων ειναι τυτων, φιδον ειναι γη σετων εαι τιμον ταις εις φανεραι, ουδενα πας εις τιμον. Which discovers their folly in calling the Ternary alfo Γαμος. For it is the marriage of a Female with an Hermaphrodite, and a number with what is not a number. Jungentur jam gryphes eginis. So plain is it that the Appellation of Αρπουσιω & Γαμος are the peculiar Titles of the Quinary and Senary, as they have a O ο ο ο ο special
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special congruity also to the Fifth and Sixth day's work. But let us not be so strict, but admit an Unite to be rather Masculine; the Binary will be still excluded from the Title of Τριάδα, and the Ternary's Title admitted but with difficulty, as Male and Female amongst Plants, which more exquisitely fits the nature of the Third day's work.

Furthermore, Because the Binary is made by adding an Unite to an Unite, it is called Αὐτός, Συνόρος, Εὐστίος. And because Dijudication implies a Duality in the Object, it is called Δικάριος. And for that Opinion has a vergency two ways at once, it is styled Δύο καὶ and Demonstration two main parts, the Premisses and Conclusion, it is termed Επιστήμη. And lastly, because two is divided into two equal parts, it is named Δίπλωμα. Such petty Speculations did the pretended Pythagorists fall into when they once had lost the sight of that Mark that the Mystery of Numbers aimed at in the Binary.

8. Let us dip also a little further into the Ternary, where we shall bring up the like slight stuff. The most tolerable are those names of Moral consideration, as Μήτρα, Εὐγέλεια, Φιλονομία, with which the Ternary is adorned; because he that would advise well, must cast his eye upon things past, present, and to come. Also Φίλεια, Εἰμπνα, Ὀργαία, the union of parties being made by some Third thing or person. It is also called Εὖθετα, I suppose from the frequent use of the number Three in Religious Rites. The terms Τριεπικτος and Πρωτον πλατέα, are of Mathematical consideration, as are Δισυμμετακτόν and Πρωτον μικρόν in the Binary; but have no greater plot upon us in either place, than to advertize us that the Binary is representative of two Mathematical Points, and of the first and shortest Line; the Ternary of three Points, and of the first and simplest Figure, which is the Triangle. Notions certainly whereby the Mind of man is gayly edified and deliciously fed: and yet what follows is more vile and trivial. For the Ternary is called Κοσμία, because Saturn had three Sons, Ζαμπετ, Νεπτυν, and Pluto; and Τριάς, because Pluto was the third: Λαθος and Ἐκσυγ, because Latona was the Mother of Hecata who had three Titles, Λυκος, Δίας, and Προσπέρα: Χας, because there are three Graces, Αγλαία, Θαλής, Ευφροσύνη: Δισοιώδεια, from the three Dioscuri, Trittópatres, Ebulus, Dionysus: Φορμία and Γοργονία, because Phorcus was the Father of the Gorgons which were three, Μέδους, Σθενειος, Ευρυς. Of such pitiful trash was the Ternary made the Repository by the Pseudo-Pythagorists, who knew not the ancient Cabbals.

9. Who also finding Θεός ζωον upon record in the Titles of the Ternary, put in Θείας, and Αιθρίας, I believe it should be Άρμονία, which is an Epithet of Θητις in Homer; and Ovid takes notice of the beauty of Θητις feet in that Pentameter,

Et Thetidis quales viæ reor efse pedes.

They added also Ναύτις and Κρατεῖς, I think aiming at the same sense. Nor can they have any sense at all but in reference to the Third day's work, where there was made distinction of Land and Sea, and consequentially of Rivers.

But though there has been so much trash hitherto, yet there is one Name
Chap. III. of the Philosophick Cabbala.

Name behind that will compensate our pains of raking in this dunhill: And that is Δοξας, which, considering the weightiness of its signification, and its easy reference to the oblique Motion of the Earth, (upon which depends the garnishing thereof with Plants and Flowers) and that *Pythagoras is said to have first observed the obliquity of this Motion, I can willingly admit to be an ancient & authentick Title of the Ternary. To. And it will not be unseasonable to take notice that the very *Notation of the word ἤλιος countenances our conjecture, it being derived, as the ancient Hebrews have observed, from ἔλιον currere; certainly by reason of her constant course about the Sun, not because the Heavens run about her. Which we may be the better assured of, if we consider also the Notation of ἡμέρα, which is most likely to be from ἡμέρα τῶν ἡμέρων, (as the Seventy often render it) and ἡμέρα πῷ as the Pythagoreans ordinarily call the Sun. ἡμέρα, as you may see in *Aristotle, ἐν Πυθαγόρειοι τῶν ἡμερῶν, and *Plutarch, ἐν Πυθαγόρειοι τῶν ἡμερῶν, ἡμέρα, καὶ τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ λαῷ. So that his ἡμέρα πῷ, First Fire, does exactly answer to ἡμέρα, or the same significance, as all the Suns are acknowledged to be Stella Fixa.

And in that this first Fire is called by the Pythagoreans Ἑλια, is a further discovery from whence they had their Notion, namely from the Hebrews, who call Fire וָי, and the Chaldees סניר, which is in a manner the very word Ἑλια or Ψελα. Nor was it needful to retain the whole word סניר, וָי in Ἑλια having by its transplantation into the Greek tongue got a strong affinity with ἡμέρα, the same with וָי in Hebrew; so that it alone bears fully the same sense that סניר: and the best Words are but the Remembrancers of the names of the Heavens.

But none such Philosophical ones as thefe of וָי and סניר. I may add also בקע, the easy and genuine Notations of them setting out the hidden natures of the things they belong to, with that exact opposition they have one to another: that of וָי implying the Earth's Motion, that of סניר implying the Sun's fixedness, that of בקע implying the Extinction of Light or Fire in all the Planets, that of סניר implying the innate Light and Heat in all the Suns or fixed Stars. The wonderful Congruity of the Philosophical Notations of which three words (to say nothing of סניר) cannot but gain further belief both to the Notations themselves, and also to the truth of the Physical part of the Cabbala. Nor is סניר of less Philosophical consideration, though it were admitted to be from סניר excell- sum eft, and not from וָי and סניר. For then its being of the dual number would insinuate the same thing as before, namely the two Cartesian Elements or parts that Heaven does consist of, according as is observed in other words that denote things consisting of two parts, as בקע, וָי, סניר, וָי and the like: and also the two kinds of Heaven, the one created the first day, the other on the second: As וָי likewise does denote two kinds of Water, that from the Clouds, and that in the Sea, Rivers and Wells; but in a more Philosophical sense, the Waters visible and invisible; and then the Invisible, Stygian or Celestial, meaning by Celestial that part of the Mundus viti that descends וָי וָי וָי.
CHAP. IV.

1. \textit{Four Names more of the Tetrad that are Pertinent.} 2. \textit{An account of those that are Impertinent.} 3. \textit{That such Trifles either Numeral or Nominal could not win that reverence from Pythagoras, as to induce him to swear by the first Imparter of the Tetractys.} 4. Γαμ. a Name proper to the Quinary and Senary, and how the Binary and Ternary came by that Title. 5. Two more Pertinent names of the Quinary, with an account of the Impertinent ones. 6. That if the nature of Numbers, and not of Things, had been intended by the Tetractys, the Pentad had rather merited the Religion of an Oath. 7. The Impertinent Names of the Senary. 8. Names thereof referable to Γαμ. and Κόσμ. 9. Six other Names of the Senary most fitly interpretable from the Text of Moses. 10. Eight Names of the Septenary referring to the same Text. 11. Of the Impertinent Names of the Septenary, and why that Number is called Pallas, and why Apollo Ἰβδομαγάρι.

1. \textit{W}e come now to the \textit{Quaternary}, of which, besides what we have noted already, there are four more Titles not altogether inept or insignificant, as Ἐσαμα, Φύσις, Ἀιώνα, Κλη-

Ἐσαμα, because the distinct and articulate setting out the parts of the Univerfe was on the \textit{Fourth Day}. Φύσις, as denoting the Universal comprehension of Nature. Ἀιώνα, as intimating the variety of Objects in the Univerfe discoverable by the Lights of Heaven, which are the \textit{Fourth Day}'s work, and which are themselves a most eminent part of that variety: whence is ἀιώνα Νός in Sophocles, by reason of her being so variegated with Stars. And lastly, the \textit{Tetractys} is called Κλῆς ὁ ποιησθεὶς, because the expounding the \textit{Fourth day}'s work is indeed the Key of the choice secrets of Nature; or rather an \textit{Inlet} to the truest and most concerning knowledge of Universal Nature, as well \textit{Metaphysical} as \textit{Physical}. Whence the \textit{Tetrad} is not only said to be φυσικῶν αὐτοπλη-


2. But as these Names that have been here and elsewhere produced are \textit{pertinent} to the purpoze, so there are those that be as \textit{impertinent}. For I find the ignorance of Posterity to have abused the \textit{Tetrad}, as reli-


Nicomachus, \textit{Arith-


lib. 1.
Lastly, because Fire has a Pyramidal form, and Four makes the τετράγωνον which is a Pyramid, one Unite laid on the other three, (from which form of an heap it is also called Σωκράτης) they style the Tetrad Ῥωμαίος.

3. But what pitiful trading would there have been for Pythagoras, if these be the riches of that Tetrad, which he had to great esteem for, that he swore religiously by him that was the first Imparter of it? Will this answer that big report made by * Plutarch, Ἡ ἱστορία τῶν Πρεσείων, ρήματα ἃ πέραν ἦν ἐπικριτικοι, ἐκ Κόρου. (He speaks there of the compound Tetrad, but the Oath was indifferent to both.) The Tetrad thus called was a grand Oath, as is famed, and was named Κόρος, The World. And certainly it was that clear and pleasant prospect into the Order and Nature of the Systeme of the World arising out of the conjunction of the Active and Passive Principle, and then running out to all Objects, as well metaphysical as Physical, which were declared in the opening of the Fourth day's Creation; this, I say, certainly was that Tetrad, which is called Κόρος or the Universe, (that is, the Cabbala of the genuine and satisfactory knowledge thereof,) by the first communicatour of which Mystery both Pythagoras himself and the succeeding Pythagoreans so religiously swore. But those other Toyes and Niceties that are merely Numerical, it is utterly incredible that the imparting of them should ever extort any considerable esteem at all from so wide a man as Pythagoras was voted by all men.

4. Concerning the Titles of the Quinary, those that we have already taken notice of are the most renowned in Authours, as you may see in the copious citations of * Memphis, and so apposite to the work of the day, that nothing can be more. As for the Binary and Ternary's being called Ἀρχή and Γαμὸς, as they are not so applicable to the days, nor compatible to the nature of those numbers, as I have * above demonstrated; so they fall proportionably short in testimony of the Ancients, and certainly were the Additions of some idle and dry Pretenders to Pythagorism in after-Ages: as was also the adventuring to call the Quinary Αἴσθησις, when Ἀρχή and Γαμὸς had been more proper, if they had known the first scope of those Names.

5. To those few titles of the Quinary which we have produced, there may be two added more, I think, not impertinent; the one δώρα, as it signifies πάρα δώρα, the other ὀρθόντα ἐξ ἀριθμόν, ζωήν ἐπικριτικοί, alluding to the five senses, which the Pythagoreans would easily acknowledge the meanest and most evanish part of that Life that is perceptive.

But there are several other Names of the Quinary impertinent, I must confess, to the Fifth day's work, though it may not be altogether impertinent to take notice of them, that no fraud be suspected in concealing them. They are designed for the Notes of either Physical or Mathematical observation. The Physical discover how little Authentic they are; in running upon a supposition that is so unPythagorical, namely, that there are four Elements, which compasses the motion of the Earth naturally breaks a-pieces. But yet upon this Aristotelian conceit, that there are four, they will have the Ether a Fifth, and from thence call the Quinary Night, as distributing the World into these Five Orders, Earth, Water, Air,  

* In his De Iride & Offic.  
  Ch. 2. 6. 67.
Aire, Fire, Air. And in reference to this Fifth call the Quinary Palaæas, and "Açoα, as being a virgin-Element, and not mingling with the generations of things here below: also "Aμβεθως, because it is the Region of Immortality, and "Αρεως, because flesh and blood cannot inhabit there, and "Ανωλας, because the Bodies of the Inhabitants are equilibrants to the Region, and do not sink by any ponderosity; and lastly Ζαυς ουρα, because though Jupiter fills all things, yet his highest dwelling is the Air: Which yet is again very Unpythagorically spoken, for Ζαυς ουρα is the Sun, not the Air, when Physically interpreted, the name that Ïας φυλακιν is * Aristotle.

As for the Mathematical Names, Δινας, *Αμις, Διαμας, Karla., Κυκλωκ., "Αξον εφαι, all these six have but the intimation of this one very business, that Five divides Ten into two equal parts, as the Diameter does a Circle, as Juflice decides equally, and as the Heart is in the midst of the body. Admirable profound Notions! The names that follow are more considerable, as namely, 'Αρις, 'Οπιστ., Δινας, Πνευμα. All which refer to Five, as it is the Hypotenusa of the first Orthogonial Triangle, that has its sides including the right Angle, rationally: For it is called 'Οπιστ., as subfiting the right Angle; 'Αρις, as whose power is insuperable by the powers of both the sides; Δινας, as equalizing its power to the powers of both the sides; *το γενος, and lastly Πνευμα, because there is such a Project and Contrivance in bringing the same thing about so exactly by means that seemed so different, and so unlikely to produce the same effect.

6. For this Invention in Geometry Pythagoras is said to have * sacrificed an Heacatom to the Muses, and this in Numbers, which might happily be mother to that in Geometry, does so far surpass the mere Numerical Mysteries of the Tetrality, that if the Tetrality had had no further reach then those dry Niceties, pythagoras his Scholars would surely have chosen rather to have sworn by him as the teacher of the Pentad, then of the Tetrad. So well ascertained are we from every side that it was not the nature and mystery of Numbers, but of Things, that was comprehended in the Pythagorick Tetrality.

7. Of the Titles that belong to the Senary, the most dry and impertinent are 'Αμφιριμ, 'Αγχιδιμ, and Μεσθος: the Senary being called *Αμφιριμ, ος και απατ. ην διο 'Ηεισαυν ποιας κας * and 'Αγχιδιμ, as being the next Number to the Quinary called Δινας: and lastly, *Μεσθος, as being equidistant from 10, and 2. Six exceeding two as much as ten does six.

Those of Physical consideration are Διεχος and "Ημον αυτος, they both referring to the Signs of the Zodiac. The first both to those six in the Night and those other six in the Day; (For six ever rise by Night, and six by Day.) The latter to the Division of the World into two Halfs, (by the cutting of the Horizon,) Six Signs perpetually adhering to either Half thereof.

Those that refer to Pagan Superstition are 'Ευσαλιας, Τεσον, Τεσογος, which all have reference to Trivia, as being born on the sixth day of the moneth.

8. As
8. As for those Names of Ἀρχαῖα, Ζυγία, Φιλωνία, Φιλωτονία, Ζυγις, Γαμμίλια, they are all referable to Γαμμίς, which we have already taken notice of in our Defence of the Cabbala. To which you may also referre latchis, the Spinner on of Life from the birth. To Κόσμος, also you may referre Αλήθεια, Αμοινία, and Πανάρεξις: the two former, as respecting God's general approbation of all that he had made as consenent to his Mind and Will; and the last, as implying a Perfection and Self-sufficiency in the World to subsist by virtue of those powers and parts God had framed it of.

9. The Titles that follow are more particular, and cannot well be made sense of, most of them, without reference to Moses's text. Such are Ἀρχαῖα, Ἀναγγελία, Εἴδωλος, Ἡγαγονία, Τὰς Ἑωνίας Ιεσος ἐπωνυμίων, and Τριά. For why should Six be called Αρχαία, but that Adam's Dominion over the Creature is mentioned in the Sixth Day? Ἀναγγελία also answers verbatim to Male and Female created he them. And what sense can there be that Six is called Εἴδωλος, but that Adam on the Sixth Day was created the Image of the Likeness of God? Let us make man in our Image after our Likeness. Whence * Clemens and * Philo also call him εἰδωλόν εικόνα. And why should it be called Ἡγαγονία and Τὰς Ἑωνίας Ιεσος ἐπωνυμίων, but that the Creation of man was on the Sixth Day, and so described by Moses, as that Adam being but a stature of Earth, an Image of clay at first, God breathed into him the breath of life, ὡς ῥάσεως ἀνθρώπου, εἰς Ἱωάνναν ἠφίαμεν; And haply in this respect also the Sennary may be called Εἴδωλος, εἰδωλ, the Soul being the very Form of that Form or Image of Earth that God had made. And lastly, it is extremely probable that Τριά refers also to the sound constitution Adam was made in, Health being before Diseases, according to that Song in Maximus Tyrius,

Τριά ἑφεδρὰ μακρέον, &c.

And suitably to that in the Book of Widsome, For God created all things that they might have their being, and the Generations of the World were healthfull, &c. Thus plain is it from these Instances that Pythagoras his Mysteries of Numbers had relation to Moses his Text.

10. As for the Septenary, we produced no names of it, which Omificacion we will now supply. For some of them seem very opposite and naturally referable to the Mosaick Doctrine. As Οὐλομέλαια, Τελεσφόρος, 'Αφραίστια, Τυρχ. For the Septenary may well be called Οὐλομέλαια and Τελεσφόρος, because it is said that on the Seventh day God ended his work, all things being then entire and perfect. It is also facetiously called 'Αφραίστια, μετ' τοῦ δισαρχίαν, a non agenda, because God rested on the Seventh Day from all his work. Or if 'Αφραίστια signify the fame that Νεμών, the sense will be, that God sitting still and creating nothing any further, yet there is such a law of things in the very Creation it self, that what by Free Agents and what by Natural no man shall escape Punishment, which is intimated by 'Αφραίστια, deriving the word παρὰ καὶ δισαρχίαν, a non fugiendo. Τυρχ also has some affinity with this Notion, it being a refult from God's resting on the Seventh Day.

But there are also other Names, as Σεβαία, Φυλακτία, Καυρί, 'Ομαράς.

The
The first of which is rather a Pythagorick Notation of the number 
'Ενδς, then a new Name, and signifies Cultus Septenarius, from ο.utcnow or ο.œa, 
which answers to, God blessed the Seventh Day, and sanctified it. And 
from God's so strictly commanding the people φυλ.εστι ροκεσωτν, it is 
not improbable the Septenary may be called Φυλαξίς or else from 
φυλασσ., Vigiles, Watchmen or * Angels, into whose hands the Government 
of the World is committed in this Sabbatism of God. And lastly, 
it is called Καυτός, Χάτ εξωτήν, the Seventh day being so sanctified a season 
or opportunity cut out of the whole summe of time, to employ our 
thoughts on the best things, and meditate on the Wisedome of God. 
Which kind of celebrating this holy Rest and Repose if they called 
'Ορπο, it is because such divine Speculations are most clear when there 
is the strictest ligation of the Senses of the Body, analogical to that in 
Sleep. But it is more likely to referre particularly to Joseph's explication 
of Pharaoh's dreams of the seven Kine and of the Seven ears of Corn, the 
History of that Nation, whose Philosophy was so sacred to them, not 
seeming unworthy of their memory.

II. As for those Names of Αυτός and Φωνή, the reason is very trivial, 
from the Seven Vowels in the Greek Alphabet. Κρής respects the Critical 
Days in diseases, and Κέφας Αμαθέας is attributed to the Septenary 
in which the Universe is laid to be perfected, in such a sense as it was 
to the Ternary in respect of the fulnefs and well-furnishedness of the 
Earth.

The other Appellations are such as belong to either Πάλλας or Αpollo, 
both of which signify the same thing, that is to say, Wisedome: And I 
cannot assure any one that Αpollo's being called ιδωναυσις and the Sep-
tenary Πάλλας had not its true and primeval occasion from this Cabbala of 
Μωσῆs, the divinest Wisedome owing its original to Rest and Vacancy 
from worldly Employments, from which God commands his people to 
cease on the Seventh day. So that the more we consider those Names 
of the Pythagorick Numbers that can answer to the Days of the Creation, 
the greater fitness we find in them and applicability to Μωσῆs his Text.

C H A P. V.

1. The trivial Names of the Denary. 2. Nine significant Names of 
the Denary relating to the Universe or the Fourth Day's work. 3. Aa-
ron's Vesture an emblem of the Universe; 4. An Indication 
of the Divinity of Christ. 5. Three more names, Άλας, Φῶνας, and 
Σφαράς, and in what regard given to the Denary. 6. The Decad, or 
rather the Tetradys, called Κλαδιονός, because the mystery of the 
Creation is chiefly locked up in the Fourth day. 7. As also because of 
its punteal and express significancy of the nature of that Day's creation. 
8. Why it was called Κλαδιονός ή φωνορ. 9. Why the Decad or Denary 
called Κλαδιονός. 10. And why Πηγας, with a fuller inference of the 
true ground why the Tetradys was mentioned in the Pythagorick Oath; 
rather then the Pentad or any other Number.
1. We are not at all concerned in the Octenary and Novenary, they having no reference to any of the Days of the Creation. But the Denary adhereth so close to the Quaternary, in that it is the Power thereof, that it would be a culpable Omission if I should not bring into view all its Titles. The aptness and significance of Κόσμος, Οὐρανός, Παντελεήμων, and Τούτων, I have already observed. Of the remaining, the least to the purpose are * Πτωτός, πολεμωμένος, Μηνοσοίων, Μήνων. It is called Πτωτός, πολεμωμένος or the first Quadrature, only because it is made of the four first Numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4. It is adorned with the Title of Μηνοσοίων, because she is the Mother of the nine Muses; and these shallow Pseudo-Pythagorists, it seems, thought it a fine thing to bestow one of the daughters upon every one of the other nine numbers of the Denary; but they have placed the Mother as well in the Rear as the Van: so fickle are they in these worthless fooleries. I need not note that Μήνων was added as a synonymon of Μηνοσοίων.

2. But the rest of the Titles of the Denary, or Decad, are not such trash; but reflect, as the Decad ought to do, which is the power of the Tetrad, upon the Fourth Day’s Creation, which was the articulating the Universe into form and shape and right order. And therefore as this Number Ten (according as I noted before) was called Κόσμος, for the comprehensive of the Title; so, I conceive, congenorous to this are those names of Εἰμαρμένιον, Οὐρανία, 'Αιων, 'Κρατός, 'Άραγχυ, 'Άταλας, 'Αγκυμας, Πάμωχος, Θεός, (from which last the Quinary also is called 'Αμφιτής,) these all of them being of a comprehensive signification. For Εἰμαρμένιον and * 'Άραγχυ intimate that law of Fatality and Necessity in the order of the Universe; and Οὐρανία that heavenly Music or Harmony of that Order; if it was not cast in vainly as one of the nine Muses, to fill up. 'Αιων, 'Κρατός, 'Άταλας, 'Αγκυμας, denote the permanency and stable durancy of the world, that there is no fear that of its own nature it will ever fail. According to which sense are those expressions in the Pythagorick Oath, Πνεῦμα, πίστις μιᾶς ἀνένας φύσις, 'Αέας, φύσις plainly anwering to 'Αιων, which is as much as αἰών and Κρατός, 'Άταλας, 'Αγκυμας, to 'Πίστις and Πνεῦμα. For these Four, namely, The Spirit of Nature, Sun, Planets, and Vortices, are rightly said to be all what those Names express. And the Congruity is exact, in that, as the Tetrad and Decad are really the same Tetradys, so their names also of the same importance, and point at the same things. And lastly, Θεός and Πάμωχος (if Πάμωχος be Οὐρανός, as Hesychius renders it) found to the same tune, and are most fitly understood from that Tetraodis of the Sibyl,

According to which sense is also that in * Pletinus, Θεός μόνον των τοιούτων τοιούτων, κυβερνά τον κόσμον σωσίει κυβερνών, τοιούτων διὰ τούτων μέγας, γι' αυτόν πάντα ὑπό σφάλματος 

P p p ενυπ
that Earth. See See

3. But there is something so sacred in those Sibylline verses, that I cannot let them pass without further Observation. Which though it may seem somewhat digressive, is not altogether impertinent to our present purpose. For I do not question but the Sibyl in this description alludes to the Sacerdotal Vesture of Aaron, whom Philo makes a Type or Figure of the only-begotten Son of God, whom he calls Χριστός, and makes him the eternal high Priest of this vast Temple the Universe, styles him ἔοιμα τῆς θεᾶς θείας, the Image of Jehovah, and the maker of the World. And yet in a complex sense he makes the Universe also the Son of God. For after a particular description of the meaning of the Vestments of Aaron and his Priestly Ornaments, where he will have the two precious stones on his shoulders to signify the two Hemispheres (each of them having six names of the Tribes, as the Hemispheres six Signs apiece so divided by the cutting of the Horizon;) the twelve stones in the Breast-Plate to signify the twelve Signs in the Zodiac, and their being ranged into four Ternaries, to denote the four Seasons of the Year; his blew Robe to emblematize the Air, the Flower-work at the hemme thereof the Earth, θοινως the Pomegranats (in allusion to ἔοιμα) the Water, and the * Bells the harmonious mixture of Water and Earth for generation: he finally adds this reason of the Attire, Ὄσος ὑπὲ τοῖς ἑπτὰν θυγατρίσιν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐτυμον λέγει, That the whole World might supplicate together with the high Priest. To which he immediately subjoyns, For it is most fit for him that supplicates the Father, as the οἰὸν ἑτερογενῆς ἡμών ἠλεξάντει ηλεξάντειν ὑπὲρ τῆς, as if the Universe were the Son of God. Which saying is unfound, unless he, whom he elsewhere calls ἀπόλυτος θεός and the Divine Logos, be taken in to make the conception entire.

