Δῶρον λάβῃ ἥτις ἀξιωτάθη τόδε.
χάρις χάριν γὰρ ἐετίν ἡ τίκτογε̇  ἅει.
INTRODUCTION.

I. The dialogues of Plato, which I chose, from time to time, for the school work of my Sixth Form, were chiefly the Protagoras, the Euthydemus, and the Hippias Major; since this last, if not Platonic, is very amusing and instructive. But I seldom allowed any of my foremost boys to leave school without reading with them privately in the evenings the Theaetetus also, as the best preparative for their deeper study of Plato and of Greek philosophy in general: often adding to it the earlier books (1—4) of Aristotle's Ethics. In the past year, 1880, I took it for the subject of my Cambridge Lectures, reading a translation to my class, and commenting as occasion required. This was executed in the first instance quite independently, without reference to Professor Jowett's version; but in revising my translation for the press I have compared the two, with frequent advantage, as might be expected, to the correction of my own work. Still the result is, that I have generally departed less widely from the literal Greek than my confrère in the Sister University: and the reason of this is evident:
the Master of Balliol has translated for the instruction of all English-speaking students of Plato, whether Greek scholars or not: I for the special convenience of Greek students in Universities.

II. The order of Plato's writings, and the genuineness of many, are questions respecting which the varieties of opinion and the controversies resulting, chiefly within the present century, have been so many and so discordant, as to prove that no certainty can be reached on either point. Schleiermacher's translation with its prefaces (first published 1804—1810) was the trumpet-call of the warfare which has gone on ever since. His elaborate attempt to arrange the dialogues on a systematic principle of nascent and ever growing philosophic doctrine has not been fully accepted by any of the scholars who have since published their views, Ast, Socher, Stallbaum, K. F. Hermann, Steinhart, Susemihl, Suckow, Munk, Bonitz, Ueberweg, Schaarschmidt and others: while Ritter Brandis and Zeller, historians of Greek philosophy, are less unfavourable to the principle of Schleiermacher, though not admitting it in its details. Out of 35 or 36 dialogues usually set down as Plato's, Ast will only accept 14 as genuine; viz. (1) Protagoras, Phaedrus, Gorgias, Phaedo: (2) Theaetetus, Sophista, Politicus, Parmenides, Cratylus: (3) Philebus, Symposium, Republica, Timaeus, Critias: in this order. Thus he even rejects the Leges, though cited by Aristotle. This may be considered the extreme opinion on the sceptical side, as Grote in his work on 'Plato and the other companions of Socrates' represents the extreme credulous
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view, supporting the Alexandrine canon of Thrasyllus, a grammarian of the Augustan age, cited by Diogenes of Laerta. This canon rejected ten dialogues, which Diogenes enumerates; and these have since then been universally treated as spurious. Some of them did not survive: seven are printed at the close of the Tauchnitz edition and by Bekker, along with the 13 Epistles (which Grote, differing from most scholars, accepts as genuine) and the Definitions (ὅροι). Thrasyllus distributed the dialogues of Plato into two classes; (1) d. of Investigation (ζητητικοί); (2) d. of Exposition (ὑφηγητικοί). These he also subdivided variously: but his subdivisions have little interest. The chronological order of the dialogues, like the genuineness of many, is a much disputed question on some points: strikingly so respecting the date of the Phaedrus, which Schleiermacher, as an essential feature in his system, deems the earliest; while others, as Stallbaum and Steinhart, place it among the latest.

Generally it may be said that the shorter and slighter dialogues, when accepted as genuine, are ascribed to Plato's youth; the Republic, Timaeus and Leges are universally admitted to be the latest: while the Theaetetus, Sophista and Politicus (usually too the Parmenides and Cratylus) are supposed to have been written by Plato during his travels or on his return—at all events before his 40th year.

The following arrangement is that of a critic who had evidently given much time and thought, with great zeal, to the elucidation of these questions; I mean K. F. Hermann. He, in common with most
writers on this subject, distributes the works which he accepts into three groups: (1) the earlier, composed partly before the death of Socrates B.C. 399, partly after it, before Plato quitted Megara: (2) those written under the influence of the Megarian dialectic, during or immediately after the years of travel: (3) the later, commencing with the Phaedrus, and going on during the second half of Plato's career, while he was scholarch of the Academy, from 386 (probably) till his death in 347.

(1) Hippias II. 
Ion 
Alcibiades I. 
Charmides 
Lysis 
Laches 
Protagoras 
Euthydemus 
Apologia Socr.* 
Crito e 
Gorgias 
Euthyphro 
Meno 
Hippias I.

(2) Cratylus e 
Theaetetus 
Sophistes e 
Politicus e 
Parmenides.

(3) Phaedrus e 
Menexenus* 
Symposium e 
Phaedo e 
Philebus e 
Respublica e 
Timaeus e 
Critias e 
Leges e.

Those to which e is appended are classed by Grote as dialogues of exposition; the rest are of investigation (zetetic) except the two with asterisks, which are of neither kind. Grote accepts seven others which Hermann disallows.
It is satisfactory to gather from these notices that the Theaetetus is admitted on all hands to be a genuine work of Plato. It is almost universally ascribed to his age of manhood, and to a time when (having imbibed before his 27th year the lore and didactic skill of Socrates, having in the subtle discussions of Megara had full opportunity of practising the dialectic method) he had enlarged his learning and experience by intercourse with the mathematicians of Cyrene and the Pythagorean schoolmen of Italy. The dialogues called Sophistes and Politicus are connected with the Theaetetus, and their genuineness is generally admitted, though the Sophistes is disallowed by Ueberweg.

III. A preface to the Theaetetus would be incomplete without some account of antecedent Hellenic philosophy. But in a preface, even to Plato's works, much more to a single dialogue, such an account must be brief and eclectic. Some topics must be placed in stronger light, and more fully considered than others. What are these?

(1) In the first place, Socrates is an interlocutor in all Plato's dialogues, excepting 'the Laws': and in most of them (though not in the Sophistes) we find him discussing, more or less, some principle or practice of those who are called Sophists. With Socrates himself therefore, with his method, and with the Sophists and their doctrines, a young student will do well to make acquaintance, before he enters upon any of Plato's writings.

(2) In several of Plato's works (as in the Theaete-
tus) appears the contrast between (1) the physical teaching of the Eleatic School (Melissus, Parmenides, Zeno), the forerunner of pantheism, in which the universe is one Being (Ens) at rest, and (2) that of Heracleitus of Ephesus, who taught Becoming in the place of Being, Many rather than One, Motion and Change instead of Rest, ascribing such motion to the flow of a prevailing fiery element (πάντα βεί). Distinct again from these were (1) the teaching of Empedocles of Agrigentum, who took the concord of four elements (fire, air, earth, water) as the base of existence; (2) that of the Atomists, Leucippus and Democritus, who ascribed the origin of things to the fortuitous concurrence in space of small indivisible particles (ἄτομα); (3) that of Anaxagoras, who assigned the arrangement of his ὀμοιομέρεια to supreme Intelligence (νοῦς). All these philosophers had been preceded by two other famous schools in the 6th century B.C.: (1) the Ionian (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes), who imagined the primary substance of things to be—the first, Water, the second, Indeterminate Matter (τὸ ἄπειρον), the third, Air: (2) the Italic sect of Pythagoras, which lasted long, and formed a powerful order. This school ascribed marvellous organic properties to Number, and believed in the transmigration of souls. All the philosophers above-named, from Thales to Anaxagoras, flourished during the century and a half anterior to the age of Socrates (600—440 B.C.), though their exact dates are uncertain.

Zeller, whose views are welcomed by Professor
Jowett, maintains that all these various schools were engaged in teaching purely physical doctrines; for that even the seeming abstractions, assumed as primal by the Pythagoreans the Eleatics and Anaxagoras (Number, Being, Intellect), were not understood by them as absolutely incorporeal. See Zeller’s Presocratic Philosophy (translated by Alleyne); also Preller’s Historia Philosophiae (for citation of passages), Schweppler’s History of Philosophy (translated by Stirling), and the fuller work of Ueberweg (published by Messrs Hodder and Stoughton).

IV. Socrates is said by Cicero to have called down philosophy from heaven; by which is meant that Socrates was the first to change the direction of philosophical studies in Hellas; to divert them from the universe to man himself, from cosmogony to anthropology. But this credit belongs rather to that school of thinkers with whom Socrates was most at war, to those who are called Sophists: especially to Protagoras the eldest and most influential of their number—the author of the famous dogma ‘man is the measure of all things,’ in other words, ‘what seems to each is to each.’ Protagoras was born at Abdera in Thrace, and flourished B.C. 450—430. Gorgias of Leontini was contemporary, but lived to a great age, dying 380. Prodicus of Ceos flourished 435. Others of note were Hippias of Elis, Polus, Thrasymachus, and the brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. They professed to teach all subjects of liberal education; philosophy, rhetoric, language, logical eristic, &c.: and they travelled from city to
city, exacting and obtaining large fees for the instruction given. This instruction was calculated, as they declared, to acquaint their pupils with the progress of human civilization, to free them from prejudices, to give breadth and strength to their mental faculties, to make them wise thinkers and fluent speakers, to teach them how to form just opinions on public affairs, how to manage their own property, and to deal with mankind in general.

In mentioning this famous Sophistic school, so far as it deserves to be called a school, we may note the fate which has attended the name itself and its derived words. Sophist, sophistical, sophism, sophistry, sophistication, are all of them terms used to designate what is delusive and false. A similar discredit in modern times attaches to the words jesuit, jesuitical, jesuitry, jesuitism. So the words heresy, heretic, heresiarch, heretical, are now never used except in a vituperative sense. Yet Sophist was a creditable name originally: it is given by Herodotus to the Seven Sages and to Pythagoras. Jesuit simply means a member of the Society of Jesus, such title being allowed by the Pope (who calls himself ‘Vicar of Jesus Christ on earth’) to the Order of Ignatius Loyola, for the enhancement of its dignity and credit. Heresy \((\alpha\iota\rho\epsilon\sigma\upsilon\varsigma, \text{choice})\) merely meant the Latin ‘secta,’ a sect; and Clement of Alexandria calls the Catholic Church itself ‘the best of all heresies’ (sects). Each of these terms therefore acquired its evil sense, partly, no doubt, by errors and faults of those who bore them, partly by the charges and invectives of powerful ene-
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mics. Undoubtedly the Sophists, as a class, found their most powerful enemy in Plato: and upon his dialogues (especially the Euthydemus, Gorgias, Hippias I. and Sophistes) the principal charges against them as a class originally rest. In the great historian of Greece, Mr Grote, they have found their most powerful champion and rehabilitater; their cause being likewise pleaded strongly by the late Mr Lewes in his History of Philosophy. All Greek students have in their hands Grote’s History; and they may be referred to that work for a general statement of the case on both sides; but more particularly to the facts and arguments urged by him as counsel (so to say) for the defendants in Part II. Ch. lxvii. On the other side, as not fully agreeing with Mr Grote’s strong championship, may be consulted Thirlwall’s History of Greece, Ferrier’s Lectures, and Professor Jowett’s prefaces to the Platonic Dialogues, especially his preface to the Sophistes.

V. Besides the Academic school of Plato and his successors, philosophic schools of minor influence were founded by three other pupils of Socrates. These were Antisthenes, Aristippus, and Eucleides. Antisthenes taught at Athens in the gymnasium called Cynosarges, whence his school was called that of the Cynics. He held that virtue alone suffices for happiness, anticipating the later Stoic doctrines. Diogenes of Sinope, whose interview with Alexander the Great is so famous, was the best known member of

1 Grote’s views are supported by Mr H. Sidgwick in two able papers printed in the Cambridge Journal of Philology (Nos. viii. ix.).
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this school. Aristippus of Cyrene founded the Cyrenaic or Hedonic school, which taught that pleasure is the supreme good of man, thus forerunning the later teaching of Epicurus. Eucleides of Megara founded the short-lived Megaric school, which is said to have taught a fusion of Eleatic and Socratic doctrines. Dialectic was among its special studies, and was occasionally carried to the excess known as Eristic. Many curious puzzles of thought are ascribed to its disciples. Of these three schools see a brief account in Schwegler's History of Philosophy (Transl. p. 53), and consult also the larger work of Ueberweg (Vol. I. §§ 34—38). It was to Megara that Plato retired after the death of Socrates, and resided there before his travels, probably exercising himself in dialectic discussion. Susemihl thinks that in gratitude for this kindness he commemorates his Megarian friends in the introduction to the Theaetetus, thus indirectly dedicating the dialogue to them.

VI. An analysis of the Theaetetus is given in the headings of the several sections, noted in the Greek text I.—XLIV., in the translation I—44. In the notes at the close, as in the Greek text, the marginal pages and alphabetic divisions of the first edition of Stephens are also referred to. These notes are chiefly designed to trace the chain of Plato's reasoning in places where it is not easily discerned: but occasionally they refer to the commentaries of Professor Campbell and H. Schmidt.
ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ.

ΕΥΚΛΕΙΔΗΣ, | ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ,
TERΠΙΩΝ, | ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ,
ΘΕΛΙΤΗΤΟΣ.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ
ΟΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

[Numeri marginales Arabici qui vocantur, editionis primae Stephana- niaceae paginas indicant, Romani ejsdem editionis capitula. Stellula paginae, signum 1 sectionis initium notat.]

I. *’Αρτι, ὁ Τερψίων, ἢ πάλαι εὖ ἁγροῦ; TEP. 142 Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι. καὶ σὲ γε ἐξήτουν κατ’ ἁγορᾶν καὶ ἐθαύμαζον ὅτι οὐχ οἶδος τ’ ἦ ἐὑρεῖν. ET. Οὐ γὰρ ἢ κατὰ πόλιν. TEP. Ποῦ μὴν; ET. Εἰς λιμένα κατα- βαίνων Θεαιτήτῳ ἐνέτυχον φερομένῳ ἐκ Κορίθθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου Ἀθήναξ. TEP. Ζωῦτι ἢ τετελευ- τηκότι; ET. 1 Ζωῦτι καὶ μάλα μόρις: χαλεπῶς μὲν βιγάρ ἔχει καὶ ὑπὸ τραυμάτων τινῶν, μᾶλλον μὴν αὐτὸν αἴρει τὸ γεγονός νόσημα ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι. TEP. Μῶν ἡ δυσεντερία; ET. Ναί. TEP. Οἶνον ἄνδρα λέ- χεις ἐν κυδύνῳ εἶναι. ET. Καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, ὁ Τερψίων ἐπεὶ τοι καὶ νῦν ἡκουόν τινων μᾶλα ἐγκο- μιζόντων αὐτῶν περὶ τὴν μάχην. TEP. Καὶ οὐδέν γ’ ἄτοπον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ θαυμαστότερον, εἰ μὴ τοιοῦτος ἦν. ἀτὰρ πῶς οὐκ ἡ αὐτοῦ Μεγαροὶ κατέλυει; ET. 5 Ἡπείγετο οὐκαδὲ ἐπεὶ ἔγωγ’ ἔδεομι καὶ συνεδόλευσαν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἠθέλε. καὶ δῆτα προπέμψας αὐτῶν, ὥπιδ’ πάλιν ἀνεμνήσθην καὶ ὑπαίμασα Σωκράτους, ὡς μαν- τικῶς ἄλλα τε δὴ εἴπε καὶ περὶ τούτων. δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι

1—2
ὁλόγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ μειρακίῳ ὡντι, καὶ συγγενομένος τε καὶ διαλεχθεῖς πάνυ ἀγασθήναι αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν. καὶ μοι ἐλθόντι Ἀθήναξε τούς τε

 lureous οὐς διελέξθη αὐτῷ διηγήσατο, καὶ μάλα ἀξίους ἀκούς, εἰπὲ τε ὅτι πάσα ἀνάγκη εἰς τούτον ἐπλόγιμον γενέσθαι, εἴπερ εἰς ἡλικίαν ἔλθοι. ΤΕΡ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε, ὡς οὖκένε, εἴπεν. ἀτὰρ τίνες ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι; ἔχοις ἄν διηγήσασθαι; ΕΤ. Οὐ μὰ τῶν Δία, οὐκοῦν οὕτω γε ἀπὸ στοματος ἀλλ' ἐγραψάμην μὲν τὸν εὐθὺς οἴκαδ εἶλθων ὑπομνήματα, ὅστεν δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναμμηνευσκόμενος ἐγραφοῦν, καὶ ὅσκολον Ἀθήναξε ἀφικοίμην, ἔπαινησῶν τὸν Σωκράτην ὁ μὴ ἐμεμνήμην, καὶ δεύσε έλθων ἐπηνωρθούμην. ὡστε μοι σχεδὸν τι πᾶς ὁ λόγος γέγραπται. ΤΕΡ. Ἀληθῆ: ἕκουσα σου καὶ πρότερον, καὶ μέντοι ἀεὶ μέλλων κελεύσειν ἐπίδειξαι διατέτριφα δεύο. ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει νῦν ἡμᾶς διελθεῖν; πάντως ἐγογε καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι δέομαι, ὡς ἐς ἄγροι ἠκων.

Β ΕΤ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς μέχρι Ἐρυνοῦ Θεαίτητον προωπεμψα, ὡστε οὐκ ἃν ἄηδως ἀναπαυοῦμην. ἀλλ' ἱσμοι, καὶ ἡμῶν ἁμα ἀναπαυομένους ὁ παῖς ἀναγνώσται. ΤΕΡ. ὸρθώς λέγεις.—ΕΤ. Τὸ μὲν δὴ βιβλίον, ὥς Τερψίων, τοιτ' ἐγραψάμην δὲ δὴ οὔτως τὸν λόγου, οὐκ ἐμοί Σωκράτην διηγούμενον ὡς διηγεῖτο, ἀλλὰ διαλεγόμενον οὗς ἡφι διαλεχθήμαι. ἐφη δὲ τῷ τε γεωμετρήθηκε Θεοδώρῳ καὶ τῷ Θεαίτητῳ. ἵνα οὖν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ

Μὴ παρέχοις πράγματα αἱ μεταξὶ τῶν λόγων διηγήσεις περὶ αὐτοῦ τέ, ὅπως λέγοι ὁ Σωκράτης, οὗν Καὶ ἐγὼ ἡφι καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπιποῦ, ἢ αἱ περὶ τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου, ὅτι Συνέφη ὥς ὁμολογεῖ, τούτων ἐνεκα ὡς αὐτὸν αὐτῶς διαλεγόμενον ἐγραψα, ἐξελῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα. ΤΕΡ. Καὶ οὖνεν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου, ὥς Ἐὐκλείδη.
ΕΤ. Ἀλλὰ, παῖ, λαβὲ τὸ βιβλίον καὶ λέγε. — Π. ΣΩ. 
Εἰ μὲν τῶν ἐν Κυρήνῃ μᾶλλον ἐκηδόμην, ὁ Θεόδωρε, τά ἐκεῖ ἄν σὲ καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἀνηρῶτων, εἰ τινὲς αὐτόθι περὶ γεωμετρίαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν εἰσὶ τῶν νέων ἐπιμέλειαι ποιούμενοι νῦν δὲ—ἡττον γὰρ ἐκείνους ἢ τούσδε φιλῶ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι, τίνες ἢ μὲν τῶν νέων ἐπίδοξοι γενέσθαι ἐπιεικεῖς· ταῦτα δὴ αὐτὸς τε σκοπῶ καθ’ ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἑρωτῶ, ὅσον ἄρα τοὺς νέους ἐθέλοντας ἐξηγήσεσθαι. σοὶ δὴ οὐκ ὀλίγοις πλησιάζουσί, καὶ δικαίως· ἀξίωσ γὰρ τά τε ἄλλα καὶ γεωμετρίας ἑνεκα. εἰ δὴ οὖν τινὶ Εἰ ἐνέτυχες ἀξίωσ λόγου, ἥδεως ἄν πυθοίμην. ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μὴν, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἐμοὶ τε εἰπεῖν καὶ σοι ἀκούσαι πάντα ἄξιον, οἶο ὑμῖν τῶν πολιτῶν μειρακίω ἐντετύχηκα. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἢν καλῶς, ἐφοβοῦμην ἄν σφόδρα λέγειν, μὴ καὶ τῷ δόξῳ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ αὐτοῦ εἶναι νῦν δὲ, καὶ μὴ μοι ἄχοθων, οὐκ ἔστι καλῶς, προσέοικε δὲ σοὶ τὴν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν ομμάτων ἢττον δὲ ἢ σὺ ταῦτ' ἔχει. ἀδεὼς δὴ λέγω. εὖ * γὰρ ἴσθι ὑτι ὃν δὴ πῶ-
μετὰ πολλῆς πραότητος, οἷον ἐλαίου ῥέμα, ἀψοφητί ῥέοντος, ὡστε θαυμάζαι τὸ τηλικοῦτον ὄντα οὕτω ταῦτα διαφράττεσθαι. ΣΩ. Ἐν ἀγγέλλεις. τίνος δὲ καὶ ἐστὶ τῶν πολιτῶν; ΘΕΟ. Ἄκηκοα μὲν τοῦνομα, μηνμονεύω δὲ οὐ. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐστὶ 1 τῶν προσιόντων ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ. ἂρτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐξῳ δρόμῳ ἥλειφοντο ἐταύριοι τὲ τινες οὗτοι αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτός, ὦν δὲ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀλειψάμενοι δεύρο ἱέναι. ἀλλὰ σκόπει εἰ ἔγηγοςκεις ἀυτῶν. ΣΩ. Γιγνώσκω· ὁ τοῦ Σουνιέως Εὐφρονίου ἐστί, καὶ πάνυ γε, ὡ φίλε, ἀνδρός οἶον καὶ σὺ τούτων διηγεῖ, καὶ ἄλλως εὐδοκίμου, καὶ μέντοι καὶ οὐσίαν μάλι πολλῆν κατέλιπε. τὸ δ' ὠνομα οὐκ οἶδα τοῦ μειρακίου.

1 ΘΕΟ. Θεαίτητος, ὁ Σῶκρατες. 1 τὸ γε ὠνομα· τὴν μέντοι οὐσίαν δοκοῦσί μοι ἐπίτροποι τινες διεθθαρκέναι. ἀλλ' ὁμώς καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἐλευθεριότητα θαυμαστός, ὁ Σῶκρατες. ΣΩ. Γεννικὸν λέγεις τὸν ἄνδρα. καὶ μοι κέλευε αὐτὸν ἐνθάδε παρακαθηζευθεῖ. ΘΕΟ. Ἐσται ταῦτα. Θεαίτητε, δεύρο παρὰ Σωκράτη. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὡ Θεαίτητε, ἦν κάρω ἐμαυτὸν ἀνασκεφώμαι, ποιὸν τι ἐχώ τὸ πρόσωπον.

Εφησί γὰρ Θεόδωρος ἔχειν με σοι 1 ὄμοιον. ἀντὶ εἰ ἐνῶν ἐχόντων ἐκατέρου λύραν ἔφη αὐτῶς ἡμισθατι ὄμοιος, πότερον εὐθὺς ἂν ἐπιστευόμεν ἢ ἐπεσκεφάμεθ' ἂν εἰ μούσικός ὄν λέγει; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐπεσκεφάμεθ' ἂν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοιούτον μὲν εὔροντες ἐπειθόμεθ' ἂν, ἀμοῦσον δὲ, ἡπιστοῦμεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ. ΣΩ. Νῦν δὲ γ' οἴμαι, εἰ τι μέλει ἢμῖν τῆς τῶν προσώπων ὁμοίω-τητος, σκεπτέον εἰ γραφικὸς ὡν λέγει ἢ οὖ. ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ μοι. ΣΩ. Ἡ ὡν ξωγραφικὸς Θεόδωρος; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐχ, ὡσον γ' ἐμὲ εἰδέναι. ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὐδὲ γεωμετρικὸς; ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντως δήπον, ὁ Σῶκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ
αστρονομικος καὶ λογιστικὸς τε καὶ μουσικὸς καὶ ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται; ΘΕΛΙ. "Εμοιγε δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἄρα ἡμῶς τοῦ σῶματος τι ὁμοῖος φησὶν εἶναι ἑπανών πη ᾗ ψέγων, οὐ πάνυ αὐτῶ άξιον τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν. ΘΕΛΙ. Ἰσως οὐ. ΣΩ. Τί δ’ εἰ ποτέρου τὴν ψυχήν ἑπανοὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ σοφίαν; ἄρ’ οὐκ ἃξιον τῷ μὲν ἀκούσαντι προθυμεῖσθαι ἀνασκέψασθαι τὸν ἑπαινεθέντα, τῷ δὲ προθύμῳ ἕαυτὸν ἑπιδεικνύοι; ΘΕΛΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΙΙΙ. ΣΩ. "Ωρα τοίνυν, ὦ φίλε Θεάιτη, σοι μὲν ἑπιδεικνύοι, ἐμοὶ δὲ σκοπεῖσθαι; ὦς εὖ ἱσθι, ὅτι Θεόδωρος πολλοῦς δὴ πρὸς μὲ ἑπαινέσας ξέιους τε καὶ ἀστους οὐδένα πο ἑπήμενεν ὠς σὲ νῦν δή. ΘΕΛΙ. Ἐν ἂν ἔχοι, ὦ Σώκρατες ἀλλ’ ὅρα μὴ παίξων ἑλεγεν. ΣΩ. Οὐχ οὔτος ὁ τρόπος ὁ Θεοδώρου. ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀναδύου τὰ ὁμολογημένα σκηντομενος παίξοντα λέγειν τόνδε, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἀναγκασθῇ μαρτυρεῖν πάντως γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἑπισκηπτεῖ αὐτῷ. ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν ἐμμενε τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ. ΘΕΛΙ. Ἀλλὰ χρὴ ταῦτα ποιεῖν, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ μοῦ μανθάνεις ποιν παρὰ Θεοδώρῳ γεωμετρίας ἄττα; ΘΕΛΙ. Ἐγὼγε. ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ ἅ ἄρμονίας καὶ ἱ λογισμούς; ΘΕΛΙ. Προθυμοῦμαι γε δή. ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ, ὦ παῖ, παρὰ γε τούτῳ καὶ παρ’ ἄλλων, οὐς ἂν οἶμαι τι τούτων ἑπαίειν. ἀλλ’ ὡμως τὰ μὲν ἀλλὰ ἐχὼ περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως, σμικρῶν δὲ τι ἀπορῶ, ὦ μετὰ σοῦ τε καὶ τῶν δε σκεπτέον. καὶ μοι λέγε ἄρ’ οὐ τὸ μανθάνειν ἐστὶ τὸ σοφότερον γῆγρασθαι περὶ τὸ μανθάνει της; ΘΕΛΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; ΣΩ. Σοφία δὲ η’ οἶμαι σοφοὶ οἱ σοφοί. ΘΕΛΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἡ σοφία δὲ γε οὐκ οἵσον τοῖς ΘΕΛΙ. Τὸ τοῖον; ΣΩ. Ἡ σοφία. ἢ οὐχ ἀπερ ἑπιστήμονες, ταύτα καὶ σοφοί;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν; ΣΩ. Ταύτων ἀρα ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ. ΣΩ. Τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τοῖνυν ἐστὶν ὁ ἀπορῶ καὶ οὐ δύναμαι λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, 146 ἐπιστήμη ὁ τί ποτε τυχχάνει οὖν. ἃρ' οἷν δὴ ἔχομεν * λέγειν αὐτό; τί φατέ; τίς ἂν ἡμῶν πρῶτος εἴποι; ὃ δὲ ἀμαρτῶν, καὶ ὃς ἂν ἂεὶ ἀμαρτάνῃ, καθεδείται, ὃσπερ φασίν οἱ παίδες οἱ σφαιρίζοντες, ὅνος· ὅς δ' ἂν περιγενήται ἀναμάρτητος, βασίλευσε ἡμῶν καὶ ἐπιτάξει ὁ τι ἂν βουλήται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Τί συγάτε; οὐ τί ποιν, ὁ Θεόδωρῳ, ἐγὼ ὑπὸ φιλολογίας ἁγροικίζομαι, προθυμοῦμενος ἡμᾶς ποιήσαι διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φίλους τε καὶ προσηγόρους ἄλληλοις ἐγνεσθαί; ΘΕΟ. Ἡκιστα μὲν, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἂν ἡγή ἁγροικοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῶν μειρακίων τι κέλευε σοι ἀποκρίνεσθαί. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἄῤῥηθα τῆς τοιαύτης διαλέκτου, καὶ οὐδ' αὐτ' συνεθίζεσθαι ἥλικιαν ἔχω· τοῦτο δὲ πρέποι τε ἂν τοῦτο καὶ πολὺ πλείον ἐπιδίδοιεν· τῷ γὰρ ὄντι ἡ νεότης εἰς πᾶν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει. ἀλλ', ὃσπερ ἡρξώ, μή αφίσσο τοῦ Θεανήτου, ἀλλ' ἐρώτα. ΙV. ΣΩ. Ἀκουείς δή, ὁ Θεανήτε, ἢ λέγει Θεόδωρος, ὁ ἀπιστεύει. ὅς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, εὖ, οὔτε σὺ ἡθελήσεις, οὔτε θέμις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ ἐπιτίθεσθαι νέωτερον ἀπεθείνει. ἀλλ' εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἰπὲ· τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐπιστήμη; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ χρῆ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδήπερ ύμεῖς κελεύετε. πάντων γὰρ, ὅτι καὶ ἀμαρτῶ, ἐπανορθώσετε. ΣΩ. Πάντων μὲν οὖν, ἂν πέρ πει οἷοί τε ὦμεν. ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ τοινυν μοι καὶ ὁ παρὰ Θεοδώρου καὶ τις μάθοι ἐπιστήμῃ εἰναι, γεωμετρίᾳ τε καὶ ἂς νῦν δή σὺ διήλθες, καὶ αὐτός σκυτοτομικῇ τε καὶ ἂν τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν τέχναι, πάσαι τε καὶ ἐκάστῃ τούτων, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἡ ἐπιστήμη εἰναι. ΣΩ. Γενναίως γε καὶ φιλοδόρως, ὁ
Φίλε, ἐν αὐτηθεῖσ τολλὰ δίδως, καὶ ποικίλα ἀνθ' ἀπλου. ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς τί τούτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Ἡ ἱσος μὲν οὐδέν ἢ μέντοι οἶμαι, φράσω. ὅταν λέγης σκυτικήν, μή τι ἄλλο φράζεις ἢ ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων ἑργασίας; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν. ΣΩ. Τί δ' ὅταν εἴ τεκτονικήν; μή τι ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμην τῆς τῶν ἕχλινων σκευῶν ἑργασίας; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν ἀμφότεροι, οὐ ἐκατέρα ἐπιστήμην, τοῦτο ὦρίζεις; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ γε ἐπερωτηθέν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οὐ τοῦτο ἢν, τίνων ἢ ἐπιστήμην, οὐδὲ ὅποιας τινές. οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμήσαι αὐτὰς βουλόμενου ἡρόμεθα, ἀλλὰ ἴσον· ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστὶν. ἡ οὐδέν λέγω; ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὅρθως. ΣΩ. *Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τόδε. εἰ τις ἡμᾶς τῶν φαύλων τι καὶ προχείρου ἔροι· το, οἴνον περὶ πηλοῦ, ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, εἰ ἀποκριναίμεθα αὐτῶ πηλῶς τῶν χυτρέων καὶ πηλῶς ὁ τῶν ἵππο· πλαθῶν καὶ πηλῶς ὁ τῶν πλινθουργῶν, οὐκ ἂν γελοιοῦ ἐίμεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ ἱσος. ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν γε ποι οἰόμενοι συνιέναι ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀποκρίσεως τῶν ἐρωτώντα, ὅταν εἰπὼμεν πηλῶς, εἰτε ὁ τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσθέντες εἰτε 1 ἄλλων ὦντινων δημιουργῶν. ἡ οἰεί, τις τι 1: συνιέσαι τινος ὄνομα, ὃ μη οἴει τί ἐστίν; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδα· μῶς. ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων συνίσκειν ὃ ἐπιστήμην μή εἰδώς. ΘΕΑΙ. Ὡ γαρ. ΣΩ. Σκυτικήν ἄρα οὐ συνιέσιν ὃς ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἁρμονί, οὐδὲ τινὰ ἄλλην τέχνην. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐστιν οὕτω. ΣΩ. Γελοια ἄρα ἢ ἀπόκρισις τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι ἐπιστήμην τῇ ἐστίν, ὅταν ἀποκρίνηται τέχνης τινος ὄνομα. τινὸς γὰρ ἐπιστήμη· μην 1 ἀποκρίνεται, οὐ τούτῳ ἐρωτηθεὶς. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἑσπερέν. Η ΣΩ. Ἐπειτὰ γε ποι ἔξων φαύλως καὶ βραχέως ἀποκρίνασθαι περιέρχεται ἀπεραντον ὄδον. οἶον καὶ ἐν τῇ
τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτησεὶ φαινόν ποι καὶ ὠπλοῦν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι γῆ ὕγρῳ φυραθεῖσα πηλὸς ἀν εἰη, τὸ δ' ὄτου εἶν χαίρειν.

V. ΘΕΛΙ. Ὁ Ράδιον, ὁ Σώκρατες, νῦν γε οὔτω φαίνεται· ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύεις ἐρωτάν ὦν καὶ αὐτὸς ἤμιν ἐναγχος· δε εἰσῆλθε διαλεγομένους, ἔμοι τε καὶ τῷ σῷ ὁ ὀμονῦμω τοῦτῳ Σώκρατε. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποιον δή, ὁ Θεαῖτη; ΘΕΛΙ. Περὶ δυνάμεων τι ἤμιν Θεόδωρος ὁδὲ ἔγραφε, τῆς τε τρίποδος πέρι καὶ πεντέποδος, ἀποφαίνων ὅτι μήκει οὐ̂ ξύμμετροι τῇ ποδιαῖσ, καὶ οὔτω κατὰ μίαν ἐκάστην προαιρούμενος μέχρι τῆς ἐπτακαιδεκάποδος; ἐν δὲ παύτη πόσ ἐνέσχετο. ἤμιν οὖν εἰσῆλθε τι τοιοῦτον, ἐπειδὴ ἀπειρο ὁ πλήθος αἱ δυνάμεις ἐφαίνοντο, πειρατεῖν θῆναι ξυλλαβέων εἰς ἐν, ὅτω πάσας ταύτας προσαγορεύσομεν τὰς δυνάμεις. ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ εὐρετε τι τοιοῦτον; ΘΕΛΙ. Ἔμουγε δοκοῦμεν. σκόπει δὲ καὶ σὺ. ΣΩ. Δέγε. ΘΕΛΙ. Τὸν ἀρίθμον πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν. τὸν μὲν δυνάμενον ἵσον ἵσακις γίγνεσθαι τῷ τετραγώνῳ τῷ σχῆμα ἀπεικάσαντες τετράγωνον τε καὶ ἵσοπλευρὸν προσείπομεν. ΣΩ. Καὶ εὖ γε. ΘΕΛΙ. Τὸν τοῖνυν μεταξὺ τοῦτον, ὧν καὶ τὰ τρία καὶ τὰ πέντε καὶ τὰς ὅς ἀδύνατος ἵσον ἵσακις γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ ὁ πλεῖον ἐλαττονάκις ἡ ἐλάττων πλεονάκις γίγνεται, μείζων δὲ καὶ ἐλάττων αἵ πλευρὰ αὐτὸν περιλαμβάνει, τῷ προμῆκει αὐ θέχιματι ἀπεικάσαντες προμῆκη ἀρίθμον ἐκαλέσαμεν. ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα. ἀλλὰ τὶ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; ΘΕΛΙ. Ὁσαί μὲν γραμμαῖ τὸν ἵσοπλευρὸν καὶ ἐπιπέδου ἁρίθμον τετραγωνικόν, μῆκος ὁ ἄρισμεθα, ὅσαι δὲ τὸν ἔτερομήκη, δυνάμεις, ὑς μήκει μὲν οὐ̂ ξύμμετρους ἐκείναις, τοῖς δὲ ἐπιπέδοις ἀδύναται. καὶ περὶ τὰ στερεά ἀλλο τοιοῦτον. ΣΩ. Ἀριστὰ γὰ ἀνθρώπου, ὁ παιδεῖς, ὅστε μοι δοκεῖ ὁ Θεόδωρος οὐκ ἔνοχος τοῖς ψευδο-
μαρτυρίοις ἐσεσθαί. ΘΕΛΙ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ, Ὁκρατεῖς, ὦ γε ἐρωτᾶς περὶ ἐπιστήμης, οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀποκρίνασθαι ὁσπερ περὶ τοῦ μήκους καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως. καίτοι σὺ γε μοι δοκεῖς τοιοῦτον τι ξητεῖν. ὡστε πᾶλιν αὐ διανεῖται ψευδῆς ὁ Θεόδωρος. ΣΩ. Τί δαί; εἰ σε ἑ πρὸς δρόμον κεπαίνων μηδεὶς οὐτοι δρομικὸ ἐφή τῶν νέων ἐντετυ-χίκειαι, εἰτα διαθέων τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχίστου ἤπτηθης, ἤπτειν τι ἂν οἴει ἀληθῆ τόνδε ἐπαινέσαι; ΘΕΛΙ. Οὔκ ἐγώ. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὁσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, σμικρὸν τι οἴει εἰναι ἐξευρεῖν καὶ οὐ τῶν πάντη ἀκρον; ΘΕΛΙ. Νὴ τῶν Δὺ ἔγωγε καὶ μᾶλα γε τῶν ἀκροτάτων. ΣΩ. Θάρρει τοίνυν περὶ σαυτῷ καὶ τι οἶον Θεόδωρον λέγειν, προθυμηθῆτι δὲ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἄτω τε ἄλλων πέρι καὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον, τι ποτε τυγχάναι ὑν. ΘΕΛΙ. Προθυμίασ μὲν ἑνεκεν, ὦ Σωκρατεῖς, φανεῖται. VI. ΣΩ. 'Ἰθι δὴ καλῶς γὰρ ἀρτι ψηφηγῆσω πειρῶ μιμούμενος τὴν περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἀπόκρισιν, ὡσπερ ταῦτας πολλὰς οὕσας ἐνὶ εἰδεὶ περι-έλαβες, οὔτω καὶ τὰς πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐνὶ λόγῳ προσ-ειπεῖν. ΘΕΛΙ. Ἀλλ' εὑ ἰσθι, ὦ, Σωκρατεῖς, πολλάκις εἰ δὴ αὐτὸ ἐπεχειρήσασκε σκέψασθαι, ἀκούων τᾶς παρὰ σοῦ ἀποφερομένας ἐρωτήσεις ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτ' αὐτὸς δύναμαι πεῖσαι ἐμαυτῶν ὡς ἢκαίως τι λέγω, οὔτ' ἄλλοις ἀκούσαι λέγοντος οὐτῶς ὡς σὺ διακελεύει, οὐ μὲν δὴ αὐδ' ἀπαλλαγήναι τοῦ μέλλειν. ΣΩ. Ὀδίνεις γὰρ, ὦ, φίλε Θεαίτητε, διὰ τὸ μὴ κενὸς ἀλλ' ἐγκύμων εἶναι. ΘΕΛΙ. Οὔκ οἶδα, ὦ, Σωκρατεῖς ὦ, μέντοι πέπουθα λέγω. ΣΩ. Εἶτα. ὡ καταγέλαστε, οὐκ ἄκηκοας ὡς ἐγὼ εἶμι νίος μαίας μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς, Φαισαρέτης; ΘΕΛΙ.

149 c. Num legendum sit τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ quaeri potest, non decerni.
"Ηδη τουτο γε ήκουσα. ΣΩ. 'Αρα καλ 'οτι επιτηδευω την αυτην τεχνην ακήκοας; ΘΕΑΙ. Ουδαμως. ΣΩ. 'Αλλ ειν ισοθ' οτι μη μειτοι μου κατειπησ προς τους αλλους. λεληθα γαρ, οτι εταιρε, ταυτην εχουν την τεχνην' οι δε, ατε ουκ ειδοτε, τουτο μεν ου λεγουσι περι εμοι, οτι δε ατοπωτατος ειμι και ποιο τους ανθρωπους απορειν. η B και τουτο ακηκοας; ΘΕΑΙ. 'Εγωγε. ΣΩ. Ειπω ουν σοι το αιτιου; ΘΕΑΙ. Πανυ μεν ουν. ΣΩ. 'Εννοησον δε το περι τας μαιας άπαν ως έχει, και ρησαν μαθησει δ Βουλομαι. οισθα γαρ που ουδεμια αυτων έτι αυτη κυικομενη τε και τικτουσα αλλας μαιευται, αλλαι η ηδη αδυνατοι τικτειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Πανυ μεν ουν. ΣΩ. Αιτιαι δε γε τουτου φασιν ειναι την 'Αρτεμιν, οτι αλοχος ουσα την λοχειαν ειληχε. στεριψασ μεν c ουν αρα ουν' εδωκε μαιευεσθαι, οτι η ανθρωπινη φυσις ασθενεστερα η λαβειν τεχνην όν άν η άπειρον τας δε δε ηλικιαι ατοκοις προσεταξε, τιμωσα την αυτης ωμοιωσητα. ΘΕΑΙ. Εικοι. ΣΩ. Ουκοιν και τοδε εικος τε και αναγκαιον, τας κυοποιας και μη γιγανωσκεσθαι μαλλον υπο των μαιων η των αλλων; ΘΕΑΙ. Πανυ γε. ΣΩ. Και μην και διδοσαι γε αι μαιαι φαιρμαικαι D και επαδουσαι δινανται εγειρειν τε τας οδοιας 1 και μαλθακωτερας, άν βουλωνται, ποιειν, και τικτειν τε δε τας δυστοκοιας, και εαν νεον άν δοξη αμβλισκειν, αμβλισκουσιν; ΘΕΑΙ. 'Εστι ταυτα. ΣΩ. 'Αρε ουν έτι και τοδε αυτων έσθησαι, οτι και προμνηστριαι εισι δεινοταται, ως πασοφοι ουσαι περι του γηναι, ποιαν χρη ποιη ανδρι συνοιαιν ος αριστους παιδας τικτειν; ΘΕΑΙ. Όν πανυ τουτο οιδα. ΣΩ. 'Αλλ ισθ' οτι έτι

119 Ι. νεων άν corruptum videtur.
τούτῳ μείζον φρονουσιν ἢ ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμβαλητομίᾳ. ἦν νῦνει εἰ γάρ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡ ἄλλης οἷεὶ τέχνης εἶναι θεραπείαν τε καὶ ἐγνωσμὸν τῶν ἐκ ἀνδρῶν καρπῶν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐγνώσις μεν ποιὰν γῆν ποῖον φυτὸν τε καὶ σπέρμα καταβλητέον; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς. ΣΩ. Εἰς γυναικα δε, ὁ φίλε, ἄλλην μὲν οἷεὶ τοῦ τοιοῦτον, ἄλλην δὲ ἐγνωσμὸν; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκούν εἰκὸς γε. ΣΩ.* Οὔ 150 γάρ. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀδικίαν τε καὶ ἀτέχνην ἐγναγωγὴν ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς, ἢ δῆ προαγωγεία ὄνομα, φεύγουσι καὶ τὴν προμηθείαν ὀτε σεμνὰ οὖσαι αἱ μαίαι, φοβοῦμενει μὴ εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν αἰτίαν διὰ ταύτην ἐμπεσον: ἐπεὶ ταῖς γε ὄντως μαίαις μόναις ποὺ προσήκει καὶ προμηθείας ὅρθως. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν τοῖνυν τῶν μαίων τοσοῦτον, ἐλαττοῦν δὲ τοῦ ἐμὸν ὀραματος. οὐ γάρ πρόσεστι γυναιξίν εὐνότε μὲν εἰδωλά τίκτειν, ἐστὶ δ οὖτε ἡ ἀληθινά, τούτο δὲ μὴ βαδίον εἶναι β διαγνώναι. εἰ γάρ προσήκει, μέγιστον τε καὶ κάλλιστον ἔργον ἦν ἄν ταῖς μαίαις τὸ κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθῆς τε καὶ μή. ἦ οὐκ οἷει; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἑγώγῃ. VII. ΣΩ. Τῇ δὲ γ' ἐμῇ τέχνῃ τῆς μαιέουσεως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὑπάρχει, ὡσα ἐκείναις, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ τε ἀνδρας ἄλλα μὴ γυναῖκας μαιέουσθαι, καὶ τῷ ταὶς ψυχας αὐτῶν τικτούσας ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλά μὴ τὰ σώματα. μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐνι τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τέχνῃ, βασανίζεις δυνατὸν εἶναι παντὶ τρόπῳ, καὶ τοῖς εἰδωλον καὶ ψεύδος ἀποτίκτει τού νέου ἡ διάνοια ἡ γόνυμον τε καὶ ἀληθῆς. ἐπεὶ τόδε γε καὶ ἐμοί υπάρχει, ὅπερ ταῖς μαίαις: ἄγονος εἰμὶ σοφίας, καὶ ὅπερ ἡ ἐκ τού τοῦ λοι καὶ ὑπεδισαν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, αὐτῶς δέ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφὸν, ἀληθὲς ὑπεδισαν. τὸ δὲ αἰτίου τούτου τόδε: μαιέουσθαι με ό θεὸς ἀναγκάζει, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκόλυσεν.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ πάνυ τι σοφὸς, οὐδὲ τί μοι
1) ἔστιν εὐρήμα τοιούτου, γεγονός τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ἐκγονοῦ· οἱ δ’ ἐμοὶ χυγγυγούμενοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαίνονται ἐνιοὶ μὲν καὶ πάνα ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προϊόυσης τῆς ξυνουσίας, οὐσπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρείκη, βαυμαστῶν ὅσον ἐπιδιδόντες, ὡς αὐτοὶς τε καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις δοκοῦσι· καὶ τούτῳ ἐναργές, ὅτι παρ’ ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν πῶς ποτέ μαθόντες, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ παρ’ αὐτὸν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ εὑρόντες τε καὶ κατέχοντες. τῆς μέντοι μανείας ὁ θεὸς τε καὶ ἐγὼ
Εὐτύος. ὅδε δὲ δῆλον πολλοὶ ἥδη τούτο 1 ἀγνοήσαντες καὶ ἐαυτοὺς αἰτιασάμενοι, ἐμοῦ δὲ καταφρονήσαντες, ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ ὑπ’ ἄλλων πεισθέντες, ἀπῆλθον πρωιάτερον τοῦ δέοντος, ἀπελθόντες δὲ τὰ τε λοιπὰ ἐξῆμβλωσαν διὰ ποιηρῶν ξυνουσίαν καὶ τὰ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ μανειθέντα κακῶς τρέφοντες ἀπώλεσαν, ψευδὴ καὶ εἴδωλα περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, τελευτώντες δ’ αὐτοὶς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδόξαν ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι. ὅν εἰς

151 γέγονεν Ἀριστείδης * ὁ Δυσιμάχου καὶ ἄλλοι πάνυ πολλοὶ οἷς, ὅταν πάλιν ἐλθοῦσιν δεόμενοι τῆς ἐμῆς ξυνουσίας καὶ βαυμαστὰ δρῶντες, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γηγυμένον μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλύει ξυνεῖναι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἐὰν καὶ πάλιν αὐτοὶ ἐπιδιδόσαι. πάσχοντι δὲ δὴ οἱ ἐμοὶ γηγυγυγούμενοι καὶ τούτῳ ταῦτάν ταῖς τικτούσαις* ὠδίνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἀπορίας ἐμπίπλανται νῦκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας πολὺ μᾶλλον ηὔ ἐκεῖναι. ταύτην δὲ τήν ὠδίνα ἐγείρειν τε καὶ ἀποπαύειν ἡ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται. καὶ

150 ε. ἡ αὐτοὶ ἢ ὑπ’ ἄλλων. Ita rectissime Heind. Stallb. alii, μεν vulgato ἡ αὐτοὶ ὑπ’ ἄλλων.
εἶπεν, πάνυ ἵκανός τοπάζῳ οἶς ἄν ἔγγεγενόμενοι ὅναπτο. ὅν πολλοὺς μὲν δὴ ἔξεδωκα Προδίκῳ, πολλοὺς δὲ ἄλλους σοφοῖς τε καὶ θεσπεσίοις ἀνδράσι. Τάντα δὴ σοι, ὦ ἄριστε, ἐνεκα τοῦθε ἐμῆκυνα, ύποπτεύω σε, ὦσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς οἶει, ὤδινειν τι κυοῦντα ἕδου. προσφέρου οὖν πρὸς με ὦς πρὸς μαίας ύιόν καὶ ἁυτῶν μαίευτικῶν, καὶ ἄ ἐν ἑρώτῳ, προθυμοῦ ὅπως οἶός τ’ εἶ, οὖτως ἀποκρινασθαί. καὶ ἕαν ἀρα σκοπούμενος τί ὅν ἄν λέγησ, ἡγήσωμαι εἴδωλον καὶ μὴ ἀληθὲς, ἐίτα ὑπεξαίρομαι καὶ ἀποβάλλω, μὴ ἀγρίαινε ὄσπερ αἱ πρωτοτόκοι περὶ τὰ παιδία. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἥδη, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πρὸς με οὔτω διετέθησαιν, ὥστε ἀτεχνῶς δάκνειν ἐτοιμοὶ εἶναι, ἐπειδὰν τινα λήρον αὐτῶν ἀφαιρώμαι, καὶ οὐκ οἶνεται με εὖνοια τοῦτο ποιεῖν, πόρρῳ οὖντει τοῦ εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδεὶς θεὸς ἤ δύνοντας ἀνδρώποις, οὐδ’ έν γώ δυσνοία τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν δρόω, ἀλλά μοι πευδός τε ἔγνυχωρῆσαι καὶ ἀληθὲς ἀφανίσατο οὐδαμῶς θέμις. VIII. Πάλιν δὴ οὖν εξ ἀρχῆς, ὁ Θεαίτητε, ὁ τ’ ποτ’ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, πειρῶ λέγειν’ ὡς ὅ’ οὐχ οἰός τ’ εἶ, μηδέτορ’ εἰπης. ἐὰν γὰρ θεὸς θεόλη καὶ ἀνδρίζῃ, οἴος τ’ ἔσει. ΘΕΛ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὁ Σώκρατες, σοῦ γε οὔτω παρακελευμένου αἱσχρὸν μὴ οὐ παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυμεῖσθαι ὁ τ’ τις ἔχει ἔλεγεν. Εἴ δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ὁ ἐπιστάμενος τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο, ὁ ἐπιστάται, καὶ ὡς γε νῦν φαίνεται, οὖν ἀλλὸ τί ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἡ αἰσθησίς. ΣΩ. Εἴ γε καὶ γενναίως, ὁ παῖ χρῆ γὰρ οὔτως ἀποφαινόμενον λέγειν. ἀλλὰ φέρε δὴ αὐτὸ κοὐνή σκεφτόμεθα, γόνιμον ἡ ἀνεμιαίον τυχανεί ὁν. αἰσθησίς, φής, ἐπιστήμη; ΘΕΛ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύεις μέντοι λόγον οὐ φαύλον εἰρηκέναι περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλ’ οὖν ἐλεγε * καὶ Πρωταγόρας. τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλου 152 εἶρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταύτα. φησὶ γὰρ ποι πάνων χρημάτων.
μέτρον ἀνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἐστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἐστίν. ἀνέγνωκας γὰρ ποι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὔτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἰα μὲν ἐκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαύτα μὲν ἐστιν ἐμοὶ, οἰα δὲ σοι, τοιάτα δὲ αὐ σοί; ἀνθρωπος δὲ σὺ τε καγώ; ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως. ΣΩ. Εἰκὸς μὲν τοι ἰ' σοφὸν ἀνδρα μὴ ληρεῖν ἐπακολουθήσομεν οὖν αὐτῷ. ἀρ' οὐκ ἐνίστε πνεύμον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁ μὲν ἠμῶν ρίγοι, ὁ δ' οὖ; καὶ ὁ μὲν ἠρέμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα; ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα. ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τότε αὐτὸ ἐφ' έαυτοῦ τὸ πνεύμα ψυχρὸν ᾗ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν; ὡ πεισόμεθα τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ρίγοντι ψυχρόν, τῷ δὲ μὴ οὖ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἕσεκεν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτως ἐκατέρῳ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τό δὲ γε φαίνεται αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐστὶν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἕστι γὰρ. ΣΩ. 1 Φαντασία ἁρα καὶ αἰσθήσεις ταύτων ἐν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. οἰα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἐκαστός, τοιαύτα ἐκαστοὶ καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἕσεκεν. ΣΩ. Αἰσθήσεις ἁρα τοῦ ὄντος αἰ ἐστὶ καὶ ἰφευνδές, ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὕσα. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Ἕφ' οὖν πρὸς Χαρίτων πάσης σοφοῖς τις ἂν ὁ Πρωταγόρας, καὶ τούτῳ ἠμῖν μὲν ἠνίξατο τῷ πόλλῳ συρφετικῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ, ὃ Σώκρατες, τούτῳ 1 λέγεις; ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ ἔρω καὶ μάλ' οὐ φαίλων λόγον, ὡς ἁρα ἐν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ οὐδὲν ἐστὶν, οὐδ' αὖ τι προςείπως ὄρθως οὐδ' ὀποιουν τι, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ὡς μέγα προσαγορεύης, καὶ σμικρὸν φανεῖται, καὶ ἐὰν βαρύ, κούφου, ξύμπαντα τε οὕτως, ὡς μηδενὸς ὄντος ἐνὸς μήτε τινὸς μήτε ὀποιουν' ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως.

καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα, ἃ δὴ φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες ἑστὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ' οὐδὲν, αἰεὶ δὲ γίγνεται. καὶ περὶ τοῦτον πάντες ἔξης οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου ξυμφερέσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἀκροὶ τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὀμηρος: εἰπὼν γὰρ

'Οκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν πάντα εὑρήκεν ἐκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ τοῦτο λέγειν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμουγε. ΙΧ. ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ἄν ἔτι πρὸς γε τοσοῦτον * στρατόπεδον καὶ στρατηγόν 153 Ὀμηρον δύνατο ἀμφισβητήσας μὴ οἱ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ ράδιον, ὁ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ, ὁ Θεαῖτης. ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε τὸ λόγῳ σημεῖα ἱκανά, ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἡσυχίας τὸ γὰρ θερμὸν τε καὶ πῦρ, ὁ δὴ καὶ τάλλα γεννᾷ καὶ ἐπιτροπεύει, αὐτὸ γεννᾶται ἐκ φοράς καὶ τρίψεως τούτω δὲ κινήσεις. ἢ οὐχ αὐτὰ γενέσεις πυρὸς; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνταί 1 μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τὸ γε τῶν ζῴων γένος ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων φύεται. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὖ; ΣΩ. Τί δαι; ἢ τῶν σωμάτων ἐξίς οὖν ὑπὸ ἡσυχίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διόλυται, ὑπὸ γυμναισίων δὲ καὶ κινήσεως ός ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ σώζεται; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι. ΣΩ. 'Ἡ δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐξίς οὖν ὑπὸ μαθήσεως μὲν καὶ μελέτης, κινήσεως οὖν, κτάτα' τε μαθήματα καὶ σώζεται καὶ γίγνεται βελτίων, ὑπὸ δ' ἡσυχίας, ἀμελετησίας τε καὶ ἀμαθίας ούσης, οὐτε τι μανθάνει ἢ τε ἀν μάθη ἑπιλαμβάνεται; ὁ ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα. ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἀγαθὸν κίνησις

152 e. ξυμφερέσθων recte se habet pro vulg. ξυμφέρεσθον.
K. P.
κατά τε ψυχήν καὶ κατὰ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ τοιαῦταν; ΘΕΑΙ. 'Εσικεν. ΣΩ. 'Ετι οὖν σοι λέγω νηνεμίας τε καὶ γαλήνας καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σή-πουσι καὶ ἀπολλύσι, τὰ δ' ἐτέρα σῶζει; καὶ ἐπὶ τού-τοις τὸν κολοφώνα ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων, τὴν χρυσῆν σειρὰν ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸν ἥλιον Ὄμηρορ λέγει, καὶ δ ὁ δὴλοὶ ὅτι ἕως μὲν ἢ περιφορὰ ἥ κινομενή καὶ ὁ ἥλιος, πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ σῶζεται τὰ ἐν θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀν-θρώπωσι· εἰ δὲ σταῖν τοῦτο ὀσπερ δεθὲν, πάντα χρήματ' ἄν διαφθαρεῖ καὶ γένοιτ' ἄν τὸ λεγόμενον ἄνω κάτω πάντα; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατε, ταῦτα δηλοῦν, ἄπερ λέγεις. Χ. ΣΩ. Ἡπόλαβε τοίνυν, ὁ ἄριστε, οὔτωσι. κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα πρῶτον, δ' ἡ καλεῖς χρώμα λευκόν, μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἔτερόν τι ἐξ ὧν τῶν σῶν ὄμματων μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι μηδὲ των αὐτῶ χώραν ἐ ἀποτάξης. ὥδη γὰρ ἂν εἰη τε ὧν ποὺ ἐν τάξει καὶ μένωι καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν γενέσει γέγονοιτο. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ πῶς; ΣΩ. Ἐπώμεθα τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ, μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐν ὧν τιθέντες· καὶ ἡμῖν οὔτω μέλαν τε καὶ λευκὸν καὶ ὀτιοῦν ἄλλο χρώμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὄμματων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται γεγενημένου, καὶ ὁ δ' ἔκαστον εἶναι φαμέν χρώμα, οὕτε τὸ προσβάλλον 154 οὔτε * τὸ προσβάλλομεν ἐσταί, ἄλλα μεταξὶ τι ἐκά-στω ὅδιον γεγονός. ἦ σὺ διὰχυρίσασθαι ἂν, ὡς οἶνον σοι φιλήται ἔκαστον χρώμα, τοιοῦτον καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ότροῦν ζῷῳ; ΘΕΑΙ. Μᾶ Δι' οὖκ ἔγορε. ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἂρ' ὄμοιον καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ὀτιοῦν; ἔχεις τοῦτο ἵππορός, ἢ πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὅτι οὐδὲ σοὶ αὐτῷ ταυτὸν διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ὄμοιος αὐτὸν σεαυτῷ ἔχειν; Β ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦτο μᾶλλον μοι δοκεῖ ἢ ἔκεινο. ΣΩ. Ὅνυκοιν εἰ μὲν ὁ παραμετρούμεθα ἢ οὐ 1 ἐφαπτομέθα, μέγα ἢ λευκὸν ἢ θερμὸν ήν, οἶκ ἂν ποτὲ ἄλλῳ τῷ προσπεσοῦν


"ΘΕΛΙΤΗΤΟΣ. "

"άλλο ἂν ἐγερόναι, αὐτὸ γε μὴδὲν μεταβάλλον· εἰ δὲ αὖ τὸ παραμετρούμενον ἐὰν ἐφαπτόμενον ἔκαστον ἵν τοιτων, οὐκ ἂν αὖ ἄλλον προσελθόντος ἢ τι παθόντος αὐτὸ μὴδὲν παθῶν ἄλλο ἂν ἐγένετο. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε, ὦ φίλε, θαυμαστά τε καὶ γελοία εὐχερῶς πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα λέγειν, ὡς φαίη ἂν Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ πᾶς ὁ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνο ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν. ὉΕΛ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποιά λέγεις; Σ. Μικρὸν λαβὲ παράδειγμα, καὶ πάντα οἱ εἶσεὶ ἄνδροι. ἀστραγάλους γὰρ που ἔξ, ἂν μὲν τέταρτα αὐτοῖς προσενέγκης, πλείους φαμέν εἶναι τῶν τεττάρων καὶ ἡμιολίους, ἓαν δὲ δόδεκα, ἐλάττους καὶ ἡμίσεις· καὶ οὐδὲ ἀνεκτὸν ἅλλως λέγειν. ὡς ἂν ἀνέξει; ὉΕΛ. Οὐκ ἔγορη. Σ. Τί οὖν; ἂν σὲ Πρωταγόρας ἔρηται ἡ τις ἅλλος, ὁ Θεαίτητε, ἐσθ᾽ ὑποὶ τι μεῖζον ἡ πλέον ὅγενεται ἅλλως ἡ αὐξηθῇν; τι ἀποκρινεῖς; ὉΕΛ. 'Εαν μὲν, ὁ Σόκρατες, τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἐρωτησιν ἀποκρίνομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶν· ἓαν δὲ πρὸς τὴν προτέραν, φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία εἴποι, ὅτι ἐστίν. Σ. Ἐφ γε νὰ τὴν Ἰ μαίνα, ὃ φίλε, καὶ θείος. ἀτάρ, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἓαν ἀποκρίνη ὅτι ἐστὶν, Εὐριπίδειον τι εὐμβή- σισεται· ἓ μὲν γὰρ γλώττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἡμῶν ἐσται, ἓ δὲ φρῆνιν οὐκ ἀνέλεγκτος. ὉΕΛ. Ἀληθῆ. Σ. Ὁκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινὸ καὶ σοφὸ εἶν τε καὶ σὺ ἡμὲν, πάντα τὰ τῶν φρενῶν ἐξητακότες, ἴδῃ ἂν τὸς λοιπὸν ἐκ περιομομεσῶς ἀλληλῶν ἀποπειρῶμενοι, ἐξελθόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς ἐμαύητη τοιαύτη, ἀλλήλων τῶν λόγων τοῖς λόγοις ἐκροίσομεν· νῦν δὲ ἂτε ἰδιότως πρῶτον βουλησόμεθα θεᾶσασθαι αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτά, τι ποτε ἐστίν ἄ διανοοῦ- μεθα, πῶτερον ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις ἐξιμφωνεῖ ὦ οὐδ' ὀπω- στιων. ὉΕΛ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν ἔγγυε τοιτ' ἂν βουλού- μην. Χ. Σ. Καί μὴν ἔγγυε. ὦτε δ' οὖτως ἔχει,
πλατωνὸς

όλλο τί ἡ ἡρέμα, ὡς πάνιν πολλὴν σχολὴν ἄγοντες,

155 τάλιν ἐπανασκεϕόμεθα, οὐ * δυσκολαίνοντες, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὑπὸ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐξετάζοντες, ἀττα ποτ’ ἐστὶ ταῦτα τὰ φάσματα ἐν ἡμῖν. δὲν πρῶτον ἐπισκοποῦντες φήσομεν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, μηδέποτε μηδὲν ἂν μεῖζον μηδὲ ἔλαττον γενέσθαι μήτε ὅγκῳ μήτε ἀριθμῷ, ἐως ἵσον εἰ ἄντο ἐαυτῷ ὀψὶν ὡς ΤΕΕ." Ναὶ. ΣΩ. Δεύτερον δὲ γε, ὃ μήτε προστίθοιτο μήτε ἀφαιρέτῳ, τοῦτο μήτε αὐξάνεσθαι ποτὲ μήτε φθίνειν, ἀεὶ δὲ ἵσον εἶναι. Β ΤΕΕ." Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἀρ' 1 οὖν οὐ καὶ τρίτων, ὃ μή πρότερον ἢν, ἀλλὰ ὑστερον τοῦτο εἶναι ἂνευ τοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον; ΤΕΕ." Δοκεῖ γε δή. ΣΩ. Ταῦτα δὴ, οἶμαι, ὡμολογήματα τρία μάχεται αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ, ὅταν τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀστραγάλων λέγωμεν, ἢ ὅταν φῶμεν ἐμὲ τηλικῶν δῶμα, μήτε αὐξηθέντα μήτε τούναντιν παθόντα, ἐν ἐναιτῶ σοῦ τοῦ νέου νῦν μὲν μεῖζον εἶναι, ὑστερον δὲ ἔλαττο, μηδὲν τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὅγκου ἀφαιρεθέντος ἀλλὰ σοῦ αὐξηθέντος. 1 εἰμὶ γὰρ δὴ ὑστερον δὲ πρότερον οὐκ ἢν, οὐ γενόμενος ἂνευ γὰρ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον, μηδὲν δὲ ἀπολλύσ τοῦ ὅγκου οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἐγγυνόμην ἐλάττων. καὶ ἀλλὰ δὴ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις οὔτως ἔχει, εἰπερ καὶ ταῦτα παραδεξόμεθα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ποι, ὁ Θεαίτητε δοκεῖς γοῦν μοι οὐκ ἀπειρος τῶν τοιουτῶν εἶναι. ΤΕΕ." Καὶ νὴ τους θεοὺς γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὑπερφυῶς ὁς θαυμάζω, τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ ταῦτα, καὶ ἐνίοτε ὡς ἀληθῶς δ βλέπων εἰς αὐτὰ σκοτοδινῶς. ΣΩ. 1 Θεόδωρος γὰρ, ὃ φίλε, φαίνεσαι οὐ κακῶς τοπάζων περὶ τῆς φύσεως σου. μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζων ό ὁ γὰρ ἀλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὐτή, καὶ ἐνικεῖν ὁ τήν Ἡρω Θαύμαντος ἑκχονον φήσας οὐ κακῶς γενεαλογεῖν.
αλλὰ πότερον μανθάνεις ἰδή, διὸ ταῦτα τοιαῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἔξ ὅν τὸν Πρωταγόραν φαμὲν λέγειν, ἃ οὖν; ΘΕΛΙ. 
Οὔτω μοι δοκῶ. Σ. Η. Χάριν οὖν μοι εἴσει, ἐὰν σοι ἀνδρός, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνδρῶν ὅνομαστῶν τῆς διανοίας 1 τήν ἐ
ἀλήθειαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην συνεξερευνῆσομαι αὐτῶν; ΘΕΛΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ εἴσομαι, καὶ πάνυ γε πολλὴν; 
XI. Σ. Ἄθρει δὴ περισκοπῶν, μὴ τις τῶν ἁμυνήτων ἐπακούῃ. εἰσὶ δὲ-οὐτί οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἴμοινοι εἶναι 
ἡ οὐ ἀν δύνονται ἀπρίξ τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι, πράξεις δὲ καὶ γενέσεις καὶ πάν τὸ ἄφρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι 
ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μέρει. ΘΕΛΙ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ, ὡ Σώκρατες, 
σκληροῖς γε λέγεις καὶ * ἀντιτύπους ἀνθρώπους. Σ. Η. 156 
Εἰσὶ γὰρ, ὡ παῖ, μάλ' εὗ ἄμουσοι. ἄλλοι δὲ πολὺ 
kομψότεροι, ὃν μέλλω σοι τὰ μυστήρια λέγειν. ἄρχῃ 
δὲ, ἔξ ἦς καὶ ἢ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἡρτηται, ἢ δὲ 
αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἢ καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο 
οὐδὲν, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο ἑἴδη, πλήθει μὲν ἀπειροῦν 
ἐκατέρων, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχουν, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. 
ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμολίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα 
γίγνεται ἐκχονα πλῆθει μὲν ἀπειρα, 1 δίδυμα δὲ, τὸ μὲν 
β αἰσθητοῦ, τὸ δὲ αἰσθήσεως, ἢ δὲ συνεκτίπτουσα καὶ 
γενισσεία ἡ μετά τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεις τὰ 
τοιαῦτα ἢ μὲν ἔχουσιν ὄνομα, ὤψεις τε καὶ ἀκοαὶ καὶ 
ἀσφρησεις καὶ ψυξεις τε καὶ καύσεις καὶ ἡδοναὶ γε 
ἡ καὶ κύτα τα καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι κεκλημέναι καὶ 
ἄλλαι, ἀπέραντοι μὲν αἰ ἀνώνυμοι, παμπληθεὶς δὲ αἱ 
ἀνωμασμέναι: τὸ δ’ αὐτ ἁσθητοῦ γένους τούτων ἐκάσται 
όμογον, ὤψεις μὲν χρώματα παντοδαπαίς 1 παντο-

dapá, ἀκοαῖς δὲ ὀφαίτως φοναί, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰ-
σθήσεις τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητά ξυγγενή γεγονόμενα. Τι δὴ 
οὖν ἡμῖν βούλεται οὔτος ὁ μῦθος, ὡ Θεαιτητε, πρὸς τὰ
πρότερα; ἄρα ἐννοεῖς; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ πάντω, ὦ Σῶκρατες. ΣΩ. ἈΛΛ᾽ ἀθρεῖ εάν πως ἀποτελεσθῇ. Βουλεται γὰρ δὴ λέγειν ὂς ταῦτα πάντα μὲν, ὡσπερ λέγομεν, κινεῖται, τάχος δὲ καὶ βραδυτής ἐν τῇ κινήσει αὐτῶν. ὅσον μὲν οὖν βραδύ, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πλησιάζοντα τὴν \\
δ κινήσιν ἱσχει καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἡ γεννᾶ, τὰ δὲ γεννώμενα οὕτω δὴ [βραδύτερα ἐστιν’ ὅσον δὲ αὐταχύ, πρὸς τὰ πόρρωθεν τὴν κινήσιν ἱσχει καὶ οὕτω γεννᾶ, τὰ δὲ γεννώμενα οὕτω δὴ] θάπτω ἐστι’: φέρεται γὰρ καὶ ἐν φορᾷ αὐτῶν ἡ κίνησις πέφυκεν. ἐπειδὰν οὖν οὕμα καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν τούτων ἔμμετρων πλησιάσαν γεννήσῃ τὴν λευκότητα τε καὶ αὐσθησίν αὐτῇ ξύμφυτον, ὁ οὖκ ἂν ποτε ἐγένετο ἐκατέρω ἐκεῖνων πρὸς ἄλλο ἐλθόντος, τότε δὴ μεταξὺ φερομένων τῆς μὲν ὤψεως πρὸς τῶν ἐ ὀφθαλμῶν, τῆς δὲ λευκότητος 1 πρὸς τοῦ συναπτικοῦτος τὸ χρῶμα, ὁ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὤψεως ἐμπλεως ἐγένετο καὶ ὅρα δὴ τότε καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ τι ὤψις ἀλλὰ ὀφθαλμὸς ὅρων, τὸ δὲ ἐγγεγεινῄσκαν τὸ χρῶμα λευκότητος περιπλήσθη καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ λευκότης αὐτὰ ἀλλὰ λευκόν, εἰτε ἔξω ἐκεῖ λίθος εἰτε ὄτιον ἔσω ἐρήμη ἄρα ἄρα χρωσθῆναι τῷ τοιούτῳ χρώματι. καὶ τάλλα δὴ οὕτω, σκληροὺς καὶ θερμοὺς καὶ πάντα τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων ὑποληπτέου, αὐτὸ μὲν καθ’ αὐτὸ μηδὲν εἶναι, ὁ δὴ καὶ \\
157 τότε * ἔλεγομεν, ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἀλληλα ὀμιλία πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ παντοτα ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως, ἐτέι καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναι τι καὶ τὸ πάσχον αὐ τε ἐπὶ ἐνὸς νοῆσαι,

156 D. βραδύτερα et quae in uncinis sequuntur, omissa in codd., supplevit Stephannus e Cornarii eologis: et sine uncinis edidit Bekker, sensu, ut videtur, exposcente; respuunt tamen Campb., Jowett.

E. ὅτιον—χρῶμα ex correctione Cornarii receperunt Heind. et Bekker. pro vulg. ὅτιον—χρῶμα.
ὁς φασίν, οὐκ εἶναι παγώς. οὔτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστὶ τι, πρὶν ἢν τῷ πάσχοντι ξυνέλθῃ, οὔτε πάσχον, πρὶν ἢν τῷ ποιοῦντι: τὸ τέ τινι ξυνελθὼν καὶ ποιοῦν ἄλλῳ αὐτῷ προσπέσον πᾶσχον ἀνεφάνη. οὕτω εἴ άπάντων τούτων, ὃπερ εἴ ἀρχής ἐλέγομεν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τινί ἂν γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἡξαίρετον, οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς πολλά καὶ ἂρτι ἡμας τὰς κάσμεθα ὑπὸ συνηθείας καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης χρήσθαι αὐτῷ. τὸ δ' οὐ δεῖ, ὡς ὁ τῶν σοφῶν λόγος, οὔτε τι ξυνήχωρεῖν οὔτε τον οὔτ' ἐμοῦ οὔτε τόδε οὔτ' ἐκεῖνο οὔτε ἄλλο οὕδεν ὄνομα, ὁ τι ἢν ἵστη, ἀλλὰ κατά φύσιν φθέγγεσθαι γνημόμενα καὶ ποιούμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα: ὃς εάν τι τις στήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ, εὐελεγκτὸς ὁ τούτῳ ποιῶν. δεὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισθέντων, ὃ δὴ ἀθροίσματι ἀνθρωπόν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθου καὶ ἐκαστον ξύον τε καὶ εἴδος. Ταῦτα δή, ὡς Θεαίτητε, ἄρ' ἢδεα δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι, καὶ γενούς ἢν αὐτῶν ὡς ἀρεσκόντων; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οἶδα ἐγώ, ὃ Σώκρατες καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ περὶ σοῦ δύναμαι κατανοήσαι, πότερα δοκοῦντά σοι λέγεις αὐτὰ ἢ ἐμοῦ ἀποπειρᾶ. Σ. Ω. Οὐ μνημονεύεις; ὃ φίλε, ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν οὔτ' οἶδα οὔτε ποιοῦμαι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ, ἀλλ' εἰμὶ αὐτῶν ἂγονος, σὲ δὲ μαιεύομαι καὶ τούτου ἑνεκα ἐπίδω τε καὶ παρατίθημι ἐκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογεύσασθαι, ἔως ἢν εἰς φῶς τὸ σοῦ δόγμα ξυνεξαγάγων. ὁ εξαχθέντος δὲ, τὸτ' ἢδ' σκέψομαι εἴτ' ἀνεμιαίον εἴτε γόνιμον ἀναφαίνεσται. ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν καὶ καρτερῶν εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως ἀποκρίνου ἢ ἢν φαίνεται σοι περὶ ἢν ἢν ἐρωτῶ. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐρώτα δή. Χ. Ω. Λέγε τῶν πάλιν, εἰ σοι ἀρέσκει τὸ μή τι εἶναι ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι ἢ εἰ ἂγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ πάντα, ἢ ἄρτι διήμεν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ’ ἐμοιγε, ἐπειδὴ σοῦ ἀκοῦ ὡς τις ἔχειν λόγον καὶ ὑποληπτέον ἐπὶ περὶ διελήλυθας. Σ. Ω. Ἔτη τοῖνυν ἀπολιπώμεν ὡς ἀλλείπτων αὐτοῦ. λείπεται δὲ ἐνυπνίων τε πέρι καὶ νόσων, τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ μανίας, ὥσα τε παρακούειν ἢ παραρέεσθαι λέγεται. οὐσθα γὰρ πον, ὡς ἐν πάσιν τούτοις ὁμολογουμένως ἐλέγχεσθαι δοκεῖ ὅν ἂρτι διήμεν λόγον, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον ἤμών 158 ψευδεῖς ἀισθήσεις ἐν * αὐτοῖς γιγανομένας, καὶ πολλοὶ δεῖν τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι, ἄλλα πάν τούναντιον οὐδὲν ὡς φαίνεται εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέ- στατα λέγεις, ὡς Ὁσκρατεῖς. Σ. Ω. Τίς δὴ οὖν, ὁ παῖ, λείπεται λόγος τῷ τῆς αἰσθήσει ἐπιστήμην τιθεμένος καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ, ὡς φαίνεται; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγὼ μέν, ὡς Ὁσκρατεῖς, ὅκινδο εἰπεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω, διότι θν χε χεπόληδας εἰπόντι 2 αὐτῷ. ἐπεὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς γνωκε ἄν δυναίμην ἅμφισβή- τησαι, ὡς οἱ μαντόνεοι ή οἱ ὁνειρόττοτες οὐ ψευδὴ δοξάζουσιν, ὅταν οἱ μὲν θεὸι αὐτῶν οἰωνται εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πτημοί τε, καὶ ὡς πετόμενοι ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ διανοοῦνται. Σ. Ω. Ἄρ’ οὖν οὐδὲ το τοιοῦτε ἅμφισβήτημα ἐνυνιεῖς περὶ αὐτῶν, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀναρ τε καὶ ὕπαρ; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον; Σ. Ω. Ὡς τοιλάκις σε οἴμαι ἀκη- κούναι ἑρωτώντων, τί ἄν τις ἔχοι τεκμήριον ἀποδείξαι, εἰ τις ἔργος νῦν οὐτως ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πότερον κα- θεύδομεν καὶ πάντα, ἡ διανοοῦμεθα, ὁνειρόττομεν, ὡς ἐγρηγοραμέν τε καὶ ὑπαρ ἀλλήλοις ἅ διαλεγομέθα. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μὴ, ὡς Ὁσκρατεῖς, ἀπορόν γε, οὕτως χρὴ ἐπιδείξαι τεκμήριον; πάντα γὰρ ὡστερ ἀντίστροφα τὰ αὐτὰ παρακολουθεῖ. ὡς γὰρ νυνὶ διελέγμεθα, οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ δοκεῖν ἀλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι.
καὶ ὅταν δὴ ὄναρ ὀνείρατα δοκῆμεν διηγεῖσθαι, ἀτοπος ἡ ὀμοιότης τοῦτων ἑκείνως. Σ.Ὤ ὅρας οὖν, ὅτι τὸ γε 
ἀμφισβητήσαι οὐ χαλεπὸν, ὅτε καὶ πότερον ἐστιν ὑπάρ 
ἡ ὄναρ ἀμφισβητεῖται, 1 καὶ δὴ ἵσον ὄντος τοῦ χρόνου 
ὅν καθεύδομεν ὃ ἐγρηγορομεν, ἐν ἑκατέρῳ διαμάχεται 
ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ἅπα παρόντα δόγματα παντὸς μᾶλλον 
εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ὥστε ἵσον μὲν χρόνον τάδε φαμέν ὄντα 
εἶναι, ἵσον δὲ ἑκεῖνα, καὶ ὁμοίως ἐφ' ἑκατέρους 
διψαχ- 
ριγόμεθα. ΘΕΛ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Σ.Ὤ. Ὁ ὑκόδον 
καὶ περὶ νόσων τε καὶ μανιῶν ὃ αὐτός λόγος, πλῆ 
νος τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτι οὐχὶ ἵσος; ΘΕΛ. Ὁρθῶς. Σ.Ὤ. 
Τῇ οὖν; πλήθει χρόνου καὶ ὄλγυτητι τὸ ἀληθῆς ὀρισθή 
στει; ΘΕΛ. 1 Γελοίον μέντ' ἄν εἶπ' πολλαπλῇ. Σ.Ὤ. Ἀλλά 
τι ἄλλο ἔχεις σαφές ἐνδείξασθαι, ὃτοια τούτων τῶν 
ὐδασμάτων ἀληθῆ; ΘΕΛ. Οὐ μοι δοκῶ. Χ.Π.Λ. Ἐμοῦ 
τοῖνυν ἄκουε, οἷα περὶ αὐτῶν ἄν λέγοιεν οἱ τὰ ἀδ 
δοκοῦντα ὀριζόμενοι τῷ δοκοῦντι εἶναι ἀληθῆ. 
λέγουσι 
δὲ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὕτως ἐρωτῶντες, ὁ ἀν 
ἐτερον ἢ παντάπασι, μή πὴ τῶν ὁμοίων τῆς ἀὐτῆ 
ἐξει τῷ ἑτέρῳ; καὶ μὴ ὑπολαβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταῦταν εἶ 
ναι ὁ ἐρωτῶμεν, τῇ δὲ ἑτερον, ἀλλὰ ὅλος ἑτερον. ΘΕΛ. 
Ἀδύνατον τοῖνυν ταύτον τι ἔχειν ἢ ἐν δυνάμει * ἢ ἐν 159 
ἀλλῷ ὀσφοὺν, ὅταν ἡ κομιδὴ ἑτερον. Σ.Ὤ. Ὄρῳ οὖ 
οὐ καὶ ἀνόμωοι ἄναγκαίοι τὸ ποιοῦτον ὀμολογεῖν; 
ΘΕΛ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ. Σ.Ὤ. Εἰ ἄρα τι ξυμβαίνει ὁμοίο 
τῷ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἀνόμωοι, εἴτε ἑαυτῷ εἴτε ἄλλῳ, ὡμο 
ομομενον μὲν ταῦταν φήσομεν γίγνεσθαι, ἀνομοίομε 
νον δὲ ἑτερον; ΘΕΛ. Ἀνάγκη. Σ.Ὤ. Οὐκοῦν πρόσθεν 
ἐλέγομεν, ὡς πολλά μὲν εἶν ἡ ποιοῦντα καὶ ἅπειρα, 
ὠσαυτὸς δὲ γε τὰ πάσχοντα; ΘΕΛ. Ναὶ. Σ.Ὤ. Καὶ
μὴν ὅτι γε ἀλλο ἄλλῳ συμμετέχειν καὶ ἄλλῳ οὐ
βιταύτα ἄλλε ἔτερα γεννήσει; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ Πάννυ μὲν οὖν.
Σ. Λέγωμεν δὴ ἐμὲ τε καὶ σὲ καὶ τὰλλ' ἦδη κατὰ
tὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, Ἦσωκράτη ὑγιαίνοντα καὶ Ἦσωκράτη
αὐτὸς ἕστενοντα. πότερον ὁμοίοι τούτ’ ἐκεῖνο ἣ ἀνό-
μοιον φήσομεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ Ἀρα τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα Ἦσω-
κράτη, ὅλον τοῦτο λέγεις ὅλῳ ἐκεῖνο, τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι
Ἦσωκράτει; Σ. Κάλλιστα ὑπέλαβες αὐτὸ τούτο λέγω.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνόμοιον δὴ του; Σ. Καὶ ἔτερον ἀρα οὔτως,
ὁσπερ ἀνόμοιον; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη. Σ. Καὶ καθεῦ-
δοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα, ἃ νῦν 1 δυὶλθομεν, ὡσαντός φήσεις;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ Ἐγγενε. Σ. Ἡ Ἐκαστὸν δὴ τῶν πεφυκότων τι
ποιεῖν ἄλλο τι, ὅταν μὲν λάβῃ ὑγιαίνοντα Ἦσωκράτη,
ὅς ἐτέρῳ μοι χρῆσεται, ὅταν δὲ ἄσθενοῦντα, ὅς ἐτέρῳ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ’ οὐ μέλλει; Σ. Καὶ ἔτερα δὴ ἐφ’ ἐκατέρῳ ἐγεννήσομεν ἐγὼ τε ὁ πάσχων καὶ ἐκεῖνο τὸ
ποιοῦν; ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν; Σ. Ἡ Ὁταν δὴ οἶνου πίνω
ὑγιαίνων, ἦδις μοι φαίνεται καὶ γλυκύς; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.
Σ. Ἡ Ἐγέννησε γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προωμολογηθέντων τὸ
δ’ τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ 1 πάσχον γλυκύτητα τε καὶ αἰσθήσιν,
ἂμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα, καὶ ἡ μὲν αἰσθήσις πρὸς τοῦ
πάσχοντος οὐσά αἰσθανομένη τῷ γλῶσσαν ἀπειρ-
γάσατο, ἢ δὲ γλυκύτης πρὸς τοῦ οἴνου περὶ αὐτὸν
φερομένη γλυκίν τὸν οἶνον τῇ ὑγιαίνοις γλώττῃ
ἔποίησε καὶ εἶναι καὶ φαίνοεθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάννυ μὲν
οὖν τὰ πρότερα ἦμιν οὕτως ὁμολόγητο. Σ. Ἡ Ὁταν
dὲ ἄσθενοῦντα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρῶτον μὲν τῇ ἄληθείᾳ οὐ τὸν
αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν; ἀνομοίω γὰρ δὴ προσηλθεν. ΘΕΑΙ.
Ε. Ναὶ. Σ. Ἡ ἔτερα δὴ αὖ 1 ἐγεννησάτην  ὁ τε τοιοῦτος

159 Α.  καὶ ἄλλῳ οὐ. Fortasse legendum καὶ ἄλλῳ αὐ οὐ.
Σωκράτης καὶ ἡ τοῦ οἴνου πόσις, περὶ μὲν τὴν γλῶτταν αἴσθησιν πικρότητος, περὶ δὲ τὸν οἴνον γηγυμοένην καὶ φερόμενην πικρότητα, καὶ τὸν μὲν οὐ πικρότητα ἄλλα πικρόν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐκ αἴσθησιν ἄλλ' αἰσθανόμενον; ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐγὼ τε οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποτὲ γενήσομαι οὔτως αἰσθανόμενος· τοῦ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλη αἰσθήσης, καὶ ἄλλοιον * καὶ ἄλλους ποιεῖ ἱδο τὸν αἰσθανόμενον οὔτ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμὲ μή ποτ' ἄλλῳ συνελθὼν ταύτον γενήσαν τοιοῦτον γένηται· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλο γενήσαν ἄλλοιον γενήσεται. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἑστὶ ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ μὴν ἔγγορε ἐμαυτῷ τοιοῦτος, ἐκεῖνὸ τε ἑαυτῷ τοιοῦτον γενήσεται. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἀνάγκη δὲ γε ἐμὲ τε τινὸς γῆγυμεσθαι, ὅταν αἰσθανόμενος γῆγυμωμαι' αἰσθανόμενον γὰρ, μηδενὸς δὲ αἰσθανόμενον ἁδύνατον γῆγυμεσθαι· ἐκεῖνο τε τινῷ γῆγυμεσθαι, ὅταν γήλυκ' ἡ πικρῶν ἡ τοιοῦτον γῆγυμηταί· γῆλυκῷ γὰρ, μηδειν' δὲ γῆλυκῷ ἁδύνατον γενέσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Λείπεται δὴ, οἴμαι, ἦμῖν ἄλληλοις, εἴτ' ἐσμὲν, εἶναι, εἴτε γηγυμώθη, γῆγυμεσθαι, ἐπείπερ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνιδεῖ μὲν, συνιδεῖ δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐδ' αὐτ' ἦμῖν αὐτοῖς. ἄλληλοι δὴ λείπεται συνιδεόθαι. ἂστε εἴτε τις εἶναι τι ψυμαζεῖ, τινὶ εἶναι ἡ τινὸς ἡ πρὸς τῷ ῥήτεον αὐτῷ, εἴτε γῆγυμεσθαι αὐτῷ δὲ ἐφ' αὐτοῦ τι ἡ ὁν ἡ γηγυμοένοι οὐτε αὐτῷ· λεκτέον οὔτ' ἄλλου λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον, ὡς ὁ λόγος ὄν διεληλυθαμεν σημαίνει. ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὡς Σωκρατεῖς. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε δὴ τὸ ἐμὲ ποιοῦν ἐμοὶ ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῳ, ἐγὼ καὶ αἰσθάνομαι αὐτοῦ, ἄλλοις δ' οὖ· ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆς ἢρα ἐμοὶ ἡ ἐμὴ αἰσθήσις· τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὐσίας αἰε ἐστὶ. καὶ ἐγὼ κριτής κατὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν τῶν τε
όντων ἐμοὶ, ὡς ἔστι, καὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.

D ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅσιον. XV. ΣΩ. Πῶς ἂν 1 οὖν ἄψευδής ὄν καὶ μὴ πταίων τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἡ γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἐπιστήμων ἀν εἰην ὄντερ αἰσθητής; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ὅπως οὐ. ΣΩ. Παγκαλῶς ἁρα σοι εἰρηται, ὅτι ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἀλλο τί ἐστιν ἡ αἰσθησις, καὶ εἰς ταύτων συμπέπτωκε, κατὰ μὲν Ὁμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον φύλου οἰνον ρεῦματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα, κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφότατον πᾶντων χρημάτων ἀνθρωπον μέτρον εἰναι, κατὰ δὲ Θεαίτητον τούτων Ε οὕτως 1 ἐχόντων αἰσθήσιν ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι. ἡ γὰρ, ὁ Θεαίτητε; φῶμεν τούτο σοι μὲν εἰναι οἰνον νεογενέως παιδίου, ἐμὸν δὲ μαίεμα; ἡ πώς λέγεις; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως ἀνάγκη, ὁ Ὁσκρατε. ΣΩ. Τούτῳ μὲν δὴ, ὃς ἔοικε, μόνης ποτὲ ἐγεννήσαμεν, ὁ τι δὴ ποτε καὶ τυχάνει ὄν. μετὰ δὲ τὸν τόκον τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτῷ ὃς ἀληθῶς ἐν κύκλῳ περιδρεκτέον τῷ λόγῳ, σκοπουμένους μὴ λάθη ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἄξιον οὖν τροφῆς τὸ 161 γιγνόμενον, ἀλλὰ * ἀνεμαίον τε καὶ ψεύδος. ἡ σὺ οἰεὶ πάντως δεῖν τὸ γε σοι τρέφειν καὶ μὴ ἀποτιθέναι; ἡ καὶ ἀνέξει ἐλεγχόμενον ὅρῳν, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα χαλεπανεῖς, ἐάν τις σοῦ ὃς πρωτοτόκου αὐτὸ ὑφαιρῆ; ΘΕΟ. Ἀνέξεται, ὁ Ὁσκρατε, Θεαίτητος: οὐδαμῶς γὰρ δύσκολος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεὸν εἰπέ, ἢ αὖ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ΣΩ. Φιλολόγος γῆ εἰ ἀτεχνῶς καὶ χρηστός, ὁ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι με οὐεὶ λόγων τινὰ εἰναι θύλακον καὶ ράδιος ἐξε- Β λόντα ἔρειν, ὃς οὐκ αὖ ἔχει οὕτως ταύτα. τὸ δὲ 1 γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν λόγων ἐξέρχεται παρ' ἐμοῦ, ἀλλ' αἰε παρὰ τοῦ ἐμοὶ προσδιαλεγομένου, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον πλῆν βραχεόν, ὅσον λόγον παρ' ἐτέρου σοφοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι μετρίως.
καὶ νῦν τούτῳ παρὰ τοῦτο πειράσομαι, όù τι αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν. ΘΕΟ. Ἔν κάλλιον, ὁ Σῶκρατες, λέγεις· καὶ ποίει οὕτως. Χ XVI. ΣΩ. Ὠισθ' οὖν, ὁ Θεόδωρε, ὁ θαυμάζω τοῦ ἔταιρον σου Πρωταγόρου; ΘΕΟ. 1 Τὸ ἐποίον; ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μοι πάντα ἴδεις εἰρήκεν, ὁς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ ἔστι τὴν ὅ ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου τεθαύμακα, ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ἁρχόμενος τῆς Ἀληθείας, ὅτι πάντων χρημάτων μέτρων ἔστιν ὡς ἡ κυνοκέφαλος ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀτοπώτερον τῶν ἐχόντων αἰσθησιν, ἣν μεγαλοπρεπῶς καὶ πάνω καταφρονητικῶς ἦρξατο ἡμῖν λέγειν, ἐνδεικνύμενος, ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ θεόν ἑπαμμάζομεν ἐπὶ σοφία, ὁ δ' ἄρα ἐτύγχανεν ὡς εἰς φρόνησιν οὐδὲν βελτίων 1 βατράχου γυρίνου, μη ὅτι ὁ ἄλλοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἥ πῶς λέγομεν, ὁ Θεόδωρε; εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐκάστῳ ἄλληθες ἕσται ὁ ἄν δὴ ἀισθήσεως δοξάζῃ, καὶ μήτε τὸ ἄλλον πάθος ἄλλος βελτίων διακρινεῖ, μήτε τὴν δόξαν κυριώτερον ἕσται ἐπισκέψασθαι ἔτερος τῆς ἐτέρου, ὅρθη ἢ ψευδής, ἀλλ' ὁ πολλάκις εὑρηται, αὐτὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἐκαστοί μόνοις δοξάζει, ταύτα δὲ πάντα ὅρθα καὶ ἀληθῇ, τί δὴ ποτε, ὁ ἔταιρε, Πρωταγόρας μὲν σοφός, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων διδάσκαλος ἄξιονθαί 1 δικαίως ε μετὰ μεγάλων μισθῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμαθέστεροι τε καὶ φοιτητέον ἡμῖν ἢν παρ' ἐκεῖνου, μέτρω ὅντι αὐτῷ ἐκάστῳ τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας; ταύτα πῶς μὴ φώμεν δημούμενον λέγειν τῶν Πρωταγόραν; τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐμόν τε καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς τέχνης τῆς μανεντικῆς συγγό, ὅσον γέλωτα ὁφλισκάνομεν οἴμαι δὲ καὶ ξύμπασα ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία. τὸ γὰρ ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐλεύγχειν τὰς ἄλληλοι φαντασίας τε καὶ δόξας, ὅρθας ἐκάστου οἴσας, οὐ μακρὰ * μὲν καὶ διωλύγιος φλυαρία, εἰ ἄλη- 162 θής ἡ ἀλήθεια Πρωταγόρου, ἄλλα μὴ παίζουσα ἐκ τοῦ
ἀδύτου τῆς βίβλου ἐφθέγξατο; ΘΕΟ. Ὁ Σώκρατες, φίλος ἄνήρ, ὥσπερ σὺ νῦν δὴ εἶπες. ὦκ ἄν ὦν δεξαίμην δὴ ἐμοῦ ὥμολογοῦντος ἐλέγχεσθαι Πρωταγόραν, οὔτ' ἄυ παρὰ δόξαι αὐτὶ τέλειον. τὸν οὖν Θεαίττην πάλιν λαβε. πάντως καὶ νῦν δὴ μᾶλ' ἐμμελῶς σοι ἐφαίνετο ὑπακούειν. ΣΩ. Ἄρα κἂν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐλθών, ὁ Θεόδωρος, 1 πρὸς τὸς παλαιστρὰς ἁξίοις ἄν ἀλλος θεώμενος γυμνοῦς, ἐνίους φαῦλους, αὐτὸς μὴ αὐτεπιθεικύνυαι τὸ εἶδος παραποδύμενος; ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν δοκεῖς, εἴπερ μέλλοιεν μοι ἐπιτρέψει καὶ πείσεσθαι; ὡσπερ νῦν οἶμαι ὑμᾶς πείσεις ἐμὲ μὲν ἐὰν θεᾶσθαι καὶ μὴ ἐλκεῖν πρὸς τὸ γυμνάσιον σκληρὸν ἥδη ὄντα, τῷ δὲ δὴ νεοτέρῳ τε καὶ υγροτέρῳ ὤντι προσπαλαίειν. ΧVII. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ οὕτως, ὁ Θεόδωρος, καὶ σοὶ φίλοι, οὐδ' ἐμοὶ ἐχθρὸν, φασίν 1 οἱ παροιμιαζόμενοι. πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐπὶ τὸν σοφὸν Θεαίττην ἵτεοι. Δέγε δὴ, ὁ Θεαίττης, πρώτον μὲν ὃ νῦν διήλθομεν, ἀρὰ οὐ συνθαυμάζεις, εἰ ἐξαίφνης οὕτως ἀναφανήσει μηδὲν χείρων εἰς σοφίαν ἵπτομαι ἀνθρώπων ἡ καὶ θεῶν; ἡ ἡπτὸν τι οἶει τὸ Πρωταγόρειον μέτρον εἰς θεοὺς ἡ εἰς ἀνθρώπους λέγεσθαι; ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δ' οὐκ ἔγογα. καὶ ὑπὲρ γε ἑρωτᾶς, πάνυ θαυμάζω. ἡνίκα ὅπιρ διημεῖν, δ' ὃν τρόπον λέγοιεν τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκκαίστῳ τούτῳ καὶ 1 εἶναι τῷ δοκοῦντι, πάνω μοι εὗ ἐφαίνετο λέγεσθαι νῦν δὲ τούναντίον τάχα μεταπέπτωκεν. ΣΩ. Νέος γὰρ εἰ, ὁ φίλε παῦ τής οὖν δημηγορίας ὅξεως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθει. πρὸς γὰρ ταῦτα ἐρεῖ Πρωταγόρας ἢ τις ἀλλος ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, Ὁ γενναῖοι παῖδες τε καὶ γέροντες, δημηγορεῖτε ἑγνακαθεξόμενοι, θεοὺς τε εἰς τὸ μέσον ἠγοντες, Ε' οὖς ἐγὼ ἐκ τε τοῦ λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν περὶ 1 αὐτῶν, ὃς εἰσὶν ἢ ὃς οὖν εἰσίν, ἐξαιρῶ καὶ ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ ἄν
άποδέχοντο ἀκούοντες, λέγετε ταῦτα, ὥς δεινὸν εἰ μηθὲν διώσει εἰς σοφίαν ἐκαστὸς τῶν ἀνθρώπων βοσκήματος ὑπονοοῦν ἀπὸδεξίων δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδ’ ἠμητινοῦν λέγετε, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθε, ὥς εἰ ἔθελοι Θεόδωρος ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμετρεῖν, ἂξιος οἴδενος μόνου ἂν εὑρ. σκοπεῖτε οὖν σὺ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος, εἰ ἀποδεξηθεὶς πιθανολογία τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ ἅ τηλικοῦ-163 τῶν λεγομένων λόγους. ΘΕΑΙ. ἈΛΛ’ οὐ δίκαιον, οὗ Σώκρατες, οὐτε σὺ οὐτε ἄν ἡμεῖς φαίμεν. ΣΩ. ἈΛΛῃ δὴ σκεπτέον, ὡς έοικεν, ὡς ὦ τε σὸς καὶ ὁ Θεοδώρου λόγοι. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν ἄλλῃ. ΣΩ. Τήδε δὴ σκοπῶμεν, εἰ ἀρα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ αἰσθήσεις ταύτων ἢ ἔτερων. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο ποι πᾶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔτεινε, καὶ τούτου χάριν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα ταῦτα ἐκινήσαμεν. οὐ γὰρ; ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ὀμολογήσωμεν, ἢ τῷ ὀράν αἰσθανόμεθα δ ἢ τῷ ἀκούειν, πάντα ταῦτα ἄμα καὶ ἐπιστάσθαι; οἰον τῶν βαρβάρων πρὶν μαθεῖν τὴν φωνῆν πότερον οὕν νοφήσωμεν ἀκούειν, ὡς ἐμβαίνων, καὶ αὐ τις ἐμάματα μὴ ἐπιστάσθαι, διέποντες εἰς αὐτὰ πότερον οὐχ ὀράν ἢ ἐπιστάσθαι, εἴπερ ὀρῶμεν, διασχισόμεθα; ΘΕΑΙ. Αὐτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, τότε αὐτῶν, ὡς ἐμπορῶμεν τε καὶ ἀκούσωμεν, ἐπιστάσθαι φήσωμεν τῶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ χρώμα ὀρᾶν τε καὶ ἐπιστάσθαι, τῶν δὲ τῆν ὁξύ-οτητα καὶ βαρύτητα ἀκούειν τε ἄμα καὶ εἰδέναι; ὡ δὲ οὗ τε γραμματισταὶ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ ἐρμήνευς διδασκουσίων, οὔτε αἰσθάνεσθαι τῷ ὀρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν οὔτε ἐπιστάσθαι. ΣΩ. Ἀριστά γ’ ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐκ ἀξίωσιν σοι πρὸς ταῦτα ἀμφισβητῆσαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ. ΧVIII. ἈΛΛ’ ἡμᾶς δὴ καὶ τόδε ἄλλο προσιόν, καὶ σκότει, πὴ αὐτὸ
διωσόμεθα. ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον δὴ; ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιόνδε, εἰ τις ἔροιτο, ἀρα δυνατόν, ὅτου τις ἐπιστήμων γένοιτο
ὅποτε ἐτί ἐχοντα 1 μνήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦτο καὶ σωιζόμενον
tότε ὅτε μέμνηται ὃ ἐπίστασθαι αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὃ μέμνη-
tαι. μακρολογῶ δὲ, ὡς ἐοικε, βουλόμενος ἐρέσθαι, εἰ
μαθών τίς τι μεμνημένος μὴ οἴδε. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς,
ὁ Σώκρατες; τέρας γὰρ ἄν εἰη ὁ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Μὴ οὖν
ἐγὼ ληρῶ; σκόπει δὲ. ἀρα τὸ ὄραν οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι
λέγεις καὶ τὴν ὄψιν αἰσθησιν; ΘΕΑΙ. 'Εγὼγε. ΣΩ.
Οὐκοῦν ὁ ἴδιων τι ἐπιστήμων ἐκείνων γέγονεν ὃ ἐκεῖ κατὰ
Ε τῶν ἄρτι λόγων; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. 1 Τὶ δαί; μνήμην
οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖ-
δεινὸς ἢ τινός; ΘΕΑΙ. Τινὸς δὴπον. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὃν
ἐμαθε καὶ ὃν ἴσθετο, τοιοῦτοι τινος; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὶ
μὴν; ΣΩ. 'Ο δὴ εἰδέ τις, μέμνηται πον ἐνιστε;
ΘΕΑΙ. Μέμνηται. ΣΩ. 'Η καὶ μύσας; ἢ τοῦτο ὀρά-
σας ἐπελάθετο; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλα δεινὸν, ὁ Σώκρατες,
164 τοῦτο γε φάναι. ΣΩ. *Δεῖ γε μέντοι, εἰ σώσοιμεν τὸν
πρόσθεν λόγον εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐχεταί. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἐγὼ
νὴ τὸν Δ' ὑποπτεύω, οὐ μὴν ἴκανῶς γε συννοὶ ἀλλ'
eiπὲ πὴ. ΣΩ. Τηδὲ ὁ μὲν ὀρὼν ἐπιστήμων, φαμέν,
tοῦτον γέγονεν, οὕτε ὀρὼν ὁψις γὰρ καὶ αἰσθησις
cai ἐπιστήμη ταυτὸν ωμολογηται. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. 'Ο δὲ γε ὅρων καὶ ἐπιστήμων γεγονὼς οὐ ἑώρα,
ἐὰν μῦσῃ, μέμνηται μὲν, οὗ όρα δὲ αὐτὸ. ἦ γάρ;
B ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ γε οὖχ όρα οὐκ 1 ἐπίστασται
ἐστιν, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ὄρα ἐπίσταται. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.
ΣΩ. Συμβαίνει ἄρα, οὐ τις ἐπιστήμων ἐγένετο, ἄτι
μεμνημένου αὐτοῦ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ὁρᾷ· ὃ
tέρας ἐφαμεν ἄν εῖναι εἰ γέγοιτο. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέσ-
tata λέγεις. ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀδυνατων δὴ τι συμβαίνειν
φαίνεται, εάν τις ἐπιστήμην καὶ αὐσθήσιν ταύτων φη ϑείων. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐοικεν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλα ἄρα ἑκάτερον φάτεον. ΘΕΑΙ. Κωδυνεύει. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δήτ' ἂν εἰν ἐπιστήμη; τι πάλιν εξ ἄρχησ, ὡς ἐοικε, λεκτέον. Καίτοι κά τι ποτε μέλλομεν, ὁ Θεαίτητε, δραν; ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνος πέρι; ΣΩ. Φαινόμεθα μοι ἀλεκτρύνον ἀγεννοὺς δίκην, πρὶν νεκυκηκέναι, ἀποθηδίσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἄδειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δή; ΣΩ. Ἀντιλογικῶς ἐοίκαμεν πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὅνοματων ὅμολογίας ἀνομολογησάμενοι καὶ τοιούτῳ των περιγενέμοιον τοῦ λόγου ἀγαπαῖν, καὶ οὐ φάσκοντες ἀγωνισταί ἄλλα φιλόσοφοι εἰναι λανθάνομεν ταύτα ἐκεῖνοι τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀνδράσι ποιοῦντες. ΘΕΑΙ. οὐπω δι' μανθάνω ὅπως λέγεις. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι δηλώσαι περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ γε δὴ νοσ. ἡρόμεθα γὰρ δῆ, εἰ μαθῶν καὶ μεμνημένος τός τι μὴ ἐπίσταται, καὶ τόν ἱόντα καὶ μύσαντα μεμνημένον, ὡρῶντα δὲ οὖ, ἀποδείξαντες, οὐκ εἰδότα ἀπεδείξαμεν καὶ ἁμα μεμνημένου τῶτο δ' εἰναι ἀδύνατον. καὶ οὕτω δὴ μύθος ἀπώλετο ο Πρωταγόρειος, καὶ δο σος ἁμα δ' τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ αἰσθήσεως, ὅτι ταύτων ἐστὶ. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐ. Φαινεται. ΣΩ. Ὁ μετὰ τον ἄν, οἴμαι, ὁ φίλε, εἴπερ γε τοῦ πατήρ τοῦ ἐτέρου μύθου ἔξη, ἀλλα πολλά ἂν ἡμνε' νύν δὲ όρφανον αὐτῶν ἡμεῖς προπηλακίζομεν. καὶ γάρ οὕτ' οἱ ἐπὶ τρόποι, οὖς Πρωταγόρας κατέλυτε, βοηθεῖν ἐθέλουσιν, ὃν Θεόδωρος εῖς ὁδε. ἀλλα δὴ αὐτὸι κωδυνεύςομεν τοῦ δικαίου ἐνεκ' αὐτῶ βοηθεῖν. ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀλλα μᾶλλον Καλλίας ὁ Ἰππονίκου τῶν ἐκείνου ἐπὶ τρόποις 165 ἡμεῖς δὲ πῶς θάττον ἐκ τῶν ψεύδων λόγων πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρίαν ἀπενεύσαμεν. χάριν γε μέντοι ἐξομεν, εἰν αὐτῶ βοηθῆς. ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις, ὁ Θεόδωρε. σκέψης οὖν τὴν γ' ἐμὴν βοήθειαν. τῶν γὰρ ἅρτη δεινότερα ἄν

Κ.Ρ.

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tis ὁμολογήσεις εὐμη προσέχων τοῖς ρήμασι τὸν νοῦν, ἢ τὸ πολὺ εἰθίσμεθα φάναι τε καὶ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι. σοι λέγω ὅπη, ἢ Θεαντήτῳ; ΘΕΟ. Εἰς τὸ κοινὸν μὲν οὖν, ἃ ἀποκρινέσθω δὲ ὁ νεότερος σφαλεὶς 1 γὰρ ἤττον ἄσχημωνήσει. XIX. ΣΩ. Δέγω δὴ τὸ δεινῶτατον ἐρωτήμα. ἐστὶ δὲ, οἴμαι, τοιῶντε τ' ἀρα οἶον τε τὸν αὐτόν εἰδότα τι τούτο ὁ οἶδε μὴ εἰδέναι; ΘΕΟ. Τί δὴ οὖν ἀποκρινούμεθα, ὃ Θεαντήτη; ΘΕΛ. Ἀδύνατὸν ποιο, οἴμαι ἐγώ. ΣΩ. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ ὅραν γε ἐπίστασθαι θήσεις. τί γὰρ χρῆσει ἄφυκτῳ ἐρωτήματι, τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν φρέατι συνεχόμενος, ὡτοι ἐροτάν ἀνεκπληκτὸς ἁνήρ, καταλαβὼν τῇ χειρὶ σοῦ τὸν ἐτέρον ὀφθαλμὸν, εἰ ὅρας c τὸ ἱμάτιον τῷ 1 κατειλημμένῳ; ΘΕΛ. Οὐ φήσο, οἴμαι, τοῦτο γε, τὸ μὲντοι ἐτέρω. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅρας τε καὶ οὐχ ὅρας ἁμα ταῦτον; ΘΕΛ. Οὔτω γε πως. ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἐγώ, φήσει, τοῦτο ὡτε τάττω ὡτε ἱρόμην τὸ ὅπως, ἀλλ' εἰ ὁ ἐπίστασαι, τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἐπίστασαι. νῦν δὲ ὁ οὐχ ὅρας, ὅρων φαίνει. ὁμολογηκὼς δὲ τυχάνεις τὸ ὅραν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ μή ὅραν μή ἐπίστασθαι. εξ οὖν τούτων λογίζου τί σοι συμβαίνει.

D ΘΕΛ. 1 Ἀλλὰ λογίζομαι, ὅτι τὰναντία οἷς ὑπεθέμεν. ΣΩ. Ἰσως δὲ γ', ὃ θαυμάσιε, πλεῖον ἀν τοιαύτ' ἔπαθες, εἰ τίς σε προσηρώτα, εἰ ἐπίστασθαι ἔστι μὲν οξυ, ἔστι δὲ ἀμβλύ, καὶ ἐγνύθεν μὲν ἐπίστασθαι, πόρρωθεν δὲ μή, καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ ἀλλα μυρία, ἢ ἐλλοχῶν ἀν πελταστικὸς ἁνὴρ μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγοις ἔρομενος, ἢνικ' ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἰσθησιν ταῦτον ἔθου, ἐμβαλὼν ἀν εἰς τὸ ἀκούειν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τοιώτας αἰσθήσεις, ἥλεγχεν ἀν ἔπεχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνείεις, Ε 1 πρὶν θαυμάσας τὴν πολυάρατον σοφίαν εὐνοποιῶς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, οὐ δὴ σε χειρωσάμενος τε καὶ εὐνοδίασας ἧδη.
Ἄν τότε ἐλύτρων χρημάτων, ὅσον σοὶ τε κάκεινῷ ἔδοκεν. Τόν ὅν δὴ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, φαίνει ἄν ᾗςως, λόγον ἐπικουροῦν τοὺς αὐτῶν ἔρει; ἄλλο τι πειρώμεθα λέγειν; ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. ΧΧ. ΣΩ. Ταῦτα τέ δὴ πάντα, ὡσ ἡμεῖς ἐπαμύνουτε αὐτῶ λέγομεν, καὶ ὁμόσε, οἴμαι, * χωρίστηκα, καταφρονῶν ἡμῶν καὶ λέγων, Ὅστος δὴ 166 ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ χρηστός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ παιδιόν τι ἐρωτηθέν ἔδεισεν, εἰ οἶδον τε τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτὸ μεμνήσθαι ἀμα καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖσαν ἀπέφησε διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι προορᾶν, γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἔμε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξε. τὸ δὲ, ὥ ραθυμότατε Σωκράτες, τῇ ἔχειν ὅταν τι τῶν ἕμων δι᾽ ἐρωτήσεως σκοπής, ἐὰν μὲν ὁ ἐρωτηθεὶς οἶαπερ ἀν ἔγω ἀποκριναὶμην ἀποκρινάμενος σφάλληται, ἐγὼ ἐλέγχομαι, εἰ δὲ ἄλλοια, 1 αὐτὸς ὁ ἐρωτηθείς. αὐτίκα Β γὰρ δοκεῖς τινά σοι ξυγχωρήσεσθαι μνήμην παρεῖναι τῷ ὃν ἐπαθε τοιοῦτον τι οὕσαν πάθος, οἰον ὤτε ἔπασθε, μηκέτι πάσχοντι; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἢ αὖ ἀποκνήσεων ὁμολογείν οἴον τ᾽ εἶναι εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι τοῦ αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτό; ἢ ἐάνπερ τοῦτο δείσῃ, δώσεων ποτὲ τοῦ αὐτὸν εἶναι τῶν ἀνομοιοῦμεν τῶ πρὶν ἀνομοιοῦσθαι οὖντι; μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν εἶναι τινα, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχὶ τοὺς, καὶ τούτους γνωμονέμους ἀπείρους, εάνπερ ἀνομοίωσις γίγνεται, 1 εἰ ο δη ὀνομάτων γε δησέ τιθηρέσεις διευλαβεῖσθαι ἄλλη- λων; ἀλλ᾽, ὁ μακάριε, φήσει, γενναιότερως ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ ἔθιον, ὁ λέγω, εἰ δύνασαι, ἐξελέγξων, ὁς οὐχὶ ᾧδαι αἰσθήσεις ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν γίγνομαι, ἢ ὡς ἰδίων γνωμο- μένων οὗτεν τι ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ φαυνόμενον μόνῳ ἐκεῖνῳ γίγνοιτο, ἢ, εἰ εἶναι δεὶ ὀνομάζειν, εἰ, ἢ ἐπερ φαινεται. ὑς δὲ δὴ καὶ κυνοκεφάλους λέγων οὐ μόνον αὐτός ὑμεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας τοῦτο δρὰν εἰς τὰ συγγράμματά μου ἀναπείθεσις, οὐ καλῶς 1 τοιῶν. ἐγὼ γὰρ θ
φημί μὲν τὴν ἀλῆθειαν ἔχειν ός γέγραφα: μέτρον γὰρ ἐκαστον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε ὅντων καὶ μή μυρίων μέντοι διαφέρειν ἐτερον ἐτέρου αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ἢ τῷ μὲν ἄλλα ἔστι τε καὶ φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἄλλα. καὶ σοφίας καὶ σοφῶν ἄνδρα πολλοῦ δέω τὸ μή φαίναι εἶναι, ἄλλα αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ λέγω σοφῶν, ὃς ἂν τινι ἡμῶν, ὃ φαίνεται καὶ ἐστι κακά, μεταβάλλων τοιήσῃ ἀγαθαὶ φαίνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι. τόν δὲ λόγου αὐτῇ τῷ ῥήματί μου ἐδώκε, ἀλλ' ὡδὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον μάθε, τῷ λέγω. οἷον γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο ἀναμνήσθητι, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἀσθενοῦντι πικρά φαίνεται ἵ ἐσθίει, καὶ ἐστι, τῷ δὲ χρησάντοι τάναντια ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται. σοφώτερον μὲν οὐν τούτων οὐδέτερον δεῖ ποιῆσαι: οὗδε γὰρ δυνατόν· 167 οὗδ' * κατηγορητέον, ός ὁ μὲν κάμμων αμαθής, ὧτι τοιαύτα δοξάζει, ὃ δὲ χρησάντων σοφός, ὧτι ἀλλοία: μεταβλητέον δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα ἀμείων γὰρ ἡ ἐτέρα ἔξις. οὗτο δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ ἀπὸ ἐτέρας ἔξεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμείων μεταβλητέον. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἰατρὸς φαρμάκως μεταβάλλει, ὃ δ' σοφιστῆς λόγοις. ἐπεὶ οὖ τι γε ψευδὴ δοξάζοντα τῆς τινα ὑστερον ἀληθῆ ἐποίησε δοξάζειν: οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατῶν δοξάσαι, οὔτε ἄλλα παρ' ἃ ἄν πάσχῃ, ταῦτα δὲ ἀεὶ ἀληθῆ. ἀλλ' ὁ οἶμαι, ποιηρῆς ψυχῆς ἐξεῖ 1 δοξάζοντας συγγενῆ αὐτῆς χρήστη ἐποίησε δοξάσαι ἐτερα τοιαύτα, ἃ δὴ τινες τὰ φαντάσματα υπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ βελτίως μὲν τὰ ἐτερα τῶν ἐτέρων, ἀληθέστερα δὲ οὐδέν. καὶ τοὺς σοφοὺς, ὃ φίλε Σώκρατες, πολλοῦ δέω βατράχους λέγειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν σώματα ἰατροὺς λέγω, κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργοὺς. φημὶ γὰρ καὶ τούτους τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀντὶ ποιηρῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὅταν τι αὐτῶν ἀσθενῇ, οὐ χρήστας καὶ 1 υγιεινὰς αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἀληθείας ἐμ-
ποιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ γε σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν. ἔπει δὴ ἢ ἄν ἐκάστη πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτὶ, ἑως ἄν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ. ἀλλ’ ὁ σοφὸς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν ὄντων αὐτοῖς ἐκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς τοὺς παιδευομένους οὕτω δυνά- μενος παιδαγωγεῖν σοφὸς τε καὶ ἄξιος πολλῶν χρη- μάτων τοῦ παιδευθείσι. καὶ οὕτω σοφὸτεροί τε εἰσιν ὁ ἐπεροὶ ἐτέρων καὶ οὐδεὶς ἴσος δοξάζει, καὶ σοι, εάν τε βούλῃ εάν τε μή, ἀνεκτέον ὄντι μέτρω σώζεται γαρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ λόγος οὕτος, ὃ συ εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀμφισβητεῖν, ἀμφισβητεῖ, λόγῳ ἀντιδιέξελθον, εἰ δὲ δὲ ἐρωτήσεως βούλει, δ’ ἐρωτήσεων οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτῳ φευκτέον, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα διωκτέω τῷ νοῦν ἔχοντι. ποιεῖ μέντοι οὕτωσι: μή ἄδικει ἐν τῷ ἐρωτᾶν. ἐ καὶ γὰρ πολλὴ ἀλογία ἀρετῆς φάσκοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μηδὲν ἂλλ’ ἢ ἄδικοντα ἐν λόγοις διατελεῖν. ἄδικεῖν δ’ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτο, ὅταν τις μὴ χωρίς μὲν ὡς ἀγωνιζόμενος τὰς διατρίβας ποιήται, χωρίς δὲ διαλε- γόμενος, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ παίζῃ τε καὶ σφάλλῃ καθ’ ὅσον ἂν δύνηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ διαλέγεσθαι σποουδᾶς τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῦ τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον, ἐκεῖνα μόνα αὐτῷ ἐνδεικνύμενος τὰ σφάλματα, ὃ αὐτὸς υφ’ ἐαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν προτέρων συνουσιῶν παρεκκρουστο. ἀν μὲν γὰρ ἵσος οὕτω ποιήσῃ, ἐαυτοῦς αἰτιῶσονται οἱ προσδιατρίβοντες σοι τῆς αὐτῶν ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπορίας, ἄλλ’ οὕ οὐ σε, καὶ σε μὲν διώκονται καὶ φιλήσουσιν, αὐτοὺς δὲ μισήσουσιν, καὶ φεύξονται ἀφ’ ἑαυτῶν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, οὐ’ ἄλλοι γενόμενοι ἀπαλλαγώσι τῶν οἱ πρότερον ἔσαν’ εάν δὲ τάναντια τούτων δρᾶς, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, τάναντια
ξυμβήσεται σοι καὶ τοὺς ξυνόντας ἀντὶ φιλοσοφῶν
μισοῦντας τοῦτο τὸ ἰπράγμα ἀποφανεῖς, ἐπειδὰν πρεσβύτεροι γένωνται. εἰς οὖν ἔμοι πείθῃ, ὦ καὶ πρότερον ἐρρήθη, οὗ δυσμενῆς οὐδὲ μαχητικῶς, ἀλλὰ ὢν τῇ
dιανοίᾳ ξυγκαθεῖς ὥς ἀληθῶς σκέψει, τί ποτε λέγομεν, κινεῖσθαι τὲ ἀποφαίνομεν τὰ πάντα τὸ τε δοκοῦν
ἐκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ εἶναι ἱδιώτη τε καὶ πόλει, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκέψει, εἴτε ταύτων εἴτε καὶ ἀλλο ἐπιστήμη
c καὶ αἰσθησις, ἀλλὰ οὖχ, ὡσπερ ἄρτι, ἐκ συνηθείᾳ ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὅνωμάτων ἃ οἷ 1 πολλοὶ ὅπη ἀν τύχωσιν
ἐλκοντες ἀπορίας ἀλλήλοις παυτοδαπᾶς παρέχουσιν. Ταύτα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τῷ ἑταῖρῳ σου εἰς βοήθειαν προσ-
ηρξάμην κατ᾽ ἐμὴν δύναμιν, σμικρὰ ἀπὸ σμικρῶν εἰ δ᾽ αὐτὸς ἑξή, μεγαλείότερον ἀν τοὺς αὐτοῦ ἐβοηθησεν. ΧΧΙ. ΘΕΟ. Παῖζεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάνυ γὰρ νεανικῶς
tὸ ἄνδρὶ βεβοηθήκας. ΣΩ. Εὐ λέγεις, ὦ ἑταῖρε. καὶ μου εἰπὲ ἑνενόσας που λέγωντος ἄρτι τοῦ Πρωταγόρου
δ καὶ ὁνειδίζοντος ἡμῖν, ὅτι 1 πρὸς παιδίων τοὺς λόγους
ποιοῦμεν τῷ τοῦ παιδὸς φόβῳ ἀγωνιζόμεθα εἰς τὰ ἔαυτοῦ, καὶ χαριντισμὸν τίνα ἄποκαλών, ἀποσεμώνων
dε τὸ πάντων μέτρον, σπουδάσαι ἡμᾶς διεκελεύσατο
περὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον; ΘΕΟ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἑνενόσα, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; κελεύεις πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ; ΘΕΟ. Σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. Ὁρᾶς οὖν ὅτι τάδε πάντα
πλὴν σοῦ παιδία ἐστίν; εἰ οὖν πεισόμεθα τῷ ἄνδρὶ, ἐμὲ
καὶ σε δεῖ ἐρωτῶντας τε καὶ 1 ἀποκρινομένους ἀλλήλοις
σπουδάσαι περὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον, ἣν μὴ τοῦ τούτο γ᾽ ἔχη ἐγκαλεῖν, ὡς παῖζοντες πρὸς μειράκια διεσκεψάμεθ᾽
αὐ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον. ΘΕΟ. Τί δε; οὐ πολλῶν τοῦ
Θεαλητοῦς μεγάλους πρόκουν ἐχθόνων ἀμεινοῦ ἀν ἐπα-
kolouθήσειν λόγῳ διερευνομένῳ; ΣΩ. ἈΛΛ᾽ οὐ τοῦ
σοῦ γε, ὃ Θεόδωρε, ἀμεινον. μή οὖν οἷον ἐμὲ μὲν τῷ σῷ ἐταίρῳ τετελευτηκότι δεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπαμύνειν, σὲ * δὲ μηδενί, ἀλλ' ἵθι, ὃ ἀριστε, ὅλιγον ἐπίστου, 169 μέχρι τούτου αὐτοῦ ἔως ἂν εἰδῶμεν, εἰτε ἄρα σὲ δεῖ διαγραμμάτων πέρι μέτρου εἶναι, εἰτε πάντες ὁμοῖοι σοὶ ἱκανοὶ ἐαυτοῖς εἰς τε ἀστρονομίαν καὶ ἀλλα, ὅν δὲ σὺ πέρι αἰτίαν ἔχεις διαφέρειν. ΘΕΟ. Οὐ ράδιον, ὃ Σώκρατες, σοὶ παρακαθήμενον μὴ διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἄρτι παρελήρησας φάσκων σε ἐπιτρέψεωι μοι μὴ ἀποδύσεσθαι, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀναγκάσεις καθάπερ Δακεδαι-μόνοι σὺ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν Σκίρρωνα μᾶλλον τείνειν. Δακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν 1 γὰρ ἀπιέναι ἡ ἀποδύσεσθαι β κελεύοντι, σὺ δὲ κατ' Ἀυταῖον τί μοι μᾶλλον δοκείς τὸ δράμα δρᾶν τὸν γὰρ προσελθόντα οὖκ ἄνιψι πρὶν ἀναγκάσῃς ἀποδύσας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις προσπαλαίσαι. ΣΩ. Ἀριστά γε, ὃ Θεόδωρε, τὴν νόσου μου ἀπεῖκα-σας ισχυρικότερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνον. μυρίοι γὰρ ἤδη μοι Ἡρακλεῖες τε καὶ Θησέες ἐντυγχάνοντες καρτεροί πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μάλ' εὗ ἡγυγκεκόφασιν, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὔδεν τι μᾶλλον ἀφισταμαι οὐτω τις ἔρως δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε τῆς 1 περὶ ταύτα γυμνασίας. μή οὖν μηδὲ σὺ φθονήσῃς ο προσανατριψάμενος σαυτόν τε ἄμα καὶ ἐμὲ ὑμῆσαι. ΘΕΟ. οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλ' ἄγε ὅπη ἐθέλεις' πάντως τὴν περὶ ταύτα εἰμαρμένην, ἤν ἂν σὺ ἐπικλώσῃς, δεῖ ἀνατλῆναι ἐλεγχόμενον. οὐ μέντοι περαιτέρω γε ὅν προτίθεσαι οἶος τ' ἕσομαι παρασχεῖν ἐμαυτόν σοι. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ καὶ μέχρι τούτων. καὶ μοι πάνω τήρει τὸ τοιόνδε, μὴ που παιδικὸν τι λάθωμεν ἐἴδος τῶν λόγων ποιούμενοι, καὶ τις πάλιν 1 ἡμῖν αὐτὸ δ ὑπειδίη. ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ δὴ πειράσομαι γε καθ' ὅσον ἂν δύνωμαι. XXII. ΣΩ. Τοῦδε τοίνυν πρῶτον πάλιν

