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M. TULLII CICERONIS
DE NATURA DEORUM
LIBRI TRES

WITH INTRODUCTORY COMMENTARY
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA.
JOSEPH
PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY AT KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON,
FORMERLY FELLOW AND TUTOR OF ST JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,

TOGETHER WITH
A NEW COLLATION OF SEVERAL OF THE, ENGLISH MSS.

BY J. H. SWAINSON, M.A.
FORMERLY FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

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FRATRI DILECTO

JOHANNI E. R. MAYOR,

LATINARUM LITTERARUM APUD CANTABRIGIENSES PROFESSORI,

QUI PRIMUS PUERILEM MIHI MENTEM

QUO ET IPSA PUES FLAGRABAT

ANTIQUITATIS AMORE IMBUIT.

HIC GRATI LABORIS FRUCTUS

DEDICATUR.
Nam, ut vere loquamur, superstitio fusa per gentes oppressit omnium fere animos atque hominum imbecillitatem occupavit. Quod et in iis libris dictum est, qui sunt de natura deorum, et hac disputatione id maxime egimus. Multum enim et nobisvet ipsis et nostris profuturi videamur, si eam funditus sustulissemus. Nec vero (id enim diligenter intellegi volo) superstitione tollenda religio tollitur. Nam et majorum instituta tueri sacris caerimoniisque retinendis sapientis est, et esse praestantem aliquid aeternamque naturam, et eam suspiciendam admirandamque hominum generi pulchritudo mundi ordique rerum caelestium cogit conferi. Quam ob rem, ut religio propaganda etiam est, quae est juncta cum cognitione naturae, sic superstitionis stirpes omnes ejiciendae. Cic. De Divin. ii 148.
PREFATORY NOTE.

In bringing out the First Volume of my edition of Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*, I have to return my best thanks to the Syndics of the University Press for having undertaken its publication, and both to them and to Mr J. H. Swainson, late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, for the use of the collations of various English MSS. made by the latter, and placed by him in the hands of the Syndicate; also to Mr Samuel Allen of Dublin for the loan of two valuable MSS., an account of which is given in the fifth section of my Introduction. I have further to acknowledge with my hearty thanks the assistance received from friends who have looked over portions of the proof-sheets, as they were passing through the press, especially to my brother, the Rev. John E. B. Mayor, Professor of Latin
at Cambridge, and to my former pupil, Mr H. P. Richards, now Fellow and Tutor of Wadham College, Oxford; but above all to Mr J. S. Reid, whose name is well known to scholars from his excellent editions of the *Academica* and other works of Cicero, and to my old and valued friend Mr H. J. Roby. The help which I have received from the two latter is only imperfectly represented by the additions and corrections marked with the signature R., in the case of those supplied by Mr Roby, and J. S. R., in the case of those supplied by Mr Reid. Many of my own notes have been modified, and perhaps more should have been, in deference to their candid and searching criticism.

The remaining volume will, I hope, be completed for publication during the course of next year.

_April, 1880._
TABLE OF CONTENTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introduction:</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Historical Sketch of Greek Philosophy</td>
<td>ix—xxxvii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Analysis of Book I.</td>
<td>xxxvii—xxxix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Dramatis Personae</td>
<td>xl—xlii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Sources of Book I.</td>
<td>xlii—liv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Text and Orthography</td>
<td>liv—lxxvii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix on Davies' MSS.</td>
<td>lxvii—lxx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explanation of Symbols</td>
<td>lxx, lxxi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Text of Book I. with Critical Notes | 1—43

Mr Swainson's Collations of Book I. | 45—64

Commentary on Book I. | 65—228
INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY FROM
THALES TO CICERO.

As Cicero continually refers to the views of earlier philosophers, it
seems desirable here to give a short preliminary sketch, which may
serve to show their relations to each other, leaving points of detail
to be discussed in the notes on each particular passage.

Greek philosophy had its origin not in the mother country, but
in the colonies of Asia Minor and Magna Graecia. This is owing
partly to the reflectiveness belonging to a more advanced civilization,
and partly to the fact that the colonists were brought in contact with
the customs and ideas of foreign nations. The philosophers of the
earliest, or Pre-Socratic period, are broadly divided into the Ionic
and the Italic Schools. Both had the same object of interest, to
ascertain the nature, the origin, the laws, the destiny of the visible

* The modern works which have been found most useful in drawing up this
sketch are the following, arranged in what I consider to be their order of im-
portance. Full references will be found in the two which stand at the head of the
list.

Ritter and Preller, Historia Philosophiae Graecae et Romanae ex fontium
locis contexta.

Zeller, History of Greek Philosophy.

Grote, History of Greece, together with his Plato and Aristotle.


Schwegler, Hist. of Philosophy, tr. by Sterling.

Krische, Die theologischen Lehren der griechischen Denker.


A. Butler, Lectures on Ancient Philosophy.

The Fragmenta Philosophorum in Didot's series ought to have been more
useful than any of these, but its value is much lessened by the want of
discrimination shown in the selection and arrangement of the writers quoted.

M. C.
world. But while the former with the Ionic sensitiveness to all outward influences dwelt more upon the material element itself and the life which manifested itself in its ever-changing developments, the latter (who, if not themselves Dorian, were yet surrounded by Dorian settlers, with their Dorian ideal of discipline, order, stability, superiority to sense, as opposed to the Ionic ideal of free growth, of ease, beauty and nature,) turned their thoughts more to the laws by which the world was governed, or the one unchanging substance which they believed to underlie its shifting phenomena.

The first name in Greek philosophy is the so-called founder of the Ionic or physical school, Thales of Miletus, a contemporary of Solon (b.c. 640—550), said to be of Phenician descent. With him begins the transition from the mythological to the scientific interpretation of nature, the transition, as Grote puts it, from the question Who sends rain, or thunder, or earthquakes, and why does he send it? to the question What are the antecedent conditions of rain, thunder, or earthquakes? The old cosmogonies and theogonies suggested the idea of development under the form of a personal history of a number of supernatural beings variously related to each other. The first parent of all, according to Homer, was Oceanus (Il. xiv. 201, 240), perhaps a nature-myth to be interpreted of the sun rising and setting in the sea. Thales stripped him of his personality, and laid down the proposition that water is the one original substance out of which all things are produced. Aristotle conjectures that he was led to this belief by observing that moisture is essential to animal and vegetable life: probably it was also from the fact that water supplies the most obvious example of the transmutation of matter under its three forms, solid, fluid and gaseous. Thales further held that the universe is a living creature; which he expressed by saying that 'all things are full of God,' and in agreement with this he is reported to have said that 'the magnet had a soul.' It is this portion of his doctrine which is travestied by the Epicurean critic in Bk. i § 25.

The second of the Ionic philosophers was Anaximander, also an inhabitant of Miletus (b.c. 610—540). He followed Thales in seeking for an original substance to which he gave the name of ἄρχηγος, but he found this not in Water, but in the ἄρχηγος, matter indeterminate (i.e. not yet developed into any one of the forms familiar to us) and infinite, which we may regard as bearing the same relation to Hesiod's primeval Chaos, as Water did to the Homeric Oceanus.
The elementary contraries, hot, cold, moist, dry, are separated from this first matter by virtue of the eternal movement belonging to it; thus are produced the four elements; the earth was in the form of a cylinder, self-poised, in the centre of the universe; round it was air, and round that again a fiery sphere which was broken up so as to form the heavenly bodies. As all substances are produced out of the Infinite so they are resolved into it, thus 'atoning for their injustice' in arrogating to themselves a separate individual existence. The Infinite is divine, containing and directing all things: divine too are the innumerable worlds which it is ever generating and re-absorbing into its own bosom. (N. D. i 25.)

After Anaximander comes Anaximenes, also of Miletus, who is supposed to have flourished about 520 B.C. While his doctrine approaches in many respects to that of Anaximander, he nevertheless returned to the principle of Thales in so far that he assumed as the ἁρπυχ, a definite substance, ἀήρ, in contradistinction to the indefinite ἀμφιπον of his immediate predecessor. Air is infinite in extent and eternal in duration. It is in continual motion, and produces all things out of itself by condensation and rarefaction, passing through successive stages from fire downwards to wind, cloud, water, earth and stone. As man's life is supported by breathing, so the universe subsists by the air which encompasses it. We are told that Anaximenes gave the name of God both to his first principle Air, and to certain of its products, probably the stars. (N. D. i 26.)

The greatest of the Pre-Socratic philosophers, Heraclitus of Ephesus, known among the ancients as the obscure and the weeping philosopher, was a little junior to Anaximenes. Following in the steps of his predecessor, he held that it was one and the same substance which by processes of condensation and rarefaction changed itself into all the elements known by us, but he preferred to name this from its highest potency ἐσχή, rather than to stop at the intermediate stage of ἀφή. But the point of main interest with him was not the original substance, but the process, the everlasting movement upwards and downwards, fire (including air), water, earth; earth, water, fire. All death is birth into a new form, all birth the death of the previous form. There is properly no existence but only 'becoming,' i.e. a continual passing from one existence into another. Each moment is the union of opposites, being and not-being: the life of the world is maintained by conflict, πολέμος πατήρ

b 2
INTRODUCTION.

πάντων. Every particle of matter is in continual movement. All things are in flux like the waters of a river. One thing alone is permanent, the universal law which reveals itself in this movement. This is Zeus, the all-pervading reason of the world. It is only the illusion of the senses which makes us fancy that there are such things as permanent substances. Fire exhibits most clearly the incessant movement and activity of the world: confined in the body it constitutes the human soul, in the universe at large it is God (the substance and the process being thus identified).

Heraclitus is the first philosopher of whom we read that he referred to the doctrines of other philosophers. He is said to have spoken highly of some of the seven Wise Men, but condemned severely Pythagoras and Xenophanes as well as the poets Hesiod, Homer and Archilochus. Though I agree with Ueberweg in classing him with the older Ionics, yet his philosophy was no doubt largely developed with a reference to the rival schools of Italy.

In the N. D. allusion is twice made to the obscurity of Heraclitus (r 74, iii 35), but he does not appear in the catalogue of philosophers criticized by Velleius, and this though Philodemus had certainly treated of him, as we may see from the allusions in the Fragments (Gompertz, pp. 70, 81). The reason for this omission is probably that, his philosophy having been incorporated into the Stoic system, it was unnecessary to discuss it separately. See Hirzel, p. 7 foll., and N. D. iii 35, r 74.

We must now cross the water with Pythagoras of Samos, born 582 B.C., who settled at Crotona in Italy, 529 B.C., and there founded what is known as the Italic school. He seems to have found in the mysteries and in the Orphic hymns the starting point which Thales had discovered in Homer; and there can be little doubt that his doctrine and system were also in part suggested by his travels in Egypt. He established a sort of religious brotherhood with strict rules and a severe initiation, insisted on training in gymnastics, mathematics and music, and taught the doctrines of immortality and of the transmigration of souls, and the duty of abstaining from animal food. He is said to have committed nothing to writing himself, but his doctrines were religiously guarded by his disciples (cf. N. D. i 10), and recorded by Archytas and Philolaus, the latter a contemporary of Socrates.

The new and startling feature in the Pythagorean philosophy
as opposed to the Ionic systems, was that it found its ἀρχή, its key of the universe, not in any known substance, but in number and proportion. This might naturally have occurred to one who had listened to the teaching of Thales and Anaximander. After all it makes no difference, he might say, what we take as our original matter, it is the law of development, the measure of condensation which determines the nature of each thing. Number rules the harmonies of music, the proportions of sculpture and architecture, the movements of the heavenly bodies. It is Number which makes the universe into a κόσμος, and is the secret of a virtuous and orderly life. Then by a confusion similar to that which led Heraclitus to identify the law of movement with Fire, the Pythagoreans went on to identify number with substance. One, the Monad, evolved out of itself Limit (order) and the Unlimited (freedom, expansiveness), the Dyad; out of the harmonious mixture of these contraries all particular substances were produced. Again, One was the point, Two the line, Three the plane, Four the concrete solid (but from another point of view, as being the first square number, equal into equal, it was conceived to be Justice). Yet once more, One was the central fire, the hearth of the universe, the throne of Zeus, round which revolved not only the heavenly bodies, but the earth itself. The Decad is the ordered universe surrounded by its fiery envelope. The Pythagorean doctrine of the soul and of God is variously reported. Zeller thinks that Cicero's representation belongs to the later teachers, and not to Pythagoras himself, as it is not supported by Plato and Aristotle. If we may trust the oldest accounts, there does not seem to have been any close connexion between the religious and philosophical opinions of Pythagoras. We are told that he believed in One God eternal, unchangeable, ruling and upholding all things, that the soul was a 'harmony,' that the body was its prison, in which it was punished for past sin and disciplined for a divine life after death, that those who failed to profit by this discipline would pass into lower forms of life, or suffer severer penalties in Hades (N. D. 1 27, 74, 111 27, 88).

The second of the Italic schools was the Eleatic, founded by Xenophanes of Colophon in Asia Minor (b. 569 B.C.), who migrated to Elea in Italy about 540 B.C. While the Pythagoreans strove to explain nature mathematically and symbolically, the Eleatics in their later developments did the same by their metaphysical abstractions. Xenophanes himself seems to have received his first philosophical
impulse in the revulsion from the popular mythology. He con-
demned anthropomorphism and polytheism altogether, and said that
Homer and Hesiod had attributed to the Gods conduct which would
have been disgraceful in men. God is one, all eye, all ear, all
understanding; he is for ever unmoved, unchangeable, a vast all-
embracing sphere. See N. D. i 28. It is disputed whether the
last expression is to be taken literally, implying that the universe
is God, or whether it is a metaphor to express God's perfection and
omnipresence. The chief representative of the Eleatic School is
Parmenides (b. 515 B.C.). He disengaged the doctrine of Xenophanes
from its theological form, and ascribed to Being what his predecessor
had ascribed to God. His philosophy is the antithesis of that of
Heraclitus. While Heraclitus said all is motion and change, the
appearance of fixity is merely illusion of the senses; Parmenides
asserted, with distinct reference to him, that all that exists has
existed and will exist the same for ever, that it is change and
multiplicity which is illusory. It is only by thought we can become
conscious of the really existent; being and thought are the same,
sense can only give rise to uncertain opinion. In such language
we see partly a protest against the vagueness of the conception of
development or 'becoming,' by which the Ionic philosophers en-
deavoured to explain the origin of things, 'You say fire becomes
water, but each thing is what it is, and can never be otherwise;'
partly an idea of the indestructibility of matter; partly an antici-
pation of the later distinction between necessary and contingent
truth; thus one point dwelt upon by him was the impossibility of
any separation of parts of space.

