THE THEAETETUS

OF

PLATO.
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OF

PLATO,

WITH TRANSLATION AND NOTES.

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Δώρον λαβ' ἐτικ ἀξιοτάτη τοῦτε.

χάρις χάριν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ τίκτωρε ἄει.
I. THE dialogues of Plato, which I chose, from time to time, for the school work of my Sixth Form, were chiefly the Protagoras, the Euthydemus, and the Hippias Major; since this last, if not Platonic, is very amusing and instructive. But I seldom allowed any of my foremost boys to leave school without reading with them privately in the evenings the Theaetetus also, as the best preparative for their deeper study of Plato and of Greek philosophy in general: often adding to it the earlier books (1—4) of Aristotle's Ethics. In the past year, 1880, I took it for the subject of my Cambridge Lectures, reading a translation to my class, and commenting as occasion required. This was executed in the first instance quite independently, without reference to Professor Jowett's version; but in revising my translation for the press I have compared the two, with frequent advantage, as might be expected, to the correction of my own work. Still the result is, that I have generally departed less widely from the literal Greek than my confrère in the Sister University: and the reason of this is evident:
the Master of Balliol has translated for the instruction of all English-speaking students of Plato, whether Greek scholars or not: I for the special convenience of Greek students in Universities.

II. The order of Plato's writings, and the genuineness of many, are questions respecting which the varieties of opinion and the controversies resulting, chiefly within the present century, have been so many and so discordant, as to prove that no certainty can be reached on either point. Schleiermacher's translation with its prefaces (first published 1804—1810) was the trumpet-call of the warfare which has gone on ever since. His elaborate attempt to arrange the dialogues on a systematic principle of nascent and ever growing philosophic doctrine has not been fully accepted by any of the scholars who have since published their views, Ast, Socher, Stallbaum, K. F. Hermann, Steinhart, Susemihl, Suckow, Munk, Bonitz, Ueberweg, Schaarschmidt and others: while Ritter Brandis and Zeller, historians of Greek philosophy, are less unfavourable to the principle of Schleiermacher, though not admitting it in its details. Out of 35 or 36 dialogues usually set down as Plato's, Ast will only accept 14 as genuine; viz. (1) Protagoras, Phaedrus, Gorgias. Phaedo: (2) Theaetetus, Sophista, Politicus, Parmenides, Cratylus: (3) Philebus, Symposium, Republica, Timaeus, Critias: in this order. Thus he even rejects the Leges, though cited by Aristotle. This may be considered the extreme opinion on the sceptical side, as Grote in his work on 'Plato and the other companions of Socrates' represents the extreme credulous
view, supporting the Alexandrine canon of Thrasyllus, a grammarian of the Augustan age, cited by Diogenes of Laertia. This canon rejected ten dialogues, which Diogenes enumerates; and these have since then been universally treated as spurious. Some of them did not survive: seven are printed at the close of the Tauchnitz edition and by Bekker, along with the 13 Epistles (which Grote, differing from most scholars, accepts as genuine) and the Definitions (ὁροῖ). Thrasyllus distributed the dialogues of Plato into two classes; (1) d. of Investigation (ξητητίκοι); (2) d. of Exposition (ὑφηγητικοί). These he also subdivided variously: but his subdivisions have little interest. The chronological order of the dialogues, like the genuineness of many, is a much disputed question on some points: strikingly so respecting the date of the Phaedrus, which Schleiermacher, as an essential feature in his system, deems the earliest; while others, as Stallbaum and Steinhart, place it among the latest.

Generally it may be said that the shorter and slighter dialogues, when accepted as genuine, are ascribed to Plato's youth; the Republic, Timaeus and Leges are universally admitted to be the latest: while the Theaetetus, Sophista and Politicus (usually too the Parmenides and Cratylus) are supposed to have been written by Plato during his travels or on his return—at all events before his 40th year.

The following arrangement is that of a critic who had evidently given much time and thought, with great zeal, to the elucidation of these questions; I mean K. F. Hermann. He, in common with most
writers on this subject, distributes the works which he accepts into three groups: (1) the earlier, composed partly before the death of Socrates B.C. 399, partly after it, before Plato quit Megara: (2) those written under the influence of the Megarian dialectic, during or immediately after the years of travel: (3) the later, commencing with the Phaedrus, and going on during the second half of Plato's career, while he was schoolarch of the Academy, from 386 (probably) till his death in 347.

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Those to which * is appended are classed by Grote as dialogues of exposition; the rest are of investigation (zetetic) except the two with asterisks, which are of neither kind. Grote accepts seven others which Hermann disallows.
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It is satisfactory to gather from these notices that the Theaetetus is admitted on all hands to be a genuine work of Plato. It is almost universally ascribed to his age of manhood, and to a time when (having imbibed before his 27th year the lore and didactic skill of Socrates, having in the subtle discussions of Megara had full opportunity of practising the dialectic method) he had enlarged his learning and experience by intercourse with the mathematicians of Cyrene and the Pythagorean schoolmen of Italy. The dialogues called Sophistes and Politicus are connected with the Theaetetus, and their genuineness is generally admitted, though the Sophistes is disallowed by Ueberweg.

III. A preface to the Theaetetus would be incomplete without some account of antecedent Hellenic philosophy. But in a preface, even to Plato's works, much more to a single dialogue, such an account must be brief and eclectic. Some topics must be placed in stronger light, and more fully considered than others. What are these?

(1) In the first place, Socrates is an interlocutor in all Plato's dialogues, excepting 'the Laws': and in most of them (though not in the Sophistæ) we find him discussing, more or less, some principle or practice of those who are called Sophists. With Socrates himself therefore, with his method, and with the Sophists and their doctrines, a young student will do well to make acquaintance, before he enters upon any of Plato's writings.

(2) In several of Plato's works (as in the Theaete-
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tus) appears the contrast between (1) the physical
teaching of the Eleatic School (Melissus, Parmenides,
Zeno), the forerunner of pantheism, in which the
universe is one Being (Ens) at rest, and (2) that of
Heracleitus of Ephesus, who taught Becoming in the
place of Being. Many rather than One, Motion and
Change instead of Rest, ascribing such motion to
the flow of a prevailing fiery element (πάντα ἥρει).
Distinct again from these were (1) the teaching of
Empedocles of Agrigentum, who took the concord
of four elements (fire, air, earth, water) as the base
of existence; (2) that of the Atomists, Leucippus
and Democritus, who ascribed the origin of things to
the fortuitous concurrence in space of small indivisi-
ble particles (ἄτομα); (3) that of Anaxagoras, who
assigned the arrangement of his ὁμοιομέρεια to
supreme Intelligence (νοῦς). All these philosophers
had been preceded by two other famous schools in
the 6th century B.C.: (1) the Ionian (Thales, Anaxi-
mander, Anaximenes), who imagined the primary sub-
stance of things to be—the first, Water, the second,
Indeterminate Matter (τὸ ἀπειρον), the third, Air:
(2) the Italic sect of Pythagoras, which lasted long, and
formed a powerful order. This school ascribed marvellous organic properties to Number, and believed in
the transmigration of souls. All the philosophers
above-named, from Thales to Anaxagoras, flourished
during the century and a half anterior to the age of
Socrates (600—440 B.C.), though their exact dates are
uncertain.

Zeller, whose views are welcomed by Professor
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Jowett, maintains that all these various schools were engaged in teaching purely physical doctrines; for that even the seeming abstractions, assumed as primal by the Pythagoreans the Eleatics and Anaxagoras (Number, Being, Intellect), were not understood by them as absolutely incorporeal. See Zeller's Presocratic Philosophy (translated by Alleyne); also Preller's Historia Philosophiae (for citation of passages), Schwegler's History of Philosophy (translated by Stirling), and the fuller work of Ueberweg (published by Messrs Hodder and Stoughton).

IV. Socrates is said by Cicero to have called down philosophy from heaven; by which is meant that Socrates was the first to change the direction of philosophical studies in Hellas; to divert them from the universe to man himself, from cosmogony to anthropology. But this credit belongs rather to that school of thinkers with whom Socrates was most at war, to those who are called Sophists: especially to Protagoras the eldest and most influential of their number—the author of the famous dogma 'man is the measure of all things,' in other words, 'what seems to each is to each.' Protagoras was born at Abdera in Thrace, and flourished B.C. 450—430. Gorgias of Leontini was contemporary, but lived to a great age, dying 380. Prodicus of Ceos flourished 435. Others of note were Hippias of Elis, Polus, Thrasymachus, and the brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. They professed to teach all subjects of liberal education; philosophy, rhetoric, language, logical eristic, &c.: and they travelled from city to
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city, exacting and obtaining large fees for the instruction given. This instruction was calculated, as they declared, to acquaint their pupils with the progress of human civilization, to free them from prejudices, to give breadth and strength to their mental faculties, to make them wise thinkers and fluent speakers, to teach them how to form just opinions on public affairs, how to manage their own property, and to deal with mankind in general.

In mentioning this famous Sophistic school, so far as it deserves to be called a school, we may note the fate which has attended the name itself and its derived words. Sophist, sophistical, sophism, sophistry, sophistication, are all of them terms used to designate what is delusive and false. A similar discredit in modern times attaches to the words jesuit, jesuitical, jesuitry, jesuitism. So the words heresy, heretic, heresiarch, heretical, are now never used except in a vituperative sense. Yet Sophist was a creditable name originally: it is given by Herodotus to the Seven Sages and to Pythagoras. Jesuit simply means a member of the Society of Jesus, such title being allowed by the Pope (who calls himself ‘Vicar of Jesus Christ on earth’) to the Order of Ignatius Loyola, for the enhancement of its dignity and credit. Heresy (ἀἵρεσις, choice) merely meant the Latin ‘secta,’ a sect: and Clement of Alexandria calls the Catholic Church itself ‘the best of all heresies’ (sects). Each of these terms therefore acquired its evil sense, partly, no doubt, by errors and faults of those who bore them, partly by the charges and invectives of powerful ene-
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Undoubtedly the Sophists, as a class, found their most powerful enemy in Plato; and upon his dialogues (especially the Euthydemus, Gorgias, Hippias I. and Sophistes) the principal charges against them as a class originally rest. In the great historian of Greece, Mr Grote, they have found their most powerful champion and rehabilitater; their cause being likewise pleaded strongly by the late Mr Lewes in his History of Philosophy. All Greek students have in their hands Grote's History; and they may be referred to that work for a general statement of the case on both sides; but more particularly to the facts and arguments urged by him as counsel (so to say) for the defendants in Part II. Ch. lxvii. On the other side, as not fully agreeing with Mr Grote's strong championship, may be consulted Thirlwall's History of Greece, Ferrier's Lectures, and Professor Jowett's prefaces to the Platonic Dialogues, especially his preface to the Sophistes.

V. Besides the Academic school of Plato and his successors, philosophic schools of minor influence were founded by three other pupils of Socrates. These were Antisthenes, Aristippus, and Eucleides. Antisthenes taught at Athens in the gymnasium called Cynosarges, whence his school was called that of the Cynics. He held that virtue alone suffices for happiness, anticipating the later Stoic doctrines. Diogenes of Sinope, whose interview with Alexander the Great is so famous, was the best known member of

1 Grote's views are supported by Mr H. Sidgwick in two able papers printed in the Cambridge Journal of Philology (Nos. viii. ix.).
this school. Aristippus of Cyrene founded the Cyrenaic or Hedonic school, which taught that pleasure is the supreme good of man, thus forerunning the later teaching of Epicurus. Eucleides of Megara founded the short-lived Megaric school, which is said to have taught a fusion of Eleatic and Socratic doctrines. Dialectic was among its special studies, and was occasionally carried to the excess known as Eristic. Many curious puzzles of thought are ascribed to its disciples. Of these three schools see a brief account in Schwegler’s History of Philosophy (Transl. p. 53), and consult also the larger work of Ueberweg (Vol. I. §§ 34—38). It was to Megara that Plato retired after the death of Socrates, and resided there before his travels, probably exercising himself in dialectic discussion. Susemihl thinks that in gratitude for this kindness he commemorates his Megarian friends in the introduction to the Theaetetus, thus indirectly dedicating the dialogue to them.

VI. An analysis of the Theaetetus is given in the headings of the several sections, noted in the Greek text 1.—XLIV., in the translation 1—44. In the notes at the close, as in the Greek text, the marginal pages and alphabetic divisions of the first edition of Stephens are also referred to. These notes are chiefly designed to trace the chain of Plato’s reasoning in places where it is not easily discerned: but occasionally they refer to the commentaries of Professor Campbell and H. Schmidt.
ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ.

ΕΥΚΛΕΙΔΗΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ,
ΤΕΡΨΙΩΝ, ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ,
ΘΕΛΙΤΙΤΟΣ.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ
ΟΕΛΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

[Numeri marginales Arabici qui vocantur, editionis primae Stephanianna paginas indicant, Romani ejusdem editionis capitula. Stellula paginae, signum sectionis initium notat.]

I. * 'Αρτί, ὁ Τερψίων, ἦ πάλαι ἐξ ἀγροῦ; ΤΕΡ. τ.; Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι. καὶ σὲ γε ἐξήτουν κατ’ ἁγορὰν καὶ ἐθαύμαζον ὅτι οὐχ οἶδος τ’ ἢ εὑρεῖν. ΕΤ. Οὐ γὰρ ἦν κατὰ πῦλιν. ΤΕΡ. Ποῦ μὴν; ΕΤ. Εἰς λυμένα καταβαίνων Θεατίτηρος ἐνέτυχον φερομένῳ ἐκ Κορίθθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου Λαθήμαζε. ΤΕΡ. Ζώντα ἦ τετελευτηκότα; ΕΤ. Ζώντα καὶ μάλα μόρις: χαλέπως μὲν βιγάρ ἔχει καὶ ὑπὸ τραυμάτων τινῶν, μᾶλλον μὴν αὐτῶν αἱρεῖ τὸ γεγονὸς νόσημα ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι. ΤΕΡ. Μῶν ἡ δυσεντερία; ΕΤ. Ναί. ΤΕΡ. Οἶον ἄνθρα λέγεις ἐν κινδύνῳ εἶναι. ΕΤ. Κακὸν τε καὶ ἄγαθὸν, ὁ Τερψίων· ἐπεὶ τοι καὶ νῦν ἡκουόν τινων μάλα ἐγκωμιάζοντων αὐτῶν περὶ τὴν μάχην. ΤΕΡ. Καὶ οἰδέν γ’ ἀτοποῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ θαυμαστότερον, εἰ μὴ τοιοῦτος ἦν. ἀτὰρ πῶς οὐκ ἁυτῶν Μεγαρᾶ κατέληνε; ΕΤ. ο’ Ἰππεῖγετο οἰκάδε· ἐπεὶ ἔγον ἐδεόμην καὶ συνεβούλευον, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἤθελε. καὶ δήτα προπέμψας αὐτῶν, ἄπιων πάλιν ἀνεκμήκθην καὶ ἐθαύμασα Σωκράτους, ὅς μαντικῶς ἄλλα τε δὴ ἐΐπε καὶ περὶ τούτων. δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι

1—2
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όλογον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ μειρακίων ὡστι, καὶ συγγενομένως τε καὶ διαλεχθεῖς πάνυ ἀγασθῆναι αὐτοῦ τῇ φύσιν. καὶ μοι ἐλθόντι Ἀθήναξε τοὺς τε

1) λέγουσι οὖς διελέξθη αὐτῷ διηγήσατο, καὶ ἤμα αἴσθουσι πάχος, εἰπέ τε ὅτι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη εἰς τούτου ἐλλόγμου γενέσθαι, εἰπερ εἰς ἠλικιαν ἐλθοι. ΤΕΡ. Καὶ ἅληθῆ γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπεν. ἀτὰρ τίνες ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι; ἔχουσα ἀν διηγήσασθαι; ΕΤ. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δίαν, οὐκοῦν οὐτῷ γε ἀπὸ στόματος ἀλλ᾽ ἐγραψάμην μὲν τὸν εὐθεῖα * οἴκαο ἐλθὼν ὑπομνήματα, ὄστερον δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναμμηνευσκόμενος ἐγράφον, καὶ ὅσας Ἀθηναζε αἰφικοῖμην, ἐπανηρῶτι καὶ τὸν Λωκράτην ὥ μη εμεμήνηνται, καὶ δεύτερο ἐλθὼν ἐπηνωρθούμην. ὡστε μοι σχεδὸν τι πᾶς ὁ λόγος γέγραπται. ΤΕΡ. Ἀληθῆς ἕκουσά σου καὶ πρότερον, καὶ μεντοι αἰεὶ μέλλων κελεύσεις ἐπιδείξαι διατέτριφα δεύτερο. ἀλλα τί κωλὺει τινί ἡμᾶς διελθεῖν πάντως ἐγώγη καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι δέομαι ὡς ἐξ ἀγροῦ ἡκιν. 

Β ΕΤ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς μέχρι Ἐρμυνοῦ Θεαιτητοῦ προὔπεμψα, ὡστε ὅν ἀν ἀνθιδῶς ἀναπαυὸμην. ἀλλ᾽ ἔστωμεν καὶ ἡμῖν ἁμα ἀναπαύσομενοι ὁ παῖς ἀναργόσεται. ΤΕΡ. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.—ΕΤ. Το μὲν δὴ βιβλίον ὡς Τερψίων, τούτῳ ἐγραψάμην δὲ δὴ οὕτως τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι ἐμοὶ Λωκράτην διηγούμενον ὡς διηγείτο ἀλλὰ διαλεγόμενον ὡς ἐφὲ διαλεξῆθηναι ἐφε δὲ τῷ τε γεωμέτρῃ Θεοδώρῳ καὶ τῷ Θεαιτητῷ. ἵνα οὖν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐ μὴ 1 παρέχουσιν πράγματα αἱ μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων διηγήσεις περὶ αὐτοῦ τε, ὅποτε λέγοι ὁ Λωκράτης, οἶον Καὶ ἐγώ ἐφην ἢ Καὶ ἐγὼ ἐστο, ἢ αὐτῷ τοῦ ἀποκριμομένου, ὡς Συνεφὴ ἢ Οὐχ ἡμολόγησας τούτων ἐνεκά ὡς αὐτῶν αὐτοῖς διαλεγόμενον ἐγραφα, ἐξελῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα. ΤΕΡ. Καὶ οὐδὲν γε ἀπὸ τρίτου, ὡς Εὐκλείδη.
ΕΤ. Ἀλλα, παῖ, λαβὲ τὸ βιβλίον καὶ λέγε. — Π. ΣΩ. 
Εἰ μὲν τῶν ἐν Κυρίῳ 1 μᾶλλον ἐκφώμη, ὁ Θεόδωρε. τὰ ἐκεῖ ἂν σε καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἀνηρώτων, εἰ τίνες αὐτόθι περὶ γεωμετρίαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν εἰσὶ τῶν νέων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμενοι νῦν δὲ—ἡττον γὰρ ἐκείνους ἢ τούσδε φιλό, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι, τίνες ἢ μὲν τῶν νέων ἐπίδοξοι γενέσθαι ἐπιεικεῖς· ταῦτα δὴ αὐτὸς τε σκοπῶ καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἑρωτῶ, οἷς ἂν ὁρῶ τοὺς νέους ἐθέλοντας ξυγμίγρεσθαι. σοὶ δὴ οὐκ ὀλίγοις πλησίαζουσι, καὶ δικαιῶς ἄξιοι γὰρ τὰ 1 τε ἄλλα καὶ γεωμετρίας ἔνεκα. εἰ δὴ οὖν τῳ ἐνετυχει ἄξιοι λόγοι, ἥδεως ἂν πυθομήν. ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μὴν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐμοί τε εἰπεῖν καὶ σοὶ ἀκοῦσαι πάνυ ἄξιον, οἷοὶ ἦμεν τῶν πολιτῶν μειράκων ἐντετύχησα. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν καλὸς, ἐφοβοῦμην ἃν σφόδρα λέγειν, μὴ καὶ τῷ δόξῳ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ αὐτῶν εἶναι νῦν δὲ, καὶ μὴ μοι ἄχθουν, οὐκ ἔστι καλὸς, προσέοικε δὲ σοὶ τὴν τε σιμο- 
τητα καὶ τὸ ἐξω τῶν ὀμμάτων ἢττον δὲ ἢ σὺ ταῦτ' ἔχει. ἀδεὼς δὴ λέγω. εὖ * γὰρ ἵσθι ὃτι ὄν δὴ πῶ—ποτε ἐνετυχο—καὶ πάνυ πολλοῖς πεπλησίακα—οὐδένα πω ἡσθόμην ὡτῳ βαυμαστῶς εὐ πεφυκότα. τὸ γὰρ εὔμαθι ὄντα, ὡς ἄλλοι χαλεπόν, πρᾶον αὐ εἶναι δια-
φερότως, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων ἄνδρεων παρ' ὄντων, ἐγὼ μὲν οὔτ' ἂν ὁμήρη γενέσθαι οὔτε ὁρῶ γιγμομένους· ἀλλ' οὐ τε ὃξεῖς ὡσπερ ὡτός καὶ ἄρχινοι καὶ μὴμόνες ὡς 
τὰ πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὀργὰς ὁξύρρησοι εἰσι, καὶ ἄτ-
ἀντονται ὡσπερ τὰ ἀνερμάτιστα πλούτα, καὶ 1 μα-
ἰκώτεροι ἡ ἄνδρείστεροι φύσται, οὐ τε αὐ ἐμβρι-
θέστεροι νοθροί πως ἀπαντᾶσθι πρὸς τὰς μαθησεῖς καὶ 
λήθης γέμιστες. ὁ δὲ οὕτω λείως τε καὶ ἀπταιστῶς καὶ 
ἀνυσίμως ἐρχεται ἐπὶ τὰς μαθησεῖς τε καὶ ξητῆσεις
μετὰ πολλῆς πραούτητος, οίων ἐλαίου ῥέμα καὶ ὑφοιτή ῥέοντος, ὡστε θαυμάσαι τὸ τηλικοῦτον ὄντα οὕτω ταῦτα διαπράττεσθαι. ΣΩ. Εὖ ἀγγέλλεις. τίνος δὲ καὶ ἐστὶ τῶν πολιτῶν; ΘΕΟ. Ἀκίνκα μὲν τούρνομα, µηνυμονέων δὲ οὐ. ἄλλα γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν προσομίων ὃ ἐν τῷ µέσῳ. ἀρτὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἔξω δρόμῳ ἥλειφοντο ἐταῦροι τέ τινες οὕτως αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτός, ὅν ὁ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἢλειφάμευοι δεῦρο ιέναι. ἄλλα σκόπει εἰ γιγνώσκεις αὐτόν. ΣΩ. Γυνώσκω· ὃ τοῦ Σουμέως Εὐθρούνου ἐστί, καὶ πάνυ γε, ὃ φίλε, ἀνδρός οἶνοι καὶ σῦ τοῦτον διηγεῖ, καὶ ἄλλως εὐδοκίμου, καὶ μέντοι καὶ οὐσίαν μάλα πολλὴν κατέλιπε. τὸ δ' οὖνομα οὐκ οἶδα τοῦ µειρακίου.

1) ΘΕΟ. Θεαίτητος, ὃ Σώκρατες, τὸ γε οὖνομα τὴν μέντοι οὐσίαν δοκοῦσί μοι ἐπίτροποι τίνες διειθαρκεῖναι. ἄλλ' ὠμοὶ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν χρηµάτων ἔλευθερίοτητα θαυµαστός, ὃ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Γεννικὸν λέγεις τὸν ἄνδρα, καὶ μοι κέλευε αὐτὸν ἐνθάδε παρακαθίζεσθαι. ΘΕΟ. Ἑστι ταῦτα. Θεαίτητε, δεῦρο παρὰ Σωκράτη. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὃ Θεαίτητε, ἕνα κἀγὼ ἐµαυτὸν ἀνασκέψωμαι, ποιῶν τι ἕχω τὸ πρόσωπον.

Ε' φησὶ γὰρ Θεόδωρος ἔχειν µε σοὶ ἕμοιον. ἀτὰρ εἰ νῦν ἐχοντος ἐκατέρου λύραν ἕφη αὐτός ἱµοῦσθαν ὡμοίως, πότερον εἶναὶ ἂν εἰπτευεύοµεν ἢ ἐπεσκεφάλισθ' ἂν εἴ μουσικὸς ὁυ λέγει; ΘΕΑ. Ἐπεσκεφάλισθ' ἂν. ΣΩ. Οὐκόν τουλοῦτον µὲν εὐρόντες ἐπειθόμεθ' ἂν, ἁµοῦσον δὲ, ἡπιστοῦµεν; ΘΕΑ. Ἀληθῆ. ΣΩ. Νῦν δὲ γ' οἴµαι, εἴ τι µέλει ἡµῖν τῆς τῶν προσώπων ὡµοιότητος, σκεπτέον εἰ γραφικὸς ὃν λέγει ἡ οὐ. ΘΕΑ. Δοκεῖ µοι. ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν θεόγραφικὸς Θεόδωρος; ΘΕΑ. Οὐχ, ὃσον γ' ἐµὲ εἴδεναι. ΣΩ. Ἡ Αρ', οὔτε γεωµετρικός; ΘΕΑ. Πάντως δήτου, ὃ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ
αστρονομικος και λογιστικος τε και μουσικος και όσα
παιδειας έχεται; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἕμοιοι δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν
άρα ἡμις τοῦ σώματος τι όμοιος φησιν εἶναι ἐπαινῶν
πη ἡ ἑγέμων, οὖν πάνυ αὐτῷ ἄξιον τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡσας οὖ. ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἰ ποτέρου την ψυ-
χὴν ἐπαινοὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ σοφίαν; ἄρ' οὖν: ἄξιον
τῷ μὲν ἀκούσαντι προθυμεῖσθαι ἀνασκέψασθαι
tὸν ἐπαινεθέντα, τῷ δὲ προθήμως ἐαυτὸν ἐπιδιεικνύαι;
ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ὁ Σώκρατες. ΠΤ. ΣΩ."Ορα
τοίνυν, ὁ φίλε Θεαῖτη, σοὶ μὲν ἐπιδεικνύαι, ἐμοὶ δὲ
σκοπεῖσθαι: ὡς εὖ ἱσθι, ὅτι Θεόδωρος πολλοὺς δὴ πρὸς
με ἐπαινέσας ξέιοις τε καὶ ἀστοὺς οὐδένα ποι ἐπήμεσεν
ὡς σὲ νῦν δή. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐν ἀν ἔχοι, ὁ Σώκρατες ἀλλ' ὁρὰ
μὴ παίξων 1 ἔλεγεν. ΣΩ. Οὐχ οὔτος ὁ τρόπος ὁ
Θεοδώρου. ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀναδύον τὰ ὠμολογημένα σκηπτῷ-
μενος παιζοντα λέγειν τόνδε, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἀναγκασθῇ
μαρτυρεῖν πάντως γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐπισκηνῆσε αὐτῷ. ἀλλὰ
θαρρῶν ἐμμενε τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ χρῆ ταῦτα
ποιεῖν, εἰ σοι δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. Λέγῃ δὴ μοι μανθαίνεις ποι
παρὰ Θεοδώρου γεωμετρίας ἄττα; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγρογε.
ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ 1 ἄρμονίας καὶ ὅ
λογισμοὺς; ΘΕΑΙ. Προβοηθοῦμαι γε δή. ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ
ἐγώ, ὁ παῖ, παρὰ γε τούτοι καὶ παρ' ἄλλων, οὐς ἄν
οἴωμαι τι τούτων ἐπαίειν. ἀλλ' ὡς τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔχω
περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως, σμικρῶς δὲ τι ἀπορῶ, ὁ μετὰ σοῦ
τε καὶ τῶνδε σκεπτέον. καὶ μοι λέγει ἄρ' οὖ τὸ μαν-
θάνειν ἐστὶ τὸ σοφότερον γνώμεσθαι περὶ ὁ μανθά
νει τις; ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; ΣΩ. Σοφία δὲ γ' οἴμαι
σοφοὶ οἱ σοφοὶ. ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Ἡ σοφία δὲ ἐπὶ ἐπιστή-
μης; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποιῶν; ΣΩ. Ἡ σοφία. ἡ οὐχ ἀπερ ἐπιστήμονες, ταῦτα καὶ σοφοὶ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τι μήν; ΣΩ. Ταύτων ἀρα ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Τούτ’ αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἔστιν ὁ ἀπορώ καὶ οὐ δύναμαι λαβεῖν ἰκανῶς παρ’ ἐμαυτῷ.

146 ἐπιστήμη ὁ τί ποτε τυχχάνει ὁν. ἄρ’ ὦν δὴ ἔχομεν * λέγειν αὐτὸ; τί φατέ; τίς ἂν ἦμων πρῶτον εἶποι; ὁ δὲ ἀμαρτῶν, καὶ ὅς ἂν ἂν ἂμαρτάνῃ, καθεδεῖται, ὥσπερ φασίν οἱ παῖδες οἱ σφαιρίζοντες, ὅνος ὅς ὃ ἂν περιγενηται ἀναμάρτητος, βασιλεύσει ἦμῶν καὶ ἐπιτάξει ὁ τι ἂν βούληται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Τι συγάτε; οὐ τι ποιν, ὁ Θεόδωρος, ἐγώ ὑπὸ φιλολογίας ἀγροικίζομαι, προθυμούμενος ἦμᾶς ποιήσαι διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φίλους τε καὶ προσηγόρους ἀλλήλους γίγνεσθαι; ΘΕΟ. 1"Ηκισταμένος, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἂν εἰ ἂγροικομοι, ἀλλα τῶν μειρακίων τι κέλευε σοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔγω μὲν γὰρ ἄλοθης τῆς τοιαύτης διάλεκτου, καὶ οὐδ’ αὐτὸ συνεβίβασθαι ἥλικιαν ἔχω. τοῦτο δὲ πρέποι τε ἂν τοῦτο καὶ πολὺ πλεῖον επιδιδοῦς τῷ γὰρ οὔτε ἡ νεύτης εἰς τὸν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει. ἀλλ’, ὥσπερ ἡρῴω, μη ἀφίέσθε τοῦ Θεαίτητου, ἀλλ’ ἐρώτα. IV. ΣΩ. Ἀκούεις δή, ὁ Θεαίτητε, ὁ λέγει Θεόδωρος, ὁ ἀπιστεῖν, ὥς ἐγὼ οἴμαι, οὔτε σὺ ἐδελύσεις, οὔτε θέμις περὶ τὰ τοιαύτα ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ ἐπιτάττοντι νεώτερον ἀπειθεῖν. ἀλλ’ εὐ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ’ τι σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐπιστήμη; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ χρὴ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδήπερ ὑμεῖς κελεύετε. πάντως γὰρ, ἄν τι καὶ ἀμαρτῶ, ἑπαναφόρωσετε. ΣΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἄν πέρ γε οὐκ ἂν ὦμεν. ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καὶ ὁ παρὰ Θεόδωρον ἂν τις μάθω ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, γεωμετρία τε καὶ ἂς νῦν δὴ σὺ διηλθεῖς, καὶ 1) αὐτοκτονικῷ τε καὶ 1ν τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν τέχναι, πάσαι τε καὶ ἐκάστη τοιοῦτων, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἡ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι. ΣΩ. Γενναίως γε καὶ φιλοδόρως, ὁ
φίλε, ἐν αὐτηθεὶς πολλὰ δίδωσ, καὶ ποικίλα ἀνθ' ἀπλοῦ. ΘΕΛ. Πώς τί τούτο λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Ἔσως μὲν οὖδέν, ὁ μέντοι οἶμαι, φράσω. ὅταν λέγης σκυτικῆν, μή τι ἄλλο φράζεις ἢ ἑπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων ἐργασίας; ΘΕΛ. Οὐδέν. ΣΩ. Τί δ' ὅταν ἐστεγουκην; μή τι ἄλλο ἡ ἑπιστήμην τῆς τῶν ξυλίων σκευῶν ἐργασίας; ΘΕΛ. Οὐδὲ τούτο. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν ἁμφοῖν, οὐ ἐκατέρα ἑπιστήμην, τούτο ὑπερίζεις; ΘΕΛ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Το δὲ γε ἐπερωτηθέν, ὁ Θεαῖτης, οὐ τούτο ἦν, τίνων ἡ ἑπιστήμην, οὐδὲ ὑπόσαι τινές. οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμηθαί αὐτὰς βουλόμενοι ἡρόμεθα, ἄλλα ἐρωτοῦν· ἐρωτοῦν· ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ ὁ τί ποτ' ἔστιν. ἢ οὐδέν λέγω; ΘΕΛ. Πάντως μὲν οὖν ὅρθος. ΣΩ. * Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τόδε. εἴ τις ἡμᾶς τῶν φαύλων τι καὶ προχείρων ἐροτο, οἷον περὶ πηλοῦ, ὁ τί ποτ' ἔστιν, εἰ ἀποκριναίμεθα αὐτῷ πηλός ὁ τῶν χυτρέων καὶ πηλός ὁ τῶν ἵπποπλαθῶν καὶ πηλός ὁ τῶν πλυνθομένων, οὐκ ἂν ἱελοῖοι εἶμεν; ΘΕΛ. Ἔσως. ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν γε ποιοὶ οἴόμενοι συνιέναι ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀποκρίσεως τῶν ἐρωτώματα, ὅταν εἴπωμεν πηλός, εἴτε ὁ τῶν κορασιοῦν προσθέντες εἴτε ἅλλον ὤντων δημιουργὸν. ἢ οἴει, τίς τις συνιέσι τίνος ὄνομα, ὃ μὴ οὖδε τί ἔστιν; ΘΕΛ. Οὐδαιμών. ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἀρα ἑπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων συνηθεῖν ἡ ἑπιστήμην μὴ εἰδώς. ΘΕΛ. Οὐ γὰρ. ΣΩ. Σκυτικὴν ἀρα οὐ συνηθεῖν ὃς ἂν ἑπιστήμην ἁρµοῖ, οὐδὲ τινα ἄλλην τέχνην. ΘΕΛ. Ἐστιν οὕτω. ΣΩ. Γελοῖα ἁρα ἡ ἀπόκρισις τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι ἑπιστήμην τί ἔστιν, ὅταν ἀποκρίσθητι τέχνης τίνος ὄνομα. τίνος γὰρ ἑπιστήμην ὑποκρίνεται, οὐ τούτο ἐρωτηθές. ΘΕΛ. Ἐοικεν. ο ΣΩ. Ἐπειτὰ γε ποι ἐξῶν ψάλλως καὶ βραχέως ἀποκρίνασθαι περιέρχεστι ἀπέραντον ὄνομα. οἶνον καὶ ἐν τῇ
τού πηλού ἑρωτήσει φαύλον που καὶ ἀπλοῦν εἴπειν, ὅτι
gὴ ὑγρῷ φυραθεῖσα πηλὸς ἀν εἰη, τὸ δ’ ὄτον ἐὰν χαίρειν.  
V. ΘΕΑΙ. ἩΡίδιον, ὁ Σώκρατες, νῦν γε οὖτω φαίνεται:  
ἀτὰρ κινδύνευεις ἑρωτάν ὦν καὶ αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν ἐναγχός  
ὦ εἰσήλθε διαλεγομένοις, ἐμοὶ τε καὶ τῷ σῷ ὁ ὁμονύμῳ 
τούτῳ Σώκρατε. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποιὸν δὴ, ὁ Θεαίτητε;  
ΘΕΑΙ. Περὶ δυνάμεων τι ἡμῖν Θεόδωρος ὦδε ἔγραφε, 
τὴς τε τρίποδος πέρι καὶ πεντέποδος, ἀποφαίνων ὦτι 
μήκει οὐ εὐμέτροι τῇ ποδαίᾳ, καὶ οὖτος κατὰ μίαν 
ἔκαστην προαιρομένους μέχρι τῆς ἑπτακαιδέκαποδος· ἐν 
δὲ ταύτῃ ποι ἐνέσχετο. ἡμῖν οὖν εἰσῆλθε τι τοιοῦτον,  
ἐπειδὴ ἀπειροὶ τὸ πλῆθος αἱ δυνάμεις εφαίνοντο, πειρά-  
θήναι εὐλαβεῖν εἰς ἐν, ὅτι πᾶσας ταύτας ἑν προσαγο-  
ρεύσομεν τὰς δυνάμεις. ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ εὑρετῇ τι τοιοῦτον;  
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε δοκοῦμεν. σκόπει δὲ καὶ σὺ. ΣΩ. Λέγε.  
ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸν ἁριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελίβομεν. τὸν μὲν  
dυνάμενον ἴσον ἴσακις γῆγρεσθαι τῷ τετραγώνῳ τὸ  
σχῆμα ἀπεικάσαντες τετράγωνον τε καὶ ἱσόπλευρον  
προσείπομεν. ΣΩ. Καὶ εὐ γε. ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸν τοινν  
μεταξὺ τοῦτον, ὅν καὶ τὰ τρία καὶ τὰ πέντε * καὶ  
pᾶς ὃς ἀδύνατος ἴσος ἴσακις γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἡ πλεῖον  
ἐλαττονάκις ἢ ἑλάττων πλεονάκις γίγνεται, μείζων δὲ  
cαὶ ἑλάττων ἀεὶ πλευρά αὐτῶν περιλαμβάνει, τῷ προ-  
μήκει αὐτχήματι ἀπεικάσαντες προμήκη ἁριθμὸν ἐκα-  
λέσαμεν. ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα. ἀλλὰ τι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο;  
ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁσαὶ μὲν γραμμαὶ τὸν ἱσόπλευρον καὶ ἑπί-  
pεδον ἁριθμὸν τετραγωνικοῦσι, μῆκος ἁρισάμεθα, ὅσαί  
v δὲ τὸν ἑτερομῆκη, δυνάμεις, ὃς μήκει μὲν οὐ ἡ  
εὐμέτρος ἑκεῖναις, τοῖς δ’ ἑπιπέδοις ἢ δύναται. καὶ  
περὶ τὰ στερεὰ ἀλλο τοιοῦτον. ΣΩ. Ἀρίστα γ’ ἀνθρώπων, ὁ  
pαιδες, ὡστε μοι δοκεῖ ὁ Θεόδωρος οὐκ ἐνοχος τοῖς ψευδο-
μαρτυρίοις ἐσεσθαί. ΘΕΛΙ. Καὶ μὴν, ὁ Σάκρατες, ὅ γε ἔρωτάς περὶ ἐπιστήμης, οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀποκρίνασθαι ὁσπερ περὶ τοῦ μήκους καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως. καίτοι σὺ γε μοι δοκεῖς τοιοῦτον τι ξητεῖν. ὡστε πάλιν αὐτ ἐλεύθερα τυγχάνει, εἰτὰ διαθέων τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχύστον ἦττῆθας, ἦττῖν τι ἂν οἰεὶ ἀληθῇ τόνδ᾽ ἐπαινέσαι; ΘΕΛΙ. Οὐκ ἐγὼ. ΣΩ. Ὁλλα τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὁσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, σμικρὸν τι οἰεὶ εἰναι ἐξευρεῖν καὶ οὐ τῶν πάντη ἄκρων; ΘΕΛΙ. Νὴ τὸν Δί᾽ ἐγὼγε καὶ μάλα γε τῶν ἀκροτάτων. ΣΩ. Ἐσάρρει τοῖνυν περὶ σαυτῷ καὶ τι οἶον Θεόδωρον λέγειν, 1 προθυμιῆθητι ἐκ παντὶ πρόπῳ τῶν τε ἄλλων πέρι καὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον, τι ποτε τυγχάνει ὅν. ΘΕΛΙ. Προθυμίας μὲν ἐνεκεν, ὁ Σώκρατες, φανεῖται. VI. ΣΩ. Ἡθὶ δὴ καλῶς γὰρ ἀρτι υφηγήσωμεν πειρῶ μιμούμενοι τὴν περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἀπόκρισιν, ὡσπερ ταίτας πολλὰς οὐσίας ἐνι ἐφεδε περιέλαβες, οὕτω καὶ τὰς πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐνι λόγῳ προσειπεῖν. ΘΕΛΙ. Ἡλλ᾽ εὐ ἢσθι, ὁ Σώκρατες, 1 πολλάκις δὴ αὐτὸ ἐπεχείρησα σκέψασθαι, ἀκούων τῶς παρὰ σοῦ ἀποφερομένας ἐρωτήσεις ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτ᾽ αὐτῶς δύναμαι πεῖσαι ἐμαυτὸν ὡς ἰκανῶς τι λέγω, οὔτ᾽ ἄλλον ἀκόφαντα λέγοντος οὔτως ὡς σὺ διακελεύειν, οὐ μὲν δὴ αὐτοῦ ἀπαλλατηθήσαι τοῦ μέλλειν. ΣΩ. Ἡδίνεις γὰρ, ὁ φίλε Θεαίτητε, διὰ τὸ μὴ κενὸς ἄλλ᾽ ἐγκύμων εἶναι. ΘΕΛΙ. Οὐκ οὖσα, ὁ Σώκρατες ὁ μέντοι πέπονθα λέγω. ΣΩ. Εἶτα, ὃ * καταγέλαστε, οὐκ ἀκήκουας ὡς ἐγὼ εἰμι νῦν μαίας 149 μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς, Φαιναρέτης; ΘΕΛΙ.

118 c. Num legendum sit tōn pro tōd quae, potest, non decerni.
"Ἡδή τοῦτό γε ἤκουσα. Ἔνα καὶ ὅτι ἐπιτηδεύω τὴν αὐτὴν τέχνην ἀκήκοας; ἩΕΛΙ. Οὐδαμῶς. Ἔνα ἀλλ' εὐ ὑσθ' ὅτι μή μείτοι μου κατείπης πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους. λέληθα γὰρ, ὥ ἔταιρε, ταύτην ἔχων τὴν τέχνην' οἱ δὲ, ἀτε οὐκ εἰδότες, τοῦτο μὲν οὐ λέγουσι περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὅτι δὲ ἀστορώτατός εἰμὶ καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν. η ἃ καὶ τοῦτο ἀκῆκοας; ἩΕΛΙ. Ἑγὼ γε. Ἔνα εἰπὼ ὁμὶ σοι τὸ αἰτίου; ἩΕΛΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Ἔνα ἐννόησον δὴ τὸ περὶ τὰς μαίας ἅπαν ὡς ἔχει, καὶ ρᾶν μαθήσει ὁ βουλομαι. οὐσθα γὰρ ποὺ ὁ οὐδεμία αὐτῶν ἔτι αὐτὴ κυισκομένη τε καὶ τίκτουσα ἄλλας μαιεύεται, ἄλλα αἱ ἢδη ἀδύνατοι τίκτειν. ἩΕΛΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Ἔνα. Αἴτιαν δὲ γε τοῦτον φασὶν εἶναι τὴν Ἀρτεμίν, ὅτι ἄλοχος οὖσα τὴν λοχείαν εἰληχε. στερήφαις μὲν ὑπὸ ἄρα ὅνον ἕδωκε μαιεῦσθαι, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀσθενεστέρα ἡ λαβεῖν τέχνην ὥν ἄν ἡ ἄπειρος· ταῖς δὲ δὲ ἡλικίαις ἀτόκως προσέταξε, τιμῶσα τὴν αὐτής ὀμοιότητα. ἩΕΛΙ. Εἰκός. Ἔνα οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε εἰκός τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, τὰς κνούσας καὶ μὴ γιγνωσκεσθαι μᾶλλον ύπό τῶν μαίων ἡ τῶν ἄλλων; ἩΕΛΙ. Πάνω γε. Ἔνα. Καὶ μὴν καὶ διδοῦσαι γε αἱ μαίαι φαρμάκια καὶ ἐπάδουσαι δύνανται ἐγείρειν τε τὰς ὀδύνας καὶ μαλθακωτέρας, ἂν βουλόνται, ποιεῖν, καὶ τίκτειν τε δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ εἰάν νέον ὅν δόξη ἀμβλύσκειν, ἀμβλύσκουσι; ἩΕΛΙ. Ἕστη ταῦτα. Ἔνα Ἀρ' ὅν ἔτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ὑσθησαι, ὅτι καὶ προμνήστριαι εἰσὶ δεινῶταται, ὡς πᾶσσοι οὖσαι περὶ τοῦ γυνώναι, ποιαν χρῆ ποιῶν ἀνδρὶ συννούσαν ὡς ἄριστους παιῶς τίκτειν; ἩΕΛΙ. Ὁν πάνω τοῦτο οἶδα. Ἔνα ἀλλ' ὑσθ' ὅτι ἐπὶ

119 ν. νέον ὃν corruptum videtur.
τούτω μείζον φρονοῦσιν ἡ ἐπὶ τῇ ὀμφαλητομίᾳ. ἐννοεῖ ἡ γάρ· τῆς αὐτῆς ἡ ἄλλης οἷεὶ τέχνης εἶναι θεραπείαν τε καὶ ἔννοικομίδην τῶν ἐκ γῆς καρπῶν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔγγορον· εἰς ποιαν ἐγὼ ποιῶν φυτῶν τε καὶ σπέρμα καταβλητέον; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ, ἄλλα τῆς αὐτῆς. Σ. Ἔις γνωικάκα δέ, ὦ φίλε, ἄλλην μὲν οἷεὶ τοῦ τοιούτου, ἄλλην δὲ ἔννοικομίδης; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκον καίκος γε. Σ. ὑπ. * ὑπ. γάρ. ἄλλα διὰ τὴν ἀδικόν τε καὶ ἀτέχνου ἔννοικομίδην ἄνδρος καὶ γνωικώς, ἃ δὴ προαγωγεία ὄνομα, φεύγουσι καὶ τὴν προμνηστικὴν ἀτε σεμναί οὐσαί αἱ μαίαι, φοβοῦμεναι μη εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν αἰτίαν διὰ ταύτην ἐμπεσωσιν· ἐπεὶ ταῖς γε ὄντως μαίαις μόναις ποὺ προσήκει καὶ προμνησασθαι ὀρθῶς. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται. Σ. Τὸ μὲν τοιοῦν τῶν μαίων τοσοῦτον, ἐλαττῶν δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος. οὐ γάρ προσέπτι γνωικῆς ἐνίοτε μὲν εἴδωλα τίκτειν, ἐστὶ δὲ ὅτε ἁληθινά, τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι διαγνωσιν. εἰ γάρ προσήκει, μέγιστον τε καὶ κάλλιστον ἔργον ἦν ἄν ταῖς μαίαις τὸ κρίνειν τὸ ἁληθὲς τε καὶ μη. ἢ οὐκ οἶει; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώγιε. Β. Σ. ὑπ. ἡ δὲ γ' ἐμὴ τέχνη τῆς μαίεύσεως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὑπάρχει, ὡσα ἐκείναις, διαφέρει δὲ τὸ τε ἄνδρας ἄλλα μὴ γνωικάς μαίευσθαι, καὶ τῷ τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τικτούσας ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἄλλα μὴ τὰ σώματα. μέγιστον δὲ τούτ' ἐνι τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τέχνῃ, βασανίζειν δυνατόν εἶναι παντὶ τρόπῳ, κτότερον εἴδωλον καὶ ψευδός ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἡ διάνοια ἡ γόνιμον τε καὶ ἁληθὲς. ἐπεὶ τάδε γε καὶ ἐμοί ὑπάρχει, ὅπερ ταῖς μαίαις· ἁγιόνος εἰμὶ σοφίας, καὶ ὅπερ ἡ δὴ πολλοὶ μοι ὀνείδισαν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν, ἁληθὲς ὀνείδιζον. τὸ δὲ αἰτίον τούτου τίδε· μαίευσθαι μὲ τὸ θεός ἁναγκάζει, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκώλυσεν.
εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ πάνυ τι σοφὸς, οὐδὲ τι μοι

1) ἐστὶν εὐρήμα ¹ τοιοῦτον, γεγονός τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ἔκ-

γονοῦ· οἱ δὲ ἐμοὶ ξυγγενὸμενοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαίνονται

ἐνιοὶ μὲν καὶ πάνυ ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προϊόνθης τῆς

ἀντικειμένης, οὕσπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρείκη, θαυμαστὸν ὅσον

ἐπιτελεῖτο, ὡς αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσί· καὶ

τοῦτο ἑναρχής, ὅτι παρ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν πῶς ποτὲ μαθῶντες,

ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ παρ' αὐτῶν πολλά καὶ καλὰ εὐρότετε τε

καὶ κατέχοντες. τῆς μὲντοι μανείας ὁ θεὸς τε καὶ ἐγὼ

E αὐτίων. ὅδε δὲ δῆλον πολλοὶ ἡδὴ τούτο ¹ ἀγνοήσαντες

καὶ έαυτοὺς αἰτιασάμενοι, ἐμοὺ δὲ καταφρονήσαντες, ἢ

αὐτοὶ ἢ υπ' ἄλλων πεισθέντες, ἀπήλθον πρωιάτερον

tοῦ δέοντος, ἀπελθόντες δὲ τὰ τε λοιπὰ ἐξήμβλωσαν

diὰ ποιηρᾶν ξυνοῦσίαν καὶ τὰ υπ' ἐμοῦ μαινόντα

κακῶς τρέφοντες ἀπώλεσαν, ψευδῆ καὶ εἴδωλα περὶ

πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ ἄληθος, τελευτώντες δ' αὐ-

τοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδοξαὶ ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι. ὃν εἰς

151 γέγονεν Ἀριστείδης * ὁ Δυσιμάχου καὶ ἄλλων πάνω

πολλοὶ οἰς, ὅταν πάλιν ἐλθοῦσιν δεόμενοι τῆς ἐμῆς

ξυνοῦσίας καὶ θαυμαστὰ δρόμοντες, εὔνιοι μὲν τὸ γηγυ-

μενόν μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλυέ ξυνείναι, εὔνιοι δὲ εὖ-

καὶ πάλιν αὐτοὶ ἐπιτελοῦσι. πάσχοι δὲ δὴ οἱ ἐμοὶ

ξυγγενὸμενοι καὶ τοῦτο ταῦτα παῖσι τικτοῦσι∙ ὁδι-

νοῦσι γὰρ καὶ ἀπορίας ἐμπισταλται νῦκτα τε καὶ

ἡμέρας πολύ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκεῖναι. ταῦτην δὲ τὴν ὀδίνα

ἐγείρειν τε καὶ ἀποπάσειν ἡ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται. καὶ

1; οὗτοι μὲν ἢ δὴ οὕτως. εὐίστο ὁ, ὁ Θεωτῆτε, ὃν ἂν

μοι μή δόξως πως ἐγκύροντες εἶναι, ἄνοιξ ὃτι οὐδὲν

ἐμοὶ δεόνται, πάνω εὐμενός προμνῆμαι, καὶ ἔγων θεὸ

150 ε. ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλων. Ita rectissime Heind. Stallb. alii,

πιο vulgato ἢ αὐτῷ ὑπ' ἄλλων.
εἰπεῖν, πάνω ἰκανὸς τοπάξω οἷς ἂν ἔγγειγνόμενοι ὤναιντο. ἃν πολλοὺς μὲν δὴ ἐξεδώκα Προδίκῳ, πολλοὺς δὲ ἄλλους σοφοῖς τε καὶ θεσπεσίοις ἀνδράσι. Τάυτα δὴ σοι, ὅ ἁριστε, ἐνεκα τούθε ἐμήκυνα, ὑποπτεύων σε, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς οἱ, ὅδειν τι κυοῦντα ἐνδον. προσφέρου ὅν πρός με ὅς πρὸς μαίας νῦν καὶ ¹ αὐτῶν μαιευτικῶν, καὶ ὃ ἂν ἑρωτῶ, προθυμοῦ ὅπως οἶος τ' εἰ, οὕτως ἀποκρίνασθαι. καὶ ἐὰν ἁρα σκοπούμενος τι ὄν ἂν λέγης, ἡγησομαι εἰδωλον καὶ μη ἄληθὲς, ἐῖτα ὑπεξαιρόμαι καὶ ἀποβάλλω, μὴ ἀγρίανε ὥσπερ αἱ πρωτοτόκοι περὶ τὰ παιδία. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἢδη, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πρὸς με σὺν διετέθησαν, ὅστε ἀτεχνῶς διάκειν ἔτοιμοι εἶναι, ἐπειδὰν τινά λήρου αὐτῶν ἀφαιρῶμαι, καὶ οὐκ οἴονται με εὐνοία τούτο ποιεῖν, πόρρω ὄντες τοῦ εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδεὶς θείος ἡ μόνος ἄνθρωπος, οὐδ' ἐγὼ δυσνοίᾳ τοιούτων ὅ οὐδὲν δρῶ, ἀλλὰ μοι ψευδός τε ἑξηχωρήσατι καὶ ἄληθες αφανίσαι οὐδαμῶς θέμις. VIII. Πάλιν δὴ ὅν πεπλήρησαν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὦ τί ποτ' ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, πειρῶ λέγειν' ὡς ὦ οὖν οἶος τ' εἰ, μηδέποτ' εἰπής. εἰῶ γὰρ θείος ἰδέλη καὶ ἀνδρίξῃ, οἶος τ' ἐσεῖ. ΘΕΛ. Ἄλλα μέντοι, ὦ Σῶκρατε, σοῦ γε σὺ παρακελευσμένου αἰσχρόν μὴ οὐ παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυμεῖσθαι ὅ τι τις ἑχει' λέγειν. ἐ δοκεῖ ὅν μοι ὅ ἐπιστάμενος τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τούτῳ, ὦ ἐπιστάται, καὶ ὅς γε νυνί φαίνεται, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις. ΣΩ. ἦδ γε καὶ γενναίος, ὦ παίρχρη γὰρ οὕτως ἀποθείνουμεν λέγειν. ἀλλὰ φέρε δή αὐτὸ κοινή σκεψόμεθα, γόνιμον ἢ ἀνεμιαίον τυχαίου εἰν. αἰσθήσις, φής, ἐπιστήμῃ; ΘΕΛ. Ναὶ. ΣΩ. Κυνδυνεύεις μέντοι λόγον οὐ φαῦλον εἰρηκέναι περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλ' ὅν ἐλεγε * καὶ Πρωταγόρας. τρόπον δὲ τινα ἄλλον εἰρήκε τὰ αὐτὰ τάυτα. φησὶ γὰρ ποὺ πάντων χρημάτων
16

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

μέτρου ἀνθρώπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὀντῶν, ὅς ἐστι, τῶν δὲ μη ὀντῶν, ὅς οὐκ ἐστιν. ἀνέγνωκας γὰρ ποι; ΘΕΛ. Ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις. ΣΟ. Οὐκοῦν οὐτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἶα μὲν ἔκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαύτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοὶ, οἶα δὲ σοὶ, τοιαύτα δὲ αὐσοί, ἀνθρώπος δὲ σὺ τε καγώ; ΘΕΛ. Λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως. ΣΟ. Εἰκός μὲν τοι ἁ σοφὸν ἀνδρα μὴ ληρεῖν ἑπακολουθήσομεν οὖν αὐτῷ. ἀρ' οὐκ ἐνίοτε πνεύμον τον αὐτοῦ ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν ρυγοῖ, ὁ δ' οὐ; καὶ ὁ μὲν ἡρέμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα; ΘΕΛ. Καὶ μάλα. ΣΟ. Πότερον οὖν τότε αὐτῷ ἐφ' ἐαυτῷ τὸ πνεῦμα ψυχρὸν ἢ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν; ἢ πεισόμεθα τῷ Πρωταγόρα, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ρυγώντι ψυχρῷ, τῷ δὲ μη οὖ; ΘΕΛ. Ἕστη γὰρ. ΣΟ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτως ἐκατέρω; ΘΕΛ. Ναί. ΣΟ. Τὸ δὲ γε φαίνεται αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐστὶν; ΘΕΛ. Ἕστη γὰρ. ΣΟ. Αἰσθήσεις ἄρα καὶ αἰσθητικας ταῦτα ἐν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πάσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. οἰα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἐκαστὸς, τοιαύτα ἐκαστὰ καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι. ΘΕΛ. Ἕστη γὰρ. ΣΟ. Αἰσθητικας ἄρα τοῦ ὀντος αἱ ἐστὶ καὶ ἁγευζές, ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὕτα. ΘΕΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΟ. Ἕστη γὰρ. ΣΟ. Ἀρ' οὐν πρὸς Χαρίτων πάσοσφός τις ἢν ο Ἔρωτας ἠγάλαμας, καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ἤνεξε τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τῇ ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγεν; ΘΕΛ. Πῶς δή, ὦ Σώκρατε, τῶν τὸτε ἕλεγμι; ΣΟ. Ἐγὼ ἔρω καὶ μάλ', οὐ φαῦλον λόγου, ως ἀρα ἐν μὲν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτῷ οἴδει ἔστιν, οὐδ' ἐν τι προσεῖται ὁρθῶς οὐδ' ὀποιουοῦν τι, ἀλλ' ἐν ὡς μέγα προσανορεύσης, καὶ σμικρὸν φανεῖται, καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, κούφον, ἑμπαίνει τε οὕτως, ως μυθικος ὀντος ἐνὸς μὴ τινὸς μὴτ ὀποιουοῦν' ἐκ δ' ἓρη φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως

καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα, ἢ δὲ φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὅρθως προσαγορεύουστε· ἐστὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ' οὐδὲν, αἰὲ δὲ γίγνεται. καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἐξ ἕξις οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου ξυμφερέσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ὁράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἀκροὶ τῆς ποιήσεως ἐκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ �[]=$μηρος· εἰπὼν γὰρ Ὦκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν πάντα εἰρήκεν ἐκγονα ῥόης τε καὶ κινήσεως. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ τούτο λέγειν; ΘΕΛΙ. Ἐμοιγε. ΙΧ. ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ἄν ἔτι πρὸς γε τοσούτων * στρατόπεδου καὶ στρατηγίου Ὦμηρον δύνατο ἀμφισβητήσας μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι; ΘΕΛΙ. Οὐ ράδιον, ὡς Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ, ὥς Θεαίτητε· ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε τοῦ λόγου σημεῖα ἱκανά, ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀπόλυσθαι ἴδιον· τὸ γὰρ θερμὸν τε καὶ πῦρ, ὡς δὲ καὶ τάλα γεννᾶ· καὶ ἐπιτρέπεται, αὐτὸ γενναῖται ἐκ φοράς καὶ τρίϕεως· τούτω δὲ κινήσεις. ἢ οὐχ αὐτὰ γενέσεις πυρὸς; ΘΕΛΙ. Ἀνταί ἐμὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τὸ γε τῶν ἄξων γένος ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τοῦτων φύεται. ΘΕΛΙ. Πῶς δ' οὖν; ΣΩ. Τί δαί; ἢ τῶν σωμάτων ἔξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἴδιον τινος μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διόλυται, ὑπὸ γεμισμάτων δὲ καὶ κινήσεως ὡς ἔτι τὸ πολὺ σώζεται; ΘΕΛΙ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Ἡ δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔξις οὐχ ὑπὸ μαθήσεως μὲν καὶ μελέτης, κινήσεως οὖν, κτάταί τε μαθήματα καὶ σώζεται καὶ γίγνεται βελτίων, ὑπὸ δ' ἴδιον τινος, ἀμελητήσεις τε καὶ ἀμαθίας οὕτης, οὕτε τι μανθάνει ὃ τε ἄν μάθῃ ὡς ἐπιλαμβάνεται; ΘΕΛΙ. Καὶ μάλα. ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν ἀρά ἀγαθὸν κίνησις.
κατὰ τε ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ τοῦριντίον;
ΘΕΛΙ. "Εσιέεν. ΣΩ. "Ετί οὖν σοι λέγω νηφεμίας τε καὶ γαλήνας καὶ όσα τοιάυτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σήστουσι καὶ ἀπολλύσασι, τὰ δ' ἐτέρα σώζει; καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων τῶν κολοφῶνা ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζον, τὴν χρυσὴν σειράν ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸν ἥλιον Ὄμηρος λέγει, καὶ ἐκ τί ἐσεὶ μὲν ἢ περιφορὰ ἤ κινομενία καὶ ὁ ἥλιος, πάντα ἔστι καὶ σώζεται τὰ εἰς θεοὺς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπως· εἰ δὲ σταῖν τοῦτο ὀσπερ δεθὲν, πάντα χρήματ' ἂν διαφθαρεί καὶ γένοιτ' ἂν τὸ λειγόμενον ἄνω κάτω πάντα; ΘΕΛΙ. ἈΛΛ ἐμοίου δοκεῖ, ὁ Ὁκρατεῖ, ταύτα δηλοῦν, ἄπερ λέγεις. Χ. ΣΩ. Ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν, ὁ ἀριστε, οὐτωσί. κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα πρῶτον, ὁ δὴ καλεῖ χρῶμα λευκόν, μή εἶναι αὐτὸ ἐτερὸν τι ἐξω τῶν σῶν ὄμματων μηδὲ ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι μηδέ τιν αὐτῷ χώραν 1
Γ. ἀποτάξεις. ἢδη γὰρ ἄν εἰς τε ὁν που ἐν τάξει καὶ μένου· καὶ οὐκ ἄν ἐν γενέσθαι ἡγημον. ΘΕΛΙ. ἈΛΛΑ πῶς; ΣΩ. Ἐμβεβάζω τῷ ἄρτῳ λόγῳ, μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐν 15 ὁν τιθέντες· καὶ ἡμῖν οὐτω μέλαν τε καὶ λευκῶν καὶ ὅπων ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐκ τῆς προσβόλης τῶν ὄμματων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φοράν φανεῖται γεγενημένου, καὶ ὁ δὴ ἐκατόν εἶναι φαμεν χρῶμα, οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον ὡς τοῦ προσβάλλον ἐσται, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἐκάστω ἱδίων γεγονός. ἢ σὺ διϊσχυρίσαις ἂν, ὡς οἷον σοι φίλνεται ἐκατόν χρῶμα, τοιοῦτον καὶ κυνε καὶ ὅτρον ἐχόν; ΘΕΛΙ. Μᾶ Δῖ οὐκ ἔγνψε. ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἄλλη ἀνθρώπῳ ἄρ' ὁμοίων καὶ σοί φίλνεται ὅτι καὶ ἐχεις τοῦτο ἵσχυρὸς, ἢ πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὅτι οἴδε σοι αὐτῷ παύτον διὰ τὸ μυθότερο ὁμοίως αὐτοῦ σεαυτῷ ἐχεῖν;
Β. ΘΕΛΙ. Τοῦτο μᾶλλον μου δοκεῖ ἢ ἐκεῖνο. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐμὲ ἄν ὁ παραμετροῦμεθα ἢ οὔ ἐφαπτόμεθα, μέγα ἢ λευκὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἢ, οὔκ ἄν ποτε ἄλλο τῷ προσπεσοῦν
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

άλλο ἂν ἐγερόνει, αὐτὸ γε μηδὲν μεταβάλλον εἰ δὲ αὖ ὑπὸ τοῦ παραμετρούμενον ἡ ἐφαπτόμενον ἐκαστὸν ἢν τούτων, οὐκ ἂν αὖ ἄλλων προσελθόντος ἢ τι παθόντος αὐτὸ μηδὲν παθὸν ἄλλο ἂν ἐγένετο. ἑπεὶ νῦν γε, ὁ φίλε, θαυμαστά τε καὶ γελοία εὐχερὸς πως ἀναγκαζομέθα λέγειν, ὃς φαίη ἂν Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ πᾶς ὁ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκείνῳ ἑπιτειρῶν λέγειν. ἘΕΛ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποια λέγεις; Σ. Ὑμίκρων λαβὲ παράδειγμα, καὶ πάντα εἰσεὶ ἃ βούλομαι. ἀστραγάλους γὰρ που ἔξ, ἂν μὲν τέταρας αὐτοῖς προσενέγχησ, πλεῖος φαμὲν εἶναι τῶν τεττάρων καὶ ἡμιολίους, ἕαν δὲ δῶδεκα, ἐλάττους καὶ ἡμίσεις καὶ οὐδὲ ἀνεκτὸν ἄλλως λέγειν. ἢ σὺ ἀνέξει; ἘΕΛ. Ὑμίκρων ἐγώη. Σ. Τί οὖν; ἂν σε Πρωταγόρας ἐρητά τι τὸ ἄλλος, Ὡ Θεαίτητη, ἐσὼ ὑπὸ το μεῖζον ἢ πλέον ηγήνεται ἄλλως ἢ αὐξηθὲν; τί ἀποκρίνει; ἘΕΛ. Ἐάν μὲν, ὃ Σώκρατες, τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἐρώτησιν ἐποκρίνωμαι, ὃτι οὐκ ἐστίν ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς ὑπὸ τὴν προτέραν, φυλάττων μη ἐναντία εἰπὼ, ὅτι ἐστίν. Σ. Ἐάν γε ἡ τῆς Ἡραῖ, ὁ φίλε, καὶ θείως. ἀτάρ, ὡς ζωικεῖν, ἐὰν ἀποκρίνῃ ὅτι ἐστίν, Εὐρίπιδειον τι ξυμβη- σεται' ἢ μὲν γὰρ γλώττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἡμῖν ἐσται, ἢ δὲ φρήν οὐκ ἀνέλεγκτος. ἘΕΛ. Ἰ. Αληθῆ. Σ. Οὐκοῦν ἐμὲ μὲν δεῦροι καὶ σοφοὶ ἑγώ τε καὶ σύ ἡμέν, πάντα τὰ τῶν φρενῶν ἐξητακότες, ἦδη ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπὶ περιουσίας ἀλλήλων ἀποτελομένοι, ἔνυπερπάτοις σοφιστικῶς ἔις ἐμὲ μάχην τοιαῦτην, ἀλλήλων τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκροίμενεν νῦν δὲ ἂτε ἰδιώται πρῶτον βουλησόμεθα θεώσασθαι αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ, τί ποτ' ἐστίν ἢ διανοού- μεθα, πότερον ἢμῖν ἀλλήλως ἐξεμφόνει ἢ οὕτω ὑπω- στιοῦν. ἘΕΛ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν ἐγώη τοῦτ ἂν βουλοι- μην. XI. Σ. Καὶ μὴν ἐγώη; ὡτε δ' οὔτως ἔχει,
ἀλλα τὸ ἡ ἡρέμα, ὡς πάνυ πολλὴν σχολὴν ἁγοντες, 155 πάλιν ἐπανασκεφήμεθα, οὐ * δυσκολαίνοντες, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐξετάζοντες, ἄττα ποτ’ ἐστὶ ταῦτα τὰ φάσματα ἐν ἡμῖν. ὁν πρῶτον ἐπισκοποῦντες φήσομεν, ὡς ἐγώ οἶμαι, μηδέποτε μηδέν ἂν μεῖζον μηδὲ ἐλαττον γενέσθαι μήτε ὄγκω μήτε ἀριθμῷ, ἐως ἰσον εἰῃ αὐτο ἐαυτῷ. οὐχ οὕτως; ΘΕΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Δεύτερον δὲ γε, ὃ μήτε προστίθοιτο μήτε ἀφαιρέτο, τούτο μήτε αὐξάνεσθαι ποτε μήτε φθείνειν, αἰεi δὲ ἵσον εἰναι.