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ἀντιλαβώμεθα, οὕτε τὸ πρότερον, καὶ ἱδώμεν, ὀρθῶς ἢ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐδυσχεραίνομεν ἐπιτιμᾶμεν τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι αὐτάρκη ἐκαστὸν εἰς φρόνησιν ἐποίει, καὶ ἡμῖν ξυνεχώρησεν ὁ Πρωταγόρας, περὶ τε τοῦ ἁμείνονος καὶ χειρονος διαφέρειν τινάς, οὕς δὴ καὶ εἶναι σοφοῖς. οὐχί; ΘΕΟ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν αὐτὸς παρῶν ὁμολογεῖ, ἐ ἀλλὰ μὴ ἡμεῖς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ξυνεχωρίσαμεν, οὐδὲν ἄν πάλιν ἐδεί ἐπαναλαβόντας βεβαιοῦσθαι νῦν δὲ τάχι ἂν τις ἡμᾶς ἀκύρους τιθείη τῇς ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ὁμολογίας. διὸ καλλιόνως ἔχει σαφέστερον περὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ διομολογῆσασθαί οὐ γὰρ τι σμικρὸν παραλλάττει οὗτος ἔχου ἢ ἄλλως. ΘΕΟ. Δέγεις ἄληθή. ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν δὴ ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐκείνου λόγου ως διὰ 170 βραχυτάτων * λάβωμεν τὴν ὁμολογίαν. ΘΕΟ. Πώς; ΣΩ. Οὐτωσὶ. Τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ εἰναι φησὶ που φο δοκεί; ΘΕΟ. Φησὶ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπων, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντων ἀνθρώπων δόξας λέγομεν, καὶ φαμέν οὐδένα οὐτίνα οὐ τὰ μὲν αὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν ἄλλων σοφότερον, τὰ δὲ ἄλλους ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ἐν γε τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις, ὅταν ἐν στρατείαις ἢ νόσοις ἢ ἐν ταλάττῃ χειμάζωνται, ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς ἐν ἑκάστοις ἄρχοντας, Β σωτῆρας σφῶν 1 προσδοκῶντας, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τῷ διαφέροντας ἢ τῷ εἰδέναι. καὶ πάντα που μεστὰ τὰνθρώπινα ξητοῦντων διδασκάλους τε καὶ ἄρχοντας εαυτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζωῆς τῶν τε ἐργασιῶν, οἰομένων τε αὐτοὺς μὲν διδάσκειν, ἰκανῶν δὲ ἄρχειν εἰναι. καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀπασὶ τί ἄλλο φήσομεν ἢ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡγεῖσθαι σοφίαν καὶ ἁμαθίαν εἶναι παρὰ σφίσιν; ΘΕΟ. Οὐδέν ἄλλο. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν ἄληθή διάνοιαν ἡγοῦνται, τὴν δὲ ἁμαθίαν ψευδῆ δόξαν;
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Τι μήν; ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, χρησό-μεθα τῷ λόγῳ; πότερον ἀληθῆ φῶμεν αἰεί τοὺς ἀνθρώ-πους δοξάζειν, ἢ ποτὲ μὲν ἀληθῆ, ποτὲ δὲ ψευδῆ; εὖ ἀμφοτέροι γάρ που ἐυμβαίνει μὴ αἰεί ἀληθῆ ἄλλ' ἀμ-φότερα αὐτούς δοξάζειν. σκόπει γάρ, ὁ Θεόδωρε, εἰ ἐθέλοι ἢν τις τῶν ἁμφὶ Πρωταγόραν ἢ σὺ αὐτὸς δια-μάχεσθαι, ὥς οὐδεὶς ἡγεῖται ἑτερος ἑτερον ἄμαθη τε εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν. ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλ' ἀποστῶν, οἱ Σῶκρατες. ΣΩ. Καὶ μήν εἰς τούτῳ γε ἀνάγκης ὁ δ Λόγος ἦκει ὁ πάντων χρημάτων μέτρων ἀνθρώπων λέγων. ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δή; ΣΩ. "Οταν σὺ κρίνας τι παρὰ σαυτῷ πρὸς με ἀποφαίνῃ περὶ τινος δόξαν, σοι μὲν δὴ τούτῳ κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνου λόγου ἀληθὲς ἐστώ, ἢμὶν δὲ δὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις περὶ τῆς σῆς κρίσεως πότερον οὐκ ἐστὶ κρίταις γενέσθαι, ἢ αἰεὶ σε κρίνομεν ἀληθῆ δοξάζεις; ἢ μυρίου ἐκάστοτε σοι μάχονται ἀντιδοξάζοντες, ἥγουμενοι ψευ-δῆ κρίνειν τε καὶ οἰείσθαι; ΘΕΟ. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὁ Σῶ-κρατες, μάλα μυρίοι δήτα, φησὶν "Ομηρος, οὗ γε μοι Ετά εὖ ἀνθρώπων πράγματα παρέχουσιν. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; βούλει λέγωμεν, ὡς σὺ τότε σαυτῷ μὲν ἀληθῆ δοξάζεις, τοῖς δὲ μυρίοις ψευδῆ; ΘΕΟ. "Εσοικεν ἐκ γε τοῦ λόγου ἀνάγκη εἶναι. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρα; ἃρ' οὐχὶ ἀνάγκη, εἰ μὲν μηδὲ αὐτὸς φητο μέτρων εἶναι ἀνθρώπου μηδὲ οἱ πολλοὶ, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ οἴονται, μηδενὶ δὴ εἶναι ταύτῃ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἢν ἑκείνου ἔγραψεν; εἰ δὲ * αὐτὸς ἱ 71 μὲν φητο, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος μὴ συνοίλεται, οἰσθ' ὅτι πρότον μὲν ὅσῳ πλεῖος οἴς μὴ δοκεῖ ἢ οἷς δοκεῖ, τοσοῦτοι μᾶλλον οὐκ ἐστιν ἢ ἐστιν; ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη, εἰπὲρ γε καθ' ἐκάστην δόξαν ἐσται καὶ οὐκ ἐσται. ΣΩ. Ἐπειτά γε τοῦτ' ἐχει κομψότατον ἑκείνου μὲν περὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ οἰ̂̇σεως τὴν τῶν ἀντιδοξάζοντων οὐ̂̇σιν, ἢ ἑκείνου ἑ̂̇ς.
γοῦνται ψεύδεσθαι, ἐξηγχωρεῖ ποὺ ἀληθῆ εἶναι ὁμολογοῦν τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἀπαντᾶσ. ΘΕΟ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. ΒΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀν ψευδὴ ἐξηγχωροῖ, εἰ τὴν τῶν ἡγομένων αὐτὸν ψεύδεσθαι ὁμολογεῖ ἀληθῆ εἶναι; ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Οἱ δὲ γὰρ ὁμολογοῦν ἐαυτοὺς ψεύδεσθαι; ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ γὰρ ὁμολογεῖ καὶ ταύτῃ ἀληθῇ τὴν δόξαν ἐξ ὑπὸ γέγραφε. ΘΕΟ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. ἔξ ἀπάντων ἁρὰ ἀπὸ Πρωταγόρου ἀρξαμένων ἀμφισβητήσει, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπὸ γε ἐκείνου ὁμολογήσει, ὅταν τῷ τάναντι λέγοντι ἐξηγχωρῆ ἀληθῆ αὐτὸν δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς ἐξηγχωρήσεται μήτε κύναι μήτε τὸν ἐπιτυχόντα ἀνθρωπὸν μέτρον εἶναι μηδὲ περὶ ἐνὸς οὗ ἀν μὴ μάθη. οὗχ οὔτως; ΘΕΟ. Οὔτως. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων, οὔτεν ἀν εἰ τῇ Πρωταγόρου ἀλήθεια ἀληθῆς, οὔτε τινὶ ἄλλῳ οὔτε αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ. ΘΕΟ. Ἀγαν, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸν ἑταίρον μου καταθέομεν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τοι, ὁ φίλε, ἀδηλοῦ, εἰ καὶ παραθέομεν τὸ ὀρθὸν. εἰκὸς γε ἁρὰ ἐκείνου προσβεβύτερον ἢμῶν εἶναι καὶ εἰ αὐτίκα ἐντεῦθεν ἀνακύψει μέχρι τοῦ αὐχένος, πολλὰ ἀν ἐμὲ τῇ ἐλέγξας ληροῦντα, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, καὶ σὲ ὁμολογοῦντα, καταδὺς ἄν οὐχιοτο ἀποτρέχων. ἀλλὰ ἢμῶν ἀνάγκη, οἷμαι, χρῆσθαι ἢμῶν αὐτοῖς, ὁποῖοι τινὲς ἐσμέν, καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἂει ταύτα λέγειν. καὶ δῆτα καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι φῶς ὁμολογεῖν ἀν τοῦτο γε ὀντινοῦν, τὸ εἶναι σοφώτερον ἐτερον ἐτέρου, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀμαθέστερον; ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὕν δοκεῖ. ΣΧΠ. Ἄρη καὶ ταύτῃ ἀν μάλιστα ἱστασθαι τὸν λόγον, ἦ ἢμεῖς ὑπεγράψαμεν ἐβοηθοῦντες Πρωταγόρα, ὡς τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἦ δοκεῖ, ταύτῃ καὶ ἐστιν ἐκάστῳ, θερμά, ξηρά, γυμνά, πάντα.
ὁσα τού τύπου τούτου ει δέ που ἐν τισι ξυγχωρήσεται διαφέρειν ἀλλον ἄλλον, περὶ τὰ υγεινά καὶ νοσώδη ἐθελήσαι ἂν φάναι μη πᾶν γάμαιν καὶ παιδίον καὶ θηρίον δὲ ἢκαυν εἰναι ιάσθαι αὐτὸ γιγνώσκον ἐαυτῷ τὸ υγεινόν, ἄλλα ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄλλον ἄλλον διαφέρειν, εἶπερ που; ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. ΣΩ. * Οὐκ-172 οὖν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν, καλὰ μὲν καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα καὶ ὅσια καὶ μή, οἶα ἂν ἐκάστη πόλις οἰηθείσα θήται νόμιμα ἐαυτῇ, ταύτα καὶ εἶναι τῇ ἁλθείᾳ ἑκάστῃ, καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν οὐδὲν σοφώτερον οὔτε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτων οὔτε πόλιν πόλεως εἶναι ἐν δὲ τῷ ξυμφέροντα ἐαυτῇ ἢ μὴ ξυμφέροντα τίθεσθαι, εὐταῦθ', εἶπερ που, αὐ ὀμολογήσει ξύμβουλον τε ξυμβούλου διαφέρειν καὶ πόλεως δόξαν ἐτέραν ἐτέρας πρὸς ἀλθείαν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν πάνυ τολμήσειε 1 φῆσαι, ὁ ἂν θήται πόλις ξυμφέροντα οἰηθείσα αὑτῇ, παντὸς μᾶλλον ταύτα καὶ ξυνόσιε. ἀλλ' ἑκεῖ, οὐ λέγω, ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἄδικοις καὶ ὅσιοις καὶ ἀνοσίοις, ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἐαυτοῦ ἕχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν τοῦτο γίγνεται ἁλθῆς τότε ἢταν δόξη καὶ ὅσον ἂν δοκῇ χρόνῳ. καὶ ὅσοι γε δὴ μὴ παντάπασι τῶν Πρωταγόρου λόγου λέγουσιν, ὁδὲ πως τὴν σοφίαν ἁγουσι. Δόγος δὲ ἡμᾶς, ὃ Θεόδωρε, ἐκ λόγου, μεῖζων ἔξ ἐλάττωνος, 1 καταλαμβάνει. ΘΕΟ. ο Οὐκοῦν σχολὴν ἁγομεν, ὃ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Φαινόμεθα, καὶ πολλάκις μὲν γε δὴ, ὃ δαιμόνιναι, καὶ ἄλλοτε κατενόησα, ἀταρ καὶ νῦν, ὃς εἰκότως οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις πολὺν χρόνον διατρίψαντες εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια ιόντες γελοῖοι φαίνονται ῥήτορες. ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δὴ οὖν λέγεις; ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύουσιν οἱ ἐν δικαστήριοι καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ
Δὲ τὴν τοιᾶδε διατριβήν ἔθεραμένους ὡς οἰκεῖαι πρὸς ἔλευθέρους τεθράφθαι. ΘΕΟ. Πὴ δὴ; ΣΩ. Ἡ τοῖς μὲν, τούτῳ ὁ σὺ εἴπες, ἂεὶ πάρεστι σχολῇ καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιοῦνται· ὀσπέρ ἥμεῖς νυνὶ τρίτων ἦδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὐτώ κάκευνι, ἐδώ αὐτοὺς ὁ ἐπελθὼν τοῦ προκειμένου μᾶλλον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς, ἀρέστη, καὶ διὰ μακρῶν ἢ βραχέων μέλει οὐδὲν λέγειν, ἂν μόνον τύχωσι τοῦ ὄντος. οἱ δὲ ἐν ἁσχολίᾳ τε ἂεὶ λέγουσι κατεπείγει γὰρ ὑδωρ ῥέουν,

Ε καὶ οὐκ ἐγχορεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσι τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκην ἔχουν ὁ ἀντίδικος ἐφέστηκε καὶ ὑπογραφὴν παραναγιγνωσκομένην, ἄν ἐκτὸς οὐ ῥητέον· (ἤν ἀντωμοσίαν καλοῦσιν) οἱ δὲ λόγοι αἰεὶ περὶ ὁμοδούλου πρὸς δεσπότην καθήμενον, ἐν χειρὶ τὴν δίκην ἐχοῦντα, καὶ οἱ ἄγωνες οὐδέποτε τὴν ἄλλος ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος. 173 ὥστ' ἐξ * ἀπάντων τούτων ἐντούς καὶ δριμεῖς γίγνονται, ἐπιστάμενοι τὸν δεσπότην λόγῳ τε θωπεύσαι καὶ ἔργῳ χαρίσασθαι, σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχὰς. τὴν γὰρ αὐξήν καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ τε καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἢ ἐκ νέων δουλεία ἀφιρηται, ἀναγκάζουσα πράττειν σκολία, μεγάλους κινδύνους καὶ φόβους ἔτει ἀπαλαίς ψυχαῖς ἐπιβάλλονσα, οὐς οὐ δυνάμενοι μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀληθοὺς ὑποφέρειν, εὐθύς ἐπὶ τὸ ψευδός τε καὶ τὸ ἀλλήλους ἀνταδικεῖν τρεπόμενοι πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ Β συγκλώνται, ὅσθ' ύψεις οὐδὲν ἔχοντες τῆς διανοίας εἰς ἀνδρας ἐκ μειρακίων τελευτώσι, δεινοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ γεγονότες, ως οἰοῦνται. Καὶ οὕτως οὐκ ὅτι τοιοῦτοι, ὁ Θεόδωρε· τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ πότερον βούλει διελθόντες ἡ ἔσαστες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τραπωμέθεα, ἴνα μὴ καὶ, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, λίιαν τολυ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ
καὶ μεταλήψει τῶν λόγων καταχρωμεθα; ὍΕΟ. Μηδαμίδος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ διελθόντες. πάνω γὰρ εὐ τοῦτο εἴρηκας, ὅτι ὁυχ ἤμεις οἱ ἐν τῷ τοὐδε χορεύ- σοντες τῶν λόγων ὑπηρέται. ἀλλὰ οἱ λόγοι οἱ ἡμέτεροι ὦσπερ οικέται, καὶ ἐκαστος αὐτῶν περιμένει ἀποτελε- σθῆναι, ὅταν ἡμῖν δοκῇ οὔτε γὰρ δικαστὶς οὔτε θεατῆς, ὦσπερ ποιηταῖς, ἐπιτιμήσων τε καὶ ἄρξων ἐπιστατεῖ παρ’ ἡμῖν. ΧΧΙV. Σ. Λέγομεν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπεῖ σοὶ γε δοκεῖ, περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων τί γὰρ ἂν τις τοὺς γε φαύλως διατρίβοντας ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγοι; Οὔτοι δὲ πον ἐκ νέων πρῶτον μὲν εἰς ἀγορὰν οὐκ ἤσαι τὴν ὠδὸν, οὐδὲ ὁπον δικαστήριον ἡ βουλευτήριον ἡ τι κοινών δ ἀλλῳ τῆς πόλεως συνέδριον νόμους δὲ καὶ Ψηφίσματα λεγόμενα ἦ γεγραμμένα οὔτε ὁρῶσιν οὔτε ἀκούσαν. σπουδάι δὲ ἐταφείων ἔπτ ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνωδοι καὶ δεύτερα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κόμοι, οὐδὲ ὁνὰρ πράττει προσ- ἴσταται αὐτοῖς. εὐ δὲ ἦ κακῶς τις γέγονεν ἐν πόλει, ἢ τι τῷ κακῶν ἐστιν ἐκ προγόνων γεγονὸς ἢ πρὸς ἄνδρῶν ἢ γυναικῶν, μᾶλλον αὐτῶν λέληθεν ἢ οἱ τῆς θαλάττης λεγόμενοι χόες. καὶ ταῦτα πάντ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὅτι ἐ οὐκ οἴδεν, οἴδεν οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκι- μεῖν χάριν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὁντι τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πόλει κεῖται αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιδημεῖ, ἢ δὲ διάνοια, ταῦτα πάντα ἡγησαμένη σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν, ἀτιμάσασα πανταχῇ φέρεται κατά Πίνδαρον, τά τε γὰς ὑπένερθε καὶ τά ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα, οὐρανοῦ τε ὑπερ ἀστρονομοῦσα, καὶ πάσαν πάντη φύσιν ἐρευνώμενη τῶν ὄντων ἐκά- στοι ὄλοι, εἰς τῶν ἑγγὺς οὐδέν αὐτὴν συγκαθείσα. ὍΕΟ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; Σ. Ὀσπερ καὶ Θαλῆν ἀστρονομοῦντα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄνω βλέ- ποντα, πεσόντα εἰς φρέαρ, Ὀριστό τις ἐμμελής καὶ
χαρίεσσα θεραπαυνίς ἀποσκώψαι λέγεται, ὥς τὰ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ προθυμοῖτο εἰδέναι, τὰ δὲ ἐμπροσθεῖν αὐτοῦ καὶ παρὰ πόδας λανθάνου αὐτών. ταύτων δὲ ἄρκει Β σκῶμμα ἐπὶ πάντας, ὅσοι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγρουσι.  

Τοῦ γὰρ οὖν τῶν τοιοῦτον ὅ μὲν πλησίον καὶ ὁ γεῖτων λέληθεν, οὐ μόνον ὁ τι πράττει, ἀλλὰ ὁλίγων καὶ εἰ ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν ἢ τι ἄλλο θρέμμα· τί δὲ ποτ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπος καὶ τί τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει προσήκει διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖν ἢ πᾶσχειν, ξητεῖ τε καὶ πράγματ' ἐχει διερευνώμενος. μανθάνεις γὰρ ποι, ὃ Θεόδωρε. ἦ οὐ; ΘΕΟ. 'Ἐγώγε καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Τούγαρτοι, ὃ φίλε, ὢδία τε συγγυγνόμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐκάστῳ καὶ

Δημοσία, ὀπερ ἀρχόμενος ἑλεγον, ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἦ ποι ἀλλοθι ἀναγκασθῇ περί τῶν παρὰ πόδας καὶ τῶν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, γέλωτα παρέχει οἱ μόνον Θράτταις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ ὄχλῳ, εἰς φρέατα τε καὶ πᾶσαν ὑπορίαν ἐμπίπτων ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, καὶ ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη δεινῇ, δόξαν ἀβελτερίας παρεχομένη. ἐν τε γὰρ ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἵδιον ἔχει οὐδὲν οὐδένα λοι- 

δορεῖν, άτ' οὐκ εἰδός κακόν οὐδὲν οὐδενός εκ τοῦ μὴ

Δ μεμελετήκειναι ἀπορῶν οὖν γελοῖος φαίνεται· ἑν  ἐν τοῖς ἐπαίνοις καὶ ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων μεγαλαυχίαις, οὐ προσποιήσω, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἄντι γελῶν ἐνδηλὸς γιγνόμενος ληρώδης δοκεί εἶναι. τύραννον τε γὰρ ἡ βασιλέα ἐγκω- 

μιαξόμενον ἐνα τῶν νομέων, οἶον συβωτῆν, ἡ ποιμένα, ἡ τινα βουκόλον ἱγεῖται ἀκούειν εὐδαιμονιζόμενον πολὺ βδάλλοντα, δυσκολότερον δὲ ἐκείνων ξοῶν καὶ ἐπι- 

βουλότερον ποιμαίνειν τε καὶ βδάλλειν νομίζει αὐτοῦς· ἀγροικον δὲ καὶ ἀπάδευτουν ὑπὸ ἀσχολίας οὐδέν ἤττον

Ε τῶν νομέων τὸν  τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαίον γίγνεσθαι, σηκὸν ἐν ὧρα τὸ τεῖχος περιβεβλημένου. γῆς δὲ ὅταν μυρία
πλέθρα ἢ ἔτι πλεῖω ἀκούσῃ ὡς τις ἀρα κεκτημένος θαυμαστά πλήθει κέκτηται, πάνσμικρα δοκεῖ ἀκούειν εἰς ἀπασαν εἰωθῶς τὴν γῆν βλέπειν. τὰ δὲ δὴ γένη ὕμνούντων, ὡς γενναίος τις ἐπτὰ πάππους πλούσιους ἔχων ἀποφήναι, παντάπασιν ἀμβλύ καὶ ἐπὶ σμικρῶν ὅρων ὑᾷ ἐκτιτά τὸν ἐπαίνοιν, ὡπὸ ἀπαίδευσίας οὐ δυναμένων εἰς 175 τὸ πᾶν ἄεὶ βλέπειν, οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι πάππων καὶ προγόνων μυριάδες ἐκάστῳ γεγόνασιν ἀναριθμητοί, ἐν αἰς πλούσιοι καὶ πτωχοὶ καὶ βασιλείς καὶ δούλοι βάρβαροι τε καὶ Ἑλληνες πολλάκις μυρίοι γεγόνασιν ὃτρων, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πέντε καὶ εἰκοσὶ καταλόγῳ προγόνων σεμνυμένων καὶ ἀναφερόντων εἰς Ἡρακλέα τὸν Ἀμφιτρύωνος ἀτόπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας, ὅτι δὲ ὁ ἀπ' Ἀμφιτρύωνος εἰς τὸ 1 ἀνώ πεντεκαιεικοστὸς Β τοιούτος ἢ, ὁλα συνέβαινεν αὐτῷ τύχῃ, καὶ ὁ πεντηκοστὸς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, γελᾶ οὐ δυναμένων λογίζεσθαί τε καὶ χαυνότητα ἀνοιχτον ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττειν. ἐν ἀπασι δὴ τοῦτος ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν καταγελᾶται, τὰ μὲν ὑπερηφάνως ἔχων, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ δ' ἐν ποσὶν ἁγνῶν τε καὶ ἐν ἐκάστως ἀπορῶν. ΘΕΟ. Παντάπασι τὰ γεγονόμενα λέγεις, ὁ Σωκρατες. XXV. ΣΩ."Οταν δὲ γέ τινα αὐτός, ὁ φίλε, ἐλκύσῃ ἄνω, καὶ ἐθελήσῃ τις αὐτῷ 1 ἐκβήναι ἐκ τοῦ Τι ἐγὼ σε ἄδικω ἢ σὺ ἐμὲ; εἰς σκέψιν αὐτῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἄδικιας, τί τε ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν καὶ τί τῶν πάντων ἤ ἀλλήλων διαφέρετον, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ Βασιλείως εὐδαιμονίας κεκτημένος τ' αὐ πολὺ χρυσίων, βασιλείας πέρι καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης ὀλος εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἠθλιότητος ἐπὶ σκέψιν, ποιῶ τε τινε ἐστὸν καὶ τίνα τρόπου ἀνθρώπου φύσει προσήκει τὸ μὲν κτήσασθαι αὐτῶν, τὸ δὲ ἀποφυγεῖν,—περὶ τοῦτον ἀπάντων ὅταν αὐ δὲ λόγον δίδοναι τὸν 1 σμικρὸν ἐκείνον τὴν ψυχὴν
καὶ δριμῶν καὶ δικανίκων, πάλιν αὖ τὰ ἀντιστροφὰ ἀποδίδωσιν ἱλιγμῶν τε ἀφ’ ύψηλοῦ κρεμασθεῖς καὶ βλέπων μετέωρος ἀνωθεν ὑπὸ ἁθείας ἀδημονῶν τε καὶ ἀπορῶν καὶ βαρβαρίζων γέλωτα Θράττας μὲν οὐ παρεχεὶ οὐδ’ ἄλλῳ ἀπαίδευτῳ οὐδενὶ, οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνονται, τοῖς δ’ ἐναντίως ἢ ὡς ἀνδραπόδοις τραφεῖοι ἀπασίων. Ὡς οὖτος δὴ ἐκατέρω τρόπος, ὃ Θεόδωρε, ὃ μὲν τῷ ὤντι ἐν ἐκενθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένου, ὑπὲρ δὴ φιλόσοφον καλεῖς, φιλέμεσθον εὐθείᾳ δοκεῖν καὶ οὐδενὶ εἶναι, ὅταν εἰς δουλικὰ ἐμπέζη διακονήματα, οἰον στρωματοδεσμον µὴ ἐπιστάμενος συσκευάσασθαι μηδὲ ὄψιν ἴδουναι ἢ θωπας λόγους’ ὁ δ’ αὖ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα πάντα δυσαμένου τορός τε καὶ ὁξεῖς διακονεῖν, ἀναβάλλεσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἐπισταμένου ἐπιδέξια ἐκενθερώσι οὐδὲ γ’ ἀρμονίαν

176 λόγων λαβόντος ὁρθῶς ὑμνήσαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἄληθῆ. ΘΕΟ. Εἰ πάντας, ὃ Σάκρατες, πείθοις ἢ λέγεις, ὠσπερ ἐμε, πλείον ἀν εἰρήνη καὶ κακὰ ἐλάττω κατ’ ἀνθρώπους εἰη. ΣΩ. Ἄλλῳ οὖτ’ ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατῶν, ὃ Θεόδωρε ὑπεναντίον γὰρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἂεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη’ οὔτ’ ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἱδρύσθαι, τὴν δὲ θυστήμεν ἄλοι καὶ τὸν τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ εξ’ ἀνάγκης. διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρῆ ἐνθένδε 

Β ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν οὐ τὰ τάχιστα. φυγὴ ¹ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὃ ἀριστεῖ, οὐ πάνυ τι ράδιον πεῦσαι, ὡς ἁρα οὐχ ἃν ἔνεκα οἱ πολλοὶ φασὶ δεῖν πονηριᾶν μὲν φεῦγειν, ἄρετήν δὲ διώκειν, τούτων χάριν τὸ μέν ἐπιτιθεντέον, τὸ δ’ οὐ, ἕνα δὴ µή κακὸς καὶ ἴνα ἀγαθὸς δοκῆ εἶναι, ταῦτα γάρ ἔστιν ὁ λεγόμενος γραφῶν ὰθλος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὸ δὲ ἀληθῆς οὐδὲ λέγομεν. ¹ Εἰ θεὸς οὐδαμῆς οὐδαμῶς ἀδικος, ἄλλῳ ὡς οἰον τε δικαιότα-
Τος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὄμοιότερον οὐδὲν ἢ ὡς ἂν ἡμῶν αὖ γένηται ὁ τι δικαιότατος. περὶ τούτου καὶ ἡ ὡς ἄληθῶς δεινότης ἄνδρος καὶ οὐδενία τε καὶ ἀναιδία. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τούτου γυνώσι σοφία καὶ ἀρετὴ ἀληθινή, ἢ δὲ ἀγνοια ἀμαθία καὶ κακία ἐναργής. αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι δεινότητες τοι δοκούσαι καὶ σοφίαί ἐν μὲν πολιτικαῖς ὀνομαστεῖαι γιγνόμεναι φορτικά, ἐν δὲ τέχναις βάναυσοι. τὸ οὖν ἄδικοντι καὶ ἀνόσια λέγοντι ἢ ἑ πράττοντι μακρὸ ἄριστ' ἐχεῖ το μὴ συγχωρεῖν δεινὸ ὑπὸ πανοργίας εἶναι. ἀγάλλονται γὰρ τῷ ὑνείδει, καὶ οἴονται ἀκοῦειν, ότι οὐ λήροι εἰσί, γῆς ἄλλως ἄχθη, ἄλλ' ἄνδρες, οἶνους δεὶ ἐν πόλει τοὺς σωθησομένους. λεκτέου οὐν τάληθες, ὅτι τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον εἰσίν οἷοι οὐκ οἴονται, ότι οὐχὶ οἴονται: ἀγροοῦσι γὰρ ξημιάν ἀδίκιας, ὁ δὲ ἡκιστα ἀγροεῦν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἂν δοκοῦσι, πληγαὶ τε καὶ θάνατοι, ὃν ἐνίοτε πάσχουσιν οὕδεν ἄδικοντες, ἄλλα ἂγροουσαν ἐκφυγεῖν. ΘΕΟ. Τίνα δὴ λέγεις; ΣΩ. Παραδειγμάτων, ὃ φίλε, εὖ τῷ ὠντὶ ἐστῶτοι, τοῦ μὲν θείου εὐδαίμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἀθέου ἀθλιωτάτου, οὐχ ὀρῶντες ότι οὕτως ἐχεῖ, ὑπὸ ἡλιθιότητις τε καὶ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνοίας λανθάνουσι τῷ μὲν ὄμοιούμενοι διὰ τὰς * ἄδικους πράξεις, τῷ δὲ ἀνομοιούμενοι. οὐ δὴ 177 τίνους δικήν ξύνετε τῶν εἰκότα βίον ὃ ὀμοιοῦνται. εἰὼ δὲ εἴπωμεν, ὅτι, ἄν μὴ ἀπαλλαγόσι τῆς δεινότητος, καὶ τελευτήσαντας αὐτοὺς ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὁ τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς τόπος οὗ δὲξεται, ἐνθάδε δὲ τὴν αὐτοῖς ὄμοιοτητα τῆς διαγωγῆς αἰε ἐξουσί, κακοὶ κακοίς συνόντες, ταύτα δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς δεινοὶ καὶ πανούργοι ἀνοίτων τινῶν ἀκούσονται. ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μάλα δή, ὃ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ὅδα τοι, ὃ ἐταίρε. ἐν μέντοι τι ἂν τοις συμβεβήκεν, ὅτι ἂν ἰδίᾳ λόγου δὲν δοῦναι τε καὶ Κ.Ρ.
δέξασθαι περὶ ἀν ψέγουσι, καὶ ἐθελήσωσιν ἀνδρικῶς πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομείναι καὶ μὴ ἀνάδρως φεύγειν, τότε ἀτόπως, ὦ δαιμόνιε, τελευτῶντες οὐκ ἀρέσκουσιν αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς περὶ ἀν λέγουσι, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκείνη πὼς ἀπομαραίνεται, ὥστε παῖδων μηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέρειν. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάρεργα τυγχάνει λεγόμενα, ο ἀποστῶμεν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, πλεῖον οὐκ ἐπιρρέουσι 1 καταχώσει ἴμοι τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον· ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ ἐμπροσθεν ὑμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ. Ἐν μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὥς Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἀγδέστερα ἀκούειν· ρᾶω γὰρ τηλικῷ δέν ἐπικολουθεῖν εἰ μέντοι δοκεῖ, πάλιν ἐπανίσχυεν. ΧΧΧ. Ἐν αὐτῇ ποταὶ ὑμεν τοῦ λόγου, ἐν ὦ ἐφαμεν τοὺς τὴν φερομένην οὐσίαν λέγοντας, καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἰναι τούτῳ ὦ δοκεῖ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐθέλειν διασχιζεῖσθαι, καὶ οὐ χαί ἂν περὶ τὰ δίκαια, ὡς παντὸς 1 μᾶλλον, ὃ ἂν θηται πόλεις δόξαντα αὐτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ἔστι δίκαια τῇ θεμῆν, ἐωστε ἂν κέηται· περὶ δὲ τἀγαθων οὐδένα ἀνδρείον ἑθ' οὕτως εἰναι, ὥστε τομμαν διαμάχεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ ὃ ἂν ὅφελιμα χηθεῖσα πόλις ἐαυτῇ θηται, καὶ ἔστι τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἂν κέηται ὅφελιμα, πλην εἰ τις τὸ ὄνομα λέγοι τοῦτο δὲ που σκόμμι ἂν εῦρ πρὸς ὁ λέγομεν. οὐχὶ ΘΕΟ. Πάνω γε. ΣΩ. Μὴ 1 λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πράγμα, ὃ ὄνομαξόμενον θεωρεῖται. Ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις, ἂν τούτῳ ὄνομαξόμενον οὐκ εἰς τὸ πράγμα, ὃ ὄνομαξόμενον θεωρεῖται. Ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις, ἂν τούτῳ ὄνομαξόμενον οὐκ εἰς τὸ πράγμα, ὃ ὄνομαξόμενον θεωρεῖται. Ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις, ἂν τούτῳ ὄνομαξόμενον οὐκ εἰς τὸ πράγμα, ὃ ὄνομαξόμενον θεωρεῖται.
dìmolologhíseie taútà taúta, eì perì pantaì tìs tòu eidous èrwtíh, èn ò kai tò ófélímov tìnìxànei òn. èstì dé pòu kai perì tòn méllontà àhròn. òtai γáρ νομοθετómeða, ós èsòmènous ófélímovs tònìs nómovs tîdè-meða eîs tòn èsteita àhròn. tòútò dé méllon òrðhòs ãn légoímen. THO. 1 Pànu ge. ΣΩ. 'Îthì òhì, óútòuì ì èrwtòmèn Prowtaphòran ò ìllòu tinì tòn èkeíño tà autà lègòntov Pàntovn métrov ànthròpòs èstìn, ós òfaté, ò Prowtaphòra, lènikòn, báreìnov, kóufnov, ouvdenvòs òtou òu tòn toìoutov. ðèxov ògam autòv tò krrtìrìnov èn autòfì, òìa pàsçhei toíautà oìômenos, òlììhì òe òíètai autòfì kai ònta. òuìh òútòs; THO. Oútòs. ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐσεσθαι, φήσομεν, ὃς Πρωταγόρα, ἔχει τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ οἷα ἕπειρος ἐσεσθαι, καὶ ταύτα καὶ γίγνεται ἐκείνῳ τῷ οἰκθέντι; οἶνον θερμαῖ ἀρ' ὅταν τῆς οἰχήθη ἱδιώτης αὐτοῦ πυρετῶν λήψεσθαι καὶ ἐσεσθαι ταύτην τὴν θερμότητα, καὶ ἔτερος, ἰατρὸς δὲ, ἀντοιχήθη, κατὰ τὴν ποτέρου δόξαν φῶς ἐν τῷ μέλλον ἀποβήσεσθαι, ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀμφοτέρων, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἰατρῷ οὖθε πυρέττων γενησεται, εαυτῷ δὲ ἀμφότερα; ΘΕΟ. Γελοίοιν μέντ' ἂν εἶν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', οἶμαι, περὶ οἶνου γλυκύτητος καὶ αὐστηρότητος μελλούσης ἑσεσθαι ἡ τοῦ γεωργοῦ δόξα, ἄλλ' οὐχὶ ἡ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ, κυρία. ΘΕΟ. Τὶ μήν; ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἂν αὖ περὶ ἀναρμόστου τε καὶ εναρμόστου ἐσομένου παιδοτρίβης ἀν βέλτιον δοξάσεις μουσικόν, ὁ καὶ ἐπειτα αὐτῷ τῷ παιδοτρίβη δόξην εναρμόστον εἶναι. ΘΕΟ. Οὐδαμός. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐστιάσεσθαι μὴ μαγευρικοῦ ὄντος, σκευαζομένης θοινής, ἀκυροτέρα ἢ κρίσις τῆς τοῦ ὄφοποιου περὶ τῆς ἐσομένης ἡδονῆς. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἡδῆ 1 ὦτοις ἐκάστωρ ἡδέος ἢ γεγονότος μηδέν ε

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πω τῷ λόγῳ διαμαχώμεθα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐκάστῳ καὶ δόξῃ καὶ ἔσεσθαι πότερον αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἀριστος κριτῆς; ἢ σὺ, ὡς Πρωταγόρα, τὸ γε περὶ λόγους πιθανὸν ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐσόμενοι εἰς δικαστήριον βέλτιον ἢ προδοξάσαι ἢ τῶν ἱδιωτῶν ὀστισοῦν; ἘΘ. Καὶ μάλα, ὡς Σωκράτες, τούτῳ γε σφόδρα ὑπεσχείτο πάντων διαφέρειν αὐτὸς. Ἐ. Ἡ Δία, ὡς 179 μέλε; ἢ οὔδεις ὡς ἀν αὐτῷ διελέγετο * δίδοις πολὺ ἀργύριον, εἴ πη τοὺς συνόντας ἐπείθεν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐσεσθαί τε καὶ δόξῃ οὔτε μάντις οὔτε τις ἄλλος ᾑμείνων κρίνειν ἂν ὡς αὐτὸς αὐτῷ. Ἐ. Αληθέστατα. Ἐ. Οἰκοῦν καὶ αἱ νομοθεσίαι καὶ τὸ ὄφελιμον περὶ τὸ μέλλον ἑστί, καὶ πᾶς ἢ ὅμολογοι νομοθετουμένην πόλιν πολλάκις ἀνάγκην εἶναι τοῦ ὀφελμωτάτου ἀποτυγχάνεν; Ἐ. Ἐ. Μάλα γε. Ἐ. Μετρίως ἄρα ἦμιν ὑπὸ τὸν διδάσκαλον σου εἰρήσεται, ὅτι ἡ ἀνάγκη 1 αὐτῷ ὅμολογεῖν σοφότερον τε ἄλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον μέτρον εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ τῷ ἀνεπιστήμονι μηδὲ ὅπωστιον ἀνάγκην εἶναι μέτρῳ γίγνεσθαι, ὡς ἢρτι μὲ ἡμάγκαζεν ὁ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου λόγος, εἴτε ἐβουλώμην εἴτε μή, τοιοῦτον εἶναι. Ἐ. Ἐ. Εἰκείνη μοι δοκεῖ, ὡς Σωκράτες, μάλιστα ἀλίσκεσθαι ὁ λόγος, ἀλισκόμενος καὶ ταύτη, ἢ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων δόξας κυρίας ποιεῖ, αὐταὶ δὲ ἑφανησαν τους ἐκείνου λόγου οὐδαμὴ ἀληθείς ἡγομέναι. ὁ Ἐ. Ἐ. 1 Πολλαχῇ, ὡς Ἐθόδωρε, καὶ ἄλλῃ ἀν τὸ γε τοιοῦτον ἄλοιπη, μὴ πάσαν παντὸς ἀληθῆ δόξαν εἴναι· περὶ δὲ τὸ παρόν ἐκάστῳ πάθος, ἐξ ὧν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι γίγνονται, χαλεπώτερον ἐλευθερίαν, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθείς. ἢς ὧν δὲ αὐτῶν λέγω· ἀνάλωτον γάρ, εἰ ἔτυχον, εἰσί, καὶ οἱ φἀσκοντες αὐτὰς ἐναργεῖς τε εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμας τάχα ἄν ὡντα λέγοισιν, καὶ Θεάντητος
Πρώτη Θεολογία

Χριστιανική Ιστορία

Καθημερινές Γνωριμίες

Χριστιανική Ιστορία

Πρώτη Θεολογία
ἀλλ', οἴμαι, τὰ τοιαύτα τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἔπι σχολῆς φράζουσιν, ὥσ ἄν βουλώνται ὰμοίους αὐτοῖς ποιήσαι. ΘΕΟ. Ποίοις μαθηταῖς, ὦ δαμόνιε; οὐδὲ γίγνεται τῶν C τοιούτων ἐτέρους ἐτέρου μαθητής, 1 ἀλλ' αὐτόματοι ἀναφύονται, ὁπόθεν ἄν τύχῃ ἐκαστὸς αὐτῶν ἐφθονισάσας, καὶ τὸν ἐτέρον ὁ ἐτέρος οὐδὲν ἥγειται εἰδέναι. παρὰ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ὁπερ ἤα ἔρων, οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ λάβοις λόγον οὔτε ἐκόντων οὔτε ἀκόντων αὐτοὺς δὲ δὲι παραλαβόντας ὁσπερ πρόβλημα ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. ΣΩ. Καὶ μετρίως γε λέγεις. τὸ γε δὴ πρόβλημα ἄλλο τι παρειλήφαμεν παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἀρχαίων, μετὰ ποιῆσεως D ἐπικρυπτομένων τοὺς 1 πολλούς, ὡς ἣ γένεσις τῶν ἄλλων πάντων Ὀκεανός τε καὶ Τηθῦς ρέματα τυγχάνει καὶ οὐδὲν ἔστηκε, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ύστέρων, ἄτε σοφωτερών, ἀναφανδόν ἀποδεικνυμένων, ἵνα καὶ οἱ σκυτοτόμοι αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν μάθωσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ παύσωνται ἄλλος οὑμενοι τὰ μὲν ἐστάναι, τὰ δὲ κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων, μαθόντες δ' ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται τιμῶσιν αὐτοὺς; ὀλίγου δὲ ἐπελαθόμην, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοι αὖ E τάναντια τούτοις ἀπεφήμαντο, οἷον 1 ἀκώνητον τελέθειν τὸ πάντ' ὑνωμ' εἶναι, καὶ ἄλλα ὡσα Μέλισσοι τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι ἐναντιούμενοι πᾶσι τούτοις διαχυρίζονται, ὡς ἐν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἐστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῶ, οὐκ ἔχον χώραιν, ἐν ἡ κινεῖται. Τούτοις οὖν, ὦ ἐταῖρε, πᾶσι τὶ χρησόμεθα; κατὰ σμικρὸν γὰρ προϊόντες λελήθαμεν ἀμφότεροι εἰς τὸ μέσον πεπτωκότες, καὶ ἂν μὴ τη 181 ἀμμούμενοι διαφύγωμεν, * δίκην δώσομεν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς παλαιόστραῖς διὰ γραμμῆς παίζοντες, ὦταν ὑπ' ἀμφότερων ληφθέντες ἐλκοῦνται εἰς τάναντια. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι τοὺς ἐτέρους πρῶτον πεπτόμεθα, ἐφ' οὕσπερ ὀρμήσαμεν, τοὺς ἱέουσας. καὶ ἐὰν μὲν τι φαίνωνται
Λέγοντες, συνέλξομεν μετ' αυτῶν ἡμᾶς αυτοὺς, τοὺς ἐτέρους ἐκφυγεῖν πειρώμενοι· ἐὰν δὲ οἱ τοῦ ὅλου στασιῶταί ἀληθεστερα λέγειν δοκῶσι, φευξόμεθα παρ' αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν καὶ τὰ ἀκίνητα κινοῦτων. ἀμφότεροι ἔνοπλοι μιᾶς μετριῶν λέγοντες, γελοῖοι ἐσόμεθα ἱγούμενοι ἡμᾶς μὲν τι λέγειν φαίλουσ ὀντας, παμπαλαίους δὲ καὶ πασσόφοις ἄνδρας ἀποδεδοκιμακότες. ὅρα ὅν τι, ὁ Θεόδωρε, εἰ λυσιτελεῖ εἰς τοσοῦτον προέιναι κινδυνοῦν. ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν ἀνεκτῶν, ὁ Σώκρατες, μὴ συν διασκέψασθαι, τί λέγουσιν ἐκατεροί τῶν ἄνδρῶν. ΞΧΒ. ΣΟ. Σκεπτέον ἀν εὐθύς γε οὕτω προθυμομένου. Δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ἀρχῇ εἶναι τῆς σκέψεως κυνήσεως περί, 1 ποίν τι ποτε ἁρα λέγοντες φασι τὰ πάντα σ κινεῖσθαι. Βούλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοινδέ πότερον ἐν τε ἄτις λέγουσιν ἢ ὑστερ ἢ μοι φαίνεται, δύο; μή μέντοι μόνον ἢ μοι δοκεῖτο, ἀλλά συμμέτεχε καὶ σύ, ᾴνα κοινὴ πάσχομεν, ἂν τι καὶ δή. καὶ μοι λέγε ἅρα κινεῖσθαι καλέοι, ὅταν τι χώραν ἐκ χώρας μεταβάλλῃ ἢ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρέφηται; ΘΕΟ. "Εγώγε. ΣΟ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοῖς ἐν ἐτι ντε λέγοντες. ὅταν δὲ ἢ μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, γηράσκῃ δὲ ἢ 1 μέλαιν ἐκ λευκοῦ ἢ σκληροῦν ἐκ σ μαλακοῦ γίγνεται, ἢ τίνα ἀλλήν ἀλλοίωσιν ἀλλοιώτα, ἅρα οὖν ἄξιον ἐτερον ἐδος φάναι κυνήσεως; ΘΕΟ. "Εμοι γε δοκεῖ. ΣΟ. άναγκαίον μὲν οὖν. δυὸ δὴ λέγω τοῦτο εἰδὴ κυνήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τῆν δὲ περιφοράν. ΘΕΟ. ὁρθῶς γε λέγων. ΣΟ. Τοῦτο τοῖς ὁτῳ διελομένων διαλεγόμεθα ἢδη τοῖς τὰ πάντα φάσκουσι κινεῖσθαι, καὶ ἑρωτῶμεν, Πότερον πᾶν φατε ἀμφοτέρωσ κινεῖσθαι, φερόμενον τε καὶ 1 ἀλλοιώμενον, ἢ τὸ μὲν τι Ε