But though truth only belonged to the world of real existence,
Parmenides condescended to give his romance of nature for the
benefit of those who could not penetrate beyond the world of phe-
nomena. He begins with two principles, light and darkness, also
called fire and earth, or male and female; and supposes all things
to proceed from their mixture. The existing universe consists of a
central fire, the seat of the presiding Deity, and of several concentric
rings of mingled light and darkness, bounded on the outside by a
wall of flame. The first-born of Gods was Love, by whom the union
of opposites is brought about. In this we may trace a reminiscence
of the Hesiodic ἔρως (N. D. i 28).

Zeno of Elea (b. 490 B.C.) is chiefly known from his arguments
showing the absurd consequences of the ordinary belief in the
phenomenal world. Parmenides must be right in denying motion and multiplicity, for their assertion leads to self-contradiction. Zeno was in consequence called the inventor of Dialectic. His arguments, especially the famous ‘Achilles,’ still find a place in treatises on Logic (N. D. iii 82).

The clearly marked opposition between the Ionic and the Eleatic views of nature, as shown in Heraclitus and Parmenides, had a powerful influence on the subsequent course of philosophy. Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists agreed in accepting the Eleatic principle of the immutability of substance, while denying its absolute Oneness; and they explained the Ionic ‘becoming’ as the result of the mixture of a number of unchangeable substances. Empedocles of Agrigentum (b. 500 B.C.) held that there were four eternal, self-subsistent elements or ‘roots of things,’ which were being continually separated and combined under the influence of Love and Hatred. At times Love has the upper hand, at times Hate. When Love has the complete supremacy the elements are at rest, united in one all-including sphere (Σφαῖρα): when Hate prevails, the elements are entirely separate. The soul, like all other things, is formed by the mixture of the elements, and is thus capable of perception, for like can only be perceived by like. In his opinions on the Gods and on religion, Empedocles was chiefly influenced by Pythagoras. He believed in the existence of Daemons intermediate between Gods and men, some of which had passed into mortal bodies as an atonement for former sins, and could only be restored to their original state after long ages of discipline. While he speaks of God at one time as one spirit pervading the world in swift thought, in other places he speaks of Gods produced like men from the mixture of the elements, but possessed of a longer existence, and then again we find divinity attributed to Sphaerus and the four elements and two moving powers (N. D. 1 29).

Returning now to Ionia, we see the effect of the Eleatic school in the speculations of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (b. 500 B.C.), of whom Aristotle says that he appeared among the older philosophers like a sober man among drunkards. Instead of the four elements of Empedocles, which he declared to be themselves compounds, he assumed an indefinite number of ‘seeds’ of the different kinds of matter. To these seeds later philosophers gave the distinctive name
of 'homeomeries,' denoting that the constituent particles of bodies were of the same nature as the bodies which they composed, while the unqualified atoms of Democritus gave rise to the different qualities of their compounds by the mode in which they were compounded. In the beginning these seeds were huddled together in a confused chaos, then came *Nous*, the pure self-moving intelligence, almighty and all-wise (this takes the place of the half-conscious Love and Hate of Empedocles), and communicated a rotatory impulse to the inert mass, by means of which the cognate particles were gradually brought together and reduced to order. *Nous* is the soul of the world and dwells in all living things, even plants, as the principle of their life. Whether Anaxagoras called it by the name of God is doubtful. Plato and Aristotle complain that, having begun well, he failed to make full use of the right principle with which he started, and turned his attention to mechanical causes, only having recourse to *Nous* as a *deus ex machina* when the others failed. (N. D. i 26.)

Diogenes of Apollonia in Crete was a younger contemporary of Anaxagoras, against whom he took up a reactionary position and defended the older Ionic doctrine, assuming *Air* to be the one principle out of which all things were produced, and assigning to it all the attributes of *Nous*. Both he and Anaxagoras taught at Athens, but were compelled to leave it on a charge of impiety. (N. D. i 29.)

Of far greater importance is Democritus, born at the Ionic colony of Abdera in Thrace, B.C. 460, the chief expositor of the Atomic theory, which was originated by his elder contemporary and friend, Leucippus the Eleatic (N. D. i 66). Briefly stated, their doctrine is that of Anaxagoras, minus *Nous* and the qualitative diversity in the seeds or atoms. They adopted the Eleatic view so far as relates to the eternal sameness of Being, applying this to the indivisible, unchangeable atoms, but they denied its unity, continuity and immobility, and they asserted that 'Not-being' (the *Vacuum* of their system) existed no less than 'Being,' and was no less essential as an *αρχή*, since without it motion would be impossible. The atoms are absolutely solid and incompressible, they are without any secondary qualities, and differ only in size (and therefore in weight), in figure, position and arrangement. Though too small to be seen or felt by us, they produce all things by their combinations; and the compounds have various qualities in accordance with the differences in
GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

the constituent atoms, the mode of arrangement, and the immense smaller amount of vacuum separating the atoms. Thus Soul, the
divine element pervading the world, is a sort of fire made up of
small, round, smooth atoms in continual motion, and largely mixed
with vacuum. The account given by Democritus of the origin of
the existing universe is that there were, to begin with, an infinite
number of atoms carried downwards by their own inherent gravity
at different rates in proportion to their magnitude, that thus they
impinged one upon another, and gave rise to all sorts of oblique and
contrary movements, out of which was generated an all-absorbing
rotatory motion or vortex. Under these various movements cor-
responding atoms found their fitting places and became entangled
and hooked together so as to form bodies. Thus the earthy and
watery particles were drawn to the centre where they remained at
rest, while the airy and fiery rebounded from them and rose to the
circumference, forming a sort of shell between the organized world
and the infinitude of unorganized atoms on the outside. There was
an endless number of such worlds in various stages of growth or
decay under the influx or efflux of atoms; the destruction of each
world followed upon its collision with another world.

The account given of the mind and its operations was as
follows:—Particles of mind or soul were distributed throughout the
body, and were continually escaping owing to their subtle nature, but,
as they escaped, their place was taken by other particles inhaled
in the breath. When breathing ceased there was nothing to recruit
the living particles, and death speedily followed. Every mental
impression was of the nature of touch, and was caused either by
actual contact with atoms as in the case of taste and hearing, or by
images thrown off from bodies external to us, and entering in through
the pores.

These images were a kind of film consisting of the surface atoms
which were continually floating off from all bodies without any
disturbance of their mutual order, and were, so to speak, a sample
of the object from which they were detached. Democritus also used
the same word (αἰθιαία) for the anthropomorphic combinations of the
finest soul-atoms which he believed to exist in the air, and to be
at times perceived by men. These were the Gods of the popular
religion, not immortal, though longer lived than men: some were
friendly, some malignant; he prayed that he might himself only meet
with the former. Cf. N. D. i 29 & 120.
Democritus closes the series of the pre-Socratic dogmatists, men who devoted themselves to the investigation of Nature as a whole, believing that the investigation would lead to the discovery of the truth. Between these and Socrates, the great regenerator of philosophy, is interposed the sceptical or Sophistic era. That the latter was a natural and necessary stage in the development of Greek thought will be apparent from the following considerations:—

What we are told about Pythagoras and his disciples must have been more or less true of all the early philosophers. The sage no less than the poet believed himself the organ of a special inspiration, which in the case of the former revealed to him the inner truth of nature; those who were worthy to receive the revelation listened with reverence to his teaching, and rested their faith implicitly on their master’s authority. But when different schools sprang up, each asserting their own doctrines with equal positiveness; when the increase of intercommunication spread the knowledge of these contradictory systems throughout the Greek-speaking world; when philosophical questions began to be popularized by poets like Euripides, and discussed in the saloons of a Pericles or an Aspasia; when Zeno’s criticisms had made clear to the public, what had been an esoteric truth to the hearers of Parmenides and Heraclitus, that not merely traditional beliefs, but even the evidence of the senses was incapable of standing against the reason of the philosophers,—the result of all this was a widespread scepticism either as to the existence of objective truth altogether (Protagoras) or as to the possibility of the attainment of physical truth by man (Socrates). If we remember at the same time the incredibly rapid development in every department of life which took place in Greece and especially in Athens during the 5th century B.C.; the sense which must have forced itself on all the more thoughtful minds, of the incompetency of the old beliefs to explain the problems of the new age which was dawning upon them; and on the other hand the growing importance of oratory and the immense stimulus to ambition, held out in a state like Athens, to those who were of a more practical turn of mind,—we shall not be surprised if there was much curiosity to learn the opinions of the most advanced thinkers, and much eagerness to acquire the argumentative power by which a Zeno could make the worse cause appear the better. The enlightened men who came forward to supply this demand called themselves by the name of Sophists, or teachers of wisdom. They were the first who made
a profession of the higher education, and some of them amassed considerable fortunes by their lectures on rhetoric, the art of speaking, which was also made to include instruction in regard to political and social life. The speculative interest of the older philosophers was in them changed into a predominantly practical interest, 1st, as to how to acquire wealth and notoriety for themselves, and 2ndly, as a means to this, to attract by omniscient pretensions, by brilliant declamation and startling paradox, clever and ambitious young men of the richer classes; and then to secure their continued discipleship by careful training with a view to the attainment of political power*

Protagoras of Abdera (B.C. 490—415) and Gorgias of Leontini in Sicily (B.C. 480—375) are the earliest of the so-called Sophists. Protagoras taught in Sicily and at Athens, from which latter place he was banished on a charge of impiety in consequence of his treatise on Theology referred to by Cicero, N. D. i 29 & 63. His treatise on Truth began with the famous sentence, 'Man is the measure of all things;' meaning that truth is relative, not absolute, that what each man holds to be true, that is true to him; and similarly in regard to conduct, that it is impossible to pronounce universally that one kind of conduct is right, another wrong: right and wrong depend upon opinion; what is generally thought right is right generally; what each thinks right is right for him, just as each man's sensations are true for him, though perhaps not for another; there is therefore no more reason for one general assertion than for another, perhaps an opposite assertion. It is plain that this was a sort of conciliation theory naturally springing from the fact of the opposition of philosophical schools: 'each of you are equally right relatively, equally wrong absolutely; there is no need for quarrel.' Protagoras also wrote on Grammar and Philology. Gorgias is said to have first come to Athens in B.C. 427, and afterwards to have travelled about giving lectures from town to town. He devoted himself mainly to the cultivation of rhetoric, but also wrote a treatise περὶ φύσεως, in which he maintained 1st 'that nothing exists' (i.e. doubtless 'in the absolute Eleatic sense'); 2nd that if anything did exist, still it could not be known; 3rd that even if it could be known, the knowledge of it could not be communicated

* The general features of the Sophistic period are photographed in the Clouds of Aristophanes, and in Thucydides' chapters on the Plague of Athens and the Corecyrean revolution, and his speeches generally.
to others. Hippias of Elis and Prodicus of Ceos were some twenty years younger than Protagoras. The former was best known for his scientific attainments: he is said to have given utterance to the revolutionary sentiment of the age in the phrase, 'Law is a tyrant over men, forcing them to do many things contrary to nature.' Prodicus is famed for his moral apologue on the Choice of Hercules narrated by Xenophon. Cicero (N. D. i 118), following Philodemus, reports that he considered the Gods of popular religion to be merely deified utilities, Bacchus wine, Ceres corn, &c.

But the extreme effects of the disintegration of established beliefs were not seen in the teachers, but in some of their pupils who were less dependent on public opinion, young aristocrats who fretted under democratic rule, and were eager to take advantage of the disorganized state of society in order to grasp at power for themselves. Such was the Callicles of the Gorgias, such Critias and Alcibiades, both disciples of Socrates, of whom we have now to speak.

Socrates was born at Athens 470 B.C.; he was the son of Sophroniscus a sculptor, and Phaenarete a midwife. While sharing the general scepticism as to the possibility of arriving at certainty in regard to the Natural Philosophy which had formed the almost exclusive subject of earlier speculation, he maintained, in opposition to most of the popular teachers of his time, the certainty of moral distinctions, and laid down a method for the discovery of error on the one side, and the establishment of objective truth on the other. The main lines of his philosophy are given in three famous sentences: (1) that of Cicero, that he brought down philosophy from heaven to earth; (2) his own assertion that he practised in regard to the soul the art (μανηρία) which his mother had practised in regard to the body, bringing to birth and consciousness truths before held unconsciously; (3) Aristotle's statement that Socrates was the first to introduce inductive reasoning and general definitions. But more important than any innovation in regard to method was the immense personal influence of Socrates. His force of will, his indifference to conventionalities, his intense earnestness, both moral and intellectual, contrasting so strongly with the dilettantism of ordinary teachers, and yet combined with such universal interest and sympathy in all varieties of life and character, his warm and genial nature, his humour, his irony, his extraordinary conversational
powers, these formed a whole unique in the history of the world; and we can well believe that they acted like an electric shock on the more susceptible minds of his time. For we must remember that Socrates did not, like earlier philosophers, content himself with imparting the results of solitary meditation to a few favoured disciples: nor did he, like the Sophists, lecture to a paying audience on a set subject; but obeying, as he believed, a divine call, he mixed with men of every class wherever they were to be found, cross-questioning them as to the grounds of their beliefs, and endeavouring to awaken in them a consciousness of their ignorance and a desire for real knowledge. His own account of his call is as follows: one of his disciples was told by the Oracle at Delphi that Socrates was the wisest of men. Socrates could not conceive how this should be, as he was conscious only of ignorance; but he determined to question some of those who had the highest repute for wisdom; accordingly he went to statesmen and poets and orators, and last of all to craftsmen, but everywhere met with the same response: none really knew what were the true ends of life, but each one fancied that he knew, and most were angry when Socrates attempted to disturb their illusion of knowledge. Thus he arrived at the conclusion that what the oracle meant was that the first step to knowledge was the consciousness of ignorance, and he believed, in consequence of other divine warnings, that it was his special mission to bring men to this consciousness.