Β ΘΕΛ. Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἀρ' 1 οὖν οὐ καὶ τρίτον, ὁ μὴ πρῶτον ἵνα, ἀλλὰ ὑστερον τούτο εἴναι ἀνευ τοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον; ΘΕΛ. Δοκεῖ γε δὴ. ΣΩ. Ταῦτα δὴ, οἶμαι, ὀμολογήματα τρία μάχεται αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ, ὅταν τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀστραγάλων λέγομεν, ἥ ὅταν φῶς ἔμε τηλικόνθε ὄντα, μήτε αὐξηθέντα μήτε τοιναυτίων παθόντα, ἐν ἐναυτῷ σοῦ τοῦ νέου νῦν μὲν μεῖζῳ εἴναι, υστερον δὲ ἐλάττω, μηδὲν τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὄγκου ἀφαιρεθέντος ἀλλὰ σοῦ αὐξηθέντος. 1 εἰμί γὰρ δὴ ὑστερον ὁ πρῶτον οὐκ ἵνα, οὐ γενόμενος· ἀνευ γὰρ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον, μηδὲν δὲ ἀπόλλυς τοῦ ὄγκου οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐγχυμόμην ἐλάττων. καὶ ἀλλὰ δὴ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίων οὕτως ἔχει, εἴπερ καὶ ταῦτα παραδεξόμεθα. ἔπει γὰρ ποι, ὁ Θεαί- τητε δοκεῖς γροῦν μοῦ οὐκ ἀπειρος τῶν τοιούτων εἴναι. ΘΕΛ. Καὶ νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς γε, ὁ Σωκρατες, ὑπερφυὸς ὡς θαυμάζω, τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ ταῦτα, καὶ εἰστε ὃς ἀληθῶς ὁ βλέπων εἰς αὐτὰ σκοτοδινῶδ. ΣΩ. 1 Θεόδωρος γὰρ, ὁ φίλε, φαίνεται οὐ κακῶς τοπάζεων περὶ τῆς φύσεως σου. μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τούτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζεως οὐ γὰρ ἀλλη ἄρχῃ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὐτή, καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ τῆς Ἰριν Θαῖμαντος ἐκχονον φίςας οὐ κακῶς γενεαλογεῖν.
ἀλλὰ πότερον μανθάνεις ἡδη, διὸ ταῦτα τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν τὸν Πρωταγόραν φαμὲν λέγειν, ἡ οὖπω; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτω μοι δοκῶ. ΣΩ. Χάριν οὖν μοι εἰσεῖ, ἐὰν σοι ἀνδρός, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνδρῶν ὄνομαστὸν τῆς διανοίας τινὸς ἀλήθειαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην συνεξερευνῆσομαι αὐτῶν; ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ εἴσομαι, καὶ πῶς γε τολλήν; ΧΙΙ. ΣΩ. Ἀθρεὶ δὴ περισκοπῶν, μὴ τις τῶν ἀμνήστων ἐπακούῃ. εἰσὶ δὲ-οὕτωι οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἶμομενοι εἰναι ἢ οὐ ἂν δύνανται ἀπρίξ τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι, πράξεις δὲ καὶ γενέσεις καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μέρει. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ, ὃ Σώκρατες, σκληροῖς τε λέγεις καὶ * ἀντιτύπους ἀνθρώπους. ΣΩ. 156 Εἰσὶ γὰρ, ὃ παῖ, μᾶλ' εὖ ἄμουσοι. ἄλλοι δὲ πολὺ κομψότεροι, ὃν μέλλω σοι τὰ μυστήρια λέγειν. ἄρχη δὲ, ἐξ ἂς καὶ ἂ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἡρτηται, ἢ δὲ αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τούτο οὐδέν, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἴδη, πλήθει μὲν ἀπειρον ἐκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἀλλήλα γίγνεται ἐκγονα πλήθει μὲν ἀπειρα, 1 δίδυμα δὲ, τὸ μὲν Β αἰσθητον, τὸ δὲ αἰσθησις, ἀεὶ συνεκτίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰσθησεῖς τὰ τοιόδε ἡμῖν ἔχουσιν ὄνοματα, ὤψεις τε καὶ ἀκοι καὶ ὀσφρήσεις καὶ ψυξίες τε καὶ καύσεις καὶ ἥδωνα γε δὴ καὶ ἕπιπαι καὶ ἑπιθυμίαι καὶ φοβοὶ κεκλημέναι καὶ ἄλλαι, ἀπέραντοι μὲν αἱ ἀνώνυμοι, παμπληθεῖς δὲ αἱ ὀνομασμέναι. τὸ δ' αὐ αἰσθητον γένος τούτων ἐκάσται ὁμόγονον, ὤψει μὲν χρώματα παντοδειπαίς 1 παντο- ὁ δατά, ἀκοαῖς δὲ ὀσπάτως φοναί, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰ- σθήσεωι τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητὰ ξυγγενή γεγράμεναι. Τῇ δὴ οὖν ἡμῖν βούλεται οὐτος ὁ μύθος, ὁ Θεαίτητε, πρὸς τὰ
πρότερα; ἄρα ἐννοεῖς; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ πάνω, ὥς Σῶκρατες. ΣΩ. ἈΛΛ' ἄθρει εάν πως ἀποτελεσθῇ. Βούλεται γὰρ δὴ λέγειν ὡς ταῦτα πάντα μὲν, ὡσπερ λέγομεν, κινεῖται, τάχος δὲ καὶ βραδυτῆς ἐν τῇ κινήσει αὐτῶν. ὥσον μὲν ὡν βραδὺ, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πλήσιαζοντα τὴν κίνησιν ἵσχε καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἕγενα, τὰ δὲ γεννώμενα οὕτω δὴ [βραδύτερα ἐστιν ὅσον δὲ αὐ ταχύ, πρὸς τὰ πόρρωθεν τὴν κίνησιν ἵσχε καὶ οὕτω γεννᾶ, τὰ δὲ γεννώμενα οὕτω δὴ] θάττω ἐστί: φέρεται γὰρ καὶ ἐν φορᾷ αὐτῶν ἣ κίνησις πέφυκεν. ἔπειδὰν οὖν ὡμα καὶ ἄλλο τῶν τούτων ἔμμετρων πλησιάσαν γεννήσῃ τὴν λεικότητα τε καὶ αἴσθησιν αὐτῷ ἔμμφητον, ὥ ὁυκ ἂν ποτε ἑγένετο ἐκατέρω ἐκείνων πρὸς ἄλλο ἐλθόντος, τότε δὴ μεταξὺ θερμόμενῳ τῆς μὲν ὑψωσ πρὸς τῶν ἐ ὀφθαλμῶν, τῆς δὲ λευκότητος 1 πρὸς τοῦ συναπτομένου τὸ χρῶμα, ὁ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὑψωσ ἐμπλεως ἑγένετο καὶ ὅρη δὴ τότε καὶ ἑγένετο ὡς τῷ ὑψῳ ἀλλὰ ὀφθαλμὸς ὦρὼν, τὸ δὲ ἐναγωγηθέν τὸ χρῶμα λευκότητος περιεπλήσθη καὶ ἑγένετο οὐ λευκότης αὖ ἄλλα λευκόν, εἴτε ξύλων εἴτε λίθους εἴτε ὦτοιν ξυνεβη χρῆμα χρωσθήμαι τῷ τοιούτῳ χρώματι· καὶ τάλλα δὴ οὕτω, οἰκληρῶν καὶ θερμῶν καὶ πάντα τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον ἐποληπτέουν, αὐτὸ μὲν καθ' αὐτῷ μηδὲν εἶναι, ὡ δὲ καὶ 157 τότε * ἐλέγομεν, ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα ὁμολογία πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ παντοτά ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως, ἐπει καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναι τι καὶ τὸ πάσχον αὐ τὶ ἐπὶ ἐνὸς νοήσαι,

156 d. βραδύτερα et quae in uncinis sequuntur, omissa in codd., supplevit Stephannus et Cornarii eclogis: et sine uncinis edidit Bekker, sensu, ut videtur, exposcere; respuunt tamen Camph., Jowett.

e. ὠτοιν—χρῆμα ex correctione Cornarii recperunt Heind. et Bekker. pro vulg. ὠτοιν—χρῶμα.
ὁς φασίν, οὖκ εἶναι παγίως. οὔτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστὶ τι, πρὶν ἂν τῷ πάσχοντι ἡμέρῃ, οὔτε πάσχον, πρὶν ἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι τῷ τε τινι ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ποιοῦν ἄλλως αὐτῷ προσπεσοῦν πάσχον ἀνεφαίη τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τινι ἀεί γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἕξαιρετέον, οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς πολλά καὶ ἀρτί ἃναγκαία καὶ χάρισμα ὑπὸ συνυθείας καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ. τὸ δ' οὐ δεῖ, ὥς ὁ τῶν σοφῶν λόγος, οὔτε τι ἐνηχωρεῖν οὔτε τὸν οὐτ' ἐμοὶ οὔτε τόδε οὔτ' ἐκεῖνο οὔτε ἀλλο οὔδεν ὄνομα, ὁ τι ἂν ἰστῇ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν φθέγγεσθαι γιμνόμενα καὶ ποιούμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα: ὥς εὰν τί τις στήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ, εὐελεγκτὸς ὁ τούτο ποιῶν. δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισθέντων, ὃ δὴ ἀθροίσματι ἀνθρωπὸν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἐκαστὸν ζωὸν τε καὶ εἴδος. Ταῦτα δή, ὁ Θεαίτητε, ἄρ' ἥδεα δοκεῖ σοι εἴναι, καὶ γενοῦν ἂν αὐτῶν ὡς ἄρσκόντων; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οἴδα ἐγώ, ὁ Σωκράτης καὶ ήμερ οὐδὲ περὶ σοῦ δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι, πότερα δοκοῦντά σοι λέγεις αὐτὰ ἢ ἐμοῦ ἀποπειρᾷ. ΣΩ. Οὐ μιμομοιεῖς, ὁ φίλε, ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν οὔτ' οἴδα οὔτε ποιοῦμαι τῶν τοιοῦτων οὐδὲν ἐμὸν, ἀλλ' εἰμί αὐτὸν ἄγονον, ἓν δὲ μανεύομαι καὶ τούτων ἔνεκα ἐπάθω τε καὶ παρατίθημι ἐκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογεύσασθαι, ἐώς ἂν εἰς ἕνο λόγῳ τὸ σὸν δόγμα ἐπιστημονήν. ὁ ἐξακθέντος δέ, τὸτ' ἡδὴ σκέψομαι εἴτ' ἀνεμιαίον εἴτε ἡμῶν ἀναφαίησθαι. ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν καὶ καρτέρων εὗ καὶ ἀνδρεῖων ἀποκρίνον ἂν φαινεσθαί σοι περὶ ὑμὶν ἐρωτῶ. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐρώτα δή. ΧΩ. Λέγε τοῖς πάλιν, ἐν σοι ἄρέσκει το μή τι εἰναί ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι ἂν ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ πάντα, τὸ ἀρτί δείμεν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ’ ἔμοιγε, ἐπεὶ δὴ σοῦ ἀκοῦσώ ὄντω διεξιόντος, ὑπερὶ διελήλυθας. ΣΩ. Ἔλθον ἀπολύπωμεν ὅσον ἔλλειπτον αὐτῷ. Λείπεται δὲ ἐνυπνίων τε πέρι καὶ νόσων, τὰς τὲ ἄλλας καὶ μανίας, ὡσα τε παρακολουθεῖ ἢ παροραί ὢ τι ἄλλο παραισθάνεσθαι λέγεται. οὐσθα γὰρ ποι, ὅτι ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ὁμολογομένοις ἐλέγχεσθαι δοκεῖ ὅν ἄρτι διήμεν λόγον, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον ἰδίων ψευδεῖς ἀισθήσεις ἐν * αὐτοῖς γιγνομέναις, καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖν τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκάστῳ ταύτα καὶ εἶναι, ἄλλα πᾶν τούναντιν οὐδὲν ὅν φαίνεται εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθεύστατα λέγεις, ὡς Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Τίς δὴ οὖν, ὃ παῖ, λείπεται λόγος τῷ τῆς ἀισθήσεως ἐπιστήμης τιθεμένος καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκάστῳ ταύτα καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο, ὃ φαίνεται; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγὼ μὲν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὁκνὸι εἰπτεῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω, διότι μοι νῦν δὴ ἐπεπληξας εἰπόντες αὐτοῦ. ἐπεὶ ὃς ἀληθῶς γε οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀμφισβητῆσαι, ὡς οἱ μανιμένοι ὅ οἱ οἱ ὀνειρώττοτες οὐ ψευδὴ δοξάζουσιν, ὅταν οἱ μὲν θεοὶ αὐτῶν οἶωνται εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πτηνοὶ τε, καὶ οὐκ ἔτομονοι ἐν τῷ ὑπνῷ διανοοῦνται. ΣΩ. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐδὲ το ποιόν ἀμφισβῆτημα ἐννοεῖς περὶ αὐτῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἄναρ τε καὶ ὑπαρ; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποιόν; ΣΩ. Ὁ πολλάκις σε οἴμαι ἀκηκοέναι ἑρωτώντων, τί ἂν τις ἔχω τεκμήριον ἁποδείξει, εἰ τις ἔριστο νῦν οὐτῶς ἐν τῷ παρόντε, πότερον καθεύδομεν καὶ πάντα, ὃ διανοούμεθα, ὁνειρόττομεν, ὃς ἐγγυγόραμεν τε καὶ ὑπαρ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμεθα. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μὴν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἀπορῶν γε, ὡς Χρήστι ἐπιδείξαι τεκμήριον, πάντα γὰρ ὡσπερ ἀντιστροφὰ τὰ αὐτὰ παρακολούθει. ἦ τε γὰρ νυνὶ διειλέγομεθα, οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ δοκεῖν ἀλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι.
καὶ ὅταν δὴ ὅναρ ὑνείρατα δοκῆμεν διηγεῖσθαι, ἄτοπος ἡ ὁμοιότης τοῦτων ἑκείνως. ΣΩ. Ὁρᾶσ ὦν, ὅτι τὸ γε ἀμφισβητήσαι οὐ χαλεποῦ, ὅτε καὶ πότερόν ἐστιν ὕπαρ ἡ ὅναρ ἀμφισβητεῖται, 1 καὶ δὴ ἵσον ὄντος τοῦ χρόνου ὁ καθεύδομεν ὃ ἐγρηγόραμεν, ἐν ἐκατέρφι διαμάχεται ἥμων ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ αἰεὶ παρόντα δόγματα παντὸς μᾶλλον εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ὥστε ἵσον μὲν χρόνον τάδε φαμὲν οὕτα εἶναι, ἵσον δὲ ἑκείνα, καὶ ὁμοίως ἐφ' ἐκατέρφοις διϊσχυριζόμεθα. ΘΕΛ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ὁυκοῦν καὶ περὶ νόσων τε καὶ μανιῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, πλὴν τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτι οὐχὶ ἵσος; ΘΕΛ. Ὁρῆσε. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; πλῆθει χρόνου καὶ ὀλγύστητο ἀληθῆς ὀρισθησέται; ΘΕΛ. 1 Γελοιοῖο μεν' ἂν εἶη πολλαχῇ. ΣΩ. Ἀλλα ἐ τι ἄλλο ἔχεις σαφὲς ἐνδείξασθαι, ὁποία τούτων τῶν δοξασμάτων ἀληθῆ; ΘΕΛ. Οὐ μοι δοκῶ. XIV. ΣΩ. Ἕμοι τοίνυν ἄκουε, οἴα περὶ αὐτῶν ἂν λέγοιεν οἱ τὰ αἱ δοκοῦντα ὀριζόμενοι τῷ δοκοῦντι εἶναι ἀληθῆ. λέγοιες δὲ, ὅσ ἐγὼ οἴμαι, οὐτως ἐρωτώντες, Ὡ Θεάιτητε, ὁ ἂν ἔτερον ἢ παντάπασι, μή πή τινα δύναμιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐξεῖ τῷ ἐτέρῳ; καὶ μή ὑπολαβὼμεν τῇ μὲν ταύτων εἶναι ὃ ἐρωτῶμεν, τῇ δὲ ἐτέρου, ἀλλ' ὅλος ἔτερον. ΘΕΛ. Ἀπό τοίνυν ταύτων τῷ ἔχειν ἢ ἐν δυνάμει ἢ ἐν 159 ἀλλ' ὅτι, ὅταν ἥ κομιδὴ ἔτερον. ΣΩ. Ὁρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἀναγκαίον τὸ ποιοῦντον ὑμολογεῖν; ΘΕΛ. Ἐμοίγασ τοι, ἔτερον. ΣΩ. Εἰ ἀρα τι ξυμβαίνει ὁμοίων τῷ γέγονεσθαι ἢ ἀνόμοιον, εἴτε ἐαυτῷ εἴτε ἀλλίως, ὁμοιομένου μὲν ταύτων φήσομεν γέγονεσθαι, ἀνομοιομένου δὲ ἔτερον; ΘΕΛ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ὡς πολλαὶ μὲν εἴη τὰ ποιοῦντα καὶ ἔπειθα, ὡσαύτως δὲ γε τὰ πᾶσχοντα; ΘΕΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Καὶ
μὴν ὤτι γε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ συμμετοχῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ οὐ
βταύτ᾽ ἄλλ᾽ ἔτερα γεννήσει; ΘΕΛΙ. 1 Πάνω μὲν οὖν.
Σ. Δέχομεν δὴ ἐμὲ τε καὶ σὲ καὶ τὰλλ᾽ ἕδη κατὰ
tὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, Σωκράτη ὕμιανοντα καὶ Σωκράτη
αὗ ἀσθενοῦντα. πότερον ὁμοίον τοῦτ᾽ ἐκείνῳ ἦ ἀνό-
μοιον φήσομεν; ΘΕΛΙ. Ἀρα τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα Σω-
κράτη, ὅλον τοῦτο λέγεις ὅλῳ ἐκείνῳ, τῷ ὕμιανοντι
Σωκράτει; Σ. Καλλιστα ὑπέλαβες αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγω.
ΘΕΛΙ. Ἀνόμοιον δὴποιού. Σ. Καὶ ἔτερον ἅρα οὖτως,
ὡσπερ ἀνόμοιον; ΘΕΛΙ. Ἀνάγκη. Σ. Καὶ καθεύ-
δοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα, ἄ νῦν 1 διήλθομεν, ὡσαυτῶς φήσεις;
ΘΕΛΙ. Ἔγωγε. Σ.  "Εκαστὸν δὴ τῶν περιπότων τι
pοιεῖν ἄλλο τι, ὅταν μὲν λάβῃ ὕμιανοντα Σωκράτη,
ὡς ἐτέρῳ μοι χρήσεται, ὅταν δὲ ἄσθενοῦντα, ὡς ἐτέρῳ;
ΘΕΛΙ. Τί δ᾽ οὖν μέλλει; Σ. Καὶ ἔτερα δὴ ἐφ᾽
ἐκατέρου γεγομόμενον ἐγώ τε ὑπάρχων καὶ ἐκεῖνο τὸ
ποιοῦν; ΘΕΛΙ. Τί μήν; Σ. "Οταν δὴ οἴνον πῖνω
ὑμαίνων, ἰδίυ μοι φαίνεσθαι καὶ γλυκύς; ΘΕΛΙ. Ναι.
Σ. Ἐγέτων οὕρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προσωμολογημένων τὸ
1 ποιοῦν καὶ τὸν ὑπάρχον γλυκύτητα τε καὶ αἰσθησιν,
ἀμα φερόμενα ἀμπότερα, καὶ ἣ μὲν αἰσθησισ πρὸς τὸν
πάρχοντα οὖσα αἰσθανομένη τὴν γλῶσσαν ἀπειρ-
γάσατο, ὃ δὲ γλυκύτης πρὸς τὸν οἴνον περὶ αὐτὸν
φερομένη γλυκίν τῶν οἴνων τῇ ύμιανοῦσῃ γλῶσσῃ
ἐποίησε καὶ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι. ΘΕΛΙ. Πάνω μὲν
οὖν τὰ πρότερα ἤμων οὖτως ὁμολογητο. Σ. "Οταν
δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα, ἄλλο τι πρότερον μὲν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐ τὸν
αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν; ἀνομοίω γὰρ δὴ προσῆλθεν. ΘΕΛΙ.
Ε. Ναι. Σ. "Ετέρα δὴ αὐτ᾽ ἐγεννησάτην ὁ τε τοιοῦτος

150 1. καὶ ἄλλῳ οὐ. Fortasse legendum καὶ ἄλλῳ αὐτί οὐ.
Σωκράτης καὶ ἥ τοῦ οἴνου πόσις, περὶ μὲν τῇ γλῶτταν αἰσθησιν πικρότητος, περὶ δὲ τὸν οἴνον γηγυμόμενην καὶ φερομένην πικρότητα, καὶ τὸν μὲν οὐ πικρότητα ἀλλὰ πικρόν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐκ αἰσθησιν ἄλλα αἰσθανόμενοι; ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν. Σ. Ὀυκοῦν ἐγὼ τε οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποτὲ γενήσομαι οὕτως αἰσθανόμενος· τοῦ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλη αἰσθησις, καὶ ἄλλοιον ἐκεῖνο ἑνὸ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον οὔτε ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμὲ μὴ ποτέ ἄλλῳ συνελθον ταῦτον γενήσαν τοιούτον γενήσαται· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλο γενήσαν ἄλλοιον γενήσεται. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἑστὶ ταῦτα. Σ. Ὀυδὲ μὴν ἔγωγε ἐμαυτῷ τοιούτος, ἐκεῖνο τε ἐαυτῷ τοιοῦτον γενήσεται. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Σ. Ἀνάγκη δὲ γε ἐμὲ τε τινὸς γῆγυρεσθαι, ὅταν αἰσθανόμενος γηγυμώμενα αἰσθανόμενον γάρ, μηδενὸς δὲ αἰσθανόμενον ἀδύνατον γῆγυρεσθαι· ἐκεῖνο τε τίνι γῆγυρεσθαι, ὅταν γηγυκά ὁ θικρῶν ὃ ττο τοιοῦτον γηγυρησάντα· γηγυκὴ γάρ, μηδείς δὲ γηγυκὴ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Σ. Δεῖτεται δή, οἰμαί, ἡμῖν ἅλληλοις, εἰτε ἐσμέν, εἶναι, εἰτε γηγυμόμεθα, γηγυρεσθαι, ἐπεὶ πρὸς ἡμῶν ἡ ἀνάγκη τῇν οὐσίαν συνίδει μὲν, συνίδει δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐδ' αὖ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. ἅλληλοις δὴ λεῖτεται συνιδέσθαι. ὡστε εἰτε τις εἶναι τις ἑνομάζει, τινὶ εἶναι ἡ τινὸς ἡ πρὸς τι ῥήτευον αὐτῷ, εἰτε γηγυρεσθαν αὐτῷ δὲ ἐφ' αὐτοῦ τῇ ἡ ὃν ἡ γηγυμόμενον οὔτε αὐτῷ ἐκτένω οὔτε ἀλλού λέγοντος ἀποδεκτεῖν, ὡς ὁ μέγις ὁ διελληλιθαμεν σημαίνει. ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ο Σωκράτες. Σ. Ὀυκοῦν ὅτε δὴ τὸ ἐμὲ ποιοῦν ἐμοὶ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῳ, ἐγὼ καὶ αἰσθάνομαι αὐτοῦ, ἄλλος δ' οὖ; ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς γὰρ οὖ; Σ. Ἀληθῆς ἄρα ἐμοὶ ἡ ἐμὴ αἰσθησις· τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὐσίας ἀεὶ ἐστὶ. καὶ ἐγὼ κριτης κατὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν τῶν τε
οὐτῶν ἐμοὶ, ὡς ἔστι, καὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστων.

ὁ ΘΕΛ. ὡς ἔστιν. XV. Σ. Πῶς ἂν ὁι ἀφευδής ὦν καὶ μὴ πταιῶν τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἥ γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἐπιστήμων ἄν εἰην ὄντερ αἰσθητής; ΘΕΛ. Οὐδαμῶς ὡς τοι δὲ Ἐσκαλάκου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων φύλων οἰων ρεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα, κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τῶν σοφῶτατων πάντων χρημάτων ἀνθρωπον μέτρον εἰναι, κατὰ δὲ Θεαίτητον τούτων ἐν οὕτως ἐχόντων αἰσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γιγνεσθαι. ἦ γάρ, ὁ Θεαίτητε; φομεν τούτο σοῦ μὲν εἰναι οἰων νεογενεῖς παιδίων, ἐμὼν δὲ μαίεμα; ἦ πῶς λέγεις; ΘΕΛ. Οὕτως ἀνάγκη, ὁ Σώκρατες. Σ. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ, ὡς έοικε, μόνης ποτὲ ἐγεννησαμεν, ὁ τι δὴ ποτὲ καὶ τυχάνει ὑν. μετὰ δὲ τὸν τόκον τὰ ἁμφίδρομα αὐτῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν κύκλῳ περιβρεχτείν τῷ λόγῳ, σκοπούμενοι μὴ λάθη ἡμῶς οὐκ ἄξιον ὑν τροφῆς τό ἔνι ἴγνωμενον, ἀλλὰ ἀνεμιαίον τε καὶ ψεύδος. ἦ σὺ οὐκ πάντωσ δεῖν τὸ γε σοῦ τρέφειν καὶ μὴ ἀποτιθέναι; ἦ καὶ ἀνέξει ἐλεγχόμενον ὀρῶν, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα χαλεπανεῖς, ἐὰν τις σοῦ ὡς πρωτοτόκου αὐτὸ ὕφαιρῃ; ΘΕΟ. Ἀνέξεται, ὁ Σώκρατες, Θεαίτητος; οὖδαμῶς γὰρ δύσκολος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν εἰπέ, ἦ αὐτοῦ οὕτως ἔχει; Σ. Φιλολόγος ἦ εἰ ἀτεχνώς καὶ χρηστός, ὁ Θεόδωρος, ὅτι μὲ οὐκ λόγων τινὶ εἶναι θύλακον καὶ ῥαδίως ἔχει; λόγων ἔρει, ὡς οὐκ αὐτοῦ ἔχει οὕτως ταῦτα. τὸ δὲ ἴγνωμενον οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι οὐδεῖς τῶν λόγων ἔξερχεται παρ’ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλ’ αἰτ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμοῖ προσδιαλεγόμενον, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδεν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον πλῆν βραχεός, ὅσον λόγου παρ’ ἐτέρου σοφοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι μετρίως.
καὶ νῦν τοῦτο παρὰ τούτῳ πειράσομαι, οὕτω δὲ ἐπιτείν. ΘΕΟ. Σὺ καλλίου, ὃ Σώκρατες, λέγεις καὶ ποίει ὦτως. Χ. ΣΩ. Ὅσθ' ὦν, ὃ Θεόδωρε, ὃ θαυμάζω τοῦ ἐταίρου σου Πρωταγόρου; ΘΕΟ. 1 Τὸ εὐποίον; ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μοι πάντως ἔβρηκεν, ὡς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ ἔστι τὴν ὑ' ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐπικούμακα, ὅτι οὐκ ἔπειν ἀρχόμενος τῆς Ἀληθείας, ὅτι πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ὑπὸ κυνοκέφαλος ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀτοπώτερον τῶν ἐχόντων αἰσθήσεων, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπῶς καὶ πάνω καταφρονητικῶς ἤρξατο ἡμῖν λέγειν, εὐδεικνύμενος, ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν αὐτῶν ὠσπερ θεῶν ἑθαυμάξομεν ἐπὶ σοφία, ὡς ἀρα ἑτυγχαίνει ὑπὸ εἰς φρόνησιν οὐδὲν βελτίων 1 βατράχου γυνίου, μην ὅτι ᾠτί ἄλλου τοῦ ἀνθρώπων. ὡς λέγομεν, ὃ Θεόδωρε; εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐκάστῳ ἄλληθες ἐσται ὃ ἀν δὲ αἰσθήσεως δοξάζῃ, καὶ μήτε τὸ ἄλλου πάθος ἄλλος βελτίων διακρίνει, μήτε τὴν δόξαν κυριώτερον ἐσται ἑπισκέψασθαι ἐτερος τὴν ἐτέρου, ὅρθη ἢ ἑυνόης, ἀλλ' ὁ πολλάκις εἰρηται, αὐτὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἐκάστος μόνον δοξάσει, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ὀρθὰ καὶ ἀληθῆ, τί δ' ποτε, ὃ ἐταίρε, Πρωταγόρας μὲν σοφὸς, ὡςτε καὶ ἄλλων διδάσκαλος ἀξιοῦσθαι 1 δικαιῶς εἰ μετὰ μεγάλων μισθῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμαθεστεροὶ τε καὶ φοιτητέοι ἡμῖν ἢ παρ' ἐκεῖνον, μέτρω ὕμνη αὐτῶ ἐκάστῳ τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας; ταῦτα πῶς μὴ φώμεν δημούμενον λέγειν τὸν Πρωταγόραν; τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐμὸν τε καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς τέχνης τῆς ματαιτικῆς συγγο, ὅσον γέλωτα ὠφλισκάνομεν οἴμαι δὲ καὶ ξύμπασα ἢ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία. τὸ γὰρ ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐλέγχειν τὰς ἄλληλους φαντασίας τε καὶ δόξας, ὀρθας ἐκάστου οὖσας, οὐ μακρ' * μὲν καὶ διωλύγιος φλυαρία, εἰ ἀλή- 162 θης ἢ ἀλήθεια Πρωταγόρου, ἄλλα μὴ παίζουσα ἐκ τοῦ
ἀδύτου τῆς βίβλου ἐφθέγξατο; ΘΕΟ. Ὡ Σωκρατεσ, φίλος ἰνήρ, ὅσπερ σὺ νῦν δὴ εἴπες. οὐκ ἂν οὖν δεξαμεν δι' ἐμοῦ ὁμολογούντος ἐλέγχεσθαι Προταγόραν, οὐδ' αὐτὶ παρὰ δόξαν ἀντιτίθεν. τὸν οὖν Θεαίτητον πάλιν λαβεῖ. πάντως καὶ νῦν δὴ μᾶλ' ἐμμελῶς σοι ἐφαίνετο ὑπακούειν. ΣΩ. Ἄρα κἂν εἰς Δακεδαίμονα β' ἐλθὼν, ὁ Θεόδωρε, 1 πρὸς τὸς παλαιστρας άξιοῖς ἀν ἄλλους θεόμενοι γυμνοὺς, ἐνίοις φαύλους, αὐτὸς μὴ ἀντεπιδεικνύναι τὸ εἶδος παραποδομένους; ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν δοκεῖς, εἴπερ μέλλοιεν μοι ἐπιτρέψειν καὶ πεισθαι; ὅσπερ νῦν οἶμαι ὑμᾶς πείσειν ἐμὲ μὲν ἐὰν θεάσθαι καὶ μὴ ἐλκεῖν πρὸς τὸ γυμνάσιον σκληρὸν ἥδη ὑστα, τῷ δὲ δὴ νεωτέρῳ τε καὶ ύγροτέρῳ ὑστί προσπαλαίεσθαι. ΧVII. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ οὕτως, ὁ Θεόδωρε, καὶ σοι φίλουν, οὐδ' ἐμοὶ ἐχθρόν, φασίν 1 οἱ παροιμιαζόμενοι. πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐπὶ τὸν σοφὸν Θεαίτητον ἱτέων. Λέγε δὴ, ὁ Θεαίτητς, πρῶτον μὲν ἂ νῦν διήλθομεν, ἀρα οὐ συνθαυμάζεις, εἰ εξαίφησις οὕτως ἀναφανίσῃ μηδὲν χεῖρων εἰς σοφίαν ὄτου ἄνθρωπων ἡ καὶ θεῶν; ἡ ἔττον τι οἶει τὸ Προταγόρειον μέτρον εἰς θεοὺς ἡ εἰς ἄνθρωπος λέγεσθαι; ΘΕΛ. Μᾶ Δ' οὖν ἐγώῃ. καὶ ὡπερ γε ἔρωτας, πάνυ θαυμάζω. ἡνίκα ἡμὰ διήμεν, δ' οὖν τρόπον λέγοιεν τὸ δοκοῦν ἔκλασθο τούτῳ καὶ 1 εἰναι τῷ δοκοῦντι, πάνυ μοι εὐ ἐφαίνετο λέγεσθαι νῦν δὲ τούτοισιν τάχα μεταπέπτωκεν. ΣΩ. Νέος γὰρ εἴ, ὁ φίλε παῖ τής οὖν δημηγορίας ὡς ὑπακούει καὶ πείθει. πρὸς γὰρ ταῦτα ἐρεὶ Προταγόρας ἡ τις ἄλλος υπὲρ αὐτοῦ, Ὡ θεοῦ λαθίου παίδες τε καὶ γέροντες, δημηγορεῖτε ξυγκαθεζόμενοι, θεοὺς τε εἰς τὸ μέσον ἄγοντες, εἴς ἐγὼ ἐκ τοῦ λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν περὶ 1 αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰσὲν ἡ ἣς οὖκ εἰσίν, εξαιρῶ καὶ ἂ οἱ πολλοὶ ἂν
ἀποδέχομαι ἀκούοντες, λέγετε ταῦτα, ὡς δεινὸν εἰ μηδὲν διοἴσει εἰς σοφίαν ἐκαστὸς τῶν ἀνθρώπων βοσκήματος ὑπονοοῦν ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνώγκην οὐδ' ἠμίτωον λέγετε, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθε, ὧ εἰ ἐθέλοι Θεόδωρος ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμετρεῖν, ἥξιος οἰκείος μόνον ἂν εὑρ. σκοπεῖτε οὖν σὺ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος, εἰ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανολογία τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ 

ΣΤΗΛΗ. 163 τῶν λεγομένων λόγως. ΘΕΛΙ. ᾽Αλλ' οὖν δίκαιον, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὔτε σὺ οὔτε ἂν ἤμεις φαίμεν. ΣΩ. ᾽Αλλὰ δὴ σκεπτέοι, ὡς έοικεν, ὡς ὁ τε σὸς καὶ ὁ Θεόδωρος λόγος. ΘΕΛΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν ἁλλὰ. ΣΩ. Τῆς δὲ σκοπώμεν, εἱ ἄρα ἐστῖν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως ταύτων ἢ ἔτερον. εἰς γὰρ τούτο που πᾶς ὁ λόγος ἢμῖν ἔτεινε, καὶ τούτων χίριν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα ταῦτα ἐκνήσαμεν. οὐ γὰρ; ΘΕΛΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἰ' ὁμολογήσωμεν, ὃ τῷ ὀρᾶν ἀισθανόμεθα ἢ τῷ ἀκούειν, πάντα ταῦτα ἁμα καὶ ἐπιστάσθαι; οἰον τῶν βαρβάρων πρὶν μαθεῖν τὴν φωνῆν πότερον οὐ φήσομεν ἁκούειν, ὅταν φθέγγωμεν, ἢ ἁκούειν τε καὶ ἐπιστάσθαι ἢ λέγονσι: καὶ αὐ γράμματα μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι, βλέποντες εἰς αὐτὰ πότερον οὐχ ὁρὰν ἢ ἐπιστάσθαι, εἴπερ ὀρῶμεν, διασχυρούμεθα; ΘΕΛΙ. Λυτὸ γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, τούτῳ αὐτῶν, ὑπὲρ ὀρῶμεν τε καὶ ἁκούομεν, ἐπιστάσθαι φήσομεν τῶν μεν γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ χρῶμа ὀρὰν τε καὶ ἐπιστάσθαι, τῶν δὲ τῆς 

XVIII. ᾽Αλλ' ὁ θεατήτης καὶ οὐκ ἄξιόν σοι πρὸς 

ταῦτα ἀμφισβητῆσαι, ἦν καὶ αὐξάνης. ΧVIII. ᾽Αλλ' ὁ ὁ ὁ πολλα ἐκποίησα, καὶ σκόπει, πῇ αἰτὸ
διωσόμεθα. ΘΕΛΙ. Τὸ ποιον δὴ; ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιὸνδε, εἴ
tis ἔροιτο, ἢρα δυνατὸν, ὅτου τις ἐπιστήμων γένοιτο

d ποτε, ἐτὶ ἐχουτα 1 μνήμην αὐτοῦ τούτου καὶ σαξόμενον
tότε ὅτε μέμνηται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὃ μέμνη-
tαι. μακρολογῶ δὲ, ὥσ ἔοικε, βουλόμενος ἐρέσθαι, εἰ
µαθὼν τὶς τι μεμνημένοι μὴ οἴδε. ΘΕΛΙ. Καὶ πῶς,
ὁ Σωκράτης; τέρας γὰρ ἂν εἶη ὁ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Μὴ οὖν
ἐγὼ ληρῶ; σκόπει δὲ. ἢρα τὸ ὅραῖν οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι
λέγεις καὶ τὴν ὄψιν αἰσθῆσιν; ΘΕΛΙ. 'Εγγαγε. ΣΩ.
Οὐκοῦν ὁ ἱδὼν τι ἐπιστήμων ἐκείνου γέγονεν ὁ ἔδει κατὰ
Ε τῶν ἄρτι λόγου; ΘΕΛΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. 1 Τὶ δαῖ; μνήμην
οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι; ΘΕΛΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖ-
δενος ἢ τινός; ΘΕΛΙ. Τινός δήμου. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὃν
ἐμαθε καὶ ὃν ἔσθετο, τοιοτοῦν τινων; ΘΕΛΙ. Τὶ
µήν; ΣΩ. ὁ δὴ εἰδὲ τις, μέμνηται πον ἐνιότε; ΘΕΛΙ. Μέμνηται. ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ µύσας; ἢ τοῦτο ὁδά-
σας ἐπελάθετο; ΘΕΛΙ. Ἀλλὰ δεινόν, ὁ Σωκράτης,
164 τοῦτο γε φάναι. ΣΩ. 2 Δεῖ γε µέντοι, εἰ σώσοιμεν τὸν
πρόσθεν λόγον εἰ δὲ µή, οἴχεται. ΘΕΛΙ. Καὶ ἐγὼ

νὴ τὸν Δ᾽ ὑποπτεύω, οὐ µὴν ἰκανῶς ὅτι συννοώ; ἀλλ᾽
eίπε πῇ. ΣΩ. Τῇδε ὁ μὲν ὅρων ἐπιστήμων, φαμέν,
tοῦτον γέγονεν, οὔτερ ὅρων ὄψις γὰρ καὶ αἰσθησις
καὶ ἐπιστήμη παὐτὸν ὁμολόγηται. ΘΕΛΙ. Πάνω γε.
ΣΩ. Ὡ δὲ γε ὅρων καὶ ἐπιστήμων γεγονος οὐ ἔστε,
ἐὰν µύση, μέμνηται µέν, οὐχ ὅρα δὲ αὐτό, ἢ γάρ;
1 ΘΕΛΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ γε οὖχ ὅρα οὐκ 1 ἐπίσταται
ἐστιν, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ὅρα ἐπίσταται. ΘΕΛΙ. Ἀληθῆ.
ΣΩ. Ἀμβαίνει ἁρα, οὐ τις ἐπιστήμων ἐγένετο, ἐτι
µεµνηµένον αὐτοῦ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι, ἐπειδῆ οὐχ ὅρα; ὃ
τέρας ἐφαμεν ἂν εἶναι εἰ γέρνουτο. ΘΕΛΙ. Ἀληθέσ-
tατα λέγεις. ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀδυνάτων δὴ τι ξυμβαίνειν
φαίνεται, εάν τις ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἰσθησιν ταύτων φή ἐναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ έσικεν. ΣΩ. Ὕλλο ἄρα ἐκάτερον φατέον. ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει. ΣΩ. Τι οὖν δὴ ἂν εἳ ἐπιστήμη; 1 πάλιν ἐξ ἄρχης, ὥσ· έσικε, λεκτέον. Καίτοι κτὶ ποτε μέλλομεν, δ’ Ἡθαίτητε, δραίν; ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνος πέρι; ΣΩ. Φαινόμεθα μοι ἀλεκτρόνον ἀγεννούς δίκην, πρὶν νευκηκέναι, ἀποπηδήσαντες απὸ τοῦ λόγου ἀδείν. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ; ΣΩ. Ἀντιλογικῶς ἐοίκαμεν πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὅνομάτων ὁμολογίας ἀνομολογησάμενοι καὶ τοιοῦτο τινὶ περιγενέμενοι τοῦ λόγου ἀγαπάν, καὶ οὐ φάσκοιτες ἀγωνισταί ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι λανθάνομεν ταύτα ἐκείνοις 1 τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀνδράσι ποιοῦντες. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐτῶ δ’ μαυθάνῳ ὅπως λέγεις. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ’ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι δηλώσαι περὶ αὐτῶν ὧ γε δὴ νοῶ. ἡρόμεθα γὰρ δὴ, εἰ μαθῶν καὶ μεμνημένος τίς τι μὴ ἐπίσταται, καὶ τὸν ἱδόντα καὶ μύσαντα μεμνημένον, ὀρῶντα δὲ οὐ, ἀποδείξαντες, οὐκ εἰδότα ἀπεδείξαμεν καὶ ἀμα μεμνημένου τούτο ὦ εἶναι ἀδύνατον. καὶ οὔτω δὴ μύθος ἀπώλετο ὁ Πρωταγόρειος, καὶ ὁ σὸς ἀμα ὁ τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ αἰσθήσεως, ὅτι ταύτων ἐστί. ΘΕΑΙ. 1 Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Ε’ Οὐ τι ἂν, οἷμαι, ὃ φίλε, εἴπερ γε ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ ἐτέρου μνὺθον ἕξη, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἂν ἡμῶς νῦν δὲ ὁρφανῶν αὐτῶν ἡμεῖς προπηλακίζομεν. καὶ γὰρ οὐδ’ οἱ ἐπίτροποι, οὓς Πρωταγόρας κατέλιπε, βοηθεῖν ἐθέλουσιν, ὅν Θεόδωρος εἶς ὅδε. ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύσομεν τοῦ δικαίου ἐνεκ’ αὐτῶ βοηθεῖν. ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον Καλλίας ὁ Ἔποπονίκου τῶν ἐκείνου ἐπίτροποι: 165 ἡμεῖς δὲ πῶς θάττων ἐκ τῶν ψυλῶν λόγων πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρίαν ἀπενεύσαμεν. χάριν γε μέντοι ἐξομεν, εἰν αὐτῶ βοηθῆς. ΣΩ. Καλὸς λέγεις, ὁ Θεόδωρε. σκέψαι σοῦν τὴν γ’ ἐμὴν βοηθείαν. τῶν γαρ ἀρτι δεινότερα ἂν

Κ. Ρ. 3
τις ὁμολογήσειε μὴ προσέχον τοῖς ρήμασι τοῦ νόην, ἢ τὸ πολὺ εἰδίσμεθα φάναι τε καὶ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι. σοὶ λέγω ὅπη, ἢ Θεατήτῳ; ΘΕΟ. Εἰς τὸ κοινὸν μὲν οὖν, ἅ ἀποκρινέσθω δέ ὁ νεώτερος σφαλεὶς 1 γὰρ ἤττον ἀσχημονήσεi. XIX. ΣΩ. Λέγω δὲ τὸ δεινότατον ἐρώτημα. ἔστὶ δὲ, οἶμαι, τοιῶντε τι' ἄρα οὖν τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδότα τι τούτο ὁ οἶδε μὴ εἰδέναι; ΘΕΟ. Τί δὴ οὐν ἀποκρινούμεθα, ὡ Θεαίτητε; ΘΕΛΙ. Ἀδύνατον πον, οἶμαι ἐγώγε. ΣΩ. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ ὅραν γε ἐπίστασθαι θήσεις. τί γὰρ χρῆσει ἄφυκτῳ ἐρώτηματ, τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν φρέατι συνεχόμενος, ὅταν ἐροτᾶ ἀνέκπληκτος ἀνήρ, καταλαβὼν τῇ χειρὶ σοῦ τὸν ἔτερον ὀφθαλμῶν, εἰ ὁρᾶς c τὸ ἰμάτιον τῷ 1 κατειλήμμενῳ; ΘΕΛΙ. Οὐ φήσω, οἶμαι, τοῦτο γε, τὸ μέντοι ἔτερῳ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁρᾶς τε καὶ οὐχ ὁρᾶς ἀμα ταυτῷ; ΘΕΛΙ. Οὕτω γε πως. ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἐγώ, φήσει, τοῦτο οὕτε τάττω οὕτ' ἠρόμην τὸ ὁπως, ἀλλ' εἰ ὁ ἐπίστασαι, τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἐπίστασαι. νῦν δὲ ὁ οὐχ ὁρᾶς, ὁρῶν φαίνει. ὁμολογηκὼς δὲ τυχάνεις τὸ ὅραν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ μή ὅραν μή ἐπίστασθαι. ἐξ' οὖν τούτων λογίζομεν τί σοι συμβαίνει. 