άμφωτέρως, τὸ δ' ἔτερως; ΘΕΟ. Ἄλλα μὲ Δι' ἔγνωγε οὐκ ἔχω εἴπειν οὐμαί δ' ἂν φάναι ἀμφωτέρως. ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ γε μή, ὦ ἑταῖρε, κινούμενα τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἑστῶτα φανεῖται, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὀρθῶς εἴξει εἴπειν, ὅτι κινεῖται τὰ πάντα ἢ ὅτι ἐστηκεν. ΘΕΟ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὰ δεῖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ 182 κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐνεῖναι μηδενί, πάντα δὴ πᾶσαι κινήσειν αἰτὶ κινεῖται. ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ μοι τὸδὲ αὐτῶν τῆς θερμότητος ἡ λευκότητος ἢ ὀτούοι γένεσιν οὐχ οὕτω πως ἐλέγομεν φάναι αὐτοῖς, φέρεσθαι ἢκαστόν τοῦτων ἀμα αἰσθήσει μεταξὺ τοῦ ποιοῦντος τε καὶ πάσχοντος, καὶ τὸ μὲν πάσχον αἰσθητῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰσθησιν ἔτι γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν ποιοῦ τι ἀλλ' ὦν ποιότητα; ἵσως οὖν ἡ ποιότης ἀμα ἀλλόκοτον τε φαίνεται ὄνομα, καὶ οὐ μανθάνεις ἀθρόον λεγόμενον κατὰ β' μέρη οὐν ἄκουε. 1 τὸ γὰρ ποιοῦν οὔτε θερμότης οὔτε λευκότης, θερμὸν δὲ καὶ λευκὸν γίγνεται, καὶ τάλλα οὕτω. μέμνησαι γὰρ που, ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὅτι οὕτως ἐλέγομεν, ἐν μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι, μηδ' αὐ τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφωτέρων πρὸς ἀλληλα συγκυριομένων τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτίκτοντα τὰ μὲν ποιὰ ἅττα γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα. ΘΕΟ. Μέμνημαι πῶς δ' οὐ; ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ἀλλὰ χαῖρειν ἐάσωμεν, εἰτε ἄλλως 1 εἰτε οὕτως λέγουσιν οὐ δ' ἐνεκα λέγομεν, τοῦτο μόνον φυλάττομεν, ἑρωτῶτες. Κινεῖται καὶ ρεῖ, ὥς φατέ, τὰ πάντα; ἢ γὰρ; ΘΕΟ. Ναὶ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀμφωτέρας, ὡς διειλόμεθα, κινήσεις, φερόμενα τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα; ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δ' οὐ; 182 ν. ἀποτίκτοντα suspectum facit sequens τὰ. Conici potest ἀποτύκτομεν. Quod si nihil mutetur, statuenda est accusativi absoluti constructio.
εἴπερ γε δὴ τελέως κινήσεται. ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τοῖνυν ἐφέρετο μόνον, ἥλλοιοῦτο δὲ μή, εἰχομεν ἂν που εἴπειν, οἷα ἄττα ῥεὶ τὰ φερόμενα. ἦ πῶς λέγομεν; ΘΕΟ. Οὕτως. ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ 1 τοῦτο μένει, τὸ λευκὸν ὃ ῥεῖν τὸ ῥέον, ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει, ὥστε καὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου εἶναι ῥοή, τῆς λευκότητος, καὶ μεταβολὴν εἰς ἄλλην χρόαν, ἦν μὴ ἀλῳ ταύτη μένου, ἀρίτ ποτε οἶον τὲ τι προσεπτεῖν χρώμα, ὥστε καὶ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύειν; ΘΕΟ. Καὶ τίς μηχανῆ, ὃ Σῶκρατες; ἦ ἄλλο γε τι τῶν τοιοῦτων, εἴπερ αεὶ λέγοντος ὑπεξέρχεται, ἀτε δὴ ῥέον. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως ἐρόμεν ὑποικισών, οἷον τῆς τοῦ ῥόαν ἢ ἄκοινεϊ; μένειν ποτὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ῥαν ἢ ἄκοινε; ΘΕΟ. Οὐκούν δεῖ γε, εἴπερ πάντα κινεῖται. ΣΩ. Οὕτε ἄρα ῥάν προσρητέον τι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ῥάν, οὐδὲ τὶν ἄλλην αἰσθήσειν μᾶλλον ἢ μη, πάντων γε πάντως κινομένων. ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ οὐν. ΣΩ. Καὶ μήν αἰσθησίς γε ἐπιστήμη, ὡς ἔφαμεν ἔγω τε καὶ Θεατητος. ΘΕΟ. Ἡν ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμην μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκριναμεθα ἐρωτώμενοι, ὃ τι ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη. ΘΕΟ. * Ἐοίκατε. ΣΩ. Καλὸν ἂν ἦμιν 183 συμβαίνοι τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, προθυμηθέσιν ἀποδείξαι, ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται, ἦν δὴ ἐκεῖνη ἢ ἀπόκρισις ὧρθη φανῇ. τὸ δ', ὡς ἐοικεῖν, ἔφαγη, εἰ πάντα κινεῖται, πᾶσα ἀπόκρισις, περὶ ὅτου ἂν τις ἀποκρινητα, ὁμοίως ὧρθη εἶναι, οὐτω τ' ἔχειν φάναι καὶ μὴ οὗτω, εἰ δὲ βούλει, γρήγορον, ἦν μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ. ΘΕΟ. Ὁρθῶς λέγεις. ΣΩ. Πλήν γε, ὃ Θεόδωρε, ὃτι οὗτῳ τε εἴπον καὶ οὐχ οὗτω. δεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ τοὐτο οὗτο λέγειν οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἐτὶ 1 κινοῦτο οὗτω οὐδ' αὐ μὴ οὗτῳ. Β οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο κινήσεις ἀλλὰ τιν' ἀλλην φωνήθη θετέων τοῖς τοῦ λόγου τοῦτον λέγουσιν, ὡς νῦν γε πρὸς τήν
αὐτῶν ὑπόθεσιν οὖκ ἔχουσι ρήματα, εἰ μὴ ἢρα τὸ οὐδ' ὁπως. μάλιστα δ' οὗτως ἀν αὐτοὶς ἀρμόττοι, ἀπειρον λεγόμενον. ΘΕΟ. Οἰκειοτάτη γούν διάλεκτος αὕτη αὐτοῖς. ΣΩ. Ὀυκοῦν, ὁ Θεόδωρε, τοῦ τε σοῦ ἐταίρου ἀπηλλάγμεθα, καὶ οὕτω συγχωροῦμεν αὐτῷ πάντ' ὁ ἀνδρα πάντων χρημάτων μέτρου εἶναι, ἀν μὴ ἕφοιμός τις ὑ' ἐπιστήμην τε αἰσθησιν οὐ συγχωρήσωμεθα κατά γε τιν τοῦ πάντα κινεῖσθαι μέθοδον. εἰ μὴ τί πως ἄλλως Θεαίτητος ὅδε λέγει. ΘΕΟ. Ἀριστ' εἴρηκας, ὁ Σώκρατες τούτων γὰρ περαυθέντων καὶ ἐμὸ δεὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι σοι ἀποκρινόμενον κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας, ἐπειδὴ τὸ περὶ τοῦ Πρωταγόρου λόγου τέλος σχοίνη. ΧΧΙΧ. ΘΕΑΙ. Μή πρίν γ' ἂν, ὁ Θεόδωρε, Σωκράτης τε καὶ σὺ τοὺς φάσκοντας αὖ τὸ 1 πᾶν ἐστάναι διέλθητε, ὡσπερ ἄρτη προοθεσθε. ΘΕΟ. Νέος οὖν, ὁ Θεαίτητε, τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ἀδικείν διδάσκεις ὁμολογίας παραβαίνοντας; ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζου ὁπως τὸν ἐπιλοίπων Σωκράτει δώσεις λόγον. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐάν πέρ γε βούληται. ἥδιστα μὲν' ἂν ἤκουσα περὶ ἄν σε λέγω. ΘΕΟ. Ἰππέας εἰς πεδίον προκαλεῖ Σωκράτη εἰς λόγους προκαλοῦμενος· ἑρώτα οὖν καὶ ἀκούσει. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μοι δοκῶ, ὁ Θεό- έ δωρε, περὶ γε οὖν κελεύει Θεαίτητος οὐ πείσεσθαι 1 αὕτω. ΘΕΟ. Τί δὴ οὖν οὐ πείσεσθαι; ΣΩ. Μέλισσον μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οὐ ἐν ἠστὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν, αἰσχυνόμενοι μὴ φορτικὸς σκοπῶμεν, ἦττον αἰσχύνομαι ἢ ἐνα ὑντα Παρμενίδην. Παρμενίδης δὲ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ ὅμηρου, αἰδοῖος τε μοι ἁμα δεινὸς τε. ξυμπροσέμιξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέοις πάνω πρεσβύτη, καὶ μοι 184 ἐφάνη βάθος τὸ ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναίον. * φοβοῦμαι οὖν, μὴ οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα πνυμώμεν, τί τε διανοοῦμενος εἰπε πολύ πλέον λειτομέθα, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, οὐ ἔνεκα
ο λόγος ἄρμηται, ἐπιστήμης πέρι, τί ποτ' ἔστιν, ἀσκεπτον γένηται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπεισκωμαζόντων λόγων, εἳ τις αὐτῶς πείσεται ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅν νῦν ἐγείρομεν πλήθει ἀμήχανον εἴτε τις ἐν παρέργῳ σκέψεται, ἀνάξις ἄν πάθοι, εἴτε ἱκανῶς, μηκυνύμενος τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀφανεῖ. δει δὲ οὐδέτερα, ἀλλὰ Θεαίτητον ὁν 1 κυνὶ περὶ ἐπιστήμης πειράσθαι ἢμᾶς τῇ μαιευτικῇ τέχνῃ ἀπολύσαι. ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ χρῆ, εἰ δοκεῖ, οὕτω ποιεῖν. ΣΩ. Ἐστι τοίνυν, ὡ Θεαίτητε, τοσόιδε περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπίσκεψαι. αἰσθησιν γὰρ δὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρίνω. ἢ γάρ; ΘΕΛΔ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν τίς σε ὧδ' ἐρωτήσῃ τῷ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ μέλανα ὀρᾶ ἀνθρωπὸς καὶ τῷ τὰ ὄξεα καὶ βαρέα ἀκούει; εἴποις ἃν, οἴμαι, ὀμμασί τε καὶ ὅσιν. ΘΕΛΔ. Ἐγώγη. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὐχερές τῶν 1 ὀνομάτων τε καὶ ῥημάτων καὶ μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ὅπις ἀγεννές, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τοῦτον ἐναντίον ἀνελεύθερον, ἐστὶ δὲ ὅτε ἀναγκαίω, οἷον καὶ νῦν ἀνάγκη ἐπιλαβέσθαι τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, ἤν ἀποκρίνει, ἢ οὖν ὅρθη σκόπει γάρ, ἀπόκρισις ποτέρα ὀρθότερα, ὃ ὀρώμεν, τούτῳ εἰσίν ὀφθαλμοὺς, ἢ δὲ οὐ ὀρώμεν, καὶ ὃ ἀκούομεν, ὁτα, ἢ δὲ οὐ ἀκούομεν; ΘΕΛΔ. Δι' ὅν ἔκαστα αἰσθανόμεθα, ἐμούγη δοκεῖ, ὡ Σύκρατες, μᾶλλον ἢ οἶς. ΣΩ. 1 Δεινὸν γάρ ποι, ὦ παῖ, εἰ πολλαὶ τινες ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἱπποῖς, αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθηται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἱδέαν, εἴτε φυχῆν εἴπε ὁ τι δει καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα ἔξυπτειν, ἤ δια τούτων οἷον ὀργάνων αἰσθανόμεθα ἃ ἀισθητά. ΘΕΛΔ. Ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ οὕτω μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκείνως. ΣΩ. Τοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἐνεκα αὐτά σοι διακριβοῦμαι; εἰ τινὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ διὰ μὲν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐφικνούμεθα λευκῶν τε καὶ μελάνων, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐτέρων αὐτὶ τινῶν, καὶ 1 ἔξεις ἐρωτόμενος ἐ
πάντα τα τοιαύτα εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀναφέρειν; ἦσος δὲ βελτιστόν σὲ λέγειν αὐτά ἀποκρινόμενον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ ύπερ σοῦ πολυπραγμονεῖν. καὶ μοι λέγει θερμαί καὶ σκληρὰ καὶ κούφα καὶ γλυκέα δι’ ὁν ἀισθάνει, ἄρα οὐ τοῦ σωματος ἔκαστα τίθης; ἢ ἄλλου τινός; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδενὸς ἄλλου. ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἐθελήσεις ὀμολογεῖν, ἢ δὲ ἐτέρας δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι * δι’ ἄλλης ταύτης αἰσθήσθαι, οἶον ὃ δι’ ἀκοῆς, δι’ ὑψεως, ἢ ὃ δι’ ὑψεως, δι’ ἀκοῆς; ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐθελήσω; ΣΩ. Εἰ τι ἄρα περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοεῖ, οὐκ ἀν διὰ γε τοῦ ἐτέρου ὀργάνου, οὐδ’ αὖ διὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου περὶ ἀμφοτέρων αἰσθάνοι, ἢν. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. Περὶ δὴ φωνῆς καὶ περὶ χρώσας πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοεῖ, ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω ἐστόν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγέ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἐκατέρων ἐκατέρω μὲν ἐτέρων, ἐαυτῷ δὲ ταυτών; Β ΘΕΑΙ. 1 Τί μὴ; ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω δύο, ἐκατέρων δὲ ἐν; ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τοῦτο. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰτὲ ἀνομοίω εἶτε ὀμοίω ἄλληλοι, δυνατὸς εἰ ἐπισκέψασθαι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἰσως. ΣΩ. Ταύτα δὴ πάντα διὰ τίνος περὶ αὐτῶν διανοεῖ; οὔτε γὰρ δι’ ἀκοῆς οὔτε δι’ ὑψεως οἴον τε τὸ κοινὸν λαμβάνειν περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ἑκατόν περὶ οὐ λέγομεν εἰ γὰρ δυνατοῖ ἐπὶ ἀμφοτέρω σκέψασθαι, ἀρ’ ἐστῶν ἀλμυρῷ ἢ οὐ, οἰς’ ὅτι ἐξεῖς εἰπεῖν ὃ ἐπισκέψει, καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε ὃς οὔτε ἄκοι φαίνεται, ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ’ οὐ μὲλλει, ἢ γε διὰ τῆς γλώττης δύναμις; ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. ἢ δὲ δὴ διὰ τίνος δύναμις τὸ τ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινῷ καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις δῆλοι σοι, φ’ τὸ ἐστίν ἐπονομάζεις καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐστὶ καὶ ἢ νῦν δὴ ἡρωτῶμεν περὶ αὐτῶν; τούτοις πᾶσι ποῖα ἀποδώσεις ὄργανα, δι’ ὃν αἰσθάνεται ἢμῶν τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ἕκαστα; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐσίαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ
μη εἶναι, καὶ ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταύτων τε καὶ τὸ ἑτερον, ἔτι δὲ ἐν ¹ τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν ὁ περὶ αὐτῶν. δῆλον δὲ, ὅτι καὶ ἄρτιών τε καὶ περιττῶν ἑρωτᾶς, καὶ τὰλλα, ὥσα τούτων ἐπεται, διὰ τίνος ποτὲ τῶν τοῦ σώματος τῇ ψυχῇ αἰσθανόμεθα. Ἔως. Ἰπέρευν, ὁ Θεάτητε, ἀκολουθεῖς, καὶ ἔστιν ἢ ἑρωτῶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἄν ἔχοιμι εἴπειν, πλὴν γ' ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τὴν ἀρχῆν οὐδ' εἶναι τοιούτων οὐδὲν τούτων ὀργανὸν ἔδιον, ὡσπερ ἑκεῖνοι, ἀλλ' αὐτὴ δ' αὐτῆς ἢ ψυχῆς τὰ ¹ κοινά μοι φαίνεται περὶ εἰ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν. Ἔως. Καλὸς γὰρ εἶ, ὁ Θεάτητε, καὶ οὐχ, ὡς ἔλεγε Θεόδωρος, αἰσχρός· ὁ γὰρ καλῶς λέγων καλὸς τε κἀγαθός. πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εὖ ἐποίησάς με μάλα συχνοῦ λόγου ἀπαλλάξας, εἰ φαίνεται σοι τὰ μὲν αὐτῆς δὲ αὐτῆς ἢ ψυχῆς ἐπισκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεων. τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν, ὁ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἑδόκει, ἐβουλόμην δὲ καὶ σοι δόξαι. ΘΕΑΙ. *Ἀλλὰ 136 μὴν φαίνεται γε. XXX. ΣΩ. Ποτέρων οὖν τίθης τὴν οὐσίαν; τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγὼ μὲν ὃν αὐτὴ ἢ ψυχῇ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐπορέγεται. ΣΩ. ἸΗ καὶ τὸ ὁμοιὸν καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον, καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἑτερον; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν; ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τούτων μοι δοκεῖ εὖ τοὺς μάλιστα πρὸς ἄλληλα σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀναλογιζομένη ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ παρόντα ¹ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα. ΣΩ. Ἐξε δ' ἀλλο τι τοῦ μὲν σκληροῦ τὴν σκληρώτητα διὰ τῆς ἐπαφῆς αἰσθήσεται, καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ τὴν μαλακότητα ὁσαυτῶς; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τὴν δὲ γε οὐσίαν καὶ ὁ τι ἑστὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναντίοτητα πρὸς ἀλληλοῦ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐ τῆς ἐναντιότητος αὐτῆς ἢ ψυχῆς.
ἐπανιόύσα καὶ συμβάλλουσα πρὸς ἄλληλα κρίνειν πειράται ἢ μίν. ΘΕΛΙ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν εὐθὺς γενομένοις πάρεστι φύσει 1 αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θηρίοις, ὥσα διὰ τοῦ σῶματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχήν τείνει, τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρὸς τε οὕσιαν καὶ ωφέλειαν μόνης καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγιγνεται οἷς ἀν καὶ παραγιγνηται; ΘΕΛΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Οἶον τε οὖν ἀληθείας τυχεῖν, ὦ μηδὲ οὕσιας; ΘΕΛΙ. Ἀδύνατον. ΣΩ. Οὐ δὲ ἀληθείας τις ἀτυχήσει, ποτὲ τούτου ἐπιστήμων ἔσται; ΘΕΛΙ. Καὶ δ' πῶς ἄν, 1 ὁ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Ἐν μὲν ἀρὰ τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἔνι ἐπιστήμη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ οὕσιας γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἑνταῦθα μὲν, ὡς ἐοίκε, δυνατὸν ἄψασθαι, ἐκεὶ δὲ ἀδύνατον. ΘΕΛΙ. Φαι-νεται. ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ταύτων ἐκεῖνῳ τε καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς, τοσαῦτας διαφορὰς ἔχοντε; ΘΕΛΙ. Οὐκοῦν δὴ δίκαιον γε. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐκείνῳ ἀποδίδοις ὄνομα, τῷ ὁρᾶν, ἁκούειν, ὁσφρωνεσθαι, ψύχεσθαι, θερμαίνεσθαι; ΘΕΛΙ. Ε. Αἰσθάνεσθαι 1 ἐγγογε' τί γὰρ ἄλλο; ΣΩ. Ξύμπαν αὖρ' αὐτὸ καλεῖς αἰσθησιν; ΘΕΛΙ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Ἡ οὐ, φαμέν, οὐ μέτεστιν ἀληθείας ἄψασθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὕσιας. ΘΕΛΙ. Οὗ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. Οὐδ' αὖ' ἐπιστήμη. ΘΕΛΙ. Οὐ γὰρ. ΣΩ. Οὔκ αὖ' ἂν εἰ διὸ πολε, ὁ Θεαίτητε, αἰσθησίς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταὐτῶν. ΘΕΛΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται, ὁ Σώκρατες, καὶ μάλιστα γε νῦν καταφανέστατον γέγονεν ἄλλο ὑπολοκεῖθες ἐπιστήμη. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐ 187 τ' μὲν δὴ τοῦτον γε ἐνεκα ἑρχόμεθα διαλεγόμενοι, ἵνα εὐρωμεν τ' τοῦτ' οὐκ ἔστ' ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ τ' ἔστων. ὁμως δὲ τοσοῦτον γε προβεβηκαμεν, ὡς τε μὴ ζητεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν αἰσθήσει τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ τ'
θεαίτητος.

οὖματι, ὁ τι ποτ' ἔχει ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν πραγματεύεται περὶ τὰ ὅντα. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε καλεῖται, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, δοξάζειν. ΣΩ. Ὑφθασι γὰρ οἷοι, ὃ φίλε. καὶ ὅρα δὴ νῦν πάλιν ἔξ ἀρχῆς, πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν ἐξαλείψας, εἰ τι μᾶλλον καθορᾶ, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα προελήλυθας. καὶ λέγει αὐθίς, τι ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη. XXXI. ΘΕΑΙ. Δόξαν μὲν πᾶσαν εἰπεῖν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ψευδῆς ἐστὶν δόξα: κινδυνεύει δὲ ἡ ἀλήθης δόξα ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, καὶ μοι τοῦτο ἀποκεκρίσθω. εἶαν γὰρ μὴ φανῆ προϊόσων, ὡσπερ τὸ νῦν, ἀλλο τι πειρασόμεθα λέγειν. ΣΩ. Οὕτω μέντοι χρῆ, ὃ Θεαίτητε, λέγειν, προθύμως μᾶλλον, ἡ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ὁκνεῖς ἀποκρίνεσθαι. εἴαν γὰρ οὕτω δρῶμεν, δυνὼν βάτερα, ἢ εὐρίσομεν ἐφ' ὃ ἐρχόμεθα, ὡς ἢ πνοοὶ οὐσίσωμεν εἰδέναι ὃ μηδαμὴ ἠσμεν· καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰ χιμπαττὸς μισθὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος· καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τί φῆς; δυνὼν οὐκ οἰδέσαι δοξῆς, τοῦ μὲν ἀληθινοῦ, ψευδοῖς δὲ τοῦ ἑτέρου, τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην ὑρίζειν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώγε τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτὸν μοι φαίνεσαι. ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἐτ' αἰξίου περὶ δόξης ἀναλαβεῖν πάλιν; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποιον δὴ λέγεις; ΣΩ. Θράπτει μὲ πως νῦν τε καὶ ἀλλοτε δὴ πολλάκις, ὡστ' ἐν ἀπορίᾳ πολλῇ πρὸς ὁ ἐμαυτοῦ καὶ πρὸς ἀλλον γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἔχοντα εἴπειν τι ποτ' ἐστὶν τοῦτο τὸ πάθος παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐγγυνόμενον. ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποιον δὴ; ΣΩ. Τὸ δοξάζειν τινὰ ψευδῆ· σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἐτὶ διστάζῃν, πότερον εἴσωμεν αὐτὸ ἐπισκεψόμεθα ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ ὁλίγον πρότερον. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν, ὁ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ γε καὶ οπροῦν φαίνεται δεῖν; ἀρτί γὰρ οὐ κακῶς γε σὺ καὶ Θείδωρος ἐλέγετε σχολῆς πέρι, ὡς οὐδέν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτος κατεπείγει. ΣΩ. Ὑρθᾶς ὑπέμνησας. Ὑσς γὰρ οὐκ ἐν
καρυοῦ πάλιν ὡσπερ ἵχνος μετελθεῖν. κρείττον γάρ
ποὺ σμικρῶν εὔ ἃ πολὺ μὴ ἤκανός περάναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Τῇ
μὴν; ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν; τὶ δὴ καὶ λέγομεν; ψευδὴ φαμέν
ἐκάστοτε εἶναι δόξαν, καὶ τινα ἡμᾶν δοξάζειν ψευδή,
tὸν δὲ αὐ ἄληθῆ, ὡς φύσει οὔτος ἐχόντων; ΘΕΑΙ.
Φαμέν γὰρ δή. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸδε γ’ ἐσθ’ ἡμῖν περὶ
πάντα * καὶ καθ’ ἐκαστον, ἦτοι εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι,
μανθάνειν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι μεταξὺ τούτων ὡς
διὰ χάρινειν λέγω ἐν τῷ παρόντι νῦν γὰρ ἡμῖν πρὸς
λόγον ἐστὶν οὐδέν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὁ Σῶκρατες,
ἀλλ’ θ’ οὐδὲν λείπεται περὶ ἐκαστον πλὴν εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ
εἰδέναι. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἦδη ἀνάγκη τὸν δοξάζοντα δο-
ξάζειν ἢ ὅν τι οἶδεν ἢ μὴ οἶδεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.
Καὶ μὴν εἰδότα γε μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ μὴ εἰδότα
ν εἰδέναι ἢ ἀδύνατον. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ’ οὖν;
Ἀρ’ οὖν τὰ μὲν ἰονου δοξάζουν, ὁ οἶδε, ταῦτα οἴεται οὐ ταῦτα εἶναι,
ὁ ἀλλὰ ἄτα τὰ ὁ μὴ οἶδε, καὶ ἀμφότερα εἰδώς ἀγνοεῖ ἢ
ἀμφότερα; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ ἀδύνατον, ὁ Σῶκρατες. ΣΩ.
Ἀλλ’ ἄρα, ὁ μὴ οἶδεν, ἵγεται αὐτὰ εἶναι ἑτέρα ἄτα
Ἀν μὴ οἶδε, καὶ τούτ’ ἐστι τῷ μὴ Ἐκαντὴν μὴ
tὸν Ἐκαντὴν εἰδότι εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν λαβεῖν ὡς ὁ Ἐκαντῆ
Ὀ Ἐκαντῆς ἐκαντῆς εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν λαβεῖν ὡς ὁ Ἐκαντῆς
Ὃ Ἐκαντῆς ἢ ὁ Ἐκαντῆς Ἐκαντῆς; ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ
πῶς αὖ; ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ οὐ μὴν, ὃ ἔτι τις οἶδεν, οἴεται ποὺ
Ἀν μὴ οἶδεν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὐδ’ αὐ ἢ μὴ οἶδεν, ἢ οἶδεν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Τέρας γὰρ ἐστιν. ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἄν τις ἐτὶ
ψευδὴ δοξάζειν; ἐκτὸς γὰρ τούτων ἀδύνατον ποὺ δοξά-
ζειν, ἐπείπερ πάντ’ ἢ ἵσμεν ἢ οὐκ ἵσμεν, ἐν ὃ ἂ ὁ τούτως
οὐδεμοῦ φαίνεται δυνατὸν ψευδὴ δοξάσαι. ΘΕΑΙ.
Ἀληθεστάτα. ΣΩ. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐ ταύτῃ σκεπτέον ὁ
ξητόμεν, κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι οὔντας, ἀλλὰ
ὁ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι ἢ καὶ μὴ; ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις; ΣΩ.
Μῇ ἀπλοῦν η', ὅτι ο τὰ μὴ ὄντα περὶ ὅτου οὖν δοξάζων οὐκ ἐσθ' ὡς οὐ ψευδὴ δοξάσει, κἂν ὄπωσον ἄλλως τὰ τῆς διανοίας ἔχην. ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκὸς η' αὖ, ὡ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Πώς οὖν; τὰ ἐροῦμεν, ὁ Θεαίτητε, εἰών τις ἡμᾶς ἀνακρίνῃ. Δυνατὸν δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἔγεται, καὶ τις ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὴ ὃν δοξάζει, εἰτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων τοὺς εἰτε αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό; Καὶ ἡμεῖς δὴ, ὡς ἐοίκε, πρὸς ταῦτα φήσομεν Ἡ' ὅταν γε ἀληθῆ μὴ οἴησαι οἴόμενος. ἦ πῶς ἐροῦμεν; Ε Ὁ ὁν καὶ ἀλλοί οὖν τὸ τοιούτον ἔστι; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον; ΣΩ. Εἴ τις ὁρᾶ μὲν τι, ὁρᾶ δὲ οὐδέν. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς; ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ ἐν γε τι ὁρᾶ, τῶν ὄντων τι ὁρᾶ. ἦ σὺ οἰκε ποτὲ τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὔσιν εἶναι; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔκ ἐγώση. ΣΩ. Ὅ ὁ ἀρά ἐν γε τι ὁρῶν ὃν τι ὁρᾶ. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Καὶ 189 ὁ ἀρά τι ἀκούουν ἐν γε τι ἀκούει καὶ ὃν ἀκούει. ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ ἀπτόμενος δὴ τοῦ ἔνος γε τοῦ ἀπτεται καὶ ὄντος, εὑπερ ἔνος; ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τοῦτο. ΣΩ. Ὅ δὲ δὴ δοξάζων οὐχ ἐν τι δοξάζει; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Ὅ δ' ἐν τι δοξάζων οὐκ ὃν τι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐυγχωράδ. ΣΩ. Ὅ ἁρα μή ὃν δοξάζων οὐδὲν δοξάζει. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ο γε μηδὲν δοξάζου τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ δοξάζει. ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον, ὡς ἐοίκεν. ΣΩ. Ὅ ὁντος τι μή ὃν δοξάζειν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἄντων οὔτε αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Ἀλλο τι ἐρ' ἐστι τὸ ψευδὴ δοξάζειν τοῦ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλο ἐοίκεν. ΣΩ. Οὔτ' ἀρ' οὕτως οὔτε ὡς ὁλόγον πρότερον ἐσκοποῦμεν, ψευδὴς ἐστὶ δόξα ἐν ἡμῖν. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δή. ΧΧΧΙ. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἁρα ὥδε γηγομένου τότῳ προσαγορεύομεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς; ΣΩ. Ἀλλοδοξίαν τιμὰ οὔσαν ψευδὴ φαρμὲν εἶναι δόξαν, ὅταν τὰς τι τῶν ὄντων ἀλλο αὖ ἓ τῶν ὄντων,


άνταλλαξάμενος τῇ διανοίᾳ, φῇ εἶναι. οὕτω γὰρ ὑν μὲν ἂεὶ δοξάζει, ἕτερον δὲ ἀνθ' ἑτέρου, καὶ ἀμαρτάνων οὐ ἐσκόπει δικαίως ἃν καλοῖτο ψευδὴ δοξάζων. ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁρθότατά μοι νῦν δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι. ὅταν γὰρ τις ἀντὶ καλοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἢ ἀντὶ αἰσχροῦ καλὸν δοξάζῃ, τότε ὡς ἀληθῶς δοξάζει ψευδή. ΣΩ. Δῆλος εἰ, ὦ Θεαίητη, καταφρονοῦ μοι καὶ οὔ δεδιώς. ΘΕΑΙ. Τῇ μάλιστα; ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν, οἴμαι, σοι δοκῶ τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψεύδους D ἄντιλαβέσθαι, ἐρόμενος, εἰ οἶον τε ταχὺ βραδέως ἢ κούφον βαρέως ἢ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐναντίον γύρνεσθαι ἕαυτῷ ἐναντίος. τούτῳ μὲν οὖν, ἕνα μὴ μάτην ἑαρήσσῃ, ἀφίημι. ἀρέσκει δὲ, ὡς φῆς, τὸ τα ψευδὴ δοξάζεων ἀλλοδοξεῖν εἶναι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἠμοῦχε. ΣΩ. Ἡστιν ἄρα κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν ἑτερόν τι ὡς ἑτορόν καὶ μὴ ὡς ἑκεῖνο τῇ διανοίᾳ τίθεσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡστι μέντοι. ΣΩ. Ἐ ὁταν οὖν τοῦθ' ἡ διανοιὰ του δρα., οὐ καὶ ἓ ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς ἢτοι ἀμφότερα ἢ τὸ ἑτερόν διανοεῖσθαι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἡτοί ἀμα γῃ ἢ ἐν μέρει; ΘΕΑΙ. Κάλλιστα. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἂρ' ὅπερ ἐγὼ καλεῖς; ΘΕΑΙ. Τῇ καλῶν; ΣΩ. Λόγον, ὁν αὐτῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχῇ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοτῇ. ὡς γε μὴ εἴδως σοι ἀποφαίνομαι. τούτῳ γὰρ μοι ὑπάλληλης διανοουμένη, ὥσκ ἄλλο τι ἡ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτῆ ἐαυτῆς ἐρωτῶσα * καὶ ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ φάσκουσα καὶ οὐ φάσκουσα. ὅταν δὲ ὀρίσασα, εἶτε βραδύτερον εἰτε καὶ ὀξύτερον ἐπαίξασα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἢδη φῇ καὶ μὴ διστάζῃ, δόξαν ταύτην τίθεμεν αὐτῆς. ὅστ' ἔγονε τὸ δοξάζειν λέγειν καλῶ καὶ τὴν δόξαν λόγον εἰρημένον, οὐ μὲντοι πρὸς ἄλλον οὐδὲ φωνῇ, ἀλλὰ συγḫ πρὸς αὑτῶν. οὐ δὲ τῇ; ΘΕΑΙ. Καγώ. ΣΩ. Ἡσταν ἄρα τις τὸ ἑτερον
ἐτερον δοξάζη, καὶ φησίν, ὡς ἐοικε, τὸ ἐτερον ἐτερον εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν. ΘΕΑΙ. ¹Τι μὴν; ΣΩ. Ἄναμμυνή-β ό σκου δὴ, εἰ πώποτε εἴπες πρὸς σεαυτόν, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ τοῦ καλὸν αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἁδικὸν δίκαιον, ἢ καὶ τὸ πάντων κεφάλαιον σκόπτει, εἰ ποτ' ἐπεχείρησας σεαυτὸν πείθειν ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ ἐτερον ἐτερον ἐστιν, ἢ πᾶν τοιναντίον οὐδ' ἐν ὑπνῷ πώποτε θελομησάς εἴπειν πρὸς σεαυτόν, ὡς παντάπασιν ἀρα τὰ περιττα ἀρτιᾳ ἐστιν ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Ἀλλον δὲ τινα οἰεὶ ὑμαιάνουτα ὡς μαίνομενον τολο-μήσαι σπουδὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἴπειν, ἀναπείθουτα αὐτόν, ὡς ἀνάγκη τὸν βοῶν ὑππον εἶναι ἢ τὰ δύο ἐν; ΘΕΑΙ. Μᾶ Δι' οὐκ ἔγοψε. ΣΩ. Ὁυκονεν εἰ τὸ λέγειν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δοξάζειν ἐστίν, οὔδεις ἀμφότερα γε λέγων καὶ δοξάζων καὶ ἐφαπτόμενος ἀμφοῖν τῇ ψυχῇ εἴποι ἂν καὶ δοξάσειν, ὡς τὸ ἐτερον ἐτερον ἐστίν. ἐτάεον δὲ καὶ σοι τὸ ρήμα περὶ τοῦ ἐτέρου. λέγω γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇ δε, μηδένα δοξάζειν, ὡς τὸ αἰσχρὸν καλὸν ἢ ἄλλο τὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων. D ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ', ὁ Σώκρατες, εἴ τε καὶ μοι δόκει ὡς λέγεις. ΣΩ. Ἀμφω μὲν ἂρα δοξάζοντα ἄδυναν τὸ ἐτερον ἐτερον δοξάζειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐοικεν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ ἐτέρον γε μόνον δοξάζων, τὸ δὲ ἐτερον μηδαμῇ, οὔδεποτε δοξάσει τὸ ἐτερον ἐτερον εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις: ἀναγκάζοιτο γὰρ ἂν ἐφαπτέσθαι καὶ οὔ μὴ δοξάζει. ΣΩ. Οὔτ' ἂρ' ἀμφότερα οὔτε τὸ ἐτέρον δοξάζοντε εὐχαρεῖ ἀλλοδοξεῖν. ὡστ' εἰ τις ¹ὁρεῖται δὲ-εξαν εἶναι θεουδὴ τὸ ἐτεροδοξεῖν, οὔδεν ἂν λέγων' οὔτε γὰρ ταύτῃ οὔτε κατὰ τὰ πρότερα φαίνεται θεουδῆς ἐν ἤμιν οὔσα δόξα. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἐοικεν. XXXIII. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὁ Θεαίτητε, εἰ τοῦτο μὴ φανήσεται ὡς, πολλὰ ἀναγκασθησόμεθα ὁμολογεῖν καὶ ἄτοπα. ΘΕΑΙ. 5—2
Τὰ ποία δὴ; ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἐρῶ σοι, πρὶν ἀν πανταχῷ πειραθῶ σκοπῶν. αἰσχυνοῖμη γὰρ ἂν ἐπέρ ἡμῶν, ἐν ὦ ἀποροῦμεν, ἀναγκαζομένων ὁμολογεῖν οία λέγω. ἀλλ' εἶναι εὑρῶμεν καὶ ἐλεύθεροι γενώμεθα, τῶτ' ἡ ἡ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐροῦμεν ὡς πασχόντων αὐτά, ἐκτὸς τοῦ γελοίου ἑστῶτες. εἰς δὲ πάντη ἀπορήσωμεν, ταπεινωθέντες, οἶμαι, τῷ λόγῳ παρέξομεν ὡς ναυτίωντες πατεὶν τε καὶ χρήσθαι ὃ τι ἄν βουλήσαι. ἦς οὖν ἔτι πόρον τινὰ εὑρίσκω τοῦ ξητήματος ἡμῖν, ἀκούσα. ΘΕΑΙ. Δέγε μόνον. ΣΩ. Οὐ φήσω ἡμῖς ὅρθως ὁμολογήσαι, ἡνίκα ὁμολογήσαμεν, ἢ τις οἶδεν, ἄδικαν δοξάσαι ὡς οἴδεν εἶναι αὐτά, καὶ ἵνα ψευσθήματος ἀλλὰ πὴ δυνατῶν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄρα λέγεις ὃ καὶ ἐγώ τότε ὑποπτεύοντες ἡνίκα αὐτὸ ἔφασεν, τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ὅτι εἰνίστ' ἐγώ ἄρμοισκών Σωκράτη, πόρρωθεν δὲ ὅρων ἄλλου, ὅν οὐ γεγραφωσκό, ἄρθον εἶναι Σωκράτη, ὅν οἶδα; γίγνεται γὰρ δὴ ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ οἷον λέγεις. ΣΩ. Οὔκ οὖν ἀπέστημεν αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἂν οἴμεν, ἐποίησι ἡμῖς εἰδότας μὴ εἰδέναι; ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Μὴ γὰρ οὕτω τιθῶμεν, ἀλλ' ὁδε. καὶ ἵσως πὴ ἡμῖν συγχωρηθεῖται, ἵσως δὲ ἀντιτενεῖ. ο ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ ἐχόμεθα, ἐν ὦ ἀνάγκη πάντα μεταστρέφοντα λόγον βασανίζειν. σκόπειν οὖν, εἰ τι λέγω. ἀρα ἔστι μὴ εἰδότας τι πρότερον ύπερτον μαθεῖν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐστι μέντοι. ΣΩ. Οὔκ οὖν καὶ άθικα ἔτερον καὶ ἐτερον; ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὖ; ΣΩ. Θέσ δ' ἡ μοι λόγον ἐνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν εἰνον κήρινον ἐκμαγεῖον, τῷ μὲν μελίζων, τῷ δ' ἐλαττόν, καὶ τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου κηρῷ, τῷ δ' ἔκρηκτον, καὶ σκληρωτέρου, ἐνίοις δ' ἐν ύγρωτέρου, ἐπ' ἐστι δ' οἷς μετρίως ἐχόμενος. ΘΕΑΙ. Τίθημι. ΣΩ. Δύρων τοῖνυν αὐτῷ φῶμεν εἶναι τῆς τῶν Μουσῶν μητρὸς Μνημοσύνης, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο, ὃ τι ἄν
βουληθῶμεν μνημονεύσαι ὅν ἂν ἴδωμεν ἢ ἀκούσωμεν ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐννοήσωμεν, ὑπέχοντες αὐτὸ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ἐννοίασι, ἀποτυποῦσθαι, ὡσπερ δακτυλίων σημεία ἐνημερωμένους. καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν ἐκμαγῆ, μνημονεύειν τε καὶ ἐπὶστασθαί, ἐώς ἂν ἐνη ὁ εὑδολο ἀυτοῦ. ὅταν δὲ ἐξαλειφθῇ ἢ μὴ οἶδον τε γενηται ἐκμαγῆναι, ἐπὶ-ε λελησθαί τε καὶ μὴ ἐπὶστασθαί. ΘΕΛΙ, Ἐστὼ οὕτως. ΣΩ. Ὁ τοίνυν ἐπιστάμενος μὲν αὐτά, σκοπῶν δὲ τι ὁ ὁ ὅ ἄκονει, ἄθρει εἰ ἄρα τοῦδε πρόπω ψευδή ὁ δοξάσασαι. ΘΕΛΙ. Ποιῶ δὴ τινς; ΣΩ. Ἀ οἴδεν, οἰηθεὶς εἰναι τοτε μὲν ἢ οἴδε, τοτε δὲ ἢ μη. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐ καλῶς ὥμολογησαμεν ὥμολογοντες ἀδύνατα. ΘΕΛΙ. Νῦν δὲ πῶς λέγεις; ΣΩ. Δεὶ ὁδὲ ἀληθεθαί περὶ αὐτῶν, ἡ ἄρχης διοριζόμε-192 νους, ὅτι ὃ μὲν τις οἴδεν ἔχων αὐτοῦ μνημείον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, αἰσθᾶνεται δὲ αὐτὸ μη, τούτο οἰηθήναι ἔτερον τι ὃν οἴδεν, ἔχοντα καὶ ἐκείνου τύπου, αἰσθανόμενον δὲ μη, ἀδύνατον. καὶ ὁ γε οἴδεν αὖ, οἰηθήναι εἰναι ὃ μη οἴδε μηδὴ ἔχει αὐτοῦ σφραγίδα καὶ ὃ μη οἴδεν, ὃ μη οἴδεν αὐ καὶ ὃ μη οἴδεν, ὃ οἴδε καὶ ὃ αἰσθᾶνεται γε, ἐτέρον τι ὃν αἰσθᾶνεται, οἰηθήναι εἰναι καὶ ὃ αἰσθᾶ-νεται, ὃν τι μη αἰσθᾶνεται καὶ ὃ μη αἰσθᾶνεται, ὃν μη αἰσθᾶνεται καὶ ὃ μη αἰσθᾶνεται, ἦν καὶ ἦν ἄτρωσε καὶ αἰσθᾶνεται καὶ ἔχει τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν, οἰηθήναι αὐτ ἐτερόν τι ὃν οἴδε καὶ αἰσθᾶνεται καὶ ἔχει αὐ καὶ ἐκείνου τὸ σημείον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν, ἀδύνατοτερὸν ἔτι ἐκείνων, εἰ οἴδον τε. καὶ ὃ οἴδε καὶ ὃ αἰσθᾶνεται ἔχων τὸ μνημείον ὀρθῶς, ὃ οἴδεν οἰηθήναι ἀδύνατον καὶ ὃ οἴδε καὶ αἰσθᾶ-
νεται ἐχουν κατὰ ταυτά, ὥς αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὃ αὐ μὴ οἴδε 
κ μὴ οἴδε ἡ οἴδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὃ μὴ οἴδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὅ μὴ οἴδε καὶ ὃ μὴ οἴδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὅ μὴ αἰσθάνεται. πάντα ταύτα ὑπερβάλλει ἀδυνάμια τοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς ψευδῆ τινὰ δοξάσει. λείπεται δὴ ἐν τοῖς τοιοοίσθε, ἐδὲ τοῦ τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι. ΘΕΛ. 'Εν τίσι δὴ; ἐὼν ἄρα ἐξ αὐτῶν τι μᾶλλον μάθω νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἐπομαί. ΣΩ. 'Εν οἷς οἴδεν, οὐκέκναι αὐτὰ ἔτερ' ἄττα εἶναι ὃν οἴδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται. ὅ ων μὴ οἴδεν, αἰσθάνεται δὲ ἡ ὥν ἅν ἄν οἴδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται, ὅν οἴδεν αὐ καὶ αἰσθάνεται. ΘΕΛ. Ἡ συν πολὺ πλείον ἀπελείφθην ἡ τότε. XXXIV. ΣΩ. Ὁδὲ δὴ ἀνάπαλον ἄκουε. ἐγὼ εἰδὼς Θεόδωρον καὶ ἐν ἐμαυτῷ μεμνημένοι οἶος ἔστι, καὶ Θεαίτητον κατὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλο τι ἐνίστε μὲν ὅρῳ αὐτοὺς, ἐνίστε δὲ οὐ, καὶ ἀπτομαὶ ποτ' αὐτῶν, τοτὲ δ' οὐ, καὶ ἀκούω ἡ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθη- 
σιν αἰσθάνομαι, τοτὲ δ' αἰσθησιν μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἔχω περὶ ὕμῶν, μέμημαι δὲ ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν ἵπτον καὶ ἐπίσταμαι ἐ 
αὐτὸς ἐν ἐμαυτῷ; ΘΕΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Τοῦτο 
τοῖνυν πρῶτον μαθὲ ὃν βούλομαι δηλώσαι, ὅς ἐστι μὲν ὃ οἴδε μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἔστι δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι. ΘΕΛ. 
Ἀληθῆ. ΣΩ. Οὔκοιν καὶ ὃ μὴ οἴδε, πολλάκις μὲν ἔ 
στι μηδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι μόνον; ΘΕΛ. Ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο. ΣΩ. Ἡδὲ δὴ ἐὼν τι μᾶλλον 
193 νῦν ἐπίσπη. Σωκράτης ἐπιγραμμάτει * Θεόδωρον κα 
ὶ Θεαίτητον, ὅρῳ δὲ μηδέτερον, μηδὲ ἄλλη αἰσθησις αὐτῷ 
πάρεστι περὶ αὐτῶν' οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ δοξάσειν ὁς ὁ Θεαίτητος ἔστι Θεόδωρος. λέγω τι ἡ οὐδὲν; 
ΘΕΛ. Ναὶ, ἀληθῆ γε. ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοῖνυν ἐκείνων 
πρῶτον ἢν ὃν ἔλεγον. ΘΕΛ. Ἡν γὰρ. ΣΩ. Δεύτερον 
τοῖνυν, ὅτι τὸν μὲν γυγαμώσκων ὕμων, τὸν δὲ μὴ γυγα-

* Θεόδωρον καὶ Θεαίτητον, ὅρῳ δὲ μηδέτερον, μηδὲ ἄλλη αἰσθησις αὐτῷ πάρεστι περὶ αὐτῶν' οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ δοξάσειν ὁς ὁ Θεαίτητος ἔστι Θεόδωρος. λέγω τι ἡ οὐδὲν;
σκων, αἰσθανόμενοι δὲ μηδέτερον, οὐκ ἂν ποτε αὕτων οἰηθεῖν, ὃν οἶδα, εἶναι ὃν μὴ οἶδα. ὍΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως. ΣΩ. Τρίτον δὲ, μηδέτερον γυγώσκων μηδὲ αἰσθανόμενος ὁ οὐκ ἂν οἰηθεῖν, ὃν μὴ οἶδα, ἔτερον τιν' ἐίναι β' ὃν μὴ οἶδα. καὶ τάλλα τὰ πρότερα πάνθ' ἔξ' α' νόμιζε πάλιν ἀκηκοέναι, ἐν οἷς οὐδέποτ' ἔγω περὶ σοῦ καὶ Θεοδώρου τὰ ψευδὴ δοξάσω, οὔτε γυγώσκων οὔτε ἀγνωστὸν ἀμφὶ, οὔτε τὸν μὲν, τὸν δ' οὐ γυγώσκων. καὶ περὶ αἰσθήσεων κατὰ ταύτα, εἶ ἁρα ἐπει. ΘΕΑΙ. "Εσομαι. ΣΩ. Δεῖτεται τοῖς τὰ ψευδὴ δοξάσαι ὑπὸ τῶν, ὅταν γυγώσκων σὲ καὶ Θεοδώρου, καὶ ἔχων ἐν ἔκεινῳ τῷ κηρίνῳ ὕππερ δακτυλίων σφῶν ἀμφὶ τὰς σημείας, διὰ μακροῦ καὶ μὴ ἰκανῶς ὑπῶν ἀμφὶ προθυμηθῶ, τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐκάτερον σημείον ἀποδοὺ τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὤψει, ἐμπιθαγάσας προσαρμόσαι εἰς τὸ ἐαυτῆς ἔχον, ἢν γένεται ἀναγνώρισις, εἰτα τούτων ἀποτυχῶν καὶ ὕππερ οἱ ἐμπαλίν ὑποδούμενου παραλλάξας προσβάλω τὴν ἐκάτερον ὄψιν πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριον σημεῖον, ἂ καὶ οὐτὰ ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις τῆς ὄψεως πάθη, δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερὰ μεταφράσθης, ταύτων 1 παθῶν διαμάρτων. Ὑ τότε δὴ συμβαίνει ἡ ἐπεριοδία καὶ τὸ ψευδὴ δοξάζειν. ΘΕΑΙ. "Εοικε γὰρ, ὡς Σῶκρατες, θαυμασίως ὃς λέγεις τὸ τῆς ὀψεως πάθος. ΣΩ. Ἐτει τοῖς καὶ ὅταν ἀμφότερος γυγώσκων τὸν μὲν πρὸς τῷ γυγώσκειν αἰσθάνουμαι, τὸν δὲ μὴ, τὴν δὲ γνώσιν τοῦ ἔτερου μὴ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσειν ἔχω, ὃ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὕτως ἔλεγον καὶ μου τότε οὐκ ἐμάνθανες. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὴν ἔλεγον, ὅτι γυγώσκων τὸν ἔτερον καὶ 1 αἰσθανόμενος, καὶ τὴν γνώσιν κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν αὐ- Ἐ τοῦ ἔχων, οὐδέποτε ὀνήστεται εἶναι αὐτῶν ἔτερον τινα ὃν γυγώσκει τε καὶ αἰσθάνεσαι καὶ τὴν γνώσιν αὐ
καὶ ἐκεῖνον ἔχει κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν. ἢν γὰρ τούτο; ὉΕΛ. Νάϊ. Ἔ. Παρελείπετο δὲ γέ ποι τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, ἐν ό δὴ φαμέν τὴν ψευδή δόξαν γίγνεσθαι τὸ ἄμφω γιγνώσκοντα καὶ ἄμφω ὄρωντα ἢ τινὰ ἄλλην 194 αἰσθήσιν ἔχοντα ἄμφον τῷ σημείῳ μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ αἰσθήσιν ἐκάτερον ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ οἷον τοξότην φαίλον ἰέντα παραλλάξαι τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν, ό δὴ καὶ ψεῦδος ἄρα ὡνόμασται. ὉΕΛ. Εἰκότως γε. Ἔ. Καὶ ὅταν τοίνυν τῷ μὲν παρῇ αἰσθήσις τῶν σημείων, τῷ δὲ μή, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπούσης αἰσθήσεως τῇ παρούσῃ προσαρμόσῃ, πάντη ταύτῃ ψευδεταὶ ἢ διάνοια. καὶ ἐνι λόγῳ, περὶ δὲ μὲν μὴ οἴδε τις μηδὲ ἤσθετο πῶποτε, ὁμ ἔστιν, ὅς ἐοικεν, οὕτε ψευδεσθαι οὕτε ψευδής ἔδεξα, εἴ τι νῦν ἡμεῖς υγιεῖς λέγομεν περὶ δὲ δὲν ἔσχεν τε καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα, εἰν αὐτοῖς τούτοις στρέφεται καὶ ἐλήπτεται ἡ δόξα ψευδής καὶ ἄληθής γιγνομένη, καταντικροῦ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐθὺ τὰ οἰκεῖα συνάγονσα ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους, ἄληθής, εἰς πλάγια δὲ καὶ σκολιὰ ψευδής. ὉΕΛ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς, ὁ Σῶκρατες, λέγεται; Ἔ. Τοίνυν καὶ τάδε ἄκοινσας μᾶλλον αὐτὸ ἔρεις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τάληθες δοξάζεις καλὸν, τὸ δὲ ψευδεσθαί αἰσχρόν. ὉΕΛ. Πῶς δ’ οὖ; Ἔ. Ταῦτα τούντων φασίν ἐνθέντερ γίγνεσθαι. ὅταν μὲν ὁ κηρός του ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βαθὺς τε καὶ πολὺς καὶ λεῖος καὶ μετρίως ὀργασμένος ἡ, τὰ ἱόντα διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἐνσημαινόμενα εἰς τοῦτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ, ὁ ἐφὴ ὁ Ομήρος αὐτιτόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ ὁμοιότητα, τότε μὲν καὶ τούτοις καθαρὰ τὰ 1 σημεῖα ἐνγυγνώμενα καὶ ἰκανῶς ὁ τοῦ βάθος ἔχοντα πολυχρονία τε γίγνεται καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι πρῶτον μὲν εὕμαθεῖς, ἕπειτα μυήμονες, εἶτα οὗ παραλλάττουσι τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὰ σημεῖα, ἀλλὰ
δοξάζοντιν ἀληθῆ. σαφῆ γάρ καὶ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ ὑπτα
tαχὺ διανέμοντιν ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἐκαστὰ ἑκμαγεία, ἢ
dὴ ὑπερ τα καλείτα. καὶ σοφοὶ δὴ οὗτοι καλοῦνται. ἢ
οὐ δοκεῖ σοι; ΘΕΛΙ. Τπερφυώς μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. "Οταν
1 τοίνυν λάσιον τοῦ τὸ κέαρ ὑ, ὃ δὴ ἐπήνευσεν ὁ πάντα σο
σοφὸς ποιητής, ἢ ὅταν κοπρώδες καὶ μὴ καθαροῦ τοῦ
κηροῦ, ἢ υγρὸν σφόδρα ἢ σκληρὸν, ὃν μὲν υγρὸν,
εὐμαθεὶς μὲν, ἐπιλήσμονες δὲ γίγνονται, ὃν δὲ σκληρὸν,
tάναντια. οἱ δὲ δὴ λάσιον καὶ τραχὺ λιθώδες τε ἢ
γῆς ἢ κόπρον συμμυγείης ἐμπλεοῦν ἐχοντες ἀσαφῆ τὰ
ἐκμαγεία ὑσχούσιν. ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ σκληρά βάθος
γὰρ οὗκ ἐνι. ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ υγρά ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ
συγχείσθαι ταχὺ * γίγνεται ἀμυνδρά. εὰν δὲ πρὸς πᾶσι 195
tούτοις ἐπὶ ἀλλήλων συμπεπτωκότα ὑ ὑπὸ στενοχω-
ρίας, ἐὰν τού σμικρὸν ἢ τὸ ψυχάριον, ἔτι ἀσαφέστερα
ἐκεῖνον. πάντες οὖν οὗτοι γίγνονται οὗι δοξάζειν
ψευδῆ. ὅταν γὰρ τι ὁρῶσιν ἢ ἀκούσιν ἢ ἐπινοῶσιν,
ἐκαστὰ ἀπονέμειν ταχὺ ἐκάστοις οὐ δυνάμενοι βραδεῖς
tε εἰσὶ καὶ ἀλλοτριομομοῦντες παρορῶσι τε καὶ παρα-
κούσι καὶ παρανοοῦσι πλείστα, καὶ καλοῦνται αὐτοῦτοι
ἐγκυμοσύνου τε δῇ τῶν οὐντῶν καὶ ἀμαθεῖς. ΘΕΛΙ. 1'Ορ-
β θότατα ἀνθρώπων λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Φῶμεν
ἀρα ἣν ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς δόξας ἑρναι; ΘΕΛΙ. Σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς δῇ; ΘΕΛΙ. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς. ΣΩ. "Ηδὴ
οὐν οἰόμεθα ἰκανῶς ὀμολογήσατί, ὡτι παντὸς μᾶλλον
ἐστὸν ἀμφοτέρα τοῦτο τῷ δόξα; ΘΕΛΙ. Τςερφυώς
μὲν οὖν. XXXV. ΣΩ. Δεινὸν τε, ὁ Θεολήτηστε, ὡς
ἀληθῶς κινδυνεύει καὶ ἄγης εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἀδολεσχίας.
ΘΕΛΙ. Τὸ δαί; πρὸς τὶ τοῦτ εἶπες; ΣΩ. 1Τὴν ἐμαν-£
tοῦ δυσμαθίαν δυσχέραινας καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀδολεσχίαν.
tὶ γὰρ ἂν τις ἀλλοθ θείτο ὁνομα, ὡτιν ἂνω κἀτο τοὺς
λόγους ἐλκή τις ὑπὸ νοθείας οὐ δυνάμενος πεισθῆναι, καὶ ἡ δυσαπάλλακτος ἄφ’ ἐκάστον λόγου; ἩΕΑΙ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ τὴν δυσχεραίνεις; ΣΩ. Οὐ δυσχεραίνω μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δέδοικα ὅ τι ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἂν τις ἐρηταί με: Ὅ Σῶκρατες, εὐρήκασ δὴ πευδὴ δόξαι, ὅτι οὔτε ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσίν ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὔτε ἐν ταῖς ἡ διανοίασι, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ ἐνυπάφει αἰσθήσεως πρὸς διάνοιαν; Φήσω δὲ ἐγὼ, οἷμαι, καλλωπιζόμενος ὡς τι εὐρηκότων ἡμῶν καλὸν. ἩΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὡ Σῶκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τὸ νῦν ἀποδεδειγμένον. ΣΩ. Ὅντον, φήσει, λέγεις, ὅτι αὐ τοῦ ἀνθρωπον, ὅν διανοούμεθα μόνον, ὅρῳμεν δ’ οὐ, ἰππον οὐκ ἂν ποτε οὐκ θείαν εἶναι, ἂν αὐ οὔτε ὅρῳμεν οὔτε ἀππόθεμα, διανοούμεθα δὲ μόνον καὶ ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν αἰσθανόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν; Ταύτα, οἶμαι, φήσω λέγειν. ἩΕΑΙ. Καὶ ὄρθως ἐγε. ΣΩ. Τι οὖν; 1 φήσει τὰ ἐνδέκα, ἂ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἡ διανοεῖται τις, ἀλλὸ τι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἂν ποτε οὐκ θεία δῶδεκα εἶναι, ἂ μόνον αὐ διανοεῖται; ὅτι οὖν δὴ, σὺ ἀποκρίνοι. ἩΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ’ ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ὅτι ὁρῶν μὲν ἂν τις ἡ ἐφαπτόμενος οἰκθεία τὰ ἐνδέκα δῶδεκα εἶναι, ἃ μέντοι ἐν τῇ διάνοια ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν ταύτα δοξάσειν οὔτω. ΣΩ. Τι οὖν; οἶει τινὰ πῶς ποτὲ αὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ πέντε καὶ ἐπτά, λέγω δὲ 196 η ἀνθρώπους ἐπτά καὶ πέντε προθέμενον σκοπεῖν μηδ’ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, ἄλλ’ αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἐπτά, ἢ φαμεν ἐκεὶ μημεία ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγεῖῳ εἶναι καὶ ψευδὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐκ εἶναι δοξάσαι, ταύτα αὐτὰ εἰ τις ἄνθρωπων ἦδη πῶς ποτὲ ἐσκέψατο λέγων πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ἐρωτῶν, πόσα ποτ’ ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ μὲν τις εἶπεν οὐκ θείας ἐνδέκα αὐτὰ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ δῶδεκα’ ἡ πάντες λέγονσι τε καὶ οἴονται δῶδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι; ἩΕΑΙ. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία, ἀλλὰ
πολλοί δή καὶ ἐνδέκα. ἔαν δὲ γε ἐν πλείουν ἀριθμῷ β
tis skopitai, μάλλον σφάλλεται. οἴμαι γὰρ σε περὶ
pantos μάλλον ἀριθμοῦ λέγειν. ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς γὰρ οὐει
cai ἐνθυμοῦ, μή τι ποτε γίγνεται ἄλλο ἢ αὐτά τὰ
dōdeka τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ ἐνδέκα οἴηθήναι. ΘΕΔΙ.
Ἐοίκε γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκούν εἰς τοὺς πρῶτους πάλιν ἀνήκει
λόγους; ὁ γὰρ τοῦτο παθῶν, ὁ οἶδεν, ἔτερον αὐτὸ οἴηται
eῖναι ὡς αὐ οἶδεν, ὁ ἐφαμεν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τοῦτω αὐτῷ
ἡναγκάζομεν μη εἶναι 1 ψευδὴ δόξαν, ἵνα μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁ 
c αὐτος ἀναγκάζοιτο εἰδὼς μὴ εἰδέναι ἀμα. ΘΕΑ. Ἀλη-
θέστατα. ΣΩ. Οὐκούν ἀλλ’ ὁτιον δεὶ ἀποφαίνει τὸ
tὰ ψευδὴ δοξάζειν ἡ διανοίας πρὸς αὐθῆσιν παραλ-
λαγήν. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτ’ ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς
diavnoiaσιν ἐψευδόμεθα: νῦν δὲ ἦτοι οὐκ ἔστι ψευδής
dόξα, ἢ ἡ τις οἴδεν, οἶδον τε μη εἰδέναι. καὶ τούτων
πότερα αἴρει; ΘΕΔΙ. Ἀπορον αἴρεσιν προτίθης, ὁ
Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφότερά 1 γε κινδυ-
νεύει ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἐάσειν. ὡμοσ δὲ, πάντα γὰρ τολμη-
τέον, τί εἰ ἔπιστευσαίμεν ἀναίσχυντει; ΘΕΑ. Πῶς;
ΣΩ. Ἐθελησαντες εἰπεῖν, ποίον τί ποτ’ ἐστι τὸ ἐπι-
στασθαι. ΘΕΑ. Καὶ τι τοῦτο ἀναίσχυντον; ΣΩ.
Ἑοικας οὐκ ἐννοεῖν, ὅτι πᾶς ἡμῖν εῖς ἀρχής ὁ λόγος
ξῆτησις γέγονεν ἐπιστήμης, ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσι, τί ποτ’
ἐστιν. ΘΕΑ. Ἐννοοὶ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ὁπειτ’ οὐκ
ἀναιδεὶς δοκεῖ, μή εἰδότας ἐπιστήμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ
ἐπιστασθαι οἶδον ἐστίν; ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὁ Θεατήτης, 1 πάλαι ἐ
ἐσμέν ἀνάπλεσι τοῦ μη καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι. μῦρακις
γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν τὸ γυγώσκομεν καὶ οὐ γυγώσκομεν, καὶ
ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, ὡς τι συνεντεῖς ἀλ-
λήξων ἐν ὃ ἐτι ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοοῦμεν. εἰ δὲ βούλει,
cαὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κεχρήμεθ’ αὐ τῷ ἑγνοεῖν τε
καὶ συνιέναι, ὡς προσήκον αὐτοῖς χρήσθαι, εἰπερ στερόμεθα ἐπιστήμης. ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλα τίνα τρόπον δια-197 λέξει, ὧν Σώκρατες, τούτων ἀπεχόμενος; ΣΩ. * Οὐδένα ὄν γε ὅς εἰμὶ εἰ μέντοι ἢν ἀντιλογικός, οἷος ἁμὴρ εἰ καὶ νῦν παρῆν, τούτων τ' ἣν ἠφή ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ἢμῖν σφόδρῳ ἄν ἄν ἐγὼ λέγω ἐπέπληττεν. ἐπειδή οὐν ἐσμὲν φαύλοι, βούλει τολμήσω εἰπεῖν, οἷον ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι; φαίνεται γὰρ μοι προῦργον τί ἄν γενέσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Τόλμα τοῖνυν νῦ Νία. τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπεχόμενῳ σοι ἐσται πολλὴ συγγνώμη. ΧΞΧΧΧ. ΣΩ. Ἀκη-κοας οὖν ὃ νῦν λέγουσι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἰσως οὐ μέντοι ἐν γε τῷ παρόντι μνημονεύω. ΣΩ. Ἐπι-