The next step on the way to knowledge was to get clear general notions, by comparing a number of specific cases in which the same general term was employed; or, according to the phraseology of ancient philosophy, to see the One (the kind or genus, the general principle, the law, the idea,) in the Many (the subordinate species or individuals, the particulars, the phenomena, the facts) and conversely to rise from the Many to the One. The process of doing this he called Dialectic, i.e. discourse, since it was by question and answer that he believed the proposed definition could be best tested, and the universal idea which was latent in each individual could be brought to light. Truth and right were the same for all: it was only ignorance, mistake, confusion which made them seem different to different men. And similarly it is ignorance which leads men to commit vicious actions: no one willingly does wrong, since to do right is the only way to happiness, and every man desires happiness. Thus virtue is a knowledge of the way to happiness,
and more generally, right action is reasonable action; in other words, virtue is wisdom, and each particular virtue, such as courage or temperance, wisdom in reference to particular circumstances or a particular class of objects. Self-mastery and superiority to the outward conditions of life are essential to happiness.

In regard to religion, Socrates, while often employing language suited to the popular polytheism, held that there was one supreme God who was to the universe what the soul of man was to his body, that all things were arranged and ordered by Him for good, and that man was the object of His special providence and might look for guidance from Him in oracles and otherwise. The soul was immortal, and had in it a divine element. Socrates believed that he was himself favoured beyond others in the warning sign (τὸ δαύδονον) which checked him whenever he was about to take an ill-judged step.

The personal enmity provoked by the use of the Socratic elenchus, and the more general dislike to the Socratic method as unsettling the grounds of belief and undermining authority, a dislike which showed itself in the Clouds of Aristophanes as early as 423 B.C., combined with the democratic reaction, after the overthrow of the Thirty, to bring about the execution of Socrates in the year 399 B.C. The charges on which he was condemned were that he did not believe in the Gods of the established religion, that he introduced new Gods, and that he corrupted the young; the last charge probably referring to the fact that Socrates freely pointed out the faults of the Athenian constitution, and that many of his disciples took the anti-popular side (N. D. π 18, 167).

Our authorities for the life of Socrates are the writings of his two disciples, Xenophon and Plato. The former (440—355 B.C.) was a soldier and country gentleman with a taste for literature, who endeavoured to clear his master's memory from the imputation of impiety and immorality by publishing the Memorabilia, a collection of his noteworthy sayings and discourses. Xenophon was banished from Athens for fighting in the Spartan ranks at Coronea. Plato is distinguished from the other disciples of Socrates as the one who represents most truly the many-sidedness of his master, completing indeed and developing what was defective in him and incorporating all that was valuable in the earlier philosophers. Before treating of him it will be convenient to speak shortly of the 'imperfect' or one-sided Socraticists.
Euclides of Megara, the founder of the Megaric and so ultimately of the Sceptic school, was chiefly attracted by the negative teaching of Socrates, and his followers are noted as the inventors of various sophisms which served them as offensive weapons against their opponents. The main positive doctrine attributed to them is that they identified the Good, which Socrates called the highest object of knowledge, with the Absolute One of Parmenides, denying the existence of Evil.

Antisthenes (N. D. i 32), the founder of the Cynic and indirectly of the Stoic school, was the caricature of the ascetic and unconventional side of Socrates. Nothing is good but virtue, nothing evil but vice. Virtue is wisdom, and the wise man is always perfectly happy because he is self-sufficient and has no wants, no ties and no weaknesses. The mass of men are fools and slaves, and the wise man is their appointed guide and physician. Acting on these principles the Cynics were the mendicant Friars of their time, abstaining from marriage and repudiating all civil claims while they professed themselves to be citizens of a world-wide community. On the subject of religion Antisthenes stated explicitly, what was doubtless implied in the teaching of Socrates, that there was only one God, who is invisible and whose worship consists in a virtuous life.

Aristippus of Cyrene (N. D. iii 77), the founder of the Cyrenaic school, resembled Antisthenes in dwelling exclusively upon the practical side of his master's teaching. He interpreted the somewhat ambiguous language of Socrates about happiness in a purely eudaemonistic sense and declared that the only rule of life was to enjoy the present moment. Wisdom was essential to this, as it freed the mind from prejudice and passion. It was the boast of Aristippus no less than of Antisthenes 'mihi res, non me rebus subjungere conor'. Among the more prominent members of this school were Theodorus (N. D. i 2, 63), surnamed the Atheist, who lived towards the close of the 4th century, B.C. He objected to the doctrine of his predecessor on the ground that it did not leave sufficient scope to wisdom, since pleasure and pain are so much dependent on outward circumstances; and put forward as the chief good not the enjoyment of passing pleasure, but the maintaining of a calm and cheerful frame of mind. Euhemerus, whose religious system is referred to by Cicero (N. D. i 119), was a pupil of his. His contemporary, Hegesias, called σέληνος, from his gloomy doctrine, considered that as life has more of pain than pleasure, the aim of the wise man should be not
to obtain pleasure, but to steel himself against pain. Thus in the end the Cyrenaic doctrine blends with the Cynic.

Plato, the *deus philosophorum* (N. D. II 32), was born at Athens 428 B.C. and became a disciple of Socrates in 408 B.C. After the death of his master he left Athens and lived at Megara with Euclides. From thence he visited Cyrene, Egypt, Magna Graecia and Sicily. After nearly ten years of travelling he took up his residence again at Athens and began to lecture in the gymnasium of the Academia. He died in his eightieth year.

Building on the foundation of Socrates, he insists no less than his master on the importance of negative Dialectic, as a means of testing commonly received opinions; indeed most of his Dialogues come to no positive result, but merely serve to show the difficulties of the subject discussed and the unsatisfactory nature of the solutions hitherto proposed. As he makes Socrates the spokesman in almost all the Dialogues, it is not always easy to determine precisely where the line is to be drawn between the purely Socratic and the Platonic doctrine, but the general relation of the one to the other may be stated as follows.

In his theory of knowledge Plato unites the Socratic definition with the Heraclitean Becoming and the Eleatic Being. Agreeing with Heraclitus that all the objects of the senses are fleeting and unreal in themselves, he held that they are nevertheless participant of Being in so far as they represent to us the general terms after which they are named. Thus we can make no general assertion with regard to this or that concrete triangular thing: it is merely a passing sensation: but by abstraction we may rise from the concrete to the contemplation of the Ideal triangle, which is the object of science, and concerning which we may make universal and absolutely true predication. If we approach the Ideal from below, from the concrete particulars, it takes the form of the class, the common name, the definition, the concept, the Idea; but this is an incomplete view of it. The Ideal exists apart from, and prior to, all concrete embodiment. It is the eternal archetype of which the sensible objects are the copies. It is because the soul in its pre-existent state is already familiar with this archetype that it is capable of being reminded of it when it sees its shadow in the phenomenal existences
which make up the world of sense*. All knowledge is reminiscence. What cannot be traced back to this intuitive consciousness in the soul itself is not knowledge, but mere opinion. Dialectic is the means by which the soul is enabled to recover the lost consciousness of the Ideal. The highest Ideal, which is the foundation of all existence and all knowledge is the Ideal Good, personified as God. He, as the Creator or Demiurgus, formed the universe by imprinting the ideas on the formless chaotic Matter. The process of creation is described in the Timaeus under the form of a myth, Plato holding, like Parmenides, that it was not possible to arrive at more than a symbolical adumbration of physical truth. The cause and ground of creation is the goodness of God, who seeks to extend his own blessedness as widely as possible. He begins his work by constructing the soul of the world out of the two elements before him, the immutable harmonious Ideals and changing discordant Matter. This soul he infuses into the mass of matter, which thereupon crystallizes into the geometrical forms of the four elements, and assumes the shape of a perfect sphere rotating on its axis. The Kosmos thus created is divine, imperishable and infinitely beautiful. Further, each element is to have living creatures belonging to it. Those belonging to the element of fire are the Gods, both the heavenly bodies and those of whom tradition tells us. All these were fashioned by the Demiurgus himself, but the creatures belonging to the other elements, including the mortal part of man, were the work of the created gods. The immortal part of man, the reason, is of like substance with the soul of the world, and was distributed by the Demiurgus amongst the stars till the time came for each several particle to enter the body prepared for it by the created gods, where it combined with two other ingredients, the

* The reader will remember the magnificent ode in which Wordsworth has embodied Plato's sublime conception. The fact which underlies it was well illustrated by the late Prof. Sedgwick, commenting on Locke's saying that "the mind previous to experience is a sheet of white paper" (the old rasa tabula), "Naked he comes from his mother's womb, endowed with limbs and senses indeed, well fitted to the material world, yet powerless from want of use; and as for knowledge, his soul is one unvaried blank; yet has this blank been already touched by a celestial hand, and when plunged in the colours which surround it, it takes not its tinge from accident, but design, and comes forth covered with a glorious pattern."—Discourse p. 53. The Common-sense Philosophy of the Scotch and the à priori judgments of Kant are other forms of the same doctrine.

M. C.  c
INTRODUCTION.

appetitive (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) and the spirited (τὸ θυμοειδὲς) which it had to bring into subjection. If it succeeded, it returned to its star on the death of the body; if it failed, it was destined to undergo various transmigrations until its victory was complete. In all these physical speculations Plato was much influenced by the Pythagoreans.

We have now to speak of his ethical doctrines, which were based upon the psychological views mentioned above. The soul is on a small scale what the State or city is on a large scale: it is a constitution which is in its right condition when its parts work harmoniously together, when the governing reason is warmly supported by its auxiliary the heart, and promptly and loyally obeyed by the appetites. Thus perfect virtue arises when wisdom, courage and temperance are bound together by justice. The highest good is the being made like to God; and this is effected by that yearning after the Ideal which we know by the name of Love (N. D. 1 18—24, 30 al.).

Aristotle (longe omnibus—Platonem semper excipio—praestans et ingenio et diligentia, Tusc. 1 22) was born at Stagira, a Greek colony in Thrace, in the year 385 B.C. He came to Athens in his 17th year and studied under Plato for twenty years. In 343 B.C. he was invited by Philip, King of Macedon, to superintend the education of his son Alexander, then a boy of 13. When Alexander set out on his Persian expedition Aristotle returned to Athens and taught in the Lyceum. As he lectured while walking, his disciples were called Peripatetics. On the death of Alexander, Aristotle left Athens to escape from a charge of impiety, and settled at Chalcis in Euboea, where he died 322 B.C.

Aristotle's philosophy may be roughly described as Plato put into prose and worked out in detail. The vague mysticism, the high poetic imagination, of the master was altogether alien to the scholar, but the main lines of the two systems are the same. Plato's Dialectic method was developed by Aristotle into the strict technical science of Logic: Plato's Ideas were sorn of their separate supra-mundane existence and became the first of the four famous Causes of Aristotle, the formal, the material, the efficient, the final, which are really four kinds of antecedent conditions required for the existence of each thing. For instance, in order to the production of a marble statue by Phidias there is needed (1) the pre-
existence in his own mind of the ideal form which is subsequently impressed upon the stone; (2) the existence of the stone; (3) the process of carving; (4) the motive which induced the sculptor to make the statue, as for instance the desire to do honour to the God whose statue it is. But the opposition of form and matter is not confined to such simple cases—it covers the whole range of existence from the First Matter, which is mere potentiality of being at the one extreme, to the First Form which is pure immaterial actuality, the Divine Being, at the other extreme. The intermediate links in the chain are matter or form according as they are viewed from above or below, as marble for instance is form in reference to stone generally, matter in reference to statue; vitality is form in reference to the living body, matter in reference to rationality. God the First Form, is also the First Mover, the cause of the upward striving of the universe, of the development of each thing from the potential into the actual; and this not by any act of creation, for He remains ever unmoved in His own eternity, but by the natural tendency which all things have towards Him as the absolutely Good, the object and end of all effort, of all desire. The universe itself is eternal, a perfect sphere, the circumference of which is composed of the purest element, ether, and is carried round in circular motion by the immediate influence of the Deity. In it are the fixed stars, themselves divine. The lower planetary spheres have a less perfect movement and are under the guidance of subordinate divinities. Furthest removed from the First Mover comes the earth which is fixed in the centre, and composed of the four inferior elements. Still it exhibits a constant progressive movement from inorganic into organic, from plant into animal, from life which is nutritive and sensitive only into life which is locomotive and finally rational in man. The human soul is a microcosm uniting in itself all the faculties of the lower orders of animated existence, and possessing besides, the divine and immortal faculty of reason. As each thing attains its end by fulfilling the work for which it is designed by nature, so man achieves happiness by the unobstructed exercise of his special endowment, a rational and virtuous activity. Pleasure is the natural accompaniment of such an activity. Virtue, which may be described as perfected nature, belongs potentially to man's nature, but it becomes actual by the repetition of acts in accordance with reason. It is subdivided into intellectual and moral, according as it is a habit of the purely rational part of the soul, or as it is
a habit of the emotional part which is capable of being influenced by reason, but not itself rational. Every natural impulse is the potential basis of a particular virtue which may be developed by repeated actions freely performed in accordance with the law of reason so as to avoid either excess or defect. Since man is by nature gregarious, his perfection is only attainable in society, and ethical science is thus subordinate to political science (N. D. i 33, ii 42, 44, 95, al.).

The later Peripatetics are of no great importance. Cicero mentions in the N. D. Aristotle's immediate follower Theophrastus (N. D. i 35), whose treatise on Friendship is copied in the Laelius; and Strato (N. D. i 35), who succeeded Theophrastus as head of the school in the year 288 B.C. Critolaus was one of the three philosophers who were sent by the Athenians as ambassadors to Rome in the year 155 B.C., and whose coming first introduced the Romans to the new world of philosophy. Cratippus presided over the school during the lifetime of Cicero, who sent young Marcus to Athens to attend his lectures.