D ΘΕΛΙ. 1 Ἀλλὰ λογίζομαι, ὅτι τάναυτὰ οἰς ὑπεθέμεν. ΣΩ. Ἰσως δὲ γ', ὁ θαυμάσιε, πλεῖον ἂν τοιαῦτ' ἐπαθεῖς, εἰ τίς σε προσηρώτα, εἰ ἐπίστασθαι ἐστὶ μὲν οξύ, ἐστὶ δὲ ἀμβλυ, καὶ ἐγνύθεν μὲν ἐπίστασθαι, πόρρωθεν δὲ μή, καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἢρέμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, ὃ ἐλλοχῶν ἂν πελταστικὸς ἀνήρ μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγως ἐρόμενος, ἕνικ' ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἰσθησιν ταυτὸν ἔδω, ἐμβαλὼν ἂν εἰς τὸ ἀκούει καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τοιάτας αἰσθήσεις, ἤλεγχεν ἂν ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνείς, 

Ε 1 πρὶν θαυμάσας τὴν πολυάρατον σοφίαν ἐννεποδίσθης ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, οὖ δὴ σε χειροσάµενός τε καὶ ἐννοίας ἦδη
Διν τότε ἐλύτρων χρημάτων, ὡσον σοί τε κάκεινο εἴδωκεν. Τών οὖν δὴ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, φαινὴς ἂν ἴσως, λόγον ἐπικουρον τοῖς αὐτῶν ἐρεῖ; ἀλλα τι πειρώμεθα λέγειν; ΘΕΛΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. XX. ΣΩ. Ταύτι τε δὴ πάντα, ὅσα ἡμέις ἐπαμύνοντες αὐτῷ λέγομεν, καὶ ὁμόσε, οἶμαι, * χωρίστηκα, καταφρονῶν ἡμῶν καὶ λέγων. Οὗτος δὴ ἱδο τὸ Σωκράτης ὁ χρηστὸς, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ παιδίον τι ἐρωτηθέν ἐδείσεν, εἰ οἶόν τε τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ αὐτό μεμνησθαί ἕμα καὶ μὴ εἰδεναί, καὶ δεῖσαν ἀπέφησε διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι προσμαίνει, γέλοια δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξε. τὸ δὲ, ὡ ῥαθυμότατε Σωκρατεῖ, τῇδ' ἔχειν ὅταν τι τῶν ἐμῶν δι' ἐρωτήσεως σκοπῆς, εἶν μὲν ὁ ἐρωτηθείς ὁλόπερ ἀν ἐγὼ ἀποκριναίμην ἀποκριναίμενος σφάλληται, ἐγὼ ἐλέγχομαι, εἰ δὲ ἄλλοι, 1 αὐτὸς ὁ ἐρωτηθείς. αὐτίκα Β γὰρ δοκεῖς τινὰ σοι εὐγχωρήσεσθαι μνήμην παρεῖναι τῷ ὅν ἐπαθεν τοιούτω τι οὐσαν πάθος, οἴον ὅτε ἔπαισχε, μηκέτι πᾶσχοι; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἢ αὐτοκινήσεις ὁμολογεῖν οἶον τ' εἶναι εἰδεναι καὶ μὴ εἰδεναι τοῦ αὐτῶν τὸ αὐτό; ἢ εἰάνπερ τοῦτο δείση, δῶσειν ποτὲ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι τῶν ἀνυμοιουμένων τῷ πρῶ ἀνυμοιοῦσθαι ὑπτε; μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν εἶναι τινα, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τοὺς, καὶ τοῦτος γιγνομένους ἀπείρους, εἰάνπερ ἀνυμοίωσις γίγνεται, 1 εἰ ὁ δὴ ὀνομάτων γε δείσει θηρεύσεις διενλαβεῖσθαι ἀλλῆλων; ἀλλ', ὁ μακάριε, φήσει, γενναιοτέρως ἐπ' αὐτό ἐλθὼν, ὁ λέγω, εἰ δύνασαι, εξέλεγξον, ὡς οὐχὶ ἔδει αἰσθῆσεις ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν γίγνονται, ἢ ὡς οἶόν γιγνομένων οὐδὲν τι ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ φαινόμενον μόνον ἐκεῖνο γίγνοιτο, ἢ, εἰ εἶναι δὲ ὀνομάξει, εἰη, ὁπερ φαίνεται. υς δὲ δὴ καὶ κυνοκεφάλους λέγων οὐ μόνον αὐτῶς ὑπεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας τοῦτο δραίν εἰς τὰ συγγραμματᾶ μον ἀναπείθεις, οὐ καλῶς 1 τοιῶν. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἃ 3—2
φημὶ μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν ὡς γέγραφα: μέτρον γὰρ ἐκαστὸν ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τῶν ὑπὸ καὶ μή μυρίον μὲντοι διαφέρειν ἐτερον ἐτέρου αὐτῷ τοῦτο, ἢτι τῷ μὲν ἄλλα ἔστι τε καὶ φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἄλλα. καὶ σοφίαν καὶ σοφὸν ἄνδρα πολλὸν δεό τὸ μή φάναι εἶναι, ἄλλῳ αὐτῶν τούτον καὶ λέγω σοφόν, ὅσ ἂν τινι ἡμῶν, ἦν φαίνεται καὶ ἐστὶ κακά, μεταβάλλων ποιήσῃ ἀγαθὰ φαίνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι. τὸν δὲ λόγον αὐτῇ τῷ ὑμᾶτί μοι ἔδωκε, ἀλλὰ ὃδε ἐτι σαφέστερον μάθετε, τί λέγω. ὅπως γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο ἀναμνήσθη, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἁσθενοῦντι πικρὰ φαίνεται ἢ ἐσθίει, καὶ ἐστὶ, τῷ δὲ ὑμιᾶνοντι τὰναντία ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται. σοφότερον μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐδέτερον δεῖ ποιῆσαι, οὐδὲ γὰρ δυνατὸν 167 οὐδὲ * κατηγορητέον, ὅς ὁ μὲν κάρμων ἀμαθῆς, ὅτι τοιαῦτα δοζίζει, ὃ δὲ ὑμιᾶνων σοφός, ὅτι ἄλλοια: μεταβλητέον ὃ ἐπὶ θάτερα ἀμείνων γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα ἔξις. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ ἀπὸ ἑτέρας ἔξεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμείνων μεταβλητέον. ἀλλὸ ὁ μὲν ἱατρὸς φαρμάκων μεταβάλλει, ὃ δὲ σοφιστὴς λόγοις. ἐπεὶ οὐ τι γε ψευδὴ δοζίζοντα τίς τισ ποτερον ἀληθῆ ἐποίησε δοζίζειν; οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ῥύτα δυνατῶν δοζίσαι, οὔτε ἄλλα παρ' ἂν πάσχῃ, ταῦτα δὲ ἄει ἀληθῆ. ἀλλ' ἐν οἴμαι, ποιηρὰ θυτής ἐξεί 1 δοζίζοντας συγγενῆ αὐτῆς χρηστῇ ἐποίησε δοζίσαι ἑτέρα τοιαῦτα, ἢ δὴ τινὲς τὰ φαντάσματα ύπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ βελτίων μὲν τὰ ἑτέρα τῶν ἑτέρων, ἀληθεστέρα δὲ οὐδέν. καὶ τοὺς σοφούς, ὃ φίλε Σώκρατες, πολλὸν δεό βατρά- χους λέγει, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν σώματα ἱατροὺς λέγω, κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργούς. φημὶ γὰρ καὶ τούτως τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀντὶ ποιηρῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὅταν τι αὐτῶν ἀσθενῆ, ὁ χρηστάς καὶ 1 ύμεινως αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἀληθείας ἐμ-
ποιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ γε σοφοῦς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ οὖν γὰρ ἐκάστη πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῆ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῷ, ἐὼς ἂν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ. ἀλλ' ὁ σοφὸς αὐτὶ πονηρῶν ὄντων ἀυτοῖς ἐκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς τοὺς παιδευομένους ὤτω δυνάμενος παιδαγωγεῖν σοφὸς τε καὶ ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοὺς παιδευθεὶς. καὶ οὕτω σοφώτεροι τέ εἰσιν δὲ ἐτέρω καὶ οὔδεις ἑυδή δοξάζει, καὶ σοὶ, εὰν τοὺς βούλησαν τε μη, ἀνεκτέον ὤν, μέτρω σώζεται γὰρ ἐν τούτοις οὐ καθός οὔτος, ἵνα εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἕξι ἄρχης ἀμφισβητεῖν, ἀμφισβήτης, λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξελθῶν, εἰ δὲ διὰ ἐρωτήσεων βούλει, δι' ἐρωτήσεως οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο φευκτέον, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα διωκτέον τῷ νοῦν ἔχοντι. ποιεῖ μέντοι οὕτωσι μη ἄδικει εἰν τῷ ἑρωτάτων. Εἰ καὶ γὰρ πολλὴ ἀλογία ἀρετῆς φάσκοιτα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μηδὲν ἀλλ' ἦ ἄδικοντα ἐν λόγοις διατελεῖν. ἄδικεῖν δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὅταν τὸς μὴ χωρίς μὲν ως ἀγωνιζόμενος τοῖς διατριβαῖς ποιήται, χωρίς δὲ διαλεγόμενος, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ παίξῃ τε καὶ σφάλλῃ καθ' ὀσον ἄν δύνηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ διαλέγεσθαι σπουδάζῃ τε καὶ ἐπανορθῶν τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον, ἐκεῖνα μόνα αὐτῷ ἐνδεικτήθη οἷς σφάλματα, ὥς αὐτὸς υφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν * προτέρων συνουσίων παρεκέκρουστο. ἂν μὲν γὰρ ὅτι οὕτω ποιήσας ἑαυτοῦ αἰτιᾶσσονται οἱ προσδιατριβοῦσιν σοι τῆς αὐτῶν παραχίας καὶ ἀπορίας, ἀλλ' οὐ σὲ, καὶ σὲ μὲν διώξονται καὶ φιλήσουσιν, αὐτοὺς δὲ μισήσουσι, καὶ φεύξονται ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, ὡς ἄλλοι γενόμενοι ἀπαλλαγόσι τῶν οἱ προτέρου ἡσαυέν ἑαυτῷ δὲ τάναντια τοῦτων δρᾶς, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ, τάναντια
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ευμβήσεται σοι καὶ τοὺς εὐνόμτας ἀντὶ φιλοσόφων
μισοῦντας τοῦτο τὸ πράγμα ἀποφανεῖς, ἐπειδὴ πρεσβύτεροι γένωνται.
ἐὰν οὖν ἔμοι πεῖθη, ὃ καὶ πρότερον ἐρρήθη, οὐ δυσμενὸς οὐδὲ μαχητικὸς, ἀλλὰ ἕλεος 
τῇ διανοίᾳ εὐγκαθεῖς ὧς ἄληθῶς σκέψει, τί ποτε λέγομεν,
κινεῖσθαι τε ἀποφαινόμενοι τὰ πάντα τὸ τε δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι ἴδιωτη 
τε καὶ πόλει, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκέψει, εἰτε ταύτων εἰτε καὶ ἄλλο ἐπιστήμη 
καὶ αἰσθησις, ἀλλὰ οὐχ, ὡσπερ ἄρτι, ἐκ συνηθείας ῥημάτων 
των τε καὶ ὄνοματων ἂ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅπῃ ἄν τῷ χωσιν ἔλκοντες ἀπορίας ἀλλήλοις παυτοδαπαῖς παρέχονσι. 
Ταῦτα, ὃ Θεόδωρος, τῷ ἑταῖρῳ σου εἰς βοηθείαν προσηρξάμην κατ' ἐμὴν δύναμιν, σμικρὰ ἀπὸ σμικρῶν εἰ 
δ' αὐτὸς ἐξῆ, μεγαλειότερον ἄν τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἐβοηθήσεν. 
ΧΧΙ. ΘΕΟ. Παῖξεις, ὃ Σώκρατος πάνυ γὰρ νεανικὸς 
τῷ ἀνδρὶ βεβοιῆθηκας. ΣΩ. Εἴ πέρεις, ὃ ἑταῖρε. καὶ 
μοι εἰπτε ἐνενόησάς που λέγοντος ἄρτι τοῦ Πρωταγόρου 
καὶ δνειδίζοντος ἣμιν, ὃτι πρὸς παιδίον τους λόγους 
ποιούμενοι τῷ τοῦ παιδὸς φόβῳ ἀγωνιζόμεθα εἰς τὰ 
ἐαυτοῦ, καὶ χαριεισθομοῦν τινα ἀποκαλῶν, ἀποσκευήσων 
δὲ τὸ πάντων μέτρον, σπουδᾶσαι ἡμᾶς διεκελεύσατο 
περὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ λόγων; ΘΕΟ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐνενόησα, 
ὁ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; κελεύεις πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ; 
ΘΕΟ. Σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. Ἑρμῆς οὖν ὅτι τὰδε πάντα 
πλὴν σοῦ παιδία ἐστίν; εἰ οὖν πεισόμεθα τῷ ἀνδρὶ, ἐμὲ 
καὶ σὲ δὲ ἐρωτῶντάς τε καὶ ἀποκρινομένους ἀλλήλοις 
σπουδᾶσαι περὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ λόγων, ἐνα μὴ τοῦ τούτῳ γ' 
ἐχρί ἐγκαλεῖν, ὡς παίξοντες πρὸς μειράκια διεσκεψάμεθ' 
αὖ τούτων τῶν λόγων. ΘΕΟ. Τί δ' οὖν πολλῶν τοι 
Θεατητος μεγάλους ποίησας ἐχόμουν ἀμεινοῦν ἄν ἐπα
kολοθήσειε λόγῳ διερευνώμενω; ΣΩ. ἈΛΛ' οὖ τοι
σοῦ γε, ὁ Θεόδωρε, ἀμείνου. μη ὦν οἶον ἐμὲ μὲν τῷ σῷ ἑταίρῳ τετελευτηκότι δεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπαρμόνειν, σὲ * ὅ ἐμεθεῖ, ἀλλ' ἵθι, ὁ ἀριστε, ὅλων ἐπίστου, 169 μέχρι τούτου αὐτοῦ ἑώς ἂν εἰδώμεν, εἶτε ἀρα σὲ δεῖ διαγραμμάτων πέρι μέτρου εἶναι, εἶτε πάντες ὁμοίως σοὶ ἱκανοὶ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς τέ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ τάλλα, ἢν δὲ σὺ πέρι αἰτίαν ἐχεις διαφέρειν. ΘΕΟ. ὁ ὑδίουν, ὁ Σωκρατεῖ, σοὶ παρακαθίμενον μη διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἀρτι παρελήφθησα φάσκων σὲ ἐπιτρέφειν μοι μη ἀποδύσῃ, καὶ ὁυχὶ ἀναγκάσειν καθάπερ Δακεδαι-μόνιοι σὺ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν Σκιρὼνα μᾶλλον τείνειν. Δακεδαίμονίοι μὲν 1 γὰρ ἀπιέναι ἡ ἀποδύεσθαι δι' κελεύονσι, σὺ δὲ κατ' Ἀνταἰόν τί μοι μᾶλλον δοκεῖς τὸ δράμα δράν τὸν γὰρ προσελθόντα οὐκ ἀνής πρὶν ἀναγκάσης ἀποδύσαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις προσπαλαίασαι. ΣΩ. ὁ Ἀριστά γε, ὁ Θεόδωρε, τὴν νόσον μου ἀπείκα- σας ἱσχυρικώτερος μὲντοι ἐγὼ ἑκέινον. μυρίου γὰρ ὑδῆ μου Ἱππακλεῖς τε καὶ Θησέες ἐντυγχάνοντες καρτεροὶ πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μάλ' εὖ ξυγκεκόφασιν, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀφισταμαι οὔτω τις ἐρως δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε τῆς 1 περὶ ταῦτα γυμνασίας. μη ὦν μηδὲ σὺ φθονήσῃς ο προσανατριψάμενος σαυτόν τε ἀμα καὶ ἐμε ὑψάλαι. ΘΕΟ. οὐδέν ἔτι ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλ' ἀγα ὑπη ἑθελες' πάν- τως τὴν περὶ ταῦτα εἰμαρμένην, ἢν ἂν σὺ ἐπικλώσῃς, δεῖ ἀνατλήσαι ἐλεγχόμενον. οὐ μέντοι περαιτέρω γε ὁν προτίθεσαι οἴος τ' ἐσομαι παρασχεῖν ἐμαυτόν σοι. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ καὶ μέχρι τούτων. καὶ μοι πάνῳ τίρει τὸ τοιόνδε, μη ποι παιδικὸν τι λάθωμεν εἶδος τῶν λόγων ποιούμενοι, καὶ τις πάλιν ἐμήν αὐτὸ ὑνειδίση. ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ δὴ πειράσομαι γε καθ' ὄσον ἂν δύνωμαι. ΧΧΙΙ. ΣΩ. Τοῦδε τοίνυν πρῶτον πάλιν
αντιλαβώμεθα, οὔτερ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ ἤδωμεν, ὀρθῶς ἢ ὦκ ὀρθῶς ἐδυσχεραίνομεν ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι αὐτάρκη ἐκαστὸν εἶς φρόνησιν ἐποίει, καὶ ἡμῖν ξυνεχώ-ρησεν ὁ Πρωταγόρας, περὶ τε τοῦ ἀμείνονος καὶ χειρὸνος διαφέρειν τινάς, οὐς δὴ καὶ εἶναι σοφοὺς. οὐχὶ; ΘΕΟ. Ναὶ. ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τοῖνυν αὐτὸς παρὼν ὁμολόγει, ἐκ ἄλλα μὴ ἡμεῖς 1 βοηθοῦντες ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ξυνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδὲν ἀν πάλιν ἔδει ἐπαναλαβόντας βεβαιοῦσθαι νῦν δὲ τᾶς ἂν τις ἡμᾶς ἀκύρους τιθεὶ τῆς ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ὁμολογίας. διὸ καλλίόνως ἔχει σαφέστερον περὶ τοῦτον αὐτοῦ διομολογήσασθαι οὐ γὰρ τι σμικράν παραλλάττει οὕτως ἔχον ἡ ἄλλως. ΘΕΟ. Δέγεις ἄληθῆ. ΣΩ. Μὴ τοῖσιν δὲ ἄλλων, ἄλλ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐκείνου λόγον ὡς διὰ 170 βραχυτάτων * λάβωμεν τὴν ὁμολογίαν. ΘΕΟ. Πῶς; ΣΩ. Οὐτωσί. Τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι φησί που φο δοκεῖ; ΘΕΟ. Φησὶ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώποι, μάλλον δὲ πάντων ἀνθρώπων δόξας λέγομεν, καὶ φαμέν οὐδένα ὖντινα οὐ τὰ μὲν αὐτὸν ἥγεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων σοφότερον, τὰ δὲ ἄλλους ἐαυτοῦ, καὶ ἐν γε τοῖς μεγίστοις κυδύνοις, ὅταν ἐν στρατείαις ἢ νόσοις ἢ ἐν θαλάσσῃ χειριζόμεθα, ὃσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς ἐν ἐκάστοις ἄρχοντας,

1 σωτήρας σφῶν 1 προσδοκώντας, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τῷ διαφέ-ροντας ἢ τῷ εἰδέναι. καὶ πάντα που μεστὰ ταῖνθρο-πινα ξητούντων διδασκάλους τε καὶ ἄρχοντας ἐαυτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔως τῶν τούτων ἑγασιῶν, οἰομένων τε αὐ ἰκανῶν μὲν διδάσκειν, ἰκανῶν δὲ ἄρχειν εἶναι. καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀπασι τί ἄλλο φήμομεν ἢ αὐτοῦς τοὺς ἀνθρώ-πους ἥγεσθαι σοφίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι παρὰ σφίσιν; ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν ἄληθῇ διάνοιαν ἠγούνται, τὴν δὲ ἄμαθίαν ψευδῆ δόξαν;
ΤΕΛΕΥΤΗΤΟΣ. 41

ΤΩ μήν; ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, χρησί- 
μεθα τῷ λόγῳ; πότερον ἀληθῆ φῶμεν αἰὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώ-
πους δοξάζειν, ἡ ποτὲ μὲν ἀληθῆ, ποτὲ δὲ ψευδή; ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γάρ πον ἔμμεθανε μή ἀεὶ ἀληθῆ ἀλλ' ἀμ-
φότερα αὐτοὺς δοξάζειν. σκόπει γάρ, ὁ Θεόδωρε, εἰ ἐθέλοι ἀν τις τῶν ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν ἢ σὺ αὐτὸς δια-
μάχεσθαι, ὥσ οὐδεὶς ἤγεται ἐπερον ἐπερον ἀμαθῆ τε 
εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν. ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλ' ἀπιστον, ὁ 
Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Καὶ μήν εἰς τοῦτο γε ἀνάγκης ὁ 
λόγος ἤκει ὁ πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρωπον λέγων. 
ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δή; ΣΩ. "Οταν σὺ κρίνας τι παρὰ σαυτῷ 
πρός με ἀποφαίνῃ περὶ τινος δόξαν, σοι μὲν δὴ τούτω 
κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον ἀληθῆς ἔστω, ἡμῖν δὲ δὴ τοῖς 
ἄλλοις περὶ τῆς σῆς κρίσεως πότερον οὐκ ἔστι κρίταις 
γενέσθαι, ἡ αἰὲ σε κρίνομεν ἀληθῆ δοξάζειν; ἡ μυρίῳ 
ἐκάστοτε σοι μάχονται ἀντιδοξάζοντες, ἡγούμενοι ψευ-
δή κρίνειν τε καὶ οἰεσθαί; 
ΘΕΟ. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὁ Σώ-
κρατες, μάλα μυρίῳ δῆτα, φησίν ὁΜηρος, ο' γ' μοι 
τὰ εξ ἀνθρώπων πράγματα παρέχουσιν. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; 
βούλει λέγωμεν, ὥσ σὺ τότε σαυτῷ μὲν ἀληθῆ δοξάζεις, 
toῖς δὲ μυρίως ψευδή; ΘΕΟ. "Εοικεν ἕκ γε τοῦ λόγου 
ἀνάγκη εἶναι. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρα; ἄρ' οὐχὶ 
ἀνάγκη, εἰ μὲν μηδὲ αὐτὸς φέτο μέτρον εἶναι ἀνθρωπο-
μηδὲ οἱ πολλοὶ, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οἰονται, μηδενὶ δὴ εἶναι 
tαύτην τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἢν ἐκεῖνος ἐγραψεν; εἰ δὲ * αὐτὸς 171 
μὲν φέτο, το δὲ πλῆθος μὴ συνοιτεια, οἰσθ' ὅτι πρῶτον 
μὲν ὅσον πλείους οῖς μὴ δοκεῖ ἢ οῖς δοκεί, τοσοῦτω 
μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἔστιν; 
ΘΕΟ. 'Ανάγκη, εἰπερ γε 
καθ' ἐκάστην δóξαν ἐσται καὶ οὐκ ἐσται. 
ΣΩ. 'Επειτά 
γε τοῦτ' ἐχει κομψότατον, ἐκεῖνος μὲν περὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ 
οὐσεως τῆς τῶν ἀντιδοξαζόντων οὐσίων, ἢ ἐκείνου ἡ-
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

gούνται ψεύδεσθαι, ξυγχωρεῖ ποὺ ἀληθῆ εἶναι ὁμολογῶν τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἀπαντᾶσι. ΘΕΟ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

Β ΣΩ. Οὕκον τὴν αὐτοῦ ἓν ψευδή ἡ ξυγχωροῖ, εἰ τὴν τῶν ἡγουμένων αὐτῶν ψεύδεσθαι ὁμολογεῖ ἀληθῆ εἶναι; ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Οἱ δὲ γὰρ ἄλλοι οὐ ξυγχωροῦσιν ἑαυτοὺς ψεύδεσθαι; ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. Ὅ δὲ γὰρ ὁμολογεῖ καὶ ταύτην ἀληθῆ τὴν δόξαν ἓξ ὀν γέγραφη. ΘΕΟ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Ἐξ ἀπάντων ἁρα ἀπὸ Πρωταγόρου ἀρξαμένων ἀμφισβητήσεται, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπὸ γε ἐκείνων ὁμολογήσεται, ὅταν τῷ τἀναντία λέγοντι ξυγχωρὴ ἀληθῆ αὐτῶν δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ ὁ

Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς ἡ ξυγχωρήσεται μῆτε κύνα μῆτε τῶν ἐπιτυχόντα ἀνθρωπὸν μέτρον εἶναι μηδὲ περὶ ἑνὸς οὐ ἀν μη μάθῃ, οὐχ οὖσας; ΘΕΟ. Οὖσας. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων, οὐδὲν ἀν εἰν ἡ Πρωταγόρου ἀλήθεια ἀληθῆς, οὔτε τιλε ἄλλῳ οὐτ' αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ. ΘΕΟ. Ἀγαν, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸν ἑταίρον μου καταθέομεν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τοι, ὁ φίλε, ἄδηλον, εἴ καὶ παραθέομεν τὸ ὀρθόν. εἰκός γε ἃρα ἐκείνων προσβύτερον ἣμων εἶναι καὶ εἰ αὐτήκα ἑνεπεθέν ανάκυψειε μέχρι τοῦ αὐχένος, πολλὰ ἀν ἐμὲ τε ἐλέγξας ληροῦντα, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, καὶ σὲ ὁμολογῶντα, καταδύς ἀν οὐχιτο ἀποτρέχων. ἄλλα ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη, οἴμαι, χρήσθαι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, ὅποιοι τινές ἐσμέν, καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀεὶ ταύτα λέγειν. καὶ δήτα καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι φῶμεν ὁμολογεῖν ἀν τοῦτο γε ἐντυνοῦν, τὸ εἶναι σοφῶτερον ἐτερον ἐτέρου, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀμαθέστερον; ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοί γ' οὖν δοκεῖ. XXIII. ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ταύτῃ ἀν μάλιστα ἵστασθαι τὸν λόγον, ἡ ἡμεῖς ὑπεγράψαμεν

Ε Ἐβοσθοῦντες ἡ Πρωταγόρα, ὡς τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἡ δοκεῖ, ταύτῃ καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάστῳ, θερμά, ξηρά, γλυκέα, πάντα
ὁσα τοῦ τύπου τούτων εἰ δὲ ποὺ ἐν τοῖς ἕγχωρησται
dιαφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλον, περὶ τὰ υγιεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη
ἐθελήσαι ἃν φάναι μὴ πάν γύναιον καὶ παιδίον καὶ
θηρίον δὲ ίκανον εἶναι ἠσθαι αὐτὸ γιγνώσκον ἐαυτῷ
tὸ υγιεινον, ἀλλὰ ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄλλον ἄλλον διαφέρειν,
eἴπερ ποὺ; ὙΕ. Ἐμοιηκε δοκεῖ οὕτως. Σ. * Οὐκ-172
οὐν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν, καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ
dίκαια καὶ ἁδικα καὶ ὅσια καὶ μή, οἶα ἃν ἐκάστη
pόλις οἰηθεὶσα θῆται νόμιμα ἐαυτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι
τῇ ἄληθείᾳ ἐκάστῃ, καὶ ἐν τούτωι μὲν οὐδὲν σοφώ-
tερον οὔτε ἴδιωτῃ ἴδιωτου οὔτε πόλιν πόλεως εἶναι.
ἐν δὲ τῷ ξυμφέροντα ἐαυτῇ ἢ μὴ ξυμφέροντα τίθεσθαι,
ἐνταῦθ', εἴπερ ποὺ, αὐ ὁμολογήσει ξύμβουλόν τε ξυμ-
βοῦλου διαφέρειν καὶ πόλεως δόξαν ἑτέραν ἑτέρας πρὸς
ἀλήθειαν, καὶ οὐκ ἃν πάνω τολμήσει 1 φήσαι, ἢ ἃν
θηταὶ πόλις ξυμφέροντα οἰηθείσα αὐτῇ, παντὸς μᾶλλον
tαῦτα καὶ ἵναιςειν. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ, οὐ λέγω, ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις
καὶ ἁδικοῖς καὶ ὅσιοις καὶ ἀνοσίοις, ἔθελον ϟ νικαρι-
ζεσθαι, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἐαυτῶν
ἔχων, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινὴ δόξαν τοῦτο γίγνεται ἀληθές τότε
ὅταν δόξη καὶ ὅσον ἃν δοκή χρόνον. καὶ ἀφοῦ γε δὴ
μὴ παντάπασι τοῖς Πρωταγόρου λόγον λέγουσιν, ὡδὲ
πως τὴν σοφίαν ἁγουσί. Δόγος δὲ ἡμᾶς, ὁ Θεόδωρος,
ἐκ λόγου, μεῖζων ἑξ ἑλάττωνος, 1 καταλαμβάνει. ὙΕ. ο
Οὐκοῦν σχολὴν ἁγομεν, ὁ Σῶκρατες; Σ. Φαινόμεθα,
καὶ πολλάκις μὲν ἃς δὴ, ὁ δαιμόνιε, καὶ ἄλλοτε κατε-
vόησα, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν, ὡς εἰκότως οἱ ἐν τοῖς ἐφιλοσοφίαις
πολύν χρόνων διατρήσαντες εἰς τὰ δικαστηρία ἱόντες
γελοῖοι φαίνονται ῥήτορες. ΘΕ. Πῶς δὴ οὖν λέγεις; Σ.
Κινδυνεύουσιν οἱ ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ τοῖς τοιοῦ-
τοις ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν ἐφιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ
 réserve διατριβή 1 τεθραμμένους ὡς οἰκέται πρὸς ἐλευθέρους τεθράφθαι. ΘΕΟ. Πὴ δή; ΣΩ. Ἡ τοῖς μὲν, τούτῳ ὁ σὺ ἔπες, ἀεὶ πάρεστι σχολὴ καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολὴς ποιοῦνται ὁσπερ ἡμεῖς νυνὶ τρίτον ἡδή λόγον ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνωμεν, οὕτω κάκεινοι, ἐναν αὐτοὺς ὁ ἐπελθὼν τοῦ προκειμένου μᾶλλον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς, ἀρέσῃ, καὶ διὰ μακρῶν ἡ βραχέων μέλει οὐδὲν λέγειν, ἀν μόνον τύχωσι τοῦ ὄντος. οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ τε αἰεὶ λέγοντες κατεπείγει γὰρ ὤδωρ ρέον,

Ε καὶ οὐκ 1 ἐγχυρεῖ περὶ οὐ ἄν ἐπιθυμήσωσι τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκην ἔχων ὁ αὐτίδικος ἐφέστηκε καὶ ὑπογραφὴν παρανάγιγνωσκομεν, ὅτως οὐρ ῥητέον' (ὅν αὐτωμοσίαν καλοῦσιν) οἱ δὲ λόγοι αἰεὶ περὶ ὀμοδούλου πρὸς δεσπότην καθήμενοι, ἐν χειρί τὴν δίκην ἔχοντα, καὶ οἱ αἰγόνες οὐδέποτε τὴν ἄλλης ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμως.

173 ὥστ' ἔξ * ἀπάντων τούτων ἔντονοι καὶ δρμεῖς γήγονται, ἐπιστήμους τὸν δεσπότην λόγῳ τε θωπεύσαι καὶ ἔργῳ χαρίσασθαι, σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὁρθοὶ τὸς ψυχῆς. τὴν γὰρ αὐξήν καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ τε καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἡ ἐκ νέων δουλεία αἱρῄσται, ἀναγκάζουσα πράττειν σκολιά, μεγάλους κινδύνους καὶ φόβους ἐτὶ ἀπαλαῖς ψυχαῖς ἐπιβάλλουσα, οὐς οὐ δυνάμενοι μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀληθῶς ὑποφέρειν, εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸ ψεῦδος τε καὶ τὸ ἀλλήλους αὐταδικεῖν τρεπομένου πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ Β συγκλώνται, 1 ὥσθ' ὑγίεις οὐδὲν ἔχοντες τῆς διανοίας εἰς ἀνδρὰς ἐκ μειράκιων τελευτώσι, δεινοὶ τοι καὶ σοφοὶ γεγονότες, ὡς οἴονται. Καὶ οὕτων μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτοι, ὁ Θεόδωρε τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χορῷ πότερον βούλει διελθόντες ἡ ἐάσαιτε πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τραπόμεθα, ἵνα μὴ καὶ, ὁ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, λίαν πολὺ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ
καὶ μεταλήψει τῶν λόγων καταχρόμεθα; ὙΕΟ. Μη- 
δαμὼς, ὦ Σῶκρατες, ἀλλὰ διελθόντες. πάνυ γὰρ ἐν 
τούτῳ εἴρηκας, ὅτι ὦ χήμεις οἱ ἐν τῇ τούδε χορεῦ- 

c οντες τῶν λόγων ὑπηρέται. ἀλλ' οἱ λόγοι οἱ ἡμέτεροι 
ὡσπερ οἴκεται, καὶ ἐκαστὸς αὐτῶν περιμένει ἀποτελε-
σθήμα, ὅταν ἡμῖν δοκῇ οὔτε γὰρ δικαστής οὔτε θεατῆς, 
ὡσπερ ποιηταῖς, ἐπιτιμήσων τε καὶ ἄρξων ἐπιστατεῖ 
παρ' ἡμῖν. XXIV. Σ. Λέγωμεν ὅτι, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἐπεὶ 
σοὶ γε δοκεῖ, περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων τί γὰρ ἄν τις τοὺς 
γε φαύλως διατρίβοντας ἐν φιλοσοφία λέγοι; Οὐτοὶ 
δὲ ποὺ ἐκ νέων πρῶτον μὲν εἰς ἀγοράν οὐκ ὤσαν τὴν 
ὁδὸν, οὔδε ὦ χήμεις δικαστήριον ἢ βουλευτήριον ἢ τι 
κοινὸν ἀλλὰ τῆς πόλεως συνεδρίου νόμους δὲ καὶ Ὑπήρισμα 
λεγόμενα ἢ γεγραμμένα οὔτε ὀρῶσιν οὔτε ἄκουον. 
σπουδαῖ δὲ ἐταρείαν ἐπὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δείπνα 
καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κόμοι, οὔδε ὄναρ πράττειν προσ-
ισταται αὐτοῖς. εὖ δὲ ἡ κακῶς τις γέγονεν ἐν πόλει, 
ἡ τι τῳ κακῶν ἐστιν ἐκ προγόνων γέγονος ἢ πρὸς 
ἀνδρῶν ἢ γυναικῶν, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν λέληθεν ἢ οἱ τῆς 
θαλάσσης λεγόμενοι χόες. καὶ ταῦτα πάντ' ὥστε οὐ 
οὐκ οἴδεν, οἴδεν οὔδε γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκι-
μεῖν χάριν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πόλει 
κεῖται αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιδημεῖ, ἢ δὲ διάνοια, ταῦτα πάντα 
ήγημαμένη σμικρὰ καὶ οὔδεν, ἀτιμάσασα πανταχῇ 
φέρεται κατὰ Πίνδαρον, τὰ τε γὰς ὑπένερθε καὶ τὰ 
ἐπίπεδα γεωμετρεῦσα, οὐρανοῦ τε ὑπερ ἀστρονομοῦσα, 
καὶ πάσαν πάντη φύσιν * ἐρευνωμένη τῶν ὄντων ἐκά- 
στου ὄλου, εἰς τῶν ἐγχῦσι οὐδέν αὐτῆς συγκαθίεσα. 
ΘΕΟ. Πῶς τούτο λέγεις, ὦ Σῶκρατες; Σ. Ὠσπερ 
καὶ θαλῆν ἀστρονομοῦντα, ὦ Ἱεόδωρε, καὶ ἄνω βλέ-
pουστα, πεσόντα εἰς φρέαρ, Ἐρίττα τις ἐμμελῆς καὶ
χαράσσει θεραπαινίς ἂποσκώψαι λέγεται, ὡς τὰ μὲν ἐν υἱρανῷ προθυμοίτο εἰδέναι, τὰ δὲ ἐμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ καὶ παρὰ τόδας λανθάνοι αὐτῶν. ταύτων δὲ ἀρκεῖ

B σκόμμα ἐπὶ πάντας, ὥσοι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγνωσι. 1 τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τῶν τοιοῦτων δὲ μὲν πλησίον καὶ ὁ γεῖτων λέληθεν, οὐ μόνον οὐ τι πράττει, ἀλλ' οἶλον καὶ εἰ ἀνθρωπός ἔστιν ἢ τι ἄλλο θρέμμα: τί δὲ ποτ' ἔστιν ἀνθρωπος καὶ τί τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει προσήκει διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖν ἢ πᾶσχειν, ἔστει τέ καὶ πράγματ' ἔχει διερεννύμενος. μανθάνεις γὰρ ποιν, ἢ Θεόδωρε. ἢ οὖ; ΘΕΟ. 'Εγώγε καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Τοιγάρτοι, ὁ φύλε, ἱδία τε συγγυμνόμενος το τοιοῦτο ἐκάστῳ καὶ

C δημοσίᾳ, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος 1 ἔλεγον, ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἢ ποιν ἀλλοθ' ἀναγκασθῇ περὶ τῶν παρὰ πόδας καὶ τῶν ἐν ὑθαλαμοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, γέλωτα παρέχει οὐ μόνον Θράτταις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ ὁχλῷ, εἰς φρέατα τε καὶ πάσαν ἑρμνίην ἐμπίπτων ὑπὸ ὑπερίας, καὶ ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη δεινή, δόξαν ἄβελτερίας παρεχομένη. ἐν τε γὰρ ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἕδιον ἔχει οὐδέν οὐδένα λοι- δορέων, ἀτ' οὐκ εἰδῶς κακῶν οὐδέν οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μή

D μεμελετηκέναι ἀπορῶν οὐν γελοῖος φαίνεται ἐν 1 τε τοῖς ἐπαίνοις καὶ ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων μεγαλαυχίαις, οὐ προσποιήτως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὃντι γελοῖον ἐνδηλος γεγομένος ληρόδης δοκεῖ εἶναι. τύραννόν τε γὰρ ἦ βασιλέα ἐγκω- μιαζόμενον ἐνα τῶν νομέων, οἰον συνβότην, ἢ ποιμένα, ἢ τινα βουκόλον ἱρεῖται ἀκούειν εὐδαιμονιζόμενον πολὺ βδάλλουται: δυσκολώτερον δὲ ἐκεῖνων ξωον καὶ ἐπι- βουλώτερον ποιμαίνειν τε καὶ βδάλλειν νομίζει αὐτούς- ἄγροικον δὲ καὶ ἀπαίδευτον ὑπὸ ἀσχολιας οὐδέν ἦττον

Ε τῶν νομέων τῶν 1 τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον ἡγίνεσθαι, σηκὸν ἐν ὑρεί τὸ τεῖχος περιβεβλημένον. γῆς δὲ ὅταν μυρία
πλέθρα ἢ ἔτι πλείω ἀκούσῃ ὡς τις ἄρα κεκτημένος θαυμαστά πλήθει κέκτηται, πάνσυμικρὰ δοκεῖ ἀκούειν εἰς ἀπασαν εἰῳθὼς τὴν γῆν βλέπειν. τὰ δὲ δὴ γένη ὑμνοῦντων, ὡς γενναίος τις ἔπτα πάπποις πλούσιοις ἔχον ἀποφήναι, παντάπασιν ἀμβλύν καὶ ἐπὶ σμικρὸν ὅρῶντων ἤγείται τὸν ἔπαυν, ὡπὸ * ἀπαίδευσις οὐ δυναμένων εἰς 175 τὸ πᾶν ἄει βλέπειν, οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι πάππων καὶ προγόνων μυριάδες ἐκάστῳ γεγόνασιν ἀναριθμητοί, ἐν αἰς πλούσιοι καὶ πτωχοὶ καὶ βασιλεῖς καὶ δοῦλοι βάρβαροι τε καὶ Ἐλληνες πολλάκις μυρίοι γεγόνασιν ὅτροφοι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι καταλόγῳ προγόνων σεμιυγομένων καὶ ἀναφερόντων εἰς Ἡρακλέα τῶν Ἀμφιτρύωνος ἄτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας, ὅτι δὲ ὁ ἂπ' Ἀμφιτρύωνος εἰς τὸ 1 ἄνω πεντεκαιεικοστὸς Β τοιοῦτος ἢν, οἷα συνεβαινεν αὐτῷ τύχη, καὶ ὁ πεντηκοστὸς ἂπ' αὐτοῦ, γελᾷ οὐ δυναμένων λογίζεσθαι τε καὶ χαυνότητα ἀνοίγω ἡγεκαλάττειν. ἐν ἀπασὶ δὴ τούτως ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν καταγελᾶται, τὰ μὲν ὑπερηφάνως ἔχων, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ δὲ ἐν ποσὶν ἀγροὶ τε καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις ἀπορών. ΘΕΟ. Παντάπασι τὰ ἐγνόμονεα λέγεις, ὁ Ὁσκρατεῖς. ΧΧV. ΣΩ." Οταν δὲ τῇ τινα αὐτός, ὁ φίλε, ἐλκύσῃ ἄνω, καὶ ἐθελήσῃ τις αὐτῷ ἐκβήναι ἐκ τοῦ Τί ἐγὼ σὲ ἀδίκως ὥς ἐμὲ; εἰς οὐ σκέψιν αὐτῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας, τὶ τε ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν καὶ τὶ τῶν πάντων ἢ ἀλλήλων διαφέρετον, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ Ὀσκρατείος εὐδαίμονοις κεκτημένοις τ' αὐτῶν ἀλοχια ἐυδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ἐπὶ σκέψιν, ποιῶ τε τινὲς ἔστος καὶ τίνα πρόπον ἀνθρωπόν φύσει προσήκει τὸ μὲν κτήσασθαι αὐτῶν, τὸ δὲ ἀποφυγεῖν, — περὶ τούτων ἀπάντων ὅταν αὐ δὲ ν λόγον διδόναι τῶν ἑκείνων τῆν ἡγεκαλάττειν εἰς.
καὶ δριμὺν καὶ δικανικὸν, πάλιν αὖ τὰ ἀντίστροφα ἀποδίδοσιν ἱλιγμοῦ τε ᾧ δ' ὑψηλοὶ κρεμασθεὶς καὶ βλέπων μετέωροι ἀνωθεν ὑπὸ ἄθειας ἄδημονων τε καὶ ἄπορῶν καὶ βαρβαρίζουν γέλωτα Θράττας μὲν οὖ παρέχει οὐδ' ἄλλῳ ἀπαίδευτῳ οὐδενί, οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνονται, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίως ἢ ὡς ἀνδραπόδοις τραφεῖν ἄπασιν. Ὁντος δὴ ἐκατέρω τρόπος, ὁ Θεόδωρε, ὁ μὲν τῷ ὤντι ἐν Ἐ ἐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένου, ὁ δὴ φιλόσοφον καλεῖς, ὁ ἀνεμέσητον εὐθεία δοκεῖν καὶ οὐδενὶ εἶναι, ὅταν εἰς δουλικὰ ἐμπέσῃ διακονήματα, οἶον στρωματοποιοῦσθαι μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι συσκευάσασθαι μηδὲ ὄψιν ἕδυναι ήθωπας λόγους δ' ὡς τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα πάντα ὑμαμένου τορῶς τε καὶ δέσως διακονεῖν, ἀναβάλλεσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἐπισταμένου ἐπιδεξίᾳ ἐλευθερίας οὐδὲ γ' ἀρμονίαν ἱλιγμοῦ λαβόντος * ὁρθῶς ὑμήσαι θεών τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βίων ἀληθῆ. ΘΕΟ. Εἴ πάντας, ὁ Σώκρατες, πείθοις ὁ λέγεις, ὡσπερ ἐμὲ, πλείου ἀν εἰρήνη καὶ κακὰ ἐλάττων κατ' ἀνθρώπους εἰγῆ. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἀπολέσθαι τά κακὰ δυνατόν, ὁ Θεόδωρε ὑπεναντίον ἑμπρος τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἂν εἶναι ἀνάγκη οὔτ' ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἱδρύσθαι, τὴν δὲ θυετὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ εξ ἀνάγκης. διὸ καὶ πειράσθαι χρῆ ἐνθέντε Β ἐκείσε φεύγειν ὁ τί τάχιστα. φυγή ἐν οἷς ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὀσίον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. ἀλλ' ὅρα, ὃ ἀριστεῖ, οὐ πάντα τὸ ράδιον πείσαι, ὡς ἄρα οὐχ ἄν ἐνεκα οἱ πολλοὶ φασὶ δεῖν πονηρίαν μὲν φεύγειν, ἀρετὴν δὲ διώκειν, τούτων χάριν τὸ μὲν ἐπιτιθευτένοι, τὸ δ' οὖ, ἵνα δὴ μὴ κακὸς καὶ ἱνα ἀγαθὸς δοκῇ εἶναι, ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστιν ὁ λεγόμενος γραφῶν ὕθλος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαινεῖται τὸ δὲ ἄλθεθες ὁδὲ λέγομεν. ἐν θεῷ οὐδαμῆς οὐδαμῶς ἄδικος, ἀλλ' ὡς οἰον τε δικαιώτα-
τος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὅμοιότερον οὐδὲν ἢ ὡς ἀν ἡμῶν αὖ γένηται ὁ τι δικαιότατος. περὶ τούτου καὶ ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεινότης ἀνδρὸς καὶ οὐδενία τε καὶ ἀνανδρία. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τούτου γνώσει σοφία καὶ ἁρετῆ ἀληθινή, ἢ δὲ ἁγγεία ἀμαθία καὶ κακία ἐναργής· αἰ ἀλλ' ἄλλα δεινότητες τε δοκοῦσαι καὶ σοφίας ἐν μὲν πολιτικὰς δυναστείας γεμάτην τε φορτικαῖ, ἐν δὲ τέχναις βάναυσοι. τὸ οὖν ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἀνόσια λέγοντι ἢ ¹ πράττοντι μακρὸν ἁρίστ' ἔχει τὸ μὴ συγχωρεῖν δεινὸ ὑπὸ παινοργίας εἰναι. ἀγάλλοιται γὰρ τῷ οὖνειδεῖ, καὶ οἴονται ἀκοῦσιν, ὅτι οὐ λήροι εἰσί, γῆς ἀλλως ἄχηθι, ἀλλ' ἀνδρεῖς, οἴους δεὶ εὖ πόλει τοὺς σωθησομένους. λεκτέων οὖν τάληθες, ὅτι τοσοῦτοι μᾶλλον εἰσίν ο להגיד οὔκ οἴονται, ὅτι οὐχὶ οἴονται: ἀγαοῦσι γὰρ ζημίαν ἁδικίας, ὃ δὲ ἢκιστὰ ἀγνοεῖν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἢν δοκοῦσι, πληγαί τε καὶ θάνατοι, ὅν εἰνοτε πάσχονσιν οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντες, ἀλλὰ ἢν ἀδύνατον ἕκφυγεῖν. ΘΕΟ. Τίνα δὴ λέγεις; ΣΩ. Παραδειγμάτων, δ' φίλε, ἐν τῷ οἴνῳ ἐστῶτον, τοῦ μὲν θείου εὐδαιμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἄθεου ἀθλιωτάτου, οὐχ ὀρῶντες ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, ὑπὸ ἡλιθιότητος τε καὶ τῆς ἑσχάτης ἁνοίας λανθάνουσι τῷ μὲν ὁμοιούμενοι διὰ τῶς ᾧ ἄδικοις πράξεις, τῷ δὲ ἀνομοιούμενοι. οὐ δὴ 177 τίνοσιν δίκην ξύνετε τὸν εἰκόνα βίον ὃ ὁμοιοῦνται. ἐὰν δ' εἴπωμεν, ὅτι, ἀν μὴ ἀπαλλαγωσί τῆς δεινότητος, καὶ τελευτήσαντας αὐτοὺς ἐκείνοις μὲν τὸν καθαρὸς τόπος οὗ δέξεται, εύθειά δὲ τὴν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιοτητά τῆς διαγωγῆς αἰεί ἔξουσι, κακοὶ κακοίς συνόντες, ταῦτα δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ὅς δεινὸς καὶ παινοῦργοι ἄνοιχτον τινῶν ἀκούονται. ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μάλα δή, ὃ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Οἰδ' τοι, ἢ ἔταιρε. ἐν μέντοι τι ε' αὐτοῖς συμβέβηκεν, ὅτι ἄν ιδία λόγου δὲν δοῦναι τε καὶ

Κ. Ρ.
δέξασθαι περὶ ὧν ψέγουσι, καὶ έθελήσωσιν ανδρικὸς πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομείναι καὶ μὴ ἀνάμορφος φεύγειν, τότε ἀτόπως, ὃ δαιμόνιε, τελευτώντες οὐκ ἀρέσκουσιν αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς περὶ ὧν λέγουσι, καὶ ἡ ῥήτορικὴ ἐκεῖνη πῶς ἀπομαραίνεται, ὡστε παῖδων μηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέρειν. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ἐπείδὴ καὶ πάρεργα τυχχάνει λεγόμενα, υ ἀποστῶμεν εἰ δὲ μὴ, πλεῖον ἄει ἐπιρρέουντα 1 καταχώσει ἡμῶν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ ἐμπροσθεν ὑμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ. ΘΕΟ. 'Εμοὶ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἄγδεστερα ἀκούειν' ρέω γὰρ τηλικῷδε ὁντὶ ἐπακολουθεῖν εἰ μέντοι δοκεῖ, πάλιν ἐπανίωμεν. ΧΧVI. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐνταῦθα πού ἤμεν τοῦ λόγου, ἐν ὃ ἐφαμεν τοὺς τῆς φερομένης ὑσίαν λέγοντας, καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ὃ δοκεῖ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐθέλειν διασχυρίζεσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἡκίστα

Περὶ τὰ δίκαια, ως παντὸς 1 μᾶλλον, ἃ ἂν θέται πόλις δόξαντα αὐτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ἐστὶ δίκαια τῇ θεμένῃ, ἐσστερ ἂν κέιται περὶ δὲ τἀγαθοῦ οὐδένα ἀνδρεῖον ἐθ' οὕτως εἶναι, ὡστε τολμᾶν διαμάχεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ ἂν ὡφέλιμα οὐθεδέσσα πόλις ἐαυτῇ θέται, καὶ ἐστὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἂν κέιται ὡφέλιμα, πλὴν εἴ τις τὸ ὄνομα λέγον· τούτῳ δὲ που σκομμε' ἂν εἴη πρὸς ὥ δέχομεν. οὔχι;

Ε ἩΕΟ. Πάνω γε. ΣΩ. Μὴ 1 λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὃ ὄνομαζόμενον θεωρεῖται. ΘΕΟ. Μὴ γάρ. ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' ὃ ἂν τοῦτο ὄνομαζη, τοῦτον δήποτο στοχαζέσθαι νομοθετομένη, καὶ πάντας τοὺς νόμους, καθ' ὅσον ὑιέται τε καὶ δύναται, ὡς ὡφελιμωτάτους ἐαυτῇ τίθεται.

178 ἢ πρὸς ἀλλο τι βλέπουσα νομοθετεῖται; ΘΕΟ. ὁ οὐ- 

dαμῶς. ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ τυγχάνει ἄει, ἢ πολλὰ καὶ 

dιαμαρτάνει ἐκάστη; ΘΕΟ. Οἶμαι ἔγνυτε καὶ 

dιαμαρ- 
tάνειν. ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ τοίνυν ἐνθεόν ἄν μᾶλλον πάς τις
ὁμολογήσεις ταῦτα ταῦτα, εἰ περὶ παντὸς τις τοῦ εἴδους ἑρωτήσῃ, εὖ ἦν καὶ τὸ ωφέλημον τυχάναι ὕν. ἐστι δὲ που καὶ περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον. ὅταν γὰρ νομοθετῶμεθα, ὡς ἐσομένους ωφελίμους τοὺς νόμους τιθέμεθα εἰς τὸν ἐπείτα χρόνον. τούτο δὲ μέλλον ὀρθῶς ἀν λέγομεν. ὨΕΟ. ¹ Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἰδι δή, οὕτωσι Β ἑρωτῶμεν Πρωταγόραν ἣ ἄλλων τινὰ τῶν ἐκείνω τὰ αὐτὰ λεγόντων. Πάντων μέτρον ἀνθρωπώς ἔστιν, ὡς φατέ, ο Πρωταγόρα, λευκών, βαρέων, κουφών, οὐδενὸς ὅσον οὐ τῶν τοιούτων. ἔχων γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, οἷα πάσχει τοιαύτα οἴομενος, ἀλήθη τε οἴεται αὐτῷ καὶ ὄντα. οὐχ οὕτως; ὨΕΟ. Οὕτως. ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἑσεσθαι, φύσομεν, ὃ Πρωταγόρα, ἔχει τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ οἷα ¹ ἂν οἰηθῇ ἑσεσθαι, ε ταῦτα καὶ γηγυνεῖται ἐκεῖνο τῷ οἰηθέντι; οἷον θερμαί ἄρ' ὅταν τις οἰηθῇ ἰδιώτης αὐτὸν πυρετὸν λήψεσθαι καὶ ἑσεσθαι ταῦτῃ τὴν θερμότητα, καὶ ἔτερος, ἱατρὸς δὲ, ἀντοιχήθη, κατὰ τὴν ποτέρον δόξαν φόμεν τὸ μέλλον ἀποβήσεσθαι, ἥ κατὰ τὴν ἀμφότερον, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἱατρῷ οὐθέν πυρέττων γενήσεται, ἕαυτῷ δὲ ἀμφότερα; ὨΕΟ. Γελοῖον μέντ' ἂν εἰη. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', οἴμαι, περὶ οὗν τοῦ ἡλικύττητος καὶ αὐστηρότητος μελλοῦσης ¹ ἑσεσθαι ἢ τοῦ ἱερωγοῦ δόξα, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἡ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ, κυρία. ὨΕΟ. Τί μή; ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἂν αὖ περὶ ἀναρμόστων τε καὶ εὐαρμόστων ἐσομένου παιδοτρίβης ἂν βέλτιον δοξάσεις μούσικοι, ὃ καὶ ἐπείτα αὐτῷ τῷ παιδοτρίβῃ δόξει εὐαρμόστον εἰναι. ὨΕΟ. Οὐδαμώς. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἑστιώσεσθαι μὴ μαγειρικοῦ ὄντος, σκευαζομένης θοίνης, ἀκυροτέρα ἡ κρίσις τῆς τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ περὶ τῆς ἐσομένης ἡδονῆς. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἠδῆ ¹ ὄντος ἐκάστῳ ἡδέος ἡ γεγονότος μηδὲν ἐ. 4—2
πω τῷ λόγῳ διαμαχώμεθα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐκάστῳ καὶ δόξει καὶ ἐσεθαί πότερον αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἀρίστος κριτὴς; ἢ σὺ, οἱ Πρωταγόρα, τῷ γε περὶ λόγον πιθανόν ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον εἰς δικαστήριον βέλτιον ἀν προδοξίασις ἢ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ὀστισοῦν; ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σωκράτε, τοῦτό γε σφόδρα ὑπεραντεῖτο πάντων διαφέρειν αὐτός. Σ.Ν. Η Dự, ὦ 179 μέλε; ἢ οὐδεὶς ἢ ἄν αὐτῷ διελέγετο * διδοὺς πολὺ ἀργύριον, εἴ πῃ τοὺς συνοντας ἐπείδη, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐσεθαί τε καὶ δόξειν ὦτε μάντις ὦτε τις ἄλλος ἀμεινον κρίνειν ἢ ἂν αὐτὸς αὐτῶ. ΘΕΟ. Ὁληθέστατα. Σ.Ν. Οἱκοῦν καὶ αἱ νομοθεσίαι καὶ τὸ γέφελιμον περὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐστί, καὶ πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογούν νομοθετομένην πόλιν πολλάκις ἀνάγκην εἶναι τοῦ γέφελιμοτάτου ἀποτυχάνειν; ΘΕΟ. Μάλα γε. Σ.Ν. Μετρίως ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐν πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλον σου εἰρήσεται, ὅτι ἀνάγκη 1 αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖν σοφότερον τε ἄλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τῶν μὲν τοιούτων μέτρου εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ τῷ ἀνεπιστήμονι μηδὲ ὑπωστιοῦν ἀνάγκην εἶναι μέτρῳ γέρνεσθαι, ὡς ἄρτι μὲ ἡμάναγκασεν ὁ ὑπὲρ ἐκεῖνον λόγος, εἴτ' ἐβουλόμην εἶτε μή, τοιούτου εἶναι. ΘΕΟ. Ἐκείνη μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σωκράτες, μᾶλιστα ἀλίσκεσθαι ὁ λόγος, ἀλλισκόμενος καὶ ταυτή, ἢ ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων δόξας κυρίας ποιεῖ, αὕτω δὲ ἐφανησαν τοὺς ἐκεῖνον λόγους οὐδαμῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἡγούμεναι. Ὁ Σ.Ν. 1 Πολλαχῇ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄλλῃ ἂν τῷ γε τοιούτων ἀλοίᾳ, μὴ πᾶσαν παντὸς ἄληθὴ δόξαν εἶναι περὶ δὲ τὸ παρόν ἐκάστῳ πάθος, ἐξ ὦν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι γένονται, χαλεπώτερον ἐλεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς. ἦσος δὲ οὐδὲν λέγω ἀνάλωτον ἡμᾶρ, εἰ ἐτυχοῦν, εἰςί, καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες αὐτοῖς ἐναργείς τε εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήματα τάχα ἂν οὐνα λέγοντα, καὶ Θεαίτητος
οδε ουκ ἀπο σκοποῦ εἰρηκεν αὐσθησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταῦταν θέμενος. προσιτέων οὖν ἐγγυτέρω, ἡς ὁ ὑπὲρ Ἡ Πρωταγόρου Λόγος ἐπέταττε, καὶ σκεπτέων τὴν φερομένην ταῦταν οὐσίαν διακρούοντα, εἴτε ἵγες εἴτε σαθρῶν φθέγμεται. μάχη δ’ οὖν περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ φαύλη οὐδ’ ὄλγοις ἥγενον. ΞΧΨ. ΘΕΟ. Πολλοῦ καὶ δεῖ φαύλη ἐίναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τὴν Ἰονίαν καὶ ἐπιδίδωσι πάμπολυ. οἱ γὰρ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου ἐταῖροι χορηγοῦσι τοῦτον τοῦ λόγου μάλα ἐρρωμένως. ΣΩ. Τῷ τοι, ὁ φίλε Θεόδωρε, μᾶλλον σκεπτέον καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτείνονται. ΘΕΟ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, καὶ ἑ γὰρ, ὁ Σῶκρατες, περὶ τοῦτων τῶν Ἡρακλειτείων, ἡ ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις Ὁμηρείων, καὶ ἐτί παλαιοτέρων, αὐτοῖς μὲν τοὺς περὶ τὴν Ἐφεσο, ὡσοι προσποιοῦνται ἐμπειροὶ εἶναι, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὕτω τε διαλευκήσαι ἡ τοῖς οὐστράσιν. ἀντικυρίως γὰρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται, τὸ δ’ ἐπιμείναι ἐπὶ λόγον καὶ ἐρωτήματι καὶ ἠσυχίως ἐν μέρει ἀποκρύπτοι καὶ ἐρέσθαι ἤττοιν * 18ο αὐτοῖς ἐν ἡ τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὐδ’ οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ συμικρὸν ενεῖναι τοῖς ἁνδράσιν ἠσυχίας ἀλλ’ ἣν τινα τῇ ἔρη, ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ῥηματικία αἰνημιμάθην ἀναπτούσιντες ἀποτέλεσοντι, καὶ τούτων ζητῆς λόγου λαβεῖν, τι ἐκρηκεῖ, ἑτέρῳ πεπλήξει καμάς μετωνομασμένος, περανεῖς δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν πρὸς οὐδένα αὐτῶν οὐδὲ γε ἐκείνω αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀλλ’ εὗ πάνω φυλάττοσι τὸ μηδὲν βέβαιον εὰν εἶναι 1 μῆτ’ ἐν λόγῳ μῆτ’ ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ψυχαῖς, ἣμονείνοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ στάσιμον εἶναι τούτω δὲ πάνω πολεμοῦσι, καὶ καθ’ ὅσον δύνανται πανταχοῦθεν ἐκβιάλλουσιν. ΣΩ. Ἰσως, ὁ Θεόδωρε, τοῖς ἁνδράσ μαχομένως ἐδρακασ, εἰρηνεύοσι δὲ οὐ συγγέγονας οὐ γάρ σοι ἐταῖροι εἶσιν.
ἀλλ', οἴμαι, τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐπὶ σχολῆς φράζουσιν, οὐς ἂν βούλωνται ὁμοίους αὐτοῖς ποιῆσαι. ὙΕ. Ποιοὺς μαθηταῖς, ὃ δαιμόνιε; οὐδὲ γίγνεται τῶν οτιούτων ἔτερος ἐτέρου μαθητής, ἀλλ' αὐτόματοι ἀναφέρονται, ὡπόθεν ἂν τῆς ἐκαστοῦ αὐτῶν ἐξουσιώσας, καὶ τὸν ἐτέρον ὁ ἐτέρος οὐδὲν ἤγείται εἰδέναι. παρὰ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ὅπερ ἦ ἐρῶν, οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ λάβοις λέγων οὔτε ἐκόντων οὔτε ἀκόντων' αὐτοὺς δὲ δεὶ παραλαβόντας ὕσπερ πρόβλημα ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. Σ.Κ. Καὶ μετρίως γε λέγεις. τὸ γε δὴ πρόβλημα ἄλλο τι παρειλήφαμεν παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἀρχαίων, μετὰ ποιήσεως ἔπικρυπτομένων τοὺς 1 πολλοὺς, ὅς ἡ γένεσις τῶν ἀλλων πάντων Ὁκεανός τε καὶ Τηθὺς ἱεύματα τυχήκανε καὶ οὐδὲν ἐστήκε, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ὑστέρων, ἄτε σοφωτέρων, ἀναφανδον ἀποδεικνυμένων, ἣν καὶ οἱ σκυτοτόμοι αὐτῶν την σοφιαν μάθωσιν ἴκουσαντες καὶ παύσωνται ἡλιθίως οὐμενοι τὰ μὲν ἐστάναι, τὰ δὲ κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὀντων, μαθόντες δ' ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται τιμῶσιν αὐτοὺς; ὀλίγου δὲ ἐπελαθόμην, ὁ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοις αὐθενταντια τούτοις ἀπεφήμαντο, οἷον 1 ἀκώνητον τελέθειν το τὰ πάντα ὑμῶν εἶναι, καὶ ἄλλα ὡςα Μέλισσοι τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι ἐναυτοῖμενοι πάσι τούτοις διαχυρίζονται, ὡς ἐν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἐστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἔχων χώραν, ἐν ᾗ κινεῖται. Τούτοις οὖν, ὁ ἐταῖρε, πᾶσι τὶ χρησόμεθα; κατὰ σμικρὸν γὰρ προϊόντες λελιθαμεν άμφοτέρων εἰς τὸ μέσον πεπτωκότες, καὶ ἃν μὴ πηθ 181 ἀμμόνυμοι διαφύγωμεν, * δίκην δώσομεν ὅσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς παλαιόστασις διὰ γραμμῆς παίζοντες, ὅταν ἦπι άμφοτέρων ληφθέντες ἐλκούται εἰς ταναντία. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι τοὺς ἐτέρους πρότερου σκεπτέοι, ἐφ' οὔσπερ ὄρμησαμεν, τοὺς ρέοντας. καὶ εἶν μὲν τῷ φαίνωμαι
λέγοντες, συνέλξομεν μετ’ αυτῶν ἡμᾶς αὐτοῖς, τοὺς ἐτέρους ἐκφυγεῖν πειρώμενοι· εἰών δὲ οἱ τοῦ ὄλου στασιώτατοι ἀληθεστέρα λέγειν δοκῶσι, φευξόμεθα παρ’ αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν καὶ τὰ ἀκίνητα κινοῦντων. ἀμφότεροι ῥν φανώσι μηδὲν μέτριοι λέγοντες, γελοίοι ἐσόμεθα ἴγονυμενοι ἡμᾶς μὲν τι λέγειν φαίλουσι ὁντας, παμπαλαιόι δὲ καὶ πασσόφοις ἀνδρὰς ἀποδεδοκιμακότες. οὐρα οὖν, ὡ Θεόδωρε, εἰ λυσιτελεί εἰς τοσοῦτον προϊέναι κίνδυνον. ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν άνεκτὸν, ὡ Σώκρατες, μὴ οὖ διασκέψασθαι, τι λέγουσιν ἑκάτεροι τῶν ἀνδρῶν. ΣΣΧΩΠ. ΣΣ. Σκεπτέον ἀν εὑρ σοῦ γε οὕτω προθυμομένου. Δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ἄρχη εἶναι τής σκέψεως κινήσεως πέρι, τοίνυν τί ποτε ἄρα λέγοντες φασὶ τὰ πάντα εἰ κινεῖσθαι. βούλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοιοῦτο πότερον ἐν τι εἴδος αὐτῆς λέγουσιν ἢ ὡσπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, δύο; μὴ μέντοι μόνον ἐμοὶ δοκεῖτο, ἀλλὰ συμμέτεχε καὶ σὺ, ἵνα κοινή πάσχωμεν, ἀν τι καὶ δέη. καὶ μοι λέγει ἄρα κινεῖσθαι καλεῖς, ὅταν τι χώραν ἑκ χώρας μεταβάλλῃ ἢ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρέφηται; ΘΕΟ. Ἐγώγη. ΣΣ. Τούτο μὲν τοῖνυν ἐν ἐστὼ εἴδος. ὅταν δὲ ἢ μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, γηράσκῃ δὲ ἢ ἱ μέλαν ἑκ λευκοῦ ἢ σκληρὸν ἐκ μαλακοῦ γίγνεται, ἢ τινα ἅλλην ἁλλοίωσιν ἁλλοιῶτα, ἄρα ὡκ ἄξιον ἐτερον εἴδος φάναι κινήσεως; ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ. ΣΣ. Ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν. δύο δὴ λέγω τούτω εἴδη κινήσεως, ἁλλοίωσιν, τῷ δὲ περιφοράν. ΘΕΟ. Ὀρθῶς γε λέγων. ΣΣ. Τούτω τοῖνυν οὕτω διελόμενοι διαλεγόμεθα ἤδη τοῖς τὰ πάντα φάσκουσι κινεῖσθαι, καὶ ἑρωτῶμεν, Πότερον πᾶν φατὲ ἀμφότεροις κινεῖσθαι, φερόμενον τε καὶ ἅλλοιούμενον, ἢ τὸ μὲν τι Ε.
άμφοτέρως, τὸ δ' ἐτέρως; ΘΕΟ. 'Αλλὰ μὲ Δι' ἔγωγε οὐκ ἔχω εἴπειν οἷμαι δ' ἂν φάναι ἀμφοτέρως. ΣΩ. Εἴ δε γε μή, δ' ἐταίρε, κυνοῖμενα τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐστῶτα φανεῖται, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὀρθῶς ἐξει εἴπειν, ὅτι κινεῖται τὰ πάντα ἤ ὅτι ἐστηκεν. ΘΕΟ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδῆ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὰ δεῖ, τὸ δὲ μή 182 κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐνεώθαι μηδενί, πάντα δὴ πᾶσαν * κίνησιν ἀεὶ κινεῖται. ΘΕΟ. 'Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ μοι τόδε αὐτῶν τὸς θερμότητος ἢ λευκότητος ἢ ὅτου οὐν γένεσιν οὐχ οὕτω ποὺς ἐλέγομεν φάναι αὐτοῖς, φέρεσθαι ἐκαστὸν τοὺτων ἁμα αἰσθήσει μεταξὺ τοῦ ποιοῦντος τε καὶ πάσχοντος, καὶ τὸ μὲν πάσχον ἀἰσθητῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰσθησιν ἐτί γῆγεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν ποιον τι ἀλλ' οὖ ποιότητα; ἵσως οὖν ἡ ποιότης ἁμα ἁλλόκοτον τε φαίνεται ὅνομα, καὶ οὐ μανθάνεις ἀθρόον λεγόμενον κατὰ β' μέρη οὖν ἄκουε. 1 τὸ γὰρ ποιοῦν οὔτε θερμότης οὔτε λευκότης, θερμῶν δὲ καὶ λευκῶν γῆγεται, καὶ τὰλλα οὕτω. μέμνησαι γὰρ ποῦ, ἐν τοῖς πρὸσθεν ὅτι οὕτως ἐλέγομεν, ἐν μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι, μηδ' αὐ τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἄλληλα συγγεγομένων τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτίκτωντα τὰ μὲν ποια ἄττα γῆγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα. ΘΕΟ. Μέμνημαι ποῦς δ' οὐ; ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν τοῖνυν ἅλλα κ' χαίρειν εὔσωμεν, εἰτε ἅλλως 1 εἰτε οὕτως λέγουσιν οὐ δ' ἕνεκα λέγομεν, τοῦτο μόνον φυλάττωμεν, ἐρωτώτες. Κινεῖται καὶ ρεῖ, ὡς φατέ, τὰ πάντα; ἢ γὰρ; ΘΕΟ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀμφοτέρας, ἀς διειλόμεθα, κινήσεις, φερόμενα τε καὶ ἀλλοιωμένα; ΘΕΟ. Ποῦς δ' οὔ;