For thus will it appear that the Divine Logos is the true high Priest indeed, whose Indument are (according to those verses of the Sibyl) all the parts of the Universe, and that Aaron was but a Figure of Him; and that Εἴμα τῆς ἑωυ τῶν αἰωνίων answers to the sculpture of the four letters in the golden plate upon the forehead of Aaron's mitre, which Philo says was ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, upon which the Sibyl's ἐν ἀιῶνι reflects, and whereby was understood Jehovah Filius: that ἐν ἀιῶνι ἐν ἀιῶνι refers to his blow Robe; which is not the Aire, but so much of the Heaven as lies between the Sun and any Planet or Earth in the same Vortex; as those * φοινικά are not the Water, but the whole Globe of Earth and Water, which is every where at the lowest parts or hemme of this blew Garment of the eternal Aaron. Which Pomegranates fitly represent the Seminal fulness of the Earth, the mother of all things: and in that they are many, they intimate the plurality of Earths or Planets in their respective Vortices. Nor does the scarlet interwoven in the Ephod and Breast-plate signify the Element of Fire, as Philo would insinuate, but the contexture of scarlet and purple with gold and white filk, of which the Ephod and Breast-plate did consist, denotes the vehement Heat and resplendent Light of the Sun; which is the Pythagoreans πᾶς τοῦ πάσης ἐν μέσῳ ἐρυθρῶν,
as the Ephod and Breast-plate have their place in the middle of the Body, which is the Region of the Heart, the Sun of the lesser world. And lastly, the 

**Tunica Ocellata**, or Stole of *Eye-work*, as I may so call it, that reached farther then the blew Robe (even as far as could be) it is apparent that it denoted the Starry Heaven; the *Staurs* being fitly compared to *Eyes*, as *Plato* has elegantly compared them in that known Distich of his, 

\[\text{Ἀσίφας εἰσαγωγής ἀσπίδος}, \&c.\]

And though *Sibyl* in the *Silici* be called *πεντάγυμνον*, yet in that it is said *εἰς σώμαν κρατούν*, it implies the loose flowing of it, as of those Pomegranates at the hemme of the Sacerdotal Robe. Nor can the Air be said *περισσαμένον σωμή* (which certainly is here as much *παντοποίη* and that so joynly with the *Chorus* of the Planets, but it must imply the mobility and plurality of Earths; which therefore gives light to the former verse. But that there is a golden *Bell* and a Pomegranate, a golden *Bell* and a Pomegranate, no better fene can be made then what *Philo* has given in *another place*; *Τῶν ἀμπελῶν ἥν συμφωνίαν ἔσσει* διὰ τῆς μέσης μεροῦς; *The Bells import the Harmony, Symphony and Consonancy of the parts of the Universe*. For which reason the *Pythagoreans* called the Tetradis *Aporia*. And that ridiculous fame of *Pythagoras* his Mufick of the Spheres was questionles nothing but the misreflected Echo of the found of these golden Bells hanging on *Aaron’s Robe*. For *Pythagoras* held no Spheres at all, but speaking the mystical language of the *Jewish Philosophy*, was misunderstood; as he was also in the mystery of Numbers, the world conceiting generally of him that he made them the Principles of all things, whenas he understood them only as the *Symbols* of things. But *Aristotle* encounters the opinion as seriously held by him, but with as good sport to the intelligent Bystanders as if they should see one fiercely run his lance against a suit of armour, mistaking it for a man of Warr. But this onely by the bye: we will return to the business in hand.

4. That *πᾶς ὁ κόσμος υἱελείνην*, which I above cited out of *Philo*, is to be understood complexly, taking in also the Eternal *Logos*, is plain out of a parallel place, where *Philo* again describing the Sacerdotal Vestments, speaks as before; *Τῶν ἀμπελῶν ἥν συμφωνίαν ἄμαρτωλες τῆλε* ὧν καὶ τις ἑρμήνευε, ἵν’ ὅταν εἰσῆκας διὰ σύνεχας ποιήσωμεν, ἀμφότερον ὧν καὶ τις ἑρμήνευε; *wherein yet in the conclusion he does expressly comprehend ὧν τοῦ συμφωνίας ἄμαρτωλος τῆλε* and immediately adds, For it is necessary for him that would supplicate the father of the World, *ἀνάληψις χρηστάς παλαιστοι ἀριθμὸς* ὧν τοῦ αἰματωσίων αμφίβολων ἄρχοντας ἁπάντων ἀγάλματος. Whence it is no wonder that the *Decad*, which is the symbol of the Universe, is by the *Pythagoreans* called *Θεός*; which is the present and more particular scope I aimed at.

But that which is most admirable to consider is, with what exquisite reason the Eternal *Logos*, which was the Framer of the World, and is, as it were, invested in his own work, is suppos’d the true *High Priest* according to this Type of *Aaron*. For who so fit and effectual Intercel-

Exod. 28. 34.

*Phil. de Monarchia.*

*Macrobi.*

*Somn. scipion.*

*Metaphys.*

*Phil. de vit. Mosis.*
With the Father for the faults and offences of the World as he that made it, and in whose breast is contained the Platform thereof, who understands so thoroughly the necessity of the occurrence sometime of such things as are not so holy and perfect as were desirable, and can out of the perfect knowledge of the nature of things, distinctly plead the unavoidableness of sundry ill emergencies from that *Incomposibility and Incommensurability* that is inexpugnably lodged up in the perverse and unreclaimable Hyle?

Besides, presenting himself in his Sacerdotal vestments, which is the *Compasses* and harmonious fitting of all the parts of the *universe*, he does thereby also in a special manner plead for the particular miscarriages in some few, whereas the rest of the parts of the Creation are so healthful and lovely, and those that are out of frame are no more then the passing of a discord in good Musick, which makes the next Note come off more sweetly. As if he should allude to his Father, that taking one thing with another, and confidering under one view all the ends and Periods of things, all are in a sort allowable and good, and that those parts that seem most dark and dismal, it is the prerogative of the *Sovereign Goodness* to bring light out of them, and that to whom much is forgiven his love will be also much.

Such an high Priest as this I doubt not but Aaron did typifie in his Sacerdotal Habiliments. Which is a special confirmation of the Divinity of our blessed Saviour. This is our God, and there shall none other be accounted of in comparison of him. He hath found out all the ways of Knowledge, and has given it to Jacob his servant, and Israel his beloved. Afterward did he shew himself upon Earth, and conversed with men: Preludiously in the Cloud and in the Bush, but fully and completely in his being incarnate of the blessed Virgin. And Aaron also bore the figure of both his natures: of his Divine nature in his Priestly vestments, which could signify no clothing but that of God; of his humane nature in his own person, Aaron being but a mere man.

And yet because he was to sustain the person of him that was truly God, the Lord *Jesus*, there were some *injunctions*, or rather Privileges, put upon him which supposed him in a manner elevated above the nature of man. Upon consideration whereof Philo breaks out into such expressions as are the most significative of the condition of Christ the *Socratist*, and true high Priest, as any can be uttered. *BELEIâL, ó νόμον ἣ ἀρχήν μεταλαμβάνειν μετακινούμενον ἀπὸ τῆς παρασκευῆς τῆς ζωῆς, μετακινούμενον εἰς τὴν παλινδρομίαν, αὕτε αὐτὴν ἀνάρρησιν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀσθένειας τῆς ἀναρρήσεως ἡ ἀνάρρησις, ὡς ἐκ τῆς κραυγῆς ἡ κραυγή, ὡς κραυγή, ὡς κραυγή, that is to say, The Law will have the high Priest to partake of a nature greater then humane, approaching nearer to the Divine, or (to speak exactly) to be the Confine of both; that men might propitiate God by a Mediator partaking of both natures, and God by using his Ministry may reach forth the supplies of his Grace unto men. So clearly is the Divinity of Christ prefigured in the Law of Moses.

Which weighty Considerations may make this seeming Digression more
more pardonable. For it is not a mere Digression, but an Exposition of what I had alluded for the proof of the meaning of Θεός, one of the Names of the Decad that respect the integral or more Universal Lineaments of the World.

5. But Ἡλιός, and Φαῖνως, and Σφαῖρα may very well more particularly glance at the Lights made on the Fourth day; which are not without the whirling of the round Vortices, which is insinuated by Σφαῖρα. And lastly, Κλαστὸς, which was also the name of the Tetrad) Κλάστος, and Πίνας, I conceive that they all of them respect rather the Tradition of the Tetrad, or the Opening the Mystery of the Creation by the unfolding the properties of that Number applicable to the Fourth Day’s work, as it is conceived to be the more general Delineation of the Universe, then that they were meant of the things themselves said to be created on the Fourth Day. But that the Fourth Day is comprehensive of the whole Creation, those names of the Decad (which is the immediate power of the Tetrad) do plainly import, they all of them in a manner tending that way, and are drily and ridiculously imposed upon the Number without such reference. For why should the Decad be called Ἡλιός, Φαῖνως, Ειμιφθής, Αἰσχρός, Αἰών, &c. but that it refers to the Law and Order of the Universe, and the furnishing of it with Suns and Planets? And though the Decad, it being the Comprehension of all simple Numbers, may be a Symbol of the Universe, and upon that account be called Ὀφθαλμος, Κόρμος, Τὸ πνεῦμα, Παντελεήμον, and also Σφαῖρα, and by reason of the αἰωνικός, the Revolution in numbring from Ten to Ten again, and so in infinitum, is as obvious to observe: yet if there were no further drift or more serious reference to something else, the mere allusion of this Number Ten to the World or a Sphere were a very juicelos and trivial thing.

6. In brief therefore, the Cabbala of the Decad or Tetrad, for they are all one, as Athenagoras has observed, is called Κλαστὸς, or Key-bearer, First, because it was the Exposition of that part of the Mosaic Creation which was the closest locked up. For although that upon the mere granting a Philosopher’s sense of the Text, and that the First day’s Creation is only of Immortal Beings, (as the Monad naturally implies) it will necessarily follow that the Earth is not said to be created at all, unless it can find place in the Fourth day: and that moreover the Text also does universally pronounce of the Lights that were made, That they were to be for signs and for seasons and for days and years; which is very hardly good sense, taken distributively, because these ends and offices will be coincident in some, nor can be taken by way of enumeration of offices or properties belonging to every one of the Lights of Heaven, unless there be Planets or Earths about all the Suns, which we usually call Fix’d stars: Yet these things are so faintly and obscurely insinuated, and that distributive sense, though more harsh and inept, is so far possible, that the work of the Fourth day, unless we be admonished to the contrary by some knowing Myslagogus, will notwithstanding all this seem only a particular creation of the Lights of Heaven as such, and in such a sense as is vulgarly conceived. And therefore for want of such an expressness in the meaning
of this day's Creation as is in the others, the Mystery thereof may well be look'd upon as sealed and locked up from vulgar sight, and thereby the most concerning things in the whole Cabbala. Whence also the Cabbala of the Tetraëlys, or the Traditional Explication of the Fourth day's work, must be acknowledged to be rightly styled Κλειδων, as being the Key-bearer or Opener of the most concealed Mysteries of the Creation.

7. And then secondly, The Tetraëlys in reference to the nature of the number it self and the property thereof (though it be but a toy, and such as Lucian might justly deride, if there were no further usefulness in it) may well be called Κλειδων, in that it is so elegantly and expressly significative of the Cabbala of the Fourth day's Creation. And indeed the Analogy here betwixt the Sign and the thing signified is admirable: For as the Fourth day's Creation in external shew is but part of the Creation allotted to the Fourth day, as other parts to other days, but in a more recondite meaning is indeed the fashioning and ordering the whole Universe, framing of it into Suns, Planets and Vortices; so the Tetraëlys or Fourth, the Symbol hereof, is at first view but one certain number, part of the Decad, but in the hidden power comprehended therein is the whole Decad, 1, 2, 3, 4. put together making up Ten.

To which you may add, That as the work of the Fourth day seems at first view to be only the making of Lights, whose rays are receiv'd in Pyramidal form, whenas it was indeed the framing of the World, and contriving it into so many round Vortices: so the Tetrad or Tetraëlys in its open nature is only the First Pyramid (for Four is so in numbers) but in its more abstruse Power is a Sphere, as was noted * above.

And lastly, As the Fourth day's Creation seems only to respect the visible and material World according to the external sense, but does necessarily imply an Inmaterial Principle ordering the matter into that frame of things: so the Tetrad is only Feminine in its open or exterior nature, but in its parts whereby it grows into a Decad is both Masculine and Feminine, as well 1 as 3 (as Zaratus would have it) being Masculine, and 2 and 4 Feminine: As in the more compound Tetraëlys 36 there are four Masculine numbers, 1, 3, 5, 7, and four Feminine, 2, 4, 6, 8. Which, as in the former consideration, intimates the necessity of conjoining the Active and Passive principle in the Fourth day's Work, that is, in the Fabric of the Universe. But in that the composition of these parts fall into thirty six, which is a circular Number in an easier sense then Ten, there may be intimated thereby that the whole Six days Creation is comprised together in the Fourth, and that the framing of the World is by circumvagination of the Ethereal Matter into repeated Vortices. But this compound Tetraëlys belongs not to this present inquisition. The Analogy betwixt the Simple Tetrad and the Fourth Day's Creation in the Philosopher's sense is so exquisitely express, that I think it is apparent by this time why it has gain'd the Title of Κλειδων, amongst the Pythagoreans, its very property so fitly opening the right meaning of the Work of the Fourth Day.

8. And that it was called Κλειδων, & φύσεως, implies also that it was
was intended chiefly and more immediately for an universal Natural Cabbala, the grand Theorems of Nature being comprised there, as Metaphysical Theorems in the First Day's Work and in the two following Chapters. Out of which considerations the reason is evident of all those Names given to the Denarius which signify the Universal Law or Compages of Nature, which must be cast upon the Fourth Day, there being no Tenth Day of Creation for them to be cast upon. And Ten is the Tetraectys as well as the Tetractys if itself. * As Thirty Six is called the Tetraectys as well as the Four first masculine Numbers and four first feminine out of which it results.

9. That the Decad should be also called *Klæsαξασ, the reason is very easy and natural, if referred to the Fourth Day's Cabbala. For taking hold of that root or stock, as I may call it, we have also hold of the branches. For the Cabbala of the Tetraectys will naturally shoot out into the consideration of the first, second, third, and of the fifth, sixth and seventh Days; the nature of the World not being rightly understood without reaching into them also, which are as it were the Klæsα, the Sprigs or Branches on this side and that side of the Cabbala of the Fourth Day.

10. And for that third and last Name, πις, it is a further argument that the Names of the Decad refer to the Fourth Day: it intimating that the Decad is also that very Tetraectys by whose Inventer and Communicator Pythagoras and his Followers were said to swear, in that the Decad is called πις, as well as the Tetraectys' Οπαξασ, and πις is that assurance which is given by Oath. For πις ἀναφέρειν is as much as to swear in the phrase of the Greek Language. So strangely and easily do things come about everywhere, and naturally fall in together to one joyned confirmation of the truth of the Philosophick Cabbala, and so manifest is it what special reason Pythagoras had to mention the Tetrad rather then the Pentad or any other number, in that form of swearing by Him that first imparted the Cabbala. For if the Mystery had ended in the numbers themselves, and had not been the Symbols and Repositories of some real knowledge of things Natural or Divine, the Pentad had deserved that celebrity of an Oath better then the Tetraectys; as I was above intimating.

To conclude therefore in general concerning the Pythagorick Names of Numbers, I dare appeal to any one if I have not got an hundred times more ground then I have lost by being called to this strict account, and if there has not been made a large accession of very pertinent Names to those I had before produced, as also a plain discovery how those came in amongst the Pythagorick Titles that are nothing pertinent to our present Cabbala. Which so punctual account cannot but give ample satisfaction to all such as know when to be satisfied.
CHAP. VI.

1. The Second Objection, from the Unfitableness of the Pythagorick Philosophy to the Judaick Cabbala, which makes no mention of the Motion of the Earth; with the first Answer thereto. 2. A second Answer, wherein is shewn how easy, if not necessary, it was, that the Motion of the Earth should be left out of the Judaick Cabbala. 3. But that there is notwithstanding that in the Jewish Cabbala which will necessarily inferre the Motion of the Earth. 4. That the Ancient Wise men of the Jews did hold the Motion of the Earth, as appears from Pythagoras his having drawn his doctrine from that Fountain. 5. That Numam Pompilius was descended from the Jews. 6. And that the Temple he built to Vesta is a Demonstration he held the Earth's Motion.

1. The Second Objection against our Cabbala is that taken from the Maimedness of that Doctrine which I pretend to be Judaical or Mafical, which should consist of these two main parts, The Motion of the Earth with those things that are necessarily involved therein, and the Preexistence of the Soul; the former whereof, say they, is not to be met withall in the Jewish writings. To which I answer,

First, That it is on this side the Generosity of my Design, merely to apply to Moses his Text such Truths as remain amongst the Writings of the Jews, and may be supposed Reliques of the ancient Cabbala, but that the high scope I drove at was, by the method I have taken, to recover to their cognizance that noble part of their Cabbala which was lost, and yet which Pythagoras once had from their forefathers, as is abundantly testified by the suffrages of Historians. And truly this Physical part of the Cabbala which I have applied, fits so well and sticks so close to Moses his Text, not onely as to the things themselves, but also by virtue of the consideration of the Names and Properties of the Pythagoric Numbers, that by this Artifice, as by cramps of Iron, both parts of the Cabbala are held so firmly together in one, that it is made apparent to any indifferent eye, that the whole Cabbala is of one structure and piece, and belongs all to the Text of Moses.

2. And then again in the second place, I demand what is the Physical part of the Jewish Cabbala if this be not (for they will not deny but that Moses does Philosophize in this first Chapter of Genesis) or what so great and so true Theorems can they apply as I have applied to his Text? If they will answer there were indeed such, and so fitly applicable, but they are lost; I say, in that the Physical part was lost, it is a shrewd presumption, even from thence, that this is it which we have recovered, no Cabbala being so likely to be lost as this, it being a harder thing to communicate to one the Pythagorick Systeme of the World then the Preexistence of the Soul; as appears in that it was a piece of Philosophy too big for the Capacity of Aristotle himself, who though he could name the opinion, and refer it to the Pythagoreans, yet he could not close with it. For the prejudice of Sense is great against it, and then the Philosophick and Mathe-
Mathematical preparations more voluminous by far than what is requisite for the receiving of the doctrine of the Souls Preexistence. Whence it is, that though Platonism be derived from Pythagorism, yet it has left out the Theory of the Earth's Motion; nay, the Pythagoreans themselves had in time loft it, as it appears in * Timaeus Locris, Apollonius Tyaneus, and in some of the Titles the Pythagoreans have given to their Numbers.

And yet fewer Jews would be found capable of receiving this part of the Cabbala, then Pagans; it being necessary for them that they be furnished not only with what preparations were required in the other, but also with a special hardiness of enduring to see the Cortex of the MOSAICK letter as it were to break in pieces, to render up this recondite kernel for them to feed upon: when as they might be taught the Preexistence of the Soul with little or no violence to the outward Letter of Moses, that is to say, to the Literal Sense of it. Wherefore in that the Motion of the Earth has been loft, and appears not in the remains of the Jewish Cabbala, this can be no argument against its having once been part thereof.

3. Butthirdly, Though the structure of this Theorem be lost amongst them, yet the foundation is not, which is a fair evidence that the Edifice once stood there. And this foundation is to be feen not only in their language itself, which I have* noted above, but also in their Writings, as that in Gemara, Non obres, sed in callo liquido moveri sidera, vetustissima Hebreworum sententia est; at * nos docet Gemara ad initium Geneseos. But those most Ancient of the Hebrews, unless they were very short-witted, as certainly the nearer succeflours of Moses were not, but excellent Philosophers, Moses himself without all question being such, they could not possibly hold the Heavens liquid, but withall mought hold the motion of the Earth, nor they nor Pythagoras hold the Earth's motion without holding the Aetherial Vortices, as I have plainly demonstrated in my * Letter to V. C.

4. And fourthly and lastly, That they did expressly hold the motion of the Earth, is in my apprehension sufficiently evinced already by what I have produced to prove that Pythagoras was either a few himself, or at least received his Doctrine from the Jews. Of which truth the Preexistence of the Soul and the Triunity in the Godhead, which Pythagoras taught, are no obscure indications. For it is plain out of the Book Jeshrab, that the Jews hold the Triunity of the Godhead as well as the Soul's Preexistence. Wherefore in all likelihood he drew his * Physical Philosophy from the same fountain from which he did his Metaphysical. But this Physiological part of the Cabbala being neither so useful nor obligatory as to matters of Religion, nor so easily received nor grasped by reason of the vast excursions in that Theory, or if grasped, hard to be held by any long succeffion of men; (whose minds are most engaged in their personal interest, whether in reference to this world or that which is to come;) it is no wonder, as I have already noted, that time wore it off, or let it sink and loft it, there being so few that were found fit, or that thought themselves concerned to receive it.

5. But nevertheless (which is the main thing I intended to answer in
this last place) though the fame of this part of the Cabbala be in a manner extinct amongst the Jews, yet that it was once the hidden doctrine of the learned of that Nation, seems to me sufficiently credible from what Plutarch writes of Numa Pompilius. For his so strictly prohibiting the use of Images in Divine worship is very apparently Mosical. As alfo that Principle of his, "Οὐ καθέσθω φορέων το αντίπολα εν α' φυσιν γραμμασαν, That inanimate Books are no fit bearers of secret Mysteries, shews that he was taught Cabbalistically by oral Tradition: and it is a thing confessed that there was a secret Tradition of more condehit learning amongst the Jews.

And Numa's Instructer is said to be not a Graecian, but βασιλεις τις Βαλτιων Πυθαγωρος, some Barbarian greater and better then Pythagoras himself, and where, I pray you, was such an one to be found, unlefs descended from the Jews? But another name, I must confess, there is, that he was taught by Pythagoras; but not by him of Samos, for he was some Ages after, but by one Pythagoras who was a Lacedemonian, as Numa himself was. For the Sabines were a Colone of the Lacedemonians, as

* Plutarch affirms.

And to come home to the point, the Lacedemonians themselves were descended from the Jews, as appears both from the firit Book of Maccabees and from Josephus. For Areus King of the Lacedemonians in his Letter to Onias the high Priest does expressly affirm that it was found in writing, That the Lacedemonians and Jews were brethren, and that they were of the Stock of Abraham, And the Letter of Jonathan the high Priest acknowledges the Kindred, and that they found it so in their Records; and adds, further, that they remember the Lacedemonians in their Sacrifices and in their Prayers, as it becometh brethren.

6. Well, be it so then, will you say, and it seems exceeding probable from all these circumstances, that Numa was both descended from the Jews, and imbued with the Jewish Religion and learning. What's this to the purpose? or how does it prove the Motion of the Earth once to have been part of the Judaical Tradition or Cabbala? Only thus much; That Numa did so religiously reft the truth of the Theorem, that knowing there was no such august Temple of God as the Universe it self, and that to all the Inhabitants thereof it cannot but appear round from every prospect, and that in the midst there must be an ever-shining Fire, I mean a Sun; in imitation hereof he built a round Temple, which was called the Temple of Vefla, concerning which Plutarch speaks very plainly and aptly; Νυμπάς εσι το τον 'Εσαιας εγενεν εις κυκλον περιβαλλεμενην τη ανωτητι περι φθειραν, οδηγουμενην ητο σημερινον τη νυμπας το τοπιον καιρον και φθειραν εις τον τον 'Εσαιας καθευδι εις Μοαθα την τη γην τον αναστηναι ειτ εις μετα τη φασιον ειτε, δια άναμενον τη το πωροταιον, το ποιμενει που τη την περιφερειαν τη μονην ποιμεν εις αναστηναι. That Numa is reported to have built a round Temple of Vefla for the custody of a Fire in the midst thereof that was never to go out: not imitating herein the figure of the Earth, as if he was the Vefla, but of the Universe; in the midst whereof the Pythagoreans placed the Fire, and called it Vefla or Monas, and reckoned
reckoned the Earth neither immovable, nor in the midst of the Mundane Compaffe, but that it is carried about the Fire or Sun, and is none of the first and chief Elements of the World. What can be more plain then these Testimonies? But I leave it to every man's judgement to infer with what measure of confidence he thinks good.

CHAP. VII.