To return now to the Academy, this is divided into three schools, the Older, the Middle and the New Academy*. To the first belong the names of Speusippus (i 32), Xenocrates (i 34) and Polemo, who successively presided over the school between 347 and 270 B.C., as well as those of Heraclides of Pontus (i 34), Crantor and Crates. They appear to have modified the Platonic doctrines mainly by the admixture of Pythagorean elements. Crantor's writings were used by Cicero for his Consolatio and Tusculan Disputations. The chief expounders of the Middle Academy were its founder Arcesilas 315—241 B.C. (i 11, 70), Carneades of Cyrene 214—129 B.C. (I 4, II 65, III 44), one of the Athenian ambassadors to Rome in 155 B.C., and Clitomachus of Carthage, his successor in the presidency. They neglected the positive doctrine of Plato, and employed themselves mainly in a negative polemic against the dogmatism of the Stoics, professing to follow the example of Socrates, though

* Cicero only recognized the Old and the New Academy, the latter corresponding to what is above called the Middle Academy, but including Philo. Antiochus himself claimed to be a true representative of the Old Academy. Later writers made five Academic schools, the 2nd headed by Arcesilas, the 3rd by Carneades, the 4th by Philo, the 5th by Antiochus.
they thought that even he had approached too near to dogmatism in saying that he knew that he knew nothing. Probable opinion was the furthest point in the direction of knowledge to which man could attain. The Academic argument put into the mouth of Cotta in the 3rd book of the N. D. is mainly derived from Clitomachus, the literary exponent of the views of his master Carneades, who is said to have never written anything himself. The New Academy commences with Philo (N. D. i 59, 113), a pupil of Clitomachus and one of Cicero’s teachers. In it we see a return to dogmatism combined with an eclectic tendency which showed itself most strongly in Philo’s pupil Antiochus (N. D. i 6, 16), who endeavoured to reform the Academy by uniting Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines with the original Platonism. Cicero studied under him and used some of his writings for the De Finibus. Brutus, to whom the N. D. is addressed, was one of the most distinguished adherents of this stoicized Academy.

We turn now to the two most important developments of post-Aristotelian philosophy, Stoicism and Epicureanism. To understand them it is necessary to look for a moment at the changes which had been brought about by the conquests of Alexander. While Greece proper lost its national life, the Greek language and Greek civilization spread throughout the world, and the Greeks in their turn became familiarized with Oriental thought and religion. Thus the two main supports of the authoritative tradition by which practical life had hitherto been regulated, the law of the State and the old religion of Greece, were shaken from their foundations. The need which was most strongly felt by the best minds was to find some substitute for these, some principle of conduct which should enable a man to retain his self-respect under the rule of brute force to which all were subject. It must be something which would enable him to stand alone, to defy the oppressor, to rise superior to circumstances. Such a principle the Stoics boasted to have found. Zeno (N. D. i 36 ad.), the founder of the school, was a native of Citium in Cyprus. He came to Athens about 320 B.C. and attended the lectures of Crates the Cynic and afterwards of Stilpo the Megarian and of some of the Academics, and began to teach in the στοά ποιμὴ about 308 B.C. He was succeeded by Cleanthes of Assos in Asia Minor about 260 B.C. (N. D. i 37, ii 13, 24, 40, iii 63). Among his other pupils were Aristo of Chius (N. D. i 37), Herillus of
INTRODUCTION.

Carthage, Persaeus, who like his master was a native of Citium (N. D. i 38), Aratus of Soli in Cilicia, the author of two astronomical poems translated by Cicero (N. D. ii 104—115). Cleanthes was succeeded by Chrysippus of Soli (b. 280, d. 206), who developed and systematized the Stoic philosophy (N. D. i 39 al.). Next came Zeno of Tarsus, and Diogenes of Babylon, one of the three ambassadors to Rome in 155 B.C. From this time forward Stoicism begins to show a softened and eclectic tendency, as we may see in Panaetius of Rhodes (180—111 B.C.), the friend of Scipio and Laelius, whose work περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος formed the basis of the De Officiis (N. D. ii § 118), and also in his pupil Posidonius of Apamea in Syria, who was one of Cicero’s instructors (N. D. i 7 & 123, ii 88), and from whom much of the Stoic argumentation in the N. D. is probably derived.

The end of philosophy with the Stoics was purely practical. Philosophy is identical with virtue. But since virtue consists in bringing the actions into harmony with the general order of the world, it is essential to know what this order is, and thus we arrive at the famous triple division of philosophy into physics, including cosmology and theology, which explains the nature and laws of the universe; logic, which ensures us against deception and supplies the method for attaining to true knowledge; ethics, which draws the conclusion for practical life. The chief point of interest in the Logic of the Stoics is their theory as to the criterion. They considered the soul to resemble a sheet of blank paper on which impressions (φαντασίαι) were produced through the senses. The concept (ἐννοια) was produced from the impressions by generalization, which might be either spontaneous and unconscious, giving rise to common ideas or natural anticipations (κοινὴ ἐννοια, ἐμφανὸς προλήψις), or it might be conscious and methodical, giving rise to artificial concepts. In entire opposition to Plato they held that the individual object alone had real existence; the universal, the general term, existed only in the mind as subjective thought. The truth or falsehood of these impressions and conceptions depended on their possession of τὸ καταληπτικόν, the power of carrying conviction. An impression which was not merely assented to, but forced itself irresistibly on the mind, was a καταληπτική φαντασία, a perception that has a firm grasp of reality. The same irresistible evidence attaches to a πρόληψις, but artificial concepts required to have their truth proved by being connected with one or other of these criteria.
The physical theory of the Stoics is a pantheistic materialism. The only real existences are such as can act and be acted upon, and these are bodies, for like can only act on like. But these bodies are not moved simply by mechanical laws, as Democritus supposed. The whole universe is an embodied spiritual force, of which we may call one part passive, one part active, but all is alike material. The active portion is soul, a fiery ether pervading the whole, but having its principal seat in the heaven which encompasses it on every side; the passive portion consists mainly of the inferior elements, water and earth. These latter proceed from the former and are periodically reabsorbed into it in the world-conflagration. The universe itself, as a perfect living creature, is rightly called God, but the name is more particularly given to the soul of the universe, who is also known by many descriptive appellations, Rational or Artistic Fire (πῦρ νοημόν, πῦρ τεχνικόν), All-penetrating Air, Spirit, Reason, Nature, Providence, Destiny, Law, Necessity, the Ruling Principle (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν), and, with reference to his creative and ‘informing’ power, the Generative Reason (λόγος σπέρματικός). The gods of the popular religion represented different activities of the one true Deity. The human soul is an emanation from Him. Although it outlives the body, it will only retain its individual existence till the next conflagration, and that only in the case of the wise. The stars being made of pure fire are divine.

In all this we see the influence of Heraclitus, who was much quoted by the Stoics, though the distinction of the active and passive elements in the universe has been with some probability referred back to the Aristotelian distinction between Form and Matter. They agreed with Aristotle also in holding the unity, finiteness and sphericity of the world, but, unlike him, considered that there was an unlimited void beyond it. That which was peculiarly Stoical was the strong moral colouring which they gave to their materialistic system. The all-pervading fire was at the same time the all-seeing Providence who created and governed all things for the best ends, and makes each several existence, each several fact, conspire together for the good of the whole. It is the privilege of man to be able knowingly and willingly to act as a rational part of the rational whole, instead of yielding himself up to irrational and selfish impulse: but however he acts, he must perforce carry out the divine purpose, as Cleanthes says in his noble hymn:
INTRODUCTION.

ἀγων δὲ μ' ὧν Ζεῦ, καὶ σὸ γ' ἣ Πεπρωμένη,
δύναι ποθ' υμῖν εἰμι διατεταγμένοι.
ὡς ἑσομαι γ' ἀκόςι· ἂν δὲ μὴ θέλω,
κακὸς γενομένοι, οὐδὲν ἥττον ἑσομαι.

From this it follows that the *sumnum bonum* is to live according to nature and it is through virtue or wisdom that we are enabled to do this. One who thus lives is *αὐτάρκης*, in need of nothing. External good, external evil are matters of indifference; they only provide the field in which virtue is to exercise itself. Pleasure is a natural concomitant of activity, but is not a natural end: not even if we count as pleasure that high delight which belongs to virtuous activity, for pleasure regarded in itself has a tendency to lead man away from the true end, viz. acting not for self, but for the whole. Man's reason being a part of the reason of the universe reveals to him the divine law. As the emotions are liable to confuse or to disobey reason, it is the part of the wise, *i.e.* of the virtuous, man to uproot them altogether. Wisdom is not only *speculative*, judging what is in accordance with nature or the divine law, but *practical*, strongly willing what is thus determined to be right. We may distinguish different virtues in thought, but in fact no virtue can exist apart. He who has a right judgment and right intention is perfectly virtuous, he who is without right judgment and intention is perfectly vicious. There is no mean. The wise man is perfectly happy, the fool perfectly miserable: all the actions of the former are wise and good; all the actions of the latter foolish and bad. There may be a progress towards wisdom, but, until the actual moment of conversion, even those who are advancing (*οἱ προκόπτοντες*) must still be classed among the fools. Thus we have the strange union of a highly ideal ethics with a materialistic philosophy. But it was impossible to maintain this uncompromising idealism in practice. The later Stoics found themselves compelled to admit that apart from virtue and vice, the absolute good and evil, there were preferences to be made among things indifferent, from which it followed that besides perfectly virtuous actions (*κατερθώματα*) there was a subordinate class of appropriate actions (*καθήκοντα*). In the same way, since they were compelled to allow that their perfectly wise man, whom they vaunted to be equal to Zeus, had never existed, they found it necessary to allow a positive value to *προκότη*, progress towards wisdom, and to self-control, as contrasted with absolute apathy.

One other characteristic doctrine of the Stoics may be mentioned
GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

here. It will have been noticed that many representatives of the school were not of Greek birth, but only connected with it by the Macedonian conquests. It was easy to rise from this fact to the higher doctrine which flowed naturally from their first principle, the doctrine namely that all men were members of one state, that the world is the common City of Gods and men, that all men are brethren as having the same Divine Father.

Epicureanism may be roughly described as a combination of the physics of Democritus with the ethics of Aristippus. Epicurus (341—270 B.c.) was an Athenian, born in Samos, where he is said to have received instruction in the doctrines of Plato and Democritus (N. D. i 72 & 93). He founded his school at Athens about 306 B.c., teaching in his own ‘Garden,’ which became not less famous than the Stoic ‘Porch.’ Among his most distinguished disciples were Metrodorus (N. D. i 86, 113) and others mentioned N. D. i 93. Cicero mentions among his own contemporaries Phaedrus, Zeno of Sidon (N. D. i 59, 93) and Philodemus of Gadara: and his account of the Epicurean doctrines is probably borrowed from these, especially from the last. Epicureanism had great success among the Romans; but, with the exception of the poet Lucretius, none of the Latin expounders of the system seem to have been of any importance. Cicero speaks with great contempt of Amafinius and Rabirius (cf. Tusc. i 7, and Zeller on the Epicureans, ch. 15).

The end of the Epicurean philosophy was even more exclusively practical than that of the Stoics. Logic (called by Epicurus ‘Canonic’, as giving the ‘canon’ or test of truth) and physics, were merely subordinate to ethics, the art of attaining happiness. Knowledge in itself is of no value or interest. In fact it has a tendency to corrupt and distort our natural judgment and feeling: and thus Epicurus prided himself on being mainly self-taught (N. D. i 72). Truth is based on the senses: our sensations are always to be trusted: error comes in when we begin to interpret them. Repeated sensations produce a permanent image or general notion (πρόληψις, so called because it exists in the mind as an anticipation of the name which would be unmeaning if it could not be referred to a known type). These general notions also are to be trusted as a natural and spontaneous growth. But opinions (ιποληψιες) about these may be either true or false; true, if testified to by the sensation, or, supposing such direct evidence unattainable, if there is no contrary sensation; false,
in all other cases. Epicurus himself does not seem to have carried
his logical investigations further than this.

The only reason for studying physics was to free the soul from
superstitious fears, and with this view to prove that the constitution
of the universe might be explained from mechanical causes. The
two main principles asserted by Epicurus were that nothing could
be produced out of nothing, and that what exists cannot become
non-existent. From these principles he deduced the truth of the
atomic system, differing however from Democritus in one important
point, viz. in his explanation of the manner in which the atoms
were brought together. Democritus had asserted that the heavier
atoms overtook the lighter in their downward course, and thus
initiated the collision which finally resulted in a general vortical
movement. Epicurus retaining the same crude view of 'up' and 'down'
held that each atom moved with equal speed and that they could
only meet by the inherent self-movement of the atoms, which enabled
them to swerve from the rigid vertical line, and he found a confir-
mation of this indeterminate movement of the atoms in the free will
of man. In other respects there is little difference between the
physical views of Democritus and Epicurus. Both held that there
were innumerable worlds continually coming into being and passing
out of being in the infinitude of space. As to subordinate arrange-
ments Epicurus thought it unnecessary and indeed impossible to
assign any one theory as certain. It was enough if we could imagine
theories which were not palpably inadmissible, and which enabled us
to dispense with any supernatural cause. Nor was it at all necessary
to suppose that the same phenomenon, e.g. sunrise, always proceeded
from the same cause. The existence of the present race of animals
was explained, as it had been by Empedocles, on a rude Darwinian
hypothesis. Out of the innumerable combinations of atoms which
had been tried throughout the infinite ages of the past, those only
survived which were found to be suited to their environment. The
eye was not made to see with, but being made by the fortuitous
concourse of atoms it was found on trial to have the property of
seeing. But though denying in the strongest terms any creative
or governing Reason, Epicurus did not object to Gods who did not
interfere with the world or with man. On the contrary he held
that the universality of the belief in Gods proved that such belief
was based upon a primary notion, a real πρόληψις, though it had
been corrupted by the admixture of idle imaginations, υπολήψις.
And he pleased himself with the thought that he might find in the Gods a pattern of the true philosophic life. Perfect happiness, immortality and human shape were of the essence of this πρόληψις. Hence he inferred that they must be composed of the finest atoms and enjoy eternal repose in the vacant spaces between the worlds, undisturbed by those labours of sustaining and superintending the universe which were ascribed to them by other schools, as well as by the popular religion (N. D. i 43—56). Such Gods were worthy of the worship and the imitation of the philosophers. On the nature of the soul and the manner in which it receives its impressions by images from without, Epicurus follows Democritus.

While the ethical doctrines of Epicurus are mainly the same as those of Aristippus, he differs from him in attaching more value to permanent tranquillity than to momentary gratification, and also in preferring mental pleasures to bodily, as stronger and more enduring. Virtue is desirable as the means to attain pleasure. The wise man, i.e. the virtuous man, is happy because he is free from the fears of the Gods and of death, because he has learnt to moderate his passions and desires, because he knows how to estimate and compare pleasures and pains so as to secure the largest amount of the former with the least of the latter. The distinction between right and wrong rests merely on utility and has nothing mysterious about it. One chief means of attaining pleasure is the society of friends. To enjoy this we should cultivate the feelings of kindness and benevolence.