182 v. ἀποτίκτωντα suspectum facit sequens τά. Conici potest ἀποτίκτωμα. Quod si nihil mutetur, statuenda est accusativi absoluti constructio.
εἴπερ γε δὴ τελέως κινήσεται. Σ.Ω. Εἰ μὲν τοῖνυν ἐφέρετο μόνον, ἡλλοιοῦτο δὲ μή, εἴχομεν ἂν που εἴπειν, οἷα ἄττα ἰπεὶ τὰ φερόμενα. ἡ πῶς λέγομεν; ἘΘ.Ο. Οὕτως. Σ.Ω. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ 1 τούτο μένει, τὸ λευκὸν λὴ ἰπεὶ τὸ ῥέον, ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει, ὡστε καὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου εἶναι ῥοήν, τῆς λευκότητος, και μεταβολὴν εἰς ἀλλήν χρόαν, ἢν μὴ ἄλῳ ταύτῃ μέσου, ἀρίτ ποτε οἷον πε τι προσεπειν χρῶμα, ὡστε καὶ ὄρθως προσαναρέων; ἘΘ.Ο. Καὶ τὸς μηχανή, ὁ Σ.ῶκρατες; ἤ ἀλλο γε τι τῶν τοιούτων, εἴπερ αἰε λέγοντος ὑπεξέρχεται, ἀτε δὴ ῥέων. Σ.Ω. Τὶ δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως ἐρούμεν ὀποιασοῦν, οἷον τῆς τοῦ ὅραν ή ἀκούειν; μένειν ποτὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἕ ὁ ὅραν ἢ ἀκούειν; ἘΘ.Ο. Οὐκον δεὶ γε, εἴπερ πάντα κινεῖται. Σ.Ω. Οὐτε ἀρά ὅραν προσρητέον τι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ὅραν, οὐδὲ τιν' ἀλλήν αἰσθησιν μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ, πάντων τι πάντων τις κινομένων. ἘΘ.Ο. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Σ.Ω. Καὶ μὴν αἰσθησὶς γε ἐπιστήμη, ἢς ἐφαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Θεαίτητος. ἘΘ.Ο. Ἡν ταῦτα. Σ.Ω. Οὐδὲν ἀρα ἐπιστήμην μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρινάμεθα ἐρωτόμενοι, ὁ τι ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη. ἘΘ.Ο. Ἐοίκατε. Σ.Ω. Καλὸν ἂν ἡμῖν 183 συμβαίνοι τὸ ἑπανόρθωμα τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, προθυμηθεῖσαι ἀποδείξαι, ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται, ἵνα δὴ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀπόκρισις ὅρθην φαύνῃ. τὸ δ', ὦσ ἐοίκειον, ἐφανή, εἰ πάντα κινεῖται, πᾶσα ἀπόκρισις, περὶ ὅτου ἂν τις ἀποκρίνηται, ὁμοίως ὅρθη ἐστι, οὕτω τ' ἔχειν φαναί καὶ μή οὕτως, εἰ δὲ βούλει, γέμησθαι, ἵνα μὴ στηρίσωμεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ. ἘΘ.Ο. Ὄρθως λέγεις. Σ.Ω. Πλὴν γε, ὁ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι οὕτω τε εἰπον καὶ οὐχ οὕτω. δεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο οὕτω λέγειν οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἐπὶ 1 κινοῦτο οὕτω οὐδ' αὐ μὴ οὕτω; ἤ οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο κινήσεις; ἀλλὰ τιν' ἀλλήν φωνήν θετέου τοῖς τῶν λόγων τοῦτον λέγουσιν, ὡς νῦν γε πρὸς τὴν
αυτῶν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ ἔχουσι ρήματα, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ οὐδ' ὀπως. μάλιστα δ' οὕτως ἂν αυτοῖς ἀρμόττω, ἀπειρον λεγόμενον. ΘΕΟ. Οἰκειοστάτη γοὺς διάλεκτος αὕτη αὐτοῖς. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὡ Θεόδωρε, τοῦ τε σοῦ ἐταίρου ἀπηλλάγμεθα, καὶ ὦπω τυχωροῦμεν αὐτῷ πάντ' ὁ ἄνδρα πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι, ἂν μὴ' φρόνιμος τις ὑπεστήμην τε αἴσθησιν οὐ συγχωρησόμεθα κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πάντα κινεῖσθαι μέθοδον. εἰ μὴ τί πως ἄλλως Θεαίτητος ὦδε λέγει. ΘΕΟ. 'Αριστ' εἰρήκας, ὡ Σῶκρατες, τούτων γὰρ περαυθέντων καὶ ἐμὲ δεῖ ἀπηλλάχθαι σοι ἀποκρινόμενον κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας, ἐπειδὴ τὸ περὶ τοῦ Πρωταγόρου λόγου τέλος σχοινί. ΞΧΙ. ΘΕΛΙ. Μή πρὶν γ' ἄν, ὡ Θεόδωρε, Σῶκράτης τε καὶ σὺ τοὺς φάσκοντας αὐτὸ τὸ 1 πᾶν ἑστάναι διέλθητε, ὦσπερ ἄρτι προύθεσθε. ΘΕΟ. Νέος οὖν, ὡ Θεαίτητε, τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ἀδίκειν διδάσκεις ὑμολογίας παραβαίνοντας; ἄλλα παρασκευάζου ὅπως τῶν ἐπιλοίπων Σῶκρατεὶ δώσεις λόγον. ΘΕΛΙ. 'Εάν πέρ γε βουληταί, ήδιστα μέντ' ἂν ἱκουσα περὶ ὅν λέγω. ΘΕΟ. Ἐπίπεας εἰς πεδίον προκαλεῖ Σῶκράτη εἰς λόγους προκαλοῦμενος· ἐρῶτα οὖν καὶ ἀκούσει. ΣΩ. 'Αλλά μοι δοκῶ, ὡ Θεό-Ε δωρε, περὶ γε οὖν κελεύει Θεαίτητος οὐ πεισθεῖται 1 αὐτῷ. ΘΕΟ. Τί δὴ οὖν οὐ πείσθει; ΣΩ. Μέλισσων μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οὐ ἐν ἑστὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν, αἰσχυνόμενος μὴ φορτικῶς σκοτῶμεν, ἦττον αἰσχύνομαι ἢ ἐνα ὄντα Παρμενίδην. Παρμενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ 'Όμηρου, αἰδοίοις τέ μοι ἀμα δεινός τε. ἐμπροσέμειξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἄνδρι πάνω νέος πάνω πρεσβυτη, καὶ μοι 184 ἐφάνη βάθος τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναίον. * φοβοῦμαι οὖν, μὴ οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα ἐξυνώμεν, τί τε διανοοῦμενος εἰτε πολὺ πλέον λειτῶμεθα, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, οὐ ἔνεκα
ὁ λόγος ὁρμηταί, ἐπιστήμης πέρι, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν, ὕσκεπτον γένηται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπεισκωμαζομένων λόγων, εἰ τις αὑτοῖς πείσται ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅν νῦν ἐγείρομεν πλὴθει ἀρχήναν εἴπε τις ἐν παρέργῳ σκέψεται, ἀνάξιον ἄν πάθοι, εἴπε ικανῶς, μηκυνόμενος τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀφανεῖ. δεῖ δὲ οὐδέτερα, ἀλλὰ Θεαίτητον ὅν 1 κυηὶ περὶ ἐπιστήμης περάσθαι ἡμᾶς τῇ μανεντικῇ τέχνῃ ἀπολύσαι. ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ χρῆ, εἰ δοκεῖ, οὕτω ποιεῖν. ΣΩ. Ἕπε τοῖνυν, ὁ Θεαίτητε, τοσοῦτοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπίσκεψαι. αἰσθησιν γὰρ δὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρίνω. ἢ γὰρ; ΘΕΛ. Ναὶ. ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν τις σε ὁδὸ ἐρωτήσῃ τῷ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ μελανὰ ὀρᾶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ τῷ τὰ ὀξέα καὶ βαρέα ἀκούει; εἶποις ἂν, οὕμα, ὀμμασί τε καὶ ὃσιν. ΘΕΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὐχερές τῶν 1 ὀνομάτων τε καὶ ῥημάτων καὶ μὴ δὲ ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ὑπὸ ἀγενεῖς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τούτον ἐναντίον ἀνελεύθερον, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε ἀναγκαίον, ὅποι καὶ νῦν ἀνάγκη ἐπιλαβέσθαι τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, ἦν ἀποκρίνει, ἢ ὅλη ὅρθη· σκόπει γὰρ, ἀπόκρισις ποτέρα ὀρθοτέρα, ὃ ὀρῶμεν, τούτο εἶναι ὄφθαλμοι, ἢ δὲ οὖ ὀρῶμεν, καὶ ὃ ἀκούομεν, ἁτα, ἢ δὲ οὖ ἀκούομεν; ΘΕΛ. Δι᾽ ὅν ἐκαστα αἰσθανόμεθα, ἐμοψύ χολεῖ, ὡς Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ὧν οἶς. ΣΩ. 1 οἶ θείον γὰρ που, ὁ παῖ, εἰ πολλαὶ τινὲς ἐν ἴμμι, ὅσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ὑποτοῖς, αἰσθήσεις ἐγκαθητίσαται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μιᾶν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴπε φυχὴν εἴπε ὁ τι δεὶ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα ἑξυπέρετε, ἢ διὰ τούτων οἳ ὀργάνων αἰσθανόμεθα ὡσα αἰσθητά. ΘΕΛ. Ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ οὕτω μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκείνως. ΣΩ. Τοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἐνεκα αὐτὰ σοι διακριβοῦμαι; εἰ τινὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ διὰ μὲν ὄφθαλμων ἐφικνομέθα λευκῶν τι καὶ μελανῶν, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπέρων αὐτὶνων, καὶ 1 ἐξεις ἐρωτῶμενος ἔ
πάντα τι τοιαύτα εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀναφέρειν; Ἰσως δὲ βελτιωθοῦν σὲ λέγειν αὐτά ἀποκρινόμενον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ ύπὲρ σοῦ πολυπραγμονεῖν. καὶ μοι λέγει θερμά καὶ σκληρά καὶ κοφα καὶ γλυκέα δι’ ὑπν αἰσθάνει, ἀρα οὐ τοῦ σωματος ἐκαστας τίθης; ἢ ἄλλου τινός; ΘΕΙ. Οὐδενός ἄλλου. Σ.Ο. Ἡ καὶ ἐθελίσεις ὁμολογεῖν, ἢ δ’ ἐτέρας δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι * δι’ ἄλλης ταύτ’ αἰσθέσθαι, οἷν ὑ ὑ ἄκοις, ὑ ὑψεως, ἢ ὑ ὑ ὑψεως, δι’ ἄκοις; ΘΕΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐθελήσω; Σ.Ο. Εἰ τι ἄρα περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοεῖ, οὐκ ἂν διὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου ὀργάνου, ὑδ’ αὐ τοῦ ἐτέρου περὶ ἀμφοτέρων αἰσθάνοι ἐν. ΘΕΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Σ.Ο. Περὶ δὴ φωνῆς καὶ περὶ χρώας πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸ τούτο περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοεῖ, ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω ἐστῶν; ΘΕΙ. Ἐγως. Σ.Ο. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἐκάτερον ἐκατέρου μὲν ἐτέρον, ἐαυτὸ δὲ ταύτων; Β.ΘΕΙ. 1 Τι μὴν; Σ.Ο. Καὶ ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω δύο, ἐκάτερον δὲ ἐν; ΘΕΙ. Καὶ τούτο. Σ.Ο. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἴτε ἀνομοίω εἴτε ὁμοίω ἄλληλοιοι, δυνατὸς εἰ ἐπισκέψασθαι; ΘΕΙ. Ἰσως. Σ.Ο. Ταύτα δὴ πάντα διὰ τίνος περὶ αὐτῶν διανοεῖ; οὕτε γὰρ δι’ ἄκοις οὕτε δι’ ὑψεως οἴνον τε τὸ κοινὸν λαμβάνειν περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔτι δέ καὶ τόδε τεκμήριον περὶ οὐ λέγομεν εἴ γὰρ δυνατὸν εἴ άμφοτέρω σκέψασθαι, ἅρ’ ἐστῶν ἄλμας ἢ οὐ, οἷς’ ὅτι ἐξεις εἰπεῖν ὅ ἐπισκέψει, καὶ τούτο οὕτε 1 ὅψις οὕτε ἄκοι φαίνεται, ἀλλά τι ἄλλο. ΘΕΙ. Τί δ’ οὐ μέλλει, ἢ γε διὰ τής γλώττης δύναμις; Σ.Ο. Καλῶς λέγεις. ἢ δὲ δὴ διὰ τίνος δύναμις τὸ τ’ ἐπὶ πάσι κοινῶν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτων δηλοὶ σοι, ὃ τὸ ἐστὶν ἐπονομάζεις καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ ἂ νυν δὴ ἡρωτώμεν περὶ αὐτῶν; τούτοις πᾶσι ποία ἀποδώσεις ὄργανα, δι’ ὁν αἰσθάνεται ἡμῶν τὸ αἰσθησάμενον ἐκαστά; ΘΕΙ. Οὐσίαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ
μη ἐναι, καὶ ὀμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταύτων τε καὶ τὸ ἐτερον, ἐτε ἐε ἐν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλου ἀριθμὸν ὁ περὶ αὐτῶν. δῆλον δὲ, ὅτι καὶ ἄρτιν τε καὶ περιττὸν ἑρωτᾶς, καὶ τάλλα, ὅσα τούτοις ἔσται, διὰ τίνος ποτὲ τῶν τοῦ σώματος τῇ ψυχῇ αἰσθανόμεθα. Σ.Ο. Ὅπερεν, ὁ Θεαίτητε, ἀκολουθεῖς, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ ἑρωτῶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. ΘΕΓΙ. Ἄλλα μᾶ Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔγογκι οὐκ ἄν ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν, πλὴν γῆ ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδ' ἐναι τοιούτον οὐδὲν τούτοις ὀργανὸν ἔδωκ, ὥσπερ ἑκείνοις, ἀλλ' αὐτή δὲ αὐτῆς η ἡ ψυχή τὰ 1 κοινά μοι φαίνεται περὶ ἐπάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν. Σ.Ο. Καλὸς γὰρ εἰ, ὁ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐχ, ὡς ἔλεγε Θεόδωρος, αἰσχρός: ὁ γὰρ καλῶς λέγων καλὸς τε κἀγαθός. πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εὐ ἐποίησάς με μάλα συχνοῦ λόγου ἀπαλλάξας, εἰ φαίνεται σοι τὰ μὲν αὐτή δὲ αὐτῆς η ψυχή ἐπισκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεων. τούτῳ γὰρ ἢν, ὁ καὶ αὐτῶ μοι ἐδόκει, ἐβουλόμην δὲ καὶ σοὶ δόξαι. ΘΕΓΙ. *'Ἀλλὰ ἱς ἡν φαίνεται γε. ΚΕΚ. Σ.Ο. Ποτέρων οὖν τίθης την υσίαν; τούτῳ γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπτεται. ΘΕΓΙ. Ἐγὼ μὲν ὅν αὐτή η ψυχή καθ' αὐτήν ἐπορέγεται. Σ.Ο. Ἡ καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον, καὶ τὸ ταύτων καὶ ἐτερον; ΘΕΓΙ. Ναι. Σ.Ο. Τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν; ΘΕΓΙ. Καὶ τούτων μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα πρὸς ἀλληλα σκοπεῖσθαι την υσίαν, ἀναλογιζομένη ἐν ἐαυτῇ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ παρόντα 1 πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα. Σ.Ο. Ὅ τι ἐθε δή ἄλλο τι τοῦ μὲν σκληροῦ την σκληρότητα διὰ τῆς ἐπαφῆς αἰσθησεται, καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ την μαλακότητα ὀσαυτῶς; ΘΕΓΙ. Ναι. Σ.Ο. Τὴν δὲ γε υσίαν καὶ ὁ τι ἐστὸν καὶ την ἐναντίωτητα πρὸς ἀλληλῶ καὶ την υσίαν αὐ τῆς ἐναντιώτητος αὐτῇ ἡ ψυχή
Έπανιόνσα καὶ συμβάλλουσα πρὸς ἄλληλα κρίνειν πει-ράται ἤμιν. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τά

ὁμοίως γενομένοις πάρεστι φύσει ἀισθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θηρίοις, ὡς διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει, τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρὸς τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὄφελειαν μόνης καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγίγνεται οἷς ἄν καὶ παραγίγνηται; ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι

μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Οἶνον τε οὖν ἀληθείας τυχεῖν, ὥς ἐν ὄνοσίας; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον. ΣΩ. Ὡ δὲ ἀληθείας τις ἀτυχήσει, ποτὲ τούτων ἐπιστήμων ἔσται; ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ

πῶς ἃν, ὁ Ὁσκρατεῖ; ΣΩ. Ἐν μὲν ἀρα τοῖς πα-

θήμασιν οὐκ ἐν ἐπιστήμῃ, εἰ δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλ-

λογίσμῳ οὐσίας γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα μὲν, ὡς

ἐοίκε, δυνατὸν ἀψασθαι, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαι-

νεται. ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ταύτων ἐκεῖνο τε καὶ τούτῳ καλέις,

τοσαύτας διαφορὰς ἔχοντε; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν δὴ δικαίων

γε. ΣΩ. Τῇ οὖν δὴ ἐκεῖνο ἀποδίδως ὄνομα, τῷ ὁράν,

ἀκούει, ὁσφρωνεσθαι, ψύχεσθαι, θερμαίνεσθαι; ΘΕΑΙ.

Αἰσθάνεσθαι ἕγογη: τί γὰρ ἄλλο; ΣΩ. Ξύμπαν ἄρ

αὐτῷ καλεῖς αἰσθήσιν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Ὡ γε,

φαμέν, οὐ μέτεστιν ἀληθείας ἀψασθαι: οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίας.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. Οὐδ’ ἄρ’ ἐπιστήμης. ΘΕΑΙ.

Οὐ γὰρ. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ’ ἴν εἴη ποτὲ, ὁ Θεαίτης,

αἰσθησίς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ ταύτων. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνε-

ται, ὁ Ὁσκράτες, καὶ μάλιστα γε ὑν καταφανεστάτον

γέγονεν ἄλλο δὲν αἰσθήσεως ἐπιστήμη. ΣΩ. ἈΛΛ’ οὐ

τε * μὲν δὴ τούτων γε ἐνέκα ἱρχόμεθα διαλεγόμενοι, ἰνα

eύρωμεν τί ποτ’ οὐκ ἐστ’ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ τί ἔστω

όμως δὲ τοσοῦτον γε προβεβήκαμεν, ὡστε μὴ ζητεῖν

αὐτὴν ἐν αἰσθήσει τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ’ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ
ὁνόματι, ὁ τι ποτ' ἐχει ἡ φυχὴ, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν πραγματεύονται περὶ τὰ ὄντα. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλα μὴν τούτῳ γε καλεῖται, ὁ Σωκράτες, ὥσ ἐγγύοι, δοξάζειν. ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς ἡρὰρ οὗτ, ὁ φίλε, καὶ ὥρα δή νῦν πάλιν εξ ἀρχῆς, πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν ἐξαλείψας, εἴ τι μᾶλλον καθοράς, ἐπειδή ἐνταῦθα προελήλυθας. καὶ λέγει αὐθις, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη. XXXI. ΘΕΑΙ. Δόξαν μὲν πᾶσαν εἰ- πεῖν, ὁ Σωκράτες, ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἕυνθα ἐστὶ δόξα: κινδυνεύει δὲ ἡ ἀληθῆς δόξα ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, καὶ μοι τοῦτο ἀποκεκρίσθω. εἶν γὰρ μὴ φανὴ προώσιν, ὥσπερ τὸ νῦν, ἄλλο τι πειρασόμεθα λέγειν. ΣΩ. Οὐ- τῷ μέντοι χρῆ, ὁ Θεαίτητε, λέγειν, προθύμως μᾶλλον, ἢ ὅσ τὸ πρῶτον ὁκνεῖς ἀποκρίνεσθαι. εἶν γὰρ οὕτω δρῶμεν, δυνὸν βάτερα, ἢ εὐρήσομεν ἐφ' ὁ ἐρχόμεθα, ἢ ἡπτον οὐθόμεθα εἰδέναι ὁ μηδαμῇ ἵσμεν' καίτοι οὐκ ἀν εἴη μεμπτὸς μισθὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τί φής; δυνῶν οὕτως εἰδέσων δόξης, τοῦ μὲν ἀληθινοῦ, ἕυνθ- δοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἑτέρου, τῆν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην ὅριζει; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἑγὼ γας τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτ' νῦν μοι φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἐτ' αξιον περὶ δόξης ἀναλαβεῖν πάλιν; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον δὴ λέγεις; ΣΩ. Ὁράττει μὲ πως νῦν τε καὶ ἀλλοτε δὴ πολλάκις, ὡστ' ἐν ἀπορία πολλή πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἔχουσα εἰπέτιν τι ποτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐγγρηγόμενον. ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον δὴ; ΣΩ. Τὸ δοξάζειν τινὰ ψευδή, σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἐτί διστάζων, πότερον εἰσώμεθα αὐτὸ ἡ ἐπισκεψίωμεθα ἄλλον τρόπον ἡ ὅλην πρότερον. ΘΕΑΙ. Τὶ μὴν, ὁ Σωκράτες, εἰπὲρ ἐκ καὶ ὅπρον φαίνεται δεῖν; ἄρτι γὰρ οὐ κακῶς ἐγ' σὺ καὶ Θείδωρος ἐλέγετε σχολῆς πέρι, ὅσ οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις κατεπείγει. ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς ύπέμνησας. ἦσος γὰρ οὔκ ι.
απὸ καρυόν πάλιν ὦσπερ ἱχνος μετελθεὶς. κρείττον γάρ ποὺ σμικρὸν εὖ ἢ πολὺ μὴ ἴκανός περάναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν; Σ. Πῶς οὖν; τὶ δὴ καὶ λέγομεν; ψευδὴ φαμὲν ἐκάστοτε εἶναι δόξαν, καὶ τινα ἡμᾶν δοξάζειν ψευδή, τὸν δ’ αὐ τι λαύηθη, ὡς φύσει οὔτως ἐχόντων; ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμὲν γὰρ δὴ. Σ. Όυκοιν τὸδε γ’ ἐσθ’ ἡμῖν περὶ 188 πάντα σ καὶ καθ’ ἐκαστόν, ὡτοι εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι, μανθάνειν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι μεταξὺ τούτων ὡς ὅντα χαίρειν λέγω ἐν τῷ παρόντι μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγον ἑστὶν οὐδὲν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅλλα μὴν, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλ’ ἡ οὐδὲν λείπεται περὶ ἐκαστὸν πλὴν εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι. Σ. Όυκοιν ἡδὴ ἀνάγκη τὸν δοξάζοντα δοξάζειν ἢ ὅν τι οἶδεν ἢ μὴ οἶδεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη. Σ. Καὶ μὴν εἰδότα γε μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ μὴ εἰδότα λοιπὸν εἰδέναι 1 ἀδύνατον. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ’ οὖ; Σ. Ἀρ’ οὖν ὃ τὰ ψευδὴ δοξάζων, ἢ οἶδε, ταῦτα οἴεται οὐ ταῦτα εἶναι, ἄλλα ἄττα ἵνα οἴδε, καὶ ἀμφότερα εἰδὼς ἅγνοις αὖ ἀμφότερα; ΘΕΑΙ. ‘Αλλ’ ἀδύνατον, ὁ Σωκράτης. Σ. ‘Αλλ’ ἄρα, ἢ μὴ οἶδεν, ἰγεῖται αὐτῷ εἶναι ἄττα ἵνα ἰδώ δὲ οἶδε, καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ τῷ μήτε Θεαίτητος μήτε Σωκράτης εἰδοῦν εἰς τὴν διὰνοιαν λαβεῖν ὡς ὁ Σωκράτης ο Θεαίτητος ἢ ὁ Θεαίτητος Σωκράτης; ΘΕΑΙ. 1 Καὶ πῶς ἄν; Σ. Αλλ’ οὐ μὴν, ἢ γε τις οἶδεν, οἴεται πῶς ἢ μὴ οἶδεν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὔτ’ αὖ ἢ μὴ οἶδεν, ἢ οἶδε. ΘΕΑΙ. Τέρας γὰρ ἐστί. Σ. Πῶς οὖν ἄν τοις ἕτε ψευδὴ δοξάζειν ἐκτὸς γὰρ τοῖτων ἀδύνατον πῶς δοξάζειν, ἐπεὶ πάντ’ ἢ ἱσμεν ἢ οὐκ ἱσμεν, ἐν δὲ τοίτων οὐδαμον φανεῖται δυνατὸν ψευδὴ δοξάζαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνθίσταται. Σ. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐ ταὐτὰ σκέπτετον ἢ γειτοῦρ̄, κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι ἐντας, ἄλλα ἕκατὰ τὸ εἶναι 1 καὶ μὴ; ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις; Σ.
Μη ἀπλοῦν γ', ὅτι ὁ τὰ μὴ ὄντα περὶ ὄτου οὖν δοξᾶζων οὐκ ἔσθ' ὡς οὖν ψευδή δοξᾶσει, κἂν ὁπωσοῦν ἀλλως τὰ τῆς διανοίας ἐχρ. ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκόσ γ' αὖ, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ξ. Πώς οὖν; τί ἐρώμεν, ὦ Θεάτητε, εἰάν τις ἡμᾶς ἀνακρίνῃ; Δυνατὸν δὲ ὅτως ὃς λέγεται, καὶ τις ἀνθρώ- πως τὸ μὴ ὄν δοξᾶσει, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν ὄντων τοῦ εἶπε αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτό; Καὶ ἡμεῖς δὴ, ὡς ἑοίκε, πρὸς ταύτα φήσομεν ῃ ὅταν γε ἀληθῆ μὴ οἴηται οἰόμενοι. ἣ πῶς ἐρώμεν; Ε Ἐ. Οὔτως. Ξ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ ἀλλοθί που τὸ τοιοῦ- τον ἐστὶ; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον; Ξ. Ἐὰ τις ὄρα μὲν τι, ὄρα δὲ οὐδέν. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς; Ξ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἐν γε τι ὄρα, τῶν ὄντων τι ὄρα. ἦ σὺ οὐεὶ ποτὲ τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν εἶναι; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἐγώγε. Ξ. Ὁ ἄρα ἐν γε τι ὄρῳ ὃν τι ὄρα. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται. Ξ. Ὁ Καὶ 189 ὁ ἄρα τι ἀκούον ἐν γε τι ἄκονει καὶ ὁν ἄκονει. ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι. Ξ. Καὶ ὁ ἀπτόμενος δὴ τοῦ ἐνός γε τοῦ ἀπτεται καὶ ὄντος, εἰπερ ἐνός; ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τοῦτο. Ξ. Ὁ δὲ δὲ δοξᾶζον οὖχ ἐν τι δοξᾶζει; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη. Ξ. Ὁ δ' ἐν τι δοξᾶζον οὖκ ὃν τι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ξυγχωρῶ. Ξ. Ὁ ἄρα μὴ ὃν δοξᾶζον οὐδέν δοξᾶζει. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται. Ξ. 'Αλλὰ μὴν ὃς μηδὲν δοξᾶζον τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ δοξᾶζει. ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον, ὡς ἑοίκεν. Ξ. Οὐκ ἄρα οἶον τε τὸ μὴ ὑδραζεῖν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ὕμτων οὔτε αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται. Ξ. Ὁ ἄρα τι ἄρ' ἐστὶ τὸ ψευδή δοξᾶζειν τοῦ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξᾶζειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁ ἄρει ἑοίκεν. Ξ. Οὔτ' ἄρ' οὔτως οὔτε ὡς ἐκάκεν πρὸτερον ἐσκοποῦμεν, ψευδής ἐστὶ δοξα ἐν ἦμιν. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ. ΧΧΧΠ. Ξ. Ἀλλ' ἄρα ὡδε γεννάμενον τοῦτο προσαγορεύμεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς; Ξ. Ἀλλοδοξίαν τιμῶν ὄνταν ψευδὴς φαίμεν εἶναι δοξαν, ὅταν τίς τι τῶν ὄντων ἀλλο αὖ τῶν ὄντων, θεοῦ. Κ. Ρ. 5
ἀνταλλαξάμενος τῇ διανοίᾳ, φη εἶναι. οὕτω γὰρ ὃν μὲν ἀεὶ δοξάζει, ἔτερον δὲ ἀνθ' ἔτερον, καὶ ἀμαρτάνων ὑπὲρ ἐσκόπει δικαίως ἀν καλοίτο πρέπει δοξάζων. ΘΕΑΙ. Ὠρθότατα μοι νῦν δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι. ὅταν γὰρ τις ἀντὶ καλοῦ αἰσχρῶν ἢ ἀντὶ αἰσχρῶν καλὸν δοξάζῃ, τότε ὡς ἀληθῶς δοξάζει πρέπει. Σ. Δῆλος εἰ, ὡς Θεαίτητε, καταφρονοῦν μου καὶ οὐ δεδίως. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μάλιστα; Σ. Οὐκ ἂν, οἴμαι, σοὶ δοκῶ τοῦ ἀληθῶς πρέπειν δ’ ἀντιλαβέσθαι, ἵνα μεν τε ταχὺ βραδέως ἢ κούφον βαρέως ἢ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐναντίον γίγνεσθαι ἐαυτῷ ἐναντίως. τούτῳ μὲν οὖν, ὡς μή μᾶτην θαρρήσῃς, ἀφίμη. ἀρεσκεῖ δὲ, ὡς φής, τὸ τὰ πρέπει δοξάζειν ἀλλοδοξεῖν εἶναι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμουσε. Σ. Ἐστιν ἄρα κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν ἔτερον τι ὡς ἔτερον καὶ μη ὡς ἐκεῖνο τῇ διανοίᾳ τίθεσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐστὶ μέντοι. Σ.

Ε"Ὅταν οὖν τοῦτ’ ἢ διάνοια τοῦ δρᾶ, οὐ καὶ ἑναντίᾳ αὐτῆς ἢτοι ἀμφότερα ἢ τὸ ἔτερον διανοεῖσθαι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν. Σ. Ἡντο ἁμα τῆ ἐν μέρει; ΘΕΑΙ. Καλλιστα. Σ. Τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἀρ’ ὅπερ ἐγὼ καλεῖς; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὶ καλὸν; Σ. Λόγον, ὅπερ αὐτῇ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἢ ψυχῇ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἄν σκοτῆ. ὡς γε μη ἐιδῶς σοι ἀποφαίνομαι. τούτῳ γὰρ μοι ὑπάλλελαι διανοοῦμεν, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτῇ ἐαυτῆς ἢ ἐρωτῶσα καὶ ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ φᾶσκουσα καὶ οὐ φᾶσκουσα. ὅταν δὲ ὀρίσασα, εἶτε βραδύτερον εἶτε καὶ ὀξύτερον ἐπαίζουσα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ἄλλο φῆ καὶ ἢ διστάζῃ, δοξαν ταῦτην τίθεμεν αὐτῆς. ὡς ἐγὼ τὸ δοξάζειν λέγειν καλῶ καὶ τὴν δόξαν λόγου εἰρημένον, οὐ μέντοι πρὸς ἄλλον οὐδὲ φωνῇ, ἄλλα συγχρόνοι τοῖς αὐτῶν. οὐ δὲ τί; ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ γάρ. Σ. Ὅταν ἄρα τις τὸ ἔτερον
ἐπερον δοξάζῃ, καὶ φησίν, ὡς οὐκε, τὸ ἐπερον ἐπερον εἶναι πρὸς ἐαυτοῦ. ΘΕΑΙ. ἦ τι μή; ΣΩ. Ἄναμμων-β σκοῦ δή, εἰ πώποτε εἶπες πρὸς σεαυτόν, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ τοῦ καλὸν αἰσχρόν ἔστιν ἢ τὸ ἁδικὸν δίκαιον, ἢ καὶ τὸ πάντων κεφάλαιον σκόπτει, εἰ ποτ' ἐπεχείρησας σεαυτὸν πείθειν ὡς παντός μᾶλλον τὸ ἐπερον ἐπερον ἔστιν, ἢ πῶς τοιαντίον οὐδ' ἐν ὑπνὸ πώποτε ἐπιθέμησας εἶπειν πρὸς σεαυτόν, ὡς παντάπασιν ἄρα τὰ περιττὰ ἀρτια ἔστιν ἢ τ' ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Ἀλλον δὲ τίνα οἰεὶ ὑμαίνοντα ἢ μανικέμονον τολ-ο μῆς προσποιήσας πρὸς ἐαυτοῦ εἶπειν, ἀναπείθοντα αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἀνάγκη τῶν βοῶν ἐπτοκόν εἶναι ἢ τὰ δύο ἐν; ΘΕΑΙ. ὘ λῆ τ' οὐκ ἔγνως. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ λέγειν πρὸς ἐαυτοῦ δοξάζειν ἔστιν, οὔθεν ἀμφότερα γε λέγων καὶ δοξάζων καὶ ἐφαπτόμενον ἀμφότερον τῇ ψυχῇ εἴποι ἂν καὶ δοξάσειν, ὡς τὸ δεῦκεν ἐπερον ἔστιν. ἑαυτὸν δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα περὶ τοῦ ἐπερον. λέγω γὰρ αὐτὸ τῆς, μηδένα δοξάζειν, ὡς τὸ αἰσχρόν καλὸν ἢ ἄλλο τ' τῶν τοιοῦτον. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ', ο ᾽Σωκρατεῖς, εὖ τε καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ὡς λέγεις. ΣΩ. Ἀμφω μὲν ἀρὰ δοξάζοντα ἀδύνατον τὸ ἐπερον ἐπερον δοξάζειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐσοικεί. ΣΩ. Ἀλλά μή τὸ ἐπερον τῆς μόνῃ δοξάζον, τὸ δὲ ἐπερον μιδαμή, οὐδὲποτε δοξάζει τὸ ἐπερον ἐπερον εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθή λέγεις; ἀναγκάζομαι γὰρ ἂν ἐφάπτεσθαι καί οὔ μη δοξάζει. ΣΩ. Οὔτ' ἄρ' ἀμφότερα οὔτε τὸ ἐπερον δοξάζοντε ἐγχώρει ἀλλοδοξεῖν. ὡστ' εἰ τις 1 ὀριεῖται ἐς-ἐ τε οἴναι ψευδὴ τὸ ἐπερον ἐπερον, οὔθεν ἂν λέγων' οὔτε γὰρ ταύτῃ οὔτε κατὰ τὰ πρότερα ψαίνεται ψευδῆς ἐν ἤμιν οὔσα δόξα. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἐσοικεί. ΥΧΧΧΙ. ΣΩ. Ἀλλά μέντοι, ὡ Θεαιτητε, εἲ τοῦτο μη φαίνεσθαι οὖν, πολλὰ ἀναγκασθησόμεθα ὁμολογεῖν καὶ ἄτοπα. ΘΕΑΙ.
Τὰ ποία δή; Σ. Οὐκ ἐρῶ σοι, πρὶν ἂν πανταχὺ πειραθῶ σκοπῶν. αἰσχυνοίμην γὰρ ἂν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, ἐν ὦ ἀποροῦμεν, ἀναγκαζομένων ὁμολογεῖν οία λέγω. ἄλλι
εἶν * εὐρωμεν καὶ ελεύθεροι γενώμεθα, τότε ἤδη περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐροῦμεν ὡς πασχόντων αὐτά, ἐκτὸς τοῦ γελοιοῦ ἐστῶτες· εἶν δὲ πάντῃ ἀπορίσωμεν, ταπεινωθέντες, οὐ ΜΤΑ, τῷ λόγῳ παρέξομεν ὡς ναυτιῶν τετείν
tε καὶ χρίσθαι ὁ τι ἂν βοῦληται. ἢ οὖν ἔτι πόρον τινὰ εὐρίσκω τοῦ ξητήματος ἡμῖν, ἀκούε. ΘΕΑΙ. Δέγε μόνον. Σ. Οὐ
φήσω ἡμῖν ὡρθῶσ ὁμολογήσαι, ἡνίκα ὁμολογήσαμεν, ή τις οἴδεν, ἀδύνατον δοξάσαι ὃ μὴ
οἴδεν εἶναι αὐτά, καὶ 1 ψευσθήμαι ἀλλὰ πη δυνατόν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄρα λέγεις ὃ καὶ ἐγὼ τότε ὑπώπτευσα ἡνίκ
ἀυτό ἐφαιτε, τοιούτοι εἶναι, ὅτι ἐνιότ' ἐγὼ γηγυνόσκων Σωκράτη, πόρρῳθεν δὲ ὅρων ἄλλων, ὅν οὐ γηγυνόσκω, ὡθηθ
e invade Σωκράτη, ὅν οἴδε; γίγνεται γὰρ δὴ ἐν τῷ
tοιοῦτῳ οἴνον λέγεις. Σ. Οὕκοιν ἀπέστημεν αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ὃ ἤσμεν, ἑποίει ἡμῖν εἰδότας μὴ εἰδέναι; ΘΕΑI.
Pάνυ μὲν οὖν. Σ. Μή γὰρ οὕτω τιθῶμεν, ἀλλὰ ὧδε. καὶ ἴσως πη ἡμῖν συγχωρηστεῖσα, ἵσως δὲ ἀντιτενεῖ.
1 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἐχόμεθα, ἐν μὴ ἀνάγχη πάντα μεταστρέφοντα λόγον βασιλείως. σκόπει οὖν, εἴ τι
λέγω. ἀρα ἐστὶ μὴ εἰδότα τι πρότερον ύπέτερον μαθεῖν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐστι μέντοι. Σ. Οὕκοιν καὶ αὐθίς ἐπερου
cαὶ ἐπεροῦ; ΘΕΑI. Τί δ' οὖ; Σ. Ὁδ' δὴ μου λόγον ἐνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐνὸν κήρυν ἐκμαγείον, τῷ μὲν μεῖζον, τῷ δ' ἐλαττον, καὶ τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου κηρύ, τῷ δὲ κοπρωδιστέρου, καὶ σκληρωτέρου, ἐνίος
de ύγροτέρου, 1 ἔστι δ' οἷς μετρίως ἔχοντος. ΘΕΑI. Ἑθήμι. Σ. Δώρων τοινυν αὐτό φῶμεν εἶναι τῆς τῶν Μουσῶν μητρὸς Μηνομοσίνης, καὶ εἰς τούτο, ὃ τι ἂν
βουληθῶμεν μνημονεύσαι ὅν ἂν ἰδὼμεν ἢ ἀκούσωμεν ἢ αὐτὸι ἐννοήσωμεν, ὑπέχοντες αὐτὸ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ἐννοίαις, ἀποτυποῦσθαι, ὀσπερ δακτυλίων σημεία ἐνσημαινομένους. καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν ἐκμαγη, μνημονεύειν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι, ἐώς ἂν ἐνή το ἑδωλον αὐτόου. ὅταν δὲ ἐξαλειφθῇ ἢ μὴ οἶδον τε γένηται ἐκμαγη, ἐπι- λεξθαι τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι. ΘΕΛΙ. "Εστώ οὖτως. ΣΩ. Ὅ τοίνυν ἐπιστάμενος μὲν αὐτά, σκοπῶν δὲ τι ὅν ὀρα ἢ ἀκούει, ἀθρεί εἰ ἄρα τοὐφοι πρόπω φευδή ἀν δοξάσαι. ΘΕΛΙ. Ποιῶ δὴ τιν; ΣΩ. "Α οἴδε, οἰηθεὶς εἶναι τοτέ μὲν ἢ οἶδε, τοτέ δὲ ἢ μή. ταῦτα γάρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐ καλῶσ όμολογήσαμεν ὀμολο- γοῦντες ἀδύνατα. ΘΕΛΙ. Νῦν δὲ πῶς λέγεις; ΣΩ. Δεῖ οἴδε * λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς δυοριζόμε- νους, ὅτι ὃ μὲν τις οἴδεν ἐχων αὐτοῦ μυθιστον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, αἰσθάνεται δὲ αὐτὸ μή, τοῦτο οἰηθεῖ εἴτε τε ὅν οἴδεν, ἑχοντα καὶ ἐκεῖνον τύπον, αἰσθανόμενον δὲ μή, ἀδύνατον. καὶ ὃ γε οἴδεν αὐ, οἰηθεῖ εἶναι ὃ μή οἴδε μηδ' ἔχει αὐτοῦ σφραγίδα καὶ ὃ μή οἴδεν, ὃ μή οἴδεν αὐ καὶ ὃ μή οἴδεν, ὃ οἴδε καὶ ὃ αἰσθάνεται γε, ἐτερον τι ὅν αἰσθάνεται, οἰηθεῖ εἶναι καὶ ὃ αἰσθάνεται, ὃν τι μή αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὃ μή αἰσθάνεται, ὃν μή αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὃ μή αἰσθάνεται, 1 ὃν αἰσθάνεται. 11 καὶ ἐτι γε αὐ ὃν οἴδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει το σημείον κατά τὴν αἰσθησιν, οἰηθεῖς αὐ ἐτερον τι ὅν οἴδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει αὐ καὶ ἐκεῖνον τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν, ἀδυνατώτερον ἑτ' ἐκεῖνον, εἰ οἴδον τε. καὶ ὃ οἴδε καὶ ὃ αἰσθάνεται ἐχον τὸ μυθιστον ὀρθῶς, ὃ οἴδεν οἰηθεῖς ἀδύνατον καὶ ὃ οἴδε καὶ αἰσθάν-}

νεται ἕχων κατά ταύτα, ὁ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ ἀὑ μὴ οἶδε κ. μηδὲ ἐν αἰσθάνεται, ὁ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὁ μὴ οἶδε· καὶ ὁ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὁ μὴ αἰσθάνεται. πάντα ταύτα ὑπερβάλλει ἀδυναμία τοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς φευγῆ τινα δοξάσαι. λείπεται δὴ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἐπερ ποι ἄλλοθι, τὸ τοιούτον γενέσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐν τίς δὴ; ἐὼν ἄρα ἐξ αὐτῶν τι μᾶλλον μάθω νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἐπομαί. ΣΩ. Ἐν οἷς οἶδεν, οἱθῆναι αὐτὰ ἐτέρ' ἄττα εἴναι ὃν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται; ἡ δὲ ὁ μὴ οἶδεν, αἰσθάνεται δὲ ἡ ὃν 1 οἴδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται, ὅν οἶδεν αὐ καὶ αἰσθάνεται. ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν πολὺ πλείον ἀπελείφθη ἡ τότε. XXXIV. ΣΩ. Ὄδε δὴ ἀνάπαλιν ἀκονε. ἐγὼ εἰδὼς Θεόδωρον καὶ ἐν ἐμαυτῷ μεμνημένοι ὁίος ἔστι, καὶ Θεαίτητον κατὰ ταύτα, ἄλλο τι ἐνίστε μὲν ὁρῶ αὐτοὺς, ἐνίστε δὲ οὐ, καὶ ἀπτομαί ποτ' αὐτῶν τοτε δ' οὐ, καὶ ἀκοῦῳ ἡ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθησιν αἰσθάνομαι, τοτε δ' αἰσθησιν μὲν οἴδεμιαν ἔχω περὶ ύμῶν, μέμημαι δὲ ύμᾶς οὐδὲν ἥττον καὶ ἐπίσταμαι ἐ αὐτὸς ἐν ἐμαυτῷ; ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ 1 μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Τούτῳ τοίνυν πρῶτον μαθὲ ὕν βούλομαι δηλώσω, ὡς ἔστι μὲν ἂ οἴδε μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἔστι δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ. ΣΩ. Οὖκοιν καὶ ἂ μὴ οἴδε, πολλάκις μὲν ἔστι μηδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι μόνου; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐστί καὶ τούτο. ΣΩ. Ἰδε δὴ ἐὰν τι μᾶλλον νῦν ἐπίστη. Σωκράτης ἐπιγγυνώσκει * Θεόδωρον καὶ Θεαίτητον, ὁρῶ δὲ μηδέτερον, μηδὲ ἄλλην αἰσθήσεις αὐτῶ πάρεστι περὶ αὐτῶν' οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἐν ἑαυτῷ δοξάσειν ὡς ὁ Θεαίτητος ἐστὶ Θεόδωρος. λέγω τι ἡ οὐδεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί, ἀληθῆ γε. ΣΩ. Τούτῳ μὲν τοίνυν ἐκείνων πρῶτον ἢν ὕν ἐλεγον. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡν γὰρ. ΣΩ. Δεύτερον τοίνυν, ὡς τὸν μὲν γιγνώσκων ύμῶν, τὸν δὲ μὴ γιγνώ-
σκων, αἰσθανόμενος δὲ μηδέτερον, οὐκ ἂν ποτε αὖ
οἶηθεῖν, ὃν οἶδα, εἶναι ὁν μὴ οἶδα. ἘΕΛ. ὁρθῶς.
ΣΩ. Τρίτον δὲ, μηδέτερον γυμνόσκων μηδὲ αἰσθανό-
μενος ὃ ἄν οἶηθεῖν, ὃν μὴ οἶδα, ἔτερον τιν' εἶναι ὁ
ὁν μὴ οἶδα. καὶ τάλλα τα πρότερα πάνθ' ἔξης νόμιζε
πάλιν ἀκηκοέναι, ἐν οἷς οὐδέποτ' ἐγὼ περὶ σοῦ καὶ
Θεοδώρου τὰ ψευδὴ δοξάσω, οὔτε γυμνόσκων οὔτε
ἀγνωσῶν ἀμφω, οὔτε τόν μὲν, τῶν δ' οὐ γυμνόσκων,
καὶ περὶ αἰσθῆσεων κατὰ ταύτα, εἰ ἢρα ἔπει. ἘΕΛ.
"Ἐπομεν. ΣΩ. Λείπεται τοῖνυν τὰ ψευδὴ δοξάσαι ἐν
tοῖς, ὅταν γυμνόσκων σε καὶ Θεοδώρου, καὶ ἔχων ἐν
ἐκεῖνῳ τῷ κηρίῳ ὁ ὅσπερ δακτυλῶν σφῶν ἀμφῶ τὰς
σημεία, διὰ μακροῦ καὶ μὴ ἰκανός ὅρων ἀμφῶ προθυ-
μήθω, τὸ οἰκείον ἑκατέρου σημείου ἀποδοὺς ἡ ὕοικεία
οὐφει, ἐμβιβάσας προςαρμόσαι εἰς τὸ ἐαυτῆς ἔχων,
ὅποι ἐγεννηται ἀναγνώρισις, εἴτε τούτων ἀποτυχοῦν καὶ
ὁσπερ οἱ ἐμπαλιν ὑποδούμενοι παραλλάξας προσβάλω
τὴν ἑκατέρου ὅψιν πρὸς τὸ ἄλλοτριον σημείου, ἡ καὶ
οἰα τὰ ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις τῆς ὅψεως πάθη, δεξιὰ
εἰς ἀριστερὰ μεταφρέουσης, ταῦτον 1 παθῶν διαμάρτω
τὸτε δὴ συμβαίνει ἡ ἐπεροδοξία καὶ τὸ ψευδὴ δοξάζειν.
ΕΕΛ. "Εοικε γὰρ, ὦ Σῶκρατες, θαυμασίως ὃ λέγεις
to τῆς δόξης πάθος. ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοινυν καὶ ὅταν ἀμφό-
tέρους γυμνώσκων τὸν μὲν πρὸς τῷ γυμνόσκειν αἰσθά-
νομαι, τὸν δὲ μὴ, τὴν δὲ γυμνής τοῦ ἔτερου μὴ κατὰ
tὴν αἰσθησιν ἔχω, ὃ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐτως ἔλεγον
καὶ μου τότε οὐκ ἐμάνθανε. ΕΕΛ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
ΣΩ. Τούτῳ μὴν ἔλεγον, ὅτι γυμνώσκων τὸν ἔτερον καὶ
αἰσθανόμενος, καὶ τὴν γυμνὴν κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν αὖ-
τοῦ ἔχων, οὐδέποτε οἱςτεται εἶναι αὐτῶν ἔτερον τις
ὁν γυμνόσκει τε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ τὴν γυμνήν αὐ
καὶ ἐκεῖνον ἔχει κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσειν. ἂν γὰρ τούτο; ὩΕΛΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Παρελείπετο δὲ γέ που τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, ἐν ὃ δὴ φαμέν τὴν ψευδὴ δόξαν γίγνεσθαι τὸ ἄμφοτε θυμόσκοντα καὶ ἄμφω ὅρῶντα ἢ τινα ἀλήθην 194 αἰσθήσειν ἔχοντα ἀμφοῖν τῷ σημείῳ μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ αἰσθήσεως ἐκάτερον ἔχειν, ἀλλ' οἶνον τοξότην φαίλον ἵνα παραλλάξῃ τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ ἰμαρτεῖν, ὁ δὴ καὶ ψεῦδος ἀρὰ ὀψόμασται. ὩΕΛΙ. Εἰκότως γε. ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅταν τοῖς τῷ μὲν παρῆ αἰσθησὶς τῶν σημείων, τῷ δὲ μῆ, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπούσης αἰσθήσεως τῇ παρούσῃ προσαρμόσῃ, πάντη ταύτῃ ψευδεται ἡ διάνοια. καὶ ἐνι λόγῳ, περὶ ὁν μὲν μὴ οἶδε τις μηδὲ ἥσθετο πώποτε, οὐκ ἔστιν, 1 ὅς ἐοικεῖν, οὔτε ψευδεταὶ οὔτε ψευδης