1. The Third Objection, taken from the Heterogeneousness of the Exposition of the First Day's Creation to all the rest, it alone being Symbolical.
2. The Answer to the Objection. 3. That the Description of the Earth in the First Day intimates a Symbolical sense thereof. And how there is the same Idea in vulgar phantasy of Light or Day and of Heaven.
4. That Heaven in the First Day signifies the Immaterial Orders of Beings, expressly proved out of Origen.
5. The same further confirmed out of Parmenides the disciple of Diocles the Pythagorean, whom it is probable to have been acquainted with the Text of Moses.
6. That the Jewish Rabbins also give their suffrage thereto.
7. Testimony of Scripture that the Creation of Angels and of the Souls of men is signified by the Light created in the First Day.
8. That Heaven and Light understood of the Mundus Vitæ do not signify merely Symbolically.
9. A further consideration evincing the same Conclusion. 10. That whether Heaven and Light signify Symbolically or no, the First Day's work will not be so heterogeneous to the rest, an Evening and Morning being fetched from thence to every Day's Creation.
11. That the Metaphysical Hyle in the First day's creation is not called Earth merely Symbolically, a thing not hard to prove, but needless.

1. The Third Objection is against our Exposition of the First Day's work. For they urge, that it is very Heterogeneous and strangely different from the Interpretations of all the rest of the Days, where the things mentioned are not Symbolical, but are properly what they are said to be: But Heaven and Earth and Light are not so in the First Day's Creation, but the Symbols of something else. Which makes the Cabalago off but harshly, it seeming not all of one piece.

2. But I answer, The question is not whether the Interpretation may seem harsh to a nice and Queamith phasmy, but whether it be true: which I think I have produced no mean proofs for already, & must further remember you how many there be that interpreting the story of Adam and Eve in Paradise literally, do notwithstanding not think it harsh to expound that of the Serpent symbolically. But there was also a necessity of speaking of the Creation of Immortal Beings in a Symbolical way, Moses having a design not to mention any thing hard or sublime in the mere letter of the Text, as is acknowledged by all Interpreters. Neither could there be a philosophical as well as a Literal Cabala without taking this liberty, which ought to be freely granted, no uncertainty or obscurity arising therefrom,
therefrom, by reason of the Cabbala of Numbers belonging to the Six Days Creation. For that trite Aphorism of the Pythagoreans,

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is here fully verified, and was, I suspect, chiefly understood at first of the Six Days Works. That all things were like to, or bore a resemblance of, the Number to which they referred. Whence we may be assured that Immateriality was the work of the First Day, a Monad or Unite being to express a signification of the nature thereof.

3. And that the Earth might not break that sense of the Cabbala, the description is such as does very naturally favour the Philosophical meaning, the Text calling it * Vicuity or Emptiness it self, as I have already noted. Nor is it at all hard that Heaven and Light are made Symbols of the same thing, not only for those Reasons I have already alluded, which verge more near upon Philosophy, (of which the chiefest is, that Heaven or Aether is the very body of Light, or Light it self when duly moved) but also from that notion or Phantasie that naturally arises from the Letter it self according to the vulgar apprehension of things, who certainly have the same Idea in their minde of that illuminated Concave which is Heaven, that they have of Day distinct from the Sun. And there was no visible Concave at first but that of Day, there being then neither Moon nor Stars to inlighten the Night.

And that this conceit of ours is found, appears further in that Jupiter and Diespiter are the self-same Numen amongst the Heathen. And yet Jupiter, that is, Jovis Pater, Father Jovis, is the convex Heaven, Τὸν παύλα αὐξήνων ἐν οὐρανῷ, * Herodotus speaks it of the Persians. And Dies Pater, that is, Father Dies (for, as * Varro has interpreted it, it is the Nominative case, as in Marspiter, Neptunspater, Jovemspater) what can it be but this illuminated Concavity or Convexity which is called Day, a distinct Numen amongst the Heathen as well as Night, who made the notorious Phenomena of Nature so many Deities; and Macrobius expressly, Cretenses Δια ἡ ἡμέρα vocans & Jovem Salii, in carmine, Lucetiam? whence Dijovis in all likelihood is the same that Diespiter. But we will not dwell upon these thyoes. It was sufficient to have noted that Oμηρός and Ημέρα are all one in the Heathen Theologie with Zeus, and therefore all one with one another. It is now more material to confer that without any light at all there can be no discernment of anything, and that therefore Heaven must be vulgarly conceived under the notion of this luminous Concavity, which for the lightsome-nesfs thereof is called Day, and for its height and hollownesse (for Calum is as much as Κοίλον hollow) is termed Heaven, and that they are one joyn Object, especially in the First Day's Creation, Heaven being no where discoverable but in this newly-created Day, whose joyn appearances made up but one and the same Luminous Concave, as I intimated before.

Whence the literal sense of the First Day's work, as it is the Symbole or Representation of the Philosophical, is very easy and natural if you take it thus; namely, That first it is summarily said, God created Heaven, (that is, this Luminous Concave) and the Earth. But this Earth was nothing but
but Emptiness and Vacuity, and darkness was on the face of the Abyss, &c.,
describing thus, First, the condition of the Earth more punctually, which
is the first part of this day's Creation; but then after that coming to the
other part, he tells us how God commanded the Light to be made, that
is, this luminous Concave, Heaven, (for they are in Idea really the same,
as I have said, and therefore the words Light and Heaven but Synonyma's
here) and how he called this Light or Coelum luminosum, Day, &c. Which
structure and sense of things considered, it cannot but take away all scruple
and conceit of any harshness in making Heaven and Light symbols of
the same thing, namely, of that which the Platonists call Mundus viva, or
the World of Life, and Forme.

Nor can it be objected that this Literal sense is incoherent with the
Literal Cabbala we have framed already, where the Heaven is made on
the Second day, and therefore cannot be literally made in the First. For
I mean here by the Literal sense, not that continued popular sense or
Literal Cabbala; for that is not supposed the Basis of the Philosophical
(For these three distinct Cabbala's have no intended either agreement
or disagreement one with another, as having no mutual reference at all,
but grow out of the Letter which is common to all three, as several
verses out of one bed of Earth in a Garden.) But by the Literal sense here I understand such a sense as may be made out of the letter
qualified and prepared by a skilful hand for a fit and unforced exhibiting
any part of either the Literal, peculiarly so called, or else of the Philosophical or Moral Cabbala; whether this preparation be made by Gram-
mar and Criticism, or else by Phantasmatical or real and true Notion.
For the Letter, as I said, is common to all three Cabbala's, but is to be
prepared and fitted in each, not to a sense congruous to the series of
things in either of the other two, but of those things in one and the same
Cabbala. Which is a Principle that there is no man, that well considers,
but must acknowledge both rational and necessary.

4. But now, that we have given the right sense of the first Day's Cre-
ation in our Philosophical Cabbala, besides what we have produced
already, appears further out of * Clemens Alexandrinus and Origen;
who comparing the Second Day's work with the First write thus; Kai ἐν
μετὰ τὴν αἰώνας ἡμείς ἔδωκαν ἄνωθεν ἀκόλουθον, ἧν ἀιώνα, ἢ φῶς τοιῆν ἐν ἂν ἡ
ημείας ἐπειδή ἤταν ἡμείας δημιουργεῖ. Which interpretation * Or-
gen follows exactly, Cum ante, faith he, Deus coelum fecisset, nune fir-
mamentum facit; id est, corporeum coelum. Fecit enim coelum primus, de
quo dicit, Coelum mihi sedes est. And a little after, Cum enim eaque
facturas erat Deus ex Spiritu convexitur & corpore, &c. sine de causa in prin-
cipio & ante omnia coelum dicitur factum, id est, omnis Spiritus sub-
stantia, super quam velat in throno quodam & sede Deus requiescit. This
therefore is that Mundus viva which is the highest Throne of God,
Which the Pythagoreans also call Zavos, &c., the Tower of Jupiter,
it being his highest habitation, and is also termed his Δυναμεικός φρουρας,
the external framing of the World in all the parts of it being immedi-
ately or instrumentally performed by it, as the Fatum is in the wombe.

5. According to which sense is that of Parmenides, That there are but

Q. Q. two
two Principles, πός καὶ ἥν, which in Hebrew would be יְהִי רֹאֶשׁ, Lūx ὡς Terra, or (which I have shewn to be the same,) Calum & Terra; and adds further, Καὶ τὸ ἓκαμαργὸν πάντιν ἐνέχει, ἠ ἰ ὡς ἔλος. Which does so exquisitely answer to the * Text of Moses in the Philosophical sense, that it will be hard to doubt but that he had these two Principles from thence, the one Active or Demurgical, the other Passive or Material. The one symbolically called πός, יְהִי, Lūx or Αἴσθη, the other ἥν, which is יְהִי, Terra; Heaven and Earth. And for that Riddle which * Lærtius adds further, Γένοι τι αὐτήν εἰς ἐκ ζῶν ἐνεκτείνοικεν, ἡνὸν ἐκ κατανοεῖν ζῷον ἐν ὑμαῖς, I leave to the ingenious to unriddle from וֹוֹר וֹוֹר, and בֹּב, and the Hebraism of the * article מ which I have noted, and then to judge in how right a sent of things we have been in the pursuit of the meaning of the Physical part of the Philosophick Cabbala, and whether Pythagoras did not understand things the same way. For this Parmenides was a Pythagorean, as having been an Intimate of one Diocletas a follower of Pythagoras: Which Diocletas, as Sotion writes, was indeed poor, but a singularly-honest and good man; for which reason Parmenides adhered so close to him for his Society while he lived, and had to great an honour for him, that he built an Χρων, or Chapel, to him when he was dead.

All which Circumstances may justly make a man suspect that this Diiocrates was acquainted with the Jewish Learning & the very letter of Moses, (as * Pherocides Syrus is also said to have gotten πάντα Φοινίκων ἀποκρακα, βίον, that is, the secret Books of the Phanianians or * Hebrews) or, if you will, with the Literal and Philosophical Cabbala. From whence Parmenides might take occasion of making that Distribution of Philosophy into such as is accurately and intellectually true, and such as is according to the Appearance of things to the Vulgar. Διοσκορίς καὶ πός προφητικά, πός καὶ πός λόγοι, πός καὶ πός φανέρω. The latter of which, were it not in some such respect as I have intimatted, would not have been taken notice of by Parmenides for any piece of wildome or Philosophy at all. And that φανέρω will signifie external Appearance, is plain in that * Epicurus divides that which appears αὐτην into ἐναργεια and φανερον, and Democritus in Lærtius has defined, ἀρχαῖαι των ἐναργεια ἐφευρον, ἔναργεια των ἐστε ἀληθεὶς ἐναργειον, διὰ της ἐναργειον, της παλαιας ἐναργειον, to be φανέρω, or external appearances.

To this πός καὶ ἥν of Parmenides exactly answers that Couple of Principles amongst the Pythagoreans, φας καὶ ἥν ὡς, which plainly point at the Light and Darkness in the beginning of Genesis; the Pythagoreans rendring ἡ παλαια, Parmenides; πός, and the one calling the Hyle ἥν, the other στήνος, but both reflecting on the Text, where Hyle is denoted by both those characters. And that Parmenides meant not this sensible Earth is plain out of * Aristotle, who saies that Parmenides ranked his first Principle Fire, ἐναργεια τον θεον, ἐναργεια μοι παλαιας ἡν ἤ, such as Plotinus describes Hyle to be: and Theodotus renders ἑναργεια παλαιας ἡν ἤ, But I have run out too far, let us return to Origen.

6. Confonant to that Interpretation of Origen is that general Doctrine of the Jewish Rabbins, Solium glorie Dei creatum esse ante creationem Mundis,
Mundi, as you may see in Maimonides. But that that which is the Throne of God should be called Heaven, is no wonder, nothing being more ordinary than the placing of his Throne there. Wherefore, according to the general consent of the Rabbins, there was an Heaven made before the Creation of the outward World. And when I pray you, then should it be made, if not in the first day; or what can be His throne that is laid to sit upon the Cherubims, but the Angelical Orders? And that the Cabballists expound the Creation of Heaven to be the Creation of Angels, * Menaphsen Ben Israel assures us, and alledges the Targum upon Job, and Moses Egyptians to the same purpose.

7. But not only Origen, Alexandrinus, and the Jewish Writers put in their suffrage for our Interpretation, but, if I be not mistaken, the very Scripture itself, nay I may say God himself personally in the Scripture, Job 38, Where was thou when I laid the foundations of the Earth? declare, if thou hast understanding. When the Morning-Stars sang together, and all the Sons of God shouted for Joy? Where what is meant by the Morning-Stars, he must be blinde that cannot discern from the following Exegesis, namely the Sons of God, which is as much as the Angels, who are called Morning-Stars Symbolically, and in allusion to the First Day's Creation, namely the creation of Light, which was the Morning of the World and the Birth of Spiritual and Angelical Beings. And therefore again, v.19, 21, concerning this First Day's creation of Light, he asketh Job another like question; Where is the way where Light dwelleth? and as for darkness, where is the place thereof? alluding certainly to the Light and Darkness mentioned in the First Day. For thereupon he demands further, Know'st thou that thou wast then generated or made, and that the number of thy Days is great? So the learned of the Jews read it, and do out of this Text confidently conclude their Praexistence of Souls. Which if they do rightly, no question but their Creation is involved in the creation of Light in the First Day's Work. From these Testimonies I think it is plain enough, that by the Creation of Heaven or Light is understood, as Origen has ventured to affirm, the Creation of all Spiritual Substances.

8. But further, to come nearer to the Objection, I do not conceive it necessary to acknowledge that Heaven and Light do signify merely Symbolically, but that the Things created the First day may be called most truly and properly by those Names, though they were first given to the Material Heaven and Visible Light: as the words Spiritus, Anima, and Pneuma, were terms first given to that which is material, meaning thereby a waft of Air, Wind, or breath, but now signify, and that properly and truly, the first of them any Immaterial Substante, the two latter the Soul of Man which is Spiritual and Immaterial. And so it may be with Heaven and Light, that which is conceived of Heaven belonging more truly and eminently to the Mundus Vitalis then to the Material Heaven itself. * For the generations of sublunary things, their Fates and Periods, that vital Influence, and the Measurings of time, I do not doubt but all are more truly, more primarily and properly attributed to the World of Life, in which are all the Seminal Forms of things, then they are to the corporeal Heaven; & do hugely suspect, though I will not affirm, that the Lights of Heaven

* See Psichopa. Cant. 1. Stanz. 44, 45, 47. 42, 43.
Heaven themselves would not be what they seem to us, let the Matter be never so subtle & soundly agitated, were they not actuated also by the Spirit of Nature, & became in some sort Vital thereby: infomuch that I conceive Spirit to be a further illumination of Light itself, as when the Soul acts in the eye. Besides, considering the promanation and intertexture of the Rays of Light, that which is said thereof is more eminently and perfectly true in the nature of every particular spirit (as I have elsewhere shown at large) then in Light it self. That apprehension also that Heaven is the highest part of the Creation, is not severely and Philosophically true in the material Heaven, it being every where and the Earth self a Planet: but it is irrefragably true of this Heaven that was created the First day; which is also the inaccessible Light where He dwells unto whom the eye of no mortal can reach.

9. Besides all which, There being such a constant and necessary union betwixt the Æthereal or Heavenly Matter and the Mundus Vite in all the parts thereof wherever they act, in this regard also it is plain that the terming the First day’s work Heaven and Light is not merely Symbolical, but reaches the very nature & property of the things: according as Virgil does seriously Philosopher in those expressions touching the Souls of men, Ignem est olis vigor, & cælestis origo Seminibus; quantum non noxia corpora tardant, Terrenique hectant artus, moribundaque membra, Whereby he would innuinate that there is an igneous, luminous, or Æthereal Vehicle alwaies intimately adhering to the Soul, though it be much flaked and damped with the gross and crude moisture of the Body during this Earthly Peregrination.

10. And lastly, whether we phantasy Heaven or Light to signifie symbolically or no, there will not be that Heterogeneity and difference from other Day’s Creations as is conceived; this Lightsome Heaven or Heavenly Light being symbolically called the Morning of each Day’s Creation, as the Material part or Passive Principle is styled the Evening. Which Morning is alwaies a parcel of that full Day which was first created, and is callified and mitigated by its conjunction with the dark Matter into a moderate Matutine Splendour, as those several parts of the Matter thus and thus modified, answering to the several Capacities of that dark Emptiness and Vacuity (which was the Midnight opposite to that full Day) being raised to an actual Materiality, may go for the Evening-Twilight of every Day’s Creation: the Possibility of this external and material Creation being the μέσον betwixt the Mundus viti or Full day, and that Metaphysical Hyle or Midnight, so soon as once its parts have but material existence, or exist as to their Matter; as the Dusk of the Evening is the μέσον betwixt Day and Night.

11. And now if we would be so toyishly, or rather tediously, curious, we might also go about to prove that the Earth mentioned in the First day’s Creation, which is nothing but that Metaphysical Hyle, ought not to be thought to be so much symbolically as truly and properly so called, the most peculiar Attributes of the Earth being only true in it. For the Earth strictly and philosophically considered is neither the lowest of the Creation,
CHAP. VIII.

of the Philosopghick Cabbala.

Creation, nor immovable; but this Metaphysical Earth is both, as is manifest at first sight, it being the lowest degree and shadow of Being; and not only immovable, but undiminishable and unimpaired, as I have already noted. But this is a subject not worth the polishing, the main work of the First day being the creating of Heaven or Light; and the description of the Earth there being such as does easily enough assure the Philosphick sense to any that are not over-scrupulous, of which more in the following chapter: and lastly, it being a matter of no such great consequence whether Earth and Heaven and Light signify Symbolically or no; seeing that let their signification be what it will, it is, in such fort as I have described, carried down to the work of every day, whereby the whole piece becomes sufficiently homogeneal.

CHAP. VIII.

1. That Hyle or first Matter is mere Possibility of Being, according to Aristotle. 2. That the same is but Empty Space or Capacity of Body, according to Plato and Plotinus; and how truly the description of Hyle in them agrees with Moses his Terrainanis & vacua. 3. What in Plotinus his description answers to Abyss, Darkness, and Waters in Moses. 4. That Plotinus seems to make Hyle a mere Non-Entity. 5. But that his more express Opinion is, that it is the Potentiality of Corporeal Beings, and Entity in reversion. 6. How this Hyle may be said to be created. 7. Why Moses would take notice of so rank and evanid a business as this Hyle seems to be, in his Six Days Creation. 8. That Incomposibilty is involved in the notion of the Mosack Hyle, with a special reason why the Pythagoreans might call the Decad 'Avaron.

1. BUT now for those three additional Quere's touching this Metaphysical Hyle; The first of them is concerning the Name thereof, why I would adventure to give to substantial a name as Hyle, which is as much as to say, Matter, to that which I acknowledge to have no Being but a Metaphysical one, and such a Metaphysical one as is not truly any Being, but a mere Capacity thereof. But I answer, That I have rather furnamed the Hyle of the Ancients Metaphysical, then transplanted the name of Hyle to a mere Metaphysical Entity. For to far as I can find, they usually allow their Hyle no more Entity then I have allotted to it in my description thereof, namely, That it is the Capacity only of the existence of the Corporeal or Sensible World, but it self is neither Substance nor any thing else actually. *Lib. 6. cap. 3, § 6. § 7. It is Aristotle's Definition of Matter in his Meta-physics. And again not far after, To χως-κοινον, µη µη, τως τον µη τον µη, The Possibility of being and not being, that is the Hyle or Matter in every thing.

2. And Plato, in his Timæus, casting things into three ranks, makes one kind to be, *Lib. 6. cap. 2, § 6, which is intelligible, ingenerable and...
incorruptible, invisible and immovable: The second kind is what has
some resemblance of this, and bears the same name with it, but is senible,
corruptible, and movable: The third he makes παντὸς χώρας, Place or
Space (Plutarch interprets it διάμετρος) Ἐφεσίων, i.e., of the
παράθυρον ὑπὸ τῆς γένους πάνω, ἀνωτέρω, ἀνάβας, ἄφωκος ποιμ. This is his
description of Matter, as both Plutarch and also Plotinus supposes.
But it is a very fupposable business that he means
no more then empty Space by it, which he calls χώρα, and which is very
hard to conceive what it is, but makes it also the seat and foundation of all
generable things, and accordingly * Plotinus calls it ἑκατέρα. Which
answers exactly to Terra inanis & vaca in Moses, Stability and Emptiness
being thus comprised in one.

Plotinus insisting upon this notion of χώρα, makes Matter such to the
Bodies of the world as an empty room is to our Sensel, and affirms that it
is immoveable, ὅπως ἐν νωτίῳ τὸ ἀνεφόρος παυσιν ὡς ὁ ᾿Ανάπαν ἐν
αὐτῇ. as when, if one another in the same room, neither the room
nor the aire therein is concerned in their strokes. Answeably to which
notion he calls Matter ἑπόλοις καί πάνικαμον ὠξυς, the Shadow and phantom
of bulk; and adds further, that it is αὐτοπεριβόλον μὲν ὑγρόν, a thing that has
no resistance. For τὸ αὐτοπερίβολον μὲν ὑγρόν answers to what he speaks to the
same purpose in his sixth Ennead, Οὐδὲ δεδομένως καί αὐτοπεριβόλον ἐπὶ ἑπόλοις
καί πάνικαμον ὠξυς. And therefore in his second Ennead he flyles Matter ὡξυς ἑπόλοις
καί πάνικαμον, only a preparation or Capacity of bulk, as appears in that it
also ἑπόλοις καί πάνικαμον, an empty bulk, and in the eighth Chapter flatly denies
that it has either rarity or density or magnitude.

And further expressing the desolate condition of the Matter in his
third Ennead, he calls it ἦν ἀπεισωσμένος πανικαμα, an ever-craving penury and universal desolation,
which want is rather mocked then supplied: the Forms it seems to receive being like the
Echoes in hollow solitudes, not imbibed, but rebounded, nothing flicking
of what it participates, but being as a looking-glass, which rather reflects
then receives images. Which is consonant to what elsewhere he writes,
Δὲι τὸ ἀπεισωσμένος ἡκατέρας, ἄλλα ἀπεισωσμένος ἐπὶ τὴν ποιμνήν κορος, ὥσιν ἂν παράθυρον ἀνεφόρος. That the nature of Hyle must not be compound, but simple
and one, that it may be void of all: which shews how fitly it is ranged in the
First day's work. Befides that he plainly declares, Ὅν τὸ Οὐρν ἐπὶ τὴν παρά-
θυρον, ὧν Ταύτας ἑπόλοις καί πάνικαμον, That Hyle or Matter is in the rank of Incorporeals, both in his
second and third Ennead.

Such plentiful expressions are there in Plotinus that answer to Moses his
הנה והנה, which signifies Capacity and Emptiness, or ἑκατέρας ἤν ὡξυ, according
to Theodotion. We have already intimated that Hyle is called ἑκατέρας καί χώρα, which answer to the Stability of the Earth, the first Appellation of the Moaick Hyle. And Plotinus is very express in that simi-
litude of the Echo to which he compares the Forms which the Matter is
said to receive: * Άλλα ἤκατερα τὸν ἄνω τὸν ὥσιν ὧσιν ἐκατέρας, ἄλλα ἀπεισωσμένος ὧ
παράθυρον, ὡς ἑπόλοις καί πάνικαμον. In which words he compares the Matter to a
fixed seat against which the Forms do as it were hit, but do not sink
in, so that he will have the Matter to remain as before, unchanged and un-
moveable.
movable. Accordingly as he also expresseth himself in the eleventh Chapter, That the Matter has neither more nor less by the access or receivs of Forms, κατ' ἡμέραν χρόνον ὑπὲρ τῆς οἰκονομίας. Which word κατ' ἡμέραν he often uses in setting out the fieddines and immutableness of the Earth, Μένει τοῖς ἑαυτῷ τοῖς ἑαυτῷ πάσι. So that these flitting Forms and Matter are as the Generations of men and the Earth, One generation goeth and another cometh, but the Earth standeth fast for ever.

3. That also futes very well with the third Appellation of the Maffick Hyle (namely Abyffe) which Plotinus has in his second Ennead. To ἅπαξ ἡμέραν εἰκόνων ὑπὲρ τῆς οἰκονομίας, That the Profoundity of everything (he calls it the τοῖς ἑαυτῶν * elsewhere) is the Matter; and therefore is ever dark. Which Darkness is a fourth Property of the Maffick Matter, and on which Plotinus insists pretty copiously in this second Ennead, and contends we can have no other notion of it, it being ἀδρακωμικὸν τὸ σκοτός, as darkness is to the Eye: and that the Soul can no otherwise see it ἢ ἀκριμάτως οὐκ ἀκέραιοι ἢ στράτημεσις. And a little after, ἐκ τοῦ ὑπωφί ἁμικροσφόρον ὑμυρον, ὡς ὑποθέτατο για τὸ σκοτός, as a man sees darkness. And lastly, that he may not seem not to have touched, at least, every part of the Maffick description of the First Matter, what Moses may mean by the mobility of the Waters Plotinus has expressed by τὸ ἀδρακωμικόν, or ἀκριμάτως, the Indefiniteness or Undeterminateness of Matter.