The four last mentioned schools, i.e. the Academy, the Lyceum, the Porch and the Garden were, and had long been, the only recognized schools at the time when Cicero was growing up to manhood. Cicero was personally acquainted with the most distinguished living representatives of each. In his 19th year, b.c. 88, he had studied under Phaedrus the Epicurean and Philo the Academic at Rome; in his 28th year, b.c. 79, he attended the lectures of the Epicureans Phaedrus and Zeno, as well as of Antiochus, the eclectic Academic, at Athens, and in the following year those of Posidonius, the eclectic Stoic, at Rhodes. Diodotus the Stoic was for many years the honoured inmate of his house. He had also a high esteem for the Peripatetic Cratippus, whom he selected as the tutor for his son at, what we may call, the University of Athens. Nor did he only attend lectures: his letters show that he was a great reader of philosophical books, and he left behind him translations or adaptations of various dialogues
and treatises of Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Crantor, Carneades, Panaetius, Antiochus, Posidonius, and others. In a word he was confessed to be far the most learned and accomplished of the philosophical amateurs of his time. As to the nature of his own views, we shall be better able to form a judgment, if we look first at the man and his position. Cicero was much more of a modern Italian than of an ancient Roman. A novus homo, sprung from the Volscian municipium of Arpinum, he had none of that proud, self-centred hardness and toughness of character which marked the Senator of Rome. Nature had gifted him with the sensitive, idealistic temperament of the artist and the orator, and this had been trained to its highest pitch by the excellent education he had received. If he had been less open to ideas, less many-sided, less sympathetic, less conscientious, in a word, if he had been less human, he would have been a worse man, he would have exercised a less potent influence on the future of Western civilization, but he would have been a stronger and more consistent politician, more respected no doubt by the blood-and-iron school of his own day, as of ours. While his imagination pictured to him the glories of old Rome, and inflamed him with the ambition of himself acting a Roman part, as in the matter of Catiline, and in his judgment of Caesar, and while therefore he on the whole espoused the cause of the Senate, as representing the historic greatness of Rome, yet he is never fully convinced in his own mind, never satisfied either with himself or with the party or the persons with whom he is most closely allied. And this indecision of his political views is reflected in his philosophy. Epicureanism indeed he condemns, as heartily as he condemns Clodius or Antony: its want of idealism, its prosaic regard for matter of fact, or rather its exclusive regard for the lower fact to the neglect of the higher, its aversion to public life, above all perhaps its contempt for literature as such, were odious in his eyes. But neither is its rival quite to his taste. While attracted by the lofty tone of its moral and religious teaching, he is repelled by its dogmatism, its extravagance and its technicalities. Of the two remaining schools, the Peripatetic had forgotten the more distinctive portion of the teaching of its founder, until his writings were re-edited by Andronicus of Rhodes (who strangely enough is never mentioned by Cicero, though he must have been lecturing in Rome about the time of his consulship), and it had dwindled accordingly into a colourless doctrine of common sense, of which Cicero speaks with respect indeed, but without
enthusiasm. The Academy on the other hand was endeared to him as being lineally descended from Plato, for whose sublime idealism and consummate beauty of style he cherished an admiration little short of idolatry, and also as being the least dogmatic of systems, and the most helpful to the orator from the importance it attached to the use of negative dialectic. But while Cicero defended the Academic doctrine of Agnosticism in regard to speculative questions of metaphysics, while he held it impossible to give any demonstrative proof either of the immortality of the soul or of the existence of God, he refused, both on the ground of sentiment and of policy to extend his scepticism to practical questions of morality and religion. He held in common with the Stoics that the universal instinct of mankind must be regarded as testifying to a universal truth; and, in common with Scævola and the elder generation of Roman statesmen, that it was the duty of a good citizen to accept the tenets of the national religion except in so far as they might be inconsistent with the plain rules of morality. Thus the conclusion of his argument on the nature of the Gods may be considered to point the way, vaguely indeed and hesitatingly, to the mysticism of later times, when the human mind wearied out with its fruitless search after truth, abjured reason for faith, and surrendered itself blindly either to the traditions of priests or to the inward vision of the Neo-Platonists.

§ 2. ANALYSIS OF BOOK I.

A. Introduction Ch. i. § 1—Ch. vii § 17.

B. Epicurean Argument Ch. viii § 18—Ch. xx § 56.

C. Academic Criticism of Epicurean Theology Ch. xxi § 57—Ch. xliv § 124.

Aa. Importance and difficulty of the subject, variety of opinions, some asserting the existence of the Gods, some doubting, some denying it. Those who believe in their existence differ as to their nature; the Epicureans denying that they pay any regard to human affairs, the Stoics affirming that the universe is ordered by them for the good of man, while the Academy holds that man has no right to dogmatize, and confines itself to the criticism of other schools. 1—5.
Ab. C.'s defence against his critics. He had always been a student of philosophy, but had only lately begun to write upon it, partly by way of useful employment in his enforced absence from public life, partly as a solace under his heavy loss. His manner of expounding the different tenets of each school without stating his own opinion was intentionally adopted to provoke thought. The Academic school to which he belonged was unfairly branded as sceptical. It simply maintained the doctrine of probability in opposition to Stoic dogmatism. \[iii\] 5—v 12.

Ac. Preamble to the dialogue itself. In order that the reader may be enabled to form his own judgment, C. reports a conversation held at the house of Cotta in which the Epicureans were represented by Velleius, the Stoics by Balbus, the Academics by Cotta, Cicero forming the audience. \[vi\] 13—17.

Ba. Epicurean polemic against the orthodox theology of Plato and the Stoics, with their beliefs in a Creator, a mundane God, and a superintending Providence. \[viii\] 18—x 24.

Bb. Historical Section.

i. Epicurean criticism of the theological tenets of twenty seven philosophers from Thales to Diogenes of Babylon. \[x\] 25—xiv 41.

ii. Epicurean criticism of the popular belief, as seen in the writings of the poets or in Oriental religions. \[xvi\] 42, 43.

Bc. Epicurean exposition. Universal consent is a sufficient proof of the existence, blessedness, and immortality of the Gods. Such Gods must be free from care and passion, and are to be regarded with reverence, but without fear. Experience and reason both assure us that they are formed like men, but their bodies are of far finer texture than ours, and are perceptible to the mind alone, not to the bodily senses. That they are immortal is farther shown by the law of equilibrium, which provides that what is deficient in one place is compensated for in another. Thus the destructive forces which prevail in this mortal region are balanced by conservative forces elsewhere. To believe in a divine Creator and Governor of the world is to believe in a God who is full of care and trouble himself, and who causes pain to others, and is therefore an object of superstitious fear. The God of Epicurus passes his time in tranquil contemplation, while worlds are made and unmade by the fortuitous movements of innumerable atoms throughout the infinity of space. \[xvi\] 43—xx 56.
Ca. Cotta commences his reply with an expression of his belief in the existence of the Gods, but holds it impossible to arrive at any certainty with regard to the divine nature. \( \text{XXI 57—XXII 61.} \)

Cb. Weakness of the argument derived from universal consent. Negatively, such consent is unproved: positively, many have held a contrary opinion. \( \text{XXIII 62—64.} \)

Cc. The atomic doctrine is opposed to science. If it were true it would be inconsistent with the belief in the immortality of the Gods. When Epicurus, by way of evading the difficulty, speaks of quasi-corporeal Gods, he becomes unintelligible. \( \text{XXIII 65—XXVII 75.} \)

Cd. Weakness of the argument in favour of anthropomorphism. If the Gods present themselves to our eyes in human form only, that is because our ancestors, whether from superstition or policy, established that belief among us; elsewhere the case is different. If that form seems to men the most beautiful, that is merely the prejudice of race. If it is said that experience shows rationality to be confined to that form, on the same ground we might attribute all the properties of man to the Gods; but reason shows the danger of arguing from our limited experience, and it shows also that a body which is suitable for man is unsuitable for such a being as God is supposed to be. \( \text{XXVII 76—XXXVII 102.} \)

Ce. Even if we grant that there are such images as Epicurus describes, what ground have we for thinking that there is any reality corresponding to them? or, in any case, for supposing that they reveal to us a blessed and immortal being? Immortality you think proved by your doctrine of equilibrium, but the same doctrine would prove the immortality of men. And how can beings be happy who are without activity and therefore without virtue? As to pleasures of sense they are worse off than men. All that can be predicated of them is absence of pain, yet even this is impossible since they must be in constant fear of dissolution from the influx and efflux of atoms. \( \text{XXXVII 103—XLI 114.} \)

Cf. The Epicurean principles, if accepted, are fatal to religion. What inducement is there to worship beings without activity and without benevolence? Epicurus' profession of piety was merely a blind to deceive the multitude. \( \text{XLI 115—XLIV 124.} \)
§ 3. DRAMATIS PERSONAE.

The Dialogue is represented as taking place on occasion of the *Feriae Latinae* at the house of C. Aurelius Cotta. The year of its supposed occurrence has to be determined from the following data supplied by the Dialogue. Cotta and Cicero are both residing at home; the former is Pontifex but not consul, the latter, in spite of his youth, is treated as an authority in philosophical questions, and allusion is made to his Athenian experience, which is however assigned to Cotta. The facts of Cotta's life may be briefly summed up. He was born 124 B.C. and like his brothers Marcus and Lucius (who so warmly espoused the cause of C. against Catiline and Clodius) took an active part in the politics of his time. He belonged 'to that wise and far-seeing party in the Senate, which aimed at checking the corrupt and oppressive rule of the jury-courts of *equites*, and at breaking the power of the city rabble by giving the franchise to the Italian yeomen' (Wilkins *De Oratore* p. 5). After the murder of their leader Drusus in 91 B.C. (*N. D. III* 80), Cotta with many others of the party was driven into exile under the law of Q. Varius (*N. D. III* 81), by which all who had encouraged the insurrection of the Italian allies were declared guilty of treason. He remained in exile throughout the Social War, and only returned home when order had been restored by Sulla in 82 B.C. Shortly afterwards he became a member of the college of *pontifices* and in the year 75 B.C. was elected consul. During his year of office he restored to the tribunes some of the privileges which Sulla had taken from them. On ceasing to be consul he was appointed to the province of Gallia, where he gained some unimportant successes for which a triumph was decreed to him, but he died of the effects of an old wound before he was able to enjoy it. He appears in company with P. Sulpicius Rufus as one of the younger interlocutors in the *De Oratore*; and his quiet persuasive style of reasoning is contrasted with the passionate energy of the latter in the *Brutus* § 201 foll. In the 3rd book of the *De Oratore* Cotta is said to have devoted himself to the study of the Academic system of philosophy as a part of the training of an orator, in consequence of a speech of Crassus there recorded, see § 145 *numquam conquiream ante quam illorum ancipites vias rationesque et pro omnibus et contra omnia disputandi*
percepero. One of his most famous speeches was that in defence of his uncle Rutilius alluded to in _N.D._ iii 80.

To allow of Cotta's being pontifex and not consul, the time of the Dialogue must be laid between 82 and 75 B.C.; and as Cicero was studying at Athens in 79 and 78 and did not return to Rome till 77 B.C., we narrow the possible limits to the interval between 77 and 75, when Cicero was about 30 years of age and Cotta about 48.

Little is known of C. Velleius, the spokesman of the Epicureans, beyond the fact that he was born at Lanuvium (_N.D._ i 82), was a friend of the orator Crassus (see note on i 58) and held the office of Tribune in the year 90 B.C. He is called _rudis dicendi_ (_Or._ iii 78), and is described as holding the first place among the Romans of his sect (_N.D._ i 15). In the _De Finibus_ L. Manlius Torquatus is the Epicurean disputant.

Of Q. Lucilius Balbus, the spokesman of the Stoics, we know even less. He was an interlocutor in the lost dialogue entitled Hortensius and is praised as not inferior to the most distinguished Stoics of Greece. In the _De Finibus_ the Stoics are represented by Cato, in the _De Divinatione_ by Q. Cicero.

In this dialogue as in the _De Republica_ and _De Oratore_ Cicero himself merely appears as a _κωφόν πρόσωπον_: see my note on i 34 s.v. _Heraclides_.

The dialogue is dedicated to M. Junius Brutus, the conspirator, who had been carefully trained in philosophy by his maternal uncle Cato, and had embraced with ardour the Stoico-Academic doctrines of Antiochus. It is a tribute not less to the weight of character, than to the philosophical attainments of Brutus, that Cicero, twenty one years his senior, dedicated to him four of his treatises besides the _Natura Deorum_, viz. the _Orator_, _Paradoxa_, _De Finibus_ and _Tusculanae Disputationes_, and has also introduced him as an interlocutor in the dialogue _de claris oratoribus_ which is called after him. It appears from the _De Finibus_ that Brutus had previously addressed a treatise _De Virtute_ to Cicero cf. i 8; _quem timeam lectorum, cum ad te ne Graecis quidem cedentem in philosophia audeam scribere? Quamquam a te ipso id quidem facio provocatus gratissimo mihi libro, quem ad me de virtute misisti_. Quintilian speaks in high terms of the merits of the philosophical writings of Brutus _x_ 1 § 123 _sufficit ponderi rerum: scias eum sentire quae dicit, with which may be compared Caesar's judgment of the man, _magni referit hic quid velit; sed quicquid volet_,

M. C.
valde volet (Att. xiv 1). It is not to be wondered at that Cicero found such a personality to be rather oppressive at times. In a letter to Atticus vi 1 § 7 he complains that Brutus etiam cum rogat aliquid, contumaciter, arroganter, διώκωντις solet scribere. A list of his works is given in Orelli’s Onomasticon.

§ 4. ON THE SOURCES OF THE FIRST BOOK OF THE DE NATURA DEORUM.