Β δόξα, εἰ τι νῦν ἡμεῖς ύπης λέγομεν, περὶ δὲ ὁν ἔσμεν τε καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα, εἰν αὐτοῖς τούτοις στρέφεται καὶ ἐλίπτεται ἡ δόξα ψευδῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς γιγνομενή, καταντικρύ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐθὺ τὰ οἰκεία συνάγουσα ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους, ἀληθῆς, εἰς πλάγια δὲ καὶ σκολιὰ ψευδῆς. ὩΕΛΙ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς, ὁ Σώκρατες, λέγεται; ΣΩ. Ἐτε τοῖς καὶ τάδε ἀκούσας 1 μᾶλλον ο αὐτὸ ἐρεῖς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τάληθες δοξάζεις καλὸν, τὸ δὲ ψευδεσθαι αἰσχρῶν. ὩΕΛΙ. Πῶς δ' οὖ; ΣΩ. Τάντα τοῖς φασίν ἐνθεύει γίγνεσθαι. ὅταν μὲν ὁ κηρός τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βαθὺς τε καὶ πολὺς καὶ λεῖος καὶ μετρίως ὀργασμένοις ἂ, τὰ ἴόντα διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἐνσημαι- νόμενα εἰς τὸ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ, ὁ ἐφ' Ὁμηρος αἰνητόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ ὀμοιότητα, τότε μὲν καὶ τούτοις καθαρὰ τὰ 1 σημεῖα ἐνγιγνόμενα καὶ ἰκανῶς ἡ τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα πολυχρόνια τε γίγνεται καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι πρῶτοι μὲν εὐμαθεῖς, ἐπειτὰ μνήμονες, εἴτα οὗ παραλλάττουσι τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὰ σημεῖα, ἀλλὰ
δοξάζουσιν ἀληθῆ. σαφῆ γὰρ καὶ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ ὄντα ταχύ διανέμουσιν ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἐκαστά ἐκμαγεία, ἢ δὴ ὄντα καλεῖται. καὶ σοφοὶ δὴ οὗτοι καλοῦνται. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι; ὈΕΛΙ. Ὀπερφύσς μὲν οὖν. ἘΩ. 'Ὅταν τοῖνυν λάσιον τοῦ κέαρ ἢ, ὃ δὴ ἐπῆμεσφ ό πάντα εὐσοφὺς ποιητής, ἢ ὅταν κοπρώδες καὶ μὴ καθαρὸ τοῦ κηροῦ, ἢ ύγρὸν σφόδρα ἢ σκληρὸν, ὃν μὲν ύγρόν, εὐμαθεῖς μὲν, ἐπιλήσμονες δὲ γέγονονται, ὃν δὲ σκληρόν, τάναντία. οἱ δὲ δὴ λάσιον καὶ τραχὺ λιθώδες τε ἢ γῆς ἢ κόπρου συμμυγελής ἐμπλεων ἔχοντες ἁσαφῆ τὰ ἐκμαγεία ἱσχούσιν. ἁσαφῆ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ σκληρά βάθος γὰρ οὐκ ἐνι. ἁσαφῆ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ υγρὰ ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ συγχείσθαι ταχὺ * γέγονεται ἀμυδρά. εἰάν δὲ πρὸς πάσι 193 τούτοις ἐπὶ ἀλλήλων συμπεπττωκότα ἢ ύπὸ στενοχωρίας, εῶν του σμικρὸν ἢ τὸ ψυχάριον, ἐτὶ ἁσαφέστερα ἐκείνου. πάντες οὖν οὗτοι γέγονονται οὖν δοξάζειν ψευδή. ὅταν γὰρ τὶ ὀρῶσιν ἢ ἀκούσωσιν ἢ ἐπινυώσιν, ἐκαστὰ ἀπονέμειν ταχὺ ἐκάστοις οὐ δυνάμενοι βραδεῖς τε εἰς καὶ ἀλλοτριονομοῦντες παρορῶσι τε καὶ παρακούονται καὶ παρανοοῦσι πλεῖστα, καὶ καλοῦνται αὐ οὗτοι ἐγευσμένοι τε δὴ τῶν οὖντων καὶ ἁμαθεῖς. ὘ΕΛΙ. Ὕρ-Β θότατα ἀνθρώπων λέγεις, ὃ Σἀκρατεῖς. ἘΩ. Φῶμεν ἄρα ἐν ἡμῖν ψευδέως δόξας εἴναι; ὈΕΛΙ. Σφόδρα γε. ἘΩ. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς δή; ὈΕΛΙ. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς. ἘΩ. Ἡδὲ οὐν οἰόμεθα ἰκανῶς ὑμολογήσθαι, ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐστὸν ἀμφοτέρα τούτῳ τῷ δόξα; ὈΕΛΙ. Ὁπερφύσς μὲν οὖν. XXXV. ἘΩ. Δεινόν τε, ὃ Θεαίτητε, ὃς ἁληθῶς κινδυνεύει καὶ ἁγιᾶς εἶναι ἑαυτῷ ἁδολέσχησι. ὈΕΛΙ. Τί δαί; πρὸς τί τούτ’ εἴπες; ἘΩ. Ὅθεν ἐμαν-ε τοῦ δυσμαθίαν δυσχεράνας καὶ ός ἁληθῶς ἁδολεσχίαν. τί γὰρ ἄν τις ἄλλο ὑθεῖτο ὀνόμα, ὅταν ἄνω κάτω τοῖς
λόγους ἐλκή τις ὑπὸ νοσθῆασ αὖ δυνάμενος πεισθῆναι, καὶ ἦ δυσαπάλλακτος αὖ ἐκάστον λόγου; ὉΕΑΙ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ τὶ δυσχεραίνεις; ΣΩ. Οὐ δυσχεραίνω μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δέδοικα ὃ τι ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἂν τις ἐρηταῖ μὲ τῇ Σώκρατεσ, εὐρήκας δὴ ἤσοφη δόξαν, ὅτι οὔτε ἐν ταῖς αἰσθῆσεσίν ἐστι πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὔτ' ἐν ταῖς
1 διανοίασι, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ 1 συνάψει αἰσθῆσεως πρὸς διά-
νοιαν; Φίσω δὲ ἔγω, οἶμαι, καλλωπιζόμενος ὡς τι
eὐρηκότων ἥμων καλὸν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὃ Σώ-
κρατεσ, οὔκ ἀλχρὸν εἶναι τὸ νῦν ἀποδεδειγμένον. ΣΩ.
Οὐκοῦν, φίσει, λέγεις, ὅτι αὖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὅν δια-
νοούμεθα μόνον, ὁρῶμεν δ' οὐ, ἤππου οὐκ ἂν ποτε
οἰηθείμεν εἶναι, ὅν αὖ οὔτε ὁρῶμεν οὔτε ἀπτόμεθα,
diανοούμεθα δὲ μόνον καὶ ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αἰσθανόμεθα περὶ
αὐτῶν; Ταῦτα, οἴμαι, φίσω λέγειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ὀρθὸς
Ε γε. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; 1 φίσει τὰ ἐνδεκα, ἀ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἡ
diανοεῖται τις, ἄλλο τι ἐκ τούτων τού λόγου οὐκ ἂν
ποτε οἰηθέη δώδεκα εἶναι, ἂ μόνον αὐτ ἀπανοεῖται; ἦθι
οὖν δὴ, σὺ ἀποκρίνου. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἀποκρινοῦμαι,
ὅτι ὁρῶν μὲν ἂν τις ἡ ἐφαπτόμενος οἰηθεῖ τὰ ἐνδεκα
dώδεκα εἶναι, ἂ μέντοι ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν ποτε
περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα δοξάσειν οὐτω; ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οἴει
τινὰ πῶς τοιαύτων ἐν αὐτῷ πέντε καὶ ἐπτά, λέγω δὲ
196 μὴ ἄνθρωπος ἐπτά καὶ πέντε προθέμενοι σκοπεῖν
μηδὲ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, ἄλλ' αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἐπτά, ἢ φαμεν
ἐκεὶ μημεῖα ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ εἶναι καὶ ψευδὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς
οὐκ εἶναι δοξάσασι, ταῦτα αὐτὰ εἴ τις ἄνθρωπων ἦδη
πῶς τοιαύτα ἐσκέψατο λέγων πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ἔρωτων, πόσα
ποτ' ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ μὲν τις εἴπεν οἰηθεῖς ἐνδεκα αὐτὰ
eἶναι, ὃ δὲ δώδεκα; ἡ πάντες λέγουσι τε καὶ οἴουσαι
dώδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι; ὉΕΑΙ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἄλλα
πολλοὶ δὴ καὶ ἐνδεκα. ¹ εἰάν δὲ γε ἐν πλείονι ἀριθμῷ τις σκοτήται, μᾶλλον σφάλλεται. οἶμαι γὰρ σε περὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀριθμοῦ λέγειν. ΣΩ. Ὅρθως γὰρ οἶει, καὶ ἐνθυμοῦ, μὴ τί ποτε γίγνεται ἂλλο ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ δῶδεκα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγεῖο ἐνδεκα οὐθῆναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐοικὲ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρῶτους πάλιν αὐτὶς λόγους; ὁ γὰρ τοῦτο παθὼν, ὃ οἶδεν, ἔτερον αὐτὸ οἴεται εἶναι δὲν αὐτῆς οἶδεν, ὃ ἐφαμεν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τοὺτῳ αὐτῷ ἣναγκάζομεν μὴ εἶναι ἕνεκόν ὃν ἦν τὰ αὐτὰ ὃ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀναγκάζοιτο εἰδὼς μὴ εἰδέναι ἀμα. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ δἐ ἀποφαίνετο τὸ τὰ παθητῆς δοξάζειν ἡ διανοίας πρὸς αἰσθήσιν παραλλαγήν. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς διανοήμασιν ἐπευδόμεθα: νῦν δὲ ἦτοι οὐκ ἔστι παθητῆς δόξα, ἢ ἡ τις οἶδεν, οἶον τε μὴ εἰδέναι. καὶ τούτων πότερα αἴρεται; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀπορον αἴρεσιν προτίθησι, ὃ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφότερόν ἐστι κινδυνεύον ὁ λόγος οὐκ εἶσεν. ὡμος δὲ, πάντα γὰρ τολμητέον, τί εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαμεν ἀναίσχυντει; ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς; ΣΩ. Ἑθελήσαντες εἰπεῖν, ποῦν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστασθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τί τοῦτο ἀναίσχυντον; ΣΩ. Ἐφορκασαν οὐκ ἐννοεῖν, ὅτι πάς ἡμῖν εὖς ἁρχῆς ὁ λόγος ἐπίστησις γέγονεν ἐπιστήμης, ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσι, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐννοοῦ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἐπιτιμήθησεν οὖν ἀναιδῆς δοκεῖ, μὴ εἰδότας ἐπιστήμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐπιστασθαι οἶον ἐστιν; ἄλλα γὰρ, ὃ Θεαίητη, ¹ πάλαι εἴσημον ἀνάπλεψ τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι. μυριάκις γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν τὸ γνωστόκομεν καὶ οὐ γνωστόκομεν, καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, ὡς τι συμμέτεις ἀλλῆλων ἐν ὃ ἐτε ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοεῖμεν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κεχρήμεθα αὐτῷ ἀγνοεῖν τε
καὶ συμίναι, ὡς προσήκον αὐτοῖς χρήσθαι, εἴπερ στερόμεθα ἐπιστήμης. ΘΕΛΑ. Ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον διὰ 197 λέξει, ὃν Σώκρατες, τοῦτον ἀπεχόμενοι; ΣΩ. Ὁ οὐδένα ὥν γε ὃς εἰμὶ εἰ μέντοι ἢ ἄντιλογικός, οἰος ἀνήρ εἰ καὶ νῦν παρῆν, τοῦτον τ' ἄν ἐφ' ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ἧμιν σφόδρ' ἄν ἂς ἐγὼ λέγω ἐπέπλητον. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐσμὲν φαίλοι, βούλει τολμῆσο εἰπεῖν, οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστάσθαι; φαίνεται γὰρ μοι προὐργον τι ἄν γενέσθαι. ΘΕΛΑ. Τόλμη τοῖνυν νη Δια. τοῦτων δὲ μὴ ἀπεχο- μένῳ σοι ἐσται πολλὴ συγνώμη. ΧΧΧΧΧ. ΣΩ. Ἀκη- κοσάς οὖν ὃ νῦν λέγουσί το ἐπιστάσθαι; ΘΕΛΑ. 'Ισως· οὖ μέντοι ἐν γε τῷ παρόντι μνημονεύω. ΣΩ. 'Επί- β στήμης ποὺ 1 ἔξων φασίν αὐτὸ εἶναι. ΘΕΛΑ. Ἀληθῇ. ΣΩ. Ἡμεῖς τοῖνυν σμικρὸν μεταθωμεθα καὶ εὔπωμεν ἐπιστήμης κτύσων. ΘΕΛΑ. Τί οὖν δὴ φίλεις τοῦτο ἐκεῖνον διαφέρειν; ΣΩ. 'Ισως μὲν οὔδεν ὁ δ' οὖν δοκεῖ, ἀκούσας συνδοκίμαζε. ΘΕΛΑ. 'Εάν πέρ γε οἰός τ' ὁ. ΣΩ. Οὐ τοῖνυν μοι ταύτων φαίνεται τὸ κεκτήσθαι τῷ ἐχειν. οἰον εἰ ἰματιον πριάμενος τις καὶ ἐγκρατής ἀν μῆ φοροῖ, ἐχειν μὲν οὐκ ἄν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ, κεκτήσθαι c δὲ γε φαίμεν. ΘΕΛΑ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε. ΣΩ. Ὁρα 1 δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμην εἰ δυνατόν οὗτο κεκτημένον μὴ ἐχειν, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ εἰ τις ὀρνιθας ἀγρίας, περιστερᾶς ἡ τι ἄλλο, θηρεύσας οἰκοι κατασκευασάμενος περιστερεύνα τρέφοι. τρόπον μὲν γὰρ ἄν ποῦ τινα φαίμεν αὐτὸν αὐτῶς ἂεi ἐχειν, ὃτι δὴ κέκτηται. ἦ γὰρ; ΘΕΛΑ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τρόπον δὲ ὑ' ἄλλον οὐδεμιάν ἐχειν, ἀλλὰ δύναμιν μὲν αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτῶς παραγεγονέναι, εἰπειδή ἐν οἰκεῖω περιβόλῳ ὑποχειρίου ἐποιήσατο, λαβεῖν καὶ σχεῖν, δ' ἐπειδὴν βούληται, 1 θηρευσαμένα ἢν ἄν ἄει ἐθέλη, καὶ πάλιν ἀφίναι καὶ τοῦτο ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν, ὁποσάκις ἀν
δοκή αυτῷ. ΘΕΛΙ. 'Εστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Πάλιν δή, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώσθεν κήρυκοι τι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατεσκευάζομεν οὐκ οἴδ' ὁ τι πλάσμα, νῦν αὐ το ἐκάστη ψυχή ποιήσωμεν περιστερεῖν τινα παντοταπῶν ὀρνίθων, τάς μὲν κατ' ἄγελας οὕσας χωρίς τῶν ἄλλων, τάς δὲ κατ' ὀλώγας, εὖσας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασάν, ὅπη ἀν τύχω σε, πετομένας. ΘΕΛΙ. 1 Πεποιήσθω δή. ἀλλὰ εἰ τι τοιχεύθεν; ΣΩ. Παιδίων μὲν οὕτων φάναι χρή εἶναι τούτο τὸ ἀγγείον κενὸν, αὐτὶ δὲ τῶν ὀρνίθων ἐπιστήμας νοῆσαι ἢν δ' ἂν ἐπιστήμην κτησάμενος καθεῖργῇ εἰς τῶν περίβολον, φάναι αὐτῶν μεμιθηκέναι ἢ εὑρηκέναι τὸ πράγμα, οὔ ἢν αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι τοῦτ' εἶναι. ΘΕΛΙ. 'Εστω. ΣΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν πάλιν ἢν ἂν ἄν βούληται τῶν ἐπιστημῶν θηρεύετο 198 καὶ λαβόντα ἔσχεν καὶ αὕτης ἀφιέναι σκόπει τῖνων δεῖται ὅνωμάτων, εἶτε τῶν αὐτῶν ὅν τὸ πρῶτον, ὅτε ἐκτάτο, εἶτε ἑτέρων. μαθίει δ' ἐντεύθεν σαφέστερον, τὶ λέγω. ἀριθμητικὴν μὲν ὑμᾶρ λέγεις τέχνην; ΘΕΛΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ταῦτην δὴ ὑπόλαβε θήραν ἐπιστημῶν ἄρτιον τε καὶ περιττόν παντός. ΘΕΛΙ. Τπολαμβάνω. ΣΩ. Ταῦτη δὴ, οἴμαι, τῇ τέχνῃ αὐτῶς τε ὑποχειρίους τᾶς ἐπιστήμας τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐχεί καὶ ἂλλο παραδιδοσιν ὁ παραδίδοντι. ΘΕΛΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Καὶ καλοῦμεν γε παραδιδόντα μὲν διδάσκειν, παραλαμβάνοντα δὲ μανθάνειν, ἔχοντα δὲ δὴ τῷ κεκτῆσθαι εἰν τῷ περιστερεῖν ἐκεῖνῳ ἐπίστασθαι. ΘΕΛΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Τῷ δὲ δὴ ἐντεύθην ἢδη πρόσχες τῶν νοῦν. ἀριθμητικὸς γὰρ ὁ ὁ τελέως ἄλλο τῷ πάντας ἀρίθμοὺς ἐπίσταται; πάντων γὰρ ἀρίθμων εἶσιν αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμαι. ΘΕΛΙ. Τῇ μήν; ΣΩ. Ἡ 1 οὖν καὶ τοιοῦτος ἀριθμοὶ ἀν ποτὲ τι ἡ αὕτη πρὸς αὐτῶν ἢ
"άλλο τι τῶν ἕξω, ὅσα ἔχει ἀριθμοῖν; ἩΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ἀριθμεῖν ἔρχεται τῷ ςκοπεῖσθαι, πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυχαίνει ὁν. ἩΕΑΙ. Οὔτω. ΣΩ. Ὁ ἀρα ἐπιστάται, ςκοποῦμενος φαίνεται ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς, ὃν ὕμοιοῃκαμεν ἀπάντα ἀριθμοῦ εἴδεναι. ἀκούεις γὰρ που τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμφισβήτησεις. ἩΕΑΙ. 'Ἐγγογε. ΧΞΧΨ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς ἀπεικάζουσι τῇ τῶν ¹ περιστρεφὼν κτίσει τε καὶ θῆρα ἐροῦμεν, ὅτι διττῇ ἢν ἢ θῆρα, ἢ μὲν πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι τοῦ κεκτήσθαι ἑνεκα, ἢ δὲ κεκτημένῳ τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἔχειν εὖ ταῖς χερσὶν ἢ πάλαι ἐκέκτητο. οὔτω δὲ καὶ ὅν πάλαι ἐπιστῆμαι ἦσαν αὐτῶ μαθότε καὶ ἡπίστατο αὐτά, πάλιν ἐστί καταμανθάνειν ταῦτα ταῦτα ἁνάλαμβάνοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκάστου καὶ ἴσχυον, ἢν ἐκέκτητο μὲν πάλαι, πρόχειρον δ' οὔκ εἶχε τῇ διανοίᾳ; ἩΕΑΙ. Ἀληθή. ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὴ ἄρτι ἦρωτων, ὅπως ¹ χρῆ τοῖς ὅνομασι χρώμενον λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅταν ἀριθμήσων ἢ το ἀριθμητικὸν ἢ τι ἀναγνωσόμενος ὁ γραμματικὸς. ὅς ἐπιστάμενος ἁρα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάλιν ἔρχεται μαθησόμενος παρ' ἐαυτοῦ ἢ ἐπιστάται; ἩΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἀτοπον, ὁ ὲβκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἢ οὐκ ἐπιστάται φῶμεν αὐτῶν ἀναγνώσθεσθαι καὶ ἄριθμησειν, δεδωκότες αὐτῷ πάντα μὲν γράμματα, πάντα δὲ ἀριθμοῦ ἐπιστάσθαι; ἩΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτ' ᾠλογοι. ΣΩ. Βούλευ ὅνν λέγομεν, ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν ἢμῖν μέλει, ὅπῃ τις χαιρεῖ ἔλκων τὸ ἐπιστάσθαι καὶ μανθάνειν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀρισάμεθα ἔτερον μὲν τῷ τὸ κεκτήσθαι τῷν ἐπιστήμην, ἔτερον δὲ τὸ ἔχειν, ὃ μὲν τις ἐκτηται μὴ κεκτήσθαι ἀδύνατον φανεὶν εἶναι, ὅστε οὐδέποτε συμβαίνει ὁ τις οὗδε μὴ εἰδέναι, ψευδὴ μέντοι δόξαν οἴων τ' ἐναι περὶ αὐτῶν λαβεῖν; μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν
τὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦτον οἶνον τε, ἀλλ' ἐτέραν ἀντ' ἐκεῖ-β ἡς, ὅταν θηρεύον τινὰ ἄπ', αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην διαπε-
τομένων ἀνθ' ἐτέρας ἐτέραν ἀμαρτών λάβη, ὅτε ἀρα τὰ ἐνδεκα δώδεκα ὁδήθη εἶναι, τὴν τῶν ἐνδεκα ἐπιστήμην ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν δώδεκα λαβῶν, τὴν ἐν ἐαυτῷ οἴνον φάτ-
ταν ἀντὶ περιστερᾶς. ΘΕΑΙ. "Εχει γὰρ οὖν λόγον. Σ. Ω. Ὅταν δὲ γε ἦν ἐπίχειρεῖ λαβεῖν λάβη, ἄψευδεῖν τε καὶ τὰ ὅντα δοξάζειν τότε, καὶ οὔτω δὴ εἶναι ἄληθὶ
τε καὶ ψευδὴ δόξαν, καὶ ὕ οὖν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐδυσ-
χεραίνομεν οὐδὲν ἐμποδὼν ἡ γνῶσθαι; ἦσως οὖν μοι συμφύσεις; ἥ πώς ποιήσεις; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐτώς. Σ. Ω.
Καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἄπτάται μὴ ἐπίπεθαι ἀπηλ-
λάγμεθα' ὅ γὰρ κεκτήμεθα μὴ κεκτήσθαι οὐδαμοῦ ἐτι
συμβαίνει, οὔτε ψευδεῖσι τίνος οὔτε μή. δεινότερον
μέντοι πάθος ἀλλο παραφαίνεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ. ΘΕΑΙ.
Τὸ ποιῶν; Σ. Ω. Εἴ ἦ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μεταλλαγῆ
ψευδής γενήσεται ποτε δόξα. ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς δὴ; Σ. Ω.
1 Πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τινὸς ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἦ
ἀγνοεῖν, μὴ ἀγνοομοσύνη ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐαυτῷ ἐπιστήμη,
ἐπιπέτα ἐτερον αὐτοῦ δοξάζειν, τὸ δ' ἐτερον τοῦτο,
πῶς οὐ πολλῇ ἀλογίᾳ, ἐπιστήμης παραγενομένης γνώ-
ναι μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν μηδὲν, ἀγνοῆσαι δὲ πάντα; ἐκ γὰρ
τοῦτο τοῦ λόγου κοιλεῖ οὐδὲν καὶ ἀγνοοι παραγε-
νομένην γνῶναι τι ποιῆσαι καὶ τυφλότητα ἰδεῖν, εἰτερ
καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀγνοῆσαι ποτε τινα ποιήσει. ΘΕΑΙ.
1 Ἔσως γὰρ, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐ καλῶς 1 ταῖς ὀρθαῖς ἐτὶ-
θεμέν ἐπιστήμασι μόνον τιθέντες, ἔδει δὲ καὶ ἀνεπιστη-
μοσύναι τιθέναι ὁμοὶ συνδιαπετομένας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ,
καὶ τὸν θηρεύοντα τοτε μὲν ἐπιστήμην λαμβάνοντα,
τοτ' ἀνεπιστημοσύνη τοῦ αὐτοῦ πέρι ψευδὴ μὲν
δοξάζειν τῇ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ, ἀληθῆ δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμη.
ΣΩ. Οὐ ράδιόν γε, ὁ Θεαῖτης, μὴ ἐπαινεῖν σε. ὁ μέντοι εἴτες, πάλιν ἐπίσκεψαι. ἐστὼ μὲν γὰρ ὡς 200 λέγεις: ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην * λαβὼν ψευδή μὲν, φής, δοξάσει. ἥ γὰρ; ΘΕΛΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐ δήποτε καὶ ἡγήσεται ἐγενυθ δοξαζεῖν. ΘΕΛΙ. Πῶς γὰρ; ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ ἀληθή γε, καὶ ὡς εἴδώς διακείσεται περὶ ὧν ἐφευσταί. ΘΕΛΙ. Τί μὴν; ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμην ἀρὰ σύνεται τεθηρευκὼς ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀνεπιστημο- σύνην. ΘΕΛΙ. Δήλον. ΣΩ. Οὐκόνοι μακράν περιελθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην πάρεσμεν ἀπορίαν. ὁ Β. γὰρ ἐλεγκτικὸς ἐκείνος γελάσας φήσειν 1 Πότερον, ὃ βέλτιστοι, ἀμφοτέρας τις εἴδως, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ ἀνε- πιστημοσύνην, ἢν οἴδεν, ἑτέραν αὐτὴν οἴεται τινα εἰναι ὧν οἴδεν; ἢ οὐδετέραν αὐτοῖς εἴδως, ἢν μὴ οἴδε, δοξάζει ἑτέραν ὧν οὐκ οἴδεν; ἢ τὴν μὲν εἴδως, τὴν δ’ οὐ, ὧν οἴδεν, ἢν μὴ οἴδεν; ἢ ἦν μὴ οἴδεν, ἢν οἴδεν ἤγειται; ἢ πάλιν αὐτοὶ ἑρείτε ὅτι τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστη- μοσύνων εἰσίν αὐτ ἐπιστήμαι, ὡς ὁ κεκτημένος ἐν ἐτέροις τις γελοιοῖς περιστερῶσιν ἢ κηρίνους πλάσμασι καθεδράζει, 1 ἐωσπέρ ἀν κεκτήται, ἐπιστᾶται, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ προχείρους ἔχῃ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ οὔτω δὴ ἀναγκα- σθησετέ διὰ ταῦτα περιτρέχειν μυριάκις οὐδὲν πλέον ποιοῦντες. Τί πρὸς ταῦτα, ὁ Θεαῖτης, ἀποκρισθε- μεθα; ΘΕΛΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔγνωσεν οὐκ ἑχω, τί χρῆ λέγειν. ΣΩ. Ἀρ’ οὖν ἢμῖν, ὁ παῖ, καλὸς ὁ λόγος ἐπιπλήττει, καὶ εὐνοεῖται, ὧτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψευδὴ δύζαν προτέραν ἐξομνεῖ ἐπιστήμης, ἔκειν 1 ἀφέντες; 1 τὸ δ’ ἐστίν ἁδύνατον γρῶναι, πρὶν ἂν τις ἐπιστήμην ἱκανὸς λάβῃ, τί ποτ’ ἐστίν. ΘΕΛΙ. Ἀ- νάγκη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὡς λέγεις οἶεσθαι. XXXVIII. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν τις ἔρει πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιστή-
μην; οὐ γὰρ ποῦ ἀπεροθμέν ηὲ πώ. ΘΕΛ. "Ηκιστα, ἐάν περ μὴ σὺ γη ἀπαγορεύσης. ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ, τι ἀν αυτῷ μάλιστα εἶπόντες ἦκιστ' ἀν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἑναντιωθείμεν; ΘΕΛ. "Οπερ ἐπεχειρούμεν, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐν γ. τῷ πρόσθεν οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε ἄλλο οὐδέν. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον; ΘΕΛ. Τὴν ἀλήθη δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι. ἀναμάρτητον γε ποῦ ἔστι τὸ δοξάζειν ἀλήθη, καὶ τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ γίγνεται. ΣΩ. Ὁ τῶν ποταμῶν καθηγούμενος, ὁ Θεαίτης, ἐφ' ἄρα δείξειν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν ἱόντες ἔρευνόμεν, τάχ' ἂν ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον αὐτὸ * φήμει τὸ ἐξητούμενον, 201 μένουσι δὲ δὴ λοιπον οὐδέν. ΘΕΛ. Ὁρθῶς λέγεις; ἀλλ' ἰωμέν γε καὶ σκοπώμεν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτῳ γε βραχείας σκέψεως τέχνη γὰρ σοι ὅλη σημαίνει μὴ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτῷ. ΘΕΛ. Πῶς δὴ; καὶ τίς αὕτη; ΣΩ. Ἡ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σοφίαν, οὐς δὴ καλοῦσι ρήτοράς τε καὶ δικανικούς. οὕτω γὰρ ποῦ τῇ ἐαυτῶν τέχνη πειθοῦσιν οὐ διδάσκοντες, ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ποιοῦντες ἦν βούλωνται. ἢ σὺ οἴει δεινοὺς τινας οὕτω διδασκάλους εἶναι, ὡστε οἷς μὴ παρεγένοντο τινες ἀπεστερομένοις ἣ χρήματα ἢ τὰ ἄλλα βιαζομένοις, τούτοις δύνασθαι πρὸς ὑδρ συμκρόν διδάξει ἰκανῶς τῶν γενομένων τὴν ἀληθείαν; ΘΕΛ. Οὐδ' ἐγὼ γε οἴμαι, ἀλλὰ πείσαται μὲν. ΣΩ. Τὸ πείσατι ὅ οὐχὶ δοξάζει λέγεις ποιήσαι; ΘΕΛ. Τὶ μή; ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν δικαίως πεισθώσι δικαστάς περὶ ὅν ἱόντι μονὸν ἔστιν εἰδέναι, ἄλλως δὲ μή, ταῦτα τότε ἐξ ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ δόξαν λα-βόντες, ἀνευ ἐπιστήμης ἐκρίναν, ὅρθα πεισθέντες, εἴπερ εὐ ἐδίκασαν; ΘΕΛ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν, ὁ φίλε, εἴ γε ταύταν ἦν δόξα τε ἀληθῆς [καὶ δικαστήρια] καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὅρθα ποτ' ἂν δικαστής ἄκρος.

Κ. Ρ.
εὐδόξαζεν ἀνένε ἐπιστήμης· νῦν δὲ ἐοικεν ἄλλο τι ἐκά-
τερον εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. "Ὁ τε ἐγὼ, ὦ Σῶκρατες, εἰπόντος
τοῦ ἀκούσας ἐπιλελήσμην, νῦν δὲ ἐννοῶ. ἐφη δὲ τὴν
 öğrenόν ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης· καὶ ὃν μὲν μὴ ἐστὶ λόγος,
οὐκ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, οὔτωσι καὶ ὄνομαζον, ἢ δ’ ἔχει,
ἐπιστήμην. ΣΩ. "Ἡ καλὸς λέγεις. τὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπιστήμη-
ταῦτα καὶ μὴ πῇ δὴρει, λέγε, εἰ ἀρα κατὰ ταῦτα σὺ τε
cἀγὼ ἀκηκόαμεν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ’ οὐκ οἶδα, εἰ ἔξευρήσω
λέγοντος μέντ’ ἀν ἐτέρου, ὡς ἐγώμαι, ἀκολουθήσαμη.
XXXIX. ΣΩ. "Ακουε δὴ ὁναρ αὐτὶ ὅνειρατος. ἐγὼ
ἐγὼ ἀν ἐδόκοιον ἀκούειν τινῶν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν· ἕνα
πρῶτα οἰονπερεὶ στοιχεῖα, εἷς ὃν ἡμεῖς τε συγκεῖμεθα καὶ
tάλλα, λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι. αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ’ αὐτὸ ἐκατε
ὄνομαζαι μόνον εἰπ., προσεπέων δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατὸν,
οὐθ’ ὧς ἐστιν, οὔθ’ ὧς οὐκ ἐστιν’ ἦδι γὰρ ἀν οὕσιν
202 * ἡ μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ προστίθεσθαι, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν προσ-
φέρειν, εἰπερ αὐτῷ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τις ἔρει. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ
αὐτὸ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐκεῖνο οὐδὲ τὸ ἐκατε οὐδὲ τὸ μόνο
οὐδὲ τὸ τοῦτο προσοιστέων, οὐθ’ ἄλλα πολλά τοιαῦτα.
tαῦτα μὲν γὰρ περιτρέχοντα πάσι προσφέρεσθαι ἐτέρα
οῦτα ἐκεῖνων, οἷς προστίθεται, δεῖν δὲ, εἰπερ ἦν δυνατὸν
αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι καὶ εἴχεν οἰκεῖον αὐτοῦ λόγον, ἀνεῖν
tῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων λέγεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἁδύνατον εἶναι ὅτι
ὄνομα πρώτων ῥηθήμαι ἑλόγηρ’ οὐ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτῷ ἄλλῳ ἡ
ὄνομαζεσθαι μόνον ἐνομα γὰρ μόνον ἐχειν, τὰ δὲ ἐκ
τοῦτον ἦδη συγκεῖμεα, ὡσπερ αὐτα πέπλεκται, οὔτω
cαὶ τὰ ὄνοματα αὐτῶν συμπλακέντα λόγον γεγονέναι
ὄνοματων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι λόγου οὕσιαν. οὔτω
dὴ τα μὲν στοιχεία ἀλογα καὶ ἀγνώστα εἶναι, αἰσθητά
dei τὰς δὲ συλλαβαῖς γνωστάς τε καὶ ῥητάς καὶ ἀληθεὶ
δόξη δοξαστάς. ὃταν μὲν ὦν ἄνευ λόγου τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν τινὸς τις λάβῃ, ἀληθεύειν μὲν αὐτῷ τὴν ἑν ψυχὴν εἰ περὶ αὐτό, γυνώσκει δ᾽ οὐ τὸν γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενον δοῦναι τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον ἀνεπιστήμων εἶναι περὶ τούτου προσλαβόντα δὲ λόγου δυνατὸν τε ταῦτα πάντα γεγονέναι καὶ τελείως πρὸς ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν. Οὐτῶς οὖ τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἡ ἄλλως ἀκήκοας; ἙΕΑΙ. Οὔτω μὲν οὖν παντάπασιν. ΣΩ. Ἀρέσκει οὖν σε καὶ τίθεσαι ταῦτη, δόξαν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι; ἙΕΑΙ. Κωμιδῇ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. 'Αρ', ὁ Θεαίτης, νῦν οὔτω δὲ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ εἰλήφαμεν δὲ πάλαι καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν ξητοῦντες πρὶν εὑρέθων κατεγράσαν; ἙΕΑΙ. Ἐμοί γοῦν δοκεῖ, ὁ Σώκρατες, καλὰς λέγεσθαι τὸ νῦν ῥηθέν. ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰκὸς γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὔτως ἔχειν τίς γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐτί ἐπιστήμην εἰς χωρὶς λόγου τε καὶ ὀρθής δόξης; εὖ μέντοι τι με τῶν ῥηθέντων ἀπαρέσκει. ἙΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον δὴ; ΣΩ. 'Ο καὶ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι κομψότατα, ὅς τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἀγνωστα, τὸ δὲ τῶν συλλαβῶν γένος ἔχοντι ἠγνωστόν. ἙΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν ὄρθως; Ἑ ΣΩ. Ἰστέον δὴ ὡσπερ γὰρ ὄμηρος ἔχομεν τοῦ λόγου τὰ παραδείγματα, ὅς χρώμενος εἴπε πάντα ταῦτα. ἙΕΑΙ. Ποία δὴ; ΣΩ. Τὰ τῶν ἑγαμμάτων στοιχεῖα τε καὶ συλλαβάσις ἡ οἷς ἀλλοσε ποι βλέποντα ταῦτα εἴπειν τὸν εἰπόντα, ἠ λέγομεν; ἙΕΑΙ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ εἰς ταῦτα. ΧΛ. ΣΩ. Βασανίζωμεν δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαμβάνωμεν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, οὕτως ἡ οὐχ οὕτως ἑγαμματα ἐμάθομεν. φέρε πρῶτον ἢρ' αἱ μὲν συλλαβᾶς λόγου ἔχουσί, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἄλογα; ἙΕΑΙ. Ἰσως. ΣΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐμοί φαίνεται. Σωκράτους γοῦν εἰ τις ἐρωτεῖ τὴν πρώτην συλλαβήν οὕτως, ὃ Θεαίτης, λέγε τι ἐστι ὅσως, τι ἀποκρινεῖ; ἙΕΑΙ.

6—2
"Ότι σήμα καὶ ὁ. ΣΩ. Οὕκοιν τοῦτον ἔχεις λόγον 
τῆς συλλαβῆς; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Ἰθι δή, οὕτως 
β εἰπὲ καὶ τὸν τοῦ 1 σήμα λόγον. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς 
τοῦ στοιχείου τις ἔρει στοιχεῖα; καὶ γὰρ δή, ὁ Σώκρατες, 
τὸ τε σήμα τῶν ἀφώνων ἔστι, ψόφος τις μόνον, ὁδοὶν 
συριττοῦσις τῆς γλώττης τοῦ δ' αὐτήν οὔτε φωνὴ 
οὔτε ψόφος, οὔτε τῶν πλείστων στοιχείων. ὡστε πάνω 
ἐν ἔχει τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὸ ἄλογα, ὅν γε τὰ ἐναργεῖστα 
αὐτά, τὰ ἐπτά, φωνὴν μόνον ἔχει, λόγον δὲ οὐδὲ ὄντων 
ΣΩ. Τούτῳ μὲν ἀρὰ, ὁ ἔταιρε, κατορθώκαμεν περὶ ἐπι-
κ στήμης. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαινόμεθα. ΣΩ. Τὶ δὲ 1 δῇ; τὸ μὴ 
γνωστὸν εἶναι τὸ στοιχεῖον, ἀλλὰ τὴν συλλαβήν ἀρ' 
ὑρθῶς ἀποδεδείγμεθα; ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός γε. ΣΩ. Φέρε 
δή, τὴν συλλαβήν πότερον λέγομεν τὰ ἀμφότερα στοι-
χεῖα, καὶ εὰν πλεῖον ἢ ἢ δύο, τὰ πάντα, ἢ μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν 
γεγονοῦν συντεθέντων αὐτῶν; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ἁπαντὰ 
ἔμοιγε δοκοῦμεν. ΣΩ. "Ορα δὴ ἐπὶ δυοῖν, σήμα καὶ 
ὀ. ἀμφότερα ἐστιν ἢ πρώτη συλλαβή τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὄνο-
ματος. ἀλλὸ τὶ ὁ γνωστός αὐτὴν τὰ ἀμφότερα 
 دمشق; ΘΕΑΙ. 1 Τὶ μῆ; ΣΩ. Τὸ σήμα καὶ τὸ 
ὀ. ἀρὰ γνωστὲρα. ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Τὶ δὲ; ἑκάτερον 
ἀρ' ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ οὐδὲτερον εἰδῶς ἀμφότερα γνωστὲρα; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ δεινὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ὁ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. 
Ἀλλὰ μέντοι εἰ γε ἀνάγκη ἑκάτερον γνωστέρας, εἰπὲρ 
ἀμφότερά τις γνώστηται, προγνωστός τὰ στοιχεῖα 
ἀπασα ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντι ποτε γνώσθαι συλλα-
βῆς, καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακὸς οἴχη-
σται. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μᾶλα γε 1 ἐκαίφης. ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ 
καλῶς αὐτῶν φυλάττομεν. χρήμα γὰρ ἐσος τὴν συλλα-
βῆς τίθεσθαι μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐκείνων ἐν τὶ 
γεγονός εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτῶ ἔχουν, ἑτερον δὲ
τῶν στοιχείων. ΘΕΙ. Πάννυ μὲν οὖν καὶ τάχα γάρ ἀν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνους ἔχοι. ΣΩ. Σκεπτέον, καὶ οὐ προδοτέον οὕτως ἀνάνδρως μέγαν τε καὶ σεμινὸν λόγον. ΘΕΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἔχετο δή, ὡς νῦν φαμέν, μία * ίδέα εὖ ἐκάστων τῶν συναρμοττόντων στοιχείων γνωριμενή ἡ συλλαβή ὁμοίως ἐν τε γράμμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις ἀπασί. ΘΕΙ. Πάννυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μέρη αὐτής οὐ δεῖ εἶναι. ΘΕΙ. Τί δή; ΣΩ. "Οτι οὐ ἄν ἢ μέρη, τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα μέρη εἶναι. ἢ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γεγονὸς ἐν τι εἰδὸς ἐτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν; ΘΕΙ. Ἐγώγε. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ πᾶν καὶ τὸ ὅλον πότερον ταύτον καλεῖς ἢ ἐτερον 1 ἐκάστερον; ΘΕΙ. Ἐχω μὲν οὖδεν σαφές, ἃ ὅτι δὲ κελεύεις προθύμος ἀποκρίνασθαι, παρακινδυνεύον λέγω, ὅτι ἐτερον. ΣΩ. Ἡ μὲν προθυμία, ὁ Θεαιτητης, ὀρθή εἰ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόκρισις, σκεπτέον. ΘΕΙ. Δεῖ δὲ γε δη; ΧΛΙ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διαφέρου ἂν τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντός, ὡς ὁ νῦν λόγος; ΘΕΙ. Ναὶ. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ; τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἔσθ' ὁ τι διάφερει; οἷον ἐπειδὼν λέγωμεν ἐν, δύο, τρία, τέταρτα, πέντε, ἐὰς καὶ ἐὰν δις τρία ἢ 1 τρίς δύο ἢ τέταρτα τε καὶ δύο ἢ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἐν, πότερον ἐν πάσι τούτοις τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ἐτερον λέγομεν; ΘΕΙ. Ταύτων. ΣΩ. Ἄρ’ ἀλλο τι ἢ ἐς; ΘΕΙ. Οὐδέν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ’ ἐκάστης λέξεως πάντα τὰ ἐς εἰρήκαμεν; ΘΕΙ. Ναὶ. ΣΩ. Πάλιν δ’ οὐδέν λέγομεν τὰ πάντα λέγοντες; ΘΕΙ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Ἡ ἀλλο τι ἢ τὰ ἐς; ΘΕΙ. Οὐδέν. ΣΩ. Ταύτων ἄρα ἐν γε τοῖς ὡσα εὖ ἡ ἅρι-θ' θμοῦ ἐστὶ τὸ τε πᾶν προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἄπαντα;
ΘΕΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. "Ωδε δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν λέγομεν, ὁ τοῦ πλέθρου ἁριθμὸς καὶ τὸ πλέθρον ταύτων. ἢ γαρ; ΘΕΛ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ τοῦ σταδίου δὴ ὁσαύτως; ΘΕΛ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὁ τοῦ στρατοπέδου γε καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁμοίως; ὁ γαρ ἁριθμὸς πᾶς τὸ ἐν πᾶν ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν ἐστὶ. ΘΕΛ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ ἐκαστῶν ἁριθμὸς μῶν ἀλλο ἐν ἡ μέρη ἕστιν; ΘΕΛ. Οὐδέν. ΣΩ. "Οσα ἁρα ἔχει μέρη, ἐκ μερῶν ἄν εἰ; ΘΕΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ γε πάντα μέρη τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ὁμολογεῖται, εἰπερ καὶ ὁ πᾶς ἁριθμὸς τὸ πᾶν ἐσται. ΘΕΛ. Οὗτω. ΣΩ. Τὸ ὀλον ἁρ' οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐκ μερῶν. πᾶν γαρ ἄν εἰ, τὰ πάντα ἄν μέρη. ΘΕΛ. Οὐκ ἔστικ. ΣΩ. Μέρος Ὁ ἐσθ' ὅτου ἄλλου ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ὀλον; ΘΕΛ. 205 Τοῦ παντοῦ γε. ΣΩ. *'Ανδρικὸς γε, ὁ Θεαίτης, μάχει. τὸ πᾶν δὲ οὐχ ὅταν μηδὲν ἀπή, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πᾶν ἐστὶν; ΘΕΛ. 'Ανάγκη. ΣΩ. ὁ λον δὲ οὐ ταὐ- τὸν τοῦτο ἐσται, οὐ ἂν μηδαμὴ μηδὲν ἀποστατῇ; ἂν ὅ ἂν ἀποστατῇ, οὐτε ὀλον οὔτε πὰν, ἃμα γενόμενον ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτό; ΘΕΛ. Δοκεῖ μοι νῦν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ὠλον. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι οὗ ἂν μέρη γ, τὸ ὀλον τε καὶ πᾶν τὰ πάντα μέρη ἐσται; ΘΕΛ. Πάνω γε. ΣΩ. Πάλιν δῇ, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν, οὐκ, εἶπερ ἢ συλλαβῇ μῇ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐστὶν, ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς μῇ ὅς ἕστιν ἔχειν ἐαυτῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα, ὁ ταύτων οὔσαν αὐτῶς ὁμοίως ἐκείνος γνω- στὶν εἶναι; ΘΕΛ. Οὗτωσ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἰνα μὴ γένηται, ἐτερον αὐτῶν αὐτῆς ἐθέμεθα; ΘΕΛ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Τῇ δ', εἰ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα συλλαβῆς μέρη ἐστίν, ἔχεις ἄλλ' ἄττα εἰπεῖν, ἢ μέρη μὲν ἐστὶ συλλαβῆς, οὐ μέντοι στοιχεῖα γ' ἐκείνης; ΘΕΛ. Οὐδαμῶς εἰ γαρ,
ΘΕΛΗΤΗΤΟΣ.

ω Σώκρατες, μόρια ταύτης συγχωροῖν, γέλοιον ποιν τὰ στοιχεῖα ύφέντα ἐπ' ἄλλα δέναι. ΣΩ. Παυτάπασι δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, κατὰ τὸν νῦν λόγον μία τις ἱδέα ἀμέριστος συλλαβή ἀνεῖ. ΘΕΛΙ. Ἑσικε. ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ὅλιγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἤγοµένοι εὐ λέγεσθαι, ὅτι τῶν πρῶτων οὐκ εἰ ἡ λόγος, ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἄλλα σύγκειται, διότι αὐτό καθ' αὐτὸ ἐκαστὸν εἰ ἕσω ὑσθετον, καὶ οὐδὲ ὁ δι' αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς ἔχω προσφέρωντα εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔτερα καὶ ἄλλοτρία λεγόμενα, καὶ αὕτη δὴ ἡ αἰτία ἀλογὸν τε καὶ ἀγνωστὸν αὐτὸ ποιεῖ; ΘΕΛΙ. Μέμνησαι. ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ἄλλη τις ἡ αὐτή ἡ αἰτία τοῦ μονοειδές τι καὶ ἀμέριστον αὐτὸ εἶναι; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὖν ὀρθ ἄλλην. ΘΕΛΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς ταύτων ἐμπεπτωκέν ἡ συλλαβή εἰδος ἐκεῖνος, εἰπερ μέρη τε μὴ ἔχει καὶ μία ἐστὶν ἱδέα; ΘΕΛΙ. Παυτάπασι μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἄρα πολλὰ στοιχεῖα ἡ συλλαβή ἐστὶ καὶ ὄλον τι, μέρη δ' αὐτῆς ταύτα, ὦμοιος αἱ τε συλλαβῆς γνωσται καὶ ῥητα καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐπειπερ τὰ πάντα μέρη τῷ ὅλῳ ταυτῶν ἐφανῆ. ΘΕΛΙ. Καὶ ἐμάλα. ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ τέν τε καὶ ἀμερές, ὦμοιος μὲν συλλαβῆς, ὀσαύτως δὲ στοιχεῖον ἀλογὸν τε καὶ ἀγνωστὸν ἡ γὰρ αὐτή αἰτία ποιήσει αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα. ΘΕΛΙ. Οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλος εἰπεῖν. ΣΩ. Τούτω μὲν ἄρα μὴ ἀποδεχόμεθα, ὦς ἂν λέγη συλλαβῆς μὲν γνωστῶν καὶ ῥητῶν, στοιχείων δὲ τούτων. ΘΕΛΙ. Μὴ γὰρ, εἰπερ τό τό λόγῳ πειθόμεθα. ΣΩ. *Τι δ' αὐ; τούτων γοι λέγουτος ἀρ' οὖ μᾶλλον ἂν ἀποδέξαστο ἐξ ὧν αὐτῶς σύνοισθα σαυτῷ ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει; ΘΕΛΙ. Τὸ ποιεῖν; ΣΩ. Ὁς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μανθάνων διετέλεσας ἡ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν τῇ ὄψει διαγιγνώσκειν.
πειρώμενος καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀκοῇ αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ ἔκαστον, ὡς μὴ ἡ θέσις σε ταράττοι λεγομένων τε καὶ γραφομένων. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθεστάτα λέγεις. ΣΩ. Ἐν δὲ κιβαριστοῦ τελεῶς μεμαθηκέναι μοῦν ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τῶ φθόγ-γρο ἐκάστῳ δύνασθαι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ποιας χορδῆς εἴην ἢ δὴ στοιχεῖα πᾶσὶ ἄν ὁμολογήσεις μουσικῆς λέγεσθαι; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο. ΣΩ. ὤν μὲν ἀρ’ αὐτοὶ ἐμπειροὶ ἐσμὲν στοιχείων καὶ συλλαβῶν, εἰ δὲι ἄπο τοῦτο τεκμαίρεσθαι καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα, πολὺ τὸ τῶν στοιχείων γένους ἐναργεστέραν τε τὴν γνώσιν ἔχειν φύσωμεν καὶ κυριωτέραν τῆς συλλαβῆς πρὸς τὸ λαβεῖν τελεῶς ἔκα-στον μάθημα, καὶ ἐὰν τὶς φῆ συλλαβῆ μὲν γνωστὸν, ἀγνωστὸν δὲ πεφυκέναι στοιχεῖον, ἐκόντα ἢ ἀκοῦτα παίζειν ἠγησίμεθ’ αὐτῶν. ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν.

C XLII. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο μὲν ἔτι κἂν ἄλλαι φανείν ἀποδείξεις, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ τὸ δὲ προκείμενον μὴ ἐπιλαθόμεθα δ’ αὐτὰ ἰδεῖν, ὅ τι δὴποτε καὶ λέγεται τὸ μετὰ δόξης ἀληθοῦς λόγον προσγενόμενον τῇν τελεω-τάτῃν ἐπιστήμῃν γεγονέναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ ὅραν. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, τί ποτε βουλεταί τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν σημαί- νειν; τριῶν ἡμῖν ἐν τί μοι δοκεῖ λέγειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί-1) νον δὴ; ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἶν 1 ἀν τὸ τὴν αὐτοῦ διάνοιαν ἐμφανὴ ποιεῖν διὰ φανῆς μετὰ ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, ὡσπερ εἰς κάτοπτρον ἢ ὕδωρ τήν δύχαν ἐκτυπούμενον εἰς τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος ροήν. ἢ οὔ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ τοιοῦτον λόγος εἶναι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοίγε. τὸν γοῦν αὐτὸ δρότη δέλειν παρέμ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτὸ τοῦτο γε πᾶσ τοιεῖν δυνατὸς θάττον ἢ σχολαίτερον, τὸ ἐνδεί-ξασθαι τί δοκεῖ περὶ ἔκαστον αὐτῷ, ὁ μὴ ἐνεός ἢ κωφὸς ἀπ’ ἀρχής καὶ οὕτως ὅσοι τι ὅρθον δοξάζουσι, πάντες Ε. αὐτὸ μετὰ 1 λόγου φανοῦνται ἐχοντες, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ
ἐτὶ ὀρθῇ δόξα χωρὶς ἐπιστήμης γενήσεται. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄληθή. ΣΩ. Μὴ τοινυν ῥάδιος καταγγυμάκωμεν τὸ μηδὲν εἰρηκέναι τὸν ἀποφημάμενον ἐπιστήμην, ὦ νῦν σκοπούμεν. ἵςως γὰρ ὁ λέγων οὐ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα τί ἐκαστὸν δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἐρωμένῳ. ΘΕΑΙ. 227 Οἶον τι λέγεις, ὁ Σῶκρατες; ΣΩ. Οἶον καὶ Ἡσίοδος περὶ ἀμάξης λέγει τὸ ἐκατὸν δὲ τε δοῦραθ' ἀμάξης. ἢ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σὺν ἂλλῃ ἀγαπᾶμεν ἂν ἐρωτηθέντες τι τέ ἐστιν ἀμάξα, εἰ ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν τροχοῖ, ἄξων, ὑπερτερία, ἀντυγες, ξυνοῦν. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ γε ἵσως οἴοιτ' ἂν ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ ἂν τὸ σὸν ἄνομα ἐρωτηθέντας καὶ ἀποκρινομένους κατὰ συλλαβὴν, γελοίους εἶναι ὁ ὅρθως μὲν δοξάζοντας καὶ β λέγοντας ἢ λέγομεν, οἰομένους δὲ γραμματικοὺς εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν τε καὶ λέγειν γραμματικὸς τὸν τοῦ Θεαίτητου ὀνόματος λόγον, τὸ δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἔπιστημόνως οὐδὲν λέγειν, πρὶν ἂν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων μετὰ τῆς ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἐκαστον περαίνῃ τις, ὑπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσεχεν ποι ἔρρήθη. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐρρήθη γὰρ. ΣΩ. Οὗτο τοῖνυν καὶ περὶ ἀμάξης ἡμᾶς μὲν ὀρθὴν ἔχειν δόξαν, τὸν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἐκατόν ἐκείνων δυνάμενον διεξεῖν αὐτὴς τὴν ὁυ· σίαν, προσλαβάντα τοῦτο, λόγον τε προσειληφέναι τῇ ἀληθεὶ δόξη καὶ ἀντὶ δοξαστικοῦ τεχνικοῦ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμονα περὶ ἀμάξης οὐσίας γεγονέναι, διὰ στοιχείων τὸ ὁλου περάντα. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν εὐ δοκεῖ σοι, ὁ Σῶκρατες; ΣΩ. Εἰ σοι, ὁ ἑταῖρε, δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀποδέχει τὴν διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου διέξοδον περὶ ἐκάστοτον λόγον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ κατὰ συλλαβὰς ἢ καὶ κατὰ μείζον ἐτὶ ἀλογίαν, τοῦτο μοι λέγε, ἴν' αὐτῷ ὁ ἐπισκοπῶμεν.
ΘΕΛ. 'Αλλά πάνω ἀποδέχομαι. ΣΩ. Πότερον ἡγούμενος ἐπιστήμονα εἶναι ὄντων ὁτοιού, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ ὤτε μὲν τοῦ αὐτοῦ δοκῇ αὐτῷ εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ ἐτέρου, ἢ καὶ ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μὲν ἐτέρου, τοτὲ δὲ ἐτέρου δοξάζῃ; ΘΕΛ. Μᾶ Δί' οὐκ ἐγώγη. ΣΩ. Εἶτα ἀμυνομοῦσι ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει κατ' ἀρχάς σαυτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δρῶντας αὐτὰ; ΘΕΛ. Ἄρα λέγεις τῆς ἐ ἀυτῆς συλλαβῆς τοτὲ μὲν ἐτέρου, τοτὲ δὲ 1 ἐτέρου ἡγούμενους γράμμα, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τοτὲ μὲν εἰς τὴν προσήκουσαν, τοτὲ δὲ εἰς ἄλλην τιθέντας συλλαβήν; ΣΩ. Ταῦτα λέγω. ΘΕΛ. Μᾶ Δί' οὐ τοῖνυν ἀμυνομοῦ, οὐδὲ γέ πω ἡγούμαι ἐπιστασθηκαί τοὺς οὕτως ἐχοντας· ΣΩ. Τὶ οὖν; ὅταν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καυρῷ Θεαίτητον γράφων τις θῆτα καὶ ἐ οὕται τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ, καὶ αὐ * Θεόδωρων ἐπιχειρῶν γράφειν ταῦτα καὶ ἐ οὕται τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ, ἃρ' ἐπιστασθαι φήσομεν αὐτοῦ τὴν πρώτην τῶν ὑμετέρων όνομάτων συλλαβήν; ΘΕΛ. Ἄλλη ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν τὸν οὕτως ἐχοντα μήπω εἰδέναι. ΣΩ. Κωλύει οὖν τι καὶ περὶ τὴν δευτέραν συλλαβήν καὶ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην οὕτως ἐχειν τῶν αὐτῶν; ΘΕΛ. οὐδὲν γε. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν τότε τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον ἐχων γράφει Θεαίτητον μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης, ὅταν ἐξῆς γραφῆ; ΘΕΛ. Δῆλον δὴ.
τῶν ἀληθεστατῶν ἐπιστήμης λόγου. ἢ μὴ πως κατηγορώμεν; ἵσως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτο τις αὐτῶν ὀριεῖται, ἀλ-λὰ τὸ λοιπὸν εἰδὸς τῶν τριῶν, ὦν ἐν γῇ τι ἐφαμεν λόγον θήσεσθαι τῶν ἐπιστήμην ὁρίζόμενον δόξαν εἶναι ὁρθὴν μετὰ λόγου. ΘΕΙ. Ὅρθῶς ὑπέμνησας; ἐτι γὰρ ἐν λοιπόν, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἢν διανοίας ἐν φωνῇ ὁσπερ εἶδολον, τὸ δὲ ἄρτι λεχθὲν διὰ στοιχείου ὀδῶς ἑπὶ τὸ ὅλον τὸ δὲ δὴ τρίτον τι λέγεις; ΣΩ. Ὡσπερ ἄν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴποιεν, τὸ ἐχειν τι σημείον εἴπειν, ὦ τῶν ἄπαντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν. ΘΕΙ. Οἶον τίνα τίνος ἐχεῖς μοι λόγον εἴπειν; ΣΩ. Ὁλοι, εἰ βούλεις, ἴλιον ἐπὶ ἑκατον οἰκαί σοι εἶναι ἀποδέξασθαι, ὅτι τὸ λαμπροτατὸν ἐστὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν ὀνρανόν ἐντον περὶ γῆς. ΘΕΙ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Λαβᾷ δὲ οὐ χάριν εἴρηται. ἐστὶ δὲ ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, ὡς ἀρὰ τῇν διαφορὰν ἐκάστοτον ἀν λαμβάνης, ἦ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, λόγου, ὡς φασὶ τωσ, λήψει ἐως δὲ ἀν κοινῷ τινος ἐφάπτη, ἐκείνῳ περὶ σοι ἐσται ὁ λόγος, ὦν ἀν ἡ κοινότης ἦ. ΘΕΙ. Μανθάνω 1 καὶ μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς ἐχεῖν λόγον ἐτὸς τοιοῦτον καλεῖν. ΣΩ. Ὁσ δὲ ἀν μετ' ὀρθῆς δόξης περὶ ὃτους τῶν ἐντον τῇν διαφορὰν τῶν ἄλλων προσλαβή, αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμων γεγονός ἐσται, οὐ πρότερον ἢν δοξαστής. ΘΕΙ. Φαμέν γε μὴν οὕτω. ΣΩ. Νῦν δῆτα, ὁ Θεαίτητε, παντόπαιν ἐγώγη, ἐπειδὴ ἔγνως ὁσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, ἐννίμπην οὐδὲ σμικρὸν. ἐως δὲ ἀφετήρη πόρρωθεν, ἐφαίνετο τι μοι λέγεσθαι. ΘΕΙ. Πῶς τι τούτο; ΣΩ. Ἐφάσω, 209 ἐώς οἷος τε γένομαι. ὀρθὴν ἐγώγη ἐχον δόξαν περὶ σοῦ, ἐώς μὲν προσλάβω τῶν σοῦ λόγου, γιγνώσκω δὴ σε, εἰ δὲ μή, δοξάζω μόνον. ΘΕΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Λόγος δὲ γε
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ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ην ή της σῆς διαφοροτητος ἐρμηνεία. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως. ΣΩ. Ἡνίκ’ οὖν ἐδοξάζον μόνον, ἂλλο τι φ’ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρεις, τούτων οὐδενὸς ἕπτόμην τῇ διανοίᾳ; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἐσοκε. ΣΩ. Τῶν κοινῶν τι ἄρα διενοθήμην, οἷν ἐν οὐδὲν σὺ μᾶλλον ή τις ἄλλος ἔχει. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄναγκη. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός: πῶς ποτε ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ σὲ μᾶλλον ἐδοξάζον ή ἄλλον ὀντινῶν; θες γὰρ με διανοοῦμεν, οὐς ἠστην οὕτος Θεαίτητος, ὡς ἂν ἦν τε ἀνθρωπος καὶ ἔχῃ ρίνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ στόμα καὶ οὖτω δὴ ἐν ἑκαστον τῶν μελῶν. αὕτη οὖν ἡ διάνοια ἐσθ’ οτι μᾶλλω ποιήσει με Θεαίτητον ἡ Θεόδωρον διανοεῖσθαι, ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον, Μυσῶν τὸν ἐσχατον; ΘΕΑΙ. Τι γὰρ; ΣΩ. ἈΛΛ’ εἰν δὴ μη μόνον τὸν ἑξοντα ρίνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς διανοηθω, ἅλλα καὶ τὸν σιμόν τε καὶ ἕξοφθαλμον, μη τι σε αὐ μᾶλλον δοξάσω ἡ ἐμαυτῶν ἡ ὅσοι τοιούτων; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν. ΣΩ. ἈΛΛ’ οὐ πρότερον γε, οἴμαι, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐμοι δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἂν ἡ σιμότης ἀυτη τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων ἄν ἐγώ ἐφρακα διαφορόν τι μνημεῖον παρ’ ἐμοι ἐνσημαναμενη καταθήκαι, καὶ τάλλα οὕτως ἐξ ὧν εἰ σὺ, ἡ ἐμε, καὶ ἐων αὐριον ἀπαντήσα, ἀναμνήσει καὶ ποιήσει ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν περὶ σοῦ. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα. ΣΩ. Περὶ την ἑ διαφοροτητα ἄρα καὶ ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα ἂν εἰη ἑκάστου περὶ. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται γε. ΣΩ. Τό οὖν προσλάβειν λόγον τῇ ὀρθή δόξῃ τί ἂν ἐτί εἰη; εἱ μὲν γὰρ προσδοξάσαι λέγει ἦ διαφέρει τι τῶν ἄλλων, πάνω γελοῖα γῆγεται ἦ ἐπίταξις. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς; ΣΩ. ὁ ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἐχομεν, ἢ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, τούτων προσλάβειν κελεύει

209 c. ἡ ἐμε. Si η Platonis est, neglegentius scriptum videtur. Sed nescio an debuerim vel cum Heindorfo ὁ vel ἀ reponere.
νύμας ὅρθην δόξαν, ἢ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει. καὶ οὗτος ἢ μὲν σκυτάλης ἢ ύπέρον ἢ ὅτον δὴ λέγεται περιτροπὴ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐπίταξιν οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι, τυφλοῦ δὲ Εὐρακέλευσις ἀν καλοίτο δικαίοτερον τὸ γὰρ ἢ ἔχομεν ταῦτα προσλαβεῖν κελεύειν, ἢν μᾶθωμεν ἢ δοξάζομεν, πάνυ γενναῖως έοικεν ἐσκοτώμενῳ. ἘΠΑΙ. Εἴπε δὴ, τί νῦν δή ὡς ἐρών ἐπὶθου; Σ.Ε. Εἰ τὸ λόγον, ὁ παῖ, προσλαβεῖν γνῶναι κελεύει, ἀλλὰ μὴ δοξάζας τὴν διαφορότητα, ἢδ' χρῆμ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν περὶ ἐπιστήμης λόγου. τὸ γὰρ γνῶναι ἐπιστήμην που λαβείν ἐστὶν. * ἢ γὰρ; ἘΠΑΙ. Ναι. Σ.Ε. Οὐκοῦν 210 ἐρωτηθεῖς, ὃς έοικε, τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, ἀποκρινεῖται, ὅτι δοξά ὀρθὴ μετὰ ἐπιστήμης διαφορότητος. λόγου γὰρ πρόσληψις τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη κατ' ἐκείνων. ἘΠΑΙ. Ἑσθαλε. Σ.Ε. Καὶ παντάπασι τις εὔθεις, ξητούντων ἡμῶν ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν φάναι ὀρθὴν εἶναι μετ' ἐπιστήμης εἴτε διαφορότητος εἴτε ὁτουν. οὔτε ἀρα αἴσθησις, ὁ Θεαί- τητη, οὔτε δόξα ἀληθῆς οὔτε μετ' ἀληθοῦς δόξης λό- γος 1 προσγεγρόμενος ἐπιστήμη ἂν εἶη. ἘΠΑΙ. Οὐκ ' ἐσθαλε. Σ.Ε. Ἡ οὖν ἐτί κυνούμεν τι καὶ ὀδύνομεν, ὁ φιλε, περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἢ πάντα ἐκτετόκαμεν; ἘΠΑΙ. Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δ' ἐγὼς πλεῖω ἢ ὅσα εἴχον ἐν ἐμαυτῷ διὰ σὲ εἰρήκα. Σ.Ε. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν ἑπαντα ἡ μαυετικὴ ἡμῶν τέχνη ἀνεμιαία φησι γεγενήθαι καὶ οὐκ ἄξια τροφῆς; ἘΠΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Χλίβ. Σ.Ε. Ἐάν τοινυν ἄλλων μετὰ ταῦτα ἐγκύμων ἐπιχειρῆς γέγνεσθαι, ὁ Θεαίτητε, ἐάν τε ἡ γῆ, ἐρημοίς ἐστὶ σπλήρθης διὰ τὴν νῦν ἐξήτασιν, ἐάν τε κενὸς ἤς, ἢπτον ἐστὶ παρὰ τοῦτο γινοῦσθαι καὶ ἡμερότερος, σωφρόνως οὐκ οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ οἰδά. τοσοῦτον γὰρ μόνον ή
ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται, πλέον δὲ οὐδὲν, οὐδὲ τι οἶδα ὅν οἱ ἄλλοι, ὃσοι μεγάλοι καὶ θαυμάσιοι ἄνδρες εἰσὶ τε καὶ γεγόνασι. τὴν δὲ μαιείαν ταύτην ἔγω τε καὶ ἡ μήτηρ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐλάχομεν, ἥ μὲν τῶν γυναικῶν, ἔγω δὲ τῶν νέων τε ἐκ γενναίων καὶ ὃσοι καλοὶ. ὥστε μὲν οὖν ἀπαντητέου μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοὰν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, ἥν με γέγραπταί· ἐσθεν δέ, ὁ Θεό-δωρε, δεῦρο πάλιν ἀπαντῶμεν.
TRANSLATION

WITH NOTES EXPLANATORY AND ILLUSTRATIVE.
TRANSLATION.

[Euclides, founder of the Megaric School, and his friend Terpsion, both of them pupils of Socrates, meet in one of the streets of Megara. The former mentions that on his way to the harbour he had met Theaetetus, wounded and dangerously sick, being carried to Athens from the Athenian camp near Corinth. A conversation ensuing on the noble character of Theaetetus, and the estimation in which he was held by Socrates, Euclides says that he has at home in manuscript a dialogue, which Theaetetus took part in with Socrates. As Terpsion expresses a wish to hear this dialogue, the friends adjourn to the house of Euclides, where a slave reads it aloud to them as they repose.]

Eu. Ha, Terpsion! long in from the country?
Ter. A good while. And you—I was looking for you in the Agora, and wondering that I could not find you.
Eu. I was not in the city.
Ter. Where then?

1 "Αρρ...η πάλαι; English idiom would say ‘just in?’ or ‘long in?’ but not both. The translation therefore omits one alternative.
2 Ἐξ ἀγροῦ. Terpsion has a country residence; whether a town house also, there is nothing to show.
3 Καὶ σε γε. This emphasis implies a question as to the cause of Euclid’s absence. The ἀγροῦ or market-square was a promenade, where a friend might be looked for at a certain time of day, as in the Cascine at Florence.

K. P.
Eu. As I was going down\textsuperscript{4} to the harbour I met with Theaetetus being carried to Athens from the camp at Corinth.

Ter. Alive or dead?

Eu. Alive, but only just\textsuperscript{5}. Besides being very ill from wounds, he is more seriously affected\textsuperscript{6} by the malady which has broken out in the army.

Ter. You mean the dysentery?

Eu. Yes.

Ter. In danger, you say, such a man as that!

Eu. Ay, a gallant and good one\textsuperscript{7}, Terpsion. It was but just now I heard some people praising him highly for his behaviour in the battle\textsuperscript{8}.

Ter. Nothing strange in that. It were far more surprising if he had not behaved so. But how came he not to put up here at Megara\textsuperscript{9}?

Eu. He was in haste to get home. For all my entreaties and advice, he would not stay. So after accompanying him some way, as I went back I bethought me of the marvellous divination shown by Socrates in so many cases, especially in that of Theaetetus. I think it was but a little

\textsuperscript{4} Καταβαίνων. The preposition κατά compounded with verbs of motion often implies coastward movement, the converse being ἀνά. The harbour was Nisaea.

\textsuperscript{5} Καὶ μᾶλα. The intensive καὶ is largely used by Plato.

\textsuperscript{6} Αἰρεῖ. A technical verb for morbid affection.

\textsuperscript{7} Καλὸν τέ καὶ ἀγαθὸν. Καλοκαγαθία is the Athenian term for the heroic ideal of a gentleman.