β στήμης ποὺ ἡ ἤξιν φασίν αὐτὸ εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ. ΣΩ. Ἡμεῖς τοῖνυν σμικρὸν μεταβομέθα καὶ εὔπωμεν ἐπιστήμης κτήσων. ΘΕΑΙ. Τι οὖν δὴ φήσεις τούτο ἑκεῖνου διαφέρειν; ΣΩ. Ἰσως μὲν οὐδὲν ὁ δὲ οὖν δοκεῖ, ἀκούσας συνδοκίμαζε. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐάν πέρ γε οἷός ἄν δι' ὧ. ΣΩ. Οὐ τοῖνυν μοι ταύτὸν φαίνεται τὸ κεκτήσθαι τῷ ἔχειν. οἴον εἰ ἰμάτιον πριάμον ὅς καὶ ἐγκρατής ἢν μὴ φοροὶ, ἐχεῖν μὲν οὐκ ἄν αὐτὸν αὐτὸ, κεκτήσθαι c δὲ γε φαίμεν. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ὅρθως γε. ΣΩ. Ὁρα δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμην εἰ δυνατὸν οὕτω κεκτημένον μὴ ἔχειν, ἄλλα ὡσπερ εἰ τὸ ὀρνίθας ἀγρίας, περιστερὰς ἢ τι ἄλλο, θηρεύσας οἰκοι κατασκευασάμενος περιστερεῖνα τρέφοι. τρόπον μὲν γὰρ ἄν ποῦ τινα φαίμεν αὐτὸν αὐτὰς ἂει ἔχειν, ὃτι δὴ κέκτηται. ἡ γάρ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Τρόπον δὲ γ' ἄλλον οὐδεμιᾶν ἔχειν, ἄλλα δύναμιν μὲν αὐτὸ περὶ αὐτὰς παραγεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐν οἰκείω περιβόλῳ ὑποχειρίου ἐποιήσατο, λαβεῖν καὶ σχεῖν, δ ἐπειδὰν βούληται, ἡ θηρευσάμενοι ἢν ἄν ἂει ἔθελη, καὶ πάλιν ἀφιέναι καὶ τοῦτο ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν, ὅποσάκις ἄν
δοκῇ αὐτῷ. ΘΕΑΙ. ἦστι ταῦτα. ἜΩ. Πάλιν δή, ὠσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι κυριόν τι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατεσκευάζομεν οὐκ οἶδ' ὃ τι πλάσμα, νῦν αὖ ἐν ἐκάστη ψυχῇ ποιήσωμεν περιστερεών τινα παντοδαπῶν ὀρνίθων, τὰς μὲν κατ' ἀγέλας οὕσας χωρίς τῶν ἄλλων, τὰς δὲ κατ' ὀλίγος, ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν, ὅπῃ ἃν τύχωσι, πετομένας. ΘΕΑΙ. ἵ Πεποιήσθω δή, ἄλλα εἰ τι τούτου θέν; ἜΩ. Παιδίων μὲν οὖντων φάναι χρή εἶναι τούτῳ τὸ ἀγγεῖον κενόν, αὐτὶ δὲ τῶν ὀρνίθων ἐπιστήμασι νοῆσαι ἤν δ' ἂν ἐπιστήμην κτησάμενος καθείρζῃ εἰς τὸν περίπολον, φάναι αὐτὸν μεμαθηκέναι ἢ εὑρήκειν τὸ πράγμα, οὐ ἢν αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι τούτῳ εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. ἦστω. ἜΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν πάλιν ἦν ἢν βούληται τῶν ἐπιστήμων θηρεύειν 198 καὶ λαβόντα ἵσχεν καὶ αὐθίς ἀφίέναι σκόπει τίνων δεῖται ὅνομάτων, εἴτε τῶν αὐτῶν ὅν τὸ πρῶτον, ὅτε ἐκτάτο, εἴτε ἐτέρων. μαθήσει δ' ἐντεῦθεν σαφέστερον, τὶ λέγω. ἀριθμητικὴν μὲν ἡμὰρ λέγεις τέχνην; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ. ἜΩ. Ταύτην δὴ ὑπόλαβε θήραν ἐπιστημονὸν ἀρτίου τε καὶ περιττοῦ παντός. ΘΕΑΙ. ἑπολαμβάνω. ἜΩ. Ταύτη δὴ, οἶμαι, τῇ τέχνῃ αὐτὸς τοὺς υποχειρίους τὰς ἐπιστήματα τῶν ἀριθμῶν 1 ἔχει καὶ β ἄλλῳ παραδίδωσιν ὁ παραδίδοις. ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ. ἜΩ. Καὶ καλοῦμέν γε παραδίδοντα μὲν διδάσκειν, παραλαμβάνοντα δὲ μανθάνειν, ἔχοντα δὲ δὴ τῷ κεκτήσας ἐν τῷ περιστερεών ἐκεῖνω ἐπίστασθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντως οὖν εἶναι. ἜΩ. Τῷ δὲ δὴ ἐντεῦθεν ἢδη πρόσοχες τῶν νοῦν. ἀριθμητικὸς γὰρ ὃν τελέως ἄλλο τι πάντας ἀριθμοὺς ἐπίσταται; πάντων γὰρ ἀριθμῶν εἰςών αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Τῇ μίν; ἜΩ. ἦ ὁ οὖν τοιούτου ἀριθμοὶ ἃν ποτὲ τι ἢ αὐτὸ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἢ
άλλο τι τῶν ἔξω, ὥσα ἔχει ἀριθμόν; ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς γὰρ οὐ; Σ. Τὸ δὲ ἀριθμεῖν γε οὐκ ἀλλὸ τι θήσομεν τοῦ σκοπεῖσθαι, πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει ὦν. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔτω. Σ. "Ὁ ἄρα ἐπίσταται, σκοπούμενος φαίνεται ὡς οὐκ εἰδῶς, ὃν ὀμολογήκαμεν ἀπαντα ἀριθμὸν εἰδέναι. ἀκούεις γὰρ ποῦ ταῦτα ἀμφισβητήσεις. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἕγωγε. XXXVII. Σ. Οὐκοῦν ἥμεις ἀπεικάζοντες τῇ τῶν 1 περιστερῶν κτῆσει τε καὶ θῆρα ἐροῦμεν, ὅτι διττῆ ἢν ἡ θῆρα, ἢ μὲν πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι τοῦ κεκτήσθαι ἐνεκα, ἢ δὲ κεκτημένοι τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς χερεῖν ἡ πάλαι ἐκέκτηστο. οὔτω δὲ καὶ ὅν πάλαι ἐπιστῆμα ἤσαν αὐτῶ μαθόντες καὶ ἡπίστατο αὐτὰ, πάλιν ἐστὶ καταμανθάνειν ταύτα ταύτα ἀναλαμβάνοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκάστου καὶ ἱσχυοντα, ἢν ἐκέκτητο μὲν πάλαι, πρόχειρον δ' οὐκ εἰχε τῇ διανοίᾳ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ. Σ. Τοῦτο δὴ ἂρτι ἡρώτων, ὅπως 1 χρῆ τοῖς ὀνόμασι χρώμενον λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅταν ἀριθμήσων ἢ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἢ τι ἀναγνωσόμενος ὁ γραμματικὸς. ὅς ἐπιστάμενος ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῷ πάλιν ἔρχεται μαθησόμενος παρ' ἕαυτον ἡ ἐπίσταται; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἁτοποῦν, ὧν Σώκρατες. Σ. Ἀλλ' ἂν οὐκ ἐπίσταται φῶςεν αὐτὸν ἀναγνώσεσθαι καὶ ἀριθμήσειν, δεδοκότες αὐτῶ πάντα μὲν γράμματα, πάντα δὲ ἀριθμὸν ἐπίστασθαι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτ' ἀλογον. Σ. Βούλεις οὖν λέγωμεν, ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν ἢμιν μέλει, ὅπῃ τις χαίρει ἐλκὼν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μανθάνειν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀρισάμεθα ἔτερον μὲν τι τὸ κεκτήσθαι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἔτερον δὲ τὸ ἔχειν, ὃ μὲν τις ἐκτῆται μὴ κεκτήσθαι ἀδύνατον φαμεν εἶναι, ὡστε οὐδέποτε συμβαίνει ὁ τις οἶδε μὴ εἰδέναι, ὕπειρὴ μέντοι δόξαν οἴκοι τ' εἶναι περὶ αὐτῶν λαβεῖν; μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν

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τὴν ἐπιστήμην, τοῦτον οὖν τε, ἀλλὰ ἐτέραν ἀντ᾽ ἐκεῖνον, ὅταν θηρεύουν τινὰ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην διαπετομένων ἀνθθ᾽ ἐτέρας ἐτέραν ἀμαρτῶν λάβῃ, ὥστε ἀρα τὰ ἐνδέκα δώδεκα ὑήθη εἶναι, τὴν τῶν ἐνδέκα ἐπιστήμην ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν δώδεκα λαβὼν, τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὖν φύτευταν ἀντὶ περιστερᾶς. ὉΕΑΙ. Ἐχει γὰρ οὖν λόγον. ΣΩ. Ὁταν δὲ γε ἢν ἐπιτηκεὶ λαβέων λάβη, ἀψευδεὶς τε καὶ τὰ οὖντα δοξάζειεν τότε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἀληθῆς τε καὶ ψευδὴ δόξαν, καὶ ὅν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐδυσ- χεραίνομεν οὐδὲν ἐμποδῶν γεννεσθαι; ἕσως οὖν μοι συμφῆςεις. ἡ πῶς ποιήσεις; ὉΕΑΙ. Οὕτως. ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἢ ἐπιστηται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι ἀπηλλάγμεθα: ὁ γὰρ κεκτήμεθα μὴ κεκτήσθαι οὐδαμοῦ ἐτι συμβαίνει, οὔτε ψευδεῖςί τινος οὔτε μή. δεινότερον μέντοι πάθος ἄλλο παραφαίνεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ. ΗΟΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον; ΣΩ. Εἰ ἢ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μεταλλαγῆς ψευδῆς γενήσεται ποτε δόξα. ΗΟΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ; ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τινὸς ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἄγνωστον, μὴ ἀγνωμοσύνη ἄλλα τῇ ἑαυτῷ ἐπιστήμη, ἐπειδὰ ἐτερον αὐτῷ τοῦτο δοξάζειν, τὸ δ᾽ ἐτερον τοῦτο, πῶς οὖ πολλῆ ἀλογία, ἐπιστήμης παραγενομένης ἡμῶν, μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν μηδὲν, ἀγνοίσαι δὲ πάντα; ἔκ γὰρ τοῦτο τοῦ λόγου κωλὺς οὖδὲν καὶ ἀγνοιαν παραγενομένην γνῶναι τί ποιήσαι καὶ τυφλότητα ἰδεῖν, εἰτέρα καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀγνοίσαι ποτε τινὰ ποιήσει. ΗΟΕΑΙ. Ἰσως γὰρ, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐ καλὸς 1 τὰς ὀρνιθὰς ἐτί- θεμεν ἐπιστήμησις μόνον τιθέντες, ἐδει δὲ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης τιθέναι ὑμῖν συνδιαπετομένας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ τὸν θηρεύοντα τοτε μὲν ἐπιστήμην λαμβάνοντα, τοτε δ᾽ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τοῦ αὐτοῦ πέρι ψευδὴ μὲν δοξάζεις τῇ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ, ἀληθῆ δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.
ΣΩ. Οὐ ράδιόν γε, ὡ Θεαίτητε, μὴ ἐπαίνειν σε. ὃ μέντοι έίπεσ, πάλιν ἐπίσκεψαι. ἐςτώ μὲν γὰρ ὡς 200 λέγεις: ὃ δὲ δὴ τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην * λαβών ψευδή μὲν, φής, δοξάσει. ἥ γὰρ; ΘΕΛ. Νάι. ΣΩ. Οὐ δήπου καὶ ἡγήσεται γε ψευδὴ δοξάζειν. ΘΕΛ. Πῶς γὰρ; ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἀληθῆ γε, καὶ ὡς εἰδῶς διακείσεται περὶ ὧν ἐφευσταί. ΘΕΛ. Τί μή; ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμην ἄρα οὐσίσθησαν τεθηρευκὼς ἔχειν, ἄλλ' οὐκ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην. ΘΕΛ. Δήλον. ΣΩ. Οὐκοίνοι μακρὰν περιελθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην πάρεσμεν ἄπορίαν. ὁ Β' γὰρ ἑλεγκτικὸς ἐκεῖνος γελάσασας φήσει: 1 Πότερον, ὡ βέλτιστοι, ἀμφοτέρας τοις εἰδῶς, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην, ἰν οἴδεν, ἐτέραν αὐτὴν οἴεται τωι εἶναι ὧν οἴδε; ἐν οὐδετέραν αὐτῶι εἰδῶς, ἰν μὴ οἴδε, δοξάζει ἐτέραν ὧν οὐκ οἴδεν; ἐν τὴν μὲν εἰδῶς, τὴν δ' οὐ, ἰν οἴδεν, ἰν μὴ οἴδε; ἐν ἰν μὴ οἴδεν, ἐν οἴδεν ἥγεται; ἐν τάλιν αὐ μοὶ ἐρείτε ὅτι τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν εἰσίν αὐ ἐπιστήμαι, ὡς ὁ κεκτημένος ἐν ἐτέροις τισι γελοίοις περιστερέωσιν ἤ κηρίνοις πλάσμασιν καθέρξας, 1 ἐωσπερ ἄν κεκτήται, ἐπιστάταται, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ προχείρους ἔχῃ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ οὔτω δὴ ἀναγκασθήσετε εἰς ταύτων περιτρέχειν μυρίακις οὐδέν πλέον ποιοῦντες; Τι πρὸς ταύτα, ὡ Θεαίτητε, ἀποκρινομέθα; ΘΕΛ. Ἄλλα μὰ Δίᾳ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔγογκε οὐκ ἔχω, τί χρὴ λέγειν. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ήμῖν, ὁ παῖ, καλῶς ὁ λόγος ἐπιτλήττει, καὶ εὐνεκίντω, ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψευδὴ δύξαν προτέραν ξητούμεν ἐπιστήμης, ἐκείνην ἄφεντε; 1 τοῦ δὲ ἐστὶν ἄδινατον γνῶναι, πρὶν ἀν τις ἐπιστήμην ἱκανῶς λάβῃ, τί ποτ' ἐστίν. ΘΕΛ. Ἀνάγκη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὡς λέγεις οἴεσθαι. XXXVIII. ΣΩ. Τῷ οὖν τοις ἐρεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιστή-
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

μην; οὐ γάρ ποιο διπλούμεν γέ πω. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡκιστα, ἐάν περ μὴ σύ γε ἀπαγορεύσης. ΣΩ. Λέγε δή, τί ἂν αὐτῷ μάλιστα εἴπόντες ἢκιστ' ἂν ἥμιν αὐτοῖς ἐναντιωθείμεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅπερ ἐπεχειρούμεν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν οὐ γάρ ἔχω ἔγωγε ἄλλο οὐδέν. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποίον; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὴν ἀλήθη δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, ἀναμαρτητὸν γε ποι ἐστὶ τὸ δοξάζειν ἀληθῆ, καὶ τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ γίγνεται. ΣΩ. Ὡ τῶν ποταμῶν καθηγούμενοι, ὁ Θεαίτητη, ἐφ' ἀρα δεῖξεν αὐτῷ καὶ τούτῳ ἐὰν ἴσιντες ἐρευνῶμεν, τάχ' ἂν ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον αὐτῷ ἵνα το ξητούμενον, μένουσι δὲ δήλον οὐδέν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως λέγεις ἀλλ' ἵωμέν γε καὶ σκοπῶμεν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτῳ γε βραχεῖας σκέψεως τέχνη γάρ σοι ἀλήθη σημαίνει μὴ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτῷ. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ τίς αὐτή; ΣΩ. Ἡ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σοφίαν, οὕς δὴ καλοῦσι ρήτωρας τε καὶ δικαίκοις. οὕτω γὰρ ποι ἔαντων τέχνη πειθοῦσιν οὐ διδάσκοντες, ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ποιούντες ὥ ἄν βούλωνται. ἢ σὺ οἵει δεινοίς τινας οὕτω διδασκάλους εἶναι, ὡστε οἷς μὴ παρεγένυτο τινες ἀποστερούμενοι ἐν χρήματα ή τι ἄλλο βιαζομένοις, τούτοις δύνασθαι πρὸς ὑδρ σμικρὸν διδάξαε ἰκανός τῶν γεγομένων τήν ἀλήθειαν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅνδαμος ἔρωμε νοίραι, ἀλλὰ πεῖσαι μὲν. ΣΩ. Τὸ πείσαι ἥ ὧρχι δοξάσαι λέγεις ποιῆσαι; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὶ μὴν; ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν δικαίως πεισθῶμει δικασταὶ περὶ ὅν ἴδοντες μόνον ἔστιν εἰδεναι, ἄλλως ἰδὶ μὴ, οὕτως τότε έξ ακοῆς κρίνυμεν, ἀλήθη δοξα λαοῦ κρίνετες, ἀνευ ἐπιστήμης ἐκριναν, ὀρθὰ πεισθήτευτες, εὗπερ εὗ ἐδίκασαν; ΘΕΑΙ. Πανταπασι μὲν οὐν. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν, ἢ φίλε, ἐὰ γε ταύτων ἡν δόξα τε ἀληθῆς [καὶ δικαστήρια] καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὀρθά ποτ' ἂν δικαστής ἄκρος

Κ. Ρ.
εδόξαξεν ἀνευ ἐπιστήμης· νῦν δὲ ἔοικεν ἄλλο τι ἐκά-

tερον εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. "Ὁ γε ἐγὼ, ὁ Σώκρατες, εἰπόντος
tου ἀκούσας ἐπιλεξήσμην, νῦν δὲ ἐννοοῦ. ἐφη δὲ τήν

καὶ μὲν μετά λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, 1 τῆν δὲ

ἀλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης· καὶ ὅν μὲν μὴ ἔστι λόγος,

οὐκ ἐπιστήμητα εἶναι, οὐτωσί καὶ ὀνομάζων, ἂ δὲ ἔχει,

ἐπιστήμη. ΣΩ. Ἡ καλῶς λέγεις. τὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπιστήμη

tαῦτα καὶ μὴ τῇ διήρει, λέγει, εἰ ἄρα κατὰ ταύτα σὺ τε

κἀγὼ ἀκηκόαμεν. ΘΕΑΙ. ἈΛΛ' οὐκ οἶδα, εἰ ἐξευρήσω:

λέγοντος μὲντ' ἀν ἐτέρου, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἀκολουθήσαμι. ΧΧΧΧ. 

ΣΩ. Ἐκος δὴ ὅναρ ἀντὶ ὀνείρατος. ἐγώ

γὰρ αὐδεδόκουν ἀκούειν τινῶν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν. 1 πρῶτα

οἴνοπερεὶ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς τε σύγκειμεθα καὶ

τάλλα, λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι. αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐκατον

ὀνομάζασι μόνον εἶπη, προσεπείων δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατόν,

οὐθ' ὡς ἔστιν, οὐθ' ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν' Σῇ ἡμα γὰρ ἄν οὐσίαν

ἐγὼ

μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ προστίθεσθαι, δειν δὲ οὐδὲν προσ-

φέρειν, εἴπερ αὐτῷ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τις ἐρεῖ. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ

αὐτὸ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐκεῖνο οὐδὲ τὸ ἐκατον οὐδὲ τὸ μόνον

οὐδὲ τὸ τοῦτο προσοιστεόν, οὐθ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα. ταῦτα

μὲν γὰρ περιτρέχοντα πάσι προσφέρεσθαι έτερα ὀντα ἐκεῖνων, οἷς

προστίθεται, δειν δὲ, εἴπερ ήν δυνατὸν

αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι καὶ εἴχεν οἰκεῖον αὐτοῦ λόγον, ἄνευ τῶν

ἄλλων ἀπάντων λέγεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον εἴων ὅτιον

τῶν πρώτων ῥΗθῆναι 1 λόγοι' οὗ γὰρ εἴναι αὐτῷ ἄλλ' ἦ

ὀνομάζεσθαι μόνον' ἄνομα γὰρ μόνον ἔχειν, τὰ δὲ ἐκ

tούτων ήδη συγκείμενα, ὡσπερ αὐτὰ πέπλεκται, οὔτω

καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν συμπλακέντα λόγου γεγονέναι-

ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκῆ ἐκεῖ Λόγον οὐσίαν. οὔτω

δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄλογα καὶ ἄγνωστα εἴναι, αὐθήτα

dε τὰς δὲ συλλαβᾶς γνωστὰς τε καὶ ῥητὰς καὶ ἀληθεί
δόξη δοξαστάς. Όταν μὲν οὖν ἀνευ λόγου τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν τινός τις λάβῃ, ἀληθεύει μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν c περὶ αὐτῷ, μηγνώσκει δ' οὖ· τὸν γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενον δούναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον ἀνεπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ τούτου προσλαβόντα δὲ λόγου δυνατὸν τε ταῦτα πάντα γεγονέναι καὶ τελείως πρὸς ἑπιστήμην ἔχειν. Οὔτως ό, το ἐνύπτυον ἢ ἄλλως ἁκήκοας; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔτω μὲν οὖν παντάπασιν. ΣΩ. Ἀρέσκει οὖν σε καὶ τίθεσαι ταῦτη, δόξαν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου ἑπιστήμην εἶναι; ΘΕΑΙ. Κομίδη μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἄρ', ὁ Θεαίτης, 1 νῦν οὕτω δ' τῇ ἡμέρᾳ εἰλήφαμεν δ' πάλαι καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν ξητούντες πρὶν εὑρέως κατεγράσαν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἑμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ὁ Σῶκρατες, καλᾶς λέγεσθαι τὸ νῦν ῥηθέν. ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰκός γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχειν· τίς γὰρ ἀν καὶ ἔτι ἑπιστήμην εἰν χωρὶς λόγου τε καὶ ὀρθῆς δόξης; ἐν μέντοι τί με τῶν ῥηθέντων ἀπαρέσκει. ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίουν δή; ΣΩ. Ὅ καὶ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι κομψότατα, ὅσ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἀγνωστα, τὸ δὲ τῶν συλλαβῶν γένος 1 γνωστὸν. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν ὄρθως; ΕΣΩ. Ἰστέον δη' ὡσπερ γὰρ ὁμήρους ἔχομεν τοῦ λόγου τὰ παραδείγματα, ὅσ χρώμενοι εἶπε πάντα ταῦτα. ΘΕΑΙ. Ποία δη; ΣΩ. Τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖα τε καὶ συλλαβῆς. Ἡ οἷς ἄλλοσ ἐπὶ βλέποντα ταῦτα εἶπεῖν τὸν εἰπόντα, ἢ λέγομεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' εἰς ταῦτα. ΧΛ. ΣΩ. Βασανίζωμεν δη' αὐτὰ ἀναλαμβά- 203 νοντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, οὕτως ἢ ὅμως οὕτως γράμματα ἐμάθομεν. φέρε πρῶτον ἃρ' αἱ μὲν συλλαβαί λόγου ἔχουσι, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἄλογα; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄσως. ΣΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. Σωκράτους γοῦν εἰ τις ἐρωτού τὴν πρῶτην συλλαβῆν οὕτως, Ὡ, Θεαίτητε, λέγε τι ἐστὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀποκρινεῖ; ΘΕΑΙ. 6—2
"Ὅτι σύμμα καὶ ὁ. ΣΩ. Όυκοῦν τούτον ἔχεις λόγον τῆς συλλαβῆς; ὉΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Ἰθι δή, οὕτως εἰπὲ καὶ τὸν τοῦ 1 σύμμα λόγον. ὉΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς τοῦ στοιχείου τις ἐρεῖ στοιχεία; καὶ γὰρ δή, ὁ Σῶκρατες, τὸ τε σύμμα τῶν ἀφώνων ἐστὶ, ψόφος τις μόνον, οὗν συριττούσης τῆς ἡλώτης· τοῦ δ᾽ αὐ βῆτα οὔτε φωνὴ οὔτε ψόφος, οὔδὲ τῶν πλεῖστων στοιχείων. ὥστε πάνυ εὐ ἔχει τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὰ ἀλογα, ὅν γε τὰ ἐναργεστάτα αὐτά, τὰ ἐπτά, φωνὴν μόνον ἔχει, λόγον δὲ οὐδ’ ὄντων. ΣΩ. Τούτι μὲν ἁρα, ὁ ἔταιρε, καταφθάκαμεν περὶ ἐπι-

C στήμης. ὉΕΑΙ. Φαινόμεθα. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ 1 δῆ; τὸ μὴ γνωστὸν εἶναι τὸ στοιχεῖον, ἀλλὰ τὴν συλλαβῆν ἀρ’ ὑρθὼς ἀποδεδείγμεθα; ὉΕΑΙ. Εἰκὸς γε. ΣΩ. Φέρε δῆ, τὴν συλλαβῆν πότερον λέγομεν τὰ ἀμφότερα στοι-

χεία, καὶ ἐὰν πλείω ἢ ἢ δύο, τὰ πάντα, ἢ μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν γεγονοῦν συντεθέντων αὐτῶν; ὉΕΑΙ. Τὰ ἀπαντα ἐμοίγε δοκούμεν. ΣΩ. "Ορα δὴ ἐπὶ δυοῖν, σύμμα καὶ ὁ. ἀμφότερα ἐστὶν ἤ πρώτῃ συλλαβῆ τοῦ ἐμὸν ὄνο-

ματός. ἀλλο τι ὁ γιγνώσκων αὐτὴν τὰ ἀμφότερα 

D γιγνώσκει; ὉΕΑΙ. 1 Τί μὴν; ΣΩ. Τὸ σύμμα καὶ τὸ ὁ ἁρα γιγνώσκει. ὉΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; ἐκάτερον ἀρ’ ἄγνοεῖ, καὶ οὐδέτερον εἰδὼς ἀμφότερα γιγνώσκει; ὉΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ δεινὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ὁ Σῶκρατες. ΣΩ. 

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι εἴ γε ἀνάγκη ἐκάτερον γιγνώσκειν, εἴπερ ἀμφότερά τις γνώσεται, προγιγνώσκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀπας ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντι ποτὲ γνώσεσθαι συλλα-

βῆν, καὶ οὔτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰχή-

E σεται. ὉΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα γε 1 ἐξειδύνη. ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ καλῶς αὐτοῦ φυλάττομεν. χρῆν γὰρ ἐσως τὴν συλλα-

βῆν τίθεσθαι μὴ τὰ στοιχεία, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἐκείνων ἐν τῇ 

gεγονός εἶδος, ἰδέαν μιᾶν αὐτῷ αὐτοῦ ἔχουν, ἐτερον δὲ
τῶν στοιχείων. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ τάχα χ' ἄν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἡ ἐκεῖνως ἔχοι. Σ. Ω. Σκεπτέον, καὶ οὐ προδοτέον οὕτως ἀνάνδρως μέγαν τε καὶ σεμνον λόγον. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Σ. Ω. 'Εχέτω δὴ, ὡς νῦν φαμέν, μία * ἰδέα ἐξ ἐκάστων τῶν συναρμοττόντων 204 στοιχείων γνημομένη ἡ συλλαβή ὁμοῖας ἐν τε γράμμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Σ. Ω. Οὐκοῦν μέρη αὐτῆς οὐ δεῖ εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δῆ; Σ. Ω. "Ὅτι οὐ ἂν ἦν μέρη, τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα μέρη εἶναι. ἢ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γεγονός ἐν τι εἴδος ἐτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν; ΘΕΑΙ. 'Εγὼγε. Σ. Ω. Τὸ δὲ δὴ πᾶν καὶ τὸ ὅλον πότερον ταύτῳ καλεῖς ἢ ἐτερον 1 ἐκάστερον; ΘΕΑΙ. 'Εχω μὲν οὐδὲν σαφές, ὥστε δὲ κελεύεις προθύμως ἀποκρίνασθαι, παρακινούντας λέγω, ὅτι ἐτερον. Σ. Ω. Ἡ μὲν προθυμία, ὃ Ἰεαίητη, ὁρθή· εἴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόκρισις, σκεπτέον. ΘΕΑΙ. Δεῖ δὲ γε δή. Χ. Λ. Σ. Ω. Οὐκοῦν διαφέρου ἂν τὸ ὅλον του παντός, ὡς ὁ νῦν λόγος; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. Σ. Ω. Τί δὲ δή; τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐσθ' ὃ τι διαφέρει; οἶνον ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν ἐν, δύο, τρία, τέτταρα, πέντε, ἐξ, καὶ ἐνώ δις τρία ἢ 1 τρίς δύο ἢ τέτταρα τέ απὸ δύο ἢ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἐν, πότερον ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ἐτερον λέγομεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ταῦτών. Σ. Ω. *Ἀρ' ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐξ; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν. Σ. Ω. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἐκάστης λέξεως πάντα τὰ ἐξ εἰρήκαμεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. Σ. Ω. Πάλιν δ' οὐδέν λέγομεν τὰ πάντα λέγοντες; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη. Σ. Ω. Ἡ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὰ ἐξ; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν. Σ. Ω. Ταῦτών ἄρα ἐν γε τοῖς ὅσα εἴτ' ἔν ἀριθμοῦ εστὶ τὸ τε πᾶν προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἅπαντα;
ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Ὄδε δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν λέγομεν. ὁ τοῦ πλέθρου ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὸ πλέθρον ταῦτὸν. ἢ γὰρ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ τοῦ σταδίου δὴ ὀσαύτως;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὁ τοῦ στρατοπέδου γε καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁμοίως; ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς πᾶς τὸ ἐν πᾶν ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν ἐστὶν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Ὅ δὲ ἐκάστων ἀριθμὸς μοῦ ἄλλῳ εἶναι ἡ μέρη ἕστιν; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν. ΣΩ. Ἡ ὅσα ἄρα ἔχει μέρη, ἐκ μερῶν ἂν εἴη; ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ γε πάντα μέρη τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ὁμολογεῖται, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς τὸ πᾶν ἐστίν. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔτω. ΣΩ. Τὸ ὅλον ἄρ’ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐκ μερῶν. πᾶν γὰρ ἂν εἴη, τὰ πάντα ἐν μέρη.
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔκ ἐστὶ. ΣΩ. Μέρος δ’ ἐσθ’ ὅτου ἄλλου ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ὅλου; ΘΕΑΙ. 205 Τοῦ παντὸς γε. ΣΩ. Ἡ Ἀνδρικὸς γε, ὃ Θεαίτητε, μάχει. τὸ πᾶν δὲ οὐχ ὅταν μηδὲν ἀπῆ, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πᾶν ἐστὶν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄναγκη. ΣΩ. Ὡς ὅλον δὲ οὐ ταῦτων τοῦτο ἐσται, οὐ ἂν μηδαμὴ μηδὲν ἀποστατῇ; οὐ δ’ ἂν ἀποστατῇ, οὑτε ὅλον οὑτε πᾶν, ἁμα γενόμενον ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτό; ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ μοι νῦν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ὅλου. ΣΩ. Ὁκοῦν ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ ἂν μέρη θ’, τὸ ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν τὰ πάντα μέρη ἐσται; ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω γε. ΣΩ. Πάλιν δ’, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν, οὐκ, εἴπερ ἡ συλλαβή μι) τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη αὐτήν μὴ ὅς μὲρη ἔχειν ἐαυτῇς τὰ στοιχεῖα, ὃ ταῦτα οὕτων αὐτῶς ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὶ εἶναι; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔτως. ΣΩ. Ὁκοῦν τοῦτο ἤνα μὴ γένηται, ἐτερον αὐτῶν αὐτὴν ἐθέμεθα; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Τί δ’; εἰ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα συλλαβῆς μέρη ἐστίν, ἔχεις ἀλλ’ ἄττα εἴπεῖν, ἢ μέρη μὲν ἐστὶ συλλαβῆς, οὐ μέντοι στοιχεῖα γ’ ἐκείνης; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς’ εἰ γὰρ,
ὁ Σώκρατες, μόρια ταύτης συγχωρούν, γελοίον ποιν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀφέντα ἐπ᾽ ἄλλα ιέναι. Σ. Παντάπασι δὴ, ὁ Θεαίτητε, ἵκατὰ τὸν νῦν λόγον μία τις ἱδέα ἀμέριστος συλλαβῆ ἀν εἰη. ΘΕΙ. Ἑσικ. Σ. Μέμνησαι οὖν, ὁ φίλε, ὅτι ὅλῳον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἥγομένου εὑ λέγεσθαι, ὅτι τῶν πρῶτων οὐκ εἰη λόγος, ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἄλλα σύγκειται, διὸτι αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ ἐκαστὸν εἰη ἀσύνθετον, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς ἔχοι προσφέροντα εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐτερα καὶ ἄλλοτρια λεγόμενα, καὶ αὐτή δὴ ἡ αἰτία ἀλογῶν τε καὶ ἀγνωστον αὐτὸ ποιοῖ; ΘΕΙ. Μέμνησαι. Σ. Ὅrpm οὖν ἀλλη τις ἡ αὐτή ἡ αἰτία τοῦ μονοειδές τι καὶ ἀμέριστον αὐτὸ εἴναι; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὀρῶ ἄλλην. ΘΕΙ. Οὔ γὰρ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται. Σ. Οἶκοιν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἔµπεπτωκεν ἡ συλλαβῆ ἐῖδος ἐκεῖνος, εἰπερ μέρη τε ὁ ἡ ἔχει καὶ μία ἐστῖν ἱδέα; ΘΕΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Σ. Εἰ μὲν ἀρα πολλὰ στοιχεῖα ἡ συλλαβῆ ἐστι καὶ ὅλον τι, μέρη δ᾽ αὐτῆς ταύτα, ὁµοίως αὐ τε συλλαβαὶ γνωσταὶ καὶ ῥηταὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐπεῖπερ τὰ πάντα μέρη τῷ ὀλῷ ταὐτὸν ἑφάνη. ΘΕΙ. Ἐκ μᾶλα. Σ. Εἰ δὲ τε ἐν τε καὶ ἀµερές, ὁµοίως μὲν συλλαβῆ, ὡσαύτως δὲ στοιχείον ἄλογον τε καὶ ἀγνωστον ἡ γὰρ αὐτῆ αἰτία ποιήσει αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα. ΘΕΙ. Οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως εἰπεῖν. Σ. Ὅτῳτο μὲν ἀρα μὴ ἀποδεχόμεθα, ὡς ἄν λέγη συλλαβῆ μὲν γνωστὸν καὶ ῥητὸν, στοιχεῖον δὲ τούναντῖον. ΘΕΙ. Μὴ γὰρ, εἰπερ τῷ λόγῳ πειθόμεθα. Σ. Ὅτ᾽ ὃ δ᾽ αὐ; τούναντιον 20δ λέγοντος ἀρ μᾶλλον ἄν ἀποδέξασο εὖ ὃν αὐτὸς συνοισθα σαυτῷ ἐν τῇ τῶν γραµµάτων μαθήσει; ΘΕΙ. Τὸ ποιοῦν; Σ. Ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μανθάνων διετέλεσα ἢ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν τε τῇ ὄψει διαγνωσκεῖν
πειρώμενος καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄκοῇ αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ ἐκαστον, ἵνα μὴ ἢ θέσις σε ταράττοι λεγομένων τε καὶ γραφομένων. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. Σ.Ω. Ἐν δὲ κιβαριστῶν τελεώς μεμαθηκέναι μόνῳ ἄλλῳ τι ἢ τὸ τῷ φθόγγῳ ἔγγοι ἐκάστῳ δύνασθαι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ποίας χορδῆς εὴ ἡ δὴ στοιχεῖα πᾶς ἢν ὀμολογήσει μουσικῆς λέγεσθαι; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο. Σ.Ω. Ἡμὲν ἄρ’ αὐτοὶ ἔμπειροι ἐσμὲν στοιχείων καὶ συλλαβῶν, εἰ δεὶ ἀπὸ τούτων τεκμαίρεσθαι καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα, πολὺ τὸ τῶν στοιχείων γένους ἐναργεστέραν τε τὴν γνώσιν ἔχειν φίλομεν καὶ κυριωτέραν τῆς συλλαβῆς πρὸς τὸ λαβέων τελεῶς ἐκαστὸν μάθημα, καὶ ἕαν τὰς φη συλλαβῆς μὲν γνωστὸν, ἀγνωστὸν δὲ πεφυκέναι στοιχείων, εἰκότα λή ἀκούσα παλικεμένη γνησίωμεθ’ αὐτῶν. ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν.

C XLII. Σ.Ω. Ἀλλὰ δὴ τούτου μὲν ἐτὶ κἂν ἄλλαν φανεῖν ἀποδείξεις, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ τὸ δὲ προκείμενον μὴ ἐπιλαθόμεθα δι’ αὐτὰ ἰδεῖν, ὅ τι δὴποτε καὶ λέγεται τὸ μετὰ δόξης ἀληθοῦς λόγον προσγενόμενον τὴν τελεωτἀτην ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοίον χρῆ ὀράν. Σ.Ω. Φέρε δὴ, τί ποτε βουλεταί τὸν λόγον ἡμῶν σημαίνει; τριῶν γὰρ ἐν τί μοι δοκεῖ λέγειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Τὶς νοῦν δή; Σ.Ω. Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰπ’ ἂν τὸ τὴν αὐτοῦ διάποιν ἐμφανὶ ποιεῖν διὰ φωνῆς μετὰ ρημάτων τε καὶ όνομάτων, ἀσπερ εἰς κάτοπτρον ἢ ὑδωρ τῆν δύσιν ἐκτυποῦμεν εἰς τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος ροήν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ τοιοῦτον λόγος εἶναι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοίγε. τὸν γοῦν αὐτὸ δρόμιτα λέγειν φαμέν. Σ.Ω. Οὐκοίον αὕτω τοῦ γε πάσα ποιεὶν δυνατὸς θάττον ἢ σχολαίτερον, τὸ ἐνδείξασθαι τί δοκεῖ περὶ ἐκάστου αὐτῷ, ὅ μὴ ἐνεύᾳ ἡ κωφὸς ἀπ’ ἀρχής· καὶ οὕτως ὅσοι τι ὀρθῶν δοξάζουσι, πάντες Εἰ αὐτὸ μετὰ λόγου φανοῦνται ἔχοντες, καὶ οὕδαμοι
ΘΕΛΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

ἐτι ὀρθῇ δόξα χωρὶς ἐπιστήμης γενήσεται. ΘΕΛΙ.

'Αληθῆ. ΣΩ. Μὴ τοινυν ράδιως καταγιγνώσκωμεν τὸ μηδὲν εἰρηκέναι τὸν ἀποφημάμενον ἐπιστήμην, ὦ νῦν σκοποῦμεν. ἵσως γὰρ ὁ λέγων οὐ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα τὶ ἐκαστὸν δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων ἀποδοῦναι * τῷ ἐρωμένῳ. ΘΕΛΙ. 207.

Οἶνοι τὰ λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Οἶον καὶ Ἡσίοδος περὶ ἀμάξης λέγει τὸ ἐκατὸν δὲ τε δούραθ' ἀμάξης. ἢ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σὺ ἄλλα ἀγαπᾶμεν ἂν ἐρωτηθέντες ὃ τὶ ἐστὶν ἀμάξα, εἰ ἔχοιμεν εἰπεῖν προχολ., ἡξων, ὑπερτερία, ἀντυγχείς, ἕγογον. ΘΕΛΙ.

Πάνω μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ γε ἵσως οἱ οὐκ ἂν ἡμᾶς, ὄσπερ ἂν τὸ σὸν οὐνομα ἐρωτηθέντας καὶ ἀποκρινομένους κατὰ συλλαβῆν, γελοίους εἶναι 1 ὥρθως μὲν δοξάζοντας καὶ Β λέγοντας ὃ λέγομεν, οἰομένους δὲ γραμματικοὺς εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν τε καὶ λέγειν γραμματικῶς τὸν τοῦ Θεατήτου ὀνόματος λόγον. τὸ δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιστημόνως οὐδὲν λέγειν, πρὶν ἂν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων μετὰ τῆς ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἐκαστὸν περαίνῃ τις, ὄπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν που ἔρρηκα. ΘΕΛΙ. 'Ερρήθη γάρ. ΣΩ. Οὔτω τοινυν καὶ περὶ ἀμάξης ἡμᾶς μὲν ὀρθὴν ἔχειν δόξαν, τὸν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἐκατὸν ἐκείνων δυνάμενον διελθεῖν αὐτῆς τὴν 1 οὐ-ς τα, προσπαθήσως τοῦτο, λόγον τε προσειληφέναι τῇ ἀληθεὶ δόξῃ καὶ ἀντὶ δοξαστικοῦ τεχνικοῦ τε καὶ ἐπι- στήμουν περὶ ἀμάξης οὐσίας γεγονέναι, διὰ στοιχείων τὸ ὁλων περάναντα. ΘΕΛΙ. Οὐκοῦν εὐ δοκεῖ σοι, ὃ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Εἰ σοι, ὃ ἐταίρε, δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀποδέχει τὴν διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου διέξοδον περὶ ἐκαστοῦ λόγου εἶναι, τὴν δὲ κατὰ συλλαβῆς ἃ καὶ κατὰ μείζον ἐτι ἀλογίαν, τοῦτο μοι λέγε, ἢν αὐτὸ 1 ἐπίσκοπταμεν. D
ΘΕΛΙ. Ἀλλὰ πάνω ἀποδέχομαι. ΣΩ. Πότερον ἤγουμενος ἐπιστήμονα εἶναι ὄντων ὅτε μὲν τοῦ αὐτοῦ δοκῇ αὐτῷ εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ ἐτέρου, ἢ καὶ ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μὲν ἐτέρου, τοτὲ δὲ ἐτέρου δοξάζῃ; ΘΕΛΙ. Μᾶ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Εἶτα ἀμυνομονεῖς ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθῆσαι καὶ ἀρχὰς σαυτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δρᾶντας αὑτὰ; ΘΕΛΙ. Ἀρα λέγεις τῆς ἐ αὐτῆς συλλαβῆς τοτὲ μὲν ἐτέρου, τοτὲ δὲ ἐτέρου ἤγουμενον γράμμα, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τοτὲ μὲν εἰς τὴν προσήκοναν, τοτὲ δὲ εἰς ἄλλην τιθέντας συλλαβῆν; ΣΩ. Ταῦτα λέγω. ΘΕΛΙ. Μᾶ Δί' οὐ τοῖς ἀμυνομοῖς, οὐδέ γε πω ἤγουμαι ἐπίστασθαι τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας. ΣΩ. Τέ οὖν; ὅταν ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ καίρῳ Θεαίτητον γράφων τις θήτα καὶ ἐ οὕται τε δεῖν γράφει καὶ γράψῃ, καὶ αὐ* Θεόδωρων ἐπιχειρῶν γράφειν ταῦτα καὶ ἐ οὕται τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ, ἀρ' ἐπίστασθαι φησομεν αὐτῶν τὴν πρώτην τῶν ύμετέρων υἱομάτων συλλαβῆν; ΘΕΛΙ. Ἀλλ' ἄρτι ὠμολογήσαμεν τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντα μήπω εἰδέναι. ΣΩ. Κωλύει οὖν τι καὶ περὶ τῆς δευτέρας συλλαβῆς καὶ τρίτης καὶ τετάρτης οὕτως ἔχεων τῶν αὐτῶν; ΘΕΛΙ. Οὐδὲν γε. ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν τότε τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον ἔχων γράφεω Θεαίτητον μετὰ ὀρθὴς δόξης, ὅταν ἔξης γράφῃ; ΘΕΛΙ. Δῆλον δὴ. 

Γ. ΣΩ. 1 Οὐκοῦν ἔτι ἀνεπιστήμονον οὖν, ὅρθα δὲ δοξάζων, ὡς φαμέν; ΘΕΛΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Δόγων γε ἔχων μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης. τὴν γὰρ διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου ὅδων ἔχων ἐγραφεν, ἢν δὴ λόγων ὡμολογήσαμεν. ΘΕΛΙ. Ἀληθῆ. ΣΩ. Ἐστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἑταῖρε, μετὰ λόγου ὀρθὴ δόξα, ἢν οὕτω δεὶ ἐπιστημὴν καλεῖ. ΘΕΛΙ. Κινδυνεύει. XLIII. ΣΩ. Ὁναρ δὴ, ὡς ἔουκεν, ἐπλούτησαμεν οὐ̣θέντες ἔχειν
τον ἀληθεστατον ἑπιστήμης λόγον. ἢ μὴς κατηγο-
ρῶμεν; ἵσως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτο τις αὐτὸν ὑριεῖται, ἂλ-
λα τὸ λοιπὸν ἐδος τῶν τριῶν, ὃν ἐν γέ τι ἔφαμεν
λόγον θῆσεσθαί τοῦ ἑπιστήμης ὁριζόμενον δόξαν
einai ὀρθῆν μετὰ λόγον. ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως ὑπέμνησας'
ἐτι γὰρ ἐν λοιπὸν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἢν διανοίας ἐν φωνῇ
ὡσπερ εἰδωλον, τὸ δὲ ἀρτι λεχθὲν διὰ στοιχείου ὁδὸς
ἐπὶ τὸ ὅλον τὸ δὲ δὴ τρίτον τί λέγεις; ΣΩ. Ὅπερ
ἀν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴποιεν, τὸ ἐχειν τι σημεῖον εἴπειν, ὃ τῶν
ἀπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁ οὗν τίνα τίνος
ἐχεις μοι λόγον εἴπειν; ΣΩ. Ὁ οὗν, εἰ βούλει, ἡλίουν ἐν
πέρι ἰκανόν οἶμαι σοι εἶναι ἀποδέξασθαι, ὅτι τὸ λαμπρό-
tατον ἐστι τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἱόντων περὶ γῆν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Λαβὲ δὴ οὐ χάριν εἰρηταί.
ἐστι δὲ ὡσπερ ἀρτι ἐλέγομεν, ὡς ἀρα τὴν διαφορὰν ἐκάσ-
tου ἀν λαμβάνης, ἣ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, λόγον, ὡς
φασί τινας, λήψει ἐως δὲ ἄν κοινοὶ τινος ἐφάπτη,
ἐκεῖνων πέρι σοι ἐσται ὁ λόγος, ὅν ἄν ἡ κοινότης ὡ.
ΘΕΑΙ. Μανθάνω 1 καὶ μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς ἐχειν λόγον ἐ
τὸ τοιοῦτον καλεῖν. ΣΩ. Ὅς δὲ ἄν μετ’ ὀρθῆς δόξης
περὶ ὅπως ὑποῦν τῶν ὑπὸς τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἄλλων προσ-
λάβη, αὐτοῦ ἑπιστήμων γεγονός ἐσται, οὐ πρότερον ἤν
δοξαστής. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμέν γε μὴν οὐτω. ΣΩ. Νῦν
δῆτα, ὁ Θεαίπητε, παντάπασιν ἐγὼνε, ἐπειδὴ ἐγνύσ
ὡσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, ξυνῖμη
οὐδὲ σμικρὸν. ἐως δὲ ἀφετήρη πόρρωθεν, ἑφαίνετο τι
μοι λέγεσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς τι τοῦτο; ΣΩ. * Φράσω, 209
ἐάν οἴος τε γένομαι. ὀρθὴν ἐγὼνε ἐχον δόξαν περὶ σοῦ,
ἐάν μὲν προσλάβῳ τῶν σοῦ λόγον, γιγνόμηκο δῇ σε, εἰ
de μὴ, δοξάζω μόνον. ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Λόγος δὲ γε
ΡΗΝ ἡ τῆς σῆς διαφορότητος ἐρμηνεία. ΘΕΛΙ. Οὕτως. Ἐ. 'Ἡνίκ' οὖν ἐδόξαζον μόνον, ἄλλο τι φ' τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρεις, τούτων οὔδεν ἡπτόμην τῇ διανοίᾳ; ΘΕΛΙ. Οὐκ ἔσκε. Σ. Τὸν κοινῶν τι ἁρα διενούμην, ὁνὶ β οὔδεν σὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τοις ἄλλοις ἔχει. ΘΕΛΙ. 1' Ἀνάγκη. Σ. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διὸς' πῶς ποτε ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ σὲ μᾶλλον ἐδόξαζον ἡ ἄλλον ὄντων; θὲς γὰρ μὲ διανοοῦ- μενον, ὡς ἐστὶν οὕτως Θεαίτητος, ὃ τι ἢ τε ἀνθρω- πος καὶ ἔχῃ ρίνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ στόμα καὶ οὐτω ὥ ὑ ἐν ἐκαστῷ τῶν μελῶν. αὕτη οὖν ἡ διάνοια ἔσθ' ὁ τι μᾶλλον ποιήσει με Θεαίτητον ἢ Θεόδωρον διανοεῖσθαι, ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον, Μυσῶν τὸν ἔσχατον; ΘΕΛΙ. Τί γὰρ; Σ. 'ΑΛΛ' ἐων δὴ μὴ μόνον τὸν ἐξοντα ρίνα καὶ ὀφθαλ- μοὺς διανοηθῶ, 1 ἄλλα καὶ τὸν σιμόν τε καὶ ἔξοφθαλμον, μὴ τι σὲ αὐ μᾶλλον δοξάσω ἡ ἐμαυτον ἡ ὅσοι τοιοῦτοι; ΘΕΛΙ. Οὕτεν. Σ. 'ΑΛΛ' οὐ πρὸτερόν γε, σύμαι, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἂν ἡ σιμότης αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτητῶν ἃν ἐγὼ ἐώρακα διάφορον τι μυθμεῖον παρ' ἐμοὶ ἐνσημανμενή καταδήται, καὶ τὰλλα οὕτως ἢ ὃν εἴ σὺ, ἢ ἐμε, καὶ ἢν αὐριον ἀπαν- τήσω, ἀναμνήσει καὶ ποιήσει ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν περὶ δ σοῦ. ΘΕΛΙ. Ἀληθέστατα. Σ. Περὶ τὴν 1 διαφο- ρότητα ἁρα καὶ ἡ ὀρθή δόξα ἂν εἰη ἐκάστου πέρι. ΘΕΛΙ. Φαινεται γε. Σ. Το σὺ προσλαβεῖν λόγον τῇ ὀρθῇ δόξῃ τῇ ἀν ἐτι εἰ; εἴ μὲν γὰρ προσδοξάσαι λέγει ἢ διαφέρει τι τῶν ἄλλων, πάνι γελοία γίγνεται ἡ ἐπίταξις. ΘΕΛΙ. Πῶς; Σ. Ὁ ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχομεν, ἡ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, τούτων προσλαβεῖν κελεύει

209 c. ἡ ἐμε. Si ἡ Platonis est, neglegentius scriptum videtur. Sed nescio an debuerim vel cum Heindorfiō ὃ vel ἕ reponere.
ημᾶς ὅρθην δόξαν, ἢ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει. καὶ οὐτως ἢ μὲν σκυτάλης ἢ ὑπέρου ἢ ὅτου δὴ λέγεται περιτροπὴ πρὸς 1 ταύτην τὴν ἐπίταξιν οὐδὲν ἃν λέγου, τυφλοῦ δὲ διὰ παρακελευσίς ἀν καλοῖτο δικαιοτερον τὸ γὰρ ἢ ἐχομεν ταύτα προσλαβεῖν κελεύειν, ἦνα μᾶθωμεν ἢ δοξάζομεν, πάνυ γενναίως έοικεν ἐσκοτωμένως. ΘΕΛ. Εἰπὲ δὴ, τί νῦν δὴ ὡς ἐρῶν ἐπύθον; ΣΩ. Εἰ τὸ λόγον, ὡ παί, προσλαβεῖν γνώναι κελεύει, ἀλλὰ μὴ δοξάζαι τὴν διαφορότητα, ἢδ' χρήμα ἃν εἰη τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν περὶ ἐπιστήμης λόγου. τὸ γὰρ γνῶναι ἐπιστήμης που λαβεῖν ἐστὶν. * ἢ γὰρ; ΘΕΛ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν 210 ἐρωτηθεῖς, ὡς έοικε, τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, ἀποκρινεῖται, ὅτι δόξα ὁρθή μετὰ ἐπιστήμης διαφορότητος. λόγου γὰρ πρόσληψις τοῦτ' ἃν εἰη κατ' ἐκείνων. ΘΕΛ. Ἐοικε. ΣΩ. Καὶ παντάπασι γε εὐνθὲς, ξησιντων ἠμῶν ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν φάναι ὁρθὴν εἰναι μετ' ἐπιστήμης εἶνε διαφορότητος εἶνε ὀτουν. οὔτε ἄρα αἵσθησις, ὡς Θεαιτητε, οὔτε δόξα ἰλιθῆς οὔτε μετ' ἰληθοὺς δόξης λόγος 1 προσγεγρόμενος ἐπιστήμη τἀ ἐιη. ΘΕΛ. Οὐκ ἐξοικεν. ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ἔτι κυνοῦμεν τὶ καὶ ὀδίνομεν, ὡ φιλε, περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἢ πάντα ἐκτετόκαμεν; ΘΕΛ. Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δι' ἐγὼνε πλεῖο ἢ ὁσα εἶχον ἐν ἐμαυτῷ διὰ σὲ εἴρηκα. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ταύτα μὲν ἀπαντά ἡ μαιευτικὴ ἡμῖν τέχνη ἀνεμιαία φησι γεγενήσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἀξία τροφῆς; ΘΕΛ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. XLIV. ΣΩ. Ἐὰν τοῦν ἄλλων μετὰ ταύτα ἐγκύμων ἐπιξειρῆς γίγνεσθαι, ὡ Θεαῖτητε, ἐὰν τε 1 γίγνη, βελτιώνων ἐσεὶ σ πλήρης διὰ τὴν νῦν ἐξέτασιν, εάν τε κενὸς ἢς, ἢττον ἐσεὶ βαρὺς τοὺς συνοῦσι καὶ ἡμερώτερος, σωφρόνως οὐκ οἰόμενος εἴδεναι ἢ μὴ οἶσθα. τοσοῦτον γὰρ μόνον ἡ
ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται, πλέον δὲ οὐδέν, οὐδὲ τι οἶδα ὃν ὦν οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι μεγάλοι καὶ θαυμάσιοι ἄνδρες εἰσί τε καὶ γεγόνασι. τὴν δὲ ματέλαν ταύτην ἐγώ τε καὶ ἡ μήτηρ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐλάχομεν, ἡ μὲν τῶν γυναικῶν, ἐγώ δὲ τῶν Δυνέων τε ἕνας ἔμετρον καὶ ὅσοι καλοὶ. οὐν μὲν οὖν ἀπαντητέον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοάν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, ἡν με γέγραπται· ἐσθέν δὲ, ὁ Θεόδωρε, δεύτερο πάλιν ἀπαντῶμεν.
TRANSLATION

WITH NOTES EXPLANATORY AND ILLUSTRATIVE.
TRANSLATION.

[Euclides, founder of the Megaric School, and his friend Terpsion, both of them pupils of Socrates, meet in one of the streets of Megara. The former mentions that on his way to the harbour he had met Theaetetus, wounded and dangerously sick, being carried to Athens from the Athenian camp near Corinth. A conversation ensuing on the noble character of Theaetetus, and the estimation in which he was held by Socrates, Euclides says that he has at home in manuscript a dialogue, which Theaetetus took part in with Socrates. As Terpsion expresses a wish to hear this dialogue, the friends adjourn to the house of Euclides, where a slave reads it aloud to them as they repose.]

Eu. Ha, Terpsion! long in¹ from the country²?
Ter. A good while. And you³—I was looking for you in the Agora, and wondering that I could not find you.
Eu. I was not in the city.
Ter. Where then?

¹ Ἀργ...η πάλαι; English idiom would say ‘just in?’ or ‘long in?’ but not both. The translation therefore omits one alternative.
² Ἔκ ἄγρον. Terpsion has a country residence; whether a town house also, there is nothing to show.
³ Καὶ σὲ γέ. This emphasis implies a question as to the cause of Euclid’s absence. The ἄγρον or market-square was a promenade, where a friend might be looked for at a certain time of day, as in the Cascine at Florence.

K. P.
Eu. As I was going down\(^4\) to the harbour I met with Theaetetus being carried to Athens from the camp at Corinth.

Ter. Alive or dead?

Eu. Alive, but only just\(^5\). Besides being very ill from wounds, he is more seriously affected\(^6\) by the malady which has broken out in the army.

Ter. You mean the dysentery?

Eu. Yes.

Ter. In danger, you say, such a man as that!

Eu. Ay, a gallant and good one\(^7\), Terpsion. It was but just now I heard some people praising him highly for his behaviour in the battle\(^8\).

Ter. Nothing strange in that. It were far more surprising if he had not behaved so. But how came he not to put up here at Megara?\(^9\)

Eu. He was in haste to get home. For all my entreaties and advice, he would not stay. So after accompanying him some way, as I went back I bethought me of the marvellous divination shown by Socrates in so many cases, especially in that of Theaetetus. I think it was but a little

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\(^4\) \textit{Kata}bainov. The preposition \textit{kata} compounded with verbs of motion often implies coastward movement, the converse being \textit{an}a. The harbour was Nisaea.

\(^5\) \textit{Kai} \textit{mála}. The intensive \textit{kal} is largely used by Plato.

\(^6\) \textit{Aiρei}. A technical verb for morbid affection.

\(^7\) \textit{Kalov te kal áγαθον}. \textit{Kolokagathia} is the Athenian term for the heroic ideal of a gentleman.

\(^8\) \textit{Máχev}. What battle is here meant we cannot absolutely determine. The great battle near Corinth, in which the Lacedaemonians defeated the Athenians, was in July, 394 B.C. Grote, H. Gr. Part II. ch. ixxiv. Demosth. Lept. 41. But Plato may point to some other affair before 387.

\(^9\) \textit{Autov Megároi}, two local adverbs = \textit{év autois tois Megárou}, at Megara itself; at the very place he had reached, viz. Megara.
while before his own death that he met him, a mere lad at the time, and, after conversing and arguing with him, admired his genius greatly. When I went to Athens, he repeated to me the arguments he had held with him—well worth hearing they were—and said this youth must inevitably become distinguished, if he should reach man's estate.

Ter. He spoke the truth, manifestly. But what were the arguments? Can you repeat them?

Eu. No indeed: not from mere recollection. But, having returned home immediately, I jotted down\(^{10}\) some notes at once, and, afterwards taxing my memory at leisure, I went on writing; and, every time I visited Athens, I used to ask Socrates anything I had not remembered, and to make corrections on my return here. So that I have got nearly the whole conversation in writing.

Ter. True: I heard you say so once before; and I have always been meaning to bid you show it me, but have loitered till this moment. What hinders us from perusing it now? Especially as I am in real want of rest, after coming from the country.

Eu. Well, and I too escorted Theaetetus as far as Erineum\(^{11}\); so I should not dislike a siesta. Let us go then; and while we repose, the attendant shall read to us.

Ter. A good suggestion.

[They go to Euclid's house.]

Eu. Here is the manuscript, Terpsion. I must observe that I wrote out the conversation in my own way:—not in the narrative form as Socrates related it to me, but as a dialogue between him and his fellow-disputants, whom he

\(^{10}\) Εγραφάμεν. The use of the middle voice here, as compared with ἔγραψον afterwards, is notable: perhaps it implies the act of writing at the moment from recollection and for his own future revision.

\(^{11}\) Erineum: a locality on the way from Megara to Athens.
stated to be Theodorus the geometrician and Theaetetus. And, in order to escape the troublesome notices between the speeches in my manuscript (such as, when Socrates was speaker, 'I spoke,' 'I said,' and, in case of an answerer, 'he agreed' or 'he disagreed') I wrote as if he were actually talking with them, and got rid of such interpolations.

Ter. Well, no harm in that, Euclid.
Eu. Now, boy, take the volume, and read.

[The slave reads aloud all that follows.]

2 [The interlocutors in the following dialogue are: Socrates, Theodorus the geometrician of Cyrene, and Theaetetus. Two young friends of the latter are also present, one of whom is called Socrates; but neither of them is made to speak. Socrates, meeting Theodorus in a gymnasium at Athens, asks him if he has encountered any youths of promise. Theodorus names Theaetetus with high praise, adding that in some of his features he resembles Socrates. Theaetetus, then approaching with his two friends, is invited to sit beside Socrates, who engages him in a conversation about their personal resemblance. The purpose of it seems to be, partly to test the dialectic faculty of Theaetetus, partly to embolden him by relating the praise he has received from so competent a judge as Theodorus.]