It is now generally recognized that Cicero's philosophical treatises are not to be regarded as original works, but are, as he himself calls them, ‘adaptations from the Greek’; ἀπόγραφα sunt, minore labore sint; verba tantum affero quibus abundo, Att. xii 52. Hence it has been the endeavour of later editors to identify the writers from whom Cicero has borrowed in each case; and careful monographs have been written on the fontes of different treatises, as of the Tusculans by Heine 1863, and Zietzschmann 1868; of the De Divinatione by Schiche 1875, and by Hartfelder 1878; and K. F. Hermann (De interpretatione Timaei, Gott. 1842,) has given reasons for believing that the translation of the Timaeus was intended to be incorporated in a larger work treating of the origin of the world. Not of course that Cicero was always equally dependent upon his authorities. He naturally moves with more freedom when he is treating of moral and social questions, as in the De Officiis, than when he touches on abstruse points of metaphysics, as in the Academica or De Finibus. We should therefore be justified in supposing with regard to our present treatise, that Cicero had not himself read all the different books referred to in §§ 25—43, probably also that he had not read the Epicurean books referred to in §§ 43, 45, 49; even, if this a priori conclusion had not been confirmed by the fortunate discovery, among the Herculanean mss, of a treatise which is generally held to be the original of a considerable portion of the Epicurean argument con-

1 Compare on this subject Hirzel Untersuchungen zu Cicero's Philosophischen Schriften pp. 4—45, Schwencke in the Jahrb. f. class. philol. 1879 pp. 49—66, and Diels' Doxographi Graeci p. 121 f., a work which has appeared since my own remarks were written; also Spengel Philodemus πεπι εἰσεβεσλας, Munich 1863; Sauppe Philodem De Pietate, Göttingen 1864; Nanck Ueber Philodemus πεπι εἰσεβεσλας (in Mélanges Gr. Rom., St Petersburg 1864); Gomperz Herkulanische Studien vol. 2, Leipzig 1866.
tained in the first book of the N. D. I will begin with giving a short account of this treatise, proceeding then to point out the more striking resemblances between it and the present work, and will finally examine more in detail the relations of the two to each other.

In the year 1752 great curiosity was excited by the discovery of a library at Herculaneum in the house which has been called after Piso the father-in-law of Caesar', from the fact that 'its site agrees with Cicero's statement that the residence of the Pisos was visible from his own villa at Puteoli' (Hayter's Report on the Herculaneum MSS, London 1811, p. 31); and also from the fact that most of the MSS found there contained treatises by writers belonging to the Epicurean school, of which Piso was an adherent, and that many of them bore the name of Philodemus, who is known (from Cicero's speech in Pisonem) to have been the intimate friend and instructor of Piso. The difficulty of unrolling the charred papyri was very great, and it was not till the year 1793 that the 1st Vol. of Herculaneumia (containing the treatise of Philodemus περὶ μουσικῆς) appeared at Naples. At the instigation of the English Ambassador, Sir W. Hamilton, the Prince of Wales undertook to supply the necessary funds for carrying on the work more actively, and also sent his librarian, the Rev. John Hayter, to assist in opening and copying the MSS; in which he succeeded so well that, in the four years from 1802 to 1806, more than 200 were unrolled. In the latter year the work had to be abandoned in consequence of the French occupation of Naples, but copies of 94 MSS, after remaining for a while at Palermo, were ultimately sent to England and presented to the Bodleian together with four unopened papyri; and in

1 Comparetti, in his paper La Villa di Pisone in Ercolano, Nap. 1879, maintains that two of the busts found there represent Piso and his colleague Gabinius; and certainly they agree remarkably well with Cicero's description of the pair in his speech Pro Sext. 18.

2 Among the unpublished facsimiles at Oxford there is one of considerable interest to students of the N. D. It appears as No. 26 in the catalogue of Herculanean rolls given in the Preface to the Oxford Herculaneumia Vol. i, 1824, and is there entitled Φιλοδήμου περὶ καλω. Through the kindness of the Sublibrarian, Mr Bywater, I have been enabled to examine this, and find that the real title is περὶ θεώ, the title-page consisting of four longitudinal strips which have been wrongly pasted together, so as to make a portion of a broken letter look like an θ following θε. There are several pages which are fairly legible, but I did not in the short time at my disposal discover anything which would serve to illustrate the Epicurean argument in Cicero.
the year 1810 a volume of *Herculanensia*, edited by Drummond and Walpole, was published in London. This contained an anonymous fragment, twelve columns in length, entitled by the editors *περὶ τῶν θεῶν*. The fragment excited considerable interest owing to the resemblances it presented to parts of the speech of Velleius in the first book of the *N. D.*, and it was ably reviewed in the *Quarterly*¹ and *Edinburgh* during the course of the year. Hayter wrote a reply to the former in the same year, speaking of the book as *Φαῖδρον περὶ θεῶν*. The same authorship had been already claimed for it by Mürr, in a German translation of *Philodemus περὶ μουσικῆς* (Berlin, 1806), in which he announced that among the forthcoming Herculanean publications there was a treatise entitled *Φαῖδρον περὶ φύσεως θεῶν*, which had been made use of by Cicero for his own work on the same subject. Hayter allows that the name Philodemus would naturally suggest itself, but he says the space does not admit of reading so many letters. An improved text with notes was brought out in 1833 by Peterson at Hamburg, under the title *Phaedri Epicurei, vulgo anonymi Herculanensis, de Natura Deorum*. He uses the following arguments to show that Phaedrus must be the author. Since Cicero’s chief instructors in the doctrines of Epicurus were Zeno and Phaedrus, both of whom are prominently mentioned in the *N. D.*, it is natural to suppose that he must have borrowed from one or the other. And as Phaedrus is spoken of in terms of warmer praise (see § 93) he seems the more likely of the two; besides Zeno (§ 94) is said to have attacked his own contemporaries, whereas the latest writer criticized in the speech of Velleius is Diogenes of Babylon, who died not later than 150 B.C. The strongest argument however in favour of Phaedrus is, that in a letter to Atticus (xiii 43), written about the time of the composition of the *N. D.*, Cicero asks to have his treatises *περὶ θεῶν et περὶ Παλλάδος*² sent to him; just as in xiii 8 he asks for *Παναπεύτιος περὶ προνοιας*, which we know to have been used by him in *N. D.* II 118, *De Divin.* i 6, 12, ii 88;

¹ See n. on § 39 under *Chrysippus*.
² The older reading is *Φαῖδρον περὶ μουσαών et Ελλάδος*, which was supposed to refer to two books of Dicaearchus, C. having asked for other writings of his in earlier letters. It was suggested that the former treatise might be a criticism of the *Phaedrus* of Plato, which D. is known to have condemned as too ornate; while the latter was identified with the Βίος Ελλάδος of which some fragments still remain.
and in xiii 32 for Dicaearchus, used in Div. i 5, 113, ii 105, Tusc. i 21, 77.

The question of authorship was thus supposed to be settled, and for several years the fragment was generally referred to as the peri φύσεως of Phaedrus¹; but in 1862 it appeared in the 2nd. vol. of the new series of Herculaneumia published at Naples, as a portion of a much larger whole (12 columns out of 147) bearing the name Φιλοδήμου ΠΕΡΙ εὐσεβείας of which the three capital letters alone are now legible. Whether the remainder were restored from faint traces or on conjecture merely, is not stated; the fact that the volume is found in a collection containing many writings which are undoubtedly by Philodemus, and the marked resemblance of style between those writings and the present² make it at all events highly probable that it is rightly attributed to him. What then do we know of this Philodemus beyond the fact of his connexion with Piso? Cicero speaks of him as a man of elegance and taste, distinguished in literature no less than in philosophy, non philosophia solum, sed etiam litteris, quod fere ceteros Epicureos neglegere dicunt, perpolitus (In Pis. 70); and in the de Finibus ii 119 Torquatus, the Epicurean speaker, mentions him as an authority to whom difficult questions may be referred. That he had studied the history of philosophy is shown by an allusion in Diog. L. x 3 to the 13th book τῆς τῶν φιλοσοφῶν συντάξεως written by him. Zeller states (Stoics tr. p. 390), that not less than 36 treatises by him have been discovered at Herculaneum.³ He was much influenced by Zeno, whose disciple he was, see his peri σημείων p. 24 Gomp. ήμῶν μὲν οὖν διαλεγόμενος οἱ Ζήνων καὶ λόγους τῶν ἀντιδοξαζόντων τοὺς ἐκκειμένους προεφέρετο καὶ ταυτάς ἀπαντήσεις πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἡρῴδει, also p. 26, and cf. the reference to Z.’s lectures in the peri εὐσεβείας p. 118 Gomp. [a] Ζήνων γενόμεναι συναγωγαὶ διασαφοῦς; some of his treatises are professedly based upon those of Zeno, e.g. Petersen p. 8, mentions one under the Latin title De moribus ac vitis, opus ex libro Zenonis contractum; the Herculanean vol. vi, Naples 1839, contains another entitled peri τῆς τῶν θεῶν εὐστοχομάνης διαγωγῆς κατὰ Ζήνωνα; and in the preface to

¹ It had been however already claimed for Philodemus in 1818, by Blomfield on Ἐσχ. Ag. i. 362, and in the Italian Bullet. Archeolog. for 1835 p. 46.
³ Gompers has stated all that is known on this point in a letter printed by Diels, Doxographi p. 539.
⁴ Comparetti (i. c. p. 5) has more recently fixed the number at 26.
INTRODUCTION.

the Oxford *Herculaneumia*, vol. i p. v, the words Ζήνωνς σχολῶν occur in the mutilated title of the Philodemian treatise numbered 1389. This is of importance in regard to the question whether the resemblances between Cicero and Philodemus are to be explained by direct copying on the part of the former, or whether both writers may not have borrowed from Zeno.

I proceed now to point out what is the nature of these resemblances, and I think it will be seen that they cannot be simply set aside by such remarks as Schömann's (Introd. p. 18) 'ähnliche Angaben und Urtheile, wie dort, kamen ohne allen Zweifel in gar manchen anderen epikureischen Schriften ebenfalls vor.' General arguments no doubt might be a part of the common Epicurean tradition, but it is most improbable that this should be the case with regard to minute points of criticism and to particular citations from the writings of opponents, some of them misinterpreted, and likely therefore to have been exposed by hostile criticism, if they were in common use. Such references are those to Xenophon's Ἀποκλήματα (Phil. p. 71, *N. D.* 31); to the Φυσικὸς of Antisthenes (Phil. p. 72, *N. D.* 32), in support of a proposition of which we have no information from other sources; to the 3rd book of Aristotle's περὶ φιλοσοφίας (Phil. p. 72; *N. D.* 33); to Chrysippus περὶ θεῶν bk i (Phil. p. 77, *N. D.* 41), treating of the Stoic theology in general, bk ii (Phil. p. 80, *N. D.* 41) containing his explanation of the mythology of Orpheus, Musaeus, Homer and Hesiod; to the περὶ τῆς Αθηνᾶς of Diogenes of Babylon (Phil. p. 82, *N. D.* 41).

Assuming then, as we may, that there is an undoubted connexion between the two treatises, the next point is to determine its nature and extent. If we compare them broadly together, we find the Epicurean argument in the 1st book of the *N. D.* made up of three parts, (1) a preliminary polemic against the Platonic and Stoic views of the origin of the world and the nature of God (**18—24**); (2) a critical review of earlier philosophers from Thales to Diogenes of Babylon, followed by a brief notice of the popular mythology in Greece and elsewhere (**25—43**); (3) an exposition of the Epicurean theology. Similarly the Philodemian treatise, as we have it, is made up of three parts (1) a criticism of the popular mythology (pp. 5—61); (2) a criticism of older philosophers (pp. 65—89); (3) an exposition of the Epicurean theology (pp. 93—151). The resemblances noticed above belong to the second, or historical section, which we will now examine more closely. Cicero's list of philosophers is as fol-
lows: (1) Thales, (2) Anaximander, (3) Anaximenes, (4) Anaxagoras, (5) Alcmaeon, (6) Pythagoras, (7) Xenophanes, (8) Parmenides, (9) Empedocles, (10) Protagoras, (11) Democritus, (12) Diogenes of Apollonia, (13) Plato, (14) Xenophon, (15) Antisthenes, (16) Socrates, (17) Aristotle, (18) Xenocrates, (19) Heraclides, (20) Theophrastus, (21) Strato, (22) Zeno, (23) Ariston, (24) Cleanthes, (25) Persaeus, (26) Chrysippus, (27) Diogenes of Babylon. The first name which we meet with in the Philodemian fragment is Pythagoras p. 66, but there are clear allusions to Anaximenes (1) in p. 65, to Anaxagoras (2) p. 66 (see nn. on the corresponding passages in the N. D.): there is no reference to Alcmaeon or Xenophanes, but after Pythagoras (3) follows Parmenides (4) in p. 67, then Democritus (5) p. 69, Heraclitus (6) p. 70; Diogenes of Apollonia (7) p. 70; Prodicus, alluded to but not named, (8) p. 71, cf. p. 76; Xenophon (9) p. 71; Antisthenes (10) p. 72; Aristotle (11) p. 72; Theophrastus (12) possibly alluded to in p. 73, see n. on N. D. i 35; Persaeus (13) p. 75; Chrysippus (14) pp. 77—82; Diogenes of Babylon (15) p. 82; Cleanthes (16) is incidentally alluded to in p. 80, and Zeno (17) in p. 84.

Considering the very fragmentary state of the Philodemian treatise from p. 65 to 75 (i.e. till we reach Persaeus), it is remarkable that more than half of Cicero's list should be found in it almost in the same order; that in both Aristippus should be omitted; lastly that both should end with Diogenes, making no mention of his successors Antipater and Panaetius, the latter of whom exercised a far greater influence over the Romans than any other Stoic. It appears strange how ever that Heraclitus and Prodicus are not included in Cicero's list. Hirzel thinks this is because Philodemus identifies the teaching of Persaeus with that of Prodicus p. 76, and the teaching of Heraclitus with that of Chrysippus p. 81; to which Schwencke objects that Philod. gives the doctrines of Prodicus and Heraclitus by themselves in the first instance, and only mentions their agreement with

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1 The names which appears only in one list are printed in italics. Diels has facilitated the comparison of Cicero and Philodemus by printing them in parallel columns (Dozog. pp. 531—550).  
2 The order is sometimes hardly what we should expect, e.g. the Xenophontic Socrates comes after Plato and before Antisthenes.  
3 This is especially remarkable in a writer like Philodemus, who, as we know from the anonymous treatise published by Comparetti, Turin 1875, had touched on these later Stoics in other writings.
the Stoics in a later page, and that Cicero wrote in too great a hurry either to foresee this, or to correct what he had already written. Perhaps this is going too far. It is plain that Cicero felt the necessity for compressing very much the historical review, and a simple means of doing this was to omit repetitions. He was also about to speak of Prodicas in Cotta's reply (N. D. i 118), and he alludes to Heraclitus as the forerunner of the Stoics in iii 35, stating that, as he chose to be unintelligible, it was useless to discuss his opinions.