\textsuperscript{8} Μάχην. What battle is here meant we cannot absolutely determine. The great battle near Corinth, in which the Lacedaemonians defeated the Athenians, was in July, 394 B.C. Grote, H. Gr. Part ii. ch. lxxxiv. Demosth. Lept. 41. But Plato may point to some other affair before 387.

\textsuperscript{9} Αὐτοῦ Μεγαρῶν, two local adverbs=ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς Μεγάρωι, at Megara itself; at the very place he had reached, viz. Megara.
while before his own death that he met him, a mere lad at the time, and, after conversing and arguing with him, admired his genius greatly. When I went to Athens, he repeated to me the arguments he had held with him—well worth hearing they were—and said this youth must inevitably become distinguished, if he should reach man's estate.

Ter. He spoke the truth, manifestly. But what were the arguments? Can you repeat them?

Eu. No indeed: not from mere recollection. But, having returned home immediately, I jotted down¹⁰ some notes at once, and, afterwards taxing my memory at leisure, I went on writing; and, every time I visited Athens, I used to ask Socrates anything I had not remembered, and to make corrections on my return here. So that I have got nearly the whole conversation in writing.

Ter. True: I heard you say so once before; and I have always been meaning to bid you show it me, but have loitered till this moment. What hinders us from perusing it now? Especially as I am in real want of rest, after coming from the country.

Eu. Well, and I too escorted Theaetetus as far as Erineum¹¹; so I should not dislike a siesta. Let us go then; and while we repose, the attendant shall read to us.

Ter. A good suggestion.

[They go to Euclid's house.]

Eu. Here is the manuscript, Terpsion. I must observe that I wrote out the conversation in my own way:—not in the narrative form as Socrates related it to me, but as a dialogue between him and his fellow-disputants, whom he

¹⁰ ἔγραψάμεν. The use of the middle voice here, as compared with ἔγραψον afterwards, is notable: perhaps it implies the act of writing at the moment from recollection and for his own future revision.

¹¹ Erineum: a locality on the way from Megara to Athens.
stated to be Theodorus the geometrician and Theaetetus. And, in order to escape the troublesome notices between the speeches in my manuscript (such as, when Socrates was speaker, 'I spoke,' 'I said,' and, in case of an answerer, 'he agreed' or 'he disagreed') I wrote as if he were actually talking with them, and got rid of such interpolations.

Ter. Well, no harm in that, Euclid.
Eu. Now, boy, take the volume, and read.

[The slave reads aloud all that follows.]

2 [The interlocutors in the following dialogue are: Socrates, Theodorus the geometrician of Cyrene, and Theaetetus. Two young friends of the latter are also present, one of whom is called Socrates; but neither of them is made to speak. Socrates, meeting Theodorus in a gymnasium at Athens, asks him if he has encountered any youths of promise. Theodorus names Theaetetus with high praise, adding that in some of his features he resembles Socrates. Theaetetus, then approaching with his two friends, is invited to sit beside Socrates, who engages him in a conversation about their personal resemblance. The purpose of it seems to be, partly to test the dialectic faculty of Theaetetus, partly to embolden him by relating the praise he has received from so competent a judge as Theodorus.]

So. If I had a peculiar interest in Cyrene and its affairs, Theodorus, I would ask you about things there, and about its people, whether any of the young men in those parts are studying geometry or other scientific subjects. But I really care for them less than I do for our youth here, and would rather know which of our own young men are expected to become scholars. This therefore I observe for myself as well as I can, and inquire about it from every body else, with whom I see the young men desirous to converse. Now the largest number of pupils attend
your lectures; and justly: for you deserve it on many grounds, but especially for geometry. So I shall be glad to hear if you have met with any one worth naming.

_Theo._ Yes, Socrates; among your citizens I have met with a youth, whose character I can cite as well worthy of your attention. If he were handsome, I should be much afraid to mention him, lest any one should fancy I am in love with him. But in fact (don’t be vexed with me) he is not handsome: he has a flat nose and protruding eyes like you: but less marked in his case than in yours. I speak then without scruple. And I can assure you that of all the persons I ever met (and I have associated with a great number) I never found any of a nature so wonderfully excellent. Aptitude for learning such as few attain, combined with a temper singularly mild, and furthermore with unrivalled courage, I could never have expected to find, nor have I ever seen any similar instances. Those who, like him, are quick and ready-witted and gifted with a good memory, are liable to keen emotions; they rush impetuously like unbalanced vessels, and grow up with more of madness in them than of valour: whilst others of more solid temperament usually approach studies in a somewhat sluggish mood, and laden with forgetfulness. But he comes to all his studies and investigations with perfect gentleness, like a current of oil flowing without sound, so smoothly, firmly and success-fully, that we marvel to see one of his age perform these things as he does.

_So._ Good news indeed. Pray whose son is he?

_Theo._ I have heard the name, but do not remember it. However, he is the middle one of those who are now approaching us. He and these friends of his were anointing

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1 Γεμοντες. A word properly applied to laden vessels, and here opposed to ἀνεμάτιστα πλοία.
themselves just now in the outer race-course. They have finished, I suppose, and are coming this way. So see if you know him.

So. I do. He is the son of Sophronius of Sunium, just such a man, my friend, as you describe this one to be, of good repute generally, and, I can tell you, a man who left a considerable property. But I do not know the name of the youth.

Thea. Theaetetus is his name, Socrates; the property I fancy certain trustees have wasted: yet even in money matters he is wonderfully liberal.

So. A noble character you give him. Bid him come and sit down by me here.

Theo. I will. Theaetetus, come and sit here by Socrates.

So. Do by all means, Theaetetus, that I may view myself, and see what kind of face I have. Theodorus says it's like yours. Now if each of us held a lyre in his hand, and he said they were tuned to the same pitch, should we believe him at once, or should we have taken note whether he spoke as a musician?

Theae. We should have taken note.

So. And if we found him such, should we not believe him, if ignorant of music, we should disbelieve?

Theae. True.

So. And in the present case, I suppose, if we care at all for resemblance of faces, we must consider whether he speaks with a painter's skill or not.

Theae. I think so.

So. Is then Theodorus skilled in portrait-painting?

Theae. Not to my knowledge.

So. And is he not skilled in geometry?

Theae. Without doubt, Socrates.
So. And in astronomy and calculations and music and every subject of education?

Theae. I think so.

So. If then he says, either by way of praise or dispraise, that we are alike in some bodily feature, it is not very well worth while to attend to him?

Theae. Perhaps not.

So. But how, if he were to praise the soul of one or the other for virtue and wisdom? Would it not be worth while for the one who heard the praise to observe him who was praised, and for the other to exhibit himself with alacrity?

Theae. Quite so, Socrates.

[Socrates, after telling Theaetetus of the high praise given to him by Theodorus, and, questioning him about his studies, leads him to admit that the end to be gained by them is 'wisdom,' and that this is the same thing as 'knowledge.' He goes on to confess the difficulty he finds in defining what knowledge is, and invites the company to discuss the question. Theodorus declines for himself, pleading age and want of dialectic practice, but suggests that Theaetetus should be invited to carry on the discussion with Socrates.]

So. It is time, then, my dear Theaetetus, for you to exhibit and for me to observe. For I must tell you that, although Theodorus has often spoken to me with praise of many persons, both foreigners and citizens, he never gave such praise to anybody as he did to you just now.

Theae. I am glad to hear it, Socrates; but see to it, that he did not speak in jest.

2 Μουσικός. This word can either mean 'musical,' or 'literary.' The former is more probable here.
So. That is not the way of Theodorus. So do not retract your admissions on the plea that our friend here speaks in jest, lest he be compelled to add an affidavit. I am sure nobody will indict him for perjury¹. So stand to your confession boldly.

Theae. Yes, I must, if you think so.

So. Tell me now: you learn, I suppose, from Theodorus some lessons of geometry?

Theae. I do.

So. And of astronomy and harmony and calculations?

Theae. I use my best endeavour.

So. So do I, my boy, both from him and from all others whom I suppose to have any acquaintance with the subjects. Nevertheless, though I am in general pretty well versed in them, I have one little difficulty, which I must examine with your help and that of our friends here. Tell me, does not 'to learn' mean to become wiser in that which one learns?

Theae. Certainly.

So. And by wisdom it is, I suppose, that the wise are wise?

Theae. Yes.

So. Does this differ at all from knowledge?

Theae. Does what differ?

So. Wisdom. In things whereof we are knowing, are we not also wise?

Theae. Can it be otherwise?

So. Are then wisdom and knowledge the same thing?

Theae. Yes.

¹ 'Επισκήψει. Heindorf rightly says: ἐπισκήπτειν h. l. est i. q. ἐγκαλεῖν ψευδομαρτυρών. The verb in this sense is usually middle; but Aeschines Tim. 142 has the active, ἤν οὐδὲ ψευδομαρτυρῶν ἔστω ἐπισκήψαι. See below 5; also Dict. Ant. (Martyria, 'Επίσκηψε.)
So. Now here is precisely my difficulty, and I cannot adequately comprehend in my own mind what knowledge really is. Are we then able to define it? What say ye? Which of us will speak first? Whoever misses the mark on each trial, shall sit down, as boys playing at ball say, for donkey: and whoever goes through to the end without missing, shall be our king, and shall command us to answer anything he likes to ask. But perhaps, Theodorus, my love of discussion leads me to be rude in trying so hard to make us argue, and become friendly and chatty with one another.

Theo. No, Socrates, such a wish is the reverse of rudeness. But call on one of the youths to answer you. I am unaccustomed to this kind of debate, and too old to acquire the habit. It would suit our young friends, and they would get on much better: for it is a fact that in all things youth has the gift of progress. So, as you had Theaetetus in hand at first, do not let him go, but continue to question him.

[Theaetetus, having modestly consented to take his share of the argument, endeavours to define 'knowledge' by enumerating various sciences and arts which are specific kinds of it. Hereupon Socrates, by a series of elenctic questions in the dialectic manner, exposes the futility of all attempts to define, which contain the term itself proposed for definition.]

So. You hear then, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says; and you will not, I think, wish to disobey him. In such matters a wise man's injunctions cannot be lawfully disobeyed by his junior. Speak then well and nobly. What do you think that knowledge is?

Theae. I must, Socrates, since you both require. No doubt, if I make any blunder, you will correct me.

2 θέλει. See Hor. Epist. 1. 1, 59: pueri ludentes, Rex eris, aiunt, si recte facies.
So. Certainly, if we are able.

Theae. Well then, I think that all the things one can learn from Theodorus are knowledge; geometry for instance and the others which you enumerated just now: and again leather-dressing\(^1\), and the trades of the other craftsmen, all and each, I consider nothing else than knowledge.

So. In a truly noble and bountiful style, my friend, when asked for one thing you give many, and various things instead of a simple one.

Theae. Why, what is the sense of your words, Socrates?

So. Perhaps none at all\(^2\): however, I will explain what I mean. When you name leather-dressing, do you intend anything else than the knowledge of the manufacture of shoes?

Theae. Nothing else.

So. Or when you name carpentry, do you intend anything but the knowledge of the manufacture of wooden implements?

Theae. No, nothing.

So. In both cases then, you express that thing of which each is the knowledge?

Theae. Yes.

So. But the question put, Theaetetus, was not concerning the various subjects of knowledge, or their number. We did not ask with a wish to count them, but to know what the nature of knowledge itself is. Am I talking nonsense?

Theae. No, quite correctly.

So. Consider this also. Should some one ask us any trivial and obvious question, such as, what is clay? if we

\(^{1}\) Σκυτστομική and σκυτική, σκυτστόμοι and σκυτεῖσ are indifferently used for the shoe-trade.

\(^{2}\) Οὐδέν (λέγω). Λέγεω οὐδέν, to speak unreasonably (wrongly); λέγεω τι to speak reasonably (rightly).
said in reply, the clay of the potters, and the clay of the stove-makers, and the clay of the brickmakers, should we not deserve to be laughed at?

_Theae._ Probably.

_So._ In the first place because we thought the questioner would understand us from our answer, when we introduce the word 'clay,' whether we add that of the doll-makers, or of any other craftsmen. Does anybody, think you, understand any name of anything, when he does not know its correct meaning?

_Theae._ Not at all.

_So._ Then he who is ignorant of 'knowledge,' does not understand 'knowledge of shoes.'

_Theae._ He does not.

_So._ And he who is ignorant of knowledge does not understand leather-dressing or any other art?

_Theae._ True.

_So._ Then an answer made to the question—What is knowledge? is ridiculous, when a person gives in his reply the name of some art. For he names 'the knowledge of something,' when that was not the thing asked from him.

_Theae._ Apparently.

_So._ In the next place, when he might have answered easily and briefly, he goes an infinite way round. For instance, in the question about clay, it was easy and simple to say, that clay is moistened earth, and to abstain from adding whose it is.

_[Theaetetus now accepts the principle of definition laid down by Socrates, and illustrates it by citing certain mathematical terms adopted by himself and his fellow-student, young Socrates, to distinguish rational and irrational numbers. These terms are (a) τετράγωνος ἀριθμός, square number (4, 9, 16, 25...$n^2$); (β) προμήχης ἀριθμός, oblong]
number (the rest exc. 1); (γ) μῆκος, length (all integral numbers after 1) which may be represented by straight lines, and used to form squares; (δ) δύναμες (irrational roots, \(\sqrt{3}, \sqrt{5}, \sqrt{6}\) etc.) which are incommensurable with the unit of length (ποδώαλο), but can become sides of figures commensurable in area with squares. Socrates applauds this invention, and exhorts Theaetetus to apply his mind in the same way to discover a definition of knowledge.)

*Theaet*. Yes, Socrates; this method now indeed appears easy. You seem to be asking the same sort of question that occurred some time since to us in our discussions;—to myself I mean, and your namesake, Socrates here.

*So*. What was that, Theaetetus?

*Theaet*. Theodorus was writing out for us something about ‘powers,’ proving, as to the ‘tripod’ and the ‘pente-pod,’ that in length they are not commensurable with the foot-unit: and so proceeding one by one as far as seventeen: but here he somehow came to a pause. We then bethought us of such a notion as this: since the ‘powers’ were evidently infinite in number, to try to comprise them under one term, by which we should entitle all these ‘powers.’

*So*. Did you find any such term?

*Theaet*. I think we did. Consider it yourself.

*So*. Speak on.

*Theaet*. We divided number generally into two classes, one, that which is capable of being formed by the multiplication of equal factors into one another, we likened in form to the square, and called it square and equilateral.

*So*. Very good.

5 1 Τρίπων, as Heindorf says, is εὐθεῖα δύναμες τρίπων, i.e. \(\sqrt{3}\), which is irrational (not commensurate with the foot-unit, not integral), but potentially rational (becoming so when squared: \(\sqrt{3} \times \sqrt{3} = 3\)). So πεντέπων and the rest. The use of δύναμες is therefore different from the modern mathematical term “power” \((x^2, x^3...x^n)\).
Theodorus. All intervening numbers, to which belong 3 and 5 and every one that is incapable of being formed by the multiplication of equal factors, but is formed either by a larger number having a smaller—or by a smaller number having a larger—as its multiplier, we likened on the other hand to the oblong figure, which in every instance has greater and lesser sides, and called it oblong number².

So. Excellent. What next?

Theodorus. All lines which being squared form an equilateral plane figure we defined to be 'length'; all which form an oblong, we comprised under the name 'powers' (i.e. irrational roots), as not being commensurable with the others except through the surfaces which they have power to form³. And similarly with respect to the solids (cubes).

So. Nobody in the world could do better, my boys. So I do not think Theodorus will incur the guilt of perjury.

Theodorus. But as to your question about knowledge, Socrates, I could not answer it in the same way as that about length and power. Yet you seem to me to be looking for some such answer. So that now Theodorus again appears to be a false speaker.

So. Well, but if he had praised your running, and said he had never met with any young man so fleet, and then in

² This appears as a general expression in the form

\[ n \times \frac{1}{n} \left( = \frac{1}{n} \times n \right) = n + 1. \]

Example: \( 2 \times 1\frac{1}{2} (= 1\frac{1}{2} \times 2) = 3 \). As \( n \) is any integer, this includes all numbers greater than unity, πετράγωνος as well as προμήχης ἀριθμός.

³ Τοῖς δὲ ἐπετέδοις ἔδω κἀδόναται. Thus \( \sqrt{12} \) being 3.464 (nearly), \( \sqrt{12} \times \sqrt{12} = 3 \times 4 = (geometrically \text{ represented}) \) a rectangle with sides respectively either 2 and 6, or 3 and 4, or an imaginary square with side 3.464 (nearly).
a racing-match you had been defeated by one in the prime of life, and very fleet, do you think his praise would have been any the less true?

_Theae._ I do not.

_So._ And, as to knowledge, as I was saying a little while since, do you think it a small thing to discover its nature, and not one of the highest achievements?

_Theae._ Nay indeed, Socrates, I do place it among the very highest of all.

_So._ Then be at ease about yourself: and consider that Theodorus speaks truly, and shew desire in every way to obtain a right definition of knowledge, as of all other things.

_Theae._ As for desire, Socrates, it will not be found wanting.

6 [Theaetetus, though he has not yet succeeded in finding a definition of knowledge, confesses a mental feeling that he is always on the verge of success. Socrates likens this feeling to the throes of impending childbirth in women: and reminding Theaetetus that he himself (Socrates) is the son of an excellent midwife, he claims the analogous function of assisting the labour of intellectual parturition in the minds of young men; and describes the obstetric art in many of its details, with a view to illustrate and justify his own method as an educator.]

_So._ Come then: you made a good suggestion just now. Imitate your answer about the 'powers'. As you comprised their vast number under one term, so also try to describe the many kinds of knowledge by a single definition.

_Theae._ I assure you, Socrates, I have often endeavoured to gain insight into that matter, while listening to the questions you put. But, though I cannot persuade myself that I have anything important of my own to say, or that I have heard from some one else any such statement as you require,
nevertheless I cannot rid myself of the feeling that I am on the point of doing so.

So. Oh! you are in the throes of labour, dear Theaetetus, through being not empty, but pregnant.

Theae. I do not know, Socrates. I tell you my feeling, at all events.

So. Have you not heard then, simpleton, that I am the son of a very famous and solid midwife, Phaeonarete?

Theae. I have heard it before now.

So. Have you heard too that I practise the same art?

Theae. Never.

So. I do really. But don’t tell of me to other people. I am not known, my friend, to have this skill. And others, being unaware, do not say this of me, but only that I am a very strange person, and that I perplex people. Have you heard this too?

Theae. I have.

So. Shall I tell you the reason?

Theae. Pray do.

So. Reflect then upon the general situation of midwives, and you will more easily learn what I mean. You know, I suppose, that none of them practise while they are still conceiving and bearing children, but those alone who are past child-bearing.

Theae. Certainly.

So. This custom is said to be derived from Artemis, for that she, though a virgin, has the charge of parturition. Accordingly, she did not indeed allow barren women to become midwives, because human nature is too weak to acquire an art of which it has no experience: but she assigned it to

6 Mελεω is undoubtedly the true reading, giving the cue to the parable of the midwives. Mελευ would fail to do this.
those who are past the age of childbearing, in honour of their resemblance to herself.

_Theae._ Naturally.

_So._ Is not this also natural, that those who conceive and those who do not are better known by midwives than by others?

_Theae._ Quite so.

_So._ Moreover also midwives, by giving drugs and chanting incantations, are able to excite the throes and to quell them, if they will, and to make those who have a hard time bring forth: and they produce abortion¹, if the case require it.

_Theae._ True.

_So._ Have you furthermore noted this in them, that they are also very clever match-makers, being well skilled to know what woman uniting with what man must bear the finest children?

_Theae._ I was not quite aware of that.

_So._ I assure you they pride themselves on this much more than on their special practice². Just consider. Do you think the care and collection of the fruits of the earth belongs to one art, and the knowledge of what soil you must plant or sow to another?

_Theae._ No, to the same.

_So._ And do you consider it different in the case of a woman?

_Theae._ Seemingly not.

_So._ No, truly. But on account of the unlawful and

¹ _Nèon óv._ Prof. Campbell writes, 'Sc. τὸ βρέφος, said here of the embryo "at an early stage," i.e. before it is dangerous to do so.' But most commentators do not believe that νέον would be used of τὸ κύμα. Heindorf conjectures δέον for νέον óv. The words may be a gloss, and in translation no point is lost by neglecting them, as above.

² Gr. ὀμφαλητομία.
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unscientific conciliation of man and woman, which is termed 'procreation,' midwives, being a respectable body, shun match-making, fearing lest by this they should incur the other charge. For it is only to genuine midwives, I suppose, that the art of correct match-making belongs.

Theae. Apparently so.

So. Thus highly important is the function of midwives; but less so than my procedure. For, it does not happen to women at one time to bear idols, at another true children, so that it shall not be easy to distinguish them. Had they been liable to this, the greatest and noblest task for midwives would have been to decide between the true child and the untrue. Do you not think so?

Theae. I do.

[The parable of the application of the obstetric art to the labours of the intellect is carried on and concluded.]

So. But my art of midwifery, though it has in other respects the same conditions as theirs, differs in these points, that I attend men, not women, and that I inspect the labour of their souls, not of their bodies. The most important skill in our art is, the being able to test in every way whether the young man's mind is bringing forth an idol and an unreality, or a genuine and true progeny. For to me as well as to the midwives belongs the following condition. I am incapable of producing wisdom, and the reproach which many ere now have cast on me, that, while I question others, I myself give no answer about anything, because I have no wisdom in me, is a just reproach. The reason of it is this: the god compels me to act the midwife, but hindered me from engendering. I then am not indeed perfectly wise myself, nor have I brought to birth any discovery of that

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kind, as the outcome of my own soul. But of those who resort to me, some indeed appear in the outset utterly ignorant, but all, as the intercourse proceeds, and the god gives opportunity, make wonderful progress, in their own opinion and in that of others. And it is evident that they do so not by any learning they have gained from me, but because they have of themselves discovered many excellent things, which they retain. Of that midwifery however I and the god are authors. The proof is this. Many persons ere now, not knowing that fact, and imputing all to themselves while they despised me, quitted me earlier than they ought, either of their own will or by the persuasion of others. After this, they baulked all subsequent conceptions by evil intercourse, and lost by ill nurture the offspring which I had helped them to, valuing unrealities and idols more than truths; and ended by seeming to themselves, as to everybody else, mere blockheads. One of these, though there are many more, is Aristeides son of Lysimachus. When these truants come back and pray for admission to my society, and move heaven and earth to gain it, with some of them my familiar genius forbids me to consort, with others it allows me: and these

7 1 ἥ αὐτοι ἥ ὑπ’ ἄλλων πεισθέντες. The translation follows this conjecture; MSS. omit the second ἥ, by the absence of which αὐτοὶ becomes void of sense and propriety. Is it not possible that Plato wrote καὶ ἥ αὐτοι ἑαυτοῦ (μὲν) αἰτιασάμενοι ἐμοὶ δὲ καταφρονήσαντες ἥ ὑπ’ ἄλλων πεισθέντες κ.τ.λ. ‘Many are now, being ignorant of this, and either imputing all to themselves, while they contemned me, or persuaded by others &c. &c.’? This would give a still better sense than the adopted reading, viz. Many forsook the teaching of Socrates: all did so in ignorance of his divinely given power (τοῦτο ἁγνοήσαντες); but some through self-conceit (ἡ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῦς αἰτιασάμενοι), some through yielding to persuasion (ἡ ὑπ’ ἄλλων πεισθέντες). Also the passage would be more perspicuous if ἑαυτοῦς μὲν were written.

2 Ἀριστείδης, a descendant of the great Aristeides.
latter improve again. And this affection also they that associate with me have in common with women in labour: they feel throes and are full of worry day and night much more than the women. And my art has the power to excite and allay that throe. So much then for them. And sometimes, Theaetetus, when any do not seem to me to be pregnant, perceiving that they do not need me, I very kindly make a match for them, and, with the blessing of heaven, I guess very aptly by whose conversation they will profit. Many I have made over to Prodicus, many to other wise and inspired men. I have spoken at this length to you because I suspect, in conformity with your own opinion, that you are suffering throes from some inward conception. Deal with me then as the son of a midwife, and a practitioner myself, and try to answer my questions as well as you are able. And if, on examining anything you say, I consider it an idol and not a true progeny, and so remove it quietly and put it away, don't be angry as women at their first lying in are about their infants. For many, my good friend, have felt towards me so that they are actually ready to bite me when I take from them any cherished trifle: and they imagine I am not acting kindly; so little are they aware that no god is unkind to men, and that I do nothing of this sort from ill will. But my sense of duty will in no wise allow me to accept falsehood and stifle truth.

[Theaetetus, again exhorted by Socrates, takes courage, and suggests as a S defining term for knowledge αἰσθήσεως, perception (sensation, sensuous perception). Socrates at once identifies this definition with the famous doctrine of Protagoras, πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος, 'man is

3 'Εκδώσα Προδίκος. 'Εκδίδοναι (θυγατέρα) means 'to give a daughter in marriage.' Prodicus of Ceos was a famous Sophist, learned in history, mythology, and legend.
the measure of all things.' He goes on to argue that this implies 'what appears to each is true to each;' and after illustrating by an example he farther proceeds to connect this view with that of Heraclitus and his school (to whom he adds Homer) respecting a perpetual motion or flux of all things—πάντα ῥέει. This doctrine does not suffer a fixed term of being to be given to anything, such as 'one,' 'some,' 'of some quality,' 'great,' 'small,' 'heavy,' 'light,' &c. Nothing 'is' any of these, but by motion and commixture all things 'become' this or that. There is no 'being,' only 'coming to be.'

So now again, returning to the point, Theaetetus, endeavour to say what knowledge is: and never reply that you are unable: for if the god please and you play the man, you will be able.

Theae. Well, Socrates, when you thus exhort, I must own it were disgraceful not to use one's utmost endeavour to state what suggests itself to the mind. It seems to me then that he who knows anything perceives what he knows; and, in my present view, knowledge is nothing else than perception.

So. Well and nobly said, my boy. It is quite proper to speak with such open frankness. But now let us examine the doctrine in common, to see whether it is a genuine product or a wind-egg. Knowledge, you say, is perception?

Theae. Yes.

So. I really think you have given an account of knowledge which is not insignificant, being one which Protagoras also gave. But he has said the same thing in a different way. He says, I fancy, that 'man' is the measure of all things.
things;’ of things existing, that they do exist; of non-existing things, that they do not exist. Have you perhaps read this?

Theae. Yes, I have read it often.

So. He speaks then to this effect, that such as things appear to me, they severally are to me; and such as they appear to you, they severally are to you. The term ‘man’ includes you and me.

Theae. He does speak so.

So. Yes; and it is probable that a wise man is not talking nonsense: so let us follow his track. Does it not sometimes happen that, when the same wind is blowing, one of us is cold, the other not; and one is slightly cold, the other exceedingly?

Theae. No doubt.

So. Shall we then in that case say the wind in itself\(^3\) is cold or not cold; or shall we assent to Protagoras that to one who feels it cold it is cold, to one who does not feel it, not?

Theae. The latter, I should say.

So. And this is apparent to each?

Theae. Yes.

So. And the term ‘is apparent’ implies ‘perceiving’?

Theae. It does.

So. Appearance then and perception concur in things warm and the like generally. For such as each perceives them, they probably are to each.

Theae. Yes.

So. Perception then is always of that which ‘is’; and it is unerring, since it is knowledge.

\(^3\) In itself. Codd. have ἐφ' ἐαυρό, which Prof. Campbell supports by examples. Bekker reads ἐφ' ἐαυρῳ. But ἐφ' ἐαυρῳ is most usual in this sense.
Theaet. Manifestly.

So. In the name of the Graces, then, was Protagoras a man of consummate shrewdness, and did he hint this darkly to us of the common herd, while to his disciples he spoke ‘the truth’ in secret confidence?

Theaet. What do you mean by this, Socrates?

So. I will state to you a doctrine of no slight importance: namely, that nothing in itself ‘is one,’ nor can you rightly call a thing ‘some’ or ‘of some kind,’ but, if you style it great, it will turn out also small, and if heavy, light, and so in every case; since nothing ‘is’ ‘one’ or ‘some,’ or ‘of some kind’: but from vection and motion and mixture with each other all things ‘come to be,’ of which we say that they ‘are,’ using a wrong term: for nothing at any time ‘is,’ but always ‘comes to be.’ And on this point let all philosophers except Parmenides be compared in their order, Protagoras and Heracleitus and Empedocles: and of the poets those that are consummate in each poetic kind,

4 The work in which Protagoras expounded his doctrine was called Ἀληθεία, Truth. To this circumstance Plato here alludes, but perhaps, as Prof. Campbell says, he means that Protagoras “told the real truth, not in his book which is so entitled, but privately to his disciples.”

5 Πρῶτον Παρμενίδου. Parmenides, the greatest name to the Eleatic School and here made its representative (though Xenophanes before him, and Zeno after him, taught similar principles), held the doctrine directly opposed to the Heracleitean, namely, that the universe is one, continuous, stable: that only ‘being’ is; ‘non-being’ is not; there is no ‘becoming.’

6 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς. Prof. Campbell justly says that Plato introduced the words κράσεως πρὸς ἀληθῆ in order to include Empedocles of Agrigentum, who, without accepting the doctrine of Heracleitus, that οὐδὲν ἐστι, πάντα γίγνεται, denied the Eleatic unity, continuity and stability of substance, teaching that phenomenal changes are caused by the intermixture of four elements (fire, air, water, earth) which are themselves alone unchangeable.
in the comic, Epicharmus⁷, in the tragic, Homer⁸; for in saying

Ocean of gods progenitor and Tethys mother
he has said that all things are born from flux and motion. Does he not seem to say so?

Theae. I think he does.

[The Heraeleitean doctrine (πάντα ρεῖ) is further expounded and seemingly defended. But, as it is confuted afterwards (28), we must explain this defence as an instance of the Socratic εἰρωτεία.]

So. After this then, who that disputes with so great a host, and Homer its captain, can avoid making himself ridiculous?

Theae. It were not easy, Socrates.

So. No indeed, Theactetus. Since our statement—that motion produces the semblant¹ 'being,' and the 'coming to be,' while 'non-being' and 'perishing' are produced by rest—has in its favour many competent proofs. The heat of fire, which engenders and protects other things, is itself engendered by vocation and attrition. And these are motions². Are not these the parents of fire?

⁷'Επίχαρμος. Diogenes Laertius, III. 10, quotes verses from Epicharmus, the comic poet of Syracuse (490 B.C.), which contain the doctrine of perpetual mutation.

⁸Τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὡμῆρος. Plato recognizes only two forms of poetry, viz. Comedy and Tragedy, including in the latter Epic poetry, and its great master Homer. See Rep. X. 495 D, ἐπισκεπτέων τὴν τε τραγῳδίαν καὶ τὸν ἡγέμονα αὐτῆς Ὡμῆρον.

¹ Τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν. As he is professing to expound the Heraeleitean theory, which does not admit τὸ εἶναι, he evasively says τὸ εἶναι δοκοῦν, 'the semblant being.'

² Τούτω δὲ κινήσεις. This is the reading in most codd., for which
They are.

Moreover the race of animals is produced from them?

To be sure.

Again: is not the habit of bodies ruined by rest and laziness, and preserved in general\(^3\) by exercise and motion?

Yes.

And does not the habit of the soul by learning and study, which are motions, acquire doctrines and preserve\(^4\) them and become better, while through rest, which is the absence of study and learning, it both learns nothing, and forgets what it has learnt?

Decidedly.

The one then, namely motion, is a good both in soul and body, the other is the reverse.

Seemingly.

Must I farther mention to you calms and serenities and such-like things, showing that quietudes rot and destroy, while their opposites preserve? and besides these must I clinch the matter\(^5\), and evince that by the golden cord\(^6\) Homer means nothing but the sun, and indicates that, as long as the revolution continues, and the sun keeps moving,

\(κινήσει\) (dual) is suggested. But some have \(τὸῦτο δὲ κίνησις\), which Bekker edits, and Campbell approves.

\(^3\) In general, \(ὦ \epsilonπὶ τὸ \piολυ\), read in many codd. and by Stobaeus. Professors Jowett and Campbell prefer \(\epsilonπὶ \piολυ\) 'for a long time,' as in cod. Bodl.

\(^4\) \(Σώζεται\). The middle voice of \(σώξω\) is specially used of 'memory.'

\(^5\) \(Τὸν \κολοφῶνα \άναγκάξω \προσβλέψας; 'must I bring up my crowning reason and prove conclusively (\άναγκάξω)'? See Strabo's explanation of \(κολοφῶν\) in Liddell and Scott's Lexicon. Others have been given, for which see Heindorf's note.

\(^6\) For Homer's \(χρυσὴ \ςειρά\) see II. VIII. 47.
all things in heaven and earth exist and are preserved; but should this stand still as if fettered, all things would be spoilt, and, as the saying is, turned upside down?

Thææ. In my judgment, Socrates, he does indicate what you say.

[The relativity of the facts of sensation is illustrated by the phenomena of colour, number and size. What you call colour has no definite place or existence within or without you. It is the result of a passing collision between your eyes and the flux of things suited to act on them. It is neither in the agent nor in the patient, but generated in passage between them. It will not be the same to two subjects nor to the same subject at different times. The object measured or touched cannot be in itself great, white, hot or anything else; if it were, it would not appear different to another subject. The subject touching or measuring cannot be any of these, for, if so, it would be so always, and would not be modified by application to another object. Socrates illustrates by six dice, which, as compared with four, are more, and half as many again (i.e. 3 : 2), but fewer and half compared with twelve (i.e. 1 : 2). Can then anything become more without being increased, or fewer without being diminished? Thæætætæ is puzzled; and Socrates merrily suggests that they are amusing themselves with mere quibbles, like Megarian disputants.]

So. Conceive the matter in this way, my good friend. As to vision first: that what you call white colour is not in itself something outside your eyes or in your eyes. And do not assign to it any place: for then, being somewhere in position, it would 'be' and remain, and would not by generation 'come to be.'

Thææ. How so?

So. Let us follow the doctrine we were lately stating, that nothing exists as an independent unit; and in that way we shall see that black and white and every other colour have 'come to be' from the coincidence of the eyes with the suitable motion; and that what in each case we call
colour, is neither that which makes nor that which receives the impact, but something between, which is peculiar to each. Or would you insist that what each colour appears to you, such it appears also to a dog or any other animal?

Theae. No indeed, I would not.

So. Again: does anything appear to another man like what it appears to you? Are you strongly convinced it does, or are you much rather sure that even to yourself it is not the same, because at no two times are you exactly the same?

Theae. The latter seems to me truer than the former.

So. Accordingly, if a thing beside which we measure ourselves, or which we handle, were large or white or hot, it would never have become different by contact with some other, unless it underwent a change in itself. And if again the measuring or handling subject had been any of these, it would not have become different when another approached or suffered any affection, if there were no affection in itself. For now, my friend, we are compelled in a careless sort of way to say marvellous and ridiculous things, as Protagoras would affirm, and every one who ventures to propound the same that he does.

Theae. How do you mean? and what kind of things?

So. Take a small sample, and you will know what I mean. Six dice, if you place four beside them, we say are more in number and half as many again. If you bring twelve, we say the six are fewer in number, and half the second set. To say otherwise were intolerable. Will you tolerate it?

Theae. No, I will not.

So. Well: suppose Protagoras or some one else were to ask you:—Theaetetus, is it possible for anything to
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become greater or more, except by being increased? What answer would you give?

Theae. If I were to answer what I think in reply to your present question, Socrates, I should say 'no': but if with reference to the former one, to avoid self-contradiction, I should say 'yes.'

So. Well said, my friend, by Hera, and divinely. But if you answer 'yes,' something will occur like the case in Euripides: our tongue will be unconvicted, but our mind not unconvicted.

Theae. True.

So. So then, if you and I were clever and wise folk who had intimately studied the whole sphere of mind, and from that time forth amused ourselves with trying one another's powers, we should have engaged in a sophistical conflict of this kind, and be bandying arguments with each other. But now, as we are not professors, we shall wish to look at the statements comparatively, and see what it is we mean; whether they are consistent with each other or inconsistent.

Theae. Certainly that is what I should wish.

[The contradictions and difficulties implied in these statements are now set forth. It cannot possibly be true that anything becomes greater or less while it is equal to itself, or is increased without addition or diminished without subtraction, or that it is what it was not before without having 'come to be.' And yet the case of the six dice, and the case of an old man who was taller than a growing youth and in the course of one year is shorter without having 'come to be' different, seem to clash with these indubitable propositions. What are we to

1 Εὐριπίδεων τι. See Hippol. 612, ἢ γλώσσα ὁμώμοι ἡ δὲ φρήν ἄνωμος.

2 In this passage Plato censures the pseudo-dialectic (eristic) practice of certain sophistic teachers as idle waste of time.
say? Theaetetus wonders till he feels dizzy. Wonder, says Socrates, is a philosophic affection, and I will try to enlighten you by a fuller exposition of the Heraclitean doctrine.

So. So should I. But, since this is the case, shall we not calmly, as we have plenty of leisure, re-examine (not losing our temper, but really probing ourselves) what these fancies in us are? Looking at the first of them, we shall say, I think, that nothing ever becomes greater or less either in bulk or number, so long as it is equal to itself. Is it not thus?

Theae. Yes.

So. Secondly, that what suffers neither addition nor subtraction, is never either increased or wasted, but is always equal to itself.

Theae. Unquestionably.

So. Is not this also a third proposition, that what was not before, cannot afterwards be without 'having come to be' and 'coming to be'?

Theae. So it seems.

So. These three admissions, I think, severally clash with each other in our soul, when we say what was said about the dice, or when we say that I, being of the age I am, without having suffered increase or decrease, within the space of a year begin by being bigger than you, who are young, and afterwards become less,—when nothing has been withdrawn from my size, but yours has increased. For thus 'I am' afterwards what before I was not, without having 'come to be' so. Now without 'coming to be' it is impossible 'to have come to be,' and without losing any size I could never 'come to be' smaller. And other like instances there are, myriads upon myriads, if we choose to admit these. I suppose you follow me, Theaetetus: at all events you seem to me not inexperienced in such matters.
Theae. I do, Socrates; and by all the gods I wonder immensely what these things are, and really sometimes I feel dizzy when I look at them.

So. Ay, my friend; evidently Theodorus forms no bad estimate of your genius. This affection, I mean of wondering, is quite that of a philosopher; for philosophy has no other origin but this; and he who said that Iris is the child of giant Wonder seems to be no bad genealogist. But do you by this time understand why these things result from the statements we ascribe to Protagoras?

Theae. Not yet, I think.

So. You will be thankful to me then, if, when a notable man, or rather when notable men have truth hidden away in the mind, I help you to search it out from them.

Theae. Thankful indeed I must be in the highest degree.

[The doctrine of Heracleitus is now set forth in its complication with the doctrine imputed to Protagoras. Agent and Patient engender all things by motion: and there is no absolute Ens. Socrates asks if Theaetetus is so far content with the product of his intellectual labour. His answer is indecisive: and Socrates prepares him for a new dialectic discussion.]

So. Look about then, and see that none of the uninitiated are listening. These are men who think that nothing ‘is’ but what they are able to grasp with their hands, not accepting actions and generations and all that is invisible as in the category of being.

Theae. Upon my word, Socrates, stubborn and refractory people are these you tell of.

So. They are indeed, my boy, a fine set of boors¹.

¹ A fine set of boors, μάλιστα μηδεμοσοί. In these days they would be called ‘Philistines,’ a term derived from German Universities.
Others there are much more refined, whose mysteries I am going to describe to you. Their principle is, and upon it all we were just now saying depends—that the whole universe is motion, and nothing else but this, and of motions two kinds, each in number infinite, but, in respect of power, the one involving action, the other suffering. From the association and attrition of these with each other are formed products in number infinite, but of two sorts, one perceptible, the other perception, which continually breaks forth and is born with the perceptible objects. Perceptions, we find, have the following names; sight, hearing, smell, feelings of cold and heat, pleasure and pain and desire and fear and others: infinite are those without names; and those with names very numerous. And the objects of perception again are born with each of these, colours of all kinds with all kinds of vision, sounds with hearing similarly, and with the other perceptions other objects of perception are con-nate and 'come to be.' What meaning has this tale for us, Theaetetus, in reference to the former questions? do you perceive?

Thea. No, Socrates.

So. See then if it can be brought to its closing point. It means that all these things, as we say, are in motion, and in their motion are found swiftness and slowness. That which is slow has its motion in the same place and in reference to things near, and so engenders: and the things thus engendered [are slower. But that which is swift has its motion in reference to things at a distance, and so engenders, and the things thus engendered] are swifter, for they

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2 The words in brackets are not found in codd., but introduced by Stephens from the Eclogae of Cornarius. Bekker is so convinced of their being Plato’s, that he prints them without bracketing. And Heindorf maintains them. But Professors Jowett and Campbell reject
are conveyed, and their motion naturally consists invection. When then the eye and any other of its suitable objects approach and beget whiteness and its kindred perception, which could never have 'come to be' if either of them had gone to something else, then, while the sight on the part of the eyes and the whiteness on the part of that which co-engenders the colour are moving in mid space, the eye becomes full of sight, and at length sees and 'comes to be,' nowise sight, but a seeing eye, and that which co-engendered the colour is filled full with whiteness, and 'comes to be' not whiteness but a white thing, whether it be wood or stone or anything else that happens to have been coloured with this hue. And other things similarly, hard and warm and all the rest, we must understand in the same manner 'to be' nothing by themselves, as we heretofore said, but in their mutual intercourse 'to become' all and of all kinds from motion: since of agent and patient, as they affirm, taken apart (ἐπὶ ἑίρος) it is impossible to form any definite them, holding that τὰ βραδύτερα mean τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ πάσχον, and τὰ θάσσω the αἰσθήσεις and αἰσθητὰ engendered by them. I have been unable to convince myself that this latter view is right. The words πρὸς τὰ πλησιάζοντα τὴν κίνησιν ἔχει seem intended to describe the organs of touch and taste, as distinguished from those of sight and hearing, which can be employed on distant objects. It may be replied that the example given is that of sight and its object, and the latter is spoken of as πλησιάζων to the eye: which may seem to prove that anything on which τὸ ποιοῦν can act may be said πλησιάζων αὐτῷ, whether more or less distant. Weighty as this reply is, it does not remove my difficulty; for I am unable to discern the use of discriminating between agent-patient and their products as to slowness and swiftness. The act of generation between the eye and a very distant object must surely have been regarded by Plato (whatever later mathematicians may say of it) as a swift act. I admit however that the question at issue is difficult and doubtful: but it does not embarrass Plato's general meaning here. See note at the close of the Translation.
notion: for nothing is an agent till it concurs with a patient, nor a patient till it concurs with an agent: and that which concurs with one thing and is an agent, if it lights upon another, proves to be a patient, so that, as we before said, nothing is ‘one by itself,’ but always ‘comes to be’ to some other; and the term ‘being’ must be removed on all sides, although we are often, even in our present discussion, compelled to use it from habit and ignorance. But it is not proper, as the wise lay down, to allow the use of the word ‘some,’ or ‘of some’ or ‘me’ or ‘this’ or ‘that’ or any other term which ‘fixes,’ but in accordance with nature to speak of things as ‘coming to be’ and ‘being created’ and ‘perishing’ and ‘taking new forms.’ Since if any one fixes anything in speech, he who does so is easily confuted. And we ought to speak in this way both of individuals and of many in the aggregate, by which aggregation we determine ‘man’ and ‘stone’ and each class of animals. Do these views seem pleasant to you, Theaetetus, and will you find a taste of them agreeable?

Theae. I don’t know, Socrates; for about you too I cannot discern, whether you are speaking these as your own opinions, or trying me.

So. Do you not remember, my friend, that I indeed neither know nor adopt any of such things as mine? but I am barren, and act as midwife to you, and on that account I charm, and offer you, to be tasted, wise things of various sorts, until I can help to bring to light your opinion; and when it is brought forth, then and not before I will examine if it shall prove a wind-egg or a genuine offspring. So then with courage and patience answer well and manfully whatsoever appears to you to be right concerning my several questions.

Theae. Ask then.
[Arguments against the Protagorean doctrine from dreams, fevers and madness are suggested and answered. Persons so affected perceive different things from those perceived when they are awake and in health. Are these contradictory perceptions in each case equally true to the percipient?]

So. Say then again, whether you are satisfied that nothing should 'be,' but ever 'come to be,' good and noble and all things which we were lately recounting.

Thea. Yes; since I have heard this recital of yours, it appears to me marvellously clear that it is reasonable, and that we must accept the principles as you have stated them.

So. Let us then not abandon what remains of our question. There remains the topic of dreams and diseases, madness especially, and all that is called mis-hearing or mis-seeing or any other wrong perception. For you know, I suppose, that in all these cases the principle we lately explained seems by admission to be confuted, since undoubtedly false perceptions occur to us in them, and things that appear to each are far from 'being,' but, quite contrariwise, none of the things that appear 'are.'

Thea. You speak most truly, Socrates.

So. What reason then is left, my boy, to him who lays down that perception is knowledge, and that things which appear to each 'are' in every such case?

Thea. For my own part, Socrates, I shrink from answering that I have nothing to urge, because just now you rebuked me for saying so. Yet in very truth I cannot contend that maniacs or dreamers do not imagine falsities, when some of them think they are gods, and others suppose they are fowls, and imagine they are flying in their sleep.

So. Have you not in mind then a certain difficulty raised about them, especially as to the sleeping and waking vision?
Theaetetus. What difficulty?

Socrates. A question which I think you have often heard people ask, what proof one would have to give, if somebody were to ask at this moment, whether we are sleeping and dreaming all that we imagine, or are awake and talking to one another in that state.

Theaetetus. Indeed, Socrates, it is a perplexing thing to say by what proof we could establish it: for all the facts succeed one another as counterparts. Even the whole discussion we have now held there is nothing to prevent our seeming to have held in a dream. And when in a dream we seem to be relating dreams, the similarity between the cases is marvellous.

Socrates. You see then that it is not difficult to raise a question, since it can be questioned even whether we are waking or dreaming. And as the time during which we are asleep is equal to that in which we are awake, our soul in each state contends that the fancies which from time to time occur are true, so that for half the time we say that the one are existent, for half the other, and we are equally confident in regard to each.

Theaetetus. Yes, unquestionably.

Socrates. And is not the same true of diseases and madness, except that the times are not equal?

Theaetetus. Yes.

Socrates. Well, shall truth be determined by length or shortness of time?

Theaetetus. That were ridiculous on many grounds.

Socrates. Have you then any other clear sign to show which of these fancies are true?

Theaetetus. I think not.
The answer is, that a percipient is not the same subject in each of two different states: and if either of the two factors (τὰ γεννὰτα) is changed, the result (τὰ γεννᾶμενοι) is changed. Grote says that the cardinal principle set forth exhibits itself in a perpetual series of definite manifestations. To say that I the subject perceive is to say that I perceive some object: to perceive, and perceive nothing, is a contradiction. Again, if an object be sweet, it must be sweet to some percipient subject: sweet, but sweet to no one, is an impossibility. Necessity binds the percipient to a thing perceived. Every term applied to one implies some reference to the other: no name can be truly predicated of the one which implies ‘being’ or ‘coming to be’ apart from the other.

So. Hear then from me what they will say on this point, who lay it down that what from time to time ‘seems,’ ‘is’ true for him who so beholds it. Their opinion, I think, is expressed by this question: ‘O Theaetetus, of two things which are totally different, can the one and the other have any identical powers?’ We must not assume that the things in question are in one respect the same, in another different, but that they are wholly different.

Theae. It is impossible that they should have anything the same, either in power or in aught else, when they are wholly different.

So. Must we not also perforce confess the two things to be unlike?

Theae. I think so.

So. If, then, anything happens ‘to become’ like, either to itself or to another, shall we say that when made like it ‘becomes’ the same; when it gets unlike, different?

Theae. Necessarily.

So. Were we not previously saying that agents are many and infinite, and patients likewise?

Theae. Yes.
So. And also that a thing combining first with one, then with another, will not produce the same things, but different?

Theaetetus. Certainly.

So. Let us now specify myself, or you, or anything else, in the same relations. Say Socrates in health and Socrates out of health. Shall we say the latter is like the former, or unlike?

Theaetetus. Socrates out of health, you say; do you compare this as a whole with the former as a whole, with Socrates in health?

So. Very well put: that is my meaning.

Theaetetus. Unlike, of course.

So. And different, as being unlike?

Theaetetus. Necessarily.

So. And you will say the same of Socrates sleeping, and in all the states we cited?

Theaetetus. I would.

So. And will not each of the things which have an active nature, when they find Socrates in health, deal with me as one thing; when out of health, as a different one?

Theaetetus. They must.

So. And I, the patient, and that agent, will in each case produce different things?

Theaetetus. To be sure.

So. When I drink wine in health, does it appear to me agreeable and sweet?

Theaetetus. Yes.

So. True; for, by our admissions, the agent and the patient produced sweetness and perception, both of them in motion together; and perception on the side of the patient made the tongue percipient, and sweetness on the
part of the wine, moving about it, made the wine to be and to appear sweet to the healthy tongue.

Theae. Such certainly were our previous admissions.

So. But when it finds me out of health, does it not in the first place find one who is not the same? It comes to an unlike object.

Theae. Yes.

So. Such a Socrates, then, and the draught of wine, produce different things; in regard to the tongue a perception of bitterness, in regard to the wine a bitterness beginning to be and moving; and the wine it makes not bitterness, but bitter, and me not perception, but one that perceives.

Theae. Assuredly.

So. I then shall never become percipient of anything else in the same way; for perception of another is another thing, and makes the percipient different and another; nor will that which acts on me, if it concur with another, ever engender the same and become similar: for from another it will engender another and become different.

Theae. That is true.

So. I then shall never become similar to my former self; nor will the object become similar to its former self.

Theae. No, surely not.

So. When I perceive, I must needs become percipient of something: for to become percipient, yet percipient of nothing, is impossible; and the object, when it becomes sweet or bitter, or anything of the kind, must become so to some one: for to become sweet, yet sweet to no one, is impossible.

Theae. Assuredly.

So. Then, I think, the inference remains, that to each other we 'are,' if we are, or we 'come to be,' if we come
to be: since necessity binds our essence indeed, but binds it to nothing else, nor yet to ourselves individually; it remains then that we are bound to one another. So that if a person says that anything ‘is’ or ‘becomes,’ he must say that it ‘is’ or ‘becomes’ ‘to something,’ or ‘of something,’ or ‘in relation to something’; but, if we have come to a right conclusion, he must not say or allow of anyone else saying, that anything ‘is’ or ‘comes to be’ absolutely.

_Theae._ Undoubtedly, Socrates.

_So._ And so, when that which acts on me is to myself and not to another, I perceive it, and no one else does.

_Theae._ Certainly.

_So._ Then my perception is true to me: for it belongs always to my being; and, according to Protagoras, I am judge of things which are to me, that they are, and of things which are not, that they are not.

_Theae._ So it seems.

15 [Having thus by a series of plausible arguments brought to birth the suggestion of Theaetetus, that knowledge is sensuous perception, Socrates asks if he can bear to learn that the bantling after all is not worth rearing. Theodorus interferes, and pledges himself for the tolerant temper of his pupil. He is reminded that Socrates only professes to draw out the thoughts of those who converse with him.]

_So._ How then, being infallible and unerring in mind as regards things which ‘are’ and ‘come to be,’ can I be unknowing of things whereof I am percipient?

_Theae._ In no sort of way.

_So._ Therefore you have said very well that knowledge

1 _Aἰοθηρίς_, a novel word, but here pretty certainly the true one.
is nothing else than perception; and it turns out to be one and the same thing, that (as Homer and Heracleitus, and their whole tribe, affirm) all things move like streams, and that (after the opinion of the consummately wise Protagoras) man is the measure of all things, and that (as Theaetetus infers from these premises) perception is proved to be knowledge. Is it so, Theaetetus? Must we say, that this, as it were, is your newborn child, and the product of my midwifery? What say you?

Theae. It must be so, Socrates.

So. This then, seemingly, we have with much difficulty brought to birth, whatever it prove to be. And now, after its birth, we must, in good sooth, run round the hearth with it in our discourse², not failing to observe whether the child be worth nurture, and not a wind-egg and an unreality. Or do you deem it absolutely necessary to rear your offspring, and not to put it away? Can you bear to see it confuted, and not be greatly out of temper if some one should filch from you your firstborn?

Theo. Theaetetus will bear it, Socrates. He is not the least ill-tempered. But in heaven's name tell me, is not this then true?

So. You are a very gourmand of discussion, Theodorus, and a good creature, in that you take me to be a sack of arguments, and think I can pull out another, and aver that what we have said is untrue. But you do not note what is taking place: that none of the arguments proceed from myself, but from him who is conversing with me at the time; and that I know nothing more than this little feat, how to obtain an argument from another wise person and to treat

² The fifth day after a child's birth the festival was called Ἀμφιδρίμα, when the babe was carried round the ἵστια and received its name.
13 [Socrates now assails the doctrine of Protagoras. If man is a measure, why not an ape or a frog? If his own sensation is true to every man, what makes Protagoras superlatively wise? or what is the good of arguing on any subject? Theodorus, who was challenged as a friend of Protagoras, declines to take up his defence, and refers Socrates back to Theaetetus.]

So. Do you know then, Theodorus, what surprises me in your friend Protagoras?

Theo. What is that?

So. I am much pleased with everything else he has said, how what ‘seems’ to each ‘is’ to each. But the commencement of his treatise does surprise me. I wonder that in the outset of his ‘Truth’ he did not say that a pig, or a dog-faced baboon, or any other more monstrous specimen of things that have perception, is the measure of all things, that so he might have spoken to us at once in a magnificent and very disdainful style, ostentatiously shewing that, while we were marvelling at his wisdom, as if he were a god, he was all the while not a whit superior in judgment to a tadpole, not to say, to any of his fellow-men. Or how are we to put the case, Theodorus? For if that opinion shall be true to each man which he gets by perception, and nobody’s affection shall be better determined by another person, nor one be more entitled than another to review opinion, and to say whether it be true or false, but, as has been often said, each person singly shall form his own opinions, and all these shall be right and true—why in the world, my friend, is Protagoras so wise as to be justly deemed a worthy teacher with high fees, and we dunces in
comparison, who must go to school to him, though each of us is the measure of his own wisdom? Must we not say that Protagoras speaks thus to amuse the vulgar? while as to my case, and that of my art of midwifery, I forbear to say what ridicule we incur: so indeed does the whole practice of dialectic. For, as to reviewing and criticising each other's fancies and opinions, when each man's are right, is it not a tedious and monstrous folly, if the 'Truth' of Protagoras is true, and he did not proclaim it in jest from the shrine of his book?

Theo. He was my friend, Socrates, as you said just now. I cannot therefore allow Protagoras to be confuted by my admissions, nor yet resist you contrary to my opinion. So take in hand Theaetetus again. For certainly he appeared some time back to follow your lead very prettily.

So. If you went to the wrestling-courts at Lacedaemon, Theodorus, and there beheld naked people, some your inferiors, would you refuse to strip yourself beside them, and exhibit your own form competitively?

Theo. Why do you think I would not refuse, Socrates, with their permission and consent? So now I shall try to persuade you to let me look on, rather than be dragged to the play-ground in my present stiff condition, and to wrestle it out yourself with one who is younger and more supple.

[Socrates asks Theaetetus if his faith in the Protagorean doctrine is shaken by what has been said. When he admits that it is, he is rallied by Socrates for his facility, and recalled to the question, 'Knowledge is sensation.' (Are we to say we know the barbarian tongues because we hear them spoken, or letters because we see them? Theaetetus replies that we know them in some respects, not in others.)]

So. If such is your will, Theodorus, I don't say 'nill,' as proverbialists have it. So I must turn again to the wise
Theaetetus. Tell me then, Theaetetus, first of all, as to our late discussions; do you not share my surprise if thus all of a sudden you shall turn out to be no wise inferior in wisdom to any man or even any god? Or do you suppose that the 'measure' of Protagoras is less applicable to gods than to men?

Theae. Upon my word I do not. And as to your question, I am much surprised. For when we were engaged in showing how that which 'seemed' to each 'was' also to him who thought it, the statement appeared to me very good; but now another view has taken its place all of a sudden.

So. You are young, my dear boy: you quickly succumb to popular declamation, and become a convert. For Protagoras, or some one on his part, will say in reply: My fine gentlemen, young and old, ye sit together and declaim, bringing gods into question, whom I, after speaking and writing about them, as to their existence or non-existence, set aside: and you say just what the populace would hear with approval, that it is too bad for mankind not to differ in wisdom from every kind of beast: but you offer no convincing proof whatever; you resort to probability, which if Theodorus or any other geometricalian sought to use in geometry, he would be good for nothing. Just consider then, you and Theodorus, if on such important subjects you will accept arguments relying on mere persuasion and probability.

Theae. No, Socrates, we should not any more than yourself affirm that to be just.

So. We must view it then in some other way, as you and Theodorus suggest.

Theae. In some other way certainly.

So. In this way then let us consider it: whether know-
ledge and perception are the same or different. For to this point, I ween, our whole argument tended; and for this purpose we stirred all these many strange questions. Did we not?

Theae. Assuredly.

So. Shall we then admit that all the things which we perceive by sight and hearing we at the same time know? For instance, before we have learnt the language of the barbarians, shall we say that we do not hear them when they speak, or that we both hear and understand what they say? And again, if we do not know letters, shall we, when we look at them, say we do not see them, or shall we insist that we know, since we see them?

Theae. So much of them, Socrates, as we see and hear, we shall say we know; we shall say we both see and know the figure and the colour, and that we both hear and know the sharp and flat sound: but what grammarians and interpreters teach concerning them we shall say we neither perceive by sight and hearing, nor know.

So. Excellent, Theaetetus. And it is not worth while to dispute these positions of yours, that you may grow.

[Socrates now brings an argument against the Protagorean doctrine which he afterwards acknowledges to be captious and eristic. He says that Theodorus ought to champion the cause of his friend's children, as their guardian. Theodorus naively says that Callias holds that office, not himself.]

But look at this other question also which approaches, and consider how we shall repel it.

17 All who spoke another language than Greek were by the Hellenes called βαρβάροι. Hence Prof. Jowett renders this word in English, 'foreigners.'
Theaet. What is that?

So. This. If any one shall ask—'Suppose a man has become cognisant of anything, is it possible that, having and preserving memory of this thing, at the time when he remembers he should not know the very thing which he remembers?' But I am verbose, apparently, when I wish to ask if a man remembering anything he has learnt does not know it.

Theaet. How could that be, Socrates? The thing you suggest would be a miracle.

So. Perhaps then I am trifling: but consider. Do you not call seeing perceiving, and sight perception?

Theaet. I do.

So. Has not then one who has seen something become cognisant of the thing he saw according to your last statement?

Theaet. Yes.

So. Well: do you not grant there is such a thing as memory?

Theaet. Yes.

So. Memory of something or of nothing?

Theaet. Of something, certainly.

So. Of what one has learnt then, and of what one has perceived; of such things, is it not?

Theaet. Undoubtedly.

So. What a man has seen, he remembers at times, I suppose?

Theaet. He does.

So. Even when he has shut his eyes? or on doing so has he forgotten?

Theaet. It were monstrous to suppose that, Socrates.

So. We must, I can tell you, if we are to maintain our former argument. If not, there is an end of it.
Theæ. I really suspect so myself; but I cannot quite make up my mind. Tell me how.

So. In this way. One who sees becomes, we say, cognisant of what he sees. For sight and perception and knowledge are admitted to be the same.

Theæ. Quite so.

So. And he who saw and became cognisant of what he saw, if he shuts his eyes, remembers, but does not see the thing. Is it so?

Theæ. Yes.

So. And not seeing means not knowing, if seeing means knowing.

Theæ. True.

So. The inference then is, that, while a man remembers something of which he has become cognisant, yet, since he does not see, he does not know it: and this we said would be a miracle.

Theæ. All quite true.

So. If then anybody says that knowledge and perception are the same, there results an evident impossibility.

Theæ. So it seems.

So. Therefore we must distinguish one from the other.

Theæ. I suppose so.

So. What then will knowledge be? We must begin our statement over again, it seems. Yet what are we going to do, Theaetetus?

Theæ. About what?

So. We seem to me, like an ignoble cock, to hop away from the argument and crow, before we have gained the victory.

Theæ. How so?