4. And truly I think what we have produced hitherto bids fair for a proof that he means no substantive a Being by Matter then what may well be called Metaphysical. But he speaks broader, and yet more copiously, in his third Ennead, where (as * Clemens also fayes Platon) styles the Matter) he calls it τὸ ἄκρωτος μήν ὑπέρ, That which is truly Non-Entity: and a little after further describing it, ἃ τὸ ὑπὲρ για καταλεύκον ὑπὸ ᾗ ἥπι, Which Entity being but in imagination is no Being: And in chapter the thirteenth he declares, That if Matter would keep herself what she is, ἀναγχάζονται μήν μὴν ἀναγχάζοντας εἰς ἑαυτὸν καταλεύκον οὐκ ᾗ ἥπι, ἀλλὰ ἢ ἀπό τοῦ μὴν ἀναγχάζοντας εἰς ἑαυτὸν καταλεύκον οὐκ ᾗ ἥπι, she must necessarily be unreceptive of all Entities: nay, if there be but the least shadow of them, she must not share therein, that she may conserve to herself her own property.

5. But the Philosopher is so severe in such expressions, that he seems to strip Matter more naked then she really ought to be. But he is more moderate in others, where he will permit her to be the Possibility of the outward & sensible World, and only argues her to be no Entity, because she is only this Possibility. As in Ennead the sixth, ἐν τῇ μερίδι τοῦ ἁμορφοῦ, ὡς ἀν ἀντι τὴν ἀντι τῆς, For if that be only Potentiality which is to come, and that which is to come no Essence or Substance; Matter, which is but Potentiality, is no Substance or Essence. And in Ennead the second he will allow Matter to be Essence in Reversion. Το ἡ ἀντι μήν τοῦ μὴν ἐπικαλεσμένον, The Being of Matter is only an expected or promismon being, or, as I said, a Being in reversion. And toward the end of the Chapter he concludes, Εἶπερ ἄνατ οὗτος ἀντις, οὗτος ἀντι τοῦ εἰς τοῦ εἰς τοῦ μην ἐκτὸς τοῦ. And in the close of all, Εἶπερ ἄνατ οὗτος ἄνατος ἡ ἀνταντισύνη ὑπὸ προειδότων, ὡς ἀντι λοιπῶν. * Lib. 4, c. 5. * Ennead. 1. * Lib. 8, cap. 7. * Lib. 4, c. 10. * Lib. 6, cap. 7. * Strom. lib. 5. * Lib. 1, cap. 27. * Lib. 5, cap. 5. * Lib. 5, cap. 9.
An Appendix to the Defence

Chap. VIII.

The sense of both which sentences is but this, That the essence of Matter excludes real existence, and consists only in capacity or possibility of being. Whence it is manifest, that this Platonical style which I have applied to the first day's Creation may rightly be called *Metaphysical*, or, if you will, that which has but the most evanish *Metaphysical* entity be called *Hyle*, which was the thing aimed at.

6. But now there is a more dangerous quære that emerges out of the answer to the former, namely, How this mere capacity or possibility of corporeal and sensible beings can be said to be created. For this possibility and capacity seems to be of itself, and to need no creation. But I answer, That creation is nothing else but an emanation of the creature from God, as *Aquinus* has determined; and I say, that this possibility and capacity of things is the utmost projection or emanation from the Divine existence, and would not be without Him. For if he were not, every thing else would be impossible to be. Therefore this possibility depending on Him, and being not a mere nothing according to the metaphysicians, who allow ens in potentia to be truly ens as well as ens actus, it is rightly said to be created by Him. And if creation be ex nihilo, this is much more eminently so then any, that which is below it being the most absolute *Non-ens* that is conceivable; which is, as I said, *Impossibility*, which would be the state of all things were there not a God.

7. The third and last quære is, why Moses should take notice of so lank and evanish a business as this mere possibility of the external creation. For what good is there to consider that the possibility of an house or statue is before the Masons and Statuaries making of them? But I answer, The reason is not the same, there being an infinite difference between the whole Universe and an house or statue, and betwixt God and a Mason or Statuary. And therefore in such vast things as God and the Universe every minute consideration will be great: and we see that humane understanding has ever thought it so. For mens minds have been much puzzled and plunged in the diving down to the lowest and last ground of all things, which they call *Hyle*, and have commonly defined it such as I have described it, a mere *Potentiality*.

Besides, it is that a contemptible notion or speculation, to consider that the very possibility of other beings is from God; and that it is impossible for any thing to be without Him; for as it is an aphorism most true, so is it also very closely connex with piety and religion; and such a Philosophy we are to expect from so holy a man as Moses.

And lastly, when we say, This *Hyle* is the *Potentiality* or *Capacity* of things, it involves also in it *Incomposibility*, as being a finite capacity or possibility. And therefore from hence there will be a necessary sequel of such things as are accounted evil in the World. For such a capacity or possibility as is but finite dwells next door to necessity, the Mother of mischief, as is intimated in the Pythagoric verses, though upon another occasion,

---Διώμις γάρ ἀνάγκη ἐνυδίται ῥαί.]

Nor
Chap. VIII.

of the Philosphick Cabbala.

Nor can I make any allowable sense of *Plato's 'Αράγγθ ρολά τος τερκον ἡν ἀνδριλακον, of his Necessity that does refractorily and unta-

medly resift and oppose God, but this Incomposibility of the Creation.

But in that he calls it ταυτον διντην Κακοτοισι, and διντην εκταιρευν ὑπο

καταλον της αγαθωσευ, is either a ranting piece of Rhetorick, or rather Poetry, or else a gros mistake of Moses his Text (for that he was ac-

quainted with it I have intimated before) he interpreting νομις ην in

such a sense as the Literal Cabbala has expressed it, which he conceived to

be the effect of this διντην αμαλατι. ἡν κακοτοισι which he imagined.

8. But the face of the First Matter in Moses is horrid and dismal enough

without any such freakish conceits fetch'd from the misunderstanding of the

Literal Cabbala, to make it bewray its own guilt and accessories to

those evils that happen in the World. And being no other then such

as has been hitherto described out of Plotinus, Plotinus himself does not

withstanding lamentably complain of the mischiefs arising out of it, in

his Περι της τω, ἂ πολιον και κακο, where he defines this Hyle to be κακο

εστα, and το αρχητων καινοι, The essence of Evil, and the First or Original

Evil; and giving a reason of what evil there is in the World, he writes

thus, Μεμνενων δι χνι της τω καινοι φύσιν εκ της της αγαθωσευ, ἡν σπι

παραθευν εις αυλεν ἐκα σεια, το τη κακο εκ της αρχαιας φύσιν κ. * υπαν

λεγομεν * That the world is mixt of Intelect and Necessity, and that

those things that come from God are good, but the evils are from that antique

Nature which is called Hyle. But it is, I must confes, pretty humourously

spoken of him to call this Hyle antique, unless it be merely in reference to

particularly vanishing shows in the World: For the World it self is as an-
tique as this Hyle according to his own doctrine elsewhere. As in his fifth

* Ennead, where he makes the Universe a necessary Emanation of God, and

the natural Image of the Eternal Intelect: and thence inferres, Παιων ἡ

φυσι ειςων ειςον αν το αρχαινον μενοι. And in another place, Εἰς

αρχητων εις το Κόσμο θα, ἡ εις εκ φυσιν ρεδομενοι, ἢλλα φυσις αρχαιον

γενομεν κατα φυσιν ὑποτελεον τοιούτος. And in the foregoing chapter to this

Citation he says the very same thing, Γενοης ο το Κόσμο θρυ ιος μενον τω

τω το εκ, ἢλλα Δολεας φυσις αρχητων. That the World was not made by con-
sultation and reason that it ought to be so, but by the immediate Necessity of

the emanation of an After-Nature, Which Conclusions of Plotinus if they
be true, I should think this as eminent a reason as any why the Pythago-

reans called the Decad, which is their Symbol of the Universe, 'Αραγγθ, that

is, Necessity.

But I the more willingly made this excursion, because it makes for

the more easy understanding of what I was going to adde for the further

proving that Plotinus makes Hyle the Root of all evils, In the first

* Ennead, as before, Εὐει τοι ζ το αρχαινον το αρχητων, 'Αραγγθ της εκσαφης

tης ιποτελοεων, ο εις υπο της εκσαφης λειτουρ, της αει καθοτητος η οντων,

tο εκσαφη, η μεθ ο σων εις γειτονει επισεων, το τω ἐν τω καινοι το αρχητων

δι 'Αραγγθον εις τοι μεθ το αρχητων, οικ εις το εκσαφη. Το τω την μονα εκσαφη
tο εκσαφη αυτω, η αυτω 'Αραγγθ τω καινοι. For since that the Soveraign
goodness is not alone, it must needs be that, by an Egressio, or gradual Subfidency

or Deficent or Distance from it, the Extreme, and after which it was im-

possible
possible there should be anything, that this must be the Evil. And of necessity there is something after the First, so that there must be an extreme. And this is Hyle or Matter, having nothing of the First, and this is the necessity of Evil: namely so far forth as this Hyle has nothing of the First, nor is capable thereof. Which is as much as to say, that the Incomposibility or Incommensurability in the lowest creation of things (and such is this Corporeal World) is this Ἀναγνώσμα, this Necessity of Evil. That there would be an Impossibility of all things if there were no God, but there is now an Incomposibility or Incommensurability in these lower things notwithstanding that there is one: as it is impossible that the edge of a Knife and the back should be alike strong.

Which considerations of this Metaphysical Hyle are not so trivial, nor are rather so weighty, that they may very well be thought worthy of Moses his distinctly taking notice of them in that squallid and horrid hew he sets out this Hyle or First Matter in, in the First Day's Creation, and for these reasons, his having made it part of the First Day's work. For it is such a truth as deserves a serious meditation; nor can it misbecome a Philosopher to speculate the First grounds of those effects for which all foreseeing Providence has so expressly fitted the generality of mankind, in furnishing them for the reception of such odd and cross occurrences with those high and histrional Passions of Laughter and Weeping. So plain is it that our making this Metaphysical Hyle to be signified by the void and formless Earth enveloped with waters and darkness, is a sound and unexceptionable Interpretation.

1. A new Supposition concerning Hyle, as if it were an actual material Substance, and how applicable Moses his description is thereunto. 2. How it can be referred to the First Day's Creation, of which an Unite is the character. 3. How it will be found to be the Interior Waters in the Philosophical sense. 4. What coagulated the Monadical confidence of this Physical Hyle into a capacity of becoming Ether or the Second Day's work. 5. That the supposition of this Physical Hyle is very passable, if of Monadical confidence; otherwise intolerable.

BUT if it will be an ease to any man's mind to have a more plump and perceptible Object couched under this name Hyle, the Text peradventure is not altogether uncapable of it. For suppose we should make this Hyle real and actual Matter, consisting of those perfect Parvitudes (which I have * elsewhere described) actually divided one from another, and equally charged with so much motion or thereabout as is now conferred in the World; the attributes of that Hyle described in Moses will agree very well thereto.

For first, it will be ἀξίωμα and * οὐσία a ground and seat for Forms: and being thus a Sustentacle or Foundation, be fitly represented by the term

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* Immortal. Book 1. ch. 6. also Preſ. leaſt, 3
* Plotin. Ennead. 6. lib. 1. c. 28.
term Earth. As also it will be such a Βάσις, or Profundity as the name Ἀβυσσος may well reflect upon, it being the deepest or lowest of the real Creation. Then for Vacuity and Emptiness, this Hyle is utterly empty of all sensible Forms (and we suppose it as yet not joynd with any Substantial ones) and is not so much as thin or thick to the touch, because not perceptible at all, and is truly that to μέλα ἀνυπόθενας ὅθαν which * Plato ventured at, it being indeed tangible in itself, but not so to the touch of man or Angel, by reason of the infinite subtlety of the consistency thereof. And must needs be therefore as a void Solitude and empty Space, a mere Vacuum as to the search of any created sense; which roving up and down could finde no consistitude any where but what these perfect Parvities have, which are so infinitely subtle that no Touch can perceive them, so that all will seeme as absolutely empty and void.

And thirdly, this void Solitude will be as dark as Pitch, insomuch that if the Sun were where it is now, and the rest of the Parvities were of this consistency of Matter I descrybe, it would be as black as Midnight, as I could easily demonstrate.

And lastly, for the Fluidity or Waterishness of it, it is infinitely more Water, that is to say, more fluid than Water itself; and if Thales his opinion had any truth in it, it must be found here. But * Aristoteles seems to make this the Philosophy of far ancienter Sages, Such, faith he, as made Oceanus and Tethys the fathers of Generation, Ἄριστος αὐτάρκης, (for so he speaks) and taught that Water, namely Styx, was the Oath of the Gods, Τίμωμαι τὸ ἀφετέρων, ὅρας ἄριστος ἀνάμειν Ὀσ. And certainly such a Water as this Hyle is which I have describ'd, which the Sun cannot so enlighten as to be seen through it, or any light from the Sun, must be a Stygian water indeed: and it is here observable that the Pythagoreans called the Monad Styx. So fitly does the nature of this Physical Hyle thus describ'd agree with those Attributes in Moses his Text.

2. But how will you beable, will you say, to make it fute with the character of the Day, namely with an Unite or Monad, and so carry things down into the Second Day's work so as you do in your Metaphysical Hyle, which you make the Waters under the Firmament, and that Firmament the vastly-extended matter, which is properly divisible, and therefore denoted by the Binary, and being framed into an Æthereal consistency is called Heaven, which environeth every Earth, as lying next to the Physical waters thereof, which are every where to be gathered together into one place, &c.

I must confess, that the nature of the Physical Matter being divisible, and the Binary so express a note thereof, and the Metaphysical is τὸ ἁλσιοῦ ἄνως, as * Plotinus has describ'd it, I could not withhold but conclude, That the Metaphysical Hyle belonged to the First day, and the Physical to the Second. Which is a very sober and safe Interpretation, as appears from what has been saied. But I shall hold on, and try how tolerable the other will prove.

I lay therefore, That this Physical Hyle, as I have describ'd it, is also ἐν τῷ ἁλσιοῦ ἄνως, in a very considerable sense. It is one and simple, that is to say, exactly uniform every where, and indivisible into any parts
parts that are of a different nature; whenas the Firmament in the Second Day is distinguishable into the First and Second Element. And then again, as to any fene it is as good as incorporeal, being only anent μεταφυσικον, as Plato has phrased it to our hands, and therefore may well be ranged amongst incorporeal Beings. But besides, it consisting of actual perfect Paritutes and of nothing else, which are so many Physical Monads, and utterly indivisible in themselves, as the incorporeal Beings created the First day are, but separable, as they likewise are, one from another; it may unforcibly be referred to the First day's work.

3. But now as touching the Waters under the Firmament: This Physical Hyle thus considered with all that ἐνασκία and fluid Undeterminezesse of the Possibility of corporeal Creatures which is necessarily inherent in it, will be fitly and expressly enough those inferior Waters. And the Firmament or Heaven, will be an Order of Being betwixt this Physical Hyle (wherein is comprized the above-said Possibility of things and Indeterminateness) and those Immaterial Beings that descend εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν, and are noted by the name of Superior Waters or Waters above the Firmament. For this thin Primordial Water consisting of mere Physical Monads was before the Firmament, and filled all. Out of this, and in order next above it, was the Heaven or Firmament, or, as the Greeks call it, Αἰθέρ; and next above this Αἰθέρ, and which was created before it, is that part of the World of Life that descends into generation. This is the Order of things; and it is easily intelligible, you will say, that the Αἰθέρ is a middle Term betwixt those two Extremes, the Physical Hyle and the World of Life.

4. But you will farther demand how this Primordial Water, this Hyle consisting of mere Physical Monads, should ever coagulate or cruddle into that consistency of the Αἰθέρ, which is made up of the globular particles and of that thinner Element, but both much groffer then the first consistency of the Matter. But to this I have nothing to answer, but that that which in the efformation of Animals coagulates the firft humid Matter there into such organized consistency of several degrees and uses, the same also coagulated this primordial consistency of the Matter of the World into such different degrees of crassitude as was fit to produce those two Elements of which the Αἰθέρ does confist: and that thou the World be a Machina, yet the Mechanick or Artificer is not Matter, but some other Principle in the World of Life.

Wherefore the Monadical consistency of the Matter being loft in the production of the Αἰθέρ, and it expressly falling also into two distinct principles, which Cartesius has judiciously taken notice of, the Creation of this Αἰθέρ or Heaven does naturally come under the character of the Binary, and is fittingly placed in the Second Day.

Nor is it needful to add, how all things will now go on orderly as before, and how this Αἰθέρ will environ the Physical or Sensible waters that cover the Earths, in which joynt the Literal and Philosophical Cabbala easily fall in together, as they do in the Fifth and Sixth Day's Creation. Nor does it belong to this place to consider, how after the Stygian Darknes of these Primordial Waters, the Matter being coagulated, as was above-said,
said, and set upon Vortical Motion, Light dawne out in infinite parts of the World, and the whole Heavens at last glistered bright with innumerable Suns or Stars, this speculation appertaining altogether to the Fourth Day’s Work.

5. In the interim, it is plain that this new Interpretation is very pasable: and though the Authority of Platonius and the Platonists bear strong toward the first, whose suffrages may justly seem the more considerable, they being of the succession in the Philosophick Cabbala; yet that venerable Father of the Church, St. Augustine, favours this second, and Plato himself calling Mater οὐσίον & μετά, seems to insinuate that it is more then Metaphysical: as also Plutarch his affirming that both Plato and Aristotle make the Mater σαλμονίον. But if this Physical Hyle be not conceived to have been of a Monadical confinence at first, this Interpretation which upon that Hypothefis is fo plausible, or rather unexceptionable, will without it be found intolerable. For this Hyle will then be necessarily devolved to the Binary, or else the Pythagorick Numbers will signify nothing at all. But admitting it to have been of such a confinence at first, all things will follow smoothly and easily, and either Exposition prove fit and rational to any indifferent judgment; but which to prefer I leave to the liberty of the perufier. And yet I cannot abftain from casting in thus much in the behalf of this latter, That Generation is out of that which is more liquid then what is generated; and that there is nothing more liquid then the Heavens, unless this Primordial Water of Monadical confinence, this ancient Styx, the folemn Oath of the Gods, as you heard out of Aristotle.

CHAP. X.

1. The Fourth Objection, taken from the preposterous placing the Suns in the Fourth Day and the Earths in the Third. 2. The Answers; First, That the inflexible Order of these Six mystical Numbers of the Creation was intended only as a Repository for memory and concealment, not for a book of accurately-digested Method. 3. Secondly, That the Method is not so reprehensible as it is pretended; the Earth rightly following the Aether (which is the Second day’s work) as the immediate effect thereof. 4. As does the garnifhing of the Earth also (as the first assured effect of the conjunction of the Active Principle with the Aether in the Second Day) but rightly precedes the Fourth day’s work, as the End or Object thereof. 5. That it was not needful, nor it may be possible, that one and the same series of Text should bear a threefold sense with the same exactness of order in things belonging to each of them.

The Fourth Objection is, That the Order of those things comprised in the Six days creation, according to the Philosophick Cabbala, is harsh and preposterous; the work of the Fourth day being more naturally to be placed in the Third, Suns being before Planets,
Planets, and Planets before there can be Earths to be garnished with Rivers, Plants and Flowers. And therefore according to the Priority of Nature the Creation of Sun and Planets should have been placed before the garnishing of the Earth with Sea, Rivers and Plants.

2. But I answer, That the Objection is made upon this mistake, as if the external Cortex of the Text of Moses in this order of the Six daies Creation were a Covering of limber silk, not a Cabinet made of hard Materials, and so figured and framed that every part cannot be alike capable of receiving of every thing into it. Wherefore the rule of placing things must be the Cabinet itself, not our desire or phancy that would place them. Just so the cafe stands in this mystical Repository made up of the six first Numbers, whose natures are immutable and inflexible, and their order not to be transposed or inverted. And therefore those noble Truths of Philosophy that are to be couched or concealed under them, are to be laid in such as are most significative of them, and in such order as the Numbers themselves stand. From whence it was necessary that the garnishing of the Earth should precede the adorning of the Universe with Sun and Planets; because the Number Three precedes the Number Four; and these were the fittest Numeral Boxes; as I may so speake, for the receiving those great Truths hid in the Third and Fourth day’s Creation into this mysterious Cabinet: which is only the Repository of memory and mystical concealment, not a Book of natural and accurately-digested Method; but yet not the less serviceable for the occasional imparting these Mysteries to them that were thought worthy of them: which could not be without fuller Converse, wherein all things would be orderly and methodically unfolded.

3. And this Answer I hold so substantial, that I account it superfluous to add any thing more, though I might also contend that the order of the things themselves is not so unnatural as is pretended. For the Second day’s work is the Aether or Heaven, which consists of the first and second Element of Des-Cartes, whose third Element, which yet is the effect of the first, is all that of which the Earths consist. In what a natural order therefore does the consideration of the Earth succeed that of the Firmament or Heaven as the effect thereof, and so take place in the Third Day? For though, by reason of some circumstance, as namely of the gathering together of the subtler part of the Aether by the recession of the Cortex into the form of a Sun, the Earth may be look’d upon as the Third from the Aether in order of production, and for this cause the Ternary be fitly called Teloγóνα in Pythagoras his School; yet it is also really an immediate product of that subtle principle in the Aether, and which is as much Aether as the other Principle therein. Wherefore the placing the Earth immediately after the Aether is, in this respect, according to natural Order, and may pass for tolerable Method.

4. The Garnishing also thereof with Land and Sea, Trees, Grasfs and Flowers, is the first assured effect of that Active Principle united with Matter, mentioned in the Second Day’s work. So that the Earth with its vegetative Garnishings does orderly enough succeed the Making of the Heaven or Aether, but needs not be laid to be created the Third day, be-
cause an Earth and Primary Planet being all one, it is comprised in the Creation of the Fourth. Wherefore the Earths with their furniture succeed the Second Day's creation as an Effect thereof, but precede the Fourth Day's Creation, as being an Objection of those things that are there left to be created. For the Sun, Moon and Stars are made to shine upon the Earth, and send down their influences thereon for the seasonable rectifications of the Seminal Powers of Plants and Herbs. So that the Earth seems to be the Finis Cui of the Creation of the Luminaries of Heaven as Luminaries, and therefore according to the Priority of Nature rightly enough precedes, whether as the Final Cause or Objection of their Influence: As both the Furniture of the Earths and the Luminaries of Heaven precede in order, as Objections of the Seniles of Man and other Animals that are said to be created on the Fifth and Sixth days:

And thus the Order of the whole six days Creation in the Philosophical Sense is natural enough and Logically coherent, though not everywhere under the notion of Causality, nor this Causality every where that of the Efficient.

5. And it had been a needless Miracle, and it may be impossible, to contrive one and the same Text to answer in accurate Order to the popular Appearances of things, to the severity of Philosophick Truth, and the Moral Allegory at once. With all which this Text of Moses is charged, & does to admiration make good the design as to all considerable intents & purposes: but an exact concatenation of the Series of things throughout is more than ought to be expected, no such Accuracy being industriously intended, but only that the Order of Numbers according to their Significance should be a Repertory of Notes and Remembrances, but the management of the Cabbala itself, (that is, of the ancient Philosophy of the Jews,) left to the skill of the Mystagogus, when he was consulted, who would not fail to declare all things in a due and natural Method.

CHAP. XI.

1. The Fifth Objection answered, concerning the pretended Trivialness of the Fifth Day's Work: 2. As also of the work of the Sixth day. 3. An Answer to the Sixth Objection, against that Theologia implied in our Interpretation of Paradise: First, in reference to Grammar and Criticism: 4. Secondly, in reference to the nature of things themselves. 5. An Answer to the Last Objection, made against the interpreting the Cherubim and Flaming Sword to be a state that Adam must pass through or into, before he can become immortal. 6. That there was a necessity of so punitively and continually setting a Philosophical Sense to Moses his Text, because of the Interruption of the Tradition of the Mosaic Philosophy.
AS for the pretended Trivialness of the Fifth and Sixth Day's work; I think it is apparent from what we have noted on the Fifth Day, that Moses his ranging of Fifth and Fowl together is a consideration not vulgar and trivial, but Philosophical. And his Distinctly allotting them a Morning and Evening, that is, an Active and Passive principle, is the pointing at a Truth very weighty, and useful for the giving a timely stop to that dangerous mistake of making mere Matter capable of sense and cogitation, which would be a great prejudice to the belief of the Existence of humane Souls themselves.

2. And for the Sixth day's work, there is yet less reason for such a Detraction. For, first, he is Philosophically judicious in reckoning Man amongst the Mediterranean Animals, because the conformation of their inward parts especially is nearer one another then either that of Birds or Fishes: And the external similitude of Mankind with Apes (whose species are many) is so near also, and goes off so by degrees to those that are more thoroughly Quadrapedal, that it is evident that men and they are held together naturally in one subordinate rank and Series. And then again, that is of very great moment, there being this nearness and affinity in outward and inward conformation of parts betwixt Men and Beasts, especially some kind of Apes, so distinctly and expressly to declare that Man notwithstanding is of a condition highly raised above them, and of a nature plainly Divine, being in respect of his Soul the Image and Likeness of God; and (which is remarkable) not less such for her actuating this Terrestrial body as God does the World: as is insinuated in the Cabbala itself, and is so weighty a Philosophical truth, that it is not fit for every man's consideration.

Nor is the mention of their multiplication, which refers to the contrivance of the genital Organs in all Creatures, both in the Fifth and Sixth day, as also of the provision of food, low and trivial, but noble speculations, and the grand pledges of a Divine Providence. So widely are they mistaken that think thus meanly of what is mentioned in the Fifth and Sixth day's Creation.