So far there appears to be no improbability in Cicero's having borrowed directly from Philodemus, but it becomes more difficult to suppose this, when we compare the two writings more minutely. Thus, while both criticize Anaximenes, Ph. has nothing in common with C., but merely speaks of air as without sensation; while there is a fair agreement as to the doctrines of Anaxagoras, there is no criticism in Ph.; on Pythagoras and Democritus Ph. is too fragmentary to allow of comparison; on Parmenides there is hardly any agreement; on Diogenes they agree to a certain extent, but Ph. is much fuller; on Xenophon Ph. quotes correctly, as far as the fragment is legible, but gives no criticism, while C. is wrong throughout; on Antisthenes they agree, but Ph. has no criticism; on Aristotle there is nothing legible in Ph. beyond the actual reference; on Theophrastus Ph. has merely a reference to a treatise not mentioned by C.; on Persaeus there is substantial agreement, but Ph. is much fuller, he does not however give anything of the criticism we find in C.; between Theophrastus and Persaeus C. has some 32 lines on Strato, Zeno, and Cleanthes, to which there was probably something corresponding in pp. 73—75 of Ph., where we can trace broken allusions to the universal reason and the power that holds all things together, but the names are lost; while there is general agreement on Chrysippus (see my n. on N. D. i 39), Ph. is much fuller, except where C. dilates on the Stoic idea of the Divine Law; so on Diogenes of Babylon.

This slight sketch will show that, if C. has borrowed from Ph. he has used him with the utmost freedom, omitting without scruple, and, if we may weigh the evidence of the fragments according to the ordinary law of chances, one would say, adding not unfrequently from other sources. It is true that the absence of criticism after each name in Philodemus, may be explained by the fact that he reserves it all for the end (pp. 84—89). But then when we examine this later criticism, we find nothing in common between it and that
in C., as will be seen from the following summary of Philodemus: 'The Stoics in general are far more opposed to the established religion than we Epicureans; if they grant the existence of a deity, which they do not at all, they at any rate acknowledge no more than one God, while they impose on the multitude with their names and allegories. They are worse atheists, with their ethers and elements, than Diagoras, who confessed the existence and power of the Gods. By asserting that God cannot be the author of evil they do away with religious sanctions, which we retain; they call the Gods mortal, we assert their eternity. Even if they allowed punishment in word, who could fear these senseless elements? None would regard Gods incapable of motion or of sense; or pay any heed to the moral teaching of those who are in doubt whether there are Gods or what is their nature, or who plainly deny them: men might even be encouraged to sin by those who speak of endless strife among the Gods. Thus the philosophers are reducing men to the state of brutes, for they remove the check of religion and also of public opinion, which are the best helps for restraining injustice.' It is plain that there is more of serious thought and of a real interest in religion and morality here, than there is in the flippant sarcasm put into the mouth of Velleius.

We go on to the other sections of Philodemus. The first, dealing with the popular mythology, is made by C. a mere appendix to the section we have just been considering; and while it occupies some 60 pp. in Ph. it is condensed into a dozen lines by C. It will be seen from my nn. on §§ 42, 43 that most of the points touched by C. are fully treated by Ph., but there is no allusion to the Magians in the extant fragments of the latter. In the 3rd section, as far as we can judge from broken phrases (see n. on § 49 doct eam esse vim), Ph. seems to have treated of the divine nature in a manner not unlike C.; he speaks of the Gods as free from anger and favour and absolutely perfect and blessed, and he is equally strong against superstitious fears; but he makes religion a much more practical thing (see the passages quoted on § 44 quod beatum esset). Thus 'piety is productive of innocence and harmlessness (p. 95); by innocence man may imitate the blessedness of the Gods (p. 148); Epicurus honoured his parents, loved his brothers, observed all religious duties (p. 118), and charged his disciples to do the same in obedience to the laws (p. 126), but not for that reason only, but also because prayer is natural when we think of beings surpassing in power and excellence (p. 128); while
other philosophers have dissembled their views as to the immorality of parts of the popular religion, Epicurus laid down the plain rule that we must conform except where impiety is commanded (p. 120); God is friendly to the good, estranged from the bad (124); if Epicurus had been a hypocrite he would never have taken such pains in writing on the subject of religion (p. 134). Hirzel p. 15 foll. calls attention to the fact that certain points e.g. the trovulia and the quasi corpus mentioned by C. are not referred to Epicurus by Diog. L. and may probably be considered later developments of Epicurean doctrine.

There is still the first section of Cicero to consider, which has nothing corresponding to it in the fragments of Philodemus. It is a preliminary criticism of the Platonic and Stoic theories of the origin of the world, turning chiefly on the difficulties involved in the idea of creation at any given moment. The argument is similar to that contained in Lucr. v. 110—234, and Plut. Pl. Phil. p. 881, but given more fully than in either. We find no allusion to it in the following sections of the N. D. To this is joined an argument (repeated in the later sections) against a mundane deity, as inconsistent with the divine attributes of rationality and blessedness. Such a preliminary criticism comes naturally enough to prepare the way for the positive statements of the Epicurean theology, as there was no body of belief which could be upheld against the latter, except such as was derived either from Plato or the Stoics.

When we try to determine the connexion between this and the historical section which follows, there is much to suggest the conclusion of Krische (p. 23) and Hirzel, that the latter section was inserted as an afterthought. Thus in § 36 we find ut jam ad vestros Balbe veniam, though the Stoics, whom Balbus represents, had been already treated of in the earlier section; similarly in regard to Plato (§ 30 compared with § 18); and the inconsistency is still more manifest in § 25, if we insert alia with most editors, reading haec quidem vestra, qualia vero alia sint ab ultimo repetam (see my notes on these passages). It is further objected that there are no subsequent allusions to the historical section either by Cotta or Balbus; but Cotta does allude to it three times, §§ 63, 91, 94, and, even if he had not done so, there would be nothing surprising in it, since Cicero, as Schwencke remarks p. 56, is not likely to have had any Greek treatise at hand in which the historical errors of the Epicureans were pointed out; and there was no occasion for Balbus to recur to an
exposition which had been already dealt with by Cotta. His allusions to the remainder of the speech of Velleius are very scanty (II 47 and 73). On the whole I think the framework of the book requires some such review of previous philosophers to justify the frequent references to the diversity of opinion on the subject of theology, e.g. in § 1 and § 13 ponam in medio sententias philosophorum, and then si consenserint omnes, in § 14 doctissimorum hominum tanta dissenso; in § 42 exposui non philosophorum judicia, sed delirantium somnia, compared with § 94; expressions which would, I think, be less appropriate, if Cicero confined himself strictly to the three schools represented by the disputants. The repetitions complained of are scarcely to be called repetitions, for they leave out the main point in the previous argument against Plato and the Stoics, viz. the question as to a creation in time; but as far as they are such, they may be explained by the haste and carelessness which characterize the whole treatise, and of which we shall see instances in the latter half of the 1st book; the special difficulty of § 25 is, I think, removed by the explanation given in my note.

There is one other point which is likely to strike the reader, and which calls for a few remarks, and that is the inferiority of the historical section to the other two. In the 1st section there is the usual Epicurean arrogance of manner, but the objections stated are in themselves of interest and importance; and so as regards the arguments of the 3rd section; but in the 2nd section we meet with little besides misrepresentation and abuse. Is this a mark of a different authority having been used, or has C. wished to give us a sample of the way in which Epicureans, such as Colotes, composed their histories of philosophy, and at the same time to illustrate the charge he has himself brought against the Epicureans, vestra solum legitis, ceteros causa incognita condemnatis, N.D. II 73?

What then is the general conclusion to which we are led by this comparison of the two treatises? The impression left upon my own mind is that as far as the historical section extends certainly, and possibly for the expository section also, both have copied a common original, most likely Zeno, the teacher of both Philodemus and Cicero; whom Cotta calls the spokesman (coryphaeus) of the school, and of whom he makes the suggestive remark, that he attended his lectures at the request of Philo the Academician, in order that he might the better understand how well the latter had succeeded in refuting him, while he also compares his style of arguing to
INTRODUCTION.

that of Velleius (§ 59). It would further seem that Cicero has preserved Zeno's sharp sayings, which were softened down by the gentler Philodemus, who may also have added a good deal of his own in the later section. But then why does the historical review stop at the middle of the 2nd century B.C.? It seems as if we must go back a step further and trace Zeno's criticisms to Apollodorus ὁ κυνοτυπό-παρων, the predecessor of Zeno in the chair of Epicurus, who flourished towards the end of the 2nd century B.C. and is said to have written more than 400 books (Zeller Stoics tr. p. 389).

With regard to the sources of the other two sections I do not think we are yet able to arrive at any positive conclusion. It is possible that Zeno wrote a treatise περὶ θεῶν in four books, the 1st disproving what might be considered the orthodox theology of Plato and the Stoics, the 2nd giving a history of the traditional beliefs, the 3rd a history of philosophical speculation on the same subject, the 4th containing the views of the most advanced Epicureans; but it is equally possible that Phaedrus (as suggested by the letter to Atticus) may have been the authority copied by Cicero for his first and last sections; on the other hand it is quite possible that C. may have found his treatise unsuited to his purpose.

We proceed now to inquire what is the original source of the criticism of Epicurus which is put in the mouth of Cotta. It is natural at first sight to suppose that this, as well as the criticism of the Stoical doctrines assigned to Cotta in the third book, is derived from Clitomachus, the editor of the writings of the great Academic critic, Carneades. But further consideration shows that there are many difficulties in the way of this identification. Carneades is quoted by name in bk. iii 29, 41, but never in bk. i, where, on the contrary, we find Posidonius referred to as the authority from whom a part of the argument is borrowed (§ 123); and Schwenckes has pointed out the strong vein of Stoicism which runs through the speech. Compare for instance the jest at the expense of the Academy in § 80, the definitions of sanctitas and pietas in § 115, the view of wisdom as a bond of union not only between man and man, but between man and God § 121, the idea of virtue as an active principle.

1 Hirzel assigns the historical section to Philodemus, as the author, and the earlier and later sections to Zeno. Schwencke would give all to Zeno (pp. 56, 57). Diels (p. 126) is inclined to make Philodemus copy from Phaedrus, which does not seem to me probable.
§ 110, the approving mention, slightly veiled it is true under an Academic form, of the Stoic doctrine of the divinity of the universe § 95, and of the teleological argument § 100. Schwencke carries the argument further than this. He notices certain marks which indicate a more or less close following of his authority on the part of Cicero, such as the introduction of quotations from Latin authors, allusions to Roman customs, to other writings of his own, &c.; and in reference to this particular section, which professes to be a reply to what has gone before, he remarks that it is very unlikely that C. could have met with an independent treatise, whether Academic or Stoic, which should just meet and refute the arguments in the Epicurean treatise used by him for the earlier sections; that precise references therefore to the preceding argument are probably additions by C.; and from this he draws the conclusion that the last part of Cotta's speech, from § 115 to the end, has undergone least manipulation and most faithfully represents the original authority; and it is precisely here that we find the largest amount of Stoic matter. Again, noticing the remarkable break after § 105, where Cicero after proposing to consider the question of the abode and manner of life of the gods in § 103, suddenly recurs to their nature, leaving the previous question altogether unanswered, he suggests that we have here a fragment of the original, which C. began to translate, but found to be unsuited to his purpose of meeting the speech of Velleius and forgot afterwards to cancel. Here again there are marked indications of a Stoic origin, as I have pointed out in my notes on the bestiae quae igne nasci putentur, and on naturae accommodatum.

There are however some arguments which need consideration in favour of the Academic origin of the section. Thus Hirzel has pointed out the close resemblance between parts of this and the sceptical argument in Sext. Emp. ix; also the inconsistency between Cotta's statement as to the superstition of Epicurus § 85, and that which is quoted from Posidonius in § 123; and lastly the anti-Stoic sentiments which we find interspersed, e.g. the repeated profession of agnosticism § 57, 66, 84, 91, 94, the contempt for the consensus gentium § 62, the objection to the rationalizing and allegorizing of the myths § 119. Swencke replies with considerable force that Sextus has himself borrowed from a Stoic original in such passages as ix 123 and 131; that we find the opposing views as to the sincerity of Epicurus' religious belief stated in Sext. Emp. ix 58 and
64, and may suppose both to have been similarly stated by Posidonius, though he expressed his own assent to the latter; that C.'s motive for maintaining the other view in § 85 was probably the wish to give his own experience on the subject; lastly that the anti-Stoic remarks are no more than were required in order to give the proper colouring to a speech put in the mouth of an Academic; that they occur sometimes in purely Stoic passages; that in general the Stoic writers form the store-house from which C. borrows his arguments against Epicurus, whilst he attacks the Stoics themselves with weapons forged by the Academy, as in the De Finibus; that in the present treatise this is foreshadowed by the language used of the Epicurean doctrines in § 3, of the Stoic in § 4; that Euhemerism is not the same as Stoicism, and that the observations about the mysteries are an interpolation of Cicero's (see my nn. on § 119). See further, as to the difference between the undoubted criticism of Carneades and that contained in this section, my note on § 92 under habebit igitur.

§ 5. TEXT AND ORTHOGRAPHY.