So. Like rhetorical disputants we seem to be content that we have come to a mutual agreement as to the admitted
uses of words, and by some such method mastered the question. And though we say we are not Eristics but philosophers, we unconsciously imitate the practice of those clever fellows.

Theae. I do not yet understand your meaning.

So. Well then, I will try to explain my view of the matter. We were asking whether a man who has learnt and remembers something does not know it; and taking the case of one who had seen, and after shutting his eyes remembered though he did not see, we shewed that he did not know at the same time that he remembered; and this, we said, was impossible. And so the Protagorean fable came to ruin, and yours with it, as to knowledge and perception being the same.

Theae. Apparently.

So. But it would not, my friend, if the father of the former fable had been alive. He would have made a strong defence for it: but now that it is an orphan, we insult it. For even those trustees, whom Protagoras appointed, one of whom was Theodorus here, do not come to the rescue. Well, in the interest of justice, I will run the risk of helping him myself.

Theo. No, Socrates, I was not his children's trustee, but rather Callias son of Hipponicus. I diverged somewhat earlier from abstract studies to geometry. But we shall be much obliged to you if you will succour him.

So. Well said, Theodorus. Have an eye then to my succour. For a man would have to make stranger admissions than we lately made, if he did not attend to the terms in which we are generally wont to affirm and deny. Shall I explain how to you or to Theaetetus?

Theo. To the company generally, but let the younger one answer. For he will incur less disgrace by defeat.
So. I put now the most startling question. To this effect, I think: Is it possible for the same man knowing a thing not to know what he knows?

Thea. What answer shall we give, Theaetetus?

Thea. Impossible, in my opinion.

So. Not if you lay it down that seeing is knowing. For how will you deal with that inevitable question, when, as they say, you are caught in a well, and an unabashed man claps his hand to one of your eyes and asks, whether with the closed eye you see your cloak.

Thea. Not with that one, I suppose I shall say, but with the other.

So. Then you see and do not see the same thing at the same time?

Thea. In a sort of way.

So. I do not, he will say, define anything, nor did I ask how, but only whether you know that which you do not know. And now you are shown to see what you do not see; and you have admitted that seeing is knowing and not seeing not knowing. Consider the inference from these premises.

Thea. I consider that it directly contradicts my former assertion.

So. Probably, my fine gentleman, you would have had more such experiences, if somebody had further asked you whether it is possible to know keenly or to know bluntly, and to know near and not at a distance, and to know the same thing intensely or moderately, and other questions, countless in number, which a light-armed mercenary ambushed in the arguments might have asked, when you laid
it down that knowledge and perception are the same; and attacking your senses of hearing and smelling and the like he might have worried you with incessant confutation, until, admiring his accursed wisdom, you were entangled by him so far, that after mastering and binding you tight he might then have ransomed you for what sum you and he agreed on. Now what argument, perhaps you may say, will Protagoras advance in aid of his doctrine? Must we not try to state it?

Theaet. Certainly we must.

20 [Socrates, having obtained from Theaetetus an admission that Protagoras ought to be heard in his own defence, undertakes to plead his cause, and does so in the assumed person of Protagoras himself.]

So. Besides all this that we urge in his defence, he will also, methinks, come to close quarters, contemning us, and saying: Here's this good creature Socrates, who—when a lad got frightened on being asked whether it is possible for the same person at once to remember some particular thing and not know it, and in his fright said 'no,' because he could not see before him,—made a laughing-stock of me in the course of his arguments. But the fact, my easy-going Socrates, stands thus: when you examine any of my doctrines by the method of interrogation, if the person questioned give such answers as I should, and be defeated, I am confuted; but if they differ from mine, then the person questioned is confuted. For instance, if mutual word-catching is the thing to guard against, do you think anybody will concede to you that the memory of a past feeling is anything like what the feeling itself was at the time when it was experienced? Far from it. Or again, that he will shrink from admitting that it is possible for
the same person to know and not to know the same thing? Or, if he dread this—that he will grant an altered person to be the same he was before he was altered? Or rather—that anybody can be called 'one' and not 'many'—infinitely multiplied, if alteration goes on. But, O my good sir, he will say, encounter my main doctrine more generously, if you can, and prove against it that individual perceptions do not 'come-to-be' to each of us, or that, supposing they do, it does not follow that the appearance will 'come-to-be' (or 'be,' if that is the proper term) to that person alone, unto whom it appears. When you talk of swine and dog-headed baboons, you are not merely swinish yourself, but you likewise induce your hearers to act as such towards my treatises without any decency. For I say that the Truth is as I have written: that each of us is a measure of things that are and are not: but that, nevertheless, one man differs vastly from another in this very respect, that to one man some things are and appear, to another other things. And I am far from denying that wisdom and a wise man exist, but the man I call wise is he who, by working changes, makes things to appear and to be good to any one of us, to whom they appear and are evil. And again, do not press my argument literally; but understand from the following explanation more clearly what I mean. Recollect how it was formerly said, that to a sick man his food appears to be and is bitter, but to a man in health the opposite is the fact and appears so. Neither of these persons ought we to make wiser than the other; that is impossible: nor may we declare that the sick man is ignorant for holding such an opinion, or the man in health is wise for holding another. We must effect a change to the opposite state: for the one habit is better than the other. So also in education we must cause a change from
the one habit to the better. Now the physician changes by medicines; the wise teacher by arguments. Never indeed did anybody make one who had false opinions afterwards to hold true ones. For it is not possible either to think what is not, or anything but what one feels; and this is always true. But, I suppose, when through a bad habit of mind a man has corresponding opinions, a good habit makes him hold opinions resembling it; phantasms which some persons from inexperience call true: but I call some better than others, not truer. And wise men, dear Socrates, I am far from calling frogs: but in relation to bodies I call them physicians, in relation to plants husbandmen. For I say that these last also produce in plants, instead of evil sensations when any of them are sickly, good and healthy sensations and truths, while wise and good rhetoricians make good things instead of evil seem just to states. Since whatever things seem just and good to each state, are such to it, as long as it deems them lawful; but the wise man, in the place of those things which are severally evil to each, makes the good both to be and to seem right. And on the same principle the sophist also, who is able to instruct his pupils thus, is both wise and worthy of high fees at their hands. And thus some are wiser than others, and nobody thinks falsities: and you, whether you will or not, must submit to be a measure. For on these grounds this doctrine is maintained. And, if you wish to revive your dispute with it, dispute by counter-arguing at full; or if you prefer the method of questioning, adopt it; for no person of sense will avoid this method, but will pursue it most willingly. Mind this however; you must not question unfairly. For it is most unreasonable in one who professes esteem for virtue to be constantly pursuing an unfair method of argument. Now unfairness is shown, when a man fails to con-
duct his arguments diversely: in one way as a combatant, in another as a dialectician: in the former case rallying and tripping up as much as he can, in the latter being serious, and correcting his respondent, showing him only those errors into which he was led by his own fault or in consequence of former discussions. If you act thus, your fellow-debaters will impute to themselves the fault of their own confusion and perplexity, not to you; and they will follow and love you, and fly from themselves to philosophy, that they may become different, and get rid of their former selves. But if you take the contrary course, as most do, you will find an opposite result, and your pupils instead of philosophers will turn out haters of philosophy, when they grow older. If then you will follow my advice, as was before said, you will, in no hostile or contentious spirit, but with a really mild and condescending temper, consider what we mean, when we declare that all things are in motion, and that what seems 'is' also to each, individual as well as state. From these considerations you will discern whether knowledge and perception are the same: but not, as you lately sought, from the use of words and names, which most people pervert in every sort of way, causing each other all kinds of perplexity. Such, Theodorus, is the slight assistance which, from slight resources, I have supplied, as I best could, to your old friend. Had he been alive, he would have helped his own cause in grander language.

[Protagoras had been made in the pleading of Socrates to complain that admissions hostile to his doctrine had been wrung from the mouth of a terrified lad. Socrates now constrains Theodorus to submit, very reluctantly, to a dialectic argument on the general question at issue.]
Theo. You are joking, Socrates: for you have helped him most valiantly.

So. You are very obliging, my friend. Allow me one word. You noticed probably that Protagoras in what he said reproached us for holding our discussions with a boy, and using that boy’s alarm as a weapon of contention against his propositions: and while he represented this as mere amusement, he called ‘the measure of all things’ a grave topic, and urged us to deal seriously with his argument.

Theo. Of course I noticed it, Socrates.

So. Well: do you bid us take his advice?

Theo. Very earnestly.

So. Do you see that all here are boys except you? If then we are to take his advice, you and I must deal seriously with his doctrine by mutual questions and answers, that he may not have to reproach us with considering this subject in a jocular manner with lads.

Theo. Nay, but would not Theaetetus follow the investigation of a doctrine better than many who have great beards?

So. Not better than you, Theodorus. Do not suppose that I am bound to defend your deceased friend in every manner, and that you are bound in no manner. But come, good sir, follow the argument a little way, till such time as we know whether you are to be the measure of diagrams, or if all are competent in themselves, equally with you, to treat of astronomy and the other subjects wherein you are reported to excel.

Theo. When one sits beside you, Socrates, it is not easy to decline discussion. Indeed I spoke nonsense just now when I said you would allow me not to strip, and that you would not compel me as the Lacedaemonians do: you seem
rather to tend in Sciron's\(^1\) direction. The Lacedaemonians indeed bid one depart or strip, but you seem to me to act your part like Antæaus\(^2\): you will not let one who comes to you go away before you have forced him to strip and wrestle with you in argument.

So. You have found very good precedents for my malady, Theodorus: but I am more robust than they were. Many a Hercules and Theseus strong in argument have ere now met and thumped me very hard; but I do not flinch for all that: with such a wonderful love of this kind of exercise am I possessed. Do not then refuse to benefit yourself as well as me by trying a fall with me.

Theo. Be it as you will: I refuse no longer. I must inevitably endure by cross-examination whatever destiny you spin for me in this discussion. I shall not however be able to put myself in your hands beyond the limit which you have proposed.

So. That limit is sufficient. And pray help me to be careful of this, that we do not unawares carry on any childish kind of argument, and incur reproach again for doing so.

Theo. Very well, I'll try my best.

[The argument of Socrates against the doctrine of Protagoras, that 'man is a measure to himself;' may be briefly summarised thus. That doctrine means, 'what seems to each is to each.' Now to the mass of mankind this doctrine seems to be untrue, because it is certain that men in general do consider some to be wiser than others, and look up to the wise as teachers and guides. Therefore to them it is untrue.

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1 Sciron, or Scirrhon, the legendary robber, who flung travellers from rocks. He was slain by Theseus.

2 Antæaus, the gigantic wrestler, who slew his opponents: but was himself defeated and slain by Hercules.
And Protagoras, on his own principle, must allow that they are right; from which it necessarily follows that he is wrong, even in his own opinion. In short 'the Truth' of Protagoras is not true to himself or to any body else.

So. Let us first revert to the objection we took before, and see whether we were right or wrong in being out of humour and censuring the doctrine, in that it made every one competent in wisdom; and whether Protagoras rightly conceded to us, that, in respect of better and worse, some do surpass, and they are wise. Is it not so?

Theo. Yes.

So. Now if he had himself been present and made this admission, instead of our making it in his defence, we need not have strengthened ourselves by recurring to the subject: but now perhaps some one may allege that we are incompetent to make the confession on his part. It is better to come to a clearer mutual understanding on this special point. For whether it is so or not makes a great difference.

Theo. Very true.

So. Let us obtain the admission not through others, but from his statement, as briefly as we can.

Theo. How?

So. In this way. He says, does he not, that what seems to every one 'is' also to him unto whom it seems?

Theo. Yes, he does.

So. Do not we also, Protagoras, state a man's opinion, or rather the opinions of all men, when we say that there is nobody who does not deem himself wiser than others in some respects, and others wiser than himself in other respects; and, moreover, that in the greatest perils, when they are distressed in war or disease or at sea, men regard their rulers on such occasions as gods, expecting
them to be their saviours, though they differ from them in nothing but knowledge? And all human life teems with people who are seeking teachers and rulers of themselves and of other living creatures and of the various trades; and teems, again, with other people who deem themselves competent to teach and competent to rule. And in all these cases what else can we say than that men themselves think there exists among them wisdom and ignorance?

_Theo._ Nothing else.

_So._ Do they not deem wisdom to be true thought, and ignorance false opinion?

_Theo._ Certainly.

_So._ Well then, how shall we deal with the argument, Protagoras? Must we say that men always have true opinions, or sometimes true, sometimes false? From both views it results that they do not always think true things, but at times true things, at times false. For consider, Theodorus, whether any Protagorean, or you yourself, would wish to contend that no one person considers any other to be unlearned and to have false opinions.

_Theo._ That is incredible, Socrates.

_So._ And yet the doctrine which says that man is the measure of all things is brought to this unavoidable conclusion.

_Theo._ How so?

_So._ When you, after forming some judgment in your own mind on any point, declare to me your opinion, be it granted according to his doctrine that this is true to you: but is it not allowed to the rest of us to become judges respecting your judgment? must we always judge that you have true opinions? do not a countless number in each instance contend against you with contrary opinions, believing that you judge and think falsities?
Theo. Yes verily, Socrates, countless myriads indeed, as Homer says, who give me all the trouble in the world.

So. Well? would you have us say that in that case you have opinions true to yourself but false to the countless myriads?

Theo. Such seems to be the necessary inference from the statement.

So. And how as to Protagoras himself? Supposing he did not think man a measure, and the public did not think so, (as indeed they do not), would it not necessarily follow that what he delivered in writing as Truth, is Truth to nobody? or if he thought so, and the public does not agree with him, do you see that in proportion as those who deny are more numerous than those who affirm, so much more decidedly it is or is not so?

Theo. Of necessity, if according to each individual opinion it will be or will not be so.

So. In the next place it involves this very queer result, that he on his side, by confessing that all men hold true opinions, admits that the opinion of the opposite party about his opinion (which they deem false) is a true one.

Theo. Certainly.

So. Will he not admit that his own is false, if he confesses that the opinion of those who suppose him to think falsely is true?

Theo. Of course.

So. But the others on their side do not admit that they think falsely.

Theo. No, they do not.

So. And he again confesses also this opinion to be true according to his written doctrines.

Theo. Evidently.

So. By all parties then it will be contended, including
TRANSLATION.

Protagoras (by him it will rather be confessed, for when he grants to a gainsayer that the latter thinks what is true, then does Protagoras himself confess), that no dog or man he meets with is a measure concerning anything which he has not learnt. Is it not so?

Theo. Yes.

So. Since this is the contention of all, to nobody will the Truth of Protagoras be true, neither to himself nor to anyone else.

Theo. We run down my friend very hard, Socrates.

So. But it is doubtful, my friend, if we are outrunning the fact. It is likely that he being older is wiser than we: and if he could at once pop up his head where we are, he would not sink down and run away again, until, probably, he had convicted me of talking much nonsense, and you of agreeing to it. As it is, we must needs, I think, make the best of ourselves, such as we are, and state our real opinions for the time being. And must we not now say that everybody will confess this—that one man is wiser, one more ignorant, than another?

Theo. Yes, I think so.

[If we admit, Socrates goes on, that each may judge for himself with equal truth as to some sensible things, as 'hot' and 'cold'; this is not universally applicable. For instance, all do not know with equal truth what is 'wholesome' for them. Again, if we admit that states and persons may judge with equal truth of 'right' and 'wrong,' 'holy' and 'unholy,' they certainly cannot equally well decide what is and will be 'expedient' and 'inexpedient' for them. But, he adds, this opens new questions. Well, says Theodorus, have we not leisure for them? Yes, replies Socrates, we have; and this is the reason why philosophers make such a poor figure in the law-courts. Their habits are those of freemen; those of lawyers are in a manner slavish. Then follows the Socratic picture of an Athenian lawyer's habits and character.
He asks if Theodorus wishes to hear its contrast in the habits and character of the true philosopher. Theodorus is very desirous to hear this.

So. Must we not also say that our argument is most stably conducted on the lines we prescribed in our defence of Protagoras, averring that most things are as they seem to each, hot, dry, sweet, all such-like\(^1\)? but that, if he will grant that one excels another in anything, he will be ready to say so in judgments upon health and disease: not every woman or child or beast, he will admit, knows what is wholesome in its own case, and is competent to cure itself: here, if anywhere, one excels another.

Theo. I think so.

So. In politics, too, will he not say, that of things honourable and dishonourable, just and unjust, holy and unholy, whatsoever each state shall deem and enact to be lawful for itself are also lawful in truth for each, and that in these no individual or state is wiser than another? but in enacting things expedient or inexpedient, here, if anywhere, he will confess that counsellor differs from counsellor and the opinion of one city from that of another in respect of truth, and he will certainly not venture to affirm, that whatever a state shall deem and enact to be expedient for itself will most assuredly be expedient. But of the former things I named, justice and injustice, holiness and unholiness, they (the Protagoreans) are ready to insist that none has any essential nature, but that whatever has seemed good by public consent is true when it has seemed good, and as long as it seems good\(^2\). And those who do not altogether echo

\(^1\) Such-like, \(\omegaσα του τυπου τούτου\), lit. all that are of this type, i.e. (as Prof. Jowett says) ‘immediate sensations.’

\(^2\) In the first two speeches (§ 23) assigned to Socrates the subjects who express or allow opinions are very indistinctly stated. The reason
the doctrine of Protagoras, take some such philosophic view. But now, Theodorus, we have question growing out of question, greater out of less.

_Theo._ Are we not at leisure, Socrates?

_So._ We appear to be. On many occasions, my good sir, I have noticed, but especially on this, how natural it is for those who have spent much time on philosophy, when they go into the law-courts, to shew themselves absurd orators.

_Theo._ How do you mean?

_So._ People who from their youth have been knocking about in law-courts and such like scenes, as compared with those who have been reared in philosophic and literary society, seem to have had a breeding like that of slaves compared with freemen.

_Theo._ In what respects?

_So._ In that (referring to your last observation) philosophers have leisure at all times, and hold their discussions peacefully and with leisurely ease, and as we have now been of this seems to be, that he is referring throughout to what was said in his defence of Protagoras made in the name of Protagoras (§ 20). The oratio obliqua with which the first speech begins is dependent (as the translation indicates) on the ἄλλο τι φάμεν (must we not say?) at the close of the previous speech in § 22. Of ἔνθαφησεν and ἑβηλῆσαι ἄν φάναι, according to Heindorf and Stallbaum, τίς τινὰ understood are severally the subjects. I am rather disposed to understand Πρωταγόρας and Πρωταγόραν, as Protagoras had been mentioned just before, and his confession would be appropriate here. For the same reasons I suppose him to be the subject on whose statement or admission the oratio obliqua depends in the first paragraph of the second speech (οἷκοιν κ.τ.λ.), after which ὁμολογήσει comes, where Protagoras is the natural subject. In the next sentence, where he recurs to τὰ καλὰ κ.τ.λ., Plato uses the plural ἑβηλῶσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι. We cannot doubt that he speaks of the scholars of Protagoras, who still profess their master's doctrine on the question specified.
pursuing three arguments in succession, so do they also, if one which follows pleases them better than the preceding; nor do they care whether they speak briefly or at length, if only they can attain truth. The other class always speak in haste; for the flow of water\(^3\) quickens them, and they are not allowed to make their speeches on anything they desire; and the opponent stands over them holding compulsion in the shape of a prescribing document read in the ear, beyond the limits of which they must not speak, yclept an affidavit\(^4\): and the arguments are always about a fellow-slave addressed to a master on the bench, who holds justice between his finger and thumb; and the contests are never away from the point\(^5\), but to the point of self-interest; and often too the race is for life. So that on all these grounds they become keen and shrewd, knowing how to wheedle the master by word and gratify him by deed, being stunted and crooked in soul. For their slavery from childhood has robbed them of growth and uprightness and freedom, compelling them to act tortuously, setting before their yet tender souls great perils and fears. And as they cannot bear up against these with the help of justice and truth, they have recourse at once to falsehood and mutual injury, and twist themselves in many ways, and become warped; and so they pass from youth to manhood without any mental soundness, becoming, as they imagine,

\(^3\) *Flow of water.* The κλεψύδρα or water-clock, used to measure the time allowed to each orator, and placed within his view.

\(^4\) *Affidavit, ἀντώμοια,* literally counter-affidavit. The pleas of each party in a cause were affirmed by their several oaths: and by these affirmations they or their advocates would be bound, and could not stray from them.

\(^5\) *Away from the point,* τὴν ἀλλασ (ὁδὸν), a proverbial phrase. Such also is περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ ὅρμος.
clever and wise. Such is this class of men, Theodorus. Would you wish us now to describe those of our circle, or to pass them by and return to our argument, that we may not, as we just now said, abuse too far our freedom in the change of topics?

Theo. Not so, Socrates; finish the description. For you have said with great truth that we who form a circle like this are not servants of our discussions: our discussions are, as it were, our servants, and each of them waits to be completed when we think fit. For amongst us there is no presiding authority; neither dicast to rule, nor spectator, as in the case of poets, to censure.

[The habits and character of the true philosopher are depicted in this and 24 the succeeding chapter.]

So. We must speak then, seemingly, since you think proper, concerning the leaders of such a circle; for why need one mention the inferior students of philosophy? This class from their youth, in the first place, do not know the way to the agora, nor where a law-court is or a council-hall or any other political meeting-room: laws and decrees spoken or written they neither see nor hear. Societies agitating for office and clubs and dinners and wine-bouts with flute-girls—these are practices which even in dreams do not occur to them. Whether any one in the city is well or ill born, whether a person has inherited any disgrace from ancestors on the male or female side, he knows no more than he does of the proverbial ‘gallons in the sea.’ He does not even know that he is ignorant of all these things; for it is not for credit’s sake that he stands aloof from them, but in point of fact it is only his body that reposes and resides in the city, while his mind, deeming
all these things petty and insignificant, moves in every direction, as Pindar says, measuring things beneath the earth and on its surface, and star-gazing above the heaven, and searching out everywhere the nature of each class of existing things, condescending to none of those which are near it.

_Theo._ How do you mean, Socrates?

_So._ Compare the case of Thales, O Theodorus. While he was astronomising and gazing upward he fell into a well; and a clever and witty Thracian maidservant is said to have taunted him with desiring to know what was in heaven, but not seeing what was before him and at his feet. The same taunt is good for all who are devoted to philosophy. For in fact such a student is not only unaware of what his next neighbour is doing, but does not even know whether he is a man or some other creature. But what man is, and what it belongs to such a nature to do or to suffer differently from all others, this he inquires, and takes pains to search out. You understand, I hope, Theodorus, do you not?

_Theo._ I do, and your words are true.

_So._ Therefore, my friend, a man like this, in his associations private and public, as I said at first, when in a law-court or elsewhere he is compelled to discourse of things at his feet and before his eyes, becomes a laughing-stock not only to Thracian maids, but to the general public, falling into wells and perplexities of every kind from inexperience; and his awkwardness is marvellous, raising a suspicion of imbecility. For when personal reviling is the order of the day, he has no scandalous charge to bring, knowing no evil of anybody, because he has never taken the trouble. So he gets laughed at for his helplessness. And when eulogies and glorification of others are the theme, he is seen to laugh in right earnest without any affectation; and
so he seems to be silly. When a tyrant or a king is extolled, he thinks he hears one of the herdsmen, swineherd or shepherd or cowherd, congratulated for his large milking: but he considers that the royal proprietors in their tending and milking have to deal with a more untoward and insidious animal than the others have, and that any one of them must, for want of leisure, perforce prove quite as rude and uninstructed as the real herdsmen, having his fortification built round him like a stall upon the mountain. When he hears it said that somebody, who has got ten thousand acres of land or more, has a wonderfully large estate, he thinks the quantity named a very small one, from being in the habit of contemplating the whole earth. And when they extol birth, and say that some one is a gentleman for being able to show seven rich ancestors, this he regards as praise emanating from very dull and short-sighted persons, who through want of education can never take a comprehensive view, so as to see that every man has had countless myriads of forefathers, among whom in every case are found many rich and poor, kings and slaves, both Greeks and barbarians, recurring again and again. He is amazed at the manifestly narrow conception of those who pride themselves on a list of twenty-five ancestors, carried back to Heracles, son of Amphitryon; and he laughs at men who cannot bear in mind that the twenty-fifth ancestor, counting back from Amphitryon, and again the fiftieth before him, were just whatever they might happen to be—and by such reflection get rid of their foolish vanity. On all these occasions such a man is scorned by the multitude, partly, it would seem, on the charge of arrogance, partly for not knowing what stares him in the face, and for helplessness in general.

_Theo._ It certainly does happen as you say, Socrates.
When Socrates has completed his description of the true philosopher, Theodorus, assenting, says there would be less evil in the world if all men felt as he did. Socrates says that evil must remain as the antithesis of good; and, in a beautiful digression, he exhibits the contrast between justice and holiness on the one hand, which are blessed and godlike, injustice and unholliness on the other, which are wretched and godless. The unrighteous are apt to pride themselves on their own wickedness; but their self-satisfaction is unreal, and collapses at the last.

So. But when he himself, my friend, leads any man to take a higher view, and that man consents to quit his 'How do I wrong you or you me,' for the consideration of justice and injustice—what each is in itself, and wherein they differ from all other things or from each other,—or to turn from the maxim 'Happy the king, happy the possessor of much gold,' to the consideration of kingship itself and human happiness and misery generally—what they are and how it befits human nature to attain the one and escape the other—on all these subjects, I say, when that petty narrow-minded legal personage is required to render reason, he presents a counterpart of the philosopher. Stationed upon a height and gazing down from his elevated position, he turns dizzy from inexperience, and, uneasy perplexed and stuttering, he is a laughing-stock, not to Thracian girls or any uneducated person, for they do not see the absurdity, but to all whose training has not been that of slaves. Such are their several characters, Theodorus. One is that of the man really bred in freedom and leisure, whom you call philosopher; who may without reproach seem simple and be incompetent when he is engaged in menial services; when he does not, for instance, know how to pack a trunk of linen, or to season a dish or a flattering speech. The other is that of him who can perform all such
services thoroughly and briskly, but who does not know how to don his cloak like a gentleman, or, by acquiring harmony of language, to sing well the true life of gods and blessed men.

_Theo._ If you could bring home what you say to all men, Socrates, as you do to me, there would be more peace and less evil in the world.

_So._ Nay, Theodorus, evil cannot, on the one hand, perish altogether, for something opposite to good there must ever be; nor, on the other, can it find a seat in heaven: but our mortal nature and this lower region it haunts perforce. Wherefore we must endeavour to fly from this world to the other as soon as we can. Now that flight means the becoming like to God as much as possible; and the way to be like God is to become just and holy and wise. But indeed, my excellent friend, it is by no means an easy task to convince the world that the reasons on which most people found the duty of shunning vice and pursuing virtue are not the just motives for practising the latter and avoiding the former: in order, to wit, that a man may not seem to be wicked, and that he may seem to be good. These views, in my clear opinion, are what is called an old woman's fable: the real truth we may state as follows. God is in no way and in no degree unjust, but just in the highest extreme; and nothing is more like to him than one of us who in his own sphere shall become as just as possible. Hereby is shown a man's veritable power, in the one case; in the other, his worthless and unmanly character. For the cognition of this truth is genuine wisdom and virtue, while the ignorance of it is manifest unintelligence and viciousness. Everything else which is taken for mental power and wisdom is in political government vulgar, in art ignoble. It is by far the best way then not to allow for a
moment that one who acts unjustly and speaks or practises impiety is a man of powerful mind because he is a rogue. Such people pride themselves on the reproach, and suppose it to mean that they are no whisperers, no mere loungers about the streets, but the sort of men they ought to be to hold their own in the state. They must be told the truth therefore; namely—that their belief of not being what they are makes them what they are so much the more. For they do not know the penalty of injustice, a thing of all others which it is most proper to know. It is not what they suppose, stripes and capital punishments, which men sometimes do not incur when they act unjustly, but one from which it is impossible to escape.

Theo. What do you refer to?

So. There are, my friend, established in the world two types; of supreme happiness in the godly nature, of supreme misery in the ungodly: and these men, not seeing this truth, in their weakness and utter folly do by their unjust deeds insensibly become like the latter nature, unlike the former. The punishment they suffer is that of living a life correspondent with that nature to which they become like. And if we tell them that, unless they get rid of their wondrous wisdom, when they are dead, yon place pure from evil will not receive them, and they will ever continue to live in this world a life resembling themselves—evil amidst evil associations—such language they will undoubtedly hear as clever and cunning rogues listening to a pack of fools.

Theo. To be sure they will, Socrates.

So. I know it well, my friend. There is however one thing that befalls them. If in private they are required to give a reasonable account of their censures, though for a long time they are willing to abide the brunt manfully and
not to flee like cowards, at last, my good sir, they are strangely dissatisfied with their own reasoning; and that rhetoric of theirs dies out, somehow or other, so that they seem no better than children. As to these people, however, since the topic is a mere digression, let us drop the conversation: or else further considerations will continue to stream in and stifle our original argument. Let us return to the previous question, with your leave.

Theo. For my own part, Socrates, I lend an ear to such digressions with quite as much pleasure, as they are easier for a man of my age to follow. But, if you prefer it, let us return to our subject.

[Returning to his subject, Socrates says that the laws of a state have expediency (τὸ ὑπὲρληψις) for their end; but they often fail to attain it. Expediency is tested by the future. Does Protagoras pretend to be a measure of this? Will not a medical man judge better than he of the probability of a fever, a vine-grower of the expected quality of a wine, and so on, even as Protagoras himself could judge better than they of the arguments likely to prevail in a court of law? This was his forte and profession. He got a fortune by it. Would he have done so if he had told those who consulted him that they could judge as well as he? No: and it is hence evident that the more intelligent man is a measure, the unintelligent has no claim to be so called. True, says Theodorus; and my friend's doctrine is overthrown by this argument as well as by the former which showed that, while he admitted the opinions of all men to be true, most men denied this opinion of his to be true: which leaves him self-confuted. Yes, says Socrates, and many other confuting reasons might be added. But the momentary affections, from which arise sensation and opinion, are not so easily shown to be untrue. There is great disputation on this subject.]

So. We had, I think, reached this point in our argument. Speaking of those who teach the notion of moving
essence, and who aver that what at any time seems to each is for him to whom it seems, we said that—while on other points, and specially with respect to justice, such men would insist strongly, that what a state enacts as its pleasure, is just for the enacting state as long as it remains enacted—yet with respect to good, none are so bold as to contend that what a state enacts: considering it useful, is useful so long as it remains enacted, unless one choose to lay stress on the mere term; and that would be quibbling as to our real question. Would it not?

_Theo._ Certainly.

_So._ He should not dwell on the term, but on the thing which under that term is considered.

_Theo._ True.

_So._ Whatever term the state give to it, that which the state aims at in its legislation is, I suppose, this: all its laws, so far as its opinion and power extend, are framed in order to be as useful to itself as possible. Does it legislate with any other view?

_Theo._ None.

_So._ Does it always succeed? or do all states err in many cases?

_Theo._ I think they sometimes err.

_So._ Ay, and one may be led to this same admission more readily, by putting the question as to the whole class, of which the useful is a part. I suppose it relates to future time as well as to present. When we legislate, we enact our laws as intended to be useful for the time that is to follow. This we should rightly term 'future'?

_Theo._ Certainly.

_So._ Well then: let us ask Protagoras, or any of those who adopt his doctrine, this question. Man is the measure of all things, as ye say, O Protagoras; of things white, heavy,
light, all such-like. For, having the test in himself, thinking what he feels, he thinks what is, and what is to himself true. Is it not so?

Theo. It is.

So. And of things which are hereafter to be, we shall say, O Protagoras, has he the test in himself, and do they turn out to him such as he thinks they will be? Heat, for instance: when an unskilled person thinks that he will be seized with fever, and that this state of heat will occur, and another, who is a medical man, has an opposite opinion, shall we say that the future will turn out according to the opinion of one of the two, or according to that of both, and that to the medical man he will not be hot or feverish, but to himself both these?

Theo. This would be absurd.

So. And, I suppose, with respect to the future sweetness or harshness of wine, the vine-grower’s opinion, not that of the harp-player, will prevail?

Theo. Of course.

So. Again, as to good and bad music, a gymnast cannot judge beforehand so well as a musician, even of that which, after he has heard it, the gymnast himself will deem to be good music.

Theo. Certainly not.

So. The judgment also of one who, without culinary skill, is preparing to feast, will, while the banquet is in preparation, be less valid concerning the future pleasure than the judgment of the cook. We must not in our present argument inquire as to that which now is or which has been pleasant to each, but as to that which is about to seem and to be pleasant,—whether each individual is the best judge for himself. For example, would not you, Protagoras, form beforehand a better opinion
than an untutored person of the arguments which each of us would find persuasive in a court of law?

Theo. The very point, Socrates, in which he used to declare strongly that he had no rival.

So. To be sure he did, my dear friend; and nobody would have paid large sums of money to converse with him, if he had tried to persuade his pupils that no person, prophet, or other, is a better judge of what in the future will be, and seem to be, than a man's own self.

Theo. Very true.

So. Are not legislation and expediency concerned with the future, and will not every one confess that a state, when legislating, must of necessity often fail to attain that which is most useful?

Theo. Certainly.

So. Then it will be a fair thing to say to your master,—he must perforce confess that one man is wiser than another, and that such a man is indeed a measure; while for me, who am unknowing, there is no kind of necessity to become a measure, compelled though I was just now to be one, whether I would or not, by my argument in his defence.

Theo. In my judgment, Socrates, that is the best way of confuting his doctrine, though it is also confuted by this consideration, that it makes other people's opinions valid, and by these opinions (as was shown) his statements are deemed to be anything but true.

So. In many other ways, also, Theodorus, a doctrine such as this, that every opinion of every person is true, can be confuted. But, in respect to momentary affections, from which arise perception and correspondent opinion, it is more difficult to convict these of untruth. I am very likely wrong, however: possibly they are irrefragable;

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1 See Notes appended.
and those who assert them to be clear, and to be cognitions, may perhaps tell the truth, and our friend Theaetetus may not have missed the mark in laying down that perception and knowledge are the same. We must come closer then and examine this moving essence, by tapping it to see whether it sounds whole or cracked. No slight war is waged about this between combatants not a few.

[Theodorus gives a half serious, half jocular, character of the Heracleitan champions of the Flux. Socrates supports it by citing Homer's words as a veiled philosophy, openly professed by Heracleitus. He then refers to the antagonistic School (Eleatic), of which are Melissus and Parmenides, who teach the doctrine of Rest and Oneness of Being. Between the two, he says, we may find ourselves perplexed like outsiders between the two contending parties in the game called διά γραμμής.]

Theo. Far indeed from being a slight one; in Ionia the doctrine makes great strides. The followers of Heracleitus support it very vigorously.

Se. On that account, dear Theodorus, we must examine it more fundamentally, as they suggest.

Theo. Decidedly. For indeed, Socrates, as to these followers of Heracleitus, or, as you say, of Homer, and of others still more ancient, if we take their leading men about Ephesus, who pretend to be learned in the doctrines, there is no possibility of holding an argument with them any more than with lunatics. They are always in motion after the manner of their writings, and as to pausing on one subject, and inquiring and answering quietly in turn, their power of doing this is below zero. An infinite minus quantity goes nearer to expressing that these men have not in them the least particle of quietness. If you ask them any question, they pluck as it were out of their quiver
a little riddling phrase or two and shoot them at you, and if you try to get any account from the man of what he has said, you will be smitten with another under some novel change of name, and so you will never reach a conclusion with any one of them. Nor indeed will they themselves do so in their mutual discussions. They carefully guard themselves from allowing any certainty to appear either in an argument or in their own souls, deeming this, I suppose, a stable principle. Any such they are at war with and repel, as much as they can, on every side.

So. Probably, Theodorus, you have seen these men in battle, and never met with them in a pacific state, as they are no companions of yours. But, I suppose, they do teach certain principles at leisure to their scholars, whom they wish to make like themselves.

Theo. What do you mean by scholars, my good sir? These folk are not scholars one of another; they arise by spontaneous growth, each from some casual inspiration, and there is not one of them that supposes another to know anything. From these men, as I was going to say, you can never get a reason with or against their will. We must ourselves receive their doctrine, and examine it like a mathematical problem.

So. Very fairly suggested. We have however received the problem in another shape, from the ancients first, who hide it from the multitude in poetry, how that Oceanus and Tethys, the progenitors of all things, are streams, and that nothing stands still: from later writers secondly, who, being wiser, proclaim their views openly, that even a cobbler may hear and learn their wisdom, and cease to suppose some existences stand still while others are moving, and so, having been taught that all things move, may honour his teachers. I almost forgot, Theodorus, that
TRANSLATION.

others again put forth the doctrine opposite to this: for instance,

‘Unmoved is that they call the universe,’

and other dogmas, which, in opposition to all the preceding, such men as Melissus and Parmenides¹ insist upon, how that all things are one, and that this one stands self-supported, having no region wherein it moves. How shall we deal with all these, my friend? for we have gone on little by little till we find ourselves unexpectedly thrown midway between them, and if we do not struggle to find an escape, we shall be punished like those who play across a line in wrestling-grounds, when they are seized by both parties and dragged in opposite directions. So I think we must begin by considering the one party, to whom we first addressed ourselves, the fluent gentlemen. And if they appear to have good reasons, we will help them to drag us over, and try to escape from their opponents; but if the standard-bearers of ‘the Whole’ seem to give the true account, to them will we fly from those who move even the immoveable. If we find that neither of them have any satisfactory account to give, we shall get laughed at for supposing that poor creatures like us have anything of weight to say, and for disavowing men of the highest antiquity and wisdom. Consider, Theodorus, whether it is our interest to incur so great a risk.

Theo. Nay, Socrates, it cannot be endured that we should refuse to consider what each of these parties has to say.

¹ The Eleatic School; see p. 118.
Socrates now disproves the doctrine that perception is knowledge on Heraclitean principles. Motion is of two kinds, locomotion (including revolution) and variation. And, as all is in flux, everything must have both these motions. Referring now to the account previously given of the manner in which sensation is generated, he shows that no object can be called by any name: for before you can say that it is this or that (white for instance) the flux has proceeded, and the object is now something else. Perception therefore can be no more said to be knowledge than to be not knowledge, and the doctrine of Protagoras falls to the ground. Socrates sums up by saying that he therefore does not allow that man is the measure of all things, unless it be a wise man; nor yet that, according to the Heraclitean doctrine, knowledge is perception.

So. We must consider them, as you urge it so strongly. I think the first step in our consideration is concerning motion, to see what they intend by saying that all things move. What I mean to say is this. Do they speak of one kind of motion, or, as I think evident, two? But let it not be my sole opinion; share it with me yourself, that we may abide in common any result. Do you say a thing is moved when it changes from place to place, or revolves in the same place?

Theo. I do.

So. Let this be one kind. Now, when it stays in the same place, but grows old, or becomes black from being white, or hard from being soft, or undergoes any other variation, is it not proper to say this is another kind of motion?

Theo. I think so.

So. You cannot help it. These then I name are two kinds of motion, variation one, revolution another.

1 περιφοράν. But we should have expected φοράν, as Plato says immediately φερόμενον τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενον. Prof. Campbell thinks the motion of the heavens is regarded as embracing all other kinds. Is this quite satisfactory, or must we assume that περιφοράν is corrupt here?
Theo. You name them rightly.
So. Having made this division, let us now argue with those who say that all things move, and put to them this question: do you say that all things move in both ways, by local movement and by variation, or that one thing moves in both ways, another in one of the two?

Theo. Nay, upon my word I cannot pronounce. I think they would say all things move in both ways.

So. Yes; for if not, my friend, they will evidently make them to be both in motion and at rest, and it will be no more right to say that all things move than that they stand still.

Theo. Most truly stated.

So. Accordingly, since they must move, and it is impossible for anything not to be moving, all things are always moving with every kind of motion.


So. Now consider this point in their statements. Did we not say that they state the generation of heat or whiteness or any other perception in some such way as this—that each of these things at the moment of perception moves between the agent and the patient, and that the patient comes to be a percipient but not perception, and the agent a qualified thing but not a quality? Perhaps however quality seems to you to be a strange term, and you do not understand it when named in the general. Hear it then in particulars. The agent comes to be neither heat nor whiteness, but a hot thing and a white thing, and so with everything else. You remember, I suppose, that in

2 The ms. word aισθητον here must be corrupt. Buttmann's conjecture aισθητης (though not elsewhere found) has been largely received. Prof. Campbell prefers aισθανόμενον, chiefly on account of gender. But, as the patient is conceived of as a man, the synesis is surely allowable.
our former statements we laid it down thus; that nothing 'is' one by itself, so also neither agent nor patient; but that from both 'coming to be' together in mutual relation, sensations and sensible things are engendered, and the one comes to be of some quality and the other percipient.

*Theo.* I remember, of course.

*So.* Let us now spare ourselves the pains of considering their other various propositions, and, noting the one which is the subject of our discussion, let us put to them this question: 'All things, you say, move and are in flux.' Is this right?

*Theo.* Yes.

*So.* Do they then move with both kinds of motion which we distinguished, locomotion and variation?

*Theo.* Of course they do, if they are to move completely.

*So.* If they moved only, and were not changed, I suppose we should be able to say what kinds of things they are that move in flux. Should we not?

*Theo.* Yes.

*So.* Since it is not even an abiding fact, that what is in flux flows white, but it changes, and so there is a flux of this very thing, whiteness, and a change to another colour, that it may not be convicted of abiding in this one—is it ever possible to name any colour so as to give a correct name?

*Theo.* What possibility can there be, Socrates, in this or any other such thing, if it always slips away as one is speaking, being in constant flux?

*So.* And what shall we say of any kind of perception, such as sight or hearing? Shall we say that it ever abides in the act of seeing or hearing?

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3 On this corrupt place see the appended Notes.
Theo. Certainly it must not, seeing that all things are moving.

So. We cannot therefore aver that we see a thing more than that we do not see it, or that we have any perception more than that we have it not, since all things are in every way moving?

Theo. We cannot indeed.

So. And yet knowledge is perception, as I and Theaetetus settled it.

Theo. So it was.

So. Accordingly, when asked what knowledge is, in our reply we no more stated what it is than what it is not.

Theo. Seemingly not.

So. A fine issue to the supplement of our answer, when we were so eager to show that all things move:—for the purpose, forsooth, of proving that answer right. Now the thing proved seems to be, that, if all things move, every answer on every possible subject is equally right—to say it 'is' so and it 'is' not so, or if you prefer the term, 'comes to be,' that our terminology may not make them* stationary.

Theo. You say rightly.

So. Except, Theodorus, that I said 'So' and 'Not so.' I ought not to use this word 'So,' for no motion would be expressed by it; nor yet 'Not so,' for here again is no motion. But we must supply some other language to those who state this doctrine; since now in fact they have no words to convey their own hypothesis, except perhaps 'Nowise.' This might suit them best, being an indefinite expression.

Theo. Yes, that style of speech would be most natural to them.

4 Aυτοῖς. Buttm. Heind. would read εαυτοῖς, ourselves: αὐτὰ (τὰ πάντα) suits better: but αὐτοῖς may stand, referred to τοὺς βλέποντας.
So. Thus, Theodorus, we have got rid of your friend, and do not yet concede to him that every man is the measure of every thing, if he be not a wise man; nor yet will we concede that knowledge is perception, at least on the supposition of all things moving.

Theo. A good hearing, Socrates: for, as this topic is concluded, I must be rid of the task of answering you, as by our compact I was to be, when the question about the doctrine of Protagoras should come to an end.

29 [Theodorus rejoices that, according to the bargain, he was to be let off from the argument at this point. Theactetns thinks he should go on to discuss the opposite theory of Rest. Theodorus jocularly scolds him, and insists on his taking his turn. He consents. But Socrates, professing the highest respect for Parmenides, and alluding to the difficulties which his writings present, prefers adhering to the question at issue, the definition of knowledge. Returning to his dialectic process, he leads Theactetns to admit that it is more proper to say we perceive through the senses than with the senses, thus pointing to a central percipient (the soul). Next he makes him admit that the senses belong to the body, and that things perceived by one organ are not perceived by another. Hence any common notion acquired about things which are perceived by two different organs is not acquired through either organ, as existence, sameness, difference, likeness, and so on. What are the organs through which all these and other abstract notions are acquired? Theactetns thinks they have no peculiar organs assigned to them; but that the soul by its own powers observes these common properties. Socrates commends his conclusion as agreeing with his own.]

Theae. Nay, Theodorus, not before you and Socrates have discussed, as you just now proposed, the doctrine of those who on the other hand affirm that the universe is at rest.

Theo. What? you, Theactetns, a mere youth, teaching your elders to commit the sin of violating compacts! Come, gird yourself up to debate with Socrates that which remains.
Theae. Oh, certainly, if he wishes. But I should have been delighted to hear the other topic discussed.

Theo. You challenge cavalry to the plain when you challenge Socrates to argument. Ask him, and you will hear his answer.

So. Ay, Theodorus; but I do not think I shall obey the call which Theaetetus makes.

Theo. Why not obey it?

So. As to Melissus and the others who represent the universe as one and at rest, I respect them too much to treat their views cursorily; but in still greater respect do I hold the single name of Parmenides. He appears to me to meet Homer's definition, 'venerable and likewise awful.' I was brought into contact with him when I was very young and he very old, and he struck me as possessing a depth of character pre-eminently noble. I fear that we may not understand his language, still more that we may fail to achieve his meaning: above all, I am afraid that our original question, the definition of knowledge, may cease to be considered, if a fresh crowd of arguments rushes in, and gains our attention. In particular, this hopelessly large argument which we are awakening, if considered as a digression, would be unworthily treated; or, if pursued adequately at full length, it will swamp the question of knowledge. We should do neither one nor the other, but endeavour by our art of midwifery to deliver Theaetetus of his conceptions about knowledge.

Theo. Very well; we must, if you please.

So. Once more then, Theaetetus, consider this part of our previous discourse. You said in reply to me that knowledge is perception. Did you not?

Theae. Yes.

\[1\] II. iii. 172.
So. If anybody were to ask you the question, with what a man sees white things and black, and with what he hears sharp things and flat, you would say, I suppose, with the eyes and with the ears.

Theae. I should.

So. The easy acceptance of names and terms, and the non-exaction of strict accuracy, is indeed generally not out of place in a well-bred man; we may rather say the reverse is vulgar, yet is it occasionally necessary. And so in the present instance I must perforce take exception to the answer which you give, in so far as it is wrong. Consider which answer is more correct, that the eyes are that with which, or that through which we see, and the ears that with which, or that through which we hear.

Theae. 'Through' which in each case, I think, Socrates, rather than 'with' which.

So. Yes, my boy; it is strange, I ween, if in us, as though we were 'wooden horses'\(^2\), many independent senses are seated, instead of all these tending in common to some centre, whether we call it soul or anything else, whereby, through these senses as instruments, we perceive all things perceptible.

Theae. I think this latter view the truer one.

So. Why am I putting these minute questions to you? If with some one and the same part of ourselves we through the eyes apprehend things white and black, and through the other organs other things, and you will be able, on being asked, to refer all such perceptions at once to the body...perhaps however it is better you should specify them in answer to me than that I should save you that trouble. Now tell me. The organs through which you perceive hot things and hard

\(^2\) Plato alludes here to the famous wooden horse of the Trojan legend.
and light and sweet—do you not state them to belong severally to the body, or do they belong to anything else?

Theae. To nothing else.

So. Will you also be ready to admit, that what you perceive through any one organ, you cannot possibly perceive through another; for instance, what you perceive by hearing, you cannot perceive by sight, or the converse?

Theae. I most readily admit it.

So. If you have any common notion about both, you would not acquire it from the one organ or from the other concerning both?

Theae. I should not.

So. As to sound and colour, in the first place, have you this same notion respecting both, that both 'are'?

Theae. I have.

So. You suppose also, that each is different from each, and the same with itself?

Theae. To be sure.

So. And that both are twain, but each is one?

Theae. Yes.

So. Are you not also able to observe whether they are like one another or unlike?

Theae. Probably.

So. Through what do you form all these notions concerning both? For neither through hearing nor through sight is it possible to obtain a common notion of them. Here again is another instance in point. If it were possible to examine, whether both are briny or not, you know that you will be able to say with what you will examine, and this is evidently neither sight nor hearing, but something else.

Theae. No doubt it is; namely, the power exercised through the tongue.

K. P.
So. Well said. Now, through what does the power act which makes manifest to you what all things generally have in common with these particularly—what you mean, to wit, in saying 'is,' 'is not,' and all else comprised in our late questions? What organs will you assign as those through which our percipient faculty perceives all these severally?

Theaetetus. You mean being and non-being, and likeness and unlikeness, and sameness and difference, and moreover unity and any other number applicable to things perceived? Evidently too your question includes the even and the odd, and all other such notions; asking through what bodily organ we perceive them with the soul.

So. You follow me admirably, Theaetetus, and these are the very questions I ask.

Theaetetus. Well, Socrates, I really can give no other answer than this, that in my opinion these have originally no organ peculiar to them, such as the sensible objects have, but the soul through its own individual power appears to me to observe the common properties of all.

So. Yes, Theaetetus, you are a beauty, and not, as Theodorus said, ugly: for he who speaks beautifully is beautiful and good. And besides your beauty, I am much obliged to you for releasing me from a world of talk, if the soul appears to you to observe some things through itself, and other things through the bodily organs. This was my own opinion, and I was wishing it to be yours.

Theaetetus. Yes: to me it is apparent.

30 [Socrates now draws from Theaetetus the admission that while certain properties, as hardness and softness, are perceived through the senses common to men and beasts, essence, difference, use, and the like are matter of reflection by the soul attained through education. Without attaining essence, truth is not attained, nor without truth knowledge.]
TRANSLATION.

It is not in the affections themselves, but in the reasonable conclusions concerning them, that knowledge lies. And what is the common name for all these affections? Perception, which cannot therefore attain essence or truth or knowledge. Hence it follows that perception and knowledge cannot be the same thing. Theaetetus admits the failure of this theory. Socrates reminds him that the search is not to find what knowledge is not, but to find what it is, and then begs him to consider what it is that the soul is said to do, when it forms a judgment on existing things. Theaetetus replies: It is said to opine—to form an opinion. Socrates now asks if he can give a new answer to the question, What is knowledge?

So. To which of the two classes do you assign 'being'? For this is the notion most universally present.

Theaetetus. I assign it to that class which the soul attains to by itself.

So. Do you say the same of likeness and unlikeness, of sameness and difference?

Theaetetus. Yes.

So. And again of nobleness and baseness, good and evil?

Theaetetus. Yes: these are things the essence of which, above all others, I believe that the soul observes in their mutual relativity, comparing within itself the past and the present with the future.

So. Wait a moment. Will it not perceive the hardness of a hard object through the touch, and so again the softness of a soft one?

Theaetetus. Yes.

So. But their being, and what they are, and their mutual opposition, and again the being of that opposition, the soul itself, by reflecting and by comparing them with each other, endeavours to determine for us?

Theaetetus. Quite so.

So. Men and beasts then, as soon as they are born, are
able by nature to perceive some things, those affections I mean which reach through the body to the soul. But the reflections concerning these in regard to essence and use are acquired, by those who do acquire them, painfully and gradually through the troublesome process of education.

_Theae._ Undoubtedly.

_So._ Can any one attain truth, who does not attain being?

_Theae._ He cannot.

_So._ And if he fail to attain the truth of a thing, will he ever have knowledge of it?

_Theae._ Impossible, Socrates.

_So._ Knowledge, then, does not lie in the affections of sense, but in the reasoning concerning them: for in this it seems possible to grasp essence and truth, and not in the affections?

_Theae._ Evidently.

_So._ Do you call two things the same which are in so many respects different?

_Theae._ There were no justice in doing so.

_So._ What name do you give to the one class—seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold and hot?

_Theae._ ‘Perceiving’ I would certainly call them.

_So._ Their common notion then you would call perception?

_Theae._ Of course.

_So._ And this, we say, has no share in the attainment of truth, having none in the attainment of being.

_Theae._ It has none.

_So._ Nor yet in the attainment of knowledge?

_Theae._ No.

_So._ Then, Theaetetus, perception and knowledge will not be the same?
TRANSLATION.

Theae. Evidently not, Socrates. Now especially has knowledge been very clearly proved to be a different thing from perception.

So. But it was not by any means with this view that we began our argument, to find what knowledge is not, but to find what it is. Nevertheless we have so far advanced as not to seek it in perception at all, but in that name which, whatever it be, is applicable to the soul’s action when by itself it deals with existing things.

Theae. This, I imagine, Socrates, is called ‘opining’ (forming opinion).

So. You imagine rightly, my friend. Now go back again and, erasing all that went before, see if you have any clearer view, after having advanced to this point. Tell me once more what knowledge is.

[The first definition proposed by Theaetetus—that sensuous perception is knowledge—being thus overthrown by the elenchus concluded in § 30, he is invited to attempt a second. He hopes now to find one in that realm of pure thought which consists in believing, judging, or opining (forming opinion). But as it occurs to him that opinions formed are not always true, he sees that he must limit his definition; and, accordingly, he ventures to suggest that true opinion is knowledge. Against this doctrine Socrates opens a battery of argument without delay. It implies that such a thing as ‘false opinion’ is possible; and that possibility Socrates is not prepared to admit. All things subject to opinion are, he says, such as a man either knows or does not know. If he opines, he either knows or does not know that about which he opines: he cannot know, and not know, one and the same thing. Can he then (when he opines falsely) mistake one known thing for another known thing?—No.—Or a known thing for an unknown?—No.—Or an unknown for a known?—No.—Or one unknown for another unknown?—Impossible.—But if he forms a false opinion, he must err in one of these four ways:—all which are impossible. Therefore to form false opinion is impossible. But perhaps, adds Socrates, we should regard ‘being’ and ‘not-being’
rather than knowing and not-knowing. May not a man opine what is false, if he opines 'what is-not'? But he goes on to argue that nobody can opine 'what is not' any more than he can see or hear what is not: to opine 'what is not' is to opine 'nothing'; that is, not to opine at all. Therefore false opinion is no more possible from this point of view than it was from the former.]

Theae. To say that it is opinion generally, Socrates, is impossible, since there is false opinion. But true opinion probably is knowledge: so let this be my answer. If it shall be disproved while we proceed, as in the last case, we will try some other statement.

So. Your present forwardness to speak, Theaetetus, is more to the purpose than your original reluctance to answer. For in this way, we shall secure one of two advantages: we shall either find what we are in quest of, or our conceit of knowing what we do not know will be diminished. And this will be no despicable reward. Now let us see what it is you say. There being two kinds of opinion, the true and the false, do you make true opinion the definition of knowledge?

Theae. I do, according to my present view.

So. Is it worth while to resume the question of opinion?

Theae. Which do you mean?

So. I am somewhat disturbed now, as often before, and have found myself sorely perplexed in my own mind and in conversation, from my inability to say what this condition is in us, and in what way engendered.

Theae. What condition?

So. The holding of false opinion. Now again I am still considering and doubting whether we should leave it, or review it in a way different from that we took some little time ago.
Theae. Why not review it, Socrates, if there is any clear gain in doing so? For, as to leisure, you and Theodorus said very justly, that there is nothing to hurry us in such cases.

So. Well reminded. And perhaps it is not unreasonable to return upon our tracks. It is better, you'll allow, to achieve a little well than much inadequately.

Theae. Of course.

So. Well then? What do we in fact affirm? do we say that there is in each case false opinion, and that some one of us opines falsely, another again truly, as if such were the natural rule?

Theae. Yes, we do.

So. Does not this occur to us in respect of all things generally, and of each particularly—either knowing or not-knowing? for learning and forgetting, which lie between these, I set aside for the moment, as having no relation to our present argument.

Theae. In fact, Socrates, nothing else remains in each case but knowing and not-knowing.

So. Is it not a necessary consequence that he who opines must opine about one of the things which he knows, or one of those which he does not know?

Theae. It is.

So. And it is impossible, if he knows a thing, not to know it, or, if he knows it not, to know it?

Theae. Quite impossible.

So. Does then he who holds a false opinion think that things which he knows are not what they are, but some other things within his knowledge, and knowing both, is he ignorant of both?

Theae. It cannot be so, Socrates.

So. Or does he suppose things which he does not
know to be some other things outside of his knowledge? Does it happen to one who knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates to imagine that Socrates is Theaetetus or Theaetetus Socrates?

Theae. How can that be?

So. But surely a man does not think that what he knows is what he does not know, or that what he does not know is what he knows.

Theae. That were a miracle.

So. In what other way then can any one hold false opinions? Except under the conditions stated it is impossible, I suppose, to have opinion. In every case we either know or do not know, and so situated, it is manifestly impossible for us ever to have false opinions.

Theae. Very true.

So. Perhaps we ought to examine our question with reference not to knowing and not-knowing, but to being and not-being.

Theae. How do you mean?

So. Consider if it be not a simple truth that one who thinks concerning anything that which is not, will inevitably think what is false, whatever the condition of his mind in other respects.

Theae. This again is probable, Socrates.

So. How then? What shall we reply, Theaetetus, if any one examine us: 'Is what you say possible for any one, and will any human being think what is not, either about some existing thing, or in the abstract?' Seemingly we shall say in reply: 'Yes, when he thinks, and does not think what is true.' Or how are we to speak?

Theae. As you say.

So. Does the like happen in any other case?

Theae. What do you mean?
TRANSLATION.

So. That a person sees something, yet sees nothing.

Theae. How can that be?

So. If he sees some one thing, that 'something' is among things that are. Or do you think 'the one' is ever among the things that are not?

Theae. Not I.

So. He then, who sees some one thing, sees some thing that is.

Theae. Evidently.

So. And he who hears something hears some one thing, and a thing that is.

Theae. Yes.

So. And he who touches, I suppose, touches some one thing, and a thing that is, since it is one.

Theae. Yes.

So. And does not he who opines form opinion of some one thing?

Theae. He must.

So. And does not he who forms opinion of some one thing form it of some thing that is?

Theae. I grant this.

So. He then who opines what is not opines nothing.

Theae. Evidently.

So. Well, but he who opines nothing does not opine at all.

Theae. That seems clear.

So. Therefore it is not possible to think what is not, either about things that are, or in the abstract.

Theae. Manifestly not.

So. Thinking falsities is therefore different from thinking what is not.

Theae. It seems different.

So. And thus neither from our present consideration
(of being and not-being), nor from our previous one (of knowing and not knowing), do we find false opinion to exist in us.

Thea. No, we do not.

32 [Socrates asks, whether false opinion may not possibly be found in what he calls ‘allodoxy,’ the mental exchange of one existing thing for another existing thing. Theaetetus would like to accept this explanation. But Socrates disappoints him. A short dialectic elenchus (in the course of which Socrates describes opinion as the result of a conversation which the soul holds with itself) leads to the conclusion that, assuming two different things—the noble and the base— the just and the unjust—a horse and an ox, &c., nobody can mistake one for the other, either if he has formed an opinion of both, or if he has formed an opinion of one, but not of the other: so that allodoxy (which he now terms heterodoxy) does not supply any rational definition of false opinion.]

So. But can we not speak of it as happening in this way?

Thea. How?

So. We can say that an opinion which may be called an ‘allodoxy’ is false when anybody says that some one existing thing is another existing thing, exchanging them in his mind. For thus he always thinks of what exists, but of one thing instead of another, and, as missing that which he had in view, he may be said to have false opinion.

Thea. Your present statement seems to me very correct. For when any one opines that a thing is ugly instead of beautiful, or beautiful instead of ugly, then he very truly has false opinion.

So. Evidently, Theaetetus, you speak in contempt of me, and without fear.

Thea. Pray why?
So. You do not expect, I fancy, that I shall lay hold of your term ‘truly false’, and ask if it is possible for the swift to ‘come-to-be’ slowly, or the light heavily, or for any other opposite to come-to-be—not according to its own nature, but according to the nature of its opposite—in a manner opposed to itself. This however—that your confidence may not be fruitless—I pass over. You say you are pleased with the notion that opining falsities is ‘allo-doxy.’

Thea. I am.

So. Then in your opinion it is possible to determine in your mind that one thing is another, and not itself.

Thea. It is.

So. When therefore the mind does this, must it not perforce think either of both things, or of one of the two?

Thea. Yes, it must.

So. At the same time, or else by turns.

Thea. Very good.

So. Do you employ the term ‘thinking’ in the same sense that I do?

Thea. How do you define it?