3. The Sixth Objection is against our going back in our Exposition of the eighth verse of the second Chapter, and fetching things higher then from the Efformation of Adam out of the ground, whenas, according to the order of the Narration, after Adam was made, God planted him a Garden to solace himself in, &c. But I answer, that I have done no violence to Grammar at all in this my Exposition that seems thus preposterous. For Pata bub himself reads it, Plantaverat autem Deus, &c. And I only adjoin, & pusserat ildic hominem quem formavit, for his & pusser quem formaveras: For the Preterimperfect, Preterperfect, and Preterplusperfect Tenses are expressed all alike in the Hebrew. And that I have in the Cabbala interferted possea [which afterward he formed into a terrestrial Animal] both the mention immediately preceding of that kind of Efformation and the propriety of the word "sin" warrants me to it. For this Terrestrial efformation of Adam was after the planting of Paradise, according to the wiser sort of them that understand the Text only literally,
rally, who acknowledge that Paradise was made on the Third Day, when God caused the Trees to germinate out of the Earth. And therefore it is not hard to take the same liberty in our Philippick Cabbala.

4. But now if we respect the things themselves, and the strict Philosophical tenor of them, the order of the Narration according to our Exposition is admirably natural and easy: this History of Paradise and Adam’s fall from that Happiness being immediately subjoined to the repetition of his Terrestrial Eformation, as containing the cause and reason why so noble a Creature as Man should ever appear in this Terrestrial body, whereby he is ranked among the Brutes. It infinuates therefore that it was not so at first with him, but that God had placed him in a more Heavenly condition, and that by the temptation of the Devil he fell from that state, and sinking by degrees was at last absorbed into Terrestrial generation, and was clad in the skins of Beasts.

And there are of the Jews that interpret this very Paradise of a state before the World was created, reckoning it amongst the seven things that were created before the World. From whence it does plainly follow, that if Adam was placed in this Paradise, he was before he appeared in an Earthly Body. Which is expressly the Opinion of the Jews, as appears from what * Menahch. Ben Israel cites out of Gemara Hagigah: In caelo Empyreo esse domicilia vitae, & pacis, & animarum juorum & Spirituum, atque etiam animarum istarum que in Mundum venture sunt. And out of Berechith Rabbah he faith, That the wise men of his Nation interpret that of the Psalm, Poft & ante me formasti, of the creating Adam, that is, mankind, first in the First day, and after in the Sixth.

Adam was therefore created amongst the Angelical Orders part of the First Day’s Creation, when God made Heaven or Light. All which Intellectual Orders of Beings then created are called Heaven and Light, because, as I have intimated * before, their first and immediate vestment or Vehicle is lucid or Ethereal, in which they stood Probationers. And it would be no les than a Demonstration that this was their first state, if after the discussion of the darknes of the Chaos, speaking Physically, all the World was either light or diaphanous, I mean either Suns or Ethers; as it would naturally be, if the Original of all Planets were the Incarnation of Stars or Suns. But this is an Excursion so wide or so wide, that I am awakened, as it were with a fright, out of this Reverie or Dream.

5. The seventh and last Objection is against our interpreting the Cherubim and flaming sword (in the clofe of our Cabbala) to be a State that Adam or Terrestrial Mankind is to enter into, before they can be reposified of the celestial Paradise and become capable of Eternal Life; whereas the Text seems to import that the Cherubim and flaming sword are not to let in, but to keep out Adam out of Paradise.

But to this I answer, That after God had driven Adam out of Eden to till the ground out of which the Terrestrial Adam is taken, or, if you will, was taken, according as was mentioned before, (for the Argument of the Narration was the Terrestrial Adam, what he had been and how he came to fall) after, I say, that Adam was turned out of Paradise, and that he became Terrestrial and Mortal, God (according to the Text)
Text) is only said to place Cherubims and a flaming sword to keep the way of the Tree of Life. Which does not imply an utter prohibition of all passage, but a condition thereof, namely, that there is no passage but through this Fiery Guard. And it is as proper for a Porter or Guard to let in as to keep out. So little incongruity is there in the sense we have given in that respect.

And that these Fiery flaming Cherubims are an Hieroglyphick of a certain State that the Terrestrial man must passe into, before he can come to the enjoyment of a blessed Immortality, this is no private conceit of mine, but has the suffrage of no less then Five several Interpreters on the place; namely, S. Ambrose, Origen, Laetantius, Basil, and Rupertus, as Cornelius à Lapide affirms: who lays, it is the joynt Opinion of them all, grounded upon this Text, to wit, That there is a Fire set before the entrance into Heaven, which all Souls must passe, S. Peter and S. Paul not excepted, that they may be tried and purged thereby, if there be any impurity in them. So warrantable is it to make these Fiery Cherubims an Emblem of some State or condition of the Soul, that must fit it for the tasting of the Fruit of the Tree of Immortality. But the phantazy of this to be the passing through an external flame or Fire, I must confesse I think has too much of the MusaphadEs and PaidageradEs in it to be admitted for the sense of the Philosophick Cabbala.

Wherefore I interpreted it of the Fiery or Ethereal Vehicle, or of the condition of the flaming Cherubims, namely, that we cannot attain to the state of Immortality before we passe into this order of Beings, and become like unto them.

Whereas therefore it is said that these flaming Cherubims keep the way to the Tree of Life, being placed before the Garden of Eden, it is but in such a sense as when Hesiod lays,

"That God has made Labour the porter of the Gate of Vertue; and in such as Virgil places Grief, and Care, and Sickness, and Old Age at the entrance of Orcus,"

Restibulum ante ipsum primisque in faucibus Orct

Lucret & ultrices posuere cabilia Care, &c.

Of which certainly there is no other sense in either place, then that by being laborious a man shall attain unto Vertue, and no otherwae; and that by being overcharged with Care, Grief, Sickness, or Old Age, a man shall be sent packing into the state of the dead. So Spencer, to omit several other instances in him, in making those two grave personages, Humilia and Ignaro, the one the Porter of the Houfe of Holinefs, the other of the Castle of Duesia, can understand nothing else thereby but this, That he that would enter into the Houte of Holinefs must be like Humilia, an humble man; and he that can conscientiously passe into the communialty of the impoffurous Duesia, must be a very Ignaro.

In like manner, the sense of the placing these flaming Cherubims before Paradise and the gate to the Tree of Life, is only that they may be for an Hieroglyphical Representation, to shew what a one a man must be, or what state or condition he must partake of or pass into, before he can arrive
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of the Philosophick Cabbala.

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rive to a bleffed Immortality; namely, that he muft recover his fiery Vehicle, be made Angelical, and enter as it were into the order and condition of the Celestial Angels. Which I think is fo ease and unexceptionable a fenfe, that nothing can be more.

Unlefs peradventure it may feem still easier, if we superadd also, That the being accomplished to these Chernick Orders is not without coniderable Colligation and Conflict, the Soul not being able to approach the Angelical nature in her inward advances but with pain and agonie. (Who shall dwell with devouring fire? Who shall dwell with everlasting burnings? He that walketh righteoufly, he shall dwell on high, &c.) Which Colligation, or, if you will, Digladiation, may be represented by the flaming sword turning every way: As if the meaning were, That he that would recover the capacity of eating of the fruit of the Tree of Life, must first undergo the combat with the fiery Angelical nature, through which name he is to pass before he can come to be made partaker of life and immortality. For that external Things and Persons are the Symbols and Hieroglyphicks of internal Difpensations in Holy Scripture, is fo trite and obvious, that I need not take notice thereof.

6. I have by this time, I hope, made all smooth and plain in my Philosophical Cabbala, and taken away every imaginable scruple concerning the fitness and concinnity of things and cleanliness of those grounds I goe on, and have so expressly and articulately in every punctilio fitted a Philosophical fenfe to the Letter of the Text, that I muft confess I do not hold it probable that either Pythagoras or any one else had so particular and minute an account of the Cabbala thereof from any Jewish Priest or Prophet, supposing they had any at all; as my self have given. Not that I am so vain as to imagine with my self, that I have a certain knowledge of the meaning of the Mosiaical Text in this Philosophical way then they had; but because it was not needless for them to insist upon so curiously setting a fenfe to every clause thereof as I have done: they being able to persuade their inquisitive Myths upon the faith of a continued Tradition, that this or that was the Philosophical meaning of Moses; whenas this Tradition being interrupted so many Ages, I was necessitated to find a rational account or meaning of every thing, left the probability of truth should be doubted in all.

Which if any one think too great a curiosity, as it may be it is, (and yet why should a man conceit he has found any thing fit that was not intended by that Wisdom that prevents all thoughts?) he may content himself with those more plain and general strokes of the Cabbala, not expecting to find every passage of the Text concerned in such a Philosophical senfe: For thus the whole Contexture will be as an Apple of Gold with pictures of Silver, as I have already noted out of Maimonides. But if I have fitted a Philosophical senfe to every clause with that unexceptionableness that he can hardly refrain his affent, I hope he has no cause to complain that the Cabbalist has put into his hand a Ball of pure and continued Gold.

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CHAP. XII.

1. The Cabbalist's Apologie whereby he would clear himself of the imputa-
tion of either trifling Curiosity, 2. Rashness in divulging such hidden
Mysteries, 3. Or of Inconstancy in judgment. 4. The main Aime
of his Philosophick Cabbala. 5. The reason of placing it before the
Moral.

1. Thus much in Defence of my Philosophick Cabbala. It will not be
unseasonable to subjoin something by way of Apology for the
Cabbalist: For I find my self liable to no leffe then three several
imputations, viz., of trifling Curiosity, of Rashness, and of Inconstancy of
Judgement.

And as for the first, I know that men that are more severely Philo-
sophical and rational will condemn me of too much curious pains in applying
Natural and Metaphysical Truths to an uncertain and lubricous Text or
Letter; whenas they are better known and more fitly conveyed by
their proper proof and arguments, then by fancying they are aimed at in
such obscure and Anigmatical Writings.

But I answer, There is that fit and full congruity of the Cabbala with
the Text, besides the backing of it with advantages from the History of
the first rite of the Pythagorical or Platonical Philosophy, that it ought
not to be deemed a fancie, but a very high probability. That there is such
a Cabbala as this belonging to the Mofaical Letter: especially if you call
but to minde how luckily the nature of Numbers sets off the work of every
day, according to the senfe of the Cabbala,

And then again, for mine own part, I account no pains either curious
or tedious that tend to a common good; and I conceive no smaller a part
of mankinde concerned in my labours then the whole Nation of the
Jews and Christendome; to say nothing of the ingenious Persian, nor to
despair of the Turk, though he be for the present no friend to Allegories.

Wherefore we have not placed our pains inconsiderately, having re-
commended so weighty and useful Truths in so religious a manner to so
great a part of the world,

2. But for the imputation of Rashness, in making it my businesse to
divulge those secrets or mysteries that Moses had so sedulously covered in
his obscure Text; I say, it is the privilege of Christianity, the times now
more then ever requiring it, to pull off the veil from Moses his face: And
that though they be grand Truths that I have discovered, yet they are as
useful as sublime, and cannot but highly gratifie every good and holy man
that can competently judge of them.

3. Lastly, for Inconstancy of Judgement, which men may suspect me
of, having heretofore declared the Scripture does not teach men Philo-
sophy; I say, the change of a mans judgement for the better is no part of
Inconstancy, but a Vertue, nay part of that Vertue which is Constancy,
it being the constant purpose of a good man to embrace that which is best
and truest; whenas to persist in what we find false is nothing but per-
verinesse
verfneffe and pride. And it will prove no small argument for the truth of this present Cabbala, in that the evidence thereof has fetch'd me out of my former opinion wherein I seemed engaged.

But to say the truth, I am not at all inconsistent with myself; for I am still of opinion, That the Letter of the Scripture teaches not any precept of Philosophy concerning which there can be any controversy amongst men. And when you venture beyond the Literal Sense, you are not taught by the Scripture; but what you have learned some other way, you apply thereto. And they ought to be no trash, nor trivial Notions, nor confusible by Reason or more solid Principles of Philosophy, that a man should dare to cast upon so sacred a Text; but such as one is well assured will bear the stricteft examination, and that lead to the more full knowledge of God, and do more clearly fit the Phenomena of Nature and external Providence to his most precious Attributes, and tend to the furthering of the holy Life, which I do again profess is the sole end of the Scripture. And he that ventures beyond the Letter without that guide will soon be bewilder'd, and lose himself in his own fancies.

4. Wherefore if this Philosophick Cabbala of mine, amongst those many other advantages I have recited, had not this also added unto it, the aim of advancing the divine Life in the world, I should look upon it as both false and unprofitable, and should have rested satisfied with the Moral Cabbala. For the divine Life is above all Natural and Metaphysical knowledge whatsoever. And that man is a perfect man that is truly righteous and prudent, whom I know I cannot but gratifie with my Moral Cabbala that follows. But if any more zealous pretender to prudence and righteousness, wanting either leisure or ability to examine my Philosophick Cabbala to the bottome, shall notwithstanding either condemn it or admire it; he has unbecomingly and indiscriminately ventured out of his own sphere, and I cannot acquit him of Injustice or Folly.

5. Nor did I place my Cabbala's in this order out of more affection and esteem of Philosophy than of true holiness, but have ranked them thus according to the order of Nature: the holy and divine Life being not at all, or else being easily lost in man, if it be not produced and conserv'd by a radicated acknowledgement of those grand Truths in the Philosophick Cabbala, viz. The existence of the Eternal God, and a certain expectation of more consummate happiness upon the dissolution of this mortal Body. For to pretend to Vertue and Holiness without reference to God and a life to come, is but to fall into an more dull and flat kind of Stoicism, or to be content to feed our Cattel on this side of Jordan, in a more discreet and religious way of Epicurifm, or at least of degenerate Familism.
THE DEFENCE OF The Moral Cabbala.

CHAP. I.

What is meant by Moral, explained out of Philo. 3. That the Light in the First day improved to the height, is Adam; in the Sixth, Christ, according to the Spirit. 4. In what sense we our selves may be said to doe what God does in us. 5. Why דָּבְעַל and יָדְבֵּךְ are rendered Ignorance and Inquiry. 18. Plato's οὗ ἄλνυσία ἐν διάφοροις καὶ διαφόροις. The Pythagoreans ἐπικάρων σειροὶ applied to the Fourth day's progress. 22. That Virtue is not an extirpation, but regulation, of the Passions, according to the mind of the Pythagoreans. 24. Plotinus οὗ ἐπίκαρων οἰκονομεῖς applied to the Sixth day's progress. 26. What the Image of God is, plainly set down out of S. Paul and Plato. The divine Principle in us, ὅ ἄλνυσιν ἀνθεγέναι, out of Plotinus. 28. The distinction of the Heavenly and Earthly Man, out of Philo. 31. The Imposition of still and fixed Melancholy, and that it is not the true divine Rest and precious Sabbath of the Soul. A compendious rehearsal of the whole Allegory of the Six days Creation.

E are now come to the Moral Cabbala, which I do not call Moral in that low sense the generality of men understand Morality: For the process and growth, as likewise the failing and decay, of the divine Life, is very intelligibly set forth in this present Cabbala. But I call it Moral, in counter-distinction to Philosophical or Physical; as Philo also uses this terme Moral in divine matters. As when he speaks of God's breathing into Adam the breath of Life, εἰς τὸ ἄνευς, faith he, εὔπορος φυσώς ἢ τῶν, God breathes into Adam's face Physically and Morally: Physically, by placing there the Senfes, viz., in the Head; Morally, by inspiring his Intellec with divine knowledge, which is the highest Faculty of the Soul, as the Head is the chief part of the Body. Wherefore by Morality, I understand here divine Morality, such as is engendred in the Soul by
by the operations of the holy Spirit, that inward living Principle of all godliness and honesty. I shall be the more brief in the Defence of this Cabbala, it being of it self so plain and sensible to any that has the experience of the life I describe; but to them that have it not, nothing will make it plain or any thing at all probable.

Ver. 1. A Microcosm or little World. Nothing is more ordinary or trivial, then to compare Man to the Universe, and make him a little compendious World of himself. Wherefore it was not hard to premise that which may be so easily understood. And the Apostle supposes it, when he applies the Creation of Light here in this Chapter to the illumination of the Soul, as you shall hear hereafter.

Ver. 2. But that which is Animal or Natural operates first. According to that of the Apostle, That which is Spiritual is not first, but that which is Animal or Natural, afterward that which is Spiritual. The first Man is of the Earth, earthly; the second Man is the Lord from Heaven. But what this earthly condition is, is very lively set out by Moses in this first day's work. For here we have Earth, Water, and Wind, or one tumultuous dark Chaos and confusion of dirt and water, blown on heaps and waves; an unquiet night-storm, an unruly black tempest.

And it is observable, that it is not here said of this deformed Globe, Let there be Earth; Let there be Water; Let there be Wind: but all this is the ζευσαριωτυς, The subject matter, a thing made already, viz. The rude Soul of Man in this disorder that is described; fad Melancholy like the drownd Earth lies at the bottome, whence Care, and Grief, and Discontent, torturous Suspicion, and horrid Fear, are washed up by the unquiet warry Deire, or irregular suggestions of the Concupiscible, wherein most eminently is feated base Lust and Sensuality; and above thefe is boisterous Wrath, and frowning Revengefullnes, fool-hardy Confidence, and indefatigable Contention about vain objects. In short, whatever Passion and Diftemper is in fallen Man, it may be referred to thefe Elements. But God leaves not his creature in this evil condition; but that all this disorder may be difcovered, and fo quelled in us, and avoided by us, he faith, Let there be Light, as you read in the following verse.

Ver. 3. The day-light appears. To this alludes S. Paul, when he says, God who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, shine in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ. Where the Apostle seems to me to have struck through the whole Six days of this Spiritual Creation at once. The highest manifestation of that Light created in the First day being the face of Jesus Christ, the Heavenly Adam, fully compleated in the Sixth day. Wherefore when it is said, Let there be Light, that Light is understood that enlightens every man that comes into the world, which is the divine Intellect as it is communicable to humane Souls. And the First day is the first appearance thereof, as yet weaker and too much disjoynd from our affections; but at last it amounts to the true and plain Image and Character of the Lord from Heaven, Christ according to the Spirit.

Ver. 4. And God hath framed the Nature of Man so, that he cannot but say, &c. God working in second causes, there is nothing more ordinary then
then to ascribe that to him that is done by men, even then when the actions seem less compatible to the Nature of God. Wherefore it cannot seem harsh, if in this Moral Cabbala we admit that man does that by the power of God working in the Soul, that the Text says God does; as the approving of the Light as good, and the distinguishing between Light and Darkness, and the like; which things in the Mystical sense are compatible both to God and Man. And we speaking, in a Moral or Mystical sense, of God acting in us, the nature of the thing requires that what he is said to do there, we should be understood also to do the same through his assistance.

For the Soul of man is not merely passive as a piece of wood or stone, but is forthwith made active by being acted upon: and therefore if God in us rules, we rule with him; if he contend against sin in us, we also contend together with him against the same; if he see in us what is good or evil, we, ipso facto, see by him; In his light we see light: and so in the rest. Wherefore the supposition is very easy in this Moral Cabbala, to take the liberty, where either the sense or more compendious expression requires it, to attribute that to man, though not to man alone, which God alone does, when we recur to the Literal meaning of the Text. And this is but consonant to the Apostle, I live, and yet not I. For if the life of God or Christ was in him, surely he did live, or else what did that life there? Only he did not proudly attribute that life to himself, as his own, but acknowledged it to be from God.

Ver. 5. As betwixt the Natural Day and Night. It is very frequent with the Apostles to set out by Day and Night the Spiritual and Natural condition of man. As in such phrases as these; The night is far spent, the day is at hand: Walk as children of the Light. And elsewhere, Let us who are of the day; and in the same place, You are all the sons of light, and sons of the day. We are not of the night, nor of darkness. But this is too obvious to insist upon.

And thus Ignorance and Inquiry. The Soul of man is never quiet, but in perpetual search till she has found out her own Happiness, which is the Heavenly Adam, Christ, the Image of God, into which Image and likeness when we are thoroughly awakened, we are fully satisfied therewith; till then we are in Ignorance & Confusion, as the Hebrew word יִדְעָה does fitly signify. This Ignorance, Confusion and Dis-satisfaction puts us upon seeking, according to that measure of the Morning light that hath already visited us. And דּוֹרִים is from דָּוִים to seek, to consider, and inquire. This is the Generation of those that seek thy face, O Jacob, that is, the face of Jesus Christ, the result of the Sixth day's work, as I have intimated before.

Ver. 6. Of savoury and affectionate discernment. Wherefore he will not allent to Solomon's whore, who says, Stolen water is sweet; but will rather use the words of the Samaritane woman to Christ, when he had told her of those waters of the Spirit, though she did not so perfectly reach his meaning, Sir, give me this water, that I thirst not, neither come hither to draw. For who would seek to satisfy himself with the toilsome pleasures of the world, when he may quench his desire with the delicious draughts of that true, and yet easie-flowing, Nectar of the Spirit of God?


Chap. I.

The Defence of the Moral Cabbala.

Vers. 10. To compare to the Earth. Origen compares this condition to the Earth for fruitfulness; but I thought it not impertinent to take notice of the steadiness of the Earth also. But the condition of the ungodly is like the raging waves of the Sea; or, as the Prophet speaks, The wicked are as the troubled Sea that cannot rest, whose waters cast up mire and dirt.

Vers. 11. He is a fruitful field. This Interpretation is Origen's, as I intimated before.

Vers. 14. According to the difference of these lights. What this difference is, you will understand out of the sixteenth and eighteenth verses.

Vers. 18. To this one single, but vigorous and effectual, Light. For indeed, a true and sincere fenfe of this one comprehends all. For all the Law is fulfilled in one word; to wit, in this, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and all thy soul, and thy neighbour as thy self; and, to doe so to others as we our selves would be done to. Wherefore for men to make nothing of this Royal Law of Christ, and yet to pretend to be more accurate Indagators into matters of Religion, and more affectionate Lovers of Piety then ordinary, is either to be abominably hypocritical, or grossly ignorant in the most precious and necessary parts of Christianity; and they walk by Star-light and Moon-light, not under the clear and warm enlivening rays of the Sun of Righteousness.

It is an excellent saying of Plato's in an Epistle of his to Dionysius, To ἀληθείας εὐ θρακίη λέγεω, That Truth lies in a little room; and assuredly that which is best and most precious does, whenas the folly of every man notwithstanding so mis-guides him, that his toil and study is but to adorn himself after the mode of the most ridiculous fellow in all the Graecian Army, Thersites, of whom the Poet gives this testimony, that he was ἀγώνοις τε πολέμου τε εἷδοι,

That he had a rabble of disordered Notions and fruitless Observations, but that neither he nor any body else could make either head or foot of them; nor himself became either more wise or more honest by having them.

That Precept of the Pythagoreans, ἀπλωσαν σωφρόν, Simplifie your self, Reduce your self to One, how wise, how holy, how true is it? What a sure foundation is it of life, liberty, and easie lasciviousness in things belonging to Virtue, Religion, and Justice? I think no man is born naturally so stupid, but that if he will keep close to this single Light of divine Love, in due time, nay, in a short time, he will be no more to seek what is to be done in the carriage of his life to God or man, then an unblemished Eye will be at a loss to distinguish colours. But if he forfake this one Light, he will necessarily be benighted, and his minde distracted with a multitude of needless and uncomfortable strupulosities, and faint and ineffectual Notions, and every body will be ready to take him up for a night-wanderer, and to chaffifie him for being out of his way; and after, it may be, as friendly offer himself a guide to another path that will prove as little to the purpose, unless he bring him into this Via Regia or Νόμος, as Saint James call it, this Royal Law of the sincere Love of God and a mans neighbour.

Vers. 20. That is, that the Concupiscible in man. That the Waters are
an Emblem of this Concupiscible, Venus her being born of the Sea does intimate; which were not so much to the purpose, did not Natural Philosophy and Experience certify that Concupiscence is lodged in moisture. Whence is that of Heraclitus, "Eγνὲς τὰ νῦν τοῖς ἔννοιας (in Porphyrius his De antro Nympharum) i.e. Anima fœca apientissima. And without all question the inordinate use of the Concupiscible does mightily befet the Soul, and makes her very incapable of divine Sense and Knowledge. And yet to endeavour after an utter insensiblity of the pleasures of the body, is as groundless and unwarrantable. But concerning this I shall speak more fully on the 22, and 31 verses of this Chapter.

Ver. 21. Winged Ejaculations. Whether Mental or Vocal, they are not unfitly refembled to Fowls, according to that of Homer,

-κεκεφώστα θηγομένως.

And if Vocal words have wings, the inward Desires of the Soul may well be said to have wings also, they being the words of the Mind, as the other are of the Mouth, and fly further for the most part, and get sooner to Heaven then the other.

Note also, that Origen likewise makes a difference here betwixt the Fifth and the Fowl, and makes the Fowl to be good cogitations, the Fifth evil. But I account them rather both indifferent, and to be regulated, not extirpated, by the Mystical Adam, Christ, the Image of God in Man. And these strong Heats and Ejaculations are the effects of Melancholy, wherein the divine Principle in man, when it actuates it, works very fiercely and sharply, and is a great waster of the delightful moisture of the Concupiscible, and weakens much the pleasures of the Body, to the great advantage of the Mind, if it be done with discretion and due moderation; otherwise if this passion be over-much indulged to, it may lead to Hecticks, Phrenses and Distractions.