The text which I have given agrees in the main with that of the latest editor, C. F. W. Müller, Teubner, 1878, but I have endeavoured throughout to weigh the evidence, internal and external, for each reading to the best of my ability; and I have in some instances retained the reading of the MSS, where it had been altered by Müller in common with all the recent editors. Thus I have thought it unnecessary to insert a second eadem before requiro in § 21, and I have three times ejected a non which they had inserted, before potest in § 21, before nihil in § 93, before praeat in § 111. Elsewhere I have ventured on transposition of sentences as in §§ 5, 30 and 97; and on emendations of words, as in §§ 26, 49, 71. In the critical notes my object has been to put the reader in possession of the requisite data for forming an independent judgment on the text. As a foundation I have given the more important of the readings contained in the 2nd ed. of Orelli, brought out under Baiter's supervision in 1861; but, though the MSS (ABCEP)¹ there cited supply the principal material for determining the text of the 1st book of the N.D., they do not seem to me to

¹ For a description of the MSS see the note prefixed to the text.
possess such a transcendent superiority, either in point of accuracy
or of age, as to make it unnecessary to weigh carefully the evidence
furnished by other MSS. I have therefore thought it my duty to
examine, as far as was in my power to do so, all evidence which
could throw a light on the condition of the text up to the end
of the 15th century. Thus, besides the critical editions of Orelli,
Heindorf and Creuzer, I have had in constant use the Ascensian
ed. of 1511, and two MSS (U and Y) most kindly lent to me by
S. Allen Esq. of Dublin, whose father's name will be familiar to
students of Cicero under the Latinized form 'Alanus.' I am further
indebted to J. H. Swainson, Esq., late Fellow of Trinity College,
Cambridge, for the use of his very careful collation of eight MSS.
seven belonging to the British Museum, and one to the Cambridge
University Library, as well as of the two earliest printed texts. This
collation is given in an abridged form at the end of the volume.
Another MS (O), recently purchased by the Trustees of the British
Museum, has been collated for me by a member of the staff of the
MSS department there; but in this, as in the other cases, I have
myself compared the collation with the MS, wherever special im-
portance attached to a particular reading. In like manner the
readings of four Oxford MSS given at the end of the Oxford
4to edition of 1783 have been tested for me, e o u by H. P. Richards,
Esq., and ψ by J. S. Reid, Esq.3. Beside the MS readings, I have
also mentioned the differences between my text and those of Schö-
mann, Müller and Baiter, both in his earlier and later editions.

In order to show that the record preserved to us in Orelli's MSS
is at any rate not so complete as to dispense either with emendations
or with a careful comparison of other MSS, I have given below,
1st, a list of passages, in which the text is supported exclusively
by what are considered the inferior MSS in opposition to all Orelli's
MSS; in many of these cases the true reading had been independ-
ently restored by conjecture, and it is of course open to question
how far the MSS themselves are to be considered as witnessing
to a traditional reading or merely giving the scribe's emendation;
2nd, a list of passages in which the received text is supported by
one only of Orelli's MSS; and 3rd a list of passages in which the

3 I may mention as an illustration of the danger of trusting to negative
evidence in the case of MS readings, that scarcely one in ten of the inferences
which I had drawn ex silentio on the part of the Oxford collator of 1783 was
verified on examination of the MSS themselves.
received text rests solely on conjecture unsupported by any existing MS. Under each head I have mentioned only those readings which are accepted (except where otherwise stated) by Baiter, Schömann, and Müller in common with myself.

1. True reading preserved by inferior MSS in opposition to all Orelli's MSS.

§ 1. inscientiam for scientiam, El.
§ 2. in primis for imprimesque, OΨ
§ 16. haec for hoc, Asc. U.
§ 18. oculis (om. animi), Asc. V (Schömann dissents).
§ 26. continem for incontinentem, Asc. UCHMRV.
§ 28. commenticum for conventicum, Asc. INOV.
§ 29. earumque for eorumque, Asc. GMV.
    scientiam for sententiam, Asc. OHMV.
§ 31. diximus for dicimus, M of Moser.
§ 36. omnem for omnium, G. Red. Asc. V.
    vi divina for ut div., G.
§ 37. ipsum mundum deum for i.d.m., M.
§ 38. dicit esse for esse, UH Asc.
§ 39. fatalem vim for f. umbram, El. (Baiter dissents).
§ 41. dixerat for dixerit, UYLO.
§ 49. docet for doceat, C.
§ 53. negatis for negetis, El. GU.
§ 60. res for spes, UHM Asc. Red.
    ceterquis for ceteroque, Oxf. u Moser's E and M.
§ 61. consessu for consenue, Asc. ψ.
§ 68. quod enim for quia enim, El. Reg. UO.
§ 70. esse verum for esset v., UYL.
§ 71. quod vos for quam v., CMNR Asc.
§ 72. nihil ex for nihil ne ex, UHO.
§ 77. quasi sui for quam sui, I of Moser.
§ 81. defendes for defendens, UYL.
§ 82. Aegyptio for Aegypto, Asc.
§ 83. laudamus Athenis for l. esse Ath., I of Moser.
§ 86. aliquid esse for aliquid iste, El. Oxf. e.
§ 87. illustrationem for illustrationem, GO El. Reg. Herv.
§ 88. diceretur for dicerentur, UYO Asc.
§ 89. quid for quod, YHLMOR.
§ 96. umquamne for numquamne, R.
§ 97. at figura for ad figuram, UOHLO. (Baiter dissents).
§ 99. ad speciem nec ad usum for speciem nec usum, G. (Baiter and Müller read by conjecture specie nec usu.)
§ 103. oportet et for oportet, ON of Moser.
§ 104. ratione for rationis, UYOUC El.
         attigeris for attigerit, G.
§ 106. tu for tum, Asc.
§ 108. fuerunt for fuerant, UYOUC Asc.
§ 109. faciet for facient, G. Red.
§ 110. ex individuis for ex divinis, V, Herv.²
         se ipsa for se ipsae, Asc. OR.
§ 111. Vellei for velle, UMEV.
§ 113. nam etiam for nam enim, G.
§ 116. allicere for elicere, GHEV.
         voluptate for voluntate, ULMNOEV.
§ 123. homunculi for homunculis, MR Herv.

2. True reading preserved by inferior MSS in opposition to all but one of Orelli’s MSS.¹

§ 1. ut before magnus argumento, B² Asc. UHLO (Baiter dissents).
§ 18. descendisset for descendis (or descendens) sed, B Asc. CNMB.
§ 25. si di for sic di, EUOV.
§ 26. animal for anima, BM Asc.
§ 28. reprehenditur for reprehenderetur, E (and by correction in
         B) OLMN.
§ 34. de natura for in natura, BUOV.
§ 37. sententia est qui for sententias qui, A²UCM Asc.
§ 56. metuimus for metuemus, B¹UCMV.
§ 58. anteferret et for anteferret, Asc. PBH.
§ 65. doce for doceas, POHL Asc.
         punctis for cuntis, B Asc. U.
§ 71. corpus aut quasi, om. all but BUYO.
§ 72. olet for floret, BLO.
§ 78. corporis for corporis, CU Asc.
§ 79. exorientem for exoriente, BUM.
         at erat for aderat, CK.

¹ I have not thought it necessary here to distinguish, as I have done in the
critical notes, between positive evidence and ex silention inference, as regards the
readings of Orelli’s MSS.

M. C.
\[\begin{align*}
\S\ 81. & \quad quid si for quod si, E \text{Asc.} \\
\quad sic occurrit for si o., BGC. \\
\S\ 85. & \quad offensionem for offensione EUY Asc. CH. \\
\S\ 86. & \quad religionis for religiones, B'UCHLO. \\
\S\ 108. & \quad potuerunt for potuerant A'UY Asc. CO. \\
\S\ 114. & \quad pulchre for pulcro, C'CHLO Asc. \\
\S\ 120. & \quad soleant EN of Moser. \\
\S\ 122. & \quad nulla re for in n. r. CUY Asc. HO.
\end{align*}\]

3. True reading restored by conjecture in opposition to all MSS.

Greek for Latin in πρὸ νο αν § 18, στεφάνην § 28, ἀδάμαρον § 30,
θαμμέρν § 55, μαρτυρι § 55, &c.

iis for his repeatedly.

\S\ 13. omnium repeated.

\S\ 19. afficiendum for efficiendum.

\S\ 20. palmaria for palmaris. (Schömann dissent.)

\S\ 27. qua for quae.

\S\ 28. continentem ardore for continentem ardorem.

cegin for cingit.

revocet for revocat.

\S\ 33. a magistro non dissentient. Other conjectures are given by Sch., Ba. and Mu., but all alike change the MS reading.

modo deus moveri for modo mundus moveri. (Sch. gives a different conjecture.)

\S\ 39. universitatemque for universam atque.

\S\ 45. vitae actionem mentisque agitationem for vitam et actionem mentis atque agitationem.

\S\ 49. ad nos for ad deos. Ba. gives a different conjecture.

\S\ 64. om. aut before Neptuni.

\S\ 70. fieret for fieri.

nimis callide for nisi callide.

\S\ 72. equidem for quidem.

\S\ 73. inane for inanes.

\S\ 74. licet for liceat.

\S\ 76. quod quoniam for ut quoniam.

\S\ 77. omnino for omnium.

\S\ 81. a parvis enim for apparuisse.

\S\ 82. add alia nobis.

\S\ 85. add visu after humano.

venerantes for numerantes.
TEXT AND ORTHOGRAPHY.

§ 86. om. id esse mortale.
§ 87. deorum numero for d. natura.
§ 89. transpose sumpsisses tuo jure.
§ 96. deorum for deo (Sch. dissents).
§ 103. superior aeri aetheriis (MSS vary, other conjectures by Ba. and Sch.)
§ 104. porro for postremo.
§ 107. num for nunc.
e forma for ex forma.
   Cercopis, MSS vary.
§ 109. aequilibratatem, MSS vary.
§ 111. quarundam, MSS vary.
§ 122. in imbécillitate for imbécillatatem.

Any one who will take the trouble to compare the text of the
N. D., as it now stands, with the text of the earlier editions from the
Ed. Pr. of 1471 to the Variorum Ed. of 1818 will be astonished at
the improvement which has been effected, owing in great part to
judicious emendations by successive generations of scholars. The
value and even the necessity of conjecture, as a means of restoring
the text of this, as of other ancient writings, is sufficiently shown
by the readings cited under the last head, but it may be proved even
more conclusively by reference to other passages, which did not
admit of the same brevity and simplicity of statement, such as § 24
quodque in deo, § 25 si di possunt, § 65 nihil est enim, in which it is
confessed that the present text is wrong, though editors are not
agreed on the right mode of restoring the true text. Whilst I am
upon this subject, it may be well to give a few illustrations from
the present book, of the commoner sources of corruption in MSS,
so as to assist my younger readers in judging of the admissibility of
any proposed emendation. The illustrations are taken from the
various readings in Orelli’s edition as well as from my own. I make
no attempt at an exhaustive analysis, but simply group together
examples of similar confusion.

Addition or omission of final m: see critical notes on *speciem
§ 99, *figuram § 97, *quae § 89, exorientem § 79, imbécillitate § 122,
tu § 112 and 106, offensionem § 85, faciēm § 53, *simile and con-
tinente ardore § 28, *natura § 23, partum ortumque § 41.

1 An asterisk is prefixed wherever the reading is doubtful.
INTRODUCTION.

Interchange of t and d: see on quot § 84, *inquit § 109, relinquit § 123, id § 113, aliquid § 57 and § 104, apud § 62, sed § 61; so at for ad in § 14, *§ 97; ad for at § 79 (twice), § 82, § 84, § 90, § 109, § 115, § 116, § 122.

Interchange of final is and es; see on *intellegentis § 23, *religionis § 86, mares § 95, voluptatis § 113, *mentis § 120.

Interchange of final of i and e; see on cogitari § 24, *utqui § 16 and § 57, *familiari § 58, corpori § 78, liberari § 117.

Interchange of e and ae: see on cur aquae § 25, quae *§ 89, § 92, § 97, § 110, ipsa § 110, terrena § 103, illae § 101, equus § 77, aequilibritatem § 109.

Omission or addition of prefix in: see on *insecentiam § 1, incontinentem § 26, lustrationem § 87, individuis, § 110.

Omission or addition of initial H: see on orarum § 119, omnium § 108, and his below.

Confusion between is, iis, his: see on § 2, § 3, § 7, § 10, § 11, § 12, § 31, § 50, § 55, § 61, § 66, § 103, § 113, § 116, § 122, § 123.

Interchange of quid and quod: see on § 10, § 81, § 87.

Confusion between est, sit, sint, sunt: see on disputatum est § 15, pulcherrima est § 48, aestimanda est § 55, aliquando est § 68, ausa est § 93, dicenda est § 95, natura est § 96, varias sunt § 1, *vero sint § 25, caelo sunt § 34, guidem sunt § 41, innumerabilia sint § 50, animis sunt § 103, sunt quae § 109.

Interchange of parts of verbs generally,


(2) of Singular and Plural: see on diceretur § 88, vident § 101, faciet § 109.

(3) of Second and Third Person: see on inquit § 100 and *§ 109, attigeris § 104.

Mistakes in the division of words: see notes on § 14 addubitare, § 18 descendissent, § 25 cur aquae, § 37 sententia est, qui aether, § 39 *universitatemque, § 63 posteaque, aperte, § 66 similiora, § 79 exorirentem, at erat, § 81 *a parvis enim, § 89 *argumentis sententiam, § 103 homunculi similem, § 76 informatum.
Omission of repeated words or syllables, and of words interposed between repeated words or syllables: see on § 13 omnium omnium, § 26 in infinito, *omnino in eo, § 25 *aqua adjunxit—aquam adjunxit, § 66 *hamata, § 71 quasi corpus aut quasi, § 78 formica formicae, § 81 apud eos—apud nos, § 82 *alia nobis, § 71 *in ceris dicere tur, § 58 anteferet et, § 103 oportet et, § 49 *neque eadem ad, § 98 nisi in eo—nisi in eo, § 103 *superior aeri aetheris, § 98 *moribus paribus, § 2 *natura trahimur.

Construction altered through the influence of a nearer word: see on § 2 continet—in primis changed to continet est—in primisque, § 25 *mentem changed to et mente, § 36 vi divina, changed to ut divinam, § 49 doceit changed to doceat after ut, § 70 esse changed to esset after utrum, fieret changed to fieri to suit following esse, § 71 quam for quod after mirabilius, § 73 inanes for inane to suit imagines, § 104 rationis for ratione to suit mentis.

Substitution of synonyms: see on § 68 quia for quod, so igitur for ergo constantly in C.

Interpolation,

(1) by unintentional repetition: see on § 63 *aut before Neptuni suggested by aut Carbo, § 35 *immittendique after minuendi.

(2) to complete construction: see on § 86 id esse mortale added after si quid sit, § 107 *quam inserted after minus probari possit.

(3) owing to explanatory gloss: see on § 33 *Platone added to explain magistro, § 13 *Terentius, &c. added before Synephebis, § 34 *tum to explain modo, § 58 *L. Crasso to explain familiari, § 112 *nectar ambrosianique