So. A discourse which the soul holds with itself about what it considers. I am representing this to you not as a fact that I know. In the exercise of thought, the soul, as I fancy it, is simply engaged in conversation, questioning itself and answering, affirming and denying. And when, having reached a definition, whether slowly or by a more rapid impulse, it at length agrees and affirms undoubtingly, we state this to be its opinion. So that I call opining the soul’s speaking, and opinion its spoken word, not addressed to another or uttered by the voice, but silently to itself.

Thea. So do I.
So. Therefore, when any one opines that one thing is another, he says to himself, it would seem, that one thing is another.

Theae. Certainly.

So. Try to remember whether you ever said to yourself, 'Assuredly the noble is base,' or, 'The unjust is just.' Or, to sum up, consider if you ever attempted to convince yourself that assuredly one thing was another: or if, on the contrary, you never even in sleep ventured to say to yourself, Undoubtedly the odd is even, or any such thing?

Theae. You say the truth.

So. Do you think any body in or out of his senses ever ventured seriously to say to himself, trying to make himself believe, that an ox must needs be a horse, or two things one?

Theae. No indeed, not I.

So. If then to speak to oneself is to opine, nobody who speaks and thinks of both things, and apprehends both with his soul, can say and think that one is the other. But you must avoid the terms 'one and other.' I'll state the point in this way: Nobody thinks that the noble is base, or anything of the sort.

Theae. Well, Socrates, I give up the terms, and I agree with you.

So. That one who thinks of both cannot possibly opine that one is the other?

Theae. Seemingly not.

So. Again, if he thinks of the one alone, and of the other not at all, he will never opine that one is the other.

Theae. True: for so he would be forced to apprehend that of which he has no thought.

So. Accordingly allodoxy is inadmissible for any one
who thinks either of both or of one. So that whoever shall define false opinion to be heterodoxy will talk nonsense: for it is shown by this method as well as by the former that false opinion cannot exist in us.

Theae. Seemingly not.

[Socrates seems, or feigns, to be driven to despair by the failure of his three attempts to find the habitat of false opinion. It is not in the region of knowledge, nor in that of being, nor in that confusion of phenomena, which he terms alodoxy. Surely it must be somewhere. Surely mistakes are made. May not a person know something, and, seeing something else which he does not know, mistake it for that thing which he knows? At this point in the dialogue Plato introduces two parables or myths. He supposes first, a memorial waxen block, and, later on, a bird-cage or aviary, to be situated in the human mind. (In figures of this kind Plato takes great delight: he has scattered them with profusion throughout his works. They do not supply to the pure intellect that verification which it demands in order to accept a philosophic theory. But the literary composer finds them a very convenient resource. They fill up gaps in serious argument. They rouse the imagination, they charm the fancy: they attract and amuse the general reader, when fatigued with dry dialexis. In short, they are a valuable part of that Ἑάγων, which Plato, who has a rhetoric of his own, is far from disdaining for his own use. See Dr Thompson’s Introduction to his edition of the Phaedrus, especially pp. xxi—ii, also p. 141.) In this section a general description is given of the waxen block or tablet, as Mr Grote calls it (ἐκμεμρεῖον). The wax varies in various cases, in some being larger, firmer, cleaner, and in every way better than in others. The receptacle also is more or less wide and convenient. The tablet is a gift of Mnemosyne (memory) for impressing by seals every one’s sensations and thoughts. These are remembered and known while the impressions remain: when these fade, they are forgotten and no longer known. Socrates goes on to state when false notions cannot be formed, and when they can.

So. And yet, Theaetetus, if this shall be proved im-
possible, we shall be compelled to admit many absurd consequences.

Theae. What are they?

So. I will not say till I have tried every point of view. For I should blush for us if, in a moment of perplexity, we were forced to admit such things as I allude to. But if we find a way to get free, then and not before we will speak of others as thus perplexed, standing clear of ridicule ourselves. But, if we find ourselves posed on every side, then, in a humble frame, I suppose, like sea-sick men, we shall allow the argument to trample on us and treat us as it will. Listen, while I tell you how I may still find a way of escape from our inquiry.

Theae. Pray tell me.

So. I will say we were wrong in admitting that it is impossible to opine that what one knows is what one does not know, and so to be deceived: for it is in a certain way possible.

Theae. Do you mean what I myself suspected at the time we made the assertion—a case occurring sometimes like this, that I, knowing Socrates, and seeing at a distance another whom I do not know, think it is the Socrates whom I know? For in such a case something like what you say comes to pass.

So. Did we not abandon that view, because it made us, while knowing, not to know what we do know?

Theae. Certainly.

So. Suppose we do not state it thus, but in the following manner. Perhaps it will give way to us, perhaps resist. But indeed we are in such a strait, that we must perforce turn about and examine every argument. See if I ask a rational question. Is it not possible to learn something which you formerly did not know?
Theae. Yes, it is.
So. And one thing after another?
Theae. Why not?
So. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that there is in our souls a waxen block, in one soul larger, in another smaller, of purer wax in one, in another of less pure, harder in some, moister in others; in some of medium quality.

Theae. Well.

So. Let us say it is a gift of Mnemosyne, mother of the Muses, and that on this we strike off, as if we were impressing ring-seals, any thing we wish to remember among those we see or hear or imagine, submitting the block to our senses and imaginations; and that whatever is impressed, we remember and know as long as its image subsists; but that, when it is obliterated or fails to be impressed, we have forgotten and do not know.

Theae. Be it so.

So. See then if he who knows things, and considers anything he sees or hears, may have false opinions in some such way as the following:

Theae. In what way?

So. By thinking sometimes that what he knows is what he does know, sometimes what he does not know. In our previous statements we were wrong in denying this to be possible.

Theae. How do you state it now?

So. Our statement on the subject must be this. We first determine, that what a person knows, having a record of it in his soul, but without perceiving it, he cannot possibly think to be some other thing which he knows, having an image of this also, but not perceiving it. And again it is impossible to think that what he knows is what he
knows not and has no seal of; and that what he knows not is [something else] which he knows not: and that what he knows not is what he knows: and to think what he perceives is some other thing which he perceives; and what he perceives, a thing which he does not perceive; and what he does not perceive to be another thing which he does not perceive; and what he does not perceive to be a thing which he perceives. And again to think that a thing which he knows and perceives, having the seal of it according to perception, is some other thing which he knows and perceives having its seal also according to perception—this is, if it can be, still more impossible than the preceding suppositions. And what one knows and perceives, having its record correctly, it is impossible to think [something else] which one knows: and what one knows and perceives under similar conditions, to be [something else] which one perceives: and what one neither knows nor perceives to be [something else] which one neither knows nor perceives: and what one neither knows nor perceives, to be [something else] which one does not know; and what one neither knows nor perceives, to be [something else] which one does not perceive. All these things involve the very utmost impossibility of having any false opinion about them. There remain the following cases, in which, if anywhere, such a thing may happen.

Theae. What are they? perhaps they may help me to understand. At present I do not follow you.

So. In the case of things which a person knows, to think that they are some other things which he knows and perceives; or some other things which he does not know, but perceives: or that [some things] which he knows and perceives are [some others] which he also knows and perceives.

Theae. I am more in the dark now than before.
In this section it is shown how, by the misuse of the waxen tablet, false opinion may be supposed to occur; namely, by an erroneous union of sensation and impression. Mr Grote states it as follows: "A man, having sealed on his memorial tablet the impressions of two objects A and B, which he has seen before, may come to see one of these objects again: but he may by mistake identify the present sensation with the wrong past impression, i.e. with that past impression to which it does not belong. Thus, on seeing A, he may erroneously identify it with the past impression B, instead of A; or vice versa. And so false opinion will lie, not in the conjunction or identification of sensations with sensations, nor of thoughts (or past impressions) with thoughts, but in that of present sensations with past impressions or thoughts." Such an occurrence Socrates imputes to defects in the waxen block; which may be too shallow or too hard or too soft or too narrow, or impure, or inclosed in too small a space.

So. Listen to this restatement. Do not I, knowing Theodorus and remembering in my mind what sort of man he is, and Theaetetus similarly, sometimes see them, sometimes not, and sometimes touch them, at other times not, and hear them or have some other perception of them, and again have no perception of you, but not the less remember you and know you in my mind?

Theae. Certainly.

So. This is the first lesson which I wish to make known to you, that a man may not perceive, or may perceive, things which he knows.

Theae. True.

So. Things too which he does not know, a man may often not perceive, often perceive merely?

Theae. This too is possible.

So. Now see if you follow me more easily. Socrates knows Theodorus and Theaetetus, but sees neither, and has no other present perception about them. He could never
form an opinion in his mind that Theaetetus is Theodorus? Do I speak sense or not?

Thea. All quite true.

So. This was the first of the cases spoken of.

Thea. It was.

So. The second was, that knowing one of you, and not knowing the other, and perceiving neither, I can never suppose the one I know to be the one I do not know.

Thea. Right.

So. Thirdly, knowing and perceiving neither, I cannot suppose one whom I do not know to be some other whom I do not know. And as to all my former suppositions, imagine that you have heard them stated again in order, wherein I can never have false opinions about you and Theodorus, either if I know or if I do not know both, or if I know one, but not the other. And similarly with regard to perceptions, if you follow me.

Thea. I do.

So. False opinion remains possible in a case like this: when, knowing you and Theodorus, and having in that waxen block the seals of both of you as from rings, then, seeing both at a distance and indistinctly, I strive to assign the proper seal of each to its proper visage, and to introduce and adapt this to its own mould, in order that recognition may take place: but if, failing in the attempt, and interchanging, like those who put on the wrong shoes, I apply the visage of each to the other's seal; or again, if I go wrong by an affection like that of sight in mirrors, when it flows from right to left:—then heterodoxy and false opinion occur.

Thea. You describe with marvellous truth, Socrates, the conditions to which opinion is liable.

So. Moreover [false opinion happens] when, knowing
both, I perceive one, as well as know him, but not the other, and so my knowledge of the second of the two is not according to perception—a case put in my former statement, which you did not then understand.

Theaæ. I did not.

So. Well, I meant to say that a person knowing and perceiving the one, and having his knowledge according to perception, will never think that he is some other whom he knows and perceives, and of whom his knowledge is also according to perception. Was it so?

Theaæ. Yes.

So. There remained, I think, the case we now deal with, in which we say that false opinion happens when a person knowing and seeing both, or having any other perception of both, does not keep each of the seals in accordance with his perception, but like a bad archer shoots beside the mark and so errs; and such error is called a falsity.

Theaæ. And reasonably.

So. And so, when to one of the seals perception is present, but not to the other, and the mind adapts the seal which is without perception to the perception present, in every such case it is deceived. In one word, about things which a person knows not and never perceived, error and false opinion seem out of the question, if there is any soundness in our present argument: but in those things about which we have knowledge and perception, opinion turns and twists about, becoming true or false; true, when it brings the proper impressions and forms to meet oppositely and straightly; false, when it brings them crosswise and crookedly.

Theaæ. Is not this a noble statement, Socrates?

So. You will say so with more assurance after hearing
what I have further to state: for to think the truth is noble, to be deceived is base.

Theae. No doubt.

So. These things are said to happen as follows. When the wax in any person's soul is deep and abundant and smooth and nicely wrought, the impressions become durable which pass through the senses and are sealed on this (waxen) heart of the soul, as Homer called it in allusion to the resemblance of wax; for then, and in all such cases, they are formed in it pure, and have depth enough. And such persons are in the first place quick to learn, in the next retentive, and finally they do not interchange the seals of the perceptions, but form true opinions. For as their impressions are distinct and have ample room, they rapidly distribute them to their several niches; and such impressions are called 'real:' and these persons are termed 'wise.' Do you not think so?

Theae. With entire conviction.

So. When any person's heart is shaggy, as that all-wise poet sang, or when it is miry and of impure wax, or exceedingly soft or hard—they whose heart is soft, are quick to learn, but forgetful; they whose heart is hard, the opposite: and they who have a shaggy and rough and gritty heart, or one defiled with a mixture of earth or mire, have their impressions indistinct. In those who have hard hearts, they are indistinct too, for depth is wanting: likewise in those who have soft hearts, for through confusion they soon become faint. And if besides all these faults they are furthermore crushed one upon another for want of room, when a man's soul is small, they are still more indistinct than in the former cases. All these people are capable of having false opinions. For when they see or hear or imagine anything, being unable to
assign each thing quickly to its proper impression, they go tardily to work, and, assorting erroneously, they see and hear and conceive most things wrongly. And of these persons again we say, that they have false notions of things, and are ignorant.

Theae. Never was a truer statement, Socrates.
So. May we say then that false opinions exist in us?
Theae. Decidedly.
So. And true?
Theae. Yes.
So. Now we think it sufficiently agreed that both these kinds of opinion certainly exist?
Theae. Beyond all question.

[So*ocrates has no sooner reached his conclusion as to the formation of false opinion, than he proceeds to conjure it. There are phenomena for which it does not account. Errors occur in the identification of one past impression with another: and this leads to the dilemma that either false opinion is impossible, or it is possible for a person not to know what he does know. This dilemma Theaetetus cannot solve. And Socrates remarks that this discussion has become impure, in that they have constantly used the terms ‘knowing,’ ‘knowledge,’ and ‘ignorance’ before they have reached a definition of these terms. As, however, he admits that he cannot carry on the discussion without using them in some sense or other, he declares himself willing to make the attempt, and Theaetetus applauds his resolution.]

So. What a truly terrible and disagreeable creature, Theaetetus, a chattering man appears to be.
Theae. How so? What do you say this for?
So. Because I am so annoyed by my own dullness and manifest garrulity. For what else can one call the conduct of a man, who wears every argument threadbare, and cannot be made to quit it, because he is too stupid to be convinced?
Theae. What vexes you?
So. I am not only vexed, but at a loss how to answer, should any one question me and say: ‘Have you now,
Socrates, discovered that false opinion lies neither in the mutual relation of perceptions, nor in that of thoughts, but in the union of perception with thought? I shall say, 'Yes,' I suppose, with a triumphant air, as if we had made some beautiful discovery.

Theae. I see nothing the reverse, Socrates, in what has now been proved.

So. Do you mean, he will say, that we can never suppose the man, whom we think of but do not see, to be a horse, which again we neither see nor touch but only think of, and in no way perceive? I suppose I shall say that I do mean it.

Theae. Yes, and rightly.

So. Well, he will say, as to the number eleven, which is an object of thought only, must it not follow from this statement that nobody could ever suppose it to be twelve, which is also an object of thought only? Come now, reply yourself.

Theae. I shall reply that any one who saw and touched them might think eleven to be twelve, but so far as he had them in thought, he could never conceive such an opinion regarding them.

So. Well, take the case of one who set before himself and regarded in his own mind five and seven. I don't mean seven and five men or anything of the sort, but the notions of five and seven, of which we say that they are recorded there on the waxen block, and that as to them it is impossible to have false opinion. Of these things I ask if it never chanced, that while people were considering them, and conversing with themselves, and inquiring how many they come to—one person would think and say they were eleven, another twelve:—or would all say and think that they make twelve?

Theae. No, indeed, not all; many will say, eleven.
And if a person has higher figures under consideration, he is still more liable to error. I suppose you are speaking of number generally.

So. Your supposition is right. Consider whether anything happens in such a case but imagining the number twelve, in the block, to be eleven.

Theae. Nothing else, seemingly.

So. We are thus carried back to our former discussion. The person in such a case supposes a thing which he knows to be another thing which he knows. This we said was impossible; and on this very ground we forced the conclusion that false opinion does not exist, in order that the same person might not be compelled to know and not know the same things at the same time.

Theae. Very true.

So. Therefore we must declare that holding false opinion is something else than a discrepancy between thought and sensation. For, if it were this, we could never be deceived in our mental concepts themselves. But now either there is no false opinion, or it is possible for a person not to know what he knows. Which alternative do you choose?

Theae. You offer an impossible choice, Socrates.

So. Ay, but the argument will hardly allow both. Nevertheless, as we must risk the utmost, suppose we venture to be shameless?

Theae. How?

So. By making up our minds to say what ‘to know’ means.

Theae. Why is this a shameless act?

So. You seem not to bear in mind that all our discussion from the first has been a quest of knowledge, assuming that we do not know what it is.
Theae. I do bear this in mind.

So. Is it not then shameless, if we do not know knowledge, to proclaim what knowing means? But in fact, Theaetetus, we have been long infected with an impure method of discussion. Over and over again we have used the terms ‘we know,’ and ‘we do not know,’ ‘we have knowledge’ and ‘we have not knowledge,’ as if we could understand one another, while we are yet ignorant of knowledge. If you remark, at this very moment we have again used the terms ignorance and understanding, as though it were fit for us to use them, if we are destitute of knowledge.

Theae. But in what way will you argue, Socrates, if you abstain from these terms?

So. In no way, while I am the man I am: but I could if I were a votary of contention. Were a man of that school now present, he would profess to abstain from such terms, and would rebuke us sternly for our conduct. Since however we are such poor creatures, will you let me venture to say what ‘knowing’ is? For I am clear that it will be of some help to us.

Theae. Oh yes! pray venture. You will have great excuse for not abandoning these terms.

[Having consented, for the sake of discussion, to use the term ‘knowing,’ though still undefined, Socrates now observes that most people suppose it to mean ‘the having of knowledge.’ For his own part, he would rather say ‘the possessing,’ than ‘the having.’ For a person cannot justly be said ‘to have’ what he never uses, though he may ‘possess’ it, like a coat kept in a wardrobe but never worn. This distinction he illustrates by his second parable, that of the mental dove-cage. A person may be supposed to have caught a number of doves (i.e. to have acquired sciences or cognitions) which he has turned into his cage or aviary, and so ‘possesses.’ But, if he wants to catch one of his doves (i.e. to recall and use one of his acquired cognitions), he has]
to pursue another chase in his mental aviary; and this may not always be successful. He may fail to catch the dove he wants (i.e. he may find that he has forgotten the science he had once acquired) or he may get hold of a wrong dove (i.e. he may confuse things which he could accurately distinguish at a former time).

So. You have heard then what people now mean by 'knowing?'

Theae. Possibly: but I do not remember at the moment.

So. They say it is a having of knowledge.

Theae. True.

So. Let us make a slight change and say, possession of knowledge.

Theae. What will you say is the difference between them?

So. Perhaps none: but you may as well hear, and help me to test my opinion.

Theae. I will if I can.

So. 'Having' does not appear to me the same thing as 'possessing.' For instance, if any one bought a coat, and being master of it did not wear it, we should not say he had, but possessed it.

Theae. Right.

So. Now see if it is possible in the same manner to possess knowledge without having it. Suppose a person had caught wild birds, doves or any other sort, and built a dove-cage in his dwelling and fed them. In a certain way we should say he always has them, because he possesses them. Should we not?

Theae. Yes.

So. In another sense we should say he has none of them, but he has got a power over them, since he has made them subject to him in a domestic inclosure of his own.
He can take and hold them when he likes, catching any one he wishes, and he can let it go again. And it is free to him to do this as often as he thinks proper?

Thea. It is.

So. So then, even as in the previous part of our discourse we framed in human souls a strange sort of waxen figment, let us again make in every soul a certain cage of various kinds of birds, some in flocks apart from the rest; others in small groups; others alone, flying among all wherever they may chance.

Thea. Suppose it made. What next?

So. While we are children (we must say) this structure is empty: and we must think of sciences instead of birds: and whatever science any one has acquired and shut up in his inclosure, we must say that he has learnt or discovered the thing of which it is the science: and this is 'knowing.'

Thea. Be it so.

So. Again, as to catching any one of the sciences a person chooses, and taking and holding it, and letting it go again,—consider by what terms these acts should be described, whether by the same as when he was first acquiring the sciences, or by others. You will learn what I mean more clearly from the following illustration. There is an art you call arithmetic?

Thea. Yes.

So. Suppose this to be a pursuit of the knowledge of odd and even.

Thea. Well, I do.

So. By this art, I imagine, a person both has the cognitions of all numbers in his power, and transmits them to another.

Thea. Yes.
So. And we say that one who transmits teaches, and one who receives learns, and one who has them by possessing in that cage 'knows?'

Theaet. Quite so.

So. Attend and see what next follows. Does not a perfect arithmetician know all numbers? For he has in his soul the science of all numbers.

Theaet. Certainly.

So. Could not such a person count any sum mentally, or any outward objects capable of numeration?

Theaet. No doubt he could.

So. And shall we say that counting means anything but considering how great any number is?

Theaet. Such is its meaning.

So. Then what a person 'knows,' he is shown to consider as if he did not know, though we have allowed that he knows all number. You have heard, I suppose, of these vexed questions?

Theaet. I have.

[Socrates now confutes his own hypothesis. Catching a dove which you acquired and possess, seems to mean learning from yourself what you know already. This Theaetetus sees to be absurd. And the confusion of two known things appears to be not less absurd. For this knowledge is shown to produce the effect of ignorance. Why may not ignorance as well be shown to produce the effect of knowledge, and blindness that of sight? May we not imagine, says Theaetetus, that the cage contains nesciences (non-cognitions) as well as sciences (cognitions) and that false opinion may take place when a person, hunting for a science, gets hold of a nescience in its stead? By a short elenchus Socrates shows that this hypothesis implies consequences which have been already acknowledged to be impossible. For the man who has thus got hold of nescience mistakes it for science, does he not? Yes, says Theaetetus. But how can anybody, knowing two things, take one for the other, or, knowing neither, take what he does not know, for something else that
he does not know: or knowing one but not the other, take what he does know for what he does not know, or the converse. All these are impossibilities: and so we, until we know what knowledge is, cannot know what false opinion is.

So. We then, following the similitude of the possession and chase of doves, will say that the chase was double; one before acquirement, with a view to possession: the other after possession, in order to take and hold in hand what the owner had long ago acquired. So even those same things of which a person had the knowledge long since by learning, and which he then knew, he may again thoroughly learn by resuming and holding the knowledge of each, which he had indeed long ago acquired, but had not within his mental grasp.

Theaet. True.

So. I was just now asking what terms we must use to speak of such cases, as when the arithmetician proceeds to count or the grammarian to read. Does he in this case, although he knows, come to learn from himself what he knows?

Theaet. That were absurd, Socrates.

So. But must we say that he will read and count what he does not know, after allowing him to know all letters and all number?

Theaet. This again is unreasonable.

So. Would you have us state that, as to terms, we do not care at all in what way anybody likes to twist the words 'knowing' and 'learning;' but that since we defined 'possessing' knowledge to be one thing, 'having' it another, we say it is impossible for any one not to possess what he has acquired; so that it never happens that any one does not know what he knows, but it is possible to get hold of a false opinion concerning it: for it is possible not to
have the knowledge of this one, but of another in its stead, when chasing any of the sciences which flit from him, he mistakes and lays hold on one instead of another, as in the case when he thought eleven to be twelve, getting hold of the knowledge of eleven, instead of that of twelve, the ring-dove as it were within him instead of the pigeon?

Theae. Yes, that is reasonable.

So. But when he gets hold of that which he tries to take, shall we say, that then he is free from error and opines realities, and that in this way there is true and false opinion, and that none of the difficulties which we found in our foregoing arguments come in our way? Perhaps you will endorse my statement. Will you?

Theae. I will.

So. Then so far we are rid of the notion that people do not know what they know: for it no longer happens in any case not to possess what we do possess, whether deceived about it or not. And yet there seems to glance sideways on me a trouble still more formidable.

Theae. Of what nature?

So. Whether the interchange of cognitions will ever come to be false opinion.

Theae. How do you mean?

So. First, as to the notion of anybody’s having knowledge of a thing, and at the same time being ignorant of it, not by inacquaintance, but by his own knowledge: next, as to opining this to be one thing, and the other thing to be this—is it not the height of unreason, that, when knowledge is present the soul should recognize nothing, and be ignorant of everything? for on this principle there is nothing to prevent ignorance being present and causing one to know something, and blindness causing to see, if knowledge shall ever cause any one to be ignorant.
THEAETETUS.

Theae. Perhaps, Socrates, we did not arrange the birds well in placing sciences only, but we ought to have placed also nesciences flying about with them in the soul; and the chaser, at one time getting hold of a science, at another of a nescience, has about the same thing opinions false by nescience, true by science.

So. It is not easy, Theaetetus, to avoid praising you. But review your proposition. Suppose it as you state. He who lays hold on nescience, you say, will have false opinions. Is it so?

Theae. Yes.

So. He will not, I suppose, think he has false opinions?

Theae. How can he?

So. He will think he has true ones then, and as to things in which he is deceived, he will be in the same condition as if he knew them?

Theae. No doubt.

So. He will think that he has chased and got science, not nescience?

Theae. Evidently.

So. Accordingly, after a long circuit we have reached our original perplexity. Our critic will again laugh and say: 'My right worthy friends, will one who knows them both, science and nescience, suppose that which he knows to be the other which he knows? or knowing neither of them, does he imagine what he knows not to be the other which he knows not: or, knowing one but not the other, does he suppose the one he knows to be the one he knows not, or the one he knows not to be the one he knows? Or will you tell me again that there are also sciences of sciences and of nesciences, which he who possesses has shut up in some other ridiculous dove-cage or waxen
figment, and knows as long as he possesses them, even if he have them not ready to hand in his soul? and so will you be compelled to run round and round to the same point without gaining anything by it?’ What answer shall we give to these questions, Theaetetus?

Thea. Really, Socrates, I do not know what we ought to say.

So. Does not the argument, my boy, rebuke us justly, and show that we are wrong in leaving the question of knowledge, and investigating false opinion first? It is impossible to know this latter, before we have adequately settled what knowledge is.

Thea. At this point, Socrates, I must accept your view.

[Are we then to abandon the inquiry—‘what is knowledge?’ Theaetetus will not do so, if Socrates is ready to continue it; but he reverts to his second definition, that true opinion is knowledge. Socrates says that the whole profession of lawyers and orators gainsays this doctrine: for their whole business is to persuade dicasts that certain things which the dicasts did not personally witness, are true, and that they ought to decide accordingly. If they do so decide, and that rightly, they have formed a true opinion, which cannot be called knowledge, but the result of persuasion. Therefore true opinion and knowledge are not identical. Theaetetus now remembers that he once heard it said, that true opinion with rational explanation (νοησις) is knowledge. Things are unknowable, if they cannot be rationally defined: if they can, they are knowable.]

So. Returning to the original question, what is one to say that knowledge is? For we shall not give in yet, I suppose.

Thea. Certainly not, if you do not set the example.

So. Say then how we must define it in order to escape best from self-contradiction.
Theae. As we proposed in our foregoing discussion, Socrates. I have no other suggestion to make.

So. What was the definition?

Theae. That true opinion is knowledge. True opinion is, I suppose, free from error, and its results are all noble and good.

So. The man who led the way into the river, Theaeetus, said 'the trial will prove;' and if we search for this as we go, perhaps the fact will stop us and exhibit what we are looking for. If we stand still, we shall see nothing.

Theae. Right. Let us proceed and look out.

So. This look-out of ours will be a brief one: for a whole profession indicates that true opinion is not knowledge.

Theae. How so? What is that profession?

So. The profession of the mightiest in wisdom, who are called orators and lawyers. These men in their art persuade, not by teaching, but by making men opine whatever they will. Do you suppose there are any teachers clever enough, within the flowing of a little water, to teach adequately the truth of facts to certain persons, who were not present when they were robbed of money, or when they received some other violence?

Theae. I do not suppose they could; but they would persuade.

So. By persuading you mean, 'causing to form an opinion?'

Theae. Certainly.

So. When therefore dicasts are justly persuaded about things which can be known by seeing only, not otherwise, in that case, judging the things by what they hear, they judged without knowledge, though persuaded rightly, if their verdict was good?
Theae. Unquestionably.

So. If, my friend, true opinion and knowledge were the same, a perfect dicast would never form a right opinion without knowledge. But now it seems they are not one and the same.

Theae. As to this I had forgotten, Socrates, a thing which I once heard somebody say: but I now recollect it. He said that true opinion accompanied with rational explanation was knowledge, but unexplained opinion out of the sphere of knowledge: things of which there is no explanation are, he said, not knowable, using that very term; but those which have explanation are knowable.

So. Well said. But what distinction did he draw between these knowable and unknowable things? Tell me, that I may see whether you and I have heard the same version or not.

Theae. I am not sure that I can recall it: but, if another told it, I think I could follow him.

[Socrates says that he too has heard a similar definition, which he proceeds to explain by the analogy of words and letters. The primordial elements of things are not matters either of knowledge or of true opinion, or of rational explanation, but of sensible perception merely. An element can only be perceived and called by its name. You can give it neither predicate nor epithet: you cannot speak of it as 'being,' as 'this' or 'that' or 'each,' or 'single:' for so you add to it something foreign to itself, and it is no longer an element. But the compounds of these elements may be known and explained by enumerating the elements of which they are composed. And to do this is to furnish a rational explanation (Nògos) of them. Theaetetus accepts this statement, and repeats the new definition of knowledge stated in the preceding section. Socrates intimates that he is dissatisfied with the statement that elements are unknowable, while their compounds are knowable. He further proposes to discuss this question in reference to syllables and the letters or elements of which they are composed.]
So. Hear then dream for dream. Methought I heard some say that the primal elements, as it were, of which we and all other things are compounded, have no reason: for it is only possible to name each by itself, not to predicate anything else of it, either that it is or is not, as in such case 'being' or 'not-being' is attached: while it is wrong to ascribe either, if one is to speak of the thing itself alone. We must not, they say, ascribe the term 'self' or 'that' or 'each' or 'single' or 'this,' or many other like expressions: for these run about and are applied to all things, being different from the things to which they are attached. If the primal element were capable of being described, and had a proper description of its own, the fitting course would be, that it should be described apart from all others. Since, however, it is impossible for any one of the first rudiments to be defined in words, there is nothing for it except to be named only: name is all it has. But, as to the things compounded of these, as they are themselves complex, so also their names being combined constitute definition: for a complex of names is the essence of definition. Thus I dreamed that the elements are undescribed and unknown, but perceptible; while their combinations are known and expressed and conceived by true opinion. Whenever any one gains the true opinion of anything without definition, his soul is truthful with regard to it, but does not know it, for one who cannot give and receive a spoken account of anything is incognisant of it. But after adding such an account, he is capable of becoming all this, and is perfect in knowledge. Have you heard the dream thus or otherwise?

Theae. Exactly thus.

So. Are you content with it, and do you lay it down that true opinion combined with explanation is knowledge?
TRANSLATION.

Theae. Quite so.

So. Have we to-day, Theaetetus, in this manner found at last what from ancient time so many wise men have grown old without finding?

Theae. At all events, Socrates, I think our present statement a good one.

So. It may naturally seem so. For what can be called knowledge apart from definition and right opinion? Yet I am displeased with one of the things we said.

Theae. What was that?

So. One that seems to be stated very neatly, how that the elements are unknown, but the class of combinations known.

Theae. Is not that true?

So. We must see. For we have as hostages all the examples which he used in saying what he did.

Theae. What are they?

So. Letters and syllables. Do you think the speaker had anything but these in view when he said what we cite?

Theae. No: he thought of these.

[Assailing the new definition with reference to letters and syllables, and taking as an instance the first syllable of his own name, So, Socrates, by a short elenchus, proves that the syllable is not known, unless the letters sigma and omega are known also. But, starting a fresh argument, he suggests that possibly a syllable is a general notion having a nature independent of its letters. Theaetetus is willing to accept this view. Then, says Socrates, it can have no parts. Why? Because 'a whole' must mean 'all its parts.' Can a whole be a notion distinct from all its parts? Theaetetus ventures to say it can. Socrates asks if 'the all and the whole' are different. Theaetetus risks the answer: 'they are different.']

So. Let us then take and test them; or, rather test ourselves, whether we learnt letters on this principle or any
other. To begin: can syllables be defined, but letters not?

_Theae._ Probably.

_So._ I take the same view. If some one asked about the first syllable of Socrates for instance and said, 'Tell me, Theaetetus, what Ὠ is: how would you answer?

_Theae._ Sigma and Ωmega.

_So._ This then you hold to be the definition of the syllable?

_Theae._ I do.

_So._ Well now, tell me similarly the definition of Sigma.

_Theae._ How can one tell the elements of an element? For indeed, Socrates, Sigma is one of the consonants, a sort of noise only, as when the tongue hisses; Beta again has neither sound nor noise: nor have most of the letters. So they may very well be called undefined, as the clearest of them have sound alone, but no definition at all.

_So._ So much then, my friend, we have rightly determined concerning knowledge?

_Theae._ Apparently.

_So._ Well now? Have we rightly admitted that the letter is not known, but only the syllable?

_Theae._ Seemingly.

_So._ Do we now say that the syllable is both letters, or if there be more than two, all these, or some one idea arising from their combination?

_Theae._ I think we should say, all of them.

_So._ Take the case of two, Sigma and Ωmega. These two form the first syllable of my name. Does not one who knows the syllable know both?

_Theae._ To be sure.

_So._ He knows Sigma and Ωmega?
Theae. Yes.
So. How then? is he ignorant of each, and, knowing neither, does he know both?
Theae. That were strange and unreasonable, Socrates.
So. And yet, if a person must perforce know each, in order to know both, it is absolutely necessary for one who is ever to know a syllable, to know the letters first. And thus our beautiful argument will have run clear away from us.
Theae. Ay, and in a very sudden way.
So. We do not keep a good watch on it. Perhaps we ought to have laid it down that a syllable is not the letters themselves, but some notion arising from them, having one form belonging to itself, while another belongs to the separate letters.
Theae. Quite so. And perhaps this statement may be truer than the other.
So. We must consider the point, and not abandon in this cowardly way a great and dignified theory.
Theae. Surely not.
So. Suppose it be as we now say. The syllable is one general form arising from the harmonious adaptation of the several elements; both in grammar and everywhere else.
Theae. Very well.
So. Then there must be no parts of it.
Theae. Why?
So. Because, if a thing has parts, the whole must necessarily be all the parts. Or do you say that a whole formed of parts is a notion distinct from all its parts?
Theae. Yes, I do.
So. Do you call the all and the whole the same or different?
Theae. I have no clear view: but as you bid me answer readily, I take the risk of saying they are different.
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So. Your readiness, Theaetetus, is right. Whether the answer is so too, we must consider.

Theae. We must.

41 [The first eighteen questions of this section comprise an elenchus, by which Socrates compels Theaetetus to admit, that there is no difference between 'the all' and 'the whole,' and that both terms, in a thing that has parts, mean 'all the parts.' He then puts this alternative, which Theaetetus grants: if the syllable is not the letters, they are not its parts: if it is the same with them, both must be known equally. And it was to avoid this latter consequence that it was taken to be different. But what are the parts of syllables, if the letters are not? Theaetetus admits, that, if syllables have parts, these must be the letters. In that case, says Socrates, according to the doctrine assumed, a syllable must be a single form without parts. And in that case, he now proves, it must be elementary, and so undefinable and unknown. It is not true, therefore, that the syllable can be defined and known, unless the letters can be so likewise. This proof Socrates strengthens by the testimony of experience. In learning to read, did not Theaetetus endeavour to distinguish each individual letter? In learning music, did he not strive to distinguish each particular note; and are not the notes the elements of music? All this Theaetetus admits. And Socrates draws the conclusion, that elements may be known even more clearly than compounds (syllables).]

So. Will not the whole differ from the all, according to your present argument?

Theae. Yes.

So. Well now, is there any difference between all (plural) and the all (singular)? For instance, when we say, one, two, three, four, five, six, and if we say twice three or thrice two, or four and two, or three and two and one, do we in all these cases speak of the same or something different?

Theae. Of the same.
So. That is, six; is it not?

Theae. Yes.

So. In each form of speech we have spoken of all the six?

Theae. Yes.

So. Again, when we speak of all, do we not speak of one thing¹?

Theae. We must.

So. Is it not of the six?

Theae. Yes.

So. Do we predicate the same unity of all things consisting of number, whether under the term πᾶν or τὰ πᾶντα (in singular or plural form)?

Theae. Evidently.

So. Let us now state the question as follows: The number of the acre and the acre are the same; are they not?

Theae. Yes.

So. And so of the furlong?

Theae. Yes.

So. Again, the number of the camp and the camp, and all such things similarly? For the whole number is the essential whole in each case?

Theae. Yes.

So. And is not the number of each the parts of each?

Theae. Yes.

So. And all things which have parts will consist of parts?

Theae. Evidently.

So. And all the parts have been admitted to be the all, if the entire number is to be the all.

¹ Reading, with K. F. Hermann, ὁ ὁκὴ ἤν for ms ὁ ὅκηδεν.
Thea. True.
So. Then the whole does not consist of parts. For it would be the all, being all the parts?

Thea. Seemingly not.
So. But can any thing which is a part, be a part of any thing except of a whole?

Thea. Yes, of the all.
So. You show fight manfully, Theaetetus. But is it not in the very case when nothing is absent that the all is all?

So. And will not the whole be the very same thing—that from which nothing is anywhere absent? For that from which anything is absent, is neither a whole nor an all, each of these being equally constituted by the same combination of parts.

Thea. I now think there is no difference between an all and a whole.

So. Did we not say, that whenever a thing has parts, the whole and all will mean all the parts?

Thea. Certainly.

So. Again: to resume my late essay, if the syllable is not the letters, does it not follow that it has not the letters for its parts, or if it be the same with them, it must be known equally with them?

Thea. Yes.

So. Was it not to obviate this result that we defined it to be different from them?

Thea. Yes.

So. Well, if the letters are not parts of a syllable, have you any other things to name, which are parts of a syllable, besides its letters?

Thea. By no means. For if I allowed it to have
parts, it would be ridiculous to abandon the letters, and seek anything else.

So. Decidedly, Theaetetus, according to the present view a syllable must be a single generality without parts.

Thea. Seemingly.

So. Do you remember, my friend, that a short time back we accepted the statement, deeming it a good one, that of the primal elements, of which all things are composed, there is no definition, because each by itself is uncompounded, and that it is not right to apply to it the term 'is,' nor yet 'this,' which are alien and foreign to it; and this cause makes such element undefinable and unknown?

Thea. I remember.

So. Is there any other cause than this of its being simple and indivisible? I see no other.

Thea. Apparently none.

So. Accordingly, the syllable is shown to belong to the same class as the element, if it has no parts, and is one general notion?

Thea. Undoubtedly.

So. If then the syllable has many letters, and is a certain whole, and they are its parts, syllables and letters are alike knowable and utterable, since 'all the parts' were shown to be the same with the whole?

Thea. Assuredly.

So. But if it is one and indivisible, both syllable and letter are equally undefinable and unknowable: for the same cause will make them both so?

Thea. I cannot contradict you.

So. Let us not accept this statement from anybody, that a syllable can be known and expressed, but not a letter.
Theae. We must not, if we concur with the argument.

So. Yet further: would you not rather accept the opposite view, from knowing what happened to yourself when you learnt to read?

Theae. What is that?

So. That all you went on doing in the course of learning was, to try to distinguish each individual letter as you saw and heard it, that their order might not confuse you when they were spoken and written.

Theae. Very true.

So. And did not a complete instruction at your music-master's mean the being able to follow each note, and say what string answered to it? These everybody would own to be properly called the elements of music.

Theae. Yes.

So. So far then as we have experience of letters and syllables, if from these cases we may draw inferences as to others, we shall say that the class of elements admits of a knowledge much clearer than the syllable, and more important for the perfect mastery of each study; and, if any one shall say that the syllable is naturally known, but the element unknown, we shall think he is joking or talking nonsense?

Theae. Undoubtedly.

42 [Recurring to the third definition of knowledge proposed by Theaetetus—true opinion with rational explanation (NTyanos)—Socrates now criticises this adjunct. What does it mean? Three answers may be given. (1) It may simply mean—speech. Well; but all who are not born deaf and dumb speak sooner or later; and all true opinion will carry speech with it; and so it can never be separate from knowledge. (2) NTyanos may mean the power of describing anything by the elements of which it consists. Hesiod says: 'a wagon has a hundred
But you and I, says Socrates, cannot detail these: we describe a wagon by certain known parts: axle, wheels, body, yoke, &c. Thus we have a right opinion about it: but, as we cannot enumerate the elements, we have not the full knowledge. Or again, in the case of spelling: perhaps somebody can spell the name Theaetetus quite correctly, having a true opinion about it, and being able to enumerate its syllables correctly: but, when another name, Theodorus, is in question, he is found to spell it wrongly (writing Te for Θε) This proves that his true opinion in the former instance did not amount to knowledge: and thus again we find 'true opinion with rational explanation' to fall short of knowledge.

So. Other proofs of this fact might be shewn, I think; but let us not for their sake forget to keep in view the proposed topic, namely, what is meant by saying that true opinion combined with rational explanation is the most perfect knowledge.

Theaetetus. We must keep it in view.

So. Well now, what does the term explanation indicate to us? I think it means one of three things.

Theaetetus. What are they?

So. The first will be—making one's meaning clear through the voice with verbs and nouns, imaging opinion in the stream through the voice as in a mirror or in water. Do you not consider explanation to be something of this sort?

Theaetetus. I do. We say therefore that one who does so explains.

So. This however is not everybody able to do sooner or later,—to shew what he thinks about anything—if he is not born deaf or dumb? and so all those who have any right opinion, will appear to have with it the faculty of explanation, and right opinion will thus nowhere be formed without knowledge.

Theaetetus. True.
So. Let us not however lightly pronounce sentence on him who defined knowledge in the way we are now considering—that he is guilty of talking nonsense. Perhaps he did not mean to say this, but rather the being able, when asked what anything is, to make answer to the questioner in terms of its elements.

Theae. Instance what you mean, Socrates.

So. As Hesiod speaking of a wagon says, 'A wagon consists of a hundred planks.' I cannot describe them, probably you cannot. If we were asked what a wagon is, we should be content if we could say, wheels, axle, body, seat, yoke.

Theae. Quite so.

So. The questioner might perhaps think us ridiculous, as he would if being asked your name and making answer by syllables,—while all we thought and said was right—we deemed that as skilful grammarians we had in mind and stated grammatically the definition of the name Theaetetus; though the fact is that nobody can define anything with knowledge, until he fully describe it in its elements with true opinion; as was before, I think, laid down.

Theae. It was.

So. So too he might consider, with respect to a wagon, that we have right opinion indeed, but that one who was able to detail its nature by those hundred planks, had, through this addition, joined explanation to true opinion, and instead of opinion had got technical knowledge about the nature of a wagon, having fully described the whole in its elements.

Theae. Do you not think his opinion good, Socrates?

So. If you think so, my friend, and accept this view, that the full description of everything by its elements is
explanation, but the description by syllables or anything more comprehensive is failure of explanation, tell me so, that we may criticize it.

_Thea_. I quite accept that view.

_So_. Do you accept it under the belief that a person is cognisant of anything when he thinks that the same thing sometimes belongs to the same, sometimes to another, or when he thinks that to the same thing at one time one thing belongs, at another time another?

_Thea_. I believe nothing of the sort.

_So_. Do you forget that, when you learnt your letters at first, you and the other scholars did such things?

_Thea_. Do you mean that we thought first one letter, then another, belonged to the same syllable, and that we assigned the same letter sometimes to its proper syllable, sometimes to another?

_So_. That is what I mean.

_Thea_. No, I do not forget; nor do I consider that they who are in this condition have yet acquired knowledge.

_So_. Well, when a child of that age writing 'Theaetetus,' thinks he ought to write, and does write 'theta' and 'epsilon,' and again attempting to write Theodorus thinks he ought to write and does write 'tau' and 'epsilon,' shall we say that he knows the first syllable of your names?

_Thea_. It has been just allowed that such an one does not yet know.

_So_. Is there anything to hinder the same child from making a similar error in respect of the second, third, and fourth syllables?

_Thea_. Nothing at all.

_So_. Will one who has in mind the description by
elements write 'Theaetetus' with true opinion, whenssoever he writes it in just order?

_Theae._ Evidently.

_So._ Being still without knowledge, though having right opinion, do we say?

_Theae._ Yes.

_So._ And yet he unites explanation with right opinion: for he wrote that description by elements which we admitted to be rational explanation?

_Theae._ True.

_So._ And thus, my friend, there is a right opinion with explanation, which we cannot yet call knowledge.

_Theae._ Apparently.

43 [There remains (3) a third meaning of λόγος, viz. a mark of difference by which anything is shown to be distinct from everything else. It is said that, while you perceive only those features which the thing has in common with others, you have true opinion of it only: but that, when you add those which are peculiar to it and characteristic, then you have the knowledge of it. Socrates proves this to be fallacious. You have not a true opinion about anybody or anything, until you are cognisant of the peculiarities in your object. Hence it follows that such a λόγος is already included in true opinion, and that, if an adjunct to this, it is merely superfluous and absurd. So then, says Socrates, all our three attempts to define knowledge have failed. Have you any other conception, Theaetetus? No, says the youth: you have already helped me to say much more than was in my own mind.]

_So._ So we seem only to have dreamt we were rich in thinking we had the truest explanation of knowledge. Or must we suspend this charge? Somebody, perhaps, will not define 'explanation' thus: but rather as the remaining form of those three, one or other of which we said would
be taken as 'explanation,' by one who defined knowledge to be 'true opinion with explanation.'

Thaeæ. You justly remind me. There was one form left. The first was the image, as it were, of thought in utterance: the second, now discussed, was the road to the whole through the elements. What do you call the third?

So. That which most people would define as being able to mention some sign by which the thing in question differs from all others.

Thaeæ. Can you give me an instance of any such explanation of anything?

So. Yes, one which, if you like, I think you may competently accept concerning the sun, that it is the brightest of the bodies which travel in the heaven round the earth.

Thaeæ. Certainly.

So. Now learn why this is said. The fact is, as we were lately saying, that, if you take the difference between each individual and all others, you will get a definition, as some say: but, as long as you lay hold of some common feature only, your account will be about those things which have that community.

Thaeæ. I understand. And I think it right to call such a process definition.

So. But whosoever with right opinion about any thing learns furthermore its difference from others, will have gained knowledge of that of which before he had opinion.

Thaeæ. Yes, we state it so.

So. Now then most decidedly, Theactetus, since I have come near to our proposition, as it were to a drawing, I do not understand it in the least. As long as I stood at a distance from it, there appeared to be some sense in it.
Theaetetus. What do you mean by this?
So. I will tell you, if I can. Having a right opinion of you, if I add to this your definition, I know you; if not, I have opinion of you only.
Theaetetus. Yes.
So. And the definition was the interpretation of your distinction.
Theaetetus. Even so.
So. When I was opining only, was it not the case that I did not grasp with my mind any of the points in which you differ from others?
Theaetetus. Seemingly.
So. Then I was taking note of some of the common features, which belong no more to you than to other people?
Theaetetus. Of course.
So. Now do pray tell me: in such a case how will you more than anybody else have been conceived by me? Suppose me to imagine that this is Theaetetus, whoever is a man, and has a nose and eyes and mouth, and any other individual member. Will this imagination cause me to conceive Theaetetus more than Theodorus, or, proverbially speaking, any rapscallion whatever?
Theaetetus. How can it?
So. Or, if I imagine him having not only nose and eyes, but also as the one who has a flat nose and prominent eyes, shall I have a notion of you more than of myself, or of any other with these features?
Theaetetus. No.
So. Theaetetus, I fancy, will not be conceived in my mind until this flatness of nose shall have stamped and deposited in my heart some memorial different from all other snubnesses of nose seen by me (I might say the same of all
your other features), which shall bring you to my mind, if I meet you to-morrow, and make me to have right opinion about you.

_Theae._ Most true.

_So._ Right opinion then in each case will be concerned with differentiation.

_Theae._ Evidently.

_So._ What then will be 'the adding explanation to right opinion?' For if it means, to add an opinion of the manner in which one thing differs from all others, this direction becomes utterly ridiculous.

_Theae._ How?

_So._ Of things whereof we have a right opinion as to the nature of their difference from others, it bids us add a right opinion of the nature of their difference from others. And thus the proverbial twirl of the scytal or the pestle or anything else would be a mere trifle compared with this direction: nay it might more fairly be called a blind man's direction: for to bid us add what we have got already, that we may learn what we think already, is a splendid illustration of a man groping in the dark.

_Theae._ Tell me now what answer you meant to give to your last question.

_So._ If bidding us to add explanation is bidding us to know distinction,—not to have an opinion of distinction—the finest of our definitions of knowledge will turn out to be a nice sort of thing. For to know is, I suppose, to get knowledge. Is it not?

_Theae._ Yes.

_So._ Then, if asked, it seems, what knowledge is, a person will reply that it is right opinion with a knowledge of difference: for the addition of explanation will mean this in his view.

K. P.
THEAETETUS.

Theae. Seemingly.

So. Yet it is utterly silly, when we are seeking knowledge, to say that it is right opinion with knowledge whether of difference or of anything else. So, Theaetetus, neither sensible perception, nor true opinion, nor explanation accompanying true opinion will be knowledge.

Theae. Seemingly not.

So. Do we still conceive anything and feel throes, my friend, about knowledge, or have we given birth to everything?

Theae. By all that's sacred, Socrates, with your help I have said more than I had in my own mind.

So. And does not our art declare that all these products have turned out to be wind, and not worth rearing?

Theae. Decidedly so.

44 [Well, Theaetetus, says Socrates in conclusion, the discussion of to-day will have done you good service in every way. You will cease to think you know things which you do not know, and your future conceptions will be consequently truer. Also you will be a more amiable companion, more willing to tolerate the mistakes of other disputants. I must now leave you, to keep an appointment with my accuser Melitus. To-morrow, Theodorus, let us meet here again.]

So. Well, Theaetetus, if you seek to become, and do become, pregnant with other thoughts hereafter, the present enquiry will have improved your conceptions; and, if you do not, you will be less severe to your associates, more mild and temperate, not supposing that you know what you do not know. So much only as this my art can do, no more. Nor do I know any of the things which others do, who are—and have made themselves—great and
wondrous men. This midwifery I and my mother received as our function from God, she to practise it on women, I on young, noble and beautiful men.

Now, however, I must encounter Melitus and his indictment against me at the Porch of the King. In the morning, Theodorus, let us meet again here.

44  1 The indictment against Socrates for impiety was brought by his accusers Anytus and Melitus in the court of the ᾨχων βασιλεύς, situated at the στόα thence called βασιλική, the Porch of the King.
APPENDED NOTES.

[The references are (1) to chapters in translation; (2) to pages in text and translation; (3) to pages in Ed. I. of Stephens, as shown in margin of text.]

5 pp. 10, 109. St. i.47. D. περὶ δύναμεών τι ἡμῖν Θεό-δωρος ὁδὲ ἔγραφε, τῆς τε τρισδιάστημα πέρι καὶ πεντεποθυός ἀποθεομένων ὁπτὶ μῆκει οὐ ἔγραμεν τῇ ποδίαί, 'Theodorus was describing to us something about powers, proving as to the root of 3 and root of 5, that they are not in length commensurable with the foot-unit;' i.e. shewing that $\sqrt{3}$ is greater than 1 and less than 2, and that $\sqrt{5}$ is greater than 2 and less than 3; that therefore they do not contain unity so many times; that they are fractions, not integers. With ποδίαι understand γραμματί.

H. Schmidt in his Exegetic Commentary tries to shew that what Theodorus taught was a corollary to the Pythagorean Theorem (Euclid i. 47); that δύναμες mean the powers $a^2$, $b^2$ &c. as in modern algebra, and that ποδίαι here is a unit square $a^2$, by which the squares of a series of hypotenuses of right-angled triangles, having for their kathetes $a$ and the foregoing hypotenuse, are all commensurable: since

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$b^2 = 2a^2, c^2 = 3a^2, d^2 = 4a^2$, &c. Theodorus may have taught this truth, but it is certainly not introduced here, as the word μῆκει proves, shewing ποδιαλα to be the linear foot-unit. And that δυνάμεις mean roots, not the modern 'powers,' is clear from what follows 148 ά, δοσά δὲ τὸν ετερομήκη, δυνάμεις, ὡς μῆκει μὲν οὐ ἔννομέτρους ἐκεῖναισ, τοῖς δ' ἐπιπέδοις ὄ δύνανται, i.e. $\sqrt{3}, \sqrt{5}$ &c. are called 'powers,' because they have power, when squared, to form areas which are commensurable with the squares 4, 9, 16, 25, &c. So Professors Jowett and Campbell.

The words in which Plato recites the famous doctrine of Protagoras on the relativity of knowledge (μέτρον ἄνθρωπος, homo mensura) are probably cited from that philosopher's treatise called Ἄληθεια, Truth. But the identification of it with the suggestion of Theaetetus that knowledge is sensuous perception, I suppose with Grote, (Plato, π. p. 323 note) to be Plato's own view, which Grote considers unjust, contending at some length against it (322—336). His main argument is, that implication of object and subject is universal, affecting Noumena as well as Phaenomena: 'cogitata' suppose a 'cogitans,' as much as 'sensibilia' suppose a 'sentiens.' Therefore Protagoras would not have limited the application of his maxim to ἄνθρωπος alone. We must concur with Grote in lamenting that we get the statements and arguments of Protagoras at second hand only; and that the views of others, as of Heracleitus and his great opponent Parmenides, are known to us only in fragments and citations, and from the late biographies of Diogenes Laertius.

Socrates means: as Protagoras applies his doctrine to man generally, he applies it to you and me, seeing that we are men.
APPENDED NOTES.

pp. 16, 117. St. 152 B.C. By the illustration here used Socrates proves that the maxim of Protagoras means that what appears to any one 'is' to him: and, as appearance implies perception, it follows that perception is knowledge.

pp. 16, 118. St. 152 C. "Δρ' οὖν κ.τ.λ. Why this outburst? Socrates has just drawn from Theaetetus the admission that ἀισθησις τοῦ ὄντος ἐστί, perception is of the existent, of that which 'is.' But the Heracleitean doctrine does not allow that anything 'is' (ἐστί) but says that all things γέγραπται 'come to be.' And Protagoras in his Ἀλήθεια adopts this: so we must infer from what follows. What? says Socrates: did Protagoras then teach an obscure exoteric doctrine (γι'εξατο) to the multitude, and tell the truth in esoteric confidence (ἐν ἀποφρήτῳ ἑλεγεν) to his disciples? Did he teach the one to believe in ὄντα, the others in nothing but γιγνόμενα? Αἰσθησθαι, 'to speak in riddles,' is used of obscure or purposely veiled language. That Plato considered the doctrines which now follow to be involved in the teaching of Protagoras, is evident; indeed he distinctly says so; nor can we doubt that he had foundation for his statement in the writings of that sophist. But it is evident also that he does not here quote his precise words: and it must always be doubtful how far Protagoras was committed to all the refinements of the Heracleitean school, which appear in the next passage and afterwards.

pp. 17, 119. The Platonic complication of the three doctrines (1) the Heracleitean (ὅν εἶναι κινεῖται τῷ πάντα) (2) the Protagorean (πάντων χρημάτων ἀνθρώπων μέτρων εἴναι) and that put forth by Theaetetus (ἀισθησις ἑπιστήμης γέγραπται) is summarised below. 15. pp. 28, 135. The following observations of Grote (Plato, ii. p. 324) deserve special attention, and supply a valuable key to the difficulties occurring in Plato's treatment of this subject from 9 to 15
and again from 15 to 30, where the definition ἀετθησις is finally abandoned. 'Upon all the three opinions, thus represented as cognate or identical, Sokrates bestows a lengthened comment (occupying a half of the dialogue).... His strictures are not always easy to follow with assurance, because he often passes with little notice from one to the other of the three doctrines which he is examining: because he himself, though really opposed to them, affects in part to take them up and to suggest arguments in their favour: and further because, disclaiming all positive opinion of his own, he sometimes leaves us in doubt what is his real purpose—whether to expound or to deride the opinions of others—whether to enlighten Theaetetus, or to test his power of detecting fallacies. We cannot always distinguish between the ironical and the serious. Lastly, it is a still greater difficulty that we have not before us any one of the three opinions as set forth by their proper supporters.'

12 pp. 21, 125. St. 155 E. τῶν ἀμυνητῶν. Prof. Campbell in his learned Introduction to this dialogue examines at large the question, who are the men whom Plato glances at here in such uncomplimentary language. Had he in mind Antisthenes and the Cynics? or Democritus and the Atomists? If Plato had either of these two schools in view, it seems more probable that these were the followers of Democritus. The γηγενεῖς mentioned in the Sophistes (p. 246 &c.) are evidently the same as the σκηνηροὶ καὶ ἀντίτυποι (ἐν μᾶλ' ἀμυνοσοὶ) in this place. See Campbell, pp. xx, xxx.

pp. 22, 126. St. 156 D. I must retract the partial favour which my notes in the text and translation shew to the interpolated words of Cornarius. I find the view taken by Prof. Campbell and Prof. Jowett supported also by H. Schmidt (though Müller in his German translation
renders the words of Cornarius, and Steinhart does not contradict him): to which authorities I have to add an opinion which I highly value, that of my friend and former pupil Mr R. D. Archer-Hind, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. I had never felt disposed to follow Bekker in printing the passage as an unquestioned portion of the text; yet I hardly know that I regret having given my readers the opportunity of seeing and estimating that which conciliated the favour of so many eminent scholars. My own judgment in a case of this kind I regard as of little or no value.

20 pp. 35, 144. St. 166 A. Socrates, who up to this point has seemed to play with the doctrine of his intended victim Protagoras, as a cat with a wretched mouse, sometimes expounding and apparently supporting it, but only to strike it immediately with a harder blow, now professes to make a formal defence of it in the name of its author, for the express purpose of obliging Theodorus to take his turn in the dialogue, instead of Theaetetus, and submit to an elenchus, in defence of his old friend Protagoras.

Τὸν ἐμὲ is an assumption of dignity: 'a man like me.'

26 pp. 52, 166. St. 179 A. if he had tried...a man's own self.' In this translation we follow the reading εἰ πῦ τοὺς συνόντας ἐπειθεν instead of the vulgate εἰ μὴ. Prof. Campbell, though he keeps εἰ μὴ in the text, accepts emendation in his note, but prefers εἰ δὴ. I can have no doubt that αὐτὸς must not be referred to Protagoras by reading αὐτῷ after it, but that the sense must be as I have given it, αὐτὸς αὐτῷ, 'a man's own self.' So Prof. Jowett (who also reads δὴ) 'every one for himself.'

28 pp. 56, 172. St. 182 B. ἀλλὰ εἰ ἀμφισέβεια κ.τ.λ. The meaning of this passage can be none other than what is given in my translation, which is the same as Prof.
Jowett's in effect. But how the Greek construction is to be explained is doubtful. Prof. Campbell's note gives very faint assistance, and neither Heindorf's ἐαυτῶν for ἀμφοτέρων, nor ἀποφιλοκτόμενα for ἀποφιλοκτοντα, fully satisfy. All we can say of the place is—medicam manum expectat.

33 pp. 82, 209. St. 201, C. It is commonly supposed that the words εἰπόντος τοῦ ἀκούσας refer to Antisthenes.

44 As respects the definition of knowledge, this dialogue only arrives at certain negative conclusions; namely, that knowledge is neither perception, nor true opinion, nor true opinion combined with rational explanation. Yet, in the course of it, Plato has achieved certain objects, which he had in mind, and which he valued. For (1) he has paid a debt of gratitude to his Megarian friends and hosts, Euclides and Terpsion; (2) he has shewn what he afterwards declared by his inscription on the Academy, μηδείς ἀγεωφρέτητος εἰσίτω, that mathematical studies (i.e. exact science) are a necessary avenue to mental studies (i.e. to transcendental or abstract science); (3) he has shewn that minds capable of pursuing the former with success are not necessarily capable of mastering the latter: this he indicates by the nature of Theodorus, which is unphilosophic, as compared with that of Theaetetus, who is an apt student of philosophy; (4) he has confuted doctrines (Protagorean and Heracleitean), which he considers erroneous and mischievous, and has exhibited the errors of the great leader of that sophistic band, which he had, from his master Socrates, a mission to combat and defeat; (5) he has found a noble opportunity to develope those moral and political doctrines, as to the struggle of philosophic truth against fallacious rhetoric, which he mooted in the Gorgias, and developed more fully in the Republic at a later time; (6) he does achieve a positive result by the victorious
assertion of a central seat of thought, to which all perceptions are conveyed, and so converted into ideas: this is ἐν ἡμῖν, the soul of man. The subsequent elenchi, which confute the second and third definitions attempted by Theodorus, seem to me little more than gladiatorial word-fights, intended by Plato to exercise and display the dialectic skill which he had acquired at Megara, and at the same time to amuse and puzzle the minds of his readers by the parables or myths of the waxen tablet and the dove-cage. But he may have had more serious aims in these elenchi than are obvious to my mind.
7 DAY USE