The contrivance of the Text mentioning only such Fowls as frequent the waters, naturally points to this sense we have given it; but it our imagination strike out further to other winged creatures, as the Fowls of the Mountains; and sundry sorts of Birds, they may also have their proper meanings, and are a part of those Animal Figurations that are to be subdued and regulated by the Mystical Adam, the Spirit of Christ in us.

Ver. 22. Might have something to order. But if you take away all the Passions from the Soul, the Minde of man will be as a General without an Army, or an Army without an Enemy. The Pythagoreans define Righteousness, ἀριθμὸς τῶν τῶν μὴν ἔννοιάς, The peace of the whole Soul, the parts thereof being in good tune or harmony; according to that other Definition of theirs, describing Righteousness to be ἀριθμὸς τῶν ἀλογομένων ἔννοιας. That it is the Harmony or Agreement of the Irrational parts of the Soul with the Rational. But quite to take away all the Passions of the Minde, in stead of composing them to the right rule of Reason and the divine Light, is as if a man should cut away all the strings of an Instrument, in stead of tuning it.

Ver. 24. And makes the Traceable fruitful. Religious devotions helped on by Melancholy dry the Body very much, and heat it, and make it very
very subject to wrath: which, if it be placed upon holy matters, men call Zeal; but if it be inordinate and hypocritical, the Apostle will teach us to call it bitter zeal. This more fierce and fiery affection in man is Plutinus is of the nature in us, which if Adam keep in subjection, there is no hurt in it, but good. And it is evident in the Gospel, that our Saviour Christ was one while deeply impassioned with Sorrow, another while very strongly carried away with Zeal and Anger, as you may observe in the stories of his raising up Lazarus, and whipping the Money-changers out of the Temple. And this is no Imperfection, but rather a Perfection; the divine Life, when it has reached the Passions and Body of a man, becoming thereby more palpable, full, and sensible. But all the danger is of being impotently passioned, and when the Body is carried away by its own distemper, or by the hypocrisy of the Mind, notwithstanding to imagine or pretend that it is the Impulse of the divine Spirit. This is too frequent a mistake God knows, but such as was impossible to happen in our Saviour; and therefore the Passions of his Mind were rather Perfections then Imperfections, as they are to all them that are close and sincere followers of him, especially when they have reach'd the Sixth day's progress.

Ver. 26. By the name of his own Image. What this Image of God is, Plato, who was acquainted with these Mosaical Writings, as the holy Fathers of the Church so generally have told us, plainly express'd in these words, ὁμιλεῖς ζῷον δὲ καὶ νομίμων ἐλεήμονας μὴ φερόντος, To be like unto God, is to be Jus ional, Holy, and Wise. Like that of the Apostle to the Colossians, and put upon the new Man, which is renewed in Knowledge, after the Image of him that created him: and that more full passage in the fourth of the Ephesians, And that ye put on the new Man, which after God is created in Righteousness and true Holiness. There are all the three members of that divine Image, Knowledge, Righteousness and Holiness, which are mentioned in that foregoing description of Plato's, as if Plato had been pre-instructed by men of the same Spirit with the Apostle.

The true and perfect Man. Plutinus calls that divine Principle in us ἡ ἀληθινὸς ἀληθινοποιοσ, the true Man. There is the brutish nature, the νομίμων ἐλεήμονας ἀληθινοποιον, as I said before.

But has full power. Wherefore if this Definition of the Image or Likeness of God which Plato has made does not involve this Power in it, the word νομίμων, according to the Description of Justice by the Pythagoreans above recited, (which implies that the rational and divine part of the soul has the Passions at its command) I should add to it ἀληθινοποιον this one word more, καὶ τρίτων ἐλεήμονας, that the Description may run thus, To be like unto God, is to be Holy and Just, together with Wisdome and Power. But I rather think that this Power is comprehended in Holiness and Justice: For unless we have arrived to that Power as to be able constantly to act according to these Virtues, we are rather well-willers to Holiness and Righteousness, then properly and formally righteous and holy.

Ver. 27. In his little World. They are the words of * Philo, βράχον μὴ καταστροφον, μέγαν δὲ καταστροφον καὶ κρίσιν τῷ Ἀνθρώπῳ, That Man is a little
The Defence of the Moral Cabbala.  C H A P.  I.

a little World, and that the World is one great Man; which Analogy is supposed, as I said at first, in the Moral Cabbala of this present Chapter, and Origen upon this Chapter calls Man Minorem Mundum, a Microcosm.

Vers. 28. The Heavenly Adam, Christ. Philo makes mention of the Heavenly and Earthly man, in these words: &μεν άνθρωπον τόν ονόματι Άνθρωπος, 6 περ 6μ, 6γινομεν άνθρωπος. Man is of two sorts, the one Heavenly, the other Earthly. And S. Paul calls Christ the Heavenly Adam, and Philo's Heavenly Adam is ναί ἐναρξας Χριστός, Created after the Image of God, as Saint Paul in the forecited places to the Colossians and Ephesians also speaks concerning Christ.

Vers. 29. The Heavenly Adam to feed upon, fulfilling the Will of God. As Christ professes of himself, It is my meat and drink to doe the will of him that sent me.

Vers. 30. Nor is the Animal Life quite to be starved. For a good man is mercifull to his beast. See Origen upon the place.

Vers. 31. Approves all things which God hath created in us to be very good. Not only the divine Principle, but also the Fibles, Beasts, and Birds. Vult enim Deus ut insignis ipsis Dei factura, Homo, non folum immaculatus sit ab his sed et dominetur his: For it is the Will of God, faith Origen, not only that we should be free from any soil of these, (which would be more certainly effected if we were utterly rid of them, and they quite extirpated out of our nature) but that we should rule over them, without being anything at all blemished or disposed by them. And for mine own part, I do not understand how that the King of Heaven which is to be within us can be any Kingdom at all, if there be no Subjects at all there to be ruled over and to obey. Wherefore the Passions of the Body are not to be quite extinguished, but regulated, that there may be the greater plenitude of life in the whole man.

And those that endeavour after still, so silent & demure a condition of Mind, that they would have the sense of nothing there but peace and rest, striving to make their whole nature desolate of all Animal Figurations whatsoever, what do they effect but a clear Day shining upon a barren Heath, that feeds neither Cow nor Horse: neither Sheep nor Shepherd is to be seen there, but only a waw silent Solitude, and one uniform pareaedness and vacuity. And yet while a man fancies himself thus wholly divine, he is not aware how he is even then held down by his Animal Nature, and that it is nothing but the stillesse and fixedness of Melancholy that thus abuseth him, and in stead of the true Divine Principle, would take the Government to it self, and in this usurped tyranny cruelly destroy all the rest of the Animal Figurations: But the true Divine Life would destroy nothing that is in Nature, but only regulate things, and order them for the more full and sincere enjoyments of man; reproaching nothing but sinfulness and enormity, entitulign Sanguine and Choler to as much Vertue and Religion as either Phlegme or Melancholy. For the Divine Life as it is to take into it self the humane nature in general, so it is not abhorrent from any of the complexions thereof. But the squabbles in the world are ordinarily not about true Piety and Vertue, but which of the Complexions or what Humour shall ascend
ascend the Throne, and sit there in stead of Christ himself. But I will not expatiate too much upon one Theme; I shall rather take a short view of the whole Allegory of the Chapter.

In the First day there is Earth, Water and Wind, over which, and through which, there is nothing but disconsolate darkness and tumultuous agitation; the Winds ruffling up the Waters into mighty waves, the waves washing up the mire and dirt into the Water; all becoming but a rude heap of confusion and defolation. This is the State of the vis coxis, or Earthly Adam, as Philo calls him, till God command the Light to shine out of Darkness, offering him a guide to a better condition.

In the Second day is the Firmament created, dividing the upper and the lower Waters, that it may feel the strong impulses or taste the different relishes of either. Thus is the Will of man touch'd from above and beneath, and this is the day wherein is set before him Life and Death, Good and Evil, and he may put out his hand and take his choice.

In the Third day is the Earth uncovered of the Waters, for the planting of fruit-bearing trees, by their fruits you shall know them, faith our Saviour, that is, by their works.

In the Fourth day there appears a more full accession of Divine Light, and the Sun of Righteousness warms the Soul with a sincere love both of God and man.

In the Fifth day, that this light of Righteousness and bright Eye of divine Reason may not brandish its rays in the empty field, where there is nothing either to subdue or guide and order, God sends out whole fholes of Fishes in the Waters, and numerous flights of Fowls in the Air, besides part of the Sixth day's work, wherein all kind of beasts are created.

In these are deciphered the sundry Suggestions and Cogitations of the Mind, sprung from these lower Elements of the Humane nature, viz. Earth and Water, Flesh and Blood; all these man beholds in the Light of the Sun of Righteousness, discovers what they are, knows what to call them, can rule over them, and is not wrought to be over-ruled by them. This is Adam, the Master-piece of God's Creation, and Lord of all the creatures, framed after the Image of God, Christ according to the Spirit, under whose feet is subdued the whole Animal Life, with its sundry Motions, Forms and Shapes. He will call every thing by its proper name, and set every creature in its proper place; The vile person shall be no longer called liberal, nor the churl bountiful. Wo be unto them that call evil good, and good evil, that call the light darkness, and the darkness light. He will not call bitter Passion, holy Zeal; nor plausible meretricious Courtesie, Friendship, nor a false soft abhorrence from punishing the ill-defering, Pity; nor Cruelty, Justice; nor Revenge, Magnanimity; nor Unfaithfulness, Policy; nor Verbofity, either Wilderne or Piety. But I have run my self into the second Chapter before I am aware.

In this first, Adam is said only to have dominion over all the living creatures, and to feed upon the fruit of the Plants. And what is Pride but a mighty Mountainous Whale; Lust, a Goat; the Lion, Eagle and Bear, wilful dominion; Craft, a Fox; and worldly toil, an Oxe? Over these and a thousand more is the rule of Man, I mean of Adam, the Image of God.
But his meat and drink is to doe the will of his Maker; this is the fruit he feeds upon.

Behold therefore, O Man, what thou art, and wherunto thou art called, even to be a mighty Prince amongst the creatures of God, and to bear rule in that Province he has assigned thee, to discern the Motions of thine own heart, and to be Lord over the suggestions of thine own natural spirit; Not to listen to the counsels of the flesh, nor conspire with the Serpent against thy Creator; but to keep thy heart free and faithful to thy God: So maist thou with innocency and unblameable nerves see all the Motions of Life, and bear rule with God over the whole Creation committed to thee. This shall be thy Paradise and harmless sport on Earth, till God shall transplant thee to an higher condition of Happiness in Heaven.

C H A P. II.

The full sense of that *Aνελθα that keeps men from entering into the true Sabbath. 4. The great necessity of distinguishing the innocent motions of Nature from the suggestions of Sin. 5. That the growth of a true Christian indeed doth not adequately depend upon the lips of the Priest. 7. The meaning of This is he that comes by Water and Blood. 8. The meaning of Repent, for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand. The Seventh thousand years, the great Sabbath of the Church of God. That there will be then frequent converse betwixt Men and Angels. 9. The Tree of Life, how fitly in the Mystical sense said to be in the midst of the Garden. 17. A twofold death contracted by Adam’s disobedience. The Masculine and Feminine Faculties in Man what they are. Actuating a Body an Essential operation of the Soul; and the reason of that joyful appearance of Eve to the Humane Nature.

To the Fifth verse there is nothing but a recapitulation of what went before in the first Chapter; and therefore wants no further proof than what has already been alleged out of S. Paul and Origen and other Writers. Only there is mention of a Sabbath in the Second verse of this Chapter, of which there were no words before. And this is that Sabbath or Rest, that the Author to the Hebrews exhorts them to strive to enter into through faith and obedience. For those that were faint-hearted, and unbelieving, and pretended that the children of Anak, the offspring of the Giants, would be too hard for them; they could not enter into the promised Land wherein they were to set up their rest, under the conduct of Joshua, a Type of Jesus. And the same Author in the same place makes mention of this very Sabbath that ensured the accomplishment of the Creation, concluding thus; There remaineth therefore a Sabbathism or Rest to the people of God: For he that has entered into his Rest, he also has ceased from his own works, as God did from his. Let us labour therefore to enter into that Rest, lest any man fall after that example

Hebr. 4.
example of disobedience and unbelief. For the Greek word ἀντιτροπή may well include both Senfes, viz. Disobedience, or the not doing the Will of God, according to that measure of Power and Knowledge he has already given us; and unbelief, that the divine Life and Spirit in us is not able to subdue the whole Creation of the little World under us, that is, all the Animal Motions and Figurations, be they Lions, Bears, Goats, Whales, be they what they will be, as well as to cast out the children of Anak before the Israelites, as it is in that other Type of Christ, and of his Kingdom in the Souls of Men.

Ver. 4. The Generations of the Animal Life when God created them. For these are as truly the works of God as the Divine Life itself, though they are nothing comparable unto it. Nay, indeed, they are but an heap of confusion without it. Wherefore the great accomplishmment is to have these in due order and subjection unto the Spirit or Heavenly Life in us, which is Christ: and that you may have a more particular apprehension of these generations of the Animal Life, I shall give you a Catalogue of some of them, though confusedly, so as they come first to my memory.

Such therefore are Anger, Zeal, Indignation, Sorrow, Derision, Mirth, Gravity, Open-heartedness, Reservedness, Stoutness, Flexibility, Boldness, Fearfulness, Mildness, Tartness, Candour, Suspicion, Peremptoriness, Despondency, Triumph or Gloriation: All the Propensions to the exercise of Strength, or activity of Body; as Running, Leaping, Swimming, Wrestling, Fussing, Coursing, or the like: Besides all the Courtly Preambles, necessary Concomitants, and delightful Consequences of Marriage, which spring up from the Love of Women and the Pleasure of Children. To say nothing of those Enjoyments that arise from correspondent affections and mere natural friendship betwixt man and man, or fuller companies of acquaintance; their Friendly Feastings, Sports, Musick and Dancings. All these, and many more that I am not at leisure to reckon up, be but the genuine pullulations of the Animal Life, and in themselves they have neither good nor hurt in them. Nay, indeed, to speak more truly and impartially, they are good, according to the Approbation of him that made them; but they become bad only to them that are bad, and act either without measure, or for unwarrantable ends, or with undue circumstances; otherwise they are very good in their kind, they being regulated and moderated by the divine Principle in us.

And I think it is of great moment for men to take notice of this Truth for these three reasons: First, because the bounds of Sin, and of the innocent Motions of Nature, being not plainly and aptly set out and defined, men counting the several Animal Figurations and natural Motions for Sins, they heap to themselves such a task, to wit, the quite extirpating that which it were neither good, nor it may be possible, utterly to extirpate, that they seem in truth hereby to infinate that it is impossible to enter into that Rest or Sabbath of the people of God. Wherefore promiscuously sheltering themselves under this confused cloud of sins and infirmities, where they aggravate all, so as if every thing were in the same measure sinful; if they be but zealous and punctual in some,
they account it passing well, and an high testimony of their sanctimony. And their hypocrisie will be sure to pitch upon that which is leaft of all to the purpose; that is, a man will spend his zeal in the behalf of some natural Temper he himfelf is of, and againft the opposite Complexion. But for the indifpenfable dictates of the divine Light, he will be sure to neglect them, as being more hard to perform, though of more concernment both for himfelf and the common good. But if it were more plainly defined what is Sin, and what is not Sin, a man might with more heart and courage fight againft his enemy, he appearing not fo numerous and formidable; and he would have the leflle opportunity for perverse excuses and hypocritical terrors and feverations.

The second reafon is, That men may not think better of themselves then they are, for their abhorrence from things that have no hurt in them; nor think worfe of others then they deserve, when they doe but fuch things as are approvable by God and the divine Light. And this is of very great moment for the maintaining of Chriftian Love and Union amongst men.

The third and laft is, That they may obferve the madness and hypocrifie of the world, whose religious contentions or secret cenfures are commonly but the conflict and antipathy of the opposite Figureations of the Animal Life, who, like the wilde beafts, without a Master to keep good quarter amongst them, are very eagerly fet to devour one another. But by this fhall every man know whether it be Complexion or Religion that reigns in him, if he love God with all his heart and all his fouls, and his neighbour as himfelf; and can give a fufficient reafon for all his actions and opinions from that Eternal Light, the Love of God shed abroad in his heart: If not, it is but a faction of the Animal Life, fed up and fuffered by either natural Temper or Cutfome; and he is far from being arrived to the Kingdom of Chrift, and entering into that true Reft of the people of God.

*Verf. 5. Where there is no external doctrine, Pulpits, and Preachings, and external Ordinances, there is no fuch noise of them amongft the holy Patriarchs whose lives Moses describes; and therefore I conceive this fenfe I have here given the Text more genuine and warrantable. But besides, Moses unveileth being Chriftianity itfelf, the manner of the growth of the true Chriftian is here prefigured. That he is rather taught of God then of Men, he having the Spirit of Life in him, and needs no man to teach him: For he has the Unifion in himself, which will teach him all things neceffary to Life and Godlines. * Which Unifion notwithstanding does never flight external helps and the holy Ordinances of Chrift, as I have abundantly proved in its due place.

*Verf. 6. Which is Repentance from dead works. In this verfe the Philofophick Cabbala signified a Vapour, but here I tranflate it a Fountain of Water, which I am warranted to doe by the Seventy, who render it "*but that Water is an Emblem of Repentance; it is fo obvious that I need lay nothing of it: John's baptizing with Water to Repentance is frequently repeated in the Gospels.

Verf. 7. And breaths into him the Spirit of Life. In allufion to this
passage of Moses in all likelihood is that of the Psalmist, Thy hands have made me, and fashioned me: O give me understanding, and I shall live; as if, like Adam, he were but a Statue of Earth till God breathed into him the Spirit of Life and Holiness.

Of the Water and of the Spirit. The Water and the Spirit are the two extremes; the first and the last that makes up the Creation of the Spiritual Adam, or Christ, completed in us, and includes the middle, which is Blood. First therefore is Repentance from what we delighted in before: then the killing of that evil and corrupt life in us, which is resifting to blood, as the Apostle speaks. And the Epistle of John, Whatever is born of God, overcomes the world: Who is he that overcomes the world, but he that believes that Jesus Christ (the divine Light and Life in us) is the Son of God; and therefore induced with power from on high to overcome all sin and wickedness in us? This is he that comes by Water and Blood, by Repentance and perseverance till the death of the body of sin, not by Repentance only and dislike of our former life, but by the mortification also of it. Then the Spirit of Truth is awakened in us, and will bear witness of whatever is right and true. And according to this manner of testimony it is to be understood especially, That no man can say that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, but by the Spirit of God, as the Apostle elsewhere affirms. This is the Heavenly Adam, which is true Light and Glory to all them that have attained to the mystical resurrection of the dead, and into whom God hath breathed the breath of Life, without which we have not right knowledge nor sense of God at all. For this is the Scripture, They are the words of Philo upon the place. For how should the Soul of man, says he, know God, if he did not inspire her, and take hold of her by his power?

Ver. 8. To the Kingdom of Heaven. And the end of the doctrine of John, which was Repentance, was for this purpose, that men might arrive to that comfortable condition here described; and therefore it was a motive for them to repent. For though sorrow endure for a night, yet joy will come in the morning. For the new Jerusalem is to be built, and God is to pitch his Tabernacle amongst men, and to rule by his Spirit here upon Earth; which, if I would venture upon an Historical Cabbala of Moses, I should prefix would happen in the Seventh thousand years, according to the Chronology of Scripture; when the world shall be so spiritualized, that the work of Salvation shall be finished, and the great Sabbath and Festival shall be then celebrated in the height: A thousand years are but as one day, faith the Apostle Peter; and therefore the Seventh thousand years may well be the Seventh day. Wherefore in the end of the Sixth thousand years the Kingdoms of the Earth will be the second Adam's, the Lord Christs, as Adam in the Sixth day was created the Lord of the world and all the creatures therein; and this conquest of his will bring in the Seventh day of rest and peace and joy upon the face of the whole Earth. Which prefix will seem more credible, when I shall have unfolded unto you out of Philo Judas the mysterie of the number Seven: but before I fall upon that, let me a little prepare your belief, by shewing the truth of the same thing in another Figure.
Adam, Seth, Enos, Cainan, Mahalaleel, Jared, they died, not enjoying the richness of God's goodness in their bodies. But Enoch, who was the Seventh from Adam, he was taken up alive into Heaven, and seems to enjoy that great bliss in the body. The world then in the Seventh Chilid will be assumed up into God, snatch'd up by his Spirit, inacted by his Power. The Jerusalem that comes down from Heaven will then in a most glorious and eminent manner flourish upon Earth. God will, as I said, pitch his Tabernacle amongst men. And for God to be in us, and with us, is as much as for us to be lifted up into God.

But to come now to the mysterie of the Septenary, or number Seven, it is of two kindes: the one is \( \text{ἑξάδες: δεκατριά: ἑξάδομεν} \), the other \( \text{ἑκατόν} \). The Septenary within the Decad is merely seven unites, the other is a Seventh Number, beginning at an Unite, and holding on in a continued Geometrical Proportion, till you have gone through Seven Proportional Terms. For the Seventh Term there is this Septenary of the second kind, whose nature * philo fully expresseth in these words; \( \text{Αἰὲν ἐκ τῶν μεγάλων} \) 
\( \text{συνθήκος ἐν συνθήκοις ἡ συνθήκη} \) ἡ συνθήκη, ἡ συνθήκη. To this first: For always beginning from an Unite, and holding on in double, or triple, or what proportion you will, the seventh number of this rank is both Square and Cube, comprehending both kindes, as well the Corporeal as Incorporeal Substance: the Incorporeal, according to the Superficies which the Squares exhibit; but the Corporeal, according to the solid dimensions which are set out by the Cubes.

As for example, 64, or 729, these are Numbers that arise after this manner; each of them are a Seventh from an Unite, the one arising from double Proportion, the other from triple; and if the Proportion were Quadruple, Quintuple, or any else, there is the same reason, some other Seventh Number would arise which would prove of the same nature with these, they would prove both Cubes and Squares, that is, Corporeal and Incorporeal: For such is sixty four, either made by multiplying eight into eight, and so it is a Square, or else by multiplying four Cubically; for four times four times four is again sixty four, but then it is a Cube. And so seven hundred twenty nine is made either by Squaring of twenty seven, or Cubically multiplying of Nine for either way will seven hundred twenty nine be made; and so is both Cube and Square, Corporeal and Incorporeal. Whereby is intimateth, that the World shall not be reduced in the Seventh day to a mere Spiritual consistency, to an Incorporeal condition, but that there shall be a co-habitation of the Spirit with Flesh in a Mystical or Moral sense, and that God will pitch his Tent amongst us. Then shall be settled everlasting Righteousness, and rooted in the Earth, so long as mankind shall inhabit upon the face thereof.

And this Truth of the Reign of Righteousness in this Seventh thousand years is still more clearly fet out to us in the Septenary within Ten, \( 
\text{ἑξάδες: δεκατριά: ἑξάδομεν} \), as Philo calls it, the naked number Seven. For the parts it consists of and into which it is the most equally divisible, or rather only divisible as into different numbers, are 3 and 4, which put together
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together make 7. And these parts be the sides of the first Orthogonion in Numbers, the very sides that include the right angle thereof. And the Orthogonion what a foundation it is of Trigonometry, and of measuring the altitudes, latitudes and longitudes of things, every body knows that knows any thing at all in Mathematicks. And this prefigures the Uprightness of that holy Generation who will stand and walk upright, inclining neither this way nor that way, but they will approve themselves of an upright and sincere heart. And by this Spirit of Righteousness will these Saints be enabled to find out the depth and breadth and height of the Wisdom and Goodness of God, as somewhere the Apostle himself phraseth it.

But then again in the second place, this Three and Four comprehend also the conjunction of the Corporeal and Incorporeal nature; Three being the first Superficies, and Four the first Body: and in the Seventh thousand years I do verily conceive that there will be so great Union betwixt God and Man, that they shall not only partake of his Spirit, but that the Inhabitants of the Ethereal Region will openly converse with these of the Terrestrial; and such frequent conversation and ordinary visits of our cordial friends of that other world will take away all the toil of life and the fear of death amongst men, they being very cheerful and pleasant here in the body, and being well assured they shall be better when they are out of it: For Heaven and Earth shall then shake hands together, or become as one house; and to die, shall be accounted but to ascend into an higher room. And though this dispensation for the present be but very sparingly set a-foot, yet I suppose there may some few have some glimpse of it, concerning whom accomplish’d Posterity may haply utter something answerable to that of our Saviour’s concerning Abraham, who tasted of Christianity before Christ himself was come in the Flesh; Abraham saw my day, and rejoiced at it. And without all question, that plenitude of Happiness that has been referred for future times, the preface and prefiguration of it, has in all ages been a very great joy and triumph to all holy men and Prophets.

The Morning Light of the Sun of Righteousness. This is very suitable to the Text, Paradise being fain to be placed Eastward in Eden, and our Saviour Christ to be the bright Morning-Starre, and the Light that lightens every one that comes into the world, though too many are disobedient to the dictates of this Light, that so early visits them in their minds and consciences; but they that follow it, it is their peace and happiness in the conclusion.