So. If I had a peculiar interest in Cyrene and its affairs, Theodorus, I would ask you about things there, and about its people, whether any of the young men in those parts are studying geometry or other scientific subjects. But I really care for them less than I do for our youth here, and would rather know which of our own young men are expected to become scholars. This therefore I observe for myself as well as I can, and inquire about it from every body else, with whom I see the young men desirous to converse. Now the largest number of pupils attend
your lectures; and justly: for you deserve it on many grounds, but especially for geometry. So I shall be glad to hear if you have met with any one worth naming.

Theo. Yes, Socrates; among your citizens I have met with a youth, whose character I can cite as well worthy of your attention. If he were handsome, I should be much afraid to mention him, lest any one should fancy I am in love with him. But in fact (don’t be vexed with me) he is not handsome: he has a flat nose and protruding eyes like you: but less marked in his case than in yours. I speak then without scruple. And I can assure you that of all the persons I ever met (and I have associated with a great number) I never found any of a nature so wonderfully excellent. Aptitude for learning such as few attain, combined with a temper singularly mild, and furthermore with unrivalled courage, I could never have expected to find, nor have I ever seen any similar instances. Those who, like him, are quick and ready-witted and gifted with a good memory, are liable to keen emotions; they rush impetuously like unballasted vessels, and grow up with more of madness in them than of valour: whilst others of more solid temperament usually approach studies in a somewhat sluggish mood, and laden with forgetfulness. But he comes to all his studies and investigations with perfect gentleness, like a current of oil flowing without sound, so smoothly, firmly and successfully, that we marvel to see one of his age perform these things as he does.

So. Good news indeed. Pray whose son is he?

Theo. I have heard the name, but do not remember it. However, he is the middle one of those who are now approaching us. He and these friends of his were anointing

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1 Τέμονες. A word properly applied to laden vessels, and here opposed to ἀνεμάτιστα πλοία.
themselves just now in the outer race-course. They have finished, I suppose, and are coming this way. So see if you know him.

So. I do. He is the son of Sophronius of Sunium, just such a man, my friend, as you describe this one to be, of good repute generally, and, I can tell you, a man who left a considerable property. But I do not know the name of the youth.

Thea. Theaetetus is his name, Socrates: the property I fancy certain trustees have wasted: yet even in money matters he is wonderfully liberal.

So. A noble character you give him. Bid him come and sit down by me here.

Theo. I will. Theaetetus, come and sit here by Socrates.

So. Do by all means, Theaetetus, that I may view myself, and see what kind of face I have. Theodorus says it's like yours. Now if each of us held a lyre in his hand, and he said they were tuned to the same pitch, should we believe him at once, or should we have taken note whether he spoke as a musician?

Theae. We should have taken note.

So. And if we found him such, should we not believe him, if ignorant of music, we should disbelieve?

Theae. True.

So. And in the present case, I suppose, if we care at all for resemblance of faces, we must consider whether he speaks with a painter's skill or not.

Theae. I think so.

So. Is then Theodorus skilled in portrait-painting?

Theae. Not to my knowledge.

So. And is he not skilled in geometry?

Theae. Without doubt, Socrates.
So. And in astronomy and calculations and music and every subject of education?

Thea. I think so.

So. If then he says, either by way of praise or dispraise, that we are alike in some bodily feature, it is not very well worth while to attend to him?

Thea. Perhaps not.

So. But how, if he were to praise the soul of one or the other for virtue and wisdom? Would it not be worth while for the one who heard the praise to observe him who was praised, and for the other to exhibit himself with alacrity?

Thea. Quite so, Socrates.

[Socrates, after telling Theaetetus of the high praise given to him by Theodorus, and, questioning him about his studies, leads him to admit that the end to be gained by them is 'wisdom,' and that this is the same thing as 'knowledge.' He goes on to confess the difficulty he finds in defining what knowledge is, and invites the company to discuss the question. Theodorus declines for himself, pleading age and want of dialectic practice, but suggests that Theaetetus should be invited to carry on the discussion with Socrates.]

So. It is time, then, my dear Theaetetus, for you to exhibit and for me to observe. For I must tell you that, although Theodorus has often spoken to me with praise of many persons, both foreigners and citizens, he never gave such praise to anybody as he did to you just now.

Thea. I am glad to hear it, Socrates; but see to it, that he did not speak in jest.

2 Μουσικός. This word can either mean 'musical,' or 'literary.' The former is more probable here.
So. That is not the way of Theodorus. So do not retract your admissions on the plea that our friend here speaks in jest, lest he be compelled to add an affidavit. I am sure nobody will indict him for perjury. So stand to your confession boldly.

Theae. Yes, I must, if you think so.

So. Tell me now: you learn, I suppose, from Theodorus some lessons of geometry?

Theae. I do.

So. And of astronomy and harmony and calculations?

Theae. I use my best endeavour.

So. So do I, my boy, both from him and from all others whom I suppose to have any acquaintance with the subjects. Nevertheless, though I am in general pretty well versed in them, I have one little difficulty, which I must examine with your help and that of our friends here. Tell me, does not 'to learn' mean to become wiser in that which one learns?

Theae. Certainly.

So. And by wisdom it is, I suppose, that the wise are wise?

Theae. Yes.

So. Does this differ at all from knowledge?

Theae. Does what differ?

So. Wisdom. In things whereof we are knowing, are we not also wise?

Theae. Can it be otherwise?

So. Are then wisdom and knowledge the same thing?

Theae. Yes.

3 ¹ 'Επισκήψει. Heindorf rightly says: ἐπισκήπτειν h. l. est i. q. ἐγκαλεῖν ψευδομαρτυρῶν. The verb in this sense is usually middle; but Aeschines Tim. 142 has the active, ἢν οὐδὲ ψευδομαρτυρῶν ἔστω ἐπισκήψαι. See below 5; also Dict. Ant. (Martyria, 'Επισκήψει).
TRANSLATION.

So. Now here is precisely my difficulty, and I cannot adequately comprehend in my own mind what knowledge really is. Are we then able to define it? What say ye? Which of us will speak first? Whoever misses the mark on each trial, shall sit down, as boys playing at ball say, for donkey: and whoever goes through to the end without missing, shall be our king, and shall command us to answer anything he likes to ask. But perhaps, Theodorus, my love of discussion leads me to be rude in trying so hard to make us argue, and become friendly and chatty with one another.

Theo. No, Socrates, such a wish is the reverse of rudeness. But call on one of the youths to answer you. I am unaccustomed to this kind of debate, and too old to acquire the habit. It would suit our young friends, and they would get on much better: for it is a fact that in all things youth has the gift of progress. So, as you had Theaetetus in hand at first, do not let him go, but continue to question him.

[Theaetetus, having modestly consented to take his share of the argument, endeavours to define 'knowledge' by enumerating various sciences and arts which are specific kinds of it. Hereupon Socrates, by a series of elenctic questions in the dialectic manner, exposes the futility of all attempts to define, which contain the term itself proposed for definition.]

So. You hear then, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says; and you will not, I think, wish to disobey him. In such matters a wise man’s injunctions cannot be lawfully disobeyed by his junior. Speak then well and nobly. What do you think that knowledge is?

Theae. I must, Socrates, since you both require. No doubt, if I make any blunder, you will correct me.

2 Βασιλεύσει. See Hor. Epist. 1. 1, 59: puerci ludentes, Rex eris, aiunt, si recte facies.
So. Certainly, if we are able.

Theae. Well then, I think that all the things one can learn from Theodorus are knowledge; geometry for instance and the others which you enumerated just now: and again leather-dressing, and the trades of the other craftsmen, all and each, I consider nothing else than knowledge.

So. In a truly noble and bountiful style, my friend, when asked for one thing you give many, and various things instead of a simple one.

Theae. Why, what is the sense of your words, Socrates?

So. Perhaps none at all: however, I will explain what I mean. When you name leather-dressing, do you intend anything else than the knowledge of the manufacture of shoes?

Theae. Nothing else.

So. Or when you name carpentry, do you intend anything but the knowledge of the manufacture of wooden implements?

Theae. No, nothing.

So. In both cases then, you express that thing of which each is the knowledge?

Theae. Yes.

So. But the question put, Theaetetus, was not concerning the various subjects of knowledge, or their number. We did not ask with a wish to count them, but to know what the nature of knowledge itself is. Am I talking nonsense?

Theae. No, quite correctly.

So. Consider this also. Should some one ask us any trivial and obvious question, such as, what is clay? if we

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1 Σκυτώτομική and σκυτική, σκυτότομοι and σκυτείς are indifferently used for the shoe-trade.

2 Οὐδὲν (λέγω). Λέγεω οὐδὲν, to speak unreasonably (wrongly); λέγεω τι to speak reasonably (rightly).
said in reply, the clay of the potters, and the clay of the stove-makers, and the clay of the brickmakers, should we not deserve to be laughed at?

_Theae._ Probably.

_So._ In the first place because we thought the questioner would understand us from our answer, when we introduce the word 'clay,' whether we add that of the doll-makers, or of any other craftsmen. Does anybody, think you, understand any name of anything, when he does not know its correct meaning?

_Theae._ Not at all.

_So._ Then he who is ignorant of 'knowledge,' does not understand 'knowledge of shoes.'

_Theae._ He does not.

_So._ And he who is ignorant of knowledge does not understand leather-dressing or any other art?

_Theae._ True.

_So._ Then an answer made to the question—What is knowledge? is ridiculous, when a person gives in his reply the name of some art. For he names 'the knowledge of something,' when that was not the thing asked from him.

_Theae._ Apparently.

_So._ In the next place, when he might have answered easily and briefly, he goes an infinite way round. For instance, in the question about clay, it was easy and simple to say, that clay is moistened earth, and to abstain from adding whose it is.

_[Theaetetus now accepts the principle of definition laid down by Socrates, and illustrates it by citing certain mathematical terms adopted by himself and his fellow-student, young Socrates, to distinguish rational and irrational numbers. These terms are (a) τετράγωνος ἀριθμός, square number (4, 9, 16, 25...n²); (β) προμήκης ἀριθμός, oblong_
number (the rest exc. 1); (γ) μῆκος, length (all integral numbers after 1) which may be represented by straight lines, and used to form squares;  
(δ) ὄνταμας (irrational roots, $\sqrt{3}$, $\sqrt{5}$, $\sqrt{6}$ &c.) which are incommensurable with the unit of length (ποδῶα), but can become sides of figures commensurable in area with squares. Socrates applauds this invention, and exhorts Theaetetus to apply his mind in the same way to discover a definition of knowledge.]

Theae. Yes, Socrates; this method now indeed appears easy. You seem to be asking the same sort of question that occurred some time since to us in our discussions;—to myself I mean, and your namesake, Socrates here.

So. What was that, Theaetetus?

Theae. Theodorus was writing out for us something about "powers," proving, as to the "tripod" and the "pente- pod," that in length they are not commensurable with the foot-unit: and so proceeding one by one as far as seventeen: but here he somehow came to a pause. We then bethought us of such a notion as this: since the "powers" were evidently infinite in number, to try to comprise them under one term, by which we should entitle all these "powers."

So. Did you find any such term?

Theae. I think we did. Consider it yourself.

So. Speak on.

Theae. We divided number generally into two classes, one, that which is capable of being formed by the multiplication of equal factors into one another, we likened in form to the square, and called it square and equilateral.

So. Very good.

5 1 Τρίπως, as Heindorf says, is εἴθεια δύναμει τρίπως, i.e. $\sqrt{3}$, which is irrational (not commensurate with the foot-unit, not integral), but potentially rational (becoming so when squared: $\sqrt{3} \times \sqrt{3} = 3$). So πεντέπως and the rest. The use of δύναμις is therefore different from the modern mathematical term "power" ($x^2$, $x^3$...$x^n$).
Theae. All intervening numbers, to which belong 3 and 5 and every one that is incapable of being formed by the multiplication of equal factors, but is formed either by a larger number having a smaller—or by a smaller number having a larger—as its multiplier, we likened on the other hand to the oblong figure, which in every instance has greater and lesser sides, and called it oblong number².

So. Excellent. What next?

Theae. All lines which being squared form an equilateral plane figure we defined to be 'length'; all which form an oblong, we comprised under the name 'powers' (i.e. irrational roots), as not being commensurable with the others except through the surfaces which they have power to form³. And similarly with respect to the solids (cubes).

So. Nobody in the world could do better, my boys. So I do not think Theodorus will incur the guilt of perjury.

Theae. But as to your question about knowledge, Socrates, I could not answer it in the same way as that about length and power. Yet you seem to me to be looking for some such answer. So that now Theodorus again appears to be a false speaker.

So. Well, but if he had praised your running, and said he had never met with any young man so fleet, and then in

² This appears as a general expression in the form

\[ n \times \frac{1}{n} \left( = \frac{1}{n} \times n \right) = n + 1. \]

Example: \[ 2 \times 1\frac{1}{2} (= 1\frac{1}{2} \times 2) = 3. \] As \( n \) is any integer, this includes all numbers greater than unity, ῥετράγωνος as well as προμήχης ἄριθμος.

³ Τοίς δ’ ἐπιπέδοις ὄβνωσαί. Thus \( \sqrt{12} \) being 3.464 (nearly), \( \sqrt{12} \times \sqrt{12} = 12 = 2 \times 6 = 3 \times 4 = \) (geometrically represented) a rectangle with sides respectively either 2 and 6, or 3 and 4, or an imaginary square with side 3.464 (nearly).
a racing-match you had been defeated by one in the prime of life, and very fleet, do you think his praise would have been any the less true?

_Theae._ I do not.

_So._ And, as to knowledge, as I was saying a little while since, do you think it a small thing to discover its nature, and not one of the highest achievements?

_Theae._ Nay indeed, Socrates, I do place it among the very highest of all.

_So._ Then be at ease about yourself: and consider that Theodorus speaks truly, and shew desire in every way to obtain a right definition of knowledge, as of all other things.

_Theae._ As for desire, Socrates, it will not be found wanting.

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6 [Theaetetus, though he has not yet succeeded in finding a definition of knowledge, confesses a mental feeling that he is always on the verge of success. Socrates likens this feeling to the throes of impending childbirth in women: and reminding Theaetetus that he himself (Socrates) is the son of an excellent midwife, he claims the analogous function of assisting the labour of intellectual parturition in the minds of young men; and describes the obstetric art in many of its details, with a view to illustrate and justify his own method as an educator.]

_So._ Come then: you made a good suggestion just now. Imitate your answer about the 'powers'. As you comprised their vast number under one term, so also try to describe the many kinds of knowledge by a single definition.

_Theae._ I assure you, Socrates, I have often endeavoured to gain insight into that matter, while listening to the questions you put. But, though I cannot persuade myself that I have anything important of my own to say, or that I have heard from some one else any such statement as you require,
nevertheless I cannot rid myself of the feeling that I am on the point of doing so.\(^1\)

So. Oh! you are in the throes of labour, dear Theaetetus, through being not empty, but pregnant.

Theae. I do not know, Socrates. I tell you my feeling, at all events.

So. Have you not heard then, simpleton, that I am the son of a very famous and solid midwife, Phaenarete?

Theae. I have heard it before now.

So. Have you heard too that I practise the same art?

Theae. Never.

So. I do really. But don't tell of me to other people. I am not known, my friend, to have this skill. And others, being unaware, do not say this of me, but only that I am a very strange person, and that I perplex people. Have you heard this too?

Theae. I have.

So. Shall I tell you the reason?

Theae. Pray do.

So. Reflect then upon the general situation of midwives, and you will more easily learn what I mean. You know, I suppose, that none of them practise while they are still conceiving and bearing children, but those alone who are past child-bearing.

Theae. Certainly.

So. This custom is said to be derived from Artemis, for that she, though a virgin, has the charge of parturition. Accordingly, she did not indeed allow barren women to become midwives, because human nature is too weak to acquire an art of which it has no experience; but she assigned it to

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1 Meλλεω is undoubtedly the true reading, giving the cue to the parable of the midwives. Meλεω would fail to do this.
those who are past the age of childbearing, in honour of their resemblance to herself.

*Theae.* Naturally.

*So.* Is not this also natural, that those who conceive and those who do not are better known by midwives than by others?

*Theae.* Quite so.

*So.* Moreover also midwives, by giving drugs and chanting incantations, are able to excite the throes and to quell them, if they will, and to make those who have a hard time bring forth: and they produce abortion¹, if the case require it.

*Theae.* True.

*So.* Have you furthermore noted this in them, that they are also very clever match-makers, being well skilled to know what woman uniting with what man must bear the finest children?

*Theae.* I was not quite aware of that.

*So.* I assure you they pride themselves on this much more than on their special practice². Just consider. Do you think the care and collection of the fruits of the earth belongs to one art, and the knowledge of what soil you must plant or sow to another?

*Theae.* No, to the same.

*So.* And do you consider it different in the case of a woman?

*Theae.* Seemingly not.

*So.* No, truly. But on account of the unlawful and ¹ *Néov òv.* Prof. Campbell writes, 'Sc. τὸ βρέφος, said here of the embryo "at an early stage," i.e. before it is dangerous to do so.' But most commentators do not believe that *νλον* would be used of τὸ κύμα. Heindorf conjectures δίον for νλον òv. The words may be a gloss, and in translation no point is lost by neglecting them, as above.

² Gr. ὅμφαλητομία.
unscientific conciliation of man and woman, which is termed 'procuration,' midwives, being a respectable body, shun match-making, fearing lest by this they should incur the other charge. For it is only to genuine midwives, I suppose, that the art of correct match-making belongs.

Theae. Apparently so.

So. Thus highly important is the function of midwives; but less so than my procedure. For, it does not happen to women at one time to bear idols, at another true children, so that it shall not be easy to distinguish them. Had they been liable to this, the greatest and noblest task for midwives would have been to decide between the true child and the untrue. Do you not think so?

Theae. I do.

[The parable of the application of the obstetric art to the labours of the intellect is carried on and concluded.]

So. But my art of midwifery, though it has in other respects the same conditions as theirs, differs in these points, that I attend men, not women, and that I inspect the labour of their souls, not of their bodies. The most important skill in our art is, the being able to test in every way whether the young man's mind is bringing forth an idol and an unreality, or a genuine and true progeny. For to me as well as to the midwives belongs the following condition. I am incapable of producing wisdom, and the reproach which many ere now have cast on me, that, while I question others, I myself give no answer about anything, because I have no wisdom in me, is a just reproach. The reason of it is this: the god compels me to act the midwife, but hindered me from engendering. I then am not indeed perfectly wise myself, nor have I brought to birth any discovery of that
kind, as the outcome of my own soul. But of those who resort to me, some indeed appear in the outset utterly ignorant, but all, as the intercourse proceeds, and the god gives opportunity, make wonderful progress, in their own opinion and in that of others. And it is evident that they do so not by any learning they have gained from me, but because they have of themselves discovered many excellent things, which they retain. Of that midwifery however I and the god are authors. The proof is this. Many persons ere now, not knowing that fact, and imputing all to themselves while they despised me, quitted me earlier than they ought, either of their own will or by the persuasion of others. After this, they baulked all subsequent conceptions by evil intercourse, and lost by ill nurture the offspring which I had helped them to, valuing unrealities and idols more than truths; and ended by seeming to themselves, as to everybody else, mere blockheads. One of these, though there are many more, is Aristeides son of Lysimachus. When these truants come back and pray for admission to my society, and move heaven and earth to gain it, with some of them my familiar genius forbids me to consort, with others it allows me: and these

17 1 ἡ αὐτὸς ἡ ὑπ' ἄλλων πεισθέντες. The translation follows this conjecture; mss. omit the second ἡ, by the absence of which αὐτὸς becomes void of sense and propriety. Is it not possible that Plato wrote καὶ ἡ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ (μὲν) αἰτιασάμενοι ἐμὸν δὲ καταφρονήσαντες ἡ ὑπ' ἄλλων πεισθέντες κ.τ.λ. 'Many ere now, being ignorant of this, and either imputing all to themselves, while they contemned me, or persuaded by others &c. &c.? This would give a still better sense than the adopted reading, viz. Many forsook the teaching of Socrates: all did so in ignorance of his divinely given power (τούτῳ ἀγνοήσαντες); but some through self-conceit (ἡ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦς αἰτιασάμενοι), some through yielding to persuasion (ἡ ὑπ' ἄλλων πεισθέντες). Also the passage would be more perspicuous if ἑαυτοῦς μὲν were written.

2 Ἀριστείδης, a descendant of the great Aristeides.
latter improve again. And this affection also they that associate with me have in common with women in labour: they feel throes and are full of worry day and night much more than the women. And my art has the power to excite and allay that throe. So much then for them. And sometimes, Theaetetus, when any do not seem to me to be pregnant, perceiving that they do not need me, I very kindly make a match for them, and, with the blessing of heaven, I guess very aptly by whose conversation they will profit. Many I have made over to Prodicus, many to other wise and inspired men. I have spoken at this length to you because I suspect, in conformity with your own opinion, that you are suffering throes from some inward conception. Deal with me then as the son of a midwife, and a practitioner myself, and try to answer my questions as well as you are able. And if, on examining anything you say, I consider it an idol and not a true progeny, and so remove it quietly and put it away, don't be angry as women at their first lying in are about their infants. For many, my good friend, have felt towards me so that they are actually ready to bite me when I take from them any cherished trifle: and they imagine I am not acting kindly; so little are they aware that no god is unkind to men, and that I do nothing of this sort from ill will. But my sense of duty will in no wise allow me to accept falsehood and stifle truth.

[Theaetetus, again exhorted by Socrates, takes courage, and suggests as a defining term for knowledge αἰσθησις, perception (sensation, sensuous perception). Socrates at once identifies this definition with the famous doctrine of Protagoras, πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρώπος, 'man is

3 'Εξίδωκα Προδικυ. 'Εκδίδοναι (θυγατέρα) means 'to give a daughter in marriage.' Prodicus of Ceos was a famous Sophist, learned in history, mythology, and legend.
the measure of all things.' He goes on to argue that this implies 'what appears to each is true to each;' and after illustrating by an example he farther proceeds to connect this view with that of Heraclitus and his school (to whom he adds Homer) respecting a perpetual motion or flux of all things—πάντα ἔλε. This doctrine does not suffer a fixed term of being to be given to anything, such as 'one,' 'some,' 'of some quality,' 'great,' 'small,' 'heavy,' 'light,' &c. Nothing 'is' any of these, but by motion and commixture all things 'become' this or that. There is no 'being,' only 'coming to be.'

So now again, returning to the point, Theaetetus, endeavour to say what knowledge is: and never reply that you are unable: for if the god please and you play the man, you will be able.

Theae. Well, Socrates, when you thus exhort, I must own it were disgraceful not to use one's utmost endeavour to state what suggests itself to the mind. It seems to me then that he who knows anything perceives what he knows; and, in my present view, knowledge is nothing else than PERCEPTION.

So. Well and nobly said, my boy. It is quite proper to speak with such open frankness. But now let us examine the doctrine in common, to see whether it is a genuine product or a wind-egg. Knowledge, you say, is perception?

Theae. Yes.

So. I really think you have given an account of knowledge which is not insignificant, being one which Protagoras also gave. But he has said the same thing in a different way. He says, I fancy, that 'man' is the measure of all things.

1 Ἀϊθής. Sensation; perception; or rather, 'sensuous perception,' which must be understood when either of the two former terms is used in this translation.

2 Ἀνθρωπος, i.e. the human mind; the mind of each percipient.
things;’ of things existing, that they do exist; of non-existing things, that they do not exist. Have you perhaps read this?

Theae. Yes, I have read it often.

So. He speaks then to this effect, that such as things appear to me, they severally are to me; and such as they appear to you, they severally are to you. The term ‘man’ includes you and me.

Theae. He does speak so.

So. Yes; and it is probable that a wise man is not talking nonsense: so let us follow his track. Does it not sometimes happen that, when the same wind is blowing, one of us is cold, the other not; and one is slightly cold, the other exceedingly?

Theae. No doubt.

So. Shall we then in that case say the wind in itself\(^3\) is cold or not cold; or shall we assent to Protagoras that to one who feels it cold it is cold, to one who does not feel it, not?

Theae. The latter, I should say.

So. And this is apparent to each?

Theae. Yes.

So. And the term ‘is apparent’ implies ‘perceiving’?

Theae. It does.

So. Appearance then and perception concur in things warm and the like generally. For such as each perceives them, they probably are to each.

Theae. Yes.

So. Perception then is always of that which ‘is’; and it is unerring, since it is knowledge.

\(^3\) In itself. Codd. have \(\acute{e} \phi' \acute{e} \upsilon \rho'\), which Prof. Campbell supports by examples. Bekker reads \(\acute{e} \phi' \acute{e} \upsilon \rho' \omega\). But \(\acute{e} \phi' \acute{e} \upsilon \rho\omega\) is most usual in this sense.
Theae. Manifestly.

So. In the name of the Graces, then, was Protagoras a man of consummate shrewdness, and did he hint this darkly to us of the common herd, while to his disciples he spoke ‘the truth’ in secret confidence?  

Theae. What do you mean by this, Socrates?

So. I will state to you a doctrine of no slight importance: namely, that nothing in itself ‘is one,’ nor can you rightly call a thing ‘some’ or ‘of some kind,’ but, if you style it great, it will turn out also small, and if heavy, light, and so in every case; since nothing ‘is’ ‘one’ or ‘some,’ or ‘of some kind’: but from vection and motion and mixture with each other all things ‘come to be,’ of which we say that they ‘are,’ using a wrong term: for nothing at any time ‘is,’ but always ‘comes to be.’ And on this point let all philosophers except Parmenides⁴ be compared in their order, Protagoras and Heracleitus and Empedocles⁵: and of the poets those that are consummate in each poetic kind,

⁴ The work in which Protagoras expounded his doctrine was called Ἀλήθεια, Truth. To this circumstance Plato here alludes, but perhaps, as Prof. Campbell says, he means that Protagoras “told the real truth, not in his book which is so entitled, but privately to his disciples.”

⁵ Πλήρη Παρμενίδου. Parmenides, the greatest name to the Eleatic School and here made its representative (though Xenophanes before him, and Zeno after him, taught similar principles), held the doctrine directly opposed to the Heracleitean, namely, that the universe is one, continuous, stable: that only ‘being’ is; ‘non-being’ is not; there is no ‘becoming.’

⁶ Ἔμπεδοκλῆς. Prof. Campbell justly says that Plato introduced the words κράσεως πρὸς ἀληθέα in order to include Empedocles of Agrigentum, who, without accepting the doctrine of Heracleitus, that οὐδὲν ἐστι, πάντα γίνεται, denied the Eleatic unity, continuity and stability of substance, teaching that phenomenal changes are caused by the intermixture of four elements (fire, air, water, earth) which are themselves alone unchangeable.
in the comic, Epicharmus⁷, in the tragic, Homer⁸; for in saying
Ocean of gods progenitor and Tethys mother
he has said that all things are born from flux and motion. Does he not seem to say so?

Theae. I think he does.

[The Heracleitean doctrine (πάντα βεί) is further expounded and seemingly defended. But, as it is confuted afterwards (28), we must explain this defence as an instance of the Socratic elpóweλα.]

So. After this then, who that disputes with so great a host, and Homer its captain, can avoid making himself ridiculous?

Theae. It were not easy, Socrates.

So. No indeed, Theaetetus. Since our statement—that motion produces the semblant¹ 'being,' and the 'coming to be,' while 'non-being' and 'perishing' are produced by rest—has in its favour many competent proofs. The heat of fire, which engenders and protects other things, is itself engendered by vocation and attrition. And these are motions². Are not these the parents of fire?

⁷ Ἐπίχαρμος. Diogenes Laertius, iii. 10, quotes verses from Epicharmus, the comic poet of Syracuse (490 B.C.), which contain the doctrine of perpetual mutation.

⁸ Τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὀμηρος. Plato recognizes only two forms of poetry, viz. Comedy and Tragedy, including in the latter Epic poetry, and its great master Homer. See Rep. x. 495 d, ἐπισκεπτέων τὴν τε τραγῳδιαν καὶ τὸν ἡγέμονα αὐτῆς Ὀμηρον.

¹ Τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν. As he is professing to expound the Heracleitean theory, which does not admit τὸ εἶναι, he evasively says τὸ εἶναι δοκοῦν, 'the semblant being.'

² Τοῦτω δὲ κυήσεις. This is the reading in most codd., for which
They are.

Moreover the race of animals is produced from them?

To be sure.

Again: is not the habit of bodies ruined by rest and laziness, and preserved in general by exercise and motion?

Yes.

And does not the habit of the soul by learning and study, which are motions, acquire doctrines and preserve them and become better, while through rest, which is the absence of study and learning, it both learns nothing, and forgets what it has learnt?

Decidedly.

The one then, namely motion, is a good both in soul and body, the other is the reverse.

Seemingly.

Must I farther mention to you calms and serenities and such-like things, showing that quietudes rot and destroy, while their opposites preserve? and besides these must I clinch the matter, and evince that by the golden cord Homer means nothing but the sun, and indicates that, as long as the revolution continues, and the sun keeps moving,
all things in heaven and earth exist and are preserved; but should this stand still as if fettered, all things would be spoilt, and, as the saying is, turned upside down?

Theae. In my judgment, Socrates, he does indicate what you say.

[The relativity of the facts of sensation is illustrated by the phenomena of colour, number and size. What you call colour has no definite place or existence within or without you. It is the result of a passing collision between your eyes and the flux of things suited to act on them. It is neither in the agent nor in the patient, but generated in passage between them. It will not be the same to two subjects nor to the same subject at different times. The object measured or touched cannot be in itself great, white, hot or anything else; if it were, it would not appear different to another subject. The subject touching or measuring cannot be any of these, for, if so, it would be so always, and would not be modified by application to another object. Socrates illustrates by six dice, which, as compared with four, are more, and half as many again (i.e. 3:2), but fewer and half compared with twelve (i.e. 1:2). Can then anything become more without being increased; or fewer without being diminished? Theaetetus is puzzled; and Socrates merrily suggests that they are amusing themselves with mere quibbles, like Megarian disputants.]

So. Conceive the matter in this way, my good friend. As to vision first: that what you call white colour is not in itself something outside your eyes or in your eyes. And do not assign to it any place: for then, being somewhere in position, it would ‘be’ and remain, and would not by generation ‘come to be.’

Theae. How so?

So. Let us follow the doctrine we were lately stating, that nothing exists as an independent unit; and in that way we shall see that black and white and every other colour have ‘come to be’ from the coincidence of the eyes with the suitable motion; and that what in each case we call
colour, is neither that which makes nor that which receives the impact, but something between, which is peculiar to each. Or would you insist that what each colour appears to you, such it appears also to a dog or any other animal?

Theae. No indeed, I would not.

So. Again: does anything appear to another man like what it appears to you? Are you strongly convinced it does, or are you much rather sure that even to yourself it is not the same, because at no two times are you exactly the same?

Theae. The latter seems to me truer than the former.

So. Accordingly, if a thing beside which we measure ourselves, or which we handle, were large or white or hot, it would never have become different by contact with some other, unless it underwent a change in itself. And if again the measuring or handling subject had been any of these, it would not have become different when another approached or suffered any affection, if there were no affection in itself. For now, my friend, we are compelled in a careless sort of way to say marvellous and ridiculous things, as Protagoras would affirm, and every one who ventures to propound the same that he does.

Theae. How do you mean? and what kind of things?

So. Take a small sample, and you will know what I mean. Six dice, if you place four beside them, we say are more in number and half as many again. If you bring twelve, we say the six are fewer in number, and half the second set. To say otherwise were intolerable. Will you tolerate it?

Theae. No, I will not.

So. Well: suppose Protagoras or some one else were to ask you:—Theaetetus, is it possible for anything to
become greater or more, except by being increased? What answer would you give?

Theae. If I were to answer what I think in reply to your present question, Socrates, I should say 'no': but if with reference to the former one, to avoid self-contradiction, I should say 'yes.'

So. Well said, my friend, by Hera, and divinely. But if you answer 'yes,' something will occur like the case in Euripides: our tongue will be unconvicted, but our mind not unconvicted.

Theae. True.

So. So then, if you and I were clever and wise folk who had intimately studied the whole sphere of mind, and from that time forth amused ourselves with trying one another's powers, we should have engaged in a sophistical conflict of this kind, and be bandying arguments with each other. But now, as we are not professors, we shall wish to look at the statements comparatively, and see what it is we mean; whether they are consistent with each other or inconsistent.

Theae. Certainly that is what I should wish.

[The contradictions and difficulties implied in these statements are now set forth. It cannot possibly be true that anything becomes greater or less while it is equal to itself, or is increased without addition or diminished without subtraction, or that it is what it was not before without having 'come to be.' And yet the case of the six dice, and the case of an old man who was taller than a growing youth and in the course of one year is shorter without having 'come to be' different, seem to clash with these indubitable propositions. What are we to

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1 Ἐυριπίδειον τι. See Hippol. 612, ἢ γλῶσσ' ὁμώμοι' ἢ δὲ φημ' ἀνώμορος.

2 In this passage Plato censures the pseudo-dialectic (eristic) practice of certain sophistic teachers as idle waste of time.
say? Theaetetus wonders till he feels dizzy. Wonder, says Socrates, is a philosophic affection, and I will try to enlighten you by a fuller exposition of the Heracleitean doctrine."

So. So should I. But, since this is the case, shall we not calmly, as we have plenty of leisure, re-examine (not losing our temper, but really probing ourselves) what these fancies in us are? Looking at the first of them, we shall say, I think, that nothing ever becomes greater or less either in bulk or number, so long as it is equal to itself. Is it not thus?

Theae. Yes.

So. Secondly, that what suffers neither addition nor subtraction, is never either increased or wasted, but is always equal to itself.

Theae. Unquestionably.

So. Is not this also a third proposition, that what was not before, cannot afterwards be without 'having come to be' and 'coming to be'?

Theae. So it seems.

So. These three admissions, I think, severally clash with each other in our soul, when we say what was said about the dice, or when we say that I, being of the age I am, without having suffered increase or decrease, within the space of a year begin by being bigger than you, who are young, and afterwards become less,—when nothing has been withdrawn from my size, but yours has increased. For thus 'I am' afterwards what before I was not, without having 'come to be' so. Now without 'coming to be' it is impossible 'to have come to be,' and without losing any size I could never 'come to be' smaller. And other like instances there are, myriads upon myriads, if we choose to admit these. I suppose you follow me, Theaetetus: at all events you seem to me not inexperienced in such matters.
TRANSLATION.

Theae. I do, Socrates; and by all the gods I wonder immensely what these things are, and really sometimes I feel dizzy when I look at them.

So. Ay, my friend; evidently Theodorus forms no bad estimate of your genius. This affection, I mean of wondering, is quite that of a philosopher; for philosophy has no other origin but this; and he who said that Iris is the child of giant Wonder seems to be no bad genealogist. But do you by this time understand why these things result from the statements we ascribe to Protagoras?

Theae. Not yet, I think.

So. You will be thankful to me then, if, when a notable man, or rather when notable men have truth hidden away in the mind, I help you to search it out from them.

Theae. Thankful indeed I must be in the highest degree.

[The doctrine of Heracleitus is now set forth in its complication with the doctrine imputed to Protagoras. Agent and Patient engender all things by motion: and there is no absolute Ens. Socrates asks if Theaetetus is so far content with the product of his intellectual labour. His answer is indecisive: and Socrates prepares him for a new dialectic discussion.]

So. Look about then, and see that none of the uninitiated are listening. These are men who think that nothing 'is' but what they are able to grasp with their hands, not accepting actions and generations and all that is invisible as in the category of being.

Theae. Upon my word, Socrates, stubborn and refractory people are these you tell of.

So. They are indeed, my boy, a fine set of boors.\(^1\)

\(^1\) A fine set of boors, μᾶλ' εὖ ἄρουσθοι. In these days they would be called 'Philistines,' a term derived from German Universities.
Others there are much more refined, whose mysteries I am going to describe to you. Their principle is, and upon it all we were just now saying depends—that the whole universe is motion, and nothing else but this, and of motions two kinds, each in number infinite, but, in respect of power, the one involving action, the other suffering. From the association and attrition of these with each other are formed products in number infinite, but of two sorts, one perceptible, the other perception, which continually breaks forth and is born with the perceptible objects. Perceptions, we find, have the following names: sight, hearing, smell, feelings of cold and heat, pleasure and pain and desire and fear and others: infinite are those without names; and those with names very numerous. And the objects of perception again are born with each of these, colours of all kinds with all kinds of vision, sounds with hearing similarly, and with the other perceptions other objects of perception are con-nate and ‘come to be.’ What meaning has this tale for us, Theaetetus, in reference to the former questions? do you perceive?

Theae. No, Socrates.

So. See then if it can be brought to its closing point. It means that all these things, as we say, are in motion, and in their motion are found swiftness and slowness. That which is slow has its motion in the same place and in reference to things near, and so engenders: and the things thus engendered [are slower. But that which is swift has its motion in reference to things at a distance, and so engenders, and the things thus engendered]² are swifter, for they

² The words in brackets are not found in codd., but introduced by Stephens from the Eclogae of Cornarius. Bekker is so convinced of their being Plato’s, that he prints them without bracketing. And Heindorf maintains them. But Professors Jowett and Campbell reject
are conveyed, and their motion naturally consists in vection. When then the eye and any other of its suitable objects approach and beget whiteness and its kindred perception, which could never have 'come to be' if either of them had gone to something else, then, while the sight on the part of the eyes and the whiteness on the part of that which co-engenders the colour are moving in mid space, the eye becomes full of sight, and at length sees and 'comes to be,' nowise sight, but a seeing eye, and that which co-engendered the colour is filled full with whiteness, and 'comes to be' not whiteness but a white thing, whether it be wood or stone or anything else that happens to have been coloured with this hue. And other things similarly, hard and warm and all the rest, we must understand in the same manner 'to be' nothing by themselves, as we heretofore said, but in their mutual intercourse 'to become' all and of all kinds from motion: since of agent and patient, as they affirm, taken apart (ἐπὶ ἐνός) it is impossible to form any definite them, holding that τὰ βραδύτερα mean τὸ ποιῶν and τὸ πάσχου, and τὰ θάσσω the αἰσθήσεις and αἰσθητὰ engendered by them. I have been unable to convince myself that this latter view is right. The words πρὸς τὰ πλησιάζοντα τὴν κίνησιν ἵσχει seem intended to describe the organs of touch and taste, as distinguished from those of sight and hearing, which can be employed on distant objects. It may be replied that the example given is that of sight and its object, and the latter is spoken of as πλησιάσαν to the eye: which may seem to prove that anything on which τὸ ποιῶν can act may be said πλησιάζειν αὐτῷ, whether more or less distant. Weighty as this reply is, it does not remove my difficulty; for I am unable to discern the use of discriminating between agent-patient and their products as to slowness and swiftness. The act of generation between the eye and a very distant object must surely have been regarded by Plato (whatever later mathematicians may say of it) as a swift act. I admit however that the question at issue is difficult and doubtful: but it does not embarrass Plato's general meaning here. See note at the close of the Translation.
notion: for nothing is an agent till it concurs with a patient, nor a patient till it concurs with an agent: and that which concurs with one thing and is an agent, if it lights upon another, proves to be a patient, so that, as we before said, nothing is ‘one by itself,’ but always ‘comes to be’ to some other; and the term ‘being’ must be removed on all sides, although we are often, even in our present discussion, compelled to use it from habit and ignorance. But it is not proper, as the wise lay down, to allow the use of the word ‘some,’ or ‘of some’ or ‘me’ or ‘this’ or ‘that’ or any other term which ‘fixes,’ but in accordance with nature to speak of things as ‘coming to be’ and ‘being created’ and ‘perishing’ and ‘taking new forms.’ Since if any one fixes anything in speech, he who does so is easily confuted. And we ought to speak in this way both of individuals and of many in the aggregate, by which aggregation we determine ‘man’ and ‘stone’ and each class of animals. Do these views seem pleasant to you, Theaetetus, and will you find a taste of them agreeable?

Theae. I don’t know, Socrates; for about you too I cannot discern, whether you are speaking these as your own opinions, or trying me.

So. Do you not remember, my friend, that I indeed neither know nor adopt any of such things as mine? but I am barren, and act as midwife to you, and on that account I charm, and offer you, to be tasted, wise things of various sorts, until I can help to bring to light your opinion; and when it is brought forth, then and not before I will examine if it shall prove a wind-egg or a genuine offspring. So then with courage and patience answer well and manfully whatsoever appears to you to be right concerning my several questions.

Theae. Ask then.
[Arguments against the Protagorean doctrine from dreams, fevers and madness are suggested and answered. Persons so affected perceive different things from those perceived when they are awake and in health. Are these contradictory perceptions in each case equally true to the percipient?]

So. Say then again, whether you are satisfied that nothing should 'be,' but ever 'come to be,' good and noble and all things which we were lately recounting.

Theae. Yes; since I have heard this recital of yours, it appears to me marvellously clear that it is reasonable, and that we must accept the principles as you have stated them.

So. Let us then not abandon what remains of our question. There remains the topic of dreams and diseases, madness especially, and all that is called mis-hearing or mis-seeing or any other wrong perception. For you know, I suppose, that in all these cases the principle we lately explained seems by admission to be confuted, since undoubtedly false perceptions occur to us in them, and things that appear to each are far from 'being,' but, quite contrariwise, none of the things that appear 'are.'

Theae. You speak most truly, Socrates.

So. What reason then is left, my boy, to him who lays down that 'perception is knowledge,' and that things which appear to each 'are' in every such case?

Theae. For my own part, Socrates, I shrink from answering that I have nothing to urge, because just now you rebuked me for saying so. Yet in very truth I cannot contend that maniacs or dreamers do not imagine falsities, when some of them think they are gods, and others suppose they are fowls, and imagine they are flying in their sleep.

So. Have you not in mind then a certain difficulty raised about them, especially as to the sleeping and waking vision?

K. P.
Thea. What difficulty?

So. A question which I think you have often heard people ask, what proof one would have to give, if somebody were to ask at this moment, whether we are sleeping and dreaming all that we imagine, or are awake and talking to one another in that state.

Thea. Indeed, Socrates, it is a perplexing thing to say by what proof we could establish it: for all the facts succeed one another as counterparts. Even the whole discussion we have now held there is nothing to prevent our seeming to have held in a dream. And when in a dream we seem to be relating dreams, the similarity between the cases is marvellous.

So. You see then that it is not difficult to raise a question, since it can be questioned even whether we are waking or dreaming. And as the time during which we are asleep is equal to that in which we are awake, our soul in each state contends that the fancies which from time to time occur are true, so that for half the time we say that the one are existent, for half the other, and we are equally confident in regard to each.

Thea. Yes, unquestionably.

So. And is not the same true of diseases and madness, except that the times are not equal?

Thea. Yes.

So. Well, shall truth be determined by length or shortness of time?

Thea. That were ridiculous on many grounds.

So. Have you then any other clear sign to show which of these fancies are true?

Thea. I think not.
The answer is, that a percipient is not the same subject in each of two different states: and if either of the two factors (τὰ γενώματα) is changed, the result (τὸ γενώμενον) is changed. Grote says that the cardinal principle set forth exhibits itself in a perpetual series of definite manifestations. To say that I the subject perceive is to say that I perceive some object: to perceive, and perceive nothing, is a contradiction. Again, if an object be sweet, it must be sweet to some percipient subject: sweet, but sweet to no one, is an impossibility. Necessity binds the percipient to a thing perceived. Every term applied to one implies some reference to the other: no name can be truly predicated of the one which implies ‘being’ or ‘coming to be’ apart from the other.

So. Hear then from me what they will say on this point, who lay it down that what from time to time ‘seems,’ ‘is’ true for him who so beholds it. Their opinion, I think, is expressed by this question: ‘O Theaetetus, of two things which are totally different, can the one and the other have any identical powers?’ We must not assume that the things in question are in one respect the same, in another different, but that they are wholly different.

Theae. It is impossible that they should have anything the same, either in power or in aught else, when they are wholly different.

So. Must we not also perforce confess the two things to be unlike?

Theae. I think so.

So. If, then, anything happens ‘to become’ like, either to itself or to another, shall we say that when made like it ‘becomes’ the same; when it gets unlike, different?

Theae. Necessarily.

So. Were we not previously saying that agents are many and infinite, and patients likewise?

Theae. Yes.
So. And also that a thing combining first with one, then with another, will not produce the same things, but different?

Theae. Certainly.

So. Let us now specify myself, or you, or anything else, in the same relations. Say Socrates in health and Socrates out of health. Shall we say the latter is like the former, or unlike?

Theae. Socrates out of health, you say; do you compare this as a whole with the former as a whole, with Socrates in health?

So. Very well put: that is my meaning.

Theae. Unlike, of course.

So. And different, as being unlike?

Theae. Necessarily.

So. And you will say the same of Socrates sleeping, and in all the states we cited?

Theae. I would.

So. And will not each of the things which have an active nature, when they find Socrates in health, deal with me as one thing; when out of health, as a different one?

Theae. They must.

So. And I, the patient, and that agent, will in each case produce different things?

Theae. To be sure.

So. When I drink wine in health, does it appear to me agreeable and sweet?

Theae. Yes.

So. True; for, by our admissions, the agent and the patient produced sweetness and perception, both of them in motion together; and perception on the side of the patient made the tongue percipient, and sweetness on the
part of the wine, moving about it, made the wine to be and to appear sweet to the healthy tongue.

Theae. Such certainly were our previous admissions.

So. But when it finds me out of health, does it not in the first place find one who is not the same? It comes to an unlike object.

Theae. Yes.

So. Such a Socrates, then, and the draught of wine, produce different things; in regard to the tongue a perception of bitterness, in regard to the wine a bitterness beginning to be and moving; and the wine it makes not bitterness, but bitter, and me not perception, but one that perceives.

Theae. Assuredly.

So. I then shall never become percipient of anything else in the same way; for perception of another is another thing, and makes the percipient different and another; nor will that which acts on me, if it concur with another, ever engender the same and become similar: for from another it will engender another and become different.

Theae. That is true.

So. I then shall never become similar to my former self; nor will the object become similar to its former self.

Theae. No, surely not.

So. When I perceive, I must needs become percipient of something: for to become percipient, yet percipient of nothing, is impossible; and the object, when it becomes sweet or bitter, or anything of the kind, must become so to some one: for to become sweet, yet sweet to no one, is impossible.

Theae. Assuredly.

So. Then, I think, the inference remains, that to each other we 'are,' if we are, or we 'come to be,' if we come
to be: since necessity binds our essence indeed, but binds it to nothing else, nor yet to ourselves individually; it remains then that we are bound to one another. So that if a person says that anything 'is' or 'becomes,' he must say that it 'is' or 'becomes' 'to something,' or 'of something,' or 'in relation to something'; but, if we have come to a right conclusion, he must not say or allow of anyone else saying, that anything 'is' or 'comes to be' absolutely.

_Theae._ Undoubtedly, Socrates.

_So._ And so, when that which acts on me is to myself and not to another, I perceive it, and no one else does.

_Theae._ Certainly.

_So._ Then my perception is true to me: for it belongs always to my being; and, according to Protagoras, I am judge of things which are to me, that they are, and of things which are not, that they are not.

_Theae._ So it seems.

15 [Having thus by a series of plausible arguments brought to birth the suggestion of Theaetetus, that knowledge is sensuous perception, Socrates asks if he can bear to learn that the bantling after all is not worth rearing. Theodorus interferes, and pledges himself for the tolerant temper of his pupil. He is reminded that Socrates only professes to draw out the thoughts of those who converse with him.]

_So._ How then, being infallible and unerring in mind as regards things which 'are' and 'come to be,' can I be unknowing of things whereof I am percipient?

_Theae._ In no sort of way.

_So._ Therefore you have said very well that knowledge

1 _Aἰσθητικός_, a novel word, but here pretty certainly the true one.
TRANSLATION.

is nothing else than perception; and it turns out to be one and the same thing, that (as Homer and Heracleitus, and their whole tribe, affirm) all things move like streams, and that (after the opinion of the consummately wise Protagoras) man is the measure of all things, and that (as Theaetetus infers from these premises) perception is proved to be knowledge. Is it so, Theaetetus? Must we say, that this, as it were, is your newborn child, and the product of my midwifery? What say you?

Thea. It must be so, Socrates.

So. This then, seemingly, we have with much difficulty brought to birth, whatever it prove to be. And now, after its birth, we must, in good sooth, run round the hearth with it in our discourse, not failing to observe whether the child be worth nurture, and not a wind-egg and an unreality. Or do you deem it absolutely necessary to rear your offspring, and not to put it away? Can you bear to see it confuted, and not be greatly out of temper if some one should filch from you your firstborn?

Theo. Theaetetus will bear it, Socrates. He is not the least ill-tempered. But in heaven's name tell me, is not this then true?

So. You are a very gourmand of discussion, Theodorus, and a good creature, in that you take me to be a sack of arguments, and think I can pull out another, and aver that what we have said is untrue. But you do not note what is taking place: that none of the arguments proceed from myself, but from him who is conversing with me at the time; and that I know nothing more than this little feat, how to obtain an argument from another wise person and to treat

2 The fifth day after a child's birth the festival was called Αμφιδώρα, when the babe was carried round the ἔστια and received its name.
it fairly. And I will now try to obtain one from our friend, and not to say something of my own.

Theo. You put the thing well, Socrates: so be it.

13 [Socrates now assails the doctrine of Protagoras. If man is a measure, why not an ape or a frog? If his own sensation is true to every man, what makes Protagoras superlatively wise? or what is the good of arguing on any subject? Theodorus, who was challenged as a friend of Protagoras, declines to take up his defence, and refers Socrates back to Theaetetus.]

So. Do you know then, Theodorus, what surprises me in your friend Protagoras?

Theo. What is that?

So. I am much pleased with everything else he has said, how what ‘seems’ to each ‘is’ to each. But the commencement of his treatise does surprise me. I wonder that in the outset of his ‘Truth’ he did not say that a pig, or a dog-faced baboon, or any other more monstrous specimen of things that have perception, is the measure of all things, that so he might have spoken to us at once in a magnificent and very disdainful style, ostentatiously shewing that, while we were marvelling at his wisdom, as if he were a god, he was all the while not a whit superior in judgment to a tadpole, not to say, to any of his fellow-men. Or how are we to put the case, Theodorus? For if that opinion shall be true to each man which he gets by perception, and nobody’s affection shall be better determined by another person, nor one be more entitled than another to review opinion, and to say whether it be true or false, but, as has been often said, each person singly shall form his own opinions, and all these shall be right and true—why in the world, my friend, is Protagoras so wise as to be justly deemed a worthy teacher with high fees, and we dunces in
comparison, who must go to school to him, though each of us is the measure of his own wisdom? Must we not say that Protagoras speaks thus to amuse the vulgar? while as to my case, and that of my art of midwifery, I forbear to say what ridicule we incur: so indeed does the whole practice of dialectic. For, as to reviewing and criticising each other's fancies and opinions, when each man's are right, is it not a tedious and monstrous folly, if the 'Truth' of Protagoras is true, and he did not proclaim it in jest from the shrine of his book?

Theo. He was my friend, Socrates, as you said just now. I cannot therefore allow Protagoras to be confuted by my admissions, nor yet resist you contrary to my opinion. So take in hand Theaetetus again. For certainly he appeared some time back to follow your lead very prettily.

So. If you went to the wrestling-courts at Lacedaemon, Theodorus, and there beheld naked people, some your inferiors, would you refuse to strip yourself beside them, and exhibit your own form competitively?

Theo. Why do you think I would not refuse, Socrates, with their permission and consent? So now I shall try to persuade you to let me look on, rather than be dragged to the play-ground in my present stiff condition, and to wrestle it out yourself with one who is younger and more supple.

[Socrates asks Theaetetus if his faith in the Protagorean doctrine is shaken by what has been said. When he admits that it is, he is rallied by Socrates for his facility, and recalled to the question, 'Knowledge is sensation.' Are we to say we know the barbarian tongues because we hear them spoken, or letters because we see them? Theaetetus replies that we know them in some respects, not in others.

So. If such is your will, Theodorus, I don't say 'nill,' as proverbialists have it. So I must turn again to the wise
Theaetetus. Tell me then, Theaetetus, first of all, as to our late discussions; do you not share my surprise if thus all of a sudden you shall turn out to be no wise inferior in wisdom to any man or even any god? Or do you suppose that the 'measure' of Protagoras is less applicable to gods than to men?

Theaetetus. Upon my word I do not. And as to your question, I am much surprised. For when we were engaged in showing how that which 'seemed' to each 'was' also to him who thought it, the statement appeared to me very good; but now another view has taken its place all of a sudden.

So. You are young, my dear boy: you quickly succumb to popular declamation, and become a convert. For Protagoras, or some one on his part, will say in reply: My fine gentlemen, young and old, ye sit together and declaim, bringing gods into question, whom I, after speaking and writing about them, as to their existence or non-existence, set aside: and you say just what the populace would hear with approval, that it is too bad for mankind not to differ in wisdom from every kind of beast: but you offer no convincing proof whatever; you resort to probability, which if Theodorus or any other geometrician sought to use in geometry, he would be good for nothing. Just consider then, you and Theodorus, if on such important subjects you will accept arguments relying on mere persuasion and probability.

Theaetetus. No, Socrates, we should not any more than yourself affirm that to be just.

So. We must view it then in some other way, as you and Theodorus suggest.

Theaetetus. In some other way certainly.

So. In this way then let us consider it: whether know-
ledge and perception are the same or different. For to this point, I ween, our whole argument tended; and for this purpose we stirred all these many strange questions. Did we not?

_Theae._ Assuredly.

_So._ Shall we then admit that all the things which we perceive by sight and hearing we at the same time know? For instance, before we have learnt the language of the barbarians, shall we say that we do not hear them when they speak, or that we both hear and understand what they say? And again, if we do not know letters, shall we, when we look at them, say we do not see them, or shall we insist that we know, since we see them?

_Theae._ So much of them, Socrates, as we see and hear, we shall say we know; we shall say we both see and know the figure and the colour, and that we both hear and know the sharp and flat sound: but what grammarians and interpreters teach concerning them we shall say we neither perceive by sight and hearing, nor know.

_So._ Excellent, Theaetetus. And it is not worth while to dispute these positions of yours, that you may grow.

_[Socrates now brings an argument against the Protagorean doctrine which he afterwards acknowledges to be captious and eristic. He says that Theodorus ought to champion the cause of his friend's children, as their guardian. Theodorus naively says that Callias holds that office, not himself.]_

But look at this other question also which approaches, and consider how we shall repel it.

17 _All who spoke another language than Greek were by the Hellenes called βάρβαροι. Hence Prof. Jowett renders this word in English, 'foreigners.'_
Theaetetus. What is that?

So. This. If any one shall ask—'Suppose a man has become cognisant of anything, is it possible that, having and preserving memory of this thing, at the time when he remembers he should not know the very thing which he remembers?' But I am verbose, apparently, when I wish to ask if a man remembering anything he has learnt does not know it.

Theaetetus. How could that be, Socrates? The thing you suggest would be a miracle.

So. Perhaps then I am trifling: but consider. Do you not call seeing perceiving, and sight perception?

Theaetetus. I do.

So. Has not then one who has seen something become cognisant of the thing he saw according to your last statement?

Theaetetus. Yes.

So. Well: do you not grant there is such a thing as memory?

Theaetetus. Yes.

So. Memory of something or of nothing?

Theaetetus. Of something, certainly.

So. Of what one has learnt then, and of what one has perceived; of such things, is it not?

Theaetetus. Undoubtedly.

So. What a man has seen, he remembers at times, I suppose?

Theaetetus. He does.

So. Even when he has shut his eyes? or on doing so has he forgotten?

Theaetetus. It were monstrous to suppose that, Socrates.

So. We must, I can tell you, if we are to maintain our former argument. If not, there is an end of it.
Theae. I really suspect so myself; but I cannot quite make up my mind. Tell me how.

So. In this way. One who sees becomes, we say, cognisant of what he sees. For sight and perception and knowledge are admitted to be the same.

Theae. Quite so.

So. And he who saw and became cognisant of what he saw, if he shuts his eyes, remembers, but does not see the thing. Is it so?

Theae. Yes.

So. And not seeing means not knowing, if seeing means knowing.

Theae. True.

So. The inference then is, that, while a man remembers something of which he has become cognisant, yet, since he does not see, he does not know it: and this we said would be a miracle.

Theae. All quite true.

So. If then anybody says that knowledge and perception are the same, there results an evident impossibility.

Theae. So it seems.

So. Therefore we must distinguish one from the other.

Theae. I suppose so.

So. What then will knowledge be? We must begin our statement over again, it seems. Yet what are we going to do, Theaetetus?

Theae. About what?

So. We seem to me, like an ignoble cock, to hop away from the argument and crow, before we have gained the victory.

Theae. How so?

So. Like rhetorical disputants we seem to be content that we have come to a mutual agreement as to the admitted
uses of words, and by some such method mastered the ques-
tion. And though we say we are not Eristics but philoso-
phers, we unconsciously imitate the practice of those clever
fellows.

Theaet. I do not yet understand your meaning.

So. Well then, I will try to explain my view of the
matter. We were asking whether a man who has learnt and
remembers something does not know it; and taking the case
of one who had seen, and after shutting his eyes remembered
though he did not see, we shewed that he did not know at
the same time that he remembered; and this, we said, was
impossible. And so the Protagorean fable came to ruin,
and yours with it, as to knowledge and perception being the
same.

Theae. Apparently.

So. But it would not, my friend, if the father of the
former fable had been alive. He would have made a strong
defence for it: but now that it is an orphan, we insult it.
For even those trustees, whom Protagoras appointed, one of
whom was Theodorus here, do not come to the rescue.
Well, in the interest of justice, I will run the risk of helping
him myself.

Theo. No, Socrates, I was not his children's trustee,
but rather Callias son of Hipponicus. I diverged some-
what earlier from abstract studies to geometry. But we
shall be much obliged to you if you will succour him.

So. Well said, Theodorus. Have an eye then to my
succour. For a man would have to make stranger admis-
sions than we lately made, if he did not attend to the terms
in which we are generally wont to affirm and deny. Shall I
explain how to you or to Theaetetus?

Theo. To the company generally, but let the younger
one answer. For he will incur less disgrace by defeat.
So. I put now the most startling question. To this effect, I think. Is it possible for the same man knowing a thing not to know what he knows?

Theo. What answer shall we give, Theaetetus?

Thea. Impossible, in my opinion.

So. Not if you lay it down that seeing is knowing. For how will you deal with that inevitable question, when, as they say, you are caught in a well, and an unabashed man claps his hand to one of your eyes and asks, whether with the closed eye you see your cloak.

Theae. Not with that one, I suppose I shall say, but with the other.

So. Then you see and do not see the same thing at the same time?

Theae. In a sort of way.

So. I do not, he will say, define anything, nor did I ask how, but only whether you know that which you do not know. And now you are shown to see what you do not see; and you have admitted that seeing is knowing and not seeing not knowing. Consider the inference from these premises.

Theae. I consider that it directly contradicts my former assertion.

So. Probably, my fine gentleman, you would have had more such experiences, if somebody had further asked you whether it is possible to know keenly or to know bluntly, and to know near and not at a distance, and to know the same thing intensely or moderately, and other questions, countless in number, which a light-armed mercenary ambushed in the arguments might have asked, when you laid
it down that knowledge and perception are the same; and attacking your senses of hearing and smelling and the like he might have worried you with incessant confutation, until, admiring his accursed wisdom, you were entangled by him so far, that after mastering and binding you tight he might then have ransomed you for what sum you and he agreed on. Now what argument, perhaps you may say, will Protagoras advance in aid of his doctrine? Must we not try to state it?