Vers. 9. Which is a sincere Obedience to the Will of God. The Tree of Life is very rightly said to be in the midst of the Garden, that is, in the midst of the Soul of man; and this is the Will or Desire of man, which is the most inward of all the Faculties of his Soul, and is as it were the Seat of all the other faculties, or vital Center of the rest, from whence they stream or grow. That therefore is the Tree of Life, if it be touch’d truly with the divine Life, and a man be heartily obedient to the Will of God. For the whole Image of divine Perfection will grow from hence, and receive nourishment, strength and continuance from it. But if this Will and Desire be broke
broke off from God, and become actuated by the creature, or be a Self-will and a Spirit of disobedience, it breeds most deadly fruit, which kills the divine Life in us, and puts man into a necessity of dying to that disorder and corruption he has thus contracted.

Whatever others would insinuate to the contrary, For there is nothing so safe, if a man be heartily sincere, as not to be led by the noise by others: For we see the sad event of it in Eve's listening to the outward suggestions of the Serpent.

Verf. 10. The four Cardinal Vertues. It is the Exposition of Philo. Till verse 17, there is no need of adding any thing more then what has already been said in the Defence of the Philosphick Cabbala.

Verf. 17. Dead to all Righteousness and Truth. The mortality that Adam contracted by his disobedience in the Moral or Mystical Sense is twofold, The one a death to righteousnes, and it is the sense of Philo upon the place, O δαίμων, σκόρπιος, καιρός και ἡμέρα, οὐδὲν οὐδὲν ἀναινεῖ. The death of the Soul is the extinction of Virtue in her, and the resurrection of Vice; and he adds, that this must be the death here meant, it being a real punishment indeed to forfeit the life of Virtue. The other mortality is a necessity of dying to unrighteousness, if he ever would be happy. Both those notions of Death are more frequent in S. Paul's Epistles then that I need to give any instance.

His more noble and Masculine Faculties. What the Masculine part in man is * Philo plainly declares in these words, ἐὰν τῇ ψυχῇ τῶν ἁγίων ἀνθρώπων ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπομονὴ, ἐν οἷς τῇ μνήμῃ, τῇ ἀληθινῇ. In us, faith he, the Man is the Intellectual, the Woman the Sense of the Body. Whence you will easily understand, that the Masculine Faculties are those that are more Spiritual and Intellectual.

Verf. 18. That the whole Humane Nature may be accomplished with the Divine. Which is agreeable to that pious ejaculation of the Apostle, 1 Thess. 5. And the God of Peace sanctifie you wholly, or thoroughly; and I pray God your whole Spirit, Soul and Body, may be kept blameless, ἐν τῇ ὑπομονῇ, by the presence or abode of Jesus Christ, the divine Life or heavenly Adam in you. This is the most easy and natural sense of that place of Scripture mystically understood, as it will appear to any man whose mind is as much set on Holiness as hard Theories. And it is very agreeable to the Mystical sense of the Second Psalm, where the Kingdom of Christ reaches to the utmost ends of the Earth, that is, as far as Soul and Life can animate, so that our very flesh and body is brought under the Scepter of Christ's Kingdom.

Verf. 19. The Figurations of the Animal Life. That the Motions of the Mind, as they are suggested from the Animal Life of the Body, are set forth by Fishes, Beasts and Birds, I have already made good from the authority of Origen.

Verf. 20. In a capacity of taking delight in them. For Melancholy had so depraved the complexion of his body, that there was no grateful sense of any thing that belong'd to nature and the life of the Vehicle.

Verf. 22. The greatest part of that Paradise a man is capable of upon Earth. This is a Truth of Sense and Experience, and is no more to be proved by Reason, then that White is White or Black is Black.
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Ver. 23. Essential operation of the Soul. The very nature of the Soul, as it is a Soul, is an aptitude of informing or actuating a Body; but that it should be always an organized Body, it is but Aristotle's laying of it, he does not prove it. But for mine own part, I am very prone to think that the Soul is never destitute of some vehicle or other, though Platonius be of another mind, and conceives that the Soul at the height is joined with God and nothing else, nakedly lodged in his arms. And I am the more bold to dissent from him in this exaltation of the Soul, I being to secure in my own conceit of that other suspected extravagancy of his, in the debasement of them, that at last they become so drowsy and senseless, that they grow up out of the ground in that dull function of life, the efformation of Trees and Plants. And I am not alone in this liberty of dissenting from Platonius: For besides my own conceit this way, (for I must confess I have no demonstrative reasons against his opinion) I am emboldened by the example of * Ficinus, who is no small admirer of the forenamed Author.

That which I was about to say is this; The informing or actuating of a Body being so indispensable and essential a part of the Soul, the temper and condition of the Body that it thus actuates cannot but be of mighty consequence unto the Soul that is conscious of the plight thereof, and reaps the joy of it or sorrow, by an universal touch and inward sense springing up into her cognizance and animadversion. And we may easily imagine of what moment the health and good plight of the Body is to the Mind that lodges there, if we do but consider the condition of Plants, whose bodies we cannot but conceive in a more grateful temper while they flourish and are sweet and pleasing to the eye, then when they are withered by age or drought, or born down to the Earth by immoderate storms of rain. And so it is with the body of man, (where there is a Soul to take notice of its condition) far better when it is in health by discretion and moderation in diet and exercise, then when it is either parched up by superstitious melancholy, or flocken and drowned in sensuality and intemperance; for they are both abaters of the joyes of life, and lessen that plentitude of happiness that man is capable of by his Mystical Eve, the woman that God has given every one to delight himself with.

Ver. 24. So far forth as they are incompenatable with the health of the body. This is an undeniable truth, else how could that hold good that the Apostle speaks, That Godlines is profitable for all things, having the promise of this world, and that which is to come; whenas without the health of the Body there is nothing at all to be enjoyed in this present world? And certainly God doth not tie us to the Law of Angels or superior Creatures, but to precepts suitable to the nature of man.

Obedience to the Precepts of that Superior Light. For if the Life of the Body grow upon us so as to extinguish or hinder the sense of divine things, of our dependence on God, and of the joyful hope of the life to come, it is then become disorderly, and is to be castigated and kept down; that it pull not us down into an aversion from all Piety, and sink us into an utter oblivion of God and the divine Life.

Ver. 25. Without any shame or blushing. See what has been said upon the Philosphick Cabbala.
A story of a dispute betwixt a Prelate and a Black-Smith, concerning Adam's eating of the Apple. 1. What is meant by the subtilty or deceit of the Serpent. That Religion wrought to its due height is a very cheerful state, and it is only the halting and hypocrisy of men that generally have put so sour and sad a wizard upon it. 5, 6. That worldly Wisdom, not Philosophy, is perstringed in the Mysteries of the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil. 10. The meaning of Adam's flying, after he had found himself naked, 20. Adam, the Earthly-minded Man, according to Philo. 21. What is meant by God's clothing Adam and Eve with hairy Coats in the Mystical sense. 23. Παραδειγματος φυσικος, or the Paradise of Luxury. That History in Scripture is wrote very concisely, and therefore admits of modest and judicious Supplements: For clearing the sense. 24. What is meant by the Cherubim and flaming Sword. Plato's definition of Philosophy, Μελίμων. A more large description of dying to Sin, and of the life of Righteousness. That Christian Religion, even as it refers to the external Person of Christ, is upon no pretence to be annulled till the Conflagration of the world.

In this Third Chapter is the said Catastrophe of the Story, the Fall of Adam, and the Original of all that misery and calamity that hath befallen mankind since the beginning of the World. Of so horrid consequence was it, that our Mother Eve could no better suppress her longing, but upon the easie per夙vation of the Serpent ate the forbidden Fruit, as a famous Prelate in France once very tragically insinuated upon the point to his attentive Auditory.

But it should seem, a certain Smith in the Church, as Bodinus relates, when he had heard from this venerable Preacher, that Universal Mankind, having a small handful of Christians, were irrevocably laps'd into eternal damnation by Adam's eating of an Apple, and he having the boldness to argue the matter with the Prelate, and receiving no satisfaction from him in his managing the Literal sense of the Text, (and his skill it would seem went no further,) the Smith at last broke out into these words, Tam multas rixas prevex tantilla instiex excitati; as if he should have said in plain English, What a deal of dust there here been about the eating of an Apple? Which blasphemous saying, as Bodinus writes, had no sooner come to the ears of the Court of France, but it became a Proverb amongst the Courtiers. So dangerous a thing is an ignorant and indiscreet Preacher, and a bold, immodest Auditor. Bodinus in the same place does profess it is his Judgement, that the unskillfull insinuting of our Divines upon the Literal sense of Moses has bred many hundred thousands of Atheists. For which reasen, I hope that men that are not very ignorant and humorous, but sincere lovers of God and the divine Truth, will receive these my Cabbala's with more favour and acceptance; especially this Moral one, it being not of too big a sense to stop the mouth of any
any honest, free, inquisitive Christian. But whatever it is, we shall further endeavour to make it good in the several passages thereof.

Ver. 1. Inordinate desire of pleasure. It is * Philo's, $ ἄρα ἀσειτίαν δοξήμενον ἀπεισούμενον, That the Serpent is a Symbol or representation of Pleasure, which he compares to that Creature for three reasons.

First, because a Serpent is an Animal without feet, and crawls along on the Earth upon his belly.

Secondly, because it is said to feed upon the dust of the Earth.

Thirdly, because it has poisonous teeth that kill those that it bites.

And so he assimilates Pleasure to it, being a base affection, and bearing it fell upon the belly, the seat of lust and intermixture, feeding on earthly things, μηστρετόν οὐρανοῦ ἀσειτίαν δοξήμενον ἀπεισούμενον, but never nourishing her self with that heavenly food which Wisdom offers to the Contemplative by her precepts and discourses.

It is much that Philo should take * no notice of that which is so particularly set down in the Text, the subtility of the Serpent, which methinks is notorious in Pleasure, it looking so smoothly and innocently on't, and infinuating itself very easily into the minds of men upon that consideration; and to deceiving them; when other Passions cannot so skillfully persuade us, they bidding more open warre to the quiet and happiness of mankind, as that judicious Poet * Spencer has well observed in his Legend of Sir Guyon or Temperance,

A harder lesson to learn continuance
In joyous pleasure then in grievous pain:
For sweetness doth allure the weaker sense
So strongly, that unceases it can refrain
From that which feeble Nature covets pain;
But grief and wrath that be our enemies,
And foes of life, the better can refrain:
Yet Fortune vaunts in both her Victories,
And Guyon in them all shows goodly Masteries.

What a rigid and severe thing, &c. This is the conceit of such as are either utter strangers to Religion, or have not yet arrived to that comfortable fruit of it that may be expected. For God takes no delight in the perpetual rack of those Souls he came to redeem, but came to redeem us from that pain and torture which the love of our selves, and our untamed lusts, and pride of spirit makes us obnoxious to, which men being lost to part with, and not having the heart to let them be struck to the very quick, and pulled up by the roots, the work not accomplished according to the full mind and purpose of God, there are still the seeds of perpetual anxiety, fainness, and inevitable pain. For to be dead, is easement; but to be still dying, is pain: and it is most ordinarily but the due punishment of halting and hypocrisy. And mens spirits being long foured thus and made sad, their profession and behaviour is such, that they fright all inexperienced young men from any tolerable compliance in matters of Religion, thinking that when they are once engaged there, they are condemned ad Fodinas for ever, and that they can never emerge out of this work and drudgery in those dark Caverns, till they die there like the poor
poor Americans, inflaved and over-wrought by the mercifless Spaniard.

But verily if we have but the patience to be laid low enough, the same hand that depressed us will exalt us above all hope and expectation. For if we be sufficiently baptized into the Death of Christ, we shall assuredly be made partakers of his Resurrection to Life, and that glorious liberty of the Sons of God, according as it is written, If the Son make you free, then are you free indeed; free from Sin, and secure from the power of any Temptation. But if Mortification has not had its perfect work, too mature a return of the sweetness of the Animal Life may prove like the Countryman's cherishing the Snake by the fire-side, which he had as he thought taken up dead in the Snow; it will move, and hisse, and bite, and sting. The strong prelages of the manifold corporeal delights and satisfactions of the flesh may grow so big and boisterous in the mind, that the Soul may deem her self too freightly girt up, and begin to listen to such whippers of the Serpent as this, What a rigid and severe thing is this business of Religion? &c. and account her self, if she be not free to every thing, that she is as good as free to nothing.

Verf. 2, 3. But the Woman's part in Adam. 'Tis but one and the same Soul in man entertaining a dialogue with her self that is set out by these Three parts, The Serpent, Adam, and the Woman. And here the Soul recollecting her self, cannot but confes that Religion denies her no honest nor fitting pleasure that is not hazardous to her greater happiness, and bethinks her self in what peril she is of losing the divine Life and due sense of God, if she venture thus promiscuously to follow her own will, and not measure all her actions and purposes by the divine Light that for the present is at hand to direct her.

Verf. 4. But the Serpent, &c. The sense of this verse is, that the eager desire of Pleasure had wrought it self so far into the sweetness of the Animal Life, that it clouded the mans judgement, and made him fondly hope that the being so freely alive to his own Will was no prejudice to the Will of the Spirit and the life of God which was in him, whenas yet notwithstanding the Apostle expressly writes, What fellowship is there betwixt righteousness and unrighteousness? what communion betwixt light and darkness? what agreement betwixt Christ and Belial? And he elsewhere tells us, That Christ gave himself for his Church, that he might so thoroughly purge it and sanctifie it, that it should have neither spot nor wrinkle; but that it should be holy and unblameable, a true Virgin-Bride clothed with his divine Life and Glory. And those men that are so willing to halt betwixt two, the Flesh and the Spirit, and have house-room enough to entertain them both, (as if there could be any friendhip and communion betwixt them) let them seriously consider whether this opinion be not the same that deceived Adam was of; and let them suspect the fame sad event, and acknowledge it to arise from the self-same Principle, the inordinate desire of pleasing their own wills, without the allowance of the divine Light and consulting with the Will of God.

Verf. 5. Skill and Experience in things. And some men make it no sin, but warrantable knowledge, to know the world, and account others fools.
fools that are ignorant of that wicked mystery. For man would be no
Slave or Idiot, but know his own liberty, and gain experience; as he pre-
tends, by the making use of it.

But that the accurate exercise of Reason in the knowledge of God’s
marvellous works in Nature, or those innocent delightful Conclusions in
Geometry and Arithmetick, and the like, that these parts of Knowledge
should be perstringed by Moses in this History, it seems to me not to have
the least probability in it, for there are so very few in the world whose
minds are carried any thing seriously to such Objects, that it had not been
worth the taking notice of. And then again, it is plain that the miscar-
riage is from the affectation of such kind of Knowledge as the Woman,
the flowering life of the Body, occasioned Adam to transgres in. Where-
fore it is the fulfilling of the various desires of the flesh, not an high aspire
after Intellectual Contemplations; for they respect the Masculine Fa-
culties, not the Feminine, that made way to the transgression.

Wherefore, I say, the Wisdom that the Serpent here promised was not
Natural Philosophy, or Mathematicks, or any of those innocuous and noble
accomplishments of the Understanding of man, but it was the Knowledge
of the world and the Wisdom of the flesh. For the Life of the Body is ful-
of desires, and prelages of satisfaction in the obtaining of this or the oth-
er external thing, whether it be in Honour, Riches, or Pleasure; and if
they shake off the divine Guide within them, they will have it by hook
or by crook. And this worldly Wisdom is so plausible in the world, and
so sweetly relished by the mere natural man, that it were temptation en-
nough for a Novice, if it were but to be esteemed Wife, to adventure up-
on such things as would initiate him therein.

Ver. 6. But the Wisdom of the flesh. The Apostle calls it φρονμη σαρ-
κος. Which wisdom of the flesh, he faith, is enmity with God. But the free
and cautious use of Reason, the Knowledge of the fabric of the world
and the course of Natural causes, to understand the Rudiments of Geo-
metry and the Principles of Mechanicks, and the like, what man, that is
not a Fool or a Fancitick, will ever affect that God bears any enmity to
these things? For again, these kind of Contemplations are not so pro-
perly the Knowledge of Good and Evil, as of Truth and Falsehood, the
Knowledge of Good and Evil referring to that experience we gather up
in Moral or Political encounters.

But those men that from this Text of Scripture would perstringe Philo-
sophy, and an honest and generous Enquiry into the true knowledge of
God in Nature, I suspect them partly of ignorance, and partly of a fly
and partial kind of counienancing of those pleasures that Beasts have as well
as Men, and I think in as high a degree, especially Baboons and Streys, and
such like lecherous Animals. And I fear there are no men so subject to
such mis-intrepretations of Scripture as the boldet Religionists and
Mock-Prophets, who are very full of heat and spirits, and have their Im-
agination too often infected with the fumes of those lower parts, the full
lens and pleasure whereof they prefer before all the subtle delights of
Reason and generous Contemplation.

But leaving these Sanguine-inspired Seers to the sweet deception and

| Gallery |
gallerly of their own corrupted Fancy, let us listen and keep close to him that can neither deceive nor be deceived. I mean Christ and his holy Apostles; and now in particular, let us consider that grave and pious Monition of S. Peter, Beloved, I beseech you, as Strangers and Pilgrims, abstain from fleshly lusts that warre against the Soul. Wherein this Holy man, instructed of God, plainly intimates that the Soul in this world is as a traveller in a strange Countrey, and that she is journeying on to a condition more futable to her then this in the Body. Whence it follows, that the tender patronizing of those Pleasures that are mortal and die with the Body, is a badge of a poor, base, degenerate Minde, and unacquainted with her own nature and dignity.

Vers. 7. How naked now he was, and bare of all strength and power to divine and holy things. This was Adam's mistake, that he thought he could serve two Masters, The will of God, and The dictates of the flesh. But thus he became estranged to the Divine Life and Power, which will not dwell in a body that is subject unto sin. For the holy Spirit of discipline will fly deceit, and remove from thoughts that are without understanding, (such as are suggested and pursued at random) and will not abide when unrighteousness cometh in.

Vers. 8. Could not endure the presence of it. For the Divine Light now was only a convincer of his miscarriages, but administred nothing of the Divine Love and Power, as it does to them that are obedient and sincere followers of its Precepts, and therefore Adam could no more endure the presence of it then fore eyes the Sun or Candle-light.

Vers. 9. Persisted and came up closer to him. This Divine Light is God, as he is manifested in the Conscience of man, but his Love and Power are not fit to be communicated to Adam in this dissolute and disobedient condition he is in, but merely Conscience, to bring him to repentance. And after the hurry of his inordinate pleasures and passions, when he was for a time left in the fuds, as they call it, this light of conscience did more strictly and particularly sift and examine him, and he might well wonder with himself that he found himself so much afraid to commune with his own Heart.

Vers. 10. Ingeniously confessed. For he presently found out the reason why he was thus estranged from the divine Light, because he found himself naked of that power and good affection he had in divine things before; having lost those by promiscuously following the wild suggestions of his own inordinate will, as you see in the following verse. Wherefore he had no mind to be convinced of any obligation to such things as he felt in himself no power left to perform nor any inclination unto.

Vers. 11. The sad event upon his disobedience. Adam's Conscience resolved all this confusion of minde into his disobedience and following his own will, without any rule or guidance from the will of God.

Vers. 12. His Rational Faculties, and said. Like that in the Comedian,

*Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto.*

And
And so commonly men reason themselves into an allowance of sin, by
pretending humane infirmities or natural frailties,

Ver. 13. That he kept his Feminine faculties in no better order. That is,
the foolish and mischievous Sophistry amongst men, whereby they im-
pose upon themselves, that because such and such things may be done,
and that they are but the suggestions of nature, which is the work of
God in the world, that therefore they may doe them, how and in what
measure they please. But here the divine Light does not chaffie Adam
for the exercise of his Feminine faculties, but that in the exercise of them
they were not regulated by an higher and more holy Rule, and that he
kept them in no more subjection unto the Masculine.

To which he had nothing to say, but, &c. The meaning is, that Adam's
temptations were very strong, and so accommodate to the vigorous life
of the body, that, as he thought, he could not resist. But the will of man
assisted by God, as Adam's was, if it be sincere, what can it not doe?

Ver. 14. Then the divine Light began to chaffie the Serpent. From this
14th verfe to the 20th there seemes to be a description of the Conscience
of a man plainly convincing him of all the ugliness and inconveniences
of those sinful courses he is engaged in, with some hints also of the advan-
tages of the Better Life, if he converted to it, which is like a present flame
kindled in his mind for a time: but the true love of the divine Life and
the power of Grace being not also communicated unto his Soul, and his
Body being unpurg'd of the filth it has contracted from former evil courses,
this flame is presently extinct, and all those monitions and representations
of what so nearly concerned him are drowned in oblivion, and he
presently settles to his old ill ways again.

That it crept basely upon the belly. See what has been said out of Philo
upon verse 1.

Ver. 15. But might I once descend so far. This the divine Light might
be very well said to speak in Adam. For his Conscience might well re-
mind him how grateful a sense of the harmlesse joys of the Body he had in
his state of obedience and sincerity: and if the divine Light had wrought
it self into a more full and universal possession of all his Faculties, the re-
gulated joys of the Body, which had been the off-spring of the woman,
had so far exceeded the tumultuous pleasures of inordinate desires, that
they would, like the Sun-beams playing upon a fire, extinguish the heat
thereof, as is already said in this 15th verse.

Ver. 16. So that the kindly joy of the health of the Body shall be much
deprieved. The divine Light in the Conscience of Adam might very well
say all this, he having had already a good taste of it in all likelihood, hav-
ing found himself after inordinate satiating his furious desires of pleasure,
in a dull, languid, nauseating condition, though new recruits spurred him
up to new follies. For the Moral Cabbala does not suppose it was one
single mistaken act that brought Adam to this confusion of mind, but dis-
obedience at large, and leading a life unguided by the Light and Law
of God.

Earthly-minded Adam. Philo calls him Ἀθανασία τῆς ἀθανασίας, the earthly mind,
pag. 332.
**Ver. 17, 18, 19.** Adam's Conscience was so awakened by the divine Light and Reason, and Experience to instruct him for the present, that he could easily read his own doom, if he persisted in these courses of disobedience, that he should be pricked and vex'd in his wild rangings after inordinate pleasure all the while the Earthly mind was his light and guide. But after all this conviction, what way Adam would settle in, did not God visit him with an higher pitch of superadventent Grace that would convey Faith, Power, and Affection unto him, you see in the verse immediately following.

**Ver. 20.** Adam was not sufficiently. For mere conviction of Light disjoin'd from Faith, Power, and Affection, may indeed disturb the Mind and confound it, but is not able of it self to compose it and settle it to good, in men that have contracted a custom of evil.

Called her, My life. So soon as this reproof and castigation of the divine Light manifested in Adam's Conscience was over, he forthwith falls into the same sense of things, and pursues the same resolutions that he had in design before; and very feelingly concludes with himself, that be that as true as it will that his Conscience dictated unto him, yet nothing can be more true then this, That the Joy of his Body was a necessary solace of life, and therefore he would set up his happiness in the improvement thereof. And so adhering in his affection to it, counted it his very life, and that there was no living at all without it. They are almost the words of *Philos* speaking of the sense of the Body, in which was this corporeal Joy, *He ἔνας ὑποκείμενος ἦν θάνατος* Adam, *διὸ καὶ πεπληρωμένος ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ, οὗ ἐκατερομένος* i.e. which corporeal sense the earthly mind in man, properly therefore called Adam, when he saw reformed, though it was really the death of the man, yet he called it his Life. This is Philos' Exposition of this present verse.

**Ver. 21.** Put hairy Coats. The Philosophick Cabbala and the Text have a marvellous fit and easie congruity in this place. And this Moral sense will not seem hard, if you consider such phrases as these in Scripture; But as for his enemies, let them be clothed with shame; and elsewhere, Let them be clothed with rebuke and dishonour; besides other places to that purpose. And to clothe men according to their conditions and quality, what is more ordinary, or more fit and natural? As those that are Fools, they ordinarily clothe them in a Fools coat. And so Adam's will and affection being carried so resolutely to the brutish life, it is not incongruous to conceive that the divine Light judging them very Brutes, the reproach she gives them is set out in this passage of clothing them with the skins of beasts.

The meaning therefore of this Verse is, that the divine Light in the Conscience of Adam had another bowt with him, and that Adam was convinced that he should grow a kinde of a Brute by the courses he meant to follow. And indeed he was content so to be, as a man may well conceive, the pleasure of sin having so weakened all the Powers of that higher life in him, that there was little or nothing, especially for the present, able to carry him at all upwards towards Heaven and Holiness.

And of a truth, vile Epicurism and Sensuality will make the Soul of man so
 CHAPTER III. The Defence of the Moral Cabbala.

If degenerate and blinde, that he will not only be content to slide into Brute immorality, but please himself in this very opinion that he is a real Brute already, an Ape, Satyre, or Baboon; and that the best of men are no better, saving that civilizing of them and industrious education has made them appear in a more refined shape, and long inculcate Precepts have been mistaken for connate Principles of Honesty and Natural Knowledge; otherwise there be no indispensible grounds of Religion and Virtue, but what has hapned to be taken up by over-ruling Custome. Which things, I dare say, are as easily confutable, as any Conclusion in Mathematicks is demonstrable. But as many as are thus fortith, let them enjoy their own wildenes and ignorance; it is sufficient for a good man that he is conscious unto himself that he is more nobly descended, better bred and born, and more skillfully taught by the purged Faculties of his own Minde.

Vers. 22. Design'd the contrary. The mercy of the Almightie is such to poor man, that his weak and dark spirit cannot be always so resolutely wicked as he is contented to be; wherefore it is a fond furnifie of desperate men, that doe all the violence they can to the remainders of that Light and Principle of Religion and Honesty left in them, hoping thereby to come to rest and tranquility of minde, by laying dead or quite obliterating all the Rules of Godlinefs and Morality out of their Souls. For it is not in their power so to doe, nor have they any reason to promise themselves they are hereby secure from the pangs of Conscience. For some passages of Providence or other may to awake them, that they shall be forced to acknowledge their error and rebellion with unexpressible bitterness and confusion of spirit: And the longer they have run wrong, the more tedious journey they have to return back.

Wherefore it is more safe to close with that life betimes, that when it is attained to, neither deferves nor is obnoxious to any change or death; I mean when we have arrived to the due measure of it. For this is the natural accomplishment of the Soul, all else but ruft and dirr that lies upon it.

Vers. 23. Out of this Paradise of Luxury. The English Translation takes no notice of any more Paradises then one, calling it always the Garden of Eden. But the Seventye, more favourable to our Moral Cabbala, that which they call a Garden in Eden at first, they after name παραδεισον, which may signify the Garden of Luxury. But whether there be any force at all in this or no, that Supplement I have made in the foregoing verse will make good the sense of our Cabbala. And in the very Letter and History of the Scripture, if a man take notice, he must of necessity make a supply of something or other to pass to what follows with due cohesion and clearnesse of sense.

So in the very next Chapter, where God dooms Cain to be a Vagabond, and he cries out that every man that meets him will kill him, according to the concise story of the Text, there was none but Adam and Eve in the world to meet him, and yet there is a mark fixt upon him by God, as if there had been then several people in the world into whose hands he might fall, and lose his life by them. And then again at verf. 17. Cain had
had no sooner got into the Land of Nod, but he has a wife and a child by her; and he is forthwith fai'd to build a City, whereas there is no mention of any but himself, his wife, and his child, to be the Artificers; but any ingenious Reader will easily make to himself fitting supplements, ever supposing due distances of time and right preparations to all that is said to be acted. And so in the Story of Samson, where he is said to take three hundred Foxes, it may be rationally suppos'd that Countrey was full of such creatures, that he had a competency of time, a sufficient number to help him, and the like. That the History of Scripture is very concise, no body can deny; and therefore where ease, natural, and agreeable supplements will clear the sense, I conceive it is very warrantable to suppos'e some such supplies, and for a Paraphraft judiciously to interweave them.

But now that Paradise at first should signify a state of divine pleasure, and afterward of sensual voluptuosnes; it is no more hath then that Adam one while is the Spiritual or Intellectual Man, another while the Earthly and Carnal. For one and the same Natural thing may be a Symbol of contrary Spiritual Mysteries. So a Lion and a Serpent are figures of Christ as well as of the Devil: and therefore it is not so hard to admit that this Garden of Eden may emblematisre, while Adam is discours'd of as innocent and obedient to God, the delights of the Spirit; but after his forfaking God, the pleasures of the Body; and consequently, that the fruits of the Tree of Life in the one, may be perseverance and establishment in the divine Life in the other, a settlement and fixedness in the brutifh and sensual.

Verse 24. The manly faculties of Reason and Conscience. These I conceive may be understood by the Cherubim and flaming Sword. For the Cherubim bear the Image of a Man, and Reason is a cutting, dividing thing like a Sword, the Stoicks call it 

\[\text{αἰσχρὸς νόρων},\]

dividing and distinguishing Reason. For Reason is nothing but a distinct discernment of the Idea's of things whereby the Mind is able to feuer what will not fuse, and lay together what will. But if any body will like better of Philo's interpretation here of the Cherubim and flaming Sword, who makes the Cherubim to signify the Goodness and Power of God; the flaming Sword, 

\[\text{κατανόω},\]

the effectual and operative Wisdom or Word of God, it does not at all clash with what we have already set down. For my part also suppose, that God by his Son the Eternal Word works upon the Reason and Conscience of man: For that Word is living and powerful, sharper then any two-edged Sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is the discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart; neither is there any creature that is not manifest in his sight, but all things are naked and open unto the eyes of him with whom we have to doe.

That he could not set up his rest for ever. Affuredly a mans heart is not so in his own hand, that he can doe himself all the mischief he is contented to doe. For we are more God's then our own, and his Goodness and Power has dominion over us. And therefore let not a man vainly fancy, that by violently running into all enormity of life, and extinguishing all the
the Principles of Piety and Vertue in him, that he shall be able thus to hide himself from God, and never be re-minded of him again for ever; for though a man may happen thus to forget God for a time, yet he can never forget us, for all things lie open to his sight. And the power of his ever-living Word will easily cut through all that thickness and dark-ness which we shrowd our selves in, and wound us so as to make us look back with shame and forrow at a time that we least thought of.

But that our pain may be the leffe, and our happines commence the sooner, it will be our wisdome to comply with the divine Light betimes; for the sooner we begin, the work is the easier, and will be the more time-ly dispatched through the power of God working in us. But this I must confefs (and I think my self bound to bear witness to so true and useful a mysterie wrap't up in this Mosatical covering,) That there is no other passage nor return into happines then by death. Whence Plato also, that had been acquainted with these Holy writings, has defined Philosophy Mæstis Sex-vier, the meditation of death, viz. the dying to the lust of the flesh and inordinate desires of the Body, which Purgatory if we had once pass'd through, there would soon spring up that Morning Joy, the Resurrection from the dead, and our arrival to everlasting life and glory. And there is no other way then this that is manifestable either by Scripture, Reason, or Experience.

But those that through the grace of God and a vehement thirst after the divine Righteousnes have born the Cross till the perfect death of the body of sin, and make it their business to have no more sense nor relish of themselves or their own particular persons then if they were not at all, they being thus demolish'd as to themselves, and turned into a Chaos or dark Nothingness, as I may so speak, they become thereby fitted for the new Creation.

And this personal life being thus destroy'd, God calls unto them in the dead of the Night, when all things are silent about them, awakes them, and raises them up, and breathes into them the breath of everlasting life, and ever after actuates them by his own Spirit, and takes all the humane Faculties unto himself, guiding or allowing all their operations, alwaies holding up the Spirit of man so that he will never sink into sin, and from henceforth death and forrow is swallowed up for ever, for the sting of Death is Sin.

But whatever liberty and joy men take to themselves that is not founded in this new life, is false and frivolous, and will end but in sadness, bitterness, and intolerable thraldome. For the Corporal life and sense will so deeply have sunk into the Soul, that it will be beyond all measure hard and painful to disintangle her.

But as many as have pass'd the Death have arrived to that Life that abides for ever and ever.

And this Life is pure and immaculate Love, and this Love is God, as he is communicable unto man, and is the sole Life and Essence of Vertue truly so called, or rather, as all colours are but the reflexion of the Rays of the Sun, so all Vertue is but this One variously coloured and figured from the diversity of Objects and Circumstances. But when the playes
playes with ease within her own pure and undisturbed Light, she is most lovely and amiable; and if she step out into zeal, Satyrical rebuke, and contestation, it is a confedent and debafement for the present; but the design is, a more enlarged exaltation of her own nature, and the getting more universal foot-hold in other persons, by dislodging her detemned enemy.

For the divine Love is the love of the divine Beauty, and that Beauty is the divine Life which would gladly insinuate it self, and become one with that particular Principle of Natural life, the Soul of man. And whatever man she has taken hold upon, and won him to her self, she does so actuate and guide, as that whatever he has, she gets the use of, and improves it to her own interest, that is, the advancement of her self.

But she observing that her progress and speed is not so faft as she could wish, (that is, that mankind is not made so fully and so generally happy by her as she could desire, and as they are capable of) she raises in a man his Anger and Indignation against those things that are obstacles and impediments in her way, beating down by solid Reason such things as pretend to Reason, and such things as are neither the genuine off-spring of the humane faculties, nor the effects of her own union with them, discountenancing them, and deriding them as Monsters and Mongrel things, they being no accomplishment of the humane nature, nor any gift of the divine. She observing also that mankind is very giddily butt to improve their Natural faculties without her, and promise themselves very rare effects of their art & industry, which if they could bring to pass, would be in the end but a scourge and plague to them, and make them more desperately bold, sensual, Atheistical, and wicked; (for no fire but that of God's Spirit in a man can clear up the true knowledge of himself unto us,) she therefore taketh courage (though she see her self flighted, or unknown) and deservedly magnifies her self above all the effects of Art and humane industry, and boldly tells the world what petty and poor things they are if compared unto her.

Nor doth she at all stick to pour out her Scorn and Derision unto the full upon those garish effects of fanatical Fancy, where Melancholy dictates strange and uncouth dreams, out of a dark hole, like the whispers of the Heathen Oracles. For it is not only an injury to her self, that such Antick Phantasms are preferred before the pure simplicitv of her own beauty; but a great mischief to her darling, the Soul of man, that he should forfake those Faculties she has a mind to sanctifie and take into her self, and should give himself up to mere inconsiderate Imaginations and casual impresses, chusing them for his guide, because they are strongest, not truest, and he will not so much as examine them.

Such like as these and several other occasions there are that oftentimes figure the divine life in good men, and sharpen it into an high degree of Zeal and Anger. But whom in wrath she then wounds, she pityes, as being an affectionate Lover of universal mankind, though an unreconcilable disfliker of their vices.

I have
Have now gone through my Threefold Cabbala, which I hope all sincere and judicious Christians will entertain with unprejudiced candour and kind acceptance. For as I have lively set out the mysteries of the holy and precious life of a Christian, even in the Mosaical Letter, so I have carefully and on purpose cleared and afflerted the grand essential Principles of Christianity itself, as it is a particular Religion; avoiding that rock of scandal that some who are taken for no small Lights in the Christian world have cast before men, who attenuate all so into Allegories, that they leave the very Fundamentals of Religion suspected, especially themselves not vouchsafing to take notice that there is any such thing as the Person of Christ now existent, much less that he is a Mediator with God for us, or that he was a sacrifice for sin when he hung at Jerusalem upon the Cross, or that there shall be again any appearance of him in the Heavens, as it was promised by the two Angels to his Apostles that savor him ascend; or that there is any life to come, after the dissolution of the natural body, though our Saviour Christ saies expressly, That after the Resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are like the Angels of God. But to be so spiritual as to interpret this of a mysterious resurrection of a man in this life, is in effect to be so truly carnal, as to injure there is no such thing at all as the Life to come, and to add to Saducism, Epicurism also, or worse, that is, a religious liberty of filling one another's houses with brats of the adulterous bed, under pretence that they are now rifer to that estate that they may without blame commit that which in other mortals is down-right Adultery. Such unlawful sporting with the Letter as this, is to me no sign of a spiritual man, but of one at least indiscreet and light-minded, more gross in my conceit than Hymenaeus and Philetus, who yet affirmed that the resurrection was past, and so allegorized away the faith of the people.

For mine own part I cannot admire any man's Fancies, but only his Reason, Modesty, Discretion and Miracles, the main thing being presupposed (which yet is the birth-right of the meaneft Christian) to be truly and sincerely Pious. But if his Imagination grow rampant, and he aspire to appear some strange thing in the world, such as was never yet heard of; that man seems to me thereby plainly to bewray his own Carnality and Ignorance. For there are no better Truths then what are plainly set down in the Scripture already, and the best, the plainest of all. So that if any one will step out to be so venerate an Instructer of the World, that no man may appear to have said any thing like unto him, either in his own age or foregoing generations; verily I am so blunt a Fool as to make bold to pronounce, that I suspect the party not a little season'd with Spiritual Pride and Melancholy: For, God be thanked, the Gospel is so plain a Rule of Life and Belief to the sincere and obedient Soul, that no man can adde any thing to it.

But then for comparison of persons, what dotage is it for any man, because he can read the common Alphabets of Honesty and a Pious life in the History of the Old and New Testament, finely allegorizing, as is conceiv'd, those external Transactions to a mysterious application of what concerns
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concerns the inward man; to either place himself, or for others to place him in the same level with Jesus Christ the Son of God, the Saviour of men, and Prince of the highest Angelical Orders, who rose out of the grave by the Omnipotent hand of his Father, and was seen to ascend into Heaven by his Apostles that gazed upon him as he passed through the Clouds, and whom all true Christians expect visibly to appear there again and revisit the world according to the promise: I say, it seems to me a very unreasonable and rash thing, if not impious and blasphemous, to acknowledge any man whatsoever comparable to so sacred a Person as he every way approved himself, and was approved by a voice from Heaven, saying, This is my beloved Son, hear him.

If any man therefore having none of these Testimonies from above, nor being able to doe any thing more then other men, shall be so unmannrly as to place himself in the same order and rank with Christ the Son of God, because he has got some fine fancies and phrases, and special and peculiar interpretations of Scripture, which he will have immediately suggested from the Spirit; I cannot forbear again to pronounce, that this man is overtaken with an high degree of either Pride or Madness, and if he can persuade any others to look upon him as so sacred a Prophet, that it must be in them at leaft Inadvertency or Ignorance; nay, I think I shall not say amiss if I attribute their mistake to a kind of Pride also. For Pride affects nothing more then Singularity; and therefore undervaluing the plain Simplicity of ordinary Christianity, such as at first sight is held forth in the Gospel of Christ, they think it no small priviledge to have a Prophet of their own; especially they getting this advantage thereby, that they can very presently, as they fancy, centre and discern the Truth or Falsehood of all that venture to speak out of the Rode of their own Sect, as if every body were bound to come their lessons according to their Book. And it is a fine thing to become so accurately wise at so cheap a rate, and discover who is Spiritual, or who is the Carnal, or mere Moral man. This is indeed the folly of all Sects, and there is no way better that I know to be freed from such inveiglements, then by earnestly endeavering after that which they all pretend to, and to become truly more holy and sincere the other men; for the thoroughly-purified man is certainly delivered from all these follies.

These things I could not forbear to speak in zeal to the honour of my Saviour, and the good and safety of his Church. For if men once get a trick to call the world Christian, where the death of Christ on the Cross at Jerusalem is not acknowledged a sacrifice for sin, nor himself now in his humane Person a Mediator with God the Father, and the Head of his Church Militant and Triumphant; nor that there is any Eternal Life nor Resurrection, but that in the Moral or Mystical sense: assuredly this will prove the most dangerous way imaginable quite to take away that in time, which is most properly called Christian Religion, out of the world, and to leave merely the name thereof behind.

But a Religion so manifestly established by God in a most miraculous manner, and being so perfect, that the wit of man cannot imagine any thing more compleat, and better fitted for winning souls to God: It can be
be nothing but giddines or light-mindedness, to think that this Religion can be ever superannuated in the world, but that it shall last till Christ's corporeal appearance in the Clouds. For there is no reason at all that the Holy Ghost should be thought to come in the flesh of some particular man, no more than God the Father did under the Law. For what can he tell us more or better then Christ already has told us, or what himself may tell us without any personal shape? And there is no Prophecy of any such thing, but only of that which is better, that Christ will procure for all those that are his faithful and obedient followers, the Spirit of Truth and Righteousness, and induc them with the divine Life; and that it shall so at length come to pass, that Justice, Peace and Equity shall more universally and fully flourish in the world then ever yet they have done; and that Faith in God and of the Life to come shall be more vigorously sealed upon the hearts of men; and that there shall be a nearer union and conjunction between the humane and divine nature in us then ever, and more frequent and sensible commerce between the Inhabitants of the Astherial and Terrestrial Region, according as I have already declared concerning the Seventh day in this Defence of the Moral Cabbala.

But in the mean time though that full Sabbatism be so far off, yet I doubt not but there have been and are very sweet and joyful prayers of it in sundry persons, which quickens their hopes and desires of the compleatment thereof: and that of the holy Apostle, Pàzo h x πίστος αυτε- νάνα ἡ σουναξία αἱρές ἡ νυν, is not less true now then in his own times, But those that would abuse that Text to a Political sense and tumultuous mispractice, are the Birth of Vipers, not the revealed Sons of God. For the wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God, Nor are the weapons of our warfare carnal, but Spiritual. Which may be a safe key to the unlocking of the Mystery of all those Prophecies concerning the Reign of the Saints and their Victories, which fanaticall persons and of a groffle temper so easily erre in, to the great disturbance of the World. And I must confess that even learned men and of a more polite judgment and peaceable Spirit have been very prone to mistake in this point, the phrase of Scripture seeming literally to found that way: which if I could believe to be the right sense thereof, I should not be able to read the Predictions without horror and affrightement; there being greater reason to be impassion'd for miseries to come then those that are long since passed, and for such as are some time to fall upon the Church of Christ then for those that concern mere Pagans. Pour out thy wrath upon the Heathen that have not known thee, and upon the Kingdoms that have not called upon thy name; would be the more natural with of every well-willer to Christendome in this case; amongst the number of whom I cannot but profess myself.

And therefore perceiving the order of things so demonstrable, that of necessity the judgment of the Little Horn, the destruction of the Man of Sin, the burning of the Whore of Babylon; and the like, are yet to come, and also concern the Christian World; and that upon this destruction all the Kingdoms of the Earth are to be the Kingdoms of Christ and of his Saints: I am infinitely relieved and refreshed in my own spirit, in that I am sufficiently satisfied in my self that

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this Destruction is not to be understood necessarily of any carnal warfare and effusion of blood, but of that warfare which is not carnal, as St. Paul speaks, and that the Reign of the Saints will not be by the invasion of the rights of Princes upon the pretence of their want of Saintship, but by the conversion of Prince and people every where into the condition of Saints; and that the burning of Rome by fire is no more meant by that Tragical Prediction in the Apocalypse, then the sacking of Corinth by St. Paul's weapons of warfare, which he boasts to be so mighty, through God for pulling down of strong holds. Nay I will add further, that it is not only not necessary that these Predictions should be understood in so gross a sense, but that there is far greater reason to conclude that they are not so to be understood, whether we consider the things themselves that are predicted, or the phrasé and prefigurations of them in the Prophecies. And it would make much for the peace and happiness of Christendome, if any able Pen were employ'd in a more particularly making out so concerning a Truth: Besides the gratifying of the more ingenious Spirits, whose understandings cannot be well at rest in any supposition that clashes with that demonstrable order of Visions, Synchronal and successive, which Mr Mede has so happily light upon, and out of the rode of which all Expositions are found so groundless and inept, to rack'd and confused; nor their hearts at ease, if those menaces and encouragements to revenge, wars and bloodshed, should be the real scope and meaning of these Apocalyptic visions, and should not be figuratively and spiritually to be understood: which undoubtedly is the chief and primary, if not the only, sense of them. An Hypothesis which once received would prevent all the ill use that might be made of these clear and wonderful Predictions, and would remove all occasion of prejudice and disgust of the most rational and coherent interpretations of them.

But out of my love of the Peace and Tranquillity of the Church, not to lull her asleep into a false security; it does not at all follow, that, because this storm of destruction is not literally meant against her, therefore she shall never fall into any such. For assuredly there may be such a constitution of things, as if the Church should fall thereinto, would certainly bring down divine vengeance, though God had never threatened it. As for example, If the Generality of the Guides of Christendome should be gross Idolaters, bold Nullers or Abrogators of the indispensible Laws of Christ by their corrupt Institutes, and bloody and barbarous Persecutors and Murderers of those that out of conscience towards God will not commit Idolatry with them, nor forfake the commands of Christ; and to arm and occurratate themselves in this devilish Apostasy, should secretly foment in their own breasts, and endeavour to convey unto others, that hideous monster of Atheism and Infidelity, taking it for their deepest foundation, That all things are alike true in Religion, only they must have the wit to direct what is most for the power and profit of the Priest, and make his Interest the measure of all, not the honour of God nor Salvation of the people: I say, if they should lapse into such a dreadful Apostasy as this, it is unimaginable how Vengeance could be kept off from overtaking them at the long run, or what hope they could have to speed better then
then the Jews, those Murderers of the Prophets of old, of whom Christ declares, that for persecuting and killing his innocent servants, all the righteous blood shed upon Earth should come upon them, from the blood of righteous Abel to the blood of Zacharias the Son of Barachias, whom they slew betwixt the Temple and the Altar. And what a sad vengeance it was that did at last overtake them, though they were the peculiar people of God, is over-well known, unless it were better considered.

If any such thing should ever come to pass, which God avert, the very external Cortex then of the Prophetick Vision would ex accidenti seem Prophetical, and the contexture of Phrases and Prefigurations such, as if they were intended to be in some sort δέλτιον μέχρια, a two-edged Sword, striking both waies, and so destroying them in the gross sense that had hardened themselves against the spiritual edge thereof, and would not suffer their foul abominations to be cut off, and that bloody and Idolatrous Beastliness, that had ruled so long, to be slain thereby. To as many as so modest a sense as this can seem intolerable, they cannot but seem to me rather Acteitically sottish, and utterly unbelieving of any truth of either Prophecies or Providence, and to think that humane wit and force will carry all before it: or else they are in a sleepy self-condemned condition, and hate the light because their deeds are evil, such as say unto God, Depart from us, we desire not the Knowledge of thy waies; or such as give the Nazarites wine to drink, and command the Prophets, saying, Prophecy not; that say to the Seers, See not, and to the Prophets, Prophecy not unto us right things; speak unto us smooth things, prophecy deceits.

But unless I would my self be a false and deceitfull Interpreter of the Prophets, I cannot but profess, that I think that that more Eximious and Illustrious Kingdom of Christ upon Earth is yet to come, and that it will in due time be accomplished one way or other, according as Daniel has predicted, That the Kingdom, and Dominion, and the greatnesse of the Kingdom under the whole Heaven, shall be given to the people of the Saints of the most High: Which is not yet come to paff, forasmuch as that little Horn that speaks such great things is not yet put to silence.

Which little Horn cannot be Antiochus Epiphanes, he plainly belonging to the Leopard with Four heads, or to the Goat with four horns; which Den. 7. 6. Beasts denote the Greek Kingdom, of which the great Horn, or Alexander, is accounted the first King, and the other four as his succesfours, (else how could he be first?) and Antiochus reckoned in the latter time of the Kingdom of the Four Horns: which further shews that the succesfours of Alexander's succesfours belong all to that one kingdom that is styled Greek, and represented by the entire bodies of those Beasts, the Leopard and He-Goat, the one with four heads and four wings, and the other with four horns after the breaking of that first great one. From whence it is necessary that the Fourth be the Roman Empire, according to what has been also the constant opinion of the Church and of the Fathers.

At the fame Times and Events does St. John point with these of Daniel, in the blatt of the seventh Trumpet. And the seventh Angel sounded, and there were great voices in Heaven, saying, The Kingdomes of the World are Rev. 11. 15. become
become the Kingdomes of our Lord, and of his Christ, and he shall reign for
ever and ever.

And lastly, the Apostle Paul also witnesseth, that before Christ deliver
up the Kingdom to his Father, he is to put down * all Rule, and all Author-
ity and Power, &c. For he must reign till he have put all his enemies under his
feet: The last enemy that shall be destroyed is Death, which (as I have
already signified unto you) though he be now the King of Terrorours, will
in that great Festival and Sabbatizm, by reason of so sensiblc and pal-
pable union betwixt the Heavenly and Earthly nature, be but a pleasante
passage into an higher room, or, to use that more mysterious expression of
the Rabbins concerning Moses, in whose Writings this Sabbatizm is
adumbrated, God will draw up a mans Soul to himself by an Amoros
kiss: For such was the death of that holy man Moses, who is said to have
died in Moab יתנש יב יב, in the kisses and embracements of God.

This shall be the condition of the Church of Christ for many hundred
years, till the Wheel of Providence driving on further, and the Stage
of things drawing on to their last Period, men shall not only be freed from
the fear and pain of death, but there shall be no capacity of dying at all.

For then shall the day of the Lord come, wherein the Heavens shall passe away
with a noise, and the Elements melt with fervent heat, and the Earth with
all the things in it shall be burnt up. Thus Christ having done vengeance
upon the oblinately wicked and disobedient, and fully triumphed over all
his enemies, he will give up his Kingdom to his Father, whose Victo-
rent hitherto he hath been in the affairs of both Men and Angels. But till
then, whosoeuer by pretending to be more Spiritual and Mystical than
other men, would sinother thofe Essentiel Principles of the Christian
Religion that have reference to the external Person of Christ, let him
phrase it as well as he will, or speak as magnificently of himself as he can,
we are never to let go the plain and warrantable Faith of the Word for
ungrounded fancys and fine sayings.

Wherefore let every man seek God apart, and search out the Truth in
the holy Scripture, preparing himself for a right understanding thereof,
by steadifyly and sincerely practising fuch things as are plainly and uncon-
 trovertedly contained therein, and expect illumination according to the
best communication thereof, that is, answerably to our own Faculties;
otherwise if we bid all Reason, and History, and Humane helps and Acqui-
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