Theae. Certainly we must.

20 [Socrates, having obtained from Theaetetus an admission that Protagoras ought to be heard in his own defence, undertakes to plead his cause, and does so in the assumed person of Protagoras himself.]

So. Besides all this that we urge in his defence, he will also, methinks, come to close quarters, contemning us, and saying: Here's this good creature Socrates, who—when a lad got frightened on being asked whether it is possible for the same person at once to remember some particular thing and not know it, and in his fright said 'no,' because he could not see before him,—made a laughing-stock of me in the course of his arguments. But the fact, my easy-going Socrates, stands thus: when you examine any of my doctrines by the method of interrogation, if the person questioned give such answers as I should, and be defeated, I am confuted; but if they differ from mine, then the person questioned is confuted. For instance, if mutual word-catchings is the thing to guard against, do you think anybody will concede to you that the memory of a past feeling is anything like what the feeling itself was at the time when it was experienced? Far from it. Or again, that he will shrink from admitting that it is possible for
the same person to know and not to know the same thing? Or, if he dread this—that he will grant an altered person to be the same he was before he was altered? Or rather—that anybody can be called 'one' and not 'many'—infinitely multiplied, if alteration goes on. But, O my good sir, he will say, encounter my main doctrine more generously, if you can, and prove against it that individual perceptions do not 'come-to-be' to each of us, or that, supposing they do, it does not follow that the appearance will 'come-to-be' (or 'be,' if that is the proper term) to that person alone, unto whom it appears. When you talk of swine and dog-headed baboons, you are not merely swinish yourself, but you likewise induce your hearers to act as such towards my treatises without any decency. For I say that the Truth is as I have written: that each of us is a measure of things that are and are not: but that, nevertheless, one man differs vastly from another in this very respect, that to one man some things are and appear, to another other things. And I am far from denying that wisdom and a wise man exist, but the man I call wise is he who, by working changes, makes things to appear and to be good to any one of us, to whom they appear and are evil. And again, do not press my argument literally; but understand from the following explanation more clearly what I mean. Recollect how it was formerly said, that to a sick man his food appears to be and is bitter, but to a man in health the opposite is the fact and appears so. Neither of these persons ought we to make wiser than the other; that is impossible: nor may we declare that the sick man is ignorant for holding such an opinion, or the man in health is wise for holding another. We must effect a change to the opposite state: for the one habit is better than the other. So also in education we must cause a change from
the one habit to the better. Now the physician changes by medicines; the wise teacher by arguments. Never indeed did anybody make one who had false opinions afterwards to hold true ones. For it is not possible either to think what is not, or anything but what one feels; and this is always true. But, I suppose, when through a bad habit of mind a man has corresponding opinions, a good habit makes him hold opinions resembling it; phantasms which some persons from inexperience call true: but I call some better than others, not truer. And wise men, dear Socrates, I am far from calling frogs: but in relation to bodies I call them physicians, in relation to plants husbandmen. For I say that these last also produce in plants, instead of evil sensations when any of them are sickly, good and healthy sensations and truths, while wise and good rhetoricians make good things instead of evil seem just to states. Since whatever things seem just and good to each state, are such to it, as long as it deems them lawful; but the wise man, in the place of those things which are severally evil to each, makes the good both to be and to seem right. And on the same principle the sophist also, who is able to instruct his pupils thus, is both wise and worthy of high fees at their hands. And thus some are wiser than others, and nobody thinks falsities; and you, whether you will or not, must submit to be a measure. For on these grounds this doctrine is maintained. And, if you wish to revive your dispute with it, dispute by counter-arguing at full; or if you prefer the method of questioning, adopt it; for no person of sense will avoid this method, but will pursue it most willingly. Mind this however; you must not question unfairly. For it is most unreasonable in one who professes esteem for virtue to be constantly pursuing an unfair method of argument. Now unfairness is shown, when a man fails to con-
duct his arguments diversely; in one way as a combatant, in another as a dialectician: in the former case rallying and tripping up as much as he can, in the latter being serious, and correcting his respondent, showing him only those errors into which he was led by his own fault or in consequence of former discussions. If you act thus, your fellow-debaters will impute to themselves the fault of their own confusion and perplexity, not to you; and they will follow and love you, and fly from themselves to philosophy, that they may become different, and get rid of their former selves. But if you take the contrary course, as most do, you will find an opposite result, and your pupils instead of philosophers will turn out haters of philosophy, when they grow older. If then you will follow my advice, as was before said, you will, in no hostile or contentious spirit, but with a really mild and condescending temper, consider what we mean, when we declare that all things are in motion, and that what seems 'is' also to each, individual as well as state. From these considerations you will discern whether knowledge and perception are the same: but not, as you lately sought, from the use of words and names, which most people pervert in every sort of way, causing each other all kinds of perplexity. Such, Theodorus, is the slight assistance which, from slight resources, I have supplied, as I best could, to your old friend. Had he been alive, he would have helped his own cause in grander language.

[Protagoras had been made in the pleading of Socrates to complain that admissions hostile to his doctrine had been wrung from the mouth of a terrified lad. Socrates now constrains Theodorus to submit, very reluctantly, to a dialectic argument on the general question at issue.]
Theo. You are joking, Socrates: for you have helped him most valiantly.

So. You are very obliging, my friend. Allow me one word. You noticed probably that Protagoras in what he said reproached us for holding our discussions with a boy, and using that boy’s alarm as a weapon of contention against his propositions: and while he represented this as mere amusement, he called ‘the measure of all things’ a grave topic, and urged us to deal seriously with his argument.

Theo. Of course I noticed it, Socrates.

So. Well: do you bid us take his advice?

Theo. Very earnestly.

So. Do you see that all here are boys except you? If then we are to take his advice, you and I must deal seriously with his doctrine by mutual questions and answers, that he may not have to reproach us with considering this subject in a jocular manner with lads.

Theo. Nay, but would not Theaetetus follow the investigation of a doctrine better than many who have great beards?

So. Not better than you, Theodorus. Do not suppose that I am bound to defend your deceased friend in every manner, and that you are bound in no manner. But come, good sir, follow the argument a little way, till such time as we know whether you are to be the measure of diagrams, or if all are competent in themselves, equally with you, to treat of astronomy and the other subjects wherein you are reported to excel.

Theo. When one sits beside you, Socrates, it is not easy to decline discussion. Indeed I spoke nonsense just now when I said you would allow me not to strip, and that you would not compel me as the Lacedaemonians do: you seem
rather to tend in Sciron's direction. The Lacedaemonians indeed bid one depart or strip, but you seem to me to act your part like Antaeus: you will not let one who comes to you go away before you have forced him to strip and wrestle with you in argument.

So. You have found very good precedents for my malady, Theodorus: but I am more robust than they were. Many a Hercules and Theseus strong in argument have ere now met and thumped me very hard; but I do not flinch for all that: with such a wonderful love of this kind of exercise am I possessed. Do not then refuse to benefit yourself as well as me by trying a fall with me.

Theo. Be it as you will: I refuse no longer. I must inevitably endure by cross-examination whatever destiny you spin for me in this discussion. I shall not however be able to put myself in your hands beyond the limit which you have proposed.

So. That limit is sufficient. And pray help me to be careful of this, that we do not unawares carry on any childish kind of argument, and incur reproach again for doing so.

Theo. Very well, I'll try my best.

[The argument of Socrates against the doctrine of Protagoras, that 'man is a measure to himself,' may be briefly summarised thus. That doctrine means, 'what seems to each is to each.' Now to the mass of mankind this doctrine seems to be untrue, because it is certain that men in general do consider some to be wiser than others, and look up to the wise as teachers and guides. Therefore to them it is untrue.]

1 Sciron, or Scirrhon, the legendary robber, who flung travellers from rocks. He was slain by Theseus.

2 Antaeus, the gigantic wrestler, who slew his opponents: but was himself defeated and slain by Hercules.
And Protagoras, on his own principle, must allow that they are right; from which it necessarily follows that he is wrong, even in his own opinion. In short, 'the Truth' of Protagoras is not true to himself or to any body else.

So. Let us first revert to the objection we took before, and see whether we were right or wrong in being out of humour and censuring the doctrine, in that it made every one competent in wisdom; and whether Protagoras rightly conceded to us, that, in respect of better and worse, some do surpass, and they are wise. Is it not so?

Theo. Yes.

So. Now if he had himself been present and made this admission, instead of our making it in his defence, we need not have strengthened ourselves by recurring to the subject: but now perhaps some one may allege that we are incompetent to make the confession on his part. It is better to come to a clearer mutual understanding on this special point. For whether it is so or not makes a great difference.

Theo. Very true.

So. Let us obtain the admission not through others, but from his statement, as briefly as we can.

Theo. How?

So. In this way. He says, does he not, that what seems to every one 'is' also to him unto whom it seems?

Theo. Yes, he does.

So. Do not we also, Protagoras, state a man's opinion, or rather the opinions of all men, when we say that there is nobody who does not deem himself wiser than others in some respects, and others wiser than himself in other respects; and, moreover, that in the greatest perils, when they are distressed in war or disease or at sea, men regard their rulers on such occasions as gods, expecting
them to be their saviours, though they differ from them in nothing but knowledge? And all human life teems with people who are seeking teachers and rulers of themselves and of other living creatures and of the various trades; and teems, again, with other people who deem themselves competent to teach and competent to rule. And in all these cases what else can we say than that men themselves think there exists among them wisdom and ignorance?

_Theo._ Nothing else.

_So._ Do they not deem wisdom to be true thought, and ignorance false opinion?

_Theo._ Certainly.

_So._ Well then, how shall we deal with the argument, Protagoras? Must we say that men always have true opinions, or sometimes true, sometimes false? From both views it results that they do not always think true things, but at times true things, at times false. For consider, Theodorus, whether any Protagorean, or you yourself, would wish to contend that no one person considers any other to be unlearned and to have false opinions.

_Theo._ That is incredible, Socrates.

_So._ And yet the doctrine which says that man is the measure of all things is brought to this unavoidable conclusion.

_Theo._ How so?

_So._ When you, after forming some judgment in your own mind on any point, declare to me your opinion, be it granted according to his doctrine that this is true to you: but is it not allowed to the rest of us to become judges respecting your judgment? must we always judge that you have true opinions? do not a countless number in each instance contend against you with contrary opinions, believing that you judge and think falsities?
Theo. Yes verily, Socrates, countless myriads indeed, as Homer says, who give me all the trouble in the world.

So. Well? would you have us say that in that case you have opinions true to yourself but false to the countless myriads?

Theo. Such seems to be the necessary inference from the statement.

So. And how as to Protagoras himself? Supposing he did not think man a measure, and the public did not think so, (as indeed they do not), would it not necessarily follow that what he delivered in writing as Truth, is Truth to nobody? or if he thought so, and the public does not agree with him, do you see that in proportion as those who deny are more numerous than those who affirm, so much more decidedly it is or is not so?

Theo. Of necessity, if according to each individual opinion it will be or will not be so.

So. In the next place it involves this very queer result, that he on his side, by confessing that all men hold true opinions, admits that the opinion of the opposite party about his opinion (which they deem false) is a true one.

Theo. Certainly.

So. Will he not admit that his own is false, if he confesses that the opinion of those who suppose him to think falsely is true?

Theo. Of course.

So. But the others on their side do not admit that they think falsely.

Theo. No, they do not.

So. And he again confesses also this opinion to be true according to his written doctrines.

Theo. Evidently.

So. By all parties then it will be contended, including
Protagoras (by him it will rather be confessed, for when he grants to a gainsayer that the latter thinks what is true, then does Protagoras himself confess), that no dog or man he meets with is a measure concerning anything which he has not learnt. Is it not so?

_Theo._ Yes.

_So._ Since this is the contention of all, to nobody will the Truth of Protagoras be true, neither to himself nor to anyone else.

_Theo._ We run down my friend very hard, Socrates.

_So._ But it is doubtful, my friend, if we are outrunning the fact. It is likely that he being older is wiser than we: and if he could at once pop up his head where we are, he would not sink down and run away again, until, probably, he had convicted me of talking much nonsense, and you of agreeing to it. As it is, we must needs, I think, make the best of ourselves, such as we are, and state our real opinions for the time being. And must we not now say that everybody will confess this—that one man is wiser, one more ignorant, than another?

_Theo._ Yes, I think so.

[If we admit, Socrates goes on, that each may judge for himself with equal truth as to some sensible things, as 'hot' and 'cold'; this is not universally applicable. For instance, all do not know with equal truth what is 'wholesome' for them. Again, if we admit that states and persons may judge with equal truth of 'right' and 'wrong,' 'holy' and ' unholy,' they certainly cannot equally well decide what is and will be 'expedient' and 'inexpedient' for them. But, he adds, this opens new questions. Well, says Theodorus, have we not leisure for them? Yes, replies Socrates, we have; and this is the reason why philosophers make such a poor figure in the law-courts. Their habits are those of freemen; those of lawyers are in a manner slavish. Then follows the Socratic picture of an Athenian lawyer's habits and character.]
He asks if Thodorus wishes to hear its contrast in the habits and character of the true philosopher. Thodorus is very desirous to hear this.

So. Must we not also say that our argument is most stably conducted on the lines we prescribed in our defence of Protagoras, averring that most things are as they seem to each, hot, dry, sweet, all such-like? but that, if he will grant that one excels another in anything, he will be ready to say so in judgments upon health and disease: not every woman or child or beast, he will admit, knows what is wholesome in its own case, and is competent to cure itself: here, if anywhere, one excels another.

Theo. I think so.

So. In politics, too, will he not say, that of things honourable and dishonourable, just and unjust, holy and unholy, whatsoever each state shall deem and enact to be lawful for itself are also lawful in truth for each, and that in these no individual or state is wiser than another? but in enacting things expedient or inexpedient, here, if anywhere, he will confess that counsellor differs from counsellor and the opinion of one city from that of another in respect of truth, and he will certainly not venture to affirm, that whatever a state shall deem and enact to be expedient for itself will most assuredly be expedient. But of the former things I named, justice and injustice, holiness and unholiness, they (the Protagoreans) are ready to insist that none has any essential nature, but that whatever has seemed good by public consent is true when it has seemed good, and as long as it seems good. And those who do not altogether echo

1 Such-like, ὁσα του τουτου τουτου, lit. all that are of this type, i.e. (as Prof. Jowett says) 'immediate sensations.'

2 In the first two speeches (§ 23) assigned to Socrates the subjects who express or allow opinions are very indistinctly stated. The reason
the doctrine of Protagoras, take some such philosophic view. But now, Theodorus, we have question growing out of question, greater out of less.

_Theo._ Are we not at leisure, Socrates?

_So._ We appear to be. On many occasions, my good sir, I have noticed, but especially on this, how natural it is for those who have spent much time on philosophy, when they go into the law-courts, to shew themselves absurd orators.

_Theo._ How do you mean?

_So._ People who from their youth have been knocking about in law-courts and such-like scenes, as compared with those who have been reared in philosophic and literary society, seem to have had a breeding like that of slaves compared with freemen.

_Theo._ In what respects?

_So._ In that (referring to your last observation) philosophers have leisure at all times, and hold their discussions peacefully and with leisurely ease, and as we have now been of this seems to be, that he is referring throughout to what was said in his defence of Protagoras made in the name of Protagoras (§ 20). The oratio obliqua with which the first speech begins is dependent (as the translation indicates) on the _άλλο_ τι _φώμεν_ (must we not say?) at the close of the previous speech in § 22. Of _εὐχρηστεῖαι_ and _εὐθήσει_ ἄν _φάναι_, according to Heindorf and Stallbaum, _τις_ _των_ understood are severally the subjects. I am rather disposed to understand _Πρωταγόρας_ and _Πρωταγόραν_, as Protagoras had been mentioned just before, and his confession would be appropriate here. For the same reasons I suppose him to be the subject on whose statement or admission the oratio obliqua depends in the first paragraph of the second speech (οἵκοιν κ.τ.λ.), after which _ὁμολογήσει_ comes, where Protagoras is the natural subject. In the next sentence, where he recurs to _τὰ_ _καλὰ_ κ.τ.λ., Plato uses the plural _εὐθλονοὺς_ _ισχυρίζεσθαι_. We cannot doubt that he speaks of the scholars of Protagoras, who still profess their master's doctrine on the question specified.
pursuing three arguments in succession, so do they also, if one which follows pleases them better than the preceding; nor do they care whether they speak briefly or at length, if only they can attain truth. The other class always speak in haste; for the flow of water\(^3\) quickens them, and they are not allowed to make their speeches on anything they desire; and the opponent stands over them holding compulsion in the shape of a prescribing document read in the ear, beyond the limits of which they must not speak, yclept an affidavit\(^4\): and the arguments are always about a fellowslave addressed to a master on the bench, who holds justice between his finger and thumb; and the contests are never away from the point\(^5\), but to the point of self-interest; and often too the race is for life. So that on all these grounds they become keen and shrewd, knowing how to wheedle the master by word and gratify him by deed, being stunted and crooked in soul. For their slavery from childhood has robbed them of growth and uprightness and freedom, compelling them to act tortuously, setting before their yet tender souls great perils and fears. And as they cannot bear up against these with the help of justice and truth, they have recourse at once to falsehood and mutual injury, and twist themselves in many ways, and become warped; and so they pass from youth to manhood without any mental soundness, becoming, as they imagine,

\(^3\) *Flow of water.* The κλεψύδρα or water-clock, used to measure the time allowed to each orator, and placed within his view.

\(^4\) Affidavit, ἀντωμοσία, literally counter-affidavit. The pleas of each party in a cause were affirmed by their several oaths: and by these affirmations they or their advocates would be bound, and could not stray from them.

\(^5\) Away from the point, τὴν ἀλλασ (ὁδὸν), a proverbial phrase. Such also is περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ ὄρομος.
TRANSLATION.

clever and wise. Such is this class of men, Theodorus. Would you wish us now to describe those of our circle, or to pass them by and return to our argument, that we may not, as we just now said, abuse too far our freedom in the change of topics?

Theo. Not so, Socrates; finish the description. For you have said with great truth that we who form a circle like this are not servants of our discussions: our discussions are, as it were, our servants, and each of them waits to be completed when we think fit. For amongst us there is no presiding authority; neither dicast to rule, nor spectator, as in the case of poets, to censure.

[The habits and character of the true philosopher are depicted in this and 24 the succeeding chapter.]

So. We must speak then, seemingly, since you think proper, concerning the leaders of such a circle; for why need one mention the inferior students of philosophy? This class from their youth, in the first place, do not know the way to the agora, nor where a law-court is or a council-hall or any other political meeting-room: laws and decrees spoken or written they neither see nor hear. Societies agitating for office and clubs and dinners and wine-bouts with flute-girls—these are practices which even in dreams do not occur to them. Whether any one in the city is well or ill born, whether a person has inherited any disgrace from ancestors on the male or female side, he knows no more than he does of the proverbial 'gallons in the sea.' He does not even know that he is ignorant of all these things; for it is not for credit's sake that he stands aloof from them, but in point of fact it is only his body that reposes and resides in the city, while his mind, deeming
all these things petty and insignificant, moves in every
direction, as Pindar says, measuring things beneath the
earth and on its surface, and star-gazing above the heaven,
and searching out everywhere the nature of each class of
existing things, condescending to none of those which are
near it.

_Theo._ How do you mean, Socrates?

_So._ Compare the case of Thales, O Theodorus. While
he was astronomising and gazing upward he fell into a well;
and a clever and witty Thracian maidservant is said to
have taunted him with desiring to know what was in heaven,
but not seeing what was before him and at his feet. The
same taunt is good for all who are devoted to philosophy.
For in fact such a student is not only unaware of what his
next neighbour is doing, but does not even know whether
he is a man or some other creature. But what man is, and
what it belongs to such a nature to do or to suffer differently
from all others, this he inquires, and takes pains to search
out. You understand, I hope, Theodorus, do you not?

_Theo._ I do, and your words are true.

_So._ Therefore, my friend, a man like this, in his
associations private and public, as I said at first, when in
a law-court or elsewhere he is compelled to discourse of
things at his feet and before his eyes, becomes a laughing-
stock not only to Thracian maids, but to the general public,
falling into wells and perplexities of every kind from inex-
perience; and his awkwardness is marvellous, raising a sus-
picion of imbecility. For when personal reviling is the order
of the day, he has no scandalous charge to bring, knowing
no evil of anybody, because he has never taken the trouble.
So he gets laughed at for his helplessness. And when
eulogies and glorification of others are the theme, he is
seen to laugh in right earnest without any affectation; and
so he seems to be silly. When a tyrant or a king is extolled, he thinks he hears one of the herdsmen, swineherd or shepherd or cowherd, congratulated for his large milking: but he considers that the royal proprietors in their tending and milking have to deal with a more untoward and insidious animal than the others have, and that any one of them must, for want of leisure, perforce prove quite as rude and uninstructed as the real herdsmen, having his fortification built round him like a stall upon the mountain. When he hears it said that somebody, who has got ten thousand acres of land or more, has a wonderfully large estate, he thinks the quantity named a very small one, from being in the habit of contemplating the whole earth. And when they extol birth, and say that some one is a gentleman for being able to show seven rich ancestors, this he regards as praise emanating from very dull and short-sighted persons, who through want of education can never take a comprehensive view, so as to see that every man has had countless myriads of forefathers, among whom in every case are found many rich and poor, kings and slaves, both Greeks and barbarians, recurring again and again. He is amazed at the manifestly narrow conception of those who pride themselves on a list of twenty-five ancestors, carried back to Heracles, son of Amphitryon; and he laughs at men who cannot bear in mind that the twenty-fifth ancestor, counting back from Amphitryon, and again the fiftieth before him, were just whatever they might happen to be—and by such reflection get rid of their foolish vanity. On all these occasions such a man is scorned by the multitude, partly, it would seem, on the charge of arrogance, partly for not knowing what stares him in the face, and for helplessness in general.

_Theo._ It certainly does happen as you say, Socrates.
When Socrates has completed his description of the true philosopher, Theodorus, assenting, says there would be less evil in the world if all men felt as he did. Socrates says that evil must remain as the antithesis of good; and, in a beautiful digression, he exhibits the contrast between justice and holiness on the one hand, which are blessed and godlike, injustice and unholiness on the other, which are wretched and godless. The unrighteous are apt to pride themselves on their own wickedness; but their self-satisfaction is unreal, and collapses at the last.

So. But when he himself, my friend, leads any man to take a higher view, and that man consents to quit his 

'How do I wrong you or you me,' for the consideration of justice and injustice—what each is in itself, and wherein they differ from all other things or from each other,—or to turn from the maxim 'Happy the king, happy the possessor of much gold,' to the consideration of kingship itself and human happiness and misery generally—what they are and how it befits human nature to attain the one and escape the other—on all these subjects, I say, when that petty narrow-minded legal personage is required to render reason, he presents a counterpart of the philosopher. Stationed upon a height and gazing down from his elevated position, he turns dizzy from inexperience, and, uneasy perplexed and stuttering, he is a laughing-stock, not to Thracian girls or any uneducated person, for they do not see the absurdity, but to all whose training has not been that of slaves. Such are their several characters, Theodorus. One is that of the man really bred in freedom and leisure, whom you call philosopher; who may without reproach seem simple and be incompetent when he is engaged in menial services; when he does not, for instance, know how to pack a trunk of linen, or to season a dish or a flattering speech. The other is that of him who can perform all such
services thoroughly and briskly, but who does not know how to don his cloak like a gentleman, or, by acquiring harmony of language, to sing well the true life of gods and blessed men.

Theo. If you could bring home what you say to all men, Socrates, as you do to me, there would be more peace and less evil in the world.

So. Nay, Theodorus, evil cannot, on the one hand, perish altogether, for something opposite to good there must ever be; nor, on the other, can it find a seat in heaven: but our mortal nature and this lower region it haunts perforce. Wherefore we must endeavour to fly from this world to the other as soon as we can. Now that flight means the becoming like to God as much as possible; and the way to be like God is to become just and holy and wise. But indeed, my excellent friend, it is by no means an easy task to convince the world that the reasons on which most people found the duty of shunning vice and pursuing virtue are not the just motives for practising the latter and avoiding the former: in order, to wit, that a man may not seem to be wicked, and that he may seem to be good. These views, in my clear opinion, are what is called an old woman's fable: the real truth we may state as follows. God is in no way and in no degree unjust, but just in the highest extreme; and nothing is more like to him than one of us who in his own sphere shall become as just as possible. Hereby is shown a man's veritable power, in the one case; in the other, his worthless and unmanly character. For the cognition of this truth is genuine wisdom and virtue, while the ignorance of it is manifest unintelligence and viciousness. Everything else which is taken for mental power and wisdom is in political government vulgar, in art ignoble. It is by far the best way then not to allow for a
moment that one who acts unjustly and speaks or practises impiety is a man of powerful mind because he is a rogue. Such people pride themselves on the reproach, and suppose it to mean that they are no whipsters, no mere loungers about the streets, but the sort of men they ought to be to hold their own in the state. They must be told the truth therefore; namely—that their belief of not being what they are makes them what they are so much the more. For they do not know the penalty of injustice, a thing of all others which it is most proper to know. It is not what they suppose, stripes and capital punishments, which men sometimes do not incur when they act unjustly, but one from which it is impossible to escape.

_Theo._ What do you refer to?

_So._ There are, my friend, established in the world two types; of supreme happiness in the godly nature, of supreme misery in the ungodly: and these men, not seeing this truth, in their weakness and utter folly do by their unjust deeds insensibly become like the latter nature, unlike the former. The punishment they suffer is that of living a life correspondent with that nature to which they become like. And if we tell them that, unless they get rid of their wondrous wisdom, when they are dead, yon place pure from evil will not receive them, and they will ever continue to live in this world a life resembling themselves—evil amidst evil associations—such language they will undoubtedly hear as clever and cunning rogues listening to a pack of fools.

_Theo._ To be sure they will, Socrates.

_So._ I know it well, my friend. There is however one thing that befalls them. If in private they are required to give a reasonable account of their censures, though for a long time they are willing to abide the brunt manfully and
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not to flee like cowards, at last, my good sir, they are strangely dissatisfied with their own reasoning; and that rhetoric of theirs dies out, somehow or other, so that they seem no better than children. As to these people, however, since the topic is a mere digression, let us drop the conversation: or else further considerations will continue to stream in and stifle our original argument. Let us return to the previous question, with your leave.

Theo. For my own part, Socrates, I lend an ear to such digressions with quite as much pleasure, as they are easier for a man of my age to follow. But, if you prefer it, let us return to our subject.

[Returning to his subject, Socrates says that the laws of a state have expediency (τὸ ὑπὲρ τῆς) for their end; but they often fail to attain it. Expediency is tested by the future. Does Protagoras pretend to be a measure of this? Will not a medical man judge better than he of the probability of a fever, a vine-grower of the expected quality of a wine, and so on, even as Protagoras himself could judge better than they of the arguments likely to prevail in a court of law? This was his forte and profession. He got a fortune by it. Would he have done so if he had told those who consulted him that they could judge as well as he? No: and it is hence evident that the more intelligent man is a measure, the unintelligent has no claim to be so called. True, says Theodorus; and my friend's doctrine is overthrown by this argument as well as by the former which showed that, while he admitted the opinions of all men to be true, most men denied this opinion of his to be true: which leaves him self-confuted. Yes, says Socrates, and many other confuting reasons might be added. But the momentary affections, from which arise sensation and opinion, are not so easily shown to be untrue. There is great disputation on this subject.]

So. We had, I think, reached this point in our argument. Speaking of those who teach the notion of moving
essence, and who aver that what at any time seems to each is for him to whom it seems, we said that—while on other points, and specially with respect to justice, such men would insist strongly, that what a state enacts as its pleasure, is just for the enacting state as long as it remains enacted—yet with respect to good, none are so bold as to contend that what a state enacts: considering it useful, is useful so long as it remains enacted, unless one choose to lay stress on the mere term; and that would be quibbling as to our real question. Would it not?

Theo. Certainly.

So. He should not dwell on the term, but on the thing which under that term is considered.

Theo. True.

So. Whatever term the state give to it, that which the state aims at in its legislation is, I suppose, this: all its laws, so far as its opinion and power extend, are framed in order to be as useful to itself as possible. Does it legislate with any other view?

Theo. None.

So. Does it always succeed? or do all states err in many cases?

Theo. I think they sometimes err.

So. Ay, and one may be led to this same admission more readily, by putting the question as to the whole class, of which the useful is a part. I suppose it relates to future time as well as to present. When we legislate, we enact our laws as intended to be useful for the time that is to follow. This we should rightly term 'future'?

Theo. Certainly.

So. Well then: let us ask Protagoras, or any of those who adopt his doctrine, this question. Man is the measure of all things, as ye say, O Protagoras; of things white, heavy,
light, all such-like. For, having the test in himself, thinking what he feels, he thinks what is, and what is to himself true. Is it not so?

Theo. It is.

So. And of things which are hereafter to be, we shall say, O Protagoras, has he the test in himself, and do they turn out to him such as he thinks they will be? Heat, for instance: when an unskilled person thinks that he will be seized with fever, and that this state of heat will occur, and another, who is a medical man, has an opposite opinion, shall we say that the future will turn out according to the opinion of one of the two, or according to that of both, and that to the medical man he will not be hot or feverish, but to himself both these?

Theo. This would be absurd.

So. And, I suppose, with respect to the future sweetness or harshness of wine, the vine-grower's opinion, not that of the harp-player, will prevail?

Theo. Of course.

So. Again, as to good and bad music, a gymnast cannot judge beforehand so well as a musician, even of that which, after he has heard it, the gymnast himself will deem to be good music.

Theo. Certainly not.

So. The judgment also of one who, without culinary skill, is preparing to feast, will, while the banquet is in preparation, be less valid concerning the future pleasure than the judgment of the cook. We must not in our present argument inquire as to that which now is or which has been pleasant to each, but as to that which is about to seem and to be pleasant,—whether each individual is the best judge for himself. For example, would not you, Protagoras, form beforehand a better opinion
than an untutored person of the arguments which each of us would find persuasive in a court of law?

Theo. The very point, Socrates, in which he used to declare strongly that he had no rival.

So. To be sure he did, my dear friend; and nobody would have paid large sums of money to converse with him, if he had tried to persuade his pupils that no person, prophet, or other, is a better judge of what in the future will be, and seem to be, than a man's own self.

Theo. Very true.

So. Are not legislation and expediency concerned with the future, and will not every one confess that a state, when legislating, must of necessity often fail to attain that which is most useful?

Theo. Certainly.

So. Then it will be a fair thing to say to your master,—he must perforce confess that one man is wiser than another, and that such a man is indeed a measure; while for me, who am unknowing, there is no kind of necessity to become a measure, compelled though I was just now to be one, whether I would or not, by my argument in his defence.

Theo. In my judgment, Socrates, that is the best way of confuting his doctrine, though it is also confuted by this consideration, that it makes other people's opinions valid, and by these opinions (as was shown) his statements are deemed to be anything but true.

So. In many other ways, also, Theodorus, a doctrine such as this, that every opinion of every person is true, can be confuted. But, in respect to momentary affections, from which arise perception and correspondent opinion, it is more difficult to convict these of untruth. I am very likely wrong, however: possibly they are irrefragable;
and those who assert them to be clear, and to be cognitions, may perhaps tell the truth, and our friend Theaetetus may not have missed the mark in laying down that perception and knowledge are the same. We must come closer then and examine this moving essence, by tapping it to see whether it sounds whole or cracked. No slight war is waged about this between combatants not a few.

[Theodorus gives a half serious, half jocular, character of the Heracleitan champions of the Flux. Socrates supports it by citing Homer's words as a veiled philosophy, openly professed by Heracleitus. He then refers to the antagonistic School (Eleatic), of which are Melissus and Parmenides, who teach the doctrine of Rest and Oneness of Being. Between the two, he says, we may find ourselves perplexed like outsiders between the two contending parties in the game called διὰ γραμμής.]

Theo. Far indeed from being a slight one; in Ionia the doctrine makes great strides. The followers of Heracleitus support it very vigorously.

So. On that account, dear Theodorus, we must examine it more fundamentally, as they suggest.

Theo. Decidedly. For indeed, Socrates, as to these followers of Heracleitus, or, as you say, of Homer, and of others still more ancient, if we take their leading men about Ephesus, who pretend to be learned in the doctrines, there is no possibility of holding an argument with them any more than with lunatics. They are always in motion after the manner of their writings, and as to pausing on one subject, and inquiring and answering quietly in turn, their power of doing this is below zero. An infinite minus quantity goes nearer to expressing that these men have not in them the least particle of quietness. If you ask them any question, they pluck as it were out of their quiver
a little riddling phrase or two and shoot them at you, and if you try to get any account from the man of what he has said, you will be smitten with another under some novel change of name, and so you will never reach a conclusion with any one of them. Nor indeed will they themselves do so in their mutual discussions. They carefully guard themselves from allowing any certainty to appear either in an argument or in their own souls, deeming this, I suppose, a stable principle. Any such they are at war with and repel, as much as they can, on every side.

So. Probably, Theodorus, you have seen these men in battle, and never met with them in a pacific state, as they are no companions of yours. But, I suppose, they do teach certain principles at leisure to their scholars, whom they wish to make like themselves.

Theo. What do you mean by scholars, my good sir? These folk are not scholars one of another; they arise by spontaneous growth, each from some casual inspiration, and there is not one of them that supposes another to know anything. From these men, as I was going to say, you can never get a reason with or against their will. We must ourselves receive their doctrine, and examine it like a mathematical problem.

So. Very fairly suggested. We have however received the problem in another shape, from the ancients first, who hide it from the multitude in poetry, how that Oceanus and Tethys, the progenitors of all things, are streams, and that nothing stands still: from later writers secondly, who, being wiser, proclaim their views openly, that even a cobbler may hear and learn their wisdom, and cease to suppose some existences stand still while others are moving, and so, having been taught that all things move, may honour his teachers. I almost forgot, Theodorus, that
others again put forth the doctrine opposite to this: for instance,

‘Unmoved is that they call the universe,’

and other dogmas, which, in opposition to all the preceding, such men as Melissus and Parmenides¹ insist upon, how that all things are one, and that this one stands self-supported, having no region wherein it moves. How shall we deal with all these, my friend? for we have gone on little by little till we find ourselves unexpectedly thrown midway between them, and if we do not struggle to find an escape, we shall be punished like those who play across a line in wrestling-grounds, when they are seized by both parties and dragged in opposite directions. So I think we must begin by considering the one party, to whom we first addressed ourselves, the fluent gentlemen. And if they appear to have good reasons, we will help them to drag us over, and try to escape from their opponents; but if the standard-bearers of ‘the Whole’ seem to give the true account, to them will we fly from those who move even the immoveable. If we find that neither of them have any satisfactory account to give, we shall get laughed at for supposing that poor creatures like us have anything of weight to say, and for disavowing men of the highest antiquity and wisdom. Consider, Theodorus, whether it is our interest to incur so great a risk.

_Theo._ Nay, Socrates, it cannot be endured that we should refuse to consider what each of these parties has to say.

¹ The Eleatic School; see p. 118.
So. We must consider them, as you urge it so strongly. I think the first step in our consideration is concerning motion, to see what they intend by saying that all things move. What I mean to say is this. Do they speak of one kind of motion, or, as I think evident, two? But let it not be my sole opinion; share it with me yourself, that we may abide in common any result. Do you say a thing is moved when it changes from place to place, or revolves in the same place?

Theo. I do.

So. Let this be one kind. Now, when it stays in the same place, but grows old, or becomes black from being white, or hard from being soft, or undergoes any other variation, is it not proper to say this is another kind of motion?

Theo. I think so.

So. You cannot help it. These then I name are two kinds of motion, variation one, revolution another.

1 περιφοράν. But we should have expected φοράν, as Plato says immediately φερόμενον τε καὶ ἄλλοιομενον. Prof. Campbell thinks the motion of the heavens is regarded as embracing all other kinds. Is this quite satisfactory, or must we assume that περιφοράν is corrupt here?
Theo. You name them rightly.

So. Having made this division, let us now argue with those who say that all things move, and put to them this question: do you say that all things move in both ways, by local movement and by variation, or that one thing moves in both ways, another in one of the two?

Theo. Nay, upon my word I cannot pronounce. I think they would say all things move in both ways.

So. Yes; for if not, my friend, they will evidently make them to be both in motion and at rest, and it will be no more right to say that all things move than that they stand still.

Theo. Most truly stated.

So. Accordingly, since they must move, and it is impossible for anything not to be moving, all things are always moving with every kind of motion.


So. Now consider this point in their statements. Did we not say that they state the generation of heat or whiteness or any other perception in some such way as this—that each of these things at the moment of perception moves between the agent and the patient, and that the patient comes to be a percipient\(^2\) but not perception, and the agent a qualified thing but not a quality? Perhaps however quality seems to you to be a strange term, and you do not understand it when named in the general. Hear it then in particulars. The agent comes to be neither heat nor whiteness, but a hot thing and a white thing, and so with everything else. You remember, I suppose, that in

\(^2\) The ms. word \(\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\pi\tau\omicron\nu\) here must be corrupt. Buttmann's conjecture \(\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\pi\tau\omicron\nu\) (though not elsewhere found) has been largely received. Prof. Campbell prefers \(\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\nu\omicron\beta\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\), chiefly on account of gender. But, as the patient is conceived of as a man, the synesis is surely allowable.
our former statements we laid it down thus; that nothing
'is' one by itself, so also neither agent nor patient; but
that from both 'coming to be' together in mutual relation,
sensations and sensible things are engendered, and the one
comes to be of some quality and the other percipient.

Theo. I remember, of course.

So. Let us now spare ourselves the pains of consider-
ing their other various propositions, and, noting the one
which is the subject of our discussion, let us put to them this
question: 'All things, you say, move and are in flux.' Is
this right?

Theo. Yes.

So. Do they then move with both kinds of motion
which we distinguished, locomotion and variation?

Theo. Of course they do, if they are to move com-
pletely.

So. If they moved only, and were not changed, I
suppose we should be able to say what kinds of things
they are that move in flux. Should we not?

Theo. Yes.

So. Since it is not even an abiding fact, that what is in
flux flows white, but it changes, and so there is a flux of
this very thing, whiteness, and a change to another colour,
that it may not be convicted of abiding in this one—is it
ever possible to name any colour so as to give a correct
name?

Theo. What possibility can there be, Socrates, in this
or any other such thing, if it always slips away as one is
speaking, being in constant flux?

So. And what shall we say of any kind of perception,
such as sight or hearing? Shall we say that it ever abides
in the act of seeing or hearing?

3 On this corrupt place see the appended Notes.
Theo. Certainly it must not, seeing that all things are moving.

So. We cannot therefore aver that we see a thing more than that we do not see it, or that we have any perception more than that we have it not, since all things are in every way moving?

Theo. We cannot indeed.

So. And yet knowledge is perception, as I and Theaetetus settled it.

Theo. So it was.

So. Accordingly, when asked what knowledge is, in our reply we no more stated what it is than what it is not.

Theo. Seemingly not.

So. A fine issue to the supplement of our answer, when we were so eager to show that all things move:—for the purpose, forsooth, of proving that answer right. Now the thing proved seems to be, that, if all things move, every answer on every possible subject is equally right—to say it 'is' so and it 'is' not so, or if you prefer the term, 'comes to be,' that our terminology may not make them stationary.

Theo. You say rightly.

So. Except, Theodorus, that I said 'So' and 'Not so.' I ought not to use this word 'So,' for no motion would be expressed by it; nor yet 'Not so,' for here again is no motion. But we must supply some other language to those who state this doctrine; since now in fact they have no words to convey their own hypothesis, except perhaps 'Nowise.' This might suit them best, being an indefinite expression.

Theo. Yes, that style of speech would be most natural to them.

4 ἄνωτες. Buttm. Heind. would read ἐαυτοῖς, ourselves: αὐτὰ (τὰ πάντα) suits better: but ἄνωτες may stand, referred to τοὺς ἰδιότοις.
So. Thus, Theodorus, we have got rid of your friend, and do not yet concede to him that every man is the measure of every thing, if he be not a wise man; nor yet will we concede that knowledge is perception, at least on the supposition of all things moving.

Thea. A good hearing, Socrates: for, as this topic is concluded, I must be rid of the task of answering you, as by our compact I was to be, when the question about the doctrine of Protagoras should come to an end.

29[Theodorus rejoices that, according to the bargain, he was to be let off from the argument at this point. Thaeetetus thinks he should go on to discuss the opposite theory of Rest. Theodorus jocularly scolds him, and insists on his taking his turn. He consents. But Socrates, professing the highest respect for Parmenides, and alluding to the difficulties which his writings present, prefers adhering to the question at issue, the definition of knowledge. Returning to his dialectic process, he leads Thaeetetus to admit that it is more proper to say we perceive through the senses than with the senses, thus pointing to a central percipient (the soul). Next he makes him admit that the senses belong to the body, and that things perceived by one organ are not perceived by another. Hence any common notion acquired about things which are perceived by two different organs is not acquired through either organ, as existence, sameness, difference, likeness, and so on. What are the organs through which all these and other abstract notions are acquired? Thaeetetus thinks they have no peculiar organs assigned to them; but that the soul by its own powers observes these common properties. Socrates commends his conclusion as agreeing with his own.]

Thea. Nay, Theodorus, not before you and Socrates have discussed, as you just now proposed, the doctrine of those who on the other hand affirm that the universe is at rest.

Theo. What? you, Thaeetetus, a mere youth, teaching your elders to commit the sin of violating compacts! Come, gird yourself up to debate with Socrates that which remains.
Theae. Oh, certainly, if he wishes. But I should have been delighted to hear the other topic discussed.

Theo. You challenge cavalry to the plain when you challenge Socrates to argument. Ask him, and you will hear his answer.

So. Ay, Theodorus; but I do not think I shall obey the call which Theaetetus makes.

Theo. Why not obey it?

So. As to Melissus and the others who represent the universe as one and at rest, I respect them too much to treat their views cursorily; but in still greater respect do I hold the single name of Parmenides. He appears to me to meet Homer's definition, 'venerable and likewise awful'. I was brought into contact with him when I was very young and he very old, and he struck me as possessing a depth of character pre-eminently noble. I fear that we may not understand his language, still more that we may fail to achieve his meaning: above all, I am afraid that our original question, the definition of knowledge, may cease to be considered, if a fresh crowd of arguments rushes in, and gains our attention. In particular, this hopelessly large argument which we are awakening, if considered as a digression, would be unworthily treated; or, if pursued adequately at full length, it will swamp the question of knowledge. We should do neither one nor the other, but endeavour by our art of midwifery to deliver Theaetetus of his conceptions about knowledge.

Theo. Very well; we must, if you please.

So. Once more then, Theaetetus, consider this part of our previous discourse. You said in reply to me that knowledge is perception. Did you not?

Theae. Yes.

1 II. III. 172.
So. If anybody were to ask you the question, with what a man sees white things and black, and with what he hears sharp things and flat, you would say, I suppose, with the eyes and with the ears.

Theaer. I should.

So. The easy acceptance of names and terms, and the non-exaction of strict accuracy, is indeed generally not out of place in a well-bred man; we may rather say the reverse is vulgar, yet is it occasionally necessary. And so in the present instance I must perforce take exception to the answer which you give, in so far as it is wrong. Consider which answer is more correct, that the eyes are that with which, or that through which we see, and the ears that with which, or that through which we hear.

Theae. ‘Through’ which in each case, I think, Socrates, rather than ‘with’ which.

So. Yes, my boy; it is strange, I ween, if in us, as though we were ‘wooden horses’, many independent senses are seated, instead of all these tending in common to some centre, whether we call it soul or anything else, whereby, through these senses as instruments, we perceive all things perceptible.

Theae. I think this latter view the truer one.

So. Why am I putting these minute questions to you? If with some one and the same part of ourselves we through the eyes apprehend things white and black, and through the other organs other things, and you will be able, on being asked, to refer all such perceptions at once to the body...perhaps however it is better you should specify them in answer to me than that I should save you that trouble. Now tell me. The organs through which you perceive hot things and hard

2 Plato alludes here to the famous wooden horse of the Trojan legend.
and light and sweet—do you not state them to belong severally to the body, or do they belong to anything else?

\textit{Theae.} To nothing else.

\textit{So.} Will you also be ready to admit, that what you perceive through any one organ, you cannot possibly perceive through another; for instance, what you perceive by hearing, you cannot perceive by sight, or the converse?

\textit{Theae.} I most readily admit it.

\textit{So.} If you have any common notion about both, you would not acquire it from the one organ or from the other concerning both?

\textit{Theae.} I should not.

\textit{So.} As to sound and colour, in the first place, have you this same notion respecting both, that both 'are'? 

\textit{Theae.} I have.

\textit{So.} You suppose also, that each is different from each, and the same with itself?

\textit{Theae.} To be sure.

\textit{So.} And that both are twain, but each is one?

\textit{Theae.} Yes.

\textit{So.} Are you not also able to observe whether they are like one another or unlike?

\textit{Theae.} Probably.

\textit{So.} Through what do you form all these notions concerning both? For neither through hearing nor through sight is it possible to obtain a common notion of them. Here again is another instance in point. If it were possible to examine, whether both are briny or not, you know that you will be able to say with what you will examine, and this is evidently neither sight nor hearing, but something else.

\textit{Theae.} No doubt it is; namely, the power exercised through the tongue.

\textbf{K. P.}
So. Well said. Now, through what does the power act which makes manifest to you what all things generally have in common with these particularly—what you mean, to wit, in saying ‘is,’ ‘is not,’ and all else comprised in our late questions? What organs will you assign as those through which our percipient faculty perceives all these severally?

Theae. You mean being and non-being, and likeness and unlikeness, and sameness and difference, and moreover unity and any other number applicable to things perceived? Evidently too your question includes the even and the odd, and all other such notions; asking through what bodily organ we perceive them with the soul.

So. You follow me admirably, Theaetetus, and these are the very questions I ask.

Theae. Well, Socrates, I really can give no other answer than this, that in my opinion these have originally no organ peculiar to them, such as the sensible objects have, but the soul through its own individual power appears to me to observe the common properties of all.

So. Yes, Theaetetus, you are a beauty, and not, as Theodorus said, ugly: for he who speaks beautifully is beautiful and good. And besides your beauty, I am much obliged to you for releasing me from a world of talk, if the soul appears to you to observe some things through itself, and other things through the bodily organs. This was my own opinion, and I was wishing it to be yours.

Theae. Yes: to me it is apparent.

[Socrates now draws from Theaetetus the admission that while certain properties, as hardness and softness, are perceived through the senses common to men and beasts, essence, difference, use, and the like are matter of reflection by the soul attained through education. Without attaining essence, truth is not attained, nor without truth knowledge.]
TRANSLATION.

It is not in the affections themselves, but in the reasonable conclusions concerning them, that knowledge lies. And what is the common name for all these affections? Perception, which cannot therefore attain essence or truth or knowledge. Hence it follows that perception and knowledge cannot be the same thing. Theaetetus admits the failure of this theory. Socrates reminds him that the search is not to find what knowledge is not, but to find what it is, and then begs him to consider what it is that the soul is said to do, when it forms a judgment on existing things. Theaetetus replies: It is said to opine—to form an opinion. Socrates now asks if he can give a new answer to the question, What is knowledge?

So. To which of the two classes do you assign 'being'? For this is the notion most universally present.

Thea. I assign it to that class which the soul attains to by itself.

So. Do you say the same of likeness and unlikeness, of sameness and difference?

Thea. Yes.

So. And again of nobleness and baseness, good and evil?

Thea. Yes: these are things the essence of which, above all others, I believe that the soul observes in their mutual relativity, comparing within itself the past and the present with the future.

So. Wait a moment. Will it not perceive the hardness of a hard object through the touch, and so again the softness of a soft one?

Thea. Yes.

So. But their being, and what they are, and their mutual opposition, and again the being of that opposition, the soul itself, by reflecting and by comparing them with each other, endeavours to determine for us?

Thea. Quite so.

So. Men and beasts then, as soon as they are born, are
able by nature to perceive some things, those affections I mean which reach through the body to the soul. But the reflections concerning these in regard to essence and use are acquired, by those who do acquire them, painfully and gradually through the troublesome process of education.

Theae. Undoubtedly.
So. Can any one attain truth, who does not attain being?

Theae. He cannot.
So. And if he fail to attain the truth of a thing, will he ever have knowledge of it?

Theae. Impossible, Socrates.
So. Knowledge, then, does not lie in the affections of sense, but in the reasoning concerning them: for in this it seems possible to grasp essence and truth, and not in the affections?

Theae. Evidently.
So. Do you call two things the same which are in so many respects different?

Theae. There were no justice in doing so.
So. What name do you give to the one class—seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold and hot?

Theae. ‘Perceiving’ I would certainly call them.
So. Their common notion then you would call perception?

Theae. Of course.
So. And this, we say, has no share in the attainment of truth, having none in the attainment of being.

Theae. It has none.
So. Nor yet in the attainment of knowledge?

Theae. No.
So. Then, Theaetetus, perception and knowledge will not be the same?
TRANSLATION.

Theae. Evidently not, Socrates. Now especially has knowledge been very clearly proved to be a different thing from perception.

So. But it was not by any means with this view that we began our argument, to find what knowledge is not, but to find what it is. Nevertheless we have so far advanced as not to seek it in perception at all, but in that name which, whatever it be, is applicable to the soul's action when by itself it deals with existing things.

Theae. This, I imagine, Socrates, is called 'opining' (forming opinion).

So. You imagine rightly, my friend. Now go back again and, erasing all that went before, see if you have any clearer view, after having advanced to this point. Tell me once more what knowledge is.

[The first definition proposed by Theactetus—that sensuous perception is knowledge—being thus overthrown by the elenchus concluded in § 30, he is invited to attempt a second. He hopes now to find one in that realm of pure thought which consists in believing, judging, or opining (forming opinion). But as it occurs to him that opinions formed are not always true, he sees that he must limit his definition; and, accordingly, he ventures to suggest that true opinion is knowledge. Against this doctrine Socrates opens a battery of argument without delay. It implies that such a thing as 'false opinion' is possible: and that possibility Socrates is not prepared to admit. All things subject to opinion are, he says, such as a man either knows or does not know. If he opines, he either knows or does not know that about which he opines: he cannot know, and not know, one and the same thing. Can he then (when he opines falsely) mistake one known thing for another known thing?—No.—Or a known thing for an unknown?—No.—Or an unknown for a known?—No.—Or one unknown for another unknown?—Impossible.—But if he forms a false opinion, he must err in one of these four ways:—all which are impossible. Therefore to form false opinion is impossible. But perhaps, adds Socrates, we should regard 'being' and 'not-being'
rather than knowing and not-knowing. May not a man opine what is false, if he opines 'what is-not'? But he goes on to argue that nobody can opine 'what is not' any more than he can see or hear what is not: to opine 'what is not' is to opine 'nothing': that is, not to opine at all. Therefore false opinion is no more possible from this point of view than it was from the former.]

Theae. To say that it is opinion generally, Socrates, is impossible, since there is false opinion. But true opinion probably is knowledge: so let this be my answer. If it shall be disproved while we proceed, as in the last case, we will try some other statement.

So. Your present forwardness to speak, Theaetetus, is more to the purpose than your original reluctance to answer. For in this way, we shall secure one of two advantages: we shall either find what we are in quest of, or our conceit of knowing what we do not know will be diminished. And this will be no despicable reward. Now let us see what it is you say. There being two kinds of opinion, the true and the false, do you make true opinion the definition of knowledge?

Theae. I do, according to my present view.

So. Is it worth while to resume the question of opinion?

Theae. Which do you mean?

So. I am somewhat disturbed now, as often before, and have found myself sorely perplexed in my own mind and in conversation, from my inability to say what this condition is in us, and in what way engendered.

Theae. What condition?

So. The holding of false opinion. Now again I am still considering and doubting whether we should leave it, or review it in a way different from that we took some little time ago.
Theaë. Why not review it, Socrates, if there is any clear gain in doing so? For, as to leisure, you and Theodorus said very justly, that there is nothing to hurry us in such cases.

So. Well reminded. And perhaps it is not unreasonable to return upon our tracks. It is better, you'll allow, to achieve a little well than much inadequately.

Theaë. Of course.

So. Well then? What do we in fact affirm? do we say that there is in each case false opinion, and that some one of us opines falsely, another again truly, as if such were the natural rule?

Theaë. Yes, we do.

So. Does not this occur to us in respect of all things generally, and of each particularly—either knowing or not-knowing? for learning and forgetting, which lie between these, I set aside for the moment, as having no relation to our present argument.

Theaë. In fact, Socrates, nothing else remains in each case but knowing and not-knowing.

So. Is it not a necessary consequence that he who opines must opine about one of the things which he knows, or one of those which he does not know?

Theaë. It is.

So. And it is impossible, if he knows a thing, not to know it, or, if he knows it not, to know it?

Theaë. Quite impossible.

So. Does then he who holds a false opinion think that things which he knows are not what they are, but some other things within his knowledge, and knowing both, is he ignorant of both?

Theaë. It cannot be so, Socrates.

So. Or does he suppose things which he does not
know to be some other things outside of his knowledge? Does it happen to one who knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates to imagine that Socrates is Theaetetus or Theaetetus Socrates?

Theae. How can that be?

So. But surely a man does not think that what he knows is what he does not know, or that what he does not know is what he knows.

Theae. That were a miracle.

So. In what other way then can any one hold false opinions? Except under the conditions stated it is impossible, I suppose, to have opinion. In every case we either know or do not know, and so situated, it is manifestly impossible for us ever to have false opinions.

Theae. Very true.

So. Perhaps we ought to examine our question with reference not to knowing and not-knowing, but to being and not-being.

Theae. How do you mean?

So. Consider if it be not a simple truth that one who thinks concerning anything that which is not, will inevitably think what is false, whatever the condition of his mind in other respects.

Theae. This again is probable, Socrates.

So. How then? What shall we reply, Theaetetus, if any one examine us: ‘Is what you say possible for any one, and will any human being think what is not, either about some existing thing, or in the abstract?’ Seemingly we shall say in reply: ‘Yes, when he thinks, and does not think what is true.’ Or how are we to speak?

Theae. As you say.

So. Does the like happen in any other case?

Theae. What do you mean?
So. That a person sees something, yet sees nothing.

Theae. How can that be?

So. If he sees some one thing, that 'something' is among things that are. Or do you think 'the one' is ever among the things that are not?

Theae. Not I.

So. He then, who sees some one thing, sees some thing that is.

Theae. Evidently.

So. And he who hears something hears some one thing, and a thing that is.

Theae. Yes.

So. And he who touches, I suppose, touches some one thing, and a thing that is, since it is one.

Theae. Yes.

So. And does not he who opines form opinion of some one thing?

Theae. He must.

So. And does not he who forms opinion of some one thing form it of some thing that is?

Theae. I grant this.

So. He then who opines what is not opines nothing.

Theae. Evidently.

So. Well, but he who opines nothing does not opine at all.

Theae. That seems clear.

So. Therefore it is not possible to think what is not, either about things that are, or in the abstract.

Theae. Manifestly not.

So. Thinking falsities is therefore different from thinking what is not.

Theae. It seems different.

So. And thus neither from our present consideration
(of being and not-being), nor from our previous one (of knowing and not knowing), do we find false opinion to exist in us.

_Theae._ No, we do not.

_So._ But can we not speak of it as happening in this way?

_Theae._ How?

_So._ We can say that an opinion which may be called an 'allodoxy' is false when anybody says that some one existing thing is another existing thing, exchanging them in his mind. For thus he always thinks of what exists, but of one thing instead of another, and, as missing that which he had in view, he may be said to have false opinion.

_Theae._ Your present statement seems to me very correct. For when any one opines that a thing is ugly instead of beautiful, or beautiful instead of ugly, then he very truly has false opinion.

_So._ Evidently, Theaetetus, you speak in contempt of me, and without fear.

_Theae._ Pray why?
So. You do not expect, I fancy, that I shall lay hold of your term 'truly false', and ask if it is possible for the swift to 'come-to-be' slowly, or the light heavily, or for any other opposite to come-to-be—not according to its own nature, but according to the nature of its opposite—in a manner opposed to itself. This however—that your confidence may not be fruitless—I pass over. You say you are pleased with the notion that opining falsities is 'allo- doxy.'

Theae. I am.

So. Then in your opinion it is possible to determine in your mind that one thing is another, and not itself.

Theae. It is.

So. When therefore the mind does this, must it not perforce think either of both things, or of one of the two?

Theae. Yes, it must.

So. At the same time, or else by turns.

Theae. Very good.

So. Do you employ the term 'thinking' in the same sense that I do?

Theae. How do you define it?

So. A discourse which the soul holds with itself about what it considers. I am representing this to you not as a fact that I know. In the exercise of thought, the soul, as I fancy it, is simply engaged in conversation, questioning itself and answering, affirming and denying. And when, having reached a definition, whether slowly or by a more rapid impulse, it at length agrees and affirms undoubtingly, we state this to be its opinion. So that I call opining the soul's speaking, and opinion its spoken word, not addressed to another or uttered by the voice, but silently to itself.

Theae. So do I.
So. Therefore, when any one opines that one thing is another, he says to himself, it would seem, that one thing is another.

Theae. Certainly.

So. Try to remember whether you ever said to yourself, ‘Assuredly the noble is base,’ or, ‘The unjust is just.’ Or, to sum up, consider if you ever attempted to convince yourself that assuredly one thing was another; or if, on the contrary, you never even in sleep ventured to say to yourself, Undoubtedly the odd is even, or any such thing?

Theae. You say the truth.

So. Do you think any body in or out of his senses ever ventured seriously to say to himself, trying to make himself believe, that an ox must needs be a horse, or two things one?

Theae. No indeed, not I.

So. If then to speak to oneself is to opine, nobody who speaks and thinks of both things, and apprehends both with his soul, can say and think that one is the other. But you must avoid the terms ‘one and other.’ I’ll state the point in this way: Nobody thinks that the noble is base, or anything of the sort.

Theae. Well, Socrates, I give up the terms, and I agree with you.

So. That one who thinks of both cannot possibly opine that one is the other?

Theae. Seemingly not.

So. Again, if he thinks of the one alone, and of the other not at all, he will never opine that one is the other.

Theae. True: for so he would be forced to apprehend that of which he has no thought.

So. Accordingly allodoxy is inadmissible for any one
who thinks either of both or of one. So that whoever shall define false opinion to be heterodoxy will talk nonsense: for it is shown by this method as well as by the former that false opinion cannot exist in us.

Theae. Seemingly not.

[Socrates seems, or feigns, to be driven to despair by the failure of his three attempts to find the habitat of false opinion. It is not in the region of knowledge, nor in that of being, nor in that confusion of phenomena, which he terms alldodoxy. Surely it must be somewhere. Surely mistakes are made. May not a person know something, and, seeing something else which he does not know, mistake it for that thing which he knows? At this point in the dialogue Plato introduces two parables or myths. He supposes first, a memorial waxen block, and, later on, a bird-cage or aviary, to be situated in the human mind. (In fragments of this kind Plato takes great delight: he has scattered them with profusion throughout his works. They do not supply to the pure intellect that verification which it demands in order to accept a philosophic theory. But the literary composer finds them a very convenient resource. They fill up gaps in serious argument. They rouse the imagination, they charm the fancy: they attract and amuse the general reader, when fatigued with dry dialexis. In short, they are a valuable part of that ψυχαγωγία, which Plato, who has a rhetoric of his own, is far from disdaining for his own use. See Dr Thompson's Introduction to his edition of the Phaedrus, especially pp. xxi—ii, also p. 141.) In this section a general description is given of the waxen block or tablet, as Mr Grote calls it (ἐκμαγεῖον). The wax varies in various cases, in some being larger, firmer, cleaner, and in every way better than in others. The receptacle also is more or less wide and convenient. The tablet is a gift of Mnemosyne (memory) for impressing by seals every one's sensations and thoughts. These are remembered and known while the impressions remain: when these fade, they are forgotten and no longer known. Socrates goes on to state when false notions cannot be formed, and when they can.]

So. And yet, Theaetetus, if this shall be proved im-
possible, we shall be compelled to admit many absurd consequences.

Thea. What are they?

So. I will not say till I have tried every point of view. For I should blush for us if, in a moment of perplexity, we were forced to admit such things as I allude to. But if we find a way to get free, then and not before we will speak of others as thus perplexed, standing clear of ridicule ourselves. But, if we find ourselves posed on every side, then, in a humble frame, I suppose, like sea-sick men, we shall allow the argument to trample on us and treat us as it will. Listen, while I tell you how I may still find a way of escape from our inquiry.

Thea. Pray tell me.

So. I will say we were wrong in admitting that it is impossible to opine that what one knows is what one does not know, and so to be deceived: for it is in a certain way possible.

Thea. Do you mean what I myself suspected at the time we made the assertion—a case occurring sometimes like this, that I, knowing Socrates, and seeing at a distance another whom I do not know, think it is the Socrates whom I know? For in such a case something like what you say comes to pass.

So. Did we not abandon that view, because it made us, while knowing, not to know what we do know?

Thea. Certainly.

So. Suppose we do not state it thus, but in the following manner. Perhaps it will give way to us, perhaps resist. But indeed we are in such a strait, that we must perforce turn about and examine every argument. See if I ask a rational question. Is it not possible to learn something which you formerly did not know?
Theae. Yes, it is.
So. And one thing after another?
Theae. Why not?
So. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that there is in our souls a waxen block, in one soul larger, in another smaller, of purer wax in one, in another of less pure, harder in some, moister in others; in some of medium quality.
Theae. Well.
So. Let us say it is a gift of Mnemosyne, mother of the Muses, and that on this we strike off, as if we were impressing ring-seals, any thing we wish to remember among those we see or hear or imagine, submitting the block to our senses and imaginations; and that whatever is impressed, we remember and know as long as its image subsists; but that, when it is obliterated or fails to be impressed, we have forgotten and do not know.
Theae. Be it so.
So. See then if he who knows things, and considers anything he sees or hears, may have false opinions in some such way as the following:
Theae. In what way?
So. By thinking sometimes that what he knows is what he does know, sometimes what he does not know. In our previous statements we were wrong in denying this to be possible.
Theae. How do you state it now?
So. Our statement on the subject must be this. We first determine, that what a person knows, having a record of it in his soul, but without perceiving it, he cannot possibly think to be some other thing which he knows, having an image of this also, but not perceiving it. And again it is impossible to think that what he knows is what he
knows not and has no seal of: and that what he knows not is [something else] which he knows not: and that what he knows not is what he knows: and to think what he perceives is some other thing which he perceives; and what he perceives, a thing which he does not perceive; and what he does not perceive to be another thing which he does not perceive; and what he does not perceive to be a thing which he perceives. And again to think that a thing which he knows and perceives, having the seal of it according to perception, is some other thing which he knows and perceives having its seal also according to perception—this is, if it can be, still more impossible than the preceding suppositions. And what one knows and perceives, having its record correctly, it is impossible to think [something else] which one knows: and what one knows and perceives under similar conditions, to be [something else] which one perceives: and what one neither knows nor perceives to be [something else] which one neither knows nor perceives: and what one neither knows nor perceives, to be [something else] which one does not know; and what one neither knows nor perceives, to be [something else] which one does not perceive. All these things involve the very utmost impossibility of having any false opinion about them. There remain the following cases, in which, if anywhere, such a thing may happen.

Theae. What are they? perhaps they may help me to understand. At present I do not follow you.

So. In the case of things which a person knows, to think that they are some other things which he knows and perceives; or some other things which he does not know, but perceives: or that [some things] which he knows and perceives are [some others] which he also knows and perceives.

Theae. I am more in the dark now than before.
[In this section it is shown how, by the misuse of the waxen tablet, false opinion may be supposed to occur; namely, by an erroneous union of sensation and impression. Mr Grote states it as follows: "A man, having sealed on his memorial tablet the impressions of two objects A and B, which he has seen before, may come to see one of these objects again; but he may by mistake identify the present sensation with the wrong past impression, i.e. with that past impression to which it does not belong. Thus, on seeing A, he may erroneously identify it with the past impression B, instead of A; or vice versa. And so false opinion will lie, not in the conjunction or identification of sensations with sensations, nor of thoughts (or past impressions) with thoughts, but in that of present sensations with past impressions or thoughts." Such an occurrence Socrates imputes to defects in the waxen block; which may be too shallow or too hard or too soft or too narrow, or impure, or inclosed in too small a space.]

So. Listen to this restatement. Do not I, knowing Theodorus and remembering in my mind what sort of man he is, and Theaetetus similarly, sometimes see them, sometimes not, and sometimes touch them, at other times not, and hear them or have some other perception of them, and again have no perception of you, but not the less remember you and know you in my mind?

Theae. Certainly.

So. This is the first lesson which I wish to make known to you, that a man may not perceive, or may perceive, things which he knows.

Theae. True.

So. Things too which he does not know, a man may often not perceive, often perceive merely?

Theae. This too is possible.

So. Now see if you follow me more easily. Socrates knows Theodorus and Theaetetus, but sees neither, and has no other present perception about them. He could never
form an opinion in his mind that Theaetetus is Theodorus? Do I speak sense or not?

_Theae._ All quite true.

_So._ This was the first of the cases spoken of.

_Theae._ It was.

_So._ The second was, that knowing one of you, and not knowing the other, and perceiving neither, I can never suppose the one I know to be the one I do not know.

_Theae._ Right.

_So._ Thirdly, knowing and perceiving neither, I cannot suppose one whom I do not know to be some other whom I do not know. And as to all my former suppositions, imagine that you have heard them stated again in order, wherein I can never have false opinions about you and Theodorus, either if I know or if I do not know both, or if I know one, but not the other. And similarly with regard to perceptions, if you follow me.

_Theae._ I do.

_So._ False opinion remains possible in a case like this: when, knowing you and Theodorus, and having in that waxen block the seals of both of you as from rings, then, seeing both at a distance and indistinctly, I strive to assign the proper seal of each to its proper visage, and to introduce and adapt this to its own mould, in order that recognition may take place: but if, failing in the attempt, and interchanging, like those who put on the wrong shoes, I apply the visage of each to the other's seal; or again, if I go wrong by an affection like that of sight in mirrors, when it flows from right to left:—then heterodoxy and false opinion occur.

_Theae._ You describe with marvellous truth, Socrates, the conditions to which opinion is liable.

_So._ Moreover [false opinion happens], when, knowing
both, I perceive one, as well as know him, but not the other, and so my knowledge of the second of the two is not according to perception—a case put in my former statement, which you did not then understand.

Theae. I did not.

So. Well, I meant to say that a person knowing and perceiving the one, and having his knowledge according to perception, will never think that he is some other whom he knows and perceives, and of whom his knowledge is also according to perception. Was it so?

Theae. Yes.

So. There remained, I think, the case we now deal with, in which we say that false opinion happens when a person knowing and seeing both, or having any other perception of both, does not keep each of the seals in accordance with his perception, but like a bad archer shoots beside the mark and so errs; and such error is called a falsity.

Theae. And reasonably.

So. And so, when to one of the seals perception is present, but not to the other, and the mind adapts the seal which is without perception to the perception present, in every such case it is deceived. In one word, about things which a person knows not and never perceived, error and false opinion seem out of the question, if there is any soundness in our present argument: but in those things about which we have knowledge and perception, opinion turns and twists about, becoming true or false; true, when it brings the proper impressions and forms to meet oppositely and straightly; false, when it brings them crosswise and crookedly.

Theae. Is not this a noble statement, Socrates?

So. You will say so with more assurance after hearing
what I have further to state: for to think the truth is noble, to be deceived is base.

Theae. No doubt.

So. These things are said to happen as follows. When the wax in any person's soul is deep and abundant and smooth and nicely wrought, the impressions become durable which pass through the senses and are sealed on this (waxen) heart of the soul, as Homer called it in allusion to the resemblance of wax; for then, and in all such cases, they are formed in it pure, and have depth enough. And such persons are in the first place quick to learn, in the next retentive, and finally they do not interchange the seals of the perceptions, but form true opinions. For as their impressions are distinct and have ample room, they rapidly distribute them to their several niches; and such impressions are called 'real:' and these persons are termed 'wise.' Do you not think so?

Theae. With entire conviction.

So. When any person's heart is shaggy, as that all-wise poet sang, or when it is miry and of impure wax, or exceedingly soft or hard—they whose heart is soft, are quick to learn, but forgetful; they whose heart is hard, the opposite: and they who have a shaggy and rough and gritty heart, or one defiled with a mixture of earth or mire, have their impressions indistinct. In those who have hard hearts, they are indistinct too, for depth is wanting: likewise in those who have soft hearts, for through confusion they soon become faint. And if besides all these faults they are furthermore crushed one upon another for want of room, when a man's soul is small, they are still more indistinct than in the former cases. All these people are capable of having false opinions. For when they see or hear or imagine anything, being unable to
assign each thing quickly to its proper impression, they go tardily to work, and, assorting erroneously, they see and hear and conceive most things wrongly. And of these persons again we say, that they have false notions of things, and are ignorant.

Theae. Never was a truer statement, Socrates.
So. May we say then that false opinions exist in us?
Theae. Decidedly.
So. And true?
Theae. Yes.
So. Now we think it sufficiently agreed that both these kinds of opinion certainly exist?
Theae. Beyond all question.

[Socrates has no sooner reached his conclusion as to the formation of false opinion, than he proceeds to confute it. There are phenomena for which it does not account. Errors occur in the identification of one past impression with another: and this leads to the dilemma that either false opinion is impossible, or it is possible for a person not to know what he does know. This dilemma Theaetetus cannot solve. And Socrates remarks that this discussion has become impure, in that they have constantly used the terms 'knowing,' 'knowledge,' and 'ignorance' before they have reached a definition of these terms. As, however, he admits that he cannot carry on the discussion without using them in some sense or other, he declares himself willing to make the attempt, and Theaetetus applauds his resolution.]

So. What a truly terrible and disagreeable creature, Theaetetus, a chattering man appears to be.
Theae. How so? What do you say this for?
So. Because I am so annoyed by my own dullness and manifest garrulity. For what else can one call the conduct of a man, who wears every argument threadbare, and cannot be made to quit it, because he is too stupid to be convinced?
Theae. What vexes you?
So. I am not only vexed, but at a loss how to answer, should any one question me and say: 'Have you now,
Socrates, discovered that false opinion lies neither in the mutual relation of perceptions, nor in that of thoughts, but in the union of perception with thought?’ I shall say, ‘Yes,’ I suppose, with a triumphant air, as if we had made some beautiful discovery.

Theae. I see nothing the reverse, Socrates, in what has now been proved.

So. Do you mean, he will say, that we can never suppose the man, whom we think of but do not see, to be a horse, which again we neither see nor touch but only think of, and in no way perceive? I suppose I shall say that I do mean it.

Theae. Yes, and rightly.

So. Well, he will say, as to the number eleven, which is an object of thought only, must it not follow from this statement that nobody could ever suppose it to be twelve, which is also an object of thought only? Come now, reply yourself.

Theae. I shall reply that any one who saw and touched them might think eleven to be twelve, but so far as he had them in thought, he could never conceive such an opinion regarding them.

So. Well, take the case of one who set before himself and regarded in his own mind five and seven. I don’t mean seven and five men or anything of the sort, but the notions of five and seven, of which we say that they are recorded there on the waxen block, and that as to them it is impossible to have false opinion. Of these things I ask if it never chanced, that while people were considering them, and conversing with themselves, and inquiring how many they come to—one person would think and say they were eleven, another twelve:—or would all say and think that they make twelve?

Theae. No, indeed, not all; many will say, eleven.
And if a person has higher figures under consideration, he is still more liable to error. I suppose you are speaking of number generally.

So. Your supposition is right. Consider whether anything happens in such a case but imagining the number twelve, in the block, to be eleven.

Theaé. Nothing else, seemingly.

So. We are thus carried back to our former discussion. The person in such a case supposes a thing which he knows to be another thing which he knows. This we said was impossible; and on this very ground we forced the conclusion that false opinion does not exist, in order that the same person might not be compelled to know and not know the same things at the same time.

Theaé. Very true.

So. Therefore we must declare that holding false opinion is something else than a discrepancy between thought and sensation. For, if it were this, we could never be deceived in our mental concepts themselves. But now either there is no false opinion, or it is possible for a person not to know what he knows. Which alternative do you choose?

Theaé. You offer an impossible choice, Socrates.

So. Ay, but the argument will hardly allow both. Nevertheless, as we must risk the utmost, suppose we venture to be shameless?

Theaé. How?

So. By making up our minds to say what 'to know' means.

Theaé. Why is this a shameless act?

So. You seem not to bear in mind that all our discussion from the first has been a quest of knowledge, assuming that we do not know what it is.
Theae. I do bear this in mind.

So. Is it not then shameless, if we do not know knowledge, to proclaim what knowing means? But in fact, Theaetetus, we have been long infected with an impure method of discussion. Over and over again we have used the terms 'we know,' and 'we do not know,' 'we have knowledge' and 'we have not knowledge,' as if we could understand one another, while we are yet ignorant of knowledge. If you remark, at this very moment we have again used the terms ignorance and understanding, as though it were fit for us to use them, if we are destitute of knowledge.

Theae. But in what way will you argue, Socrates, if you abstain from these terms?

So. In no way, while I am the man I am: but I could if I were a votary of contention. Were a man of that school now present, he would profess to abstain from such terms, and would rebuke us sternly for our conduct. Since however we are such poor creatures, will you let me venture to say what 'knowing' is? For I am clear that it will be of some help to us.

Theae. Oh yes! pray venture. You will have great excuse for not abandoning these terms.

[Having consented, for the sake of discussion, to use the term 'knowing,' Socrates now observes that most people suppose it to mean 'the having of knowledge.' For his own part, he would rather say 'the possessing,' than 'the having:' for a person cannot justly be said 'to have' what he never uses, though he may 'possess' it, like a coat kept in a wardrobe but never worn. This distinction he illustrates by his second parable, that of the mental dove-cage. A person may be supposed to have caught a number of doves (i.e. to have acquired sciences or cognitions) which he has turned into his cage or aviary, and so 'possesses.' But, if he wants to catch one of his doves (i.e. to recall and use one of his acquired cognitions), he has]
to pursue another chase in his mental aviary; and this may not always be successful. He may fail to catch the dove he wants (i.e. he may find that he has forgotten the science he had once acquired) or he may get hold of a wrong dove (i.e. he may confuse things which he could accurately distinguish at a former time).]

So. You have heard then what people now mean by ‘knowing?’

Theae. Possibly: but I do not remember at the moment.

So. They say it is a having of knowledge.

Theae. True.

So. Let us make a slight change and say, possession of knowledge.

Theae. What will you say is the difference between them?

So. Perhaps none: but you may as well hear, and help me to test my opinion.

Theae. I will if I can.

So. ‘Having’ does not appear to me the same thing as ‘possessing.’ For instance, if any one bought a coat, and being master of it did not wear it, we should not say he had, but possessed it.

Theae. Right.

So. Now see if it is possible in the same manner to possess knowledge without having it. Suppose a person had caught wild birds, doves or any other sort, and built a dove-cage in his dwelling and fed them. In a certain way we should say he always has them, because he possesses them. Should we not?

Theae. Yes.

So. In another sense we should say he has none of them, but he has got a power over them, since he has made them subject to him in a domestic inclosure of his own.
He can take and hold them when he likes, catching any one he wishes, and he can let it go again. And it is free to him to do this as often as he thinks proper?

Theae. It is.

So. So then, even as in the previous part of our discourse we framed in human souls a strange sort of waxen figment, let us again make in every soul a certain cage of various kinds of birds, some in flocks apart from the rest; others in small groups; others alone, flying among all wherever they may chance.

Theae. Suppose it made. What next?

So. While we are children (we must say) this structure is empty: and we must think of sciences instead of birds: and whatever science any one has acquired and shut up in his inclosure, we must say that he has learnt or discovered the thing of which it is the science: and this is 'knowing.'

Theae. Be it so.

So. Again, as to catching any one of the sciences a person chooses, and taking and holding it, and letting it go again,—consider by what terms these acts should be described, whether by the same as when he was first acquiring the sciences, or by others. You will learn what I mean more clearly from the following illustration. There is an art you call arithmetic?

Theae. Yes.

So. Suppose this to be a pursuit of the knowledge of odd and even.

Theae. Well, I do.

So. By this art, I imagine, a person both has the cognitions of all numbers in his power, and transmits them to another.

Theae. Yes.
So. And we say that one who transmits teaches, and one who receives learns, and one who has them by possessing in that cage ‘knows?’

Theæ. Quite so.

So. Attend and see what next follows. Does not a perfect arithmetician know all numbers? For he has in his soul the science of all numbers.

Theæ. Certainly.

So. Could not such a person count any sum mentally, or any outward objects capable of numeration?

Theæ. No doubt he could.

So. And shall we say that counting means anything but considering how great any number is?

Theæ. Such is its meaning.

So. Then what a person ‘knows,’ he is shown to consider as if he did not know, though we have allowed that he knows all number. You have heard, I suppose, of these vexed questions?

Theæ. I have.

[Socrates now confutes his own hypothesis. Catching a dove which you acquired and possess, seems to mean learning from yourself what you know already. This Theæetus sees to be absurd. And the confusion of two known things appears to be not less absurd. For this knowledge is shown to produce the effect of ignorance. Why may not ignorance as well be shown to produce the effect of knowledge, and blindness that of sight? May we not imagine, says Theæetus, that the cage contains nesciences (non-cognitions) as well as sciences (cognitions) and that false opinion may take place when a person, hunting for a science, gets hold of a nescience in its stead? By a short elenchus Socrates shows that this hypothesis implies consequences which have been already acknowledged to be impossible. For the man who has thus got hold of nescience mistakes it for science, does he not? Yes, says Theæetus. But how can anybody, knowing two things, take one for the other, or, knowing neither, take what he does not know, for something else that
he does not know: or knowing one but not the other, take what he
does know for what he does not know, or the converse. All these are
impossibilities: and so we, until we know what knowledge is, cannot
know what false opinion is.]

So. We then, following the similitude of the possession
and chase of doves, will say that the chase was double; one
before acquirement, with a view to possession: the other
after possession, in order to take and hold in hand what the
owner had long ago acquired. So even those same things
of which a person had the knowledge long since by learning,
and which he then knew, he may again thoroughly learn
by resuming and holding the knowledge of each, which
he had indeed long ago acquired, but had not within his
mental grasp.

Theae. True.

So. I was just now asking what terms we must use to
speak of such cases, as when the arithmetician proceeds to
count or the grammarian to read. Does he in this case,
although he knows, come to learn from himself what he
knows?

Theae. That were absurd, Socrates.

So. But must we say that he will read and count
what he does not know, after allowing him to know all
letters and all number?

Theae. This again is unreasonable.

So. Would you have us state that, as to terms, we
do not care at all in what way anybody likes to twist the
words 'knowing' and 'learning;' but that since we de-
defined 'possessing' knowledge to be one thing, 'having' it
another, we say it is impossible for any one not to possess
what he has acquired; so that it never happens that any one
does not know what he knows, but it is possible to get hold
of a false opinion concerning it: for it is possible not to
have the knowledge of this one, but of another in its stead, when chasing any of the sciences which flit from him, he mistakes and lays hold on one instead of another, as in the case when he thought eleven to be twelve, getting hold of the knowledge of eleven, instead of that of twelve, the ring-dove as it were within him instead of the pigeon?

Theae. Yes, that is reasonable.

So. But when he gets hold of that which he tries to take, shall we say, that then he is free from error and opines realities, and that in this way there is true and false opinion, and that none of the difficulties which we found in our foregoing arguments come in our way? Perhaps you will endorse my statement. Will you?

Theae. I will.

So. Then so far we are rid of the notion that people do not know what they know: for it no longer happens in any case not to possess what we do possess, whether deceived about it or not. And yet there seems to glance sideways on me a trouble still more formidable.

Theae. Of what nature?

So. Whether the interchange of cognitions will ever come to be false opinion.

Theae. How do you mean?

So. First, as to the notion of anybody's having knowledge of a thing, and at the same time being ignorant of it, not by inacquaintance, but by his own knowledge: next, as to opining this to be one thing, and the other thing to be this—is it not the height of unreason, that, when knowledge is present the soul should recognize nothing, and be ignorant of everything? for on this principle there is nothing to prevent ignorance being present and causing one to know something, and blindness causing to see, if knowledge shall ever cause any one to be ignorant.
Theae. Perhaps, Socrates, we did not arrange the birds well in placing sciences only, but we ought to have placed also nesciences flying about with them in the soul; and the chaser, at one time getting hold of a science, at another of a nescience, has about the same thing opinions false by nescience, true by science.

So. It is not easy, Theaetetus, to avoid praising you. But review your proposition. Suppose it as you state. He who lays hold on nescience, you say, will have false opinions. Is it so?

Theae. Yes.

So. He will not, I suppose, think he has false opinions?

Theae. How can he?

So. He will think he has true ones then, and as to things in which he is deceived, he will be in the same condition as if he knew them?

Theae. No doubt.

So. He will think that he has chased and got science, not nescience?

Theae. Evidently.

So. Accordingly, after a long circuit we have reached our original perplexity. Our critic will again laugh and say: 'My right worthy friends, will one who knows them both, science and nescience, suppose that which he knows to be the other which he knows? or knowing neither of them, does he imagine what he knows not to be the other which he knows not: or, knowing one but not the other, does he suppose the one he knows to be the one he knows not, or the one he knows not to be the one he knows? Or will you tell me again that there are also sciences of sciences and of nesciences, which he who possesses has shut up in some other ridiculous dove-cage or waxen
figment, and knows as long as he possesses them, even if he have them not ready to hand in his soul? and so will you be compelled to run round and round to the same point without gaining anything by it? What answer shall we give to these questions, Theaetetus?

Theae. Really, Socrates, I do not know what we ought to say.

So. Does not the argument, my boy, rebuke us justly, and show that we are wrong in leaving the question of knowledge, and investigating false opinion first? It is impossible to know this latter, before we have adequately settled what knowledge is.

Theae. At this point, Socrates, I must accept your view.

[Are we then to abandon the inquiry—'what is knowledge?' Theaetetus will not do so, if Socrates is ready to continue it; but he reverts to his second definition, that true opinion is knowledge. Socrates says that the whole profession of lawyers and orators gainsays this doctrine: for their whole business is to persuade dicasts that certain things which the dicasts did not personally witness, are true, and that they ought to decide accordingly. If they do so decide, and that rightly, they have formed a true opinion, which cannot be called knowledge, but the result of persuasion. Therefore true opinion and knowledge are not identical. Theaetetus now remembers that he once heard it said, that true opinion with rational explanation (λογία) is knowledge. Things are unknowable, if they cannot be rationally defined: if they can, they are knowable.]

So. Returning to the original question, what is one to say that knowledge is? For we shall not give in yet, I suppose.

Theae. Certainly not, if you do not set the example.

So. Say then how we must define it in order to escape best from self-contradiction.
Theae. As we proposed in our foregoing discussion, Socrates. I have no other suggestion to make.

So. What was the definition?

Theae. That true opinion is knowledge. True opinion is, I suppose, free from error, and its results are all noble and good.

So. The man who led the way into the river, Theaetetus, said 'the trial will prove;' and if we search for this as we go, perhaps the fact will stop us and exhibit what we are looking for. If we stand still, we shall see nothing.

Theae. Right. Let us proceed and look out.

So. This look-out of ours will be a brief one: for a whole profession indicates that true opinion is not knowledge.

Theae. How so? What is that profession?

So. The profession of the mightiest in wisdom, who are called orators and lawyers. These men in their art persuade, not by teaching, but by making men opine whatever they will. Do you suppose there are any teachers clever enough, within the flowing of a little water, to teach adequately the truth of facts to certain persons, who were not present when they were robbed of money, or when they received some other violence?

Theae. I do not suppose they could; but they would persuade.

So. By persuading you mean, 'causing to form an opinion?'

Theae. Certainly.

So. When therefore dicasts are justly persuaded about things which can be known by seeing only, not otherwise, in that case, judging the things by what they hear, they judged without knowledge, though persuaded rightly, if their verdict was good?
Theae. Unquestionably.
So. If, my friend, true opinion and knowledge were the same, a perfect dicast would never form a right opinion without knowledge. But now it seems they are not one and the same.

Theae. As to this I had forgotten, Socrates, a thing which I once heard somebody say: but I now recollect it. He said that true opinion accompanied with rational explanation was knowledge, but unexplained opinion out of the sphere of knowledge: things of which there is no explanation are, he said, not knowable, using that very term; but those which have explanation are knowable.

So. Well said. But what distinction did he draw between these knowable and unknowable things? Tell me, that I may see whether you and I have heard the same version or not.

Theae. I am not sure that I can recall it: but, if another told it, I think I could follow him.

[Socrates says that he too has heard a similar definition, which he proceeds to explain by the analogy of words and letters. The primordial elements of things are not matters either of knowledge or of true opinion, or of rational explanation, but of sensible perception merely. An element can only be perceived and called by its name. You can give it neither predicate nor epithet: you cannot speak of it as 'being,' as 'this' or 'that' or 'each,' or 'single:' for so you add to it something foreign to itself, and it is no longer an element. But the compounds of these elements may be known and explained by enumerating the elements of which they are composed. And to do this is to furnish a rational explanation (Νόγος) of them. Theaetetus accepts this statement, and repeats the new definition of knowledge stated in the preceding section. Socrates intimates that he is dissatisfied with the statement that elements are unknowable, while their compounds are knowable. He further proposes to discuss this question in reference to syllables and the letters or elements of which they are composed.]
So. Hear then dream for dream. Methought I heard some say that the primal elements, as it were, of which we and all other things are compounded, have no reason: for it is only possible to name each by itself, not to predicate anything else of it, either that it is or is not, as in such case 'being' or 'not-being' is attached: while it is wrong to ascribe either, if one is to speak of the thing itself alone. We must not, they say, ascribe the term 'self' or 'that' or 'each' or 'single' or 'this,' or many other like expressions: for these run about and are applied to all things, being different from the things to which they are attached. If the primal element were capable of being described, and had a proper description of its own, the fitting course would be, that it should be described apart from all others. Since, however, it is impossible for any one of the first rudiments to be defined in words, there is nothing for it except to be named only: name is all it has. But, as to the things compounded of these, as they are themselves complex, so also their names being combined constitute definition: for a complex of names is the essence of definition. Thus I dreamed that the elements are undescribed and unknown, but perceptible; while their combinations are known and expressed and conceived by true opinion. Whenever any one gains the true opinion of anything without definition, his soul is truthful with regard to it, but does not know it, for one who cannot give and receive a spoken account of anything is incognisant of it. But after adding such an account, he is capable of becoming all this, and is perfect in knowledge. Have you heard the dream thus or otherwise?

Theaæ. Exactly thus.

So. Are you content with it, and do you lay it down that true opinion combined with explanation is knowledge?
Theae. Quite so.
So. Have we to-day, Theaetetus, in this manner found at last what from ancient time so many wise men have grown old without finding?
Theae. At all events, Socrates, I think our present statement a good one.
So. It may naturally seem so. For what can be called knowledge apart from definition and right opinion? Yet I am displeased with one of the things we said.
Theae. What was that?
So. One that seems to be stated very neatly, how that the elements are unknown, but the class of combinations known.
Theae. Is not that true?
So. We must see. For we have as hostages all the examples which he used in saying what he did.
Theae. What are they?
So. Letters and syllables. Do you think the speaker had anything but these in view when he said what we cite?
Theae. No: he thought of these.

[Assailing the new definition with reference to letters and syllables, and taking as an instance the first syllable of his own name, Σω, Socrates, by a short elenchnus, proves that the syllable is not known, unless the letters sigma and omega are known also. But, starting a fresh argument, he suggests that possibly a syllable is a general notion having a nature independent of its letters. Theaetetus is willing to accept this view. Then, says Socrates, it can have no parts. Why? Because 'a whole' must mean 'all its parts.' Can a whole be a notion distinct from all its parts? Theaetetus ventures to say it can. Socrates asks if 'the all and the whole' are different. Theaetetus risks the answer: 'they are different.']

So. Let us then take and test them; or, rather test ourselves, whether we learnt letters on this principle or any
other. To begin: can syllables be defined, but letters not?

_Theae._ Probably.

_So._ I take the same view. If some one asked about the first syllable of Socrates for instance and said, 'Tell me, Theaetetus, what Sō is: how would you answer?

_Theae._ Sigma and Ωmega.

_So._ This then you hold to be the definition of the syllable?

_Theae._ I do.

_So._ Well now, tell me similarly the definition of Sigma.

_Theae._ How can one tell the elements of an element? For indeed, Socrates, Sigma is one of the consonants, a sort of noise only, as when the tongue hisses; Beta again has neither sound nor noise: nor have most of the letters. So they may very well be called undefined, as the clearest of them have sound alone, but no definition at all.

_So._ So much then, my friend, we have rightly determined concerning knowledge?

_Theae._ Apparently.

_So._ Well now? Have we rightly admitted that the letter is not known, but only the syllable?

_Theae._ Seemingly.

_So._ Do we now say that the syllable is both letters, or if there be more than two, all these, or some one idea arising from their combination?

_Theae._ I think we should say, all of them.

_So._ Take the case of two, Sigma and Ωmega. These two form the first syllable of my name. Does not one who knows the syllable know both?

_Theae._ To be sure.

_So._ He knows Sigma and Ωmega?
Theae. Yes.

So. How then? is he ignorant of each, and, knowing neither, does he know both?

Theae. That were strange and unreasonable, Socrates.

So. And yet, if a person must perforce know each, in order to know both, it is absolutely necessary for one who is ever to know a syllable, to know the letters first. And thus our beautiful argument will have run clear away from us.

Theae. Ay, and in a very sudden way.

So. We do not keep a good watch on it. Perhaps we ought to have laid it down that a syllable is not the letters themselves, but some notion arising from them, having one form belonging to itself, while another belongs to the separate letters.

Theae. Quite so. And perhaps this statement may be truer than the other.

So. We must consider the point, and not abandon in this cowardly way a great and dignified theory.

Theae. Surely not.

So. Suppose it be as we now say. The syllable is one general form arising from the harmonious adaptation of the several elements; both in grammar and everywhere else.

Theae. Very well.

So. Then there must be no parts of it.

Theae. Why?

So. Because, if a thing has parts, the whole must necessarily be all the parts. Or do you say that a whole formed of parts is a notion distinct from all its parts?

Theae. Yes, I do.

So. Do you call the all and the whole the same or different?

Theae. I have no clear view: but as you bid me answer readily, I take the risk of saying they are different.
THEAETETUS.

So. Your readiness, Theaetetus, is right. Whether the answer is so too, we must consider.

Theae. We must.

41 [The first eighteen questions of this section comprise an elenchus, by which Socrates compels Theaetetus to admit, that there is no difference between 'the all' and 'the whole;' and that both terms, in a thing that has parts, mean 'all the parts.' He then puts this alternative, which Theaetetus grants: if the syllable is not the letters, they are not its parts: if it is the same with them, both must be known equally. And it was to avoid this latter consequence that it was taken to be different. But what are the parts of syllables, if the letters are not? Theaetetus admits, that, if syllables have parts, these must be the letters. In that case, says Socrates, according to the doctrine assumed, a syllable must be a single form without parts. And in that case, he now proves, it must be elementary, and so undefinable and unknown. It is not true, therefore, that the syllable can be defined and known, unless the letters can be so likewise. This proof Socrates strengthens by the testimony of experience. In learning to read, did not Theaetetus endeavour to distinguish each individual letter? In learning music, did he not strive to distinguish each particular note; and are not the notes the elements of music? All this Theaetetus admits. And Socrates draws the conclusion, that elements may be known even more clearly than compounds (syllables).]

So. Will not the whole differ from the all, according to your present argument?

Theae. Yes.

So. Well now, is there any difference between all (plural) and the all (singular)? For instance, when we say, one, two, three, four, five, six, and if we say twice three or thrice two, or four and two, or three and two and one, do we in all these cases speak of the same or something different?

Theae. Of the same.
So. That is, six; is it not?

Theae. Yes.

So. In each form of speech we have spoken of all the six?

Theae. Yes.

So. Again, when we speak of all, do we not speak of one thing?  

Theae. We must.

So. Is it not of the six?

Theae. Yes.

So. Do we predicate the same unity of all things consisting of number, whether under the term πᾶν or τὰ πᾶντα (in singular or plural form)?

Theae. Evidently.

So. Let us now state the question as follows: The number of the acre and the acre are the same; are they not?

Theae. Yes.

So. And so of the furlong?

Theae. Yes.

So. Again, the number of the camp and the camp, and all such things similarly? For the whole number is the essential whole in each case?

Theae. Yes.

So. And is not the number of each the parts of each?

Theae. Yes.

So. And all things which have parts will consist of parts?

Theae. Evidently.

So. And all the parts have been admitted to be the all, if the entire number is to be the all.

1 Reading, with K. F. Hermann, δ' οὐχ ἐν for ms δ' οὐδὲν.
Thea. True.
So. Then the whole does not consist of parts. For it would be the all, being all the parts?
Thea. Seemingly not.
So. But can any thing which is a part, be a part of any thing except of a whole?
Thea. Yes, of the all.
So. You show fight manfully, Theaetetus. But is it not in the very case when nothing is absent that the all is all?
So. And will not the whole be the very same thing—that from which nothing is anywhere absent? For that from which anything is absent, is neither a whole nor an all, each of these being equally constituted by the same combination of parts.
Thea. I now think there is no difference between an all and a whole.
So. Did we not say, that whenever a thing has parts, the whole and all will mean all the parts?
Thea. Certainly.
So. Again: to resume my late essay, if the syllable is not the letters, does it not follow that it has not the letters for its parts, or if it be the same with them, it must be known equally with them?
Thea. Yes.
So. Was it not to obviate this result that we defined it to be different from them?
Thea. Yes.
So. Well, if the letters are not parts of a syllable, have you any other things to name, which are parts of a syllable, besides its letters?
Thea. By no means. For if I allowed it to have
parts, it would be ridiculous to abandon the letters, and seek anything else.

So. Decidedly, Theaetetus, according to the present view a syllable must be a single generality without parts.

Theae. Seemingly.

So. Do you remember, my friend, that a short time back we accepted the statement, deeming it a good one, that of the primal elements, of which all things are composed, there is no definition, because each by itself is uncompounded, and that it is not right to apply to it the term 'is,' nor yet 'this,' which are alien and foreign to it; and this cause makes such element undefinable and unknown?

Theae. I remember.

So. Is there any other cause than this of its being simple and indivisible? I see no other.

Theae. Apparently none.

So. Accordingly, the syllable is shown to belong to the same class as the element, if it has no parts, and is one general notion?

Theae. Undoubtedly.

So. If then the syllable has many letters, and is a certain whole, and they are its parts, syllables and letters are alike knowable and utterable, since 'all the parts' were shown to be the same with the whole?

Theae. Assuredly.

So. But if it is one and indivisible, both syllable and letter are equally undefinable and unknowable: for the same cause will make them both so?

Theae. I cannot contradict you.

So. Let us not accept this statement from anybody, that a syllable can be known and expressed, but not a letter.
Theae. We must not, if we concur with the argument.

So. Yet further: would you not rather accept the opposite view, from knowing what happened to yourself when you learnt to read?

Theae. What is that?

So. That all you went on doing in the course of learning was, to try to distinguish each individual letter as you saw and heard it, that their order might not confuse you when they were spoken and written.

Theae. Very true.

So. And did not a complete instruction at your music-master's mean the being able to follow each note, and say what string answered to it? These everybody would own to be properly called the elements of music.

Theae. Yes.

So. So far then as we have experience of letters and syllables, if from these cases we may draw inferences as to others, we shall say that the class of elements admits of a knowledge much clearer than the syllable, and more important for the perfect mastery of each study; and, if any one shall say that the syllable is naturally known, but the element unknown, we shall think he is joking or talking nonsense?

Theae. Undoubtedly.

42 [Recurring to the third definition of knowledge proposed by Theaetetus —true opinion with rational explanation (НОЯО)—Socrates now criticises this adjunct. What does it mean? Three answers may be given. (1) It may simply mean—speech. Well; but all who are not born deaf and dumb speak sooner or later; and all true opinion will carry speech with it; and so it can never be separate from knowledge. (2) ΝΟΥΟ may mean the power of describing anything by the elements of which it consists. Hesiod says: 'a wagon has a hundred
planks. But you and I, says Socrates, cannot detail these: we describe a wagon by certain known parts: axe, wheels, body, yoke, &c. Thus we have a right opinion about it: but, as we cannot enumerate the elements, we have not the full knowledge. Or again, in the case of spelling: perhaps somebody can spell the name Theaetetus quite correctly, having a true opinion about it, and being able to enumerate its syllables correctly: but, when another name, Theodorus, is in question, he is found to spell it wrongly (writing Te for Θe). This proves that his true opinion in the former instance did not amount to knowledge: and thus again we find 'true opinion with rational explanation' to fall short of knowledge.

So. Other proofs of this fact might be shewn, I think; but let us not for their sake forget to keep in view the proposed topic, namely, what is meant by saying that true opinion combined with rational explanation is the most perfect knowledge.

Theae. We must keep it in view.

So. Well now, what does the term explanation indicate to us? I think it means one of three things.

Theae. What are they?

So. The first will be — making one's meaning clear through the voice with verbs and nouns, imaging opinion in the stream through the voice as in a mirror or in water. Do you not consider explanation to be something of this sort?

Theae. I do. We say therefore that one who does so explains.

So. This however is not everybody able to do sooner or later,—to shew what he thinks about anything—if he is not born deaf or dumb? and so all those who have any right opinion, will appear to have with it the faculty of explanation, and right opinion will thus nowhere be formed without knowledge.

Theae. True.
So. Let us not however lightly pronounce sentence on him who defined knowledge in the way we are now considering—that he is guilty of talking nonsense. Perhaps he did not mean to say this, but rather the being able, when asked what anything is, to make answer to the questioner in terms of its elements.

Theæ. Instance what you mean, Socrates.

So. As Hesiod speaking of a wagon says, 'A wagon consists of a hundred planks.' I cannot describe them, probably you cannot. If we were asked what a wagon is, we should be content if we could say, wheels, axle, body, seat, yoke.

Theæ. Quite so.

So. The questioner might perhaps think us ridiculous, as he would if being asked your name and making answer by syllables,—while all we thought and said was right—we deemed that as skilful grammarians we had in mind and stated grammatically the definition of the name Theætetus; though the fact is that nobody can define anything with knowledge, until he fully describe it in its elements with true opinion; as was before, I think, laid down.

Theæ. It was.

So. So too he might consider, with respect to a wagon, that we have right opinion indeed, but that one who was able to detail its nature by those hundred planks, had, through this addition, joined explanation to true opinion, and instead of opinion had got technical knowledge about the nature of a wagon, having fully described the whole in its elements.

Theæ. Do you not think his opinion good, Socrates?

So. If you think so, my friend, and accept this view, that the full description of everything by its elements is
explanation, but the description by syllables or anything more comprehensive is failure of explanation, tell me so, that we may criticize it.

_Theae._ I quite accept that view.

_So._ Do you accept it under the belief that a person is cognisant of anything when he thinks that the same thing sometimes belongs to the same, sometimes to another, or when he thinks that to the same thing at one time one thing belongs, at another time another?

_Theae._ I believe nothing of the sort.

_So._ Do you forget that, when you learnt your letters at first, you and the other scholars did such things?

_Theae._ Do you mean that we thought first one letter, then another, belonged to the same syllable, and that we assigned the same letter sometimes to its proper syllable, sometimes to another?

_So._ That is what I mean.

_Theae._ No, I do not forget; nor do I consider that they who are in this condition have yet acquired knowledge.

_So._ Well, when a child of that age writing 'Theaetetus,' thinks he ought to write, and does write 'theta' and 'epsilon,' and again attempting to write Theodorus thinks he ought to write and does write 'tau' and 'epsilon,' shall we say that he knows the first syllable of your names?

_Theae._ It has been just allowed that such an one does not yet know.

_So._ Is there anything to hinder the same child from making a similar error in respect of the second, third, and fourth syllables?

_Theae._ Nothing at all.

_So._ Will one who has in mind the description by
elements write ‘Theaetetus’ with true opinion, whenssoever he writes it in just order?

Theae. Evidently.

So. Being still without knowledge, though having right opinion, do we say?

Theae. Yes.

So. And yet he unites explanation with right opinion: for he wrote that description by elements which we admitted to be rational explanation?

Theae. True.

So. And thus, my friend, there is a right opinion with explanation, which we cannot yet call knowledge.

Theae. Apparently.

43 [There remains (3) a third meaning of λόγος, viz. a mark of difference by which anything is shown to be distinct from everything else. It is said that, while you perceive only those features which the thing has in common with others, you have true opinion of it only; but that, when you add those which are peculiar to it and characteristic, then you have the knowledge of it. Socrates proves this to be fallacious. You have not a true opinion about anybody or anything, until you are cognisant of the peculiarities in your object. Hence it follows that such a λόγος is already included in true opinion, and that, if an adjunct to this, it is merely superfluous and absurd. So then, says Socrates, all our three attempts to define knowledge have failed. Have you any other conception, Theaetetus? No, says the youth: you have already helped me to say much more than was in my own mind.]

So. So we seem only to have dreamt we were rich in thinking we had the truest explanation of knowledge. Or must we suspend this charge? Somebody, perhaps, will not define ‘explanation’ thus: but rather as the remaining form of those three, one or other of which we said would
be taken as 'explanation,' by one who defined knowledge to be 'true opinion with explanation.'

Theae. You justly remind me. There was one form left. The first was the image, as it were, of thought in utterance: the second, now discussed, was the road to the whole through the elements. What do you call the third?

So. That which most people would define as being able to mention some sign by which the thing in question differs from all others.

Theae. Can you give me an instance of any such explanation of anything?

So. Yes, one which, if you like, I think you may competently accept concerning the sun, that it is the brightest of the bodies which travel in the heaven round the earth.

Theae. Certainly.

So. Now learn why this is said. The fact is, as we were lately saying, that, if you take the difference between each individual and all others, you will get a definition, as some say: but, as long as you lay hold of some common feature only, your account will be about those things which have that community.

Theae. I understand. And I think it right to call such a process definition.

So. But whosoever with right opinion about any thing learns furthermore its difference from others, will have gained knowledge of that of which before he had opinion.

Theae. Yes, we state it so.

So. Now then most decidedly, Theaetetus, since I have come near to our proposition, as it were to a drawing, I do not understand it in the least. As long as I stood at a distance from it, there appeared to be some sense in it.
Theae. What do you mean by this?
So. I will tell you, if I can. Having a right opinion of you, if I add to this your definition, I know you; if not, I have opinion of you only.
Theae. Yes.
So. And the definition was the interpretation of your distinction.
Theae. Even so.
So. When I was opining only, was it not the case that I did not grasp with my mind any of the points in which you differ from others?
Theae. Seemingly.
So. Then I was taking note of some of the common features, which belong no more to you than to other people?
Theae. Of course.
So. Now do pray tell me: in such a case how will you more than anybody else have been conceived by me? Suppose me to imagine that this is Theaetetus, whoever is a man, and has a nose and eyes and mouth, and any other individual member. Will this imagination cause me to conceive Theaetetus more than Theodorus, or, proverbsly speaking, any rapscallion whatever?
Theae. How can it?
So. Or, if I imagine him having not only nose and eyes, but also as the one who has a flat nose and prominent eyes, shall I have a notion of you more than of myself, or of any other with these features?
Theae. No.
So. Theaetetus, I fancy, will not be conceived in my mind until this flatness of nose shall have stamped and deposited in my heart some memorial different from all other snubnesses of nose seen by me (I might say the same of all
your other features), which shall bring you to my mind, if I meet you to-morrow, and make me to have right opinion about you.

_Theae._ Most true.

_So._ Right opinion then in each case will be concerned with differentiation.

_Theae._ Evidently.

_So._ What then will be 'the adding explanation to right opinion?' For if it means, to add an opinion of the manner in which one thing differs from all others, this direction becomes utterly ridiculous.

_Theae._ How?

_So._ Of things whereof we have a right opinion as to the nature of their difference from others, it bids us add a right opinion of the nature of their difference from others. And thus the proverbial twirl of the scytal or the pestle or anything else would be a mere trifle compared with this direction: nay it might more fairly be called a blind man's direction: for to bid us add what we have got already, that we may learn what we think already, is a splendid illustration of a man groping in the dark.

_Theae._ Tell me now what answer you meant to give to your last question.

_So._ If bidding us to add explanation is bidding us to know distinction,—not to have an opinion of distinction—the finest of our definitions of knowledge will turn out to be a nice sort of thing. For to know is, I suppose, to get knowledge. Is it not?

_Theae._ Yes.

_So._ Then, if asked, it seems, what knowledge is, a person will reply that it is right opinion with a knowledge of difference: for the addition of explanation will mean this in his view.
Theae. Seemingly.
So. Yet it is utterly silly, when we are seeking knowledge, to say that it is right opinion with knowledge whether of difference or of anything else. So, Theaetetus, neither sensible perception, nor true opinion, nor explanation accompanying true opinion will be knowledge.

Theae. Seemingly not.
So. Do we still conceive anything and feel throes, my friend, about knowledge, or have we given birth to everything?

Theae. By all that's sacred, Socrates, with your help I have said more than I had in my own mind.

So. And does not our art declare that all these products have turned out to be wind, and not worth rearing?

Theae. Decidedly so.

44 [Well, Theaetetus, says Socrates in conclusion, the discussion of to-day will have done you good service in every way. You will cease to think you know things which you do not know, and your future conceptions will be consequently truer. Also you will be a more amiable companion, more willing to tolerate the mistakes of other disputants. I must now leave you, to keep an appointment with my accuser Melitus. To-morrow, Theodorus, let us meet here again.]

So. Well, Theaetetus, if you seek to become, and do become, pregnant with other thoughts hereafter, the present enquiry will have improved your conceptions; and, if you do not, you will be less severe to your associates, more mild and temperate, not supposing that you know what you do not know. So much only as this my art can do, no more. Nor do I know any of the things which others do, who are—and have made themselves—great and
wondrous men. This midwifery I and my mother received as our function from God, she to practise it on women, I on young, noble and beautiful men.

Now, however, I must encounter Melitus and his indictment against me at the Porch of the King. In the morning, Theodorus, let us meet again here.

44 1 The indictment against Socrates for impiety was brought by his accusers Anytus and Melitus in the court of the ἀφήνων βασιλεύς, situated at the στῆα thence called βασιλική, the Porch of the King.
APPENDED NOTES.

[The references are (1) to chapters in translation; (2) to pages in text and translation; (3) to pages in Ed. I. of Stephens, as shown in margin of text.]

5 pp. 10, 109. St. 147. D. περὶ δύναμεων τι ἡμῖν Θεό-δωρος ὁδὲ ἔγραφε, τῆς τε τριποδος πέρι καὶ πεντεποδος ἀποφαί-νων ὅτι μήκει οὐ εὐμετροι τῇ ποδιαίᾳ, 'Theodorus was describing to us something about powers, proving as to the root of 3 and root of 5, that they are not in length commensurable with the foot-unit:' i.e. shewing that $\sqrt{3}$ is greater than 1 and less than 2, and that $\sqrt{5}$ is greater than 2 and less than 3; that therefore they do not contain unity so many times; that they are fractions, not integers. With ποδιαίᾳ understand γραμμῆ.

H. Schmidt in his Exegetic Commentary tries to shew that what Theodorus taught was a corollary to the Pythagorean Theorem (Euclid I. 47); that δύναμεως mean the powers $a^2$, $b^2$ &c. as in modern algebra, and that ποδιαίᾳ here is a unit square $a^2$, by which the squares of a series of hypotenuses of right-angled triangles, having for their kathetes $a$ and the foregoing hypotenuse, are all commensurable: since

15—3
\[b^2 = 2a^2, \ c^2 = 3a^2, \ d^2 = 4a^2, \ \&c.\] Theodorus may have taught this truth, but it is certainly not introduced here, as the word \(\mu\hat{k}e\i\) proves, shewing \(\pi\omega\iota\delta\iota\alpha\alpha\) to be the linear foot-unit. And that \(\delta\nu\nu\acute{\alpha}m\i\epsilon\i\) mean roots, not the modern 'powers,' is clear from what follows 148 A, \(\delta\sigma\alpha\ \delta\epsilon\ \tau\omicron\ \epsilon\tau\omicron\rho\omicron\mu\acute{\eta}\kappa\eta, \ \delta\nu\nu\acute{\alpha}m\i\epsilon\i,\ \omicron\ \mu\hat{k}e\i\ \mu\epsilon\n\ \omicron\ \nu\ \xi\mu\mu\acute{m}\acute{e}r\acute{t}o\nu\acute{s} \ \epsilon\acute{k}\epsilon\i\nu\acute{n}a\i, \ \tau\omicron\i\ \delta' \ \epsilon\pi\i\tau\acute{e}d\omicron\i, \ \acute{a} \ \delta\upsilon\nu\i\acute{n}\acute{a}tai,\) i.e. \(\sqrt{3}, \ \sqrt{5} \ \&c.\) are called 'powers,' because they have \textit{power}, when squared, to form areas which are commensurable with the squares 4, 9, 16, 25, \&c. So Professors Jowett and Campbell.

The words in which Plato recites the famous doctrine of Protagoras on the relativity of knowledge (\(\mu\acute{e}t\rho\i\omicron\nu \ \acute{a}n\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\nu\), \(\text{homo mensura}\)) are probably cited from that philosopher's treatise called '\(\Delta\lambda\acute{i}\acute{\theta}\acute{e}u\a\), Truth. But the identification of it with the suggestion of Theaetetus that knowledge is sensuous perception, I suppose with Grote, (Plato, \(\Pi.\ p.\ 323\) note) to be Plato's own view, which Grote considers unjust, contending at some length against it (322—336). His main argument is, that implication of object and subject is universal, affecting Noumena as well as Phaenomena: 'cogitata' suppose a 'cogitans,' as much as 'sensibilia' suppose a 'sentiens.' Therefore Protagoras would not have limited the application of his maxim to \(\acute{a}n\theta\acute{h}\acute{\eta}\acute{\i}\omicron\alpha\i\) alone. We must concur with Grote in lamenting that we get the statements and arguments of Protagoras at second hand only; and that the views of others, as of Heracleitus and his great opponent Parmenides, are known to us only in fragments and citations, and from the late biographies of Diogenes Laertius.

Socrates means: as Protagoras applies his doctrine to man generally, he applies it to you and me, seeing that we are men.
APPENDED NOTES. 231

pp. 16, 117. St. 152 B.C. By the illustration here used Socrates proves that the maxim of Protagoras means that what appears to any one 'is' to him: and, as appearance implies perception, it follows that perception is knowledge.

pp. 16, 118. St. 152 C. *Αρ' οὖν κ.τ.λ. Why this outburst? Socrates has just drawn from Theaetetus the admission that αἰσθητος του δυτος ἐστί, perception is of the existent, of that which 'is.' But the Heracleitean doctrine does not allow that anything 'is' (ἐστί) but says that all things γίγνεται 'come to be.' And Protagoras in his Αλήθεια adopts this: so we must infer from what follows. What? says Socrates: did Protagoras then teach an obscure exoteric doctrine (γνίξατο) to the multitude, and tell the truth in esoteric confidence (ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ ἔλεγεν) to his disciples? Did he teach the one to believe in ὄντα, the others in nothing but γνώμενα? Αἰνίπτεσθαι, 'to speak in riddles,' is used of obscure or purposely veiled language. That Plato considered the doctrines which now follow to be involved in the teaching of Protagoras, is evident; indeed he distinctly says so; nor can we doubt that he had foundation for his statement in the writings of that sophist. But it is evident also that he does not here quote his precise words: and it must always be doubtful how far Protagoras was committed to all the refinements of the Heracleitean school, which appear in the next passage and afterwards.

pp. 17, 119. The Platonic complication of the three doctrines (1) the Heracleitean (ὁν ρεύματα κινεῖσθαι τα πάντα) (2) the Protagorean (πάντων χρημάτων ἀνθρωπῶν μέτρου εἶναι) and that put forth by Theaetetus (αἰσθητῶν ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι) is summarised below, 15, pp. 28, 135. The following observations of Grote (Plato, ii. p. 324) deserve special attention, and supply a valuable key to the difficulties occurring in Plato's treatment of this subject from 9 to 15.
and again from 15 to 30, where the definition αὐσθησις is finally abandoned. 'Upon all the three opinions, thus represented as cognate or identical, Sokrates bestows a lengthened comment (occupying a half of the dialogue).... His strictures are not always easy to follow with assurance, because he often passes with little notice from one to the other of the three doctrines which he is examining: because he himself, though really opposed to them, affects in part to take them up and to suggest arguments in their favour: and further because, disclaiming all positive opinion of his own, he sometimes leaves us in doubt what is his real purpose—whether to expound or to deride the opinions of others—whether to enlighten Theaetetus, or to test his power of detecting fallacies. We cannot always distinguish between the ironical and the serious. Lastly, it is a still greater difficulty that we have not before us any one of the three opinions as set forth by their proper supporters.'

12 pp. 21, 125. St. 155 E. τῶν ἀμυντῶν. Prof. Campbell in his learned Introduction to this dialogue examines at large the question, who are the men whom Plato glances at here in such uncomplimentary language. Had he in mind Antisthenes and the Cynics? or Democritus and the Atomists? If Plato had either of these two schools in view, it seems more probable that these were the followers of Democritus. The γηγενεῖς mentioned in the Sophistes (p. 246 &c.) are evidently the same as the σκληροὶ καὶ ἄντιτυποι (ἐν μάλι' ἄμουσοι) in this place. See Campbell, pp. xx, xxx.

pp. 22, 126. St. 156 D. I must retract the partial favour which my notes in the text and translation shew to the interpolated words of Cornarius. I find the view taken by Prof. Campbell and Prof. Jowett supported also by H. Schmidt (though Müller in his German translation
renders the words of Cornarius, and Steinhart does not contradict him): to which authorities I have to add an opinion which I highly value, that of my friend and former pupil Mr R. D. Archer-Hind, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. I had never felt disposed to follow Bekker in printing the passage as an unquestioned portion of the text; yet I hardly know that I regret having given my readers the opportunity of seeing and estimating that which conciliated the favour of so many eminent scholars. My own judgment in a case of this kind I regard as of little or no value.

20 pp. 35, 144. St. 166 A. Socrates, who up to this point has seemed to play with the doctrine of his intended victim Protagoras, as a cat with a wretched mouse, sometimes expounding and apparently supporting it, but only to strike it immediately with a harder blow, now professes to make a formal defence of it in the name of its author, for the express purpose of obliging Theodorus to take his turn in the dialogue, instead of Theaetetus, and submit to an elenchus, in defence of his old friend Protagoras.

Τὸν ἐμὲ is an assumption of dignity: 'a man like me.'

26 pp. 52, 166. St. 179 A. *if he had tried...a man's own self.* In this translation we follow the reading *εἰ πὴ τῶν συνόντων ἐπειθεν* instead of the vulgate *εἰ μὴ.* Prof. Campbell, though he keeps *εἰ μὴ* in the text, accepts emendation in his note, but prefers *εἰ δὴ.* I can have no doubt that *αὐτὸς* must not be referred to Protagoras by reading *αὐτὸ* after it, but that the sense must be as I have given it, *αὐτὸς αὐτῷ, 'a man's own self.*' So Prof. Jowett (who also reads *δὴ*) 'every one for himself.'

28 pp. 56, 172. St. 182 B. ἀλλὰ ἐξ ἀμφιτέρων κ.τ.λ. The meaning of this passage can be none other than what is given in my translation, which is the same as Prof.
Jowett's in effect. But how the Greek construction is to be explained is doubtful. Prof. Campbell's note gives very faint assistance, and neither Heindorf's \( \varepsilon\alpha\nu\tau\omicron\nu \) for \( \acute{\alpha}\mu\phi\omicron\tau\omicron\rho\omicron, \) nor \( \acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\sigma\iota\kappa\tau\omicron\omicron\epsilon\nu\alpha \) for \( \acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\sigma\iota\kappa\tau\omicron\omicron\tau\alpha \), fully satisfy. All we can say of the place is—medicam manum expectat.

33 pp. 82, 209. St. 201, C. It is commonly supposed that the words \( \epsilon\iota\pi\omicron\omicron\tau\omicron\omicron\, \tau\omicron\ \acute{\alpha}k\omicron\omicron\sigma\alpha \) refer to Antisthenes.

44 As respects the definition of knowledge, this dialogue only arrives at certain negative conclusions; namely, that knowledge is neither perception, nor true opinion, nor true opinion combined with rational explanation. Yet, in the course of it, Plato has achieved certain objects, which he had in mind, and which he valued. For (1) he has paid a debt of gratitude to his Megarian friends and hosts, Eucleides and Terpsion; (2) he has shewn what he afterwards declared by his inscription on the Academy, \( \mu\eta\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota} \acute{\alpha}g\epsilon\omega\omicron\mu\epsilon\tau\omicron\omicron\tau\omicron\omicron\omicron\, \epsilon\iota\iota\tau\omicron \), that mathematical studies \( (i.e. \) exact science) are a necessary avenue to mental studies \( (i.e. \) to transcendental or abstract science); (3) he has shewn that minds capable of pursuing the former with success are not necessarily capable of mastering the latter: this he indicates by the nature of Theodorus, which is unphilosophic, as compared with that of Theaetetus, who is an apt student of philosophy; (4) he has confuted doctrines (Protagorean and Heracleitean), which he considers erroneous and mischievous, and has exhibited the errors of the great leader of that sophistic band, which he had, from his master Socrates, a mission to combat and defeat; (5) he has found a noble opportunity to develope those moral and political doctrines, as to the struggle of philosophic truth against fallacious rhetoric, which he mooted in the Gorgias, and developed more fully in the Republic at a later time; (6) he does achieve a positive result by the victorious
assertion of a central seat of thought, to which all perceptions are conveyed, and so converted into ideas: this is ψυχή, the soul of man. The subsequent elenchi, which confute the second and third definitions attempted by Theodorus, seem to me little more than gladiatorial word-fights, intended by Plato to exercise and display the dialectic skill which he had acquired at Megara, and at the same time to amuse and puzzle the minds of his readers by the parables or myths of the waxen tablet and the dove-cage. But he may have had more serious aims in these elenchi than are obvious to my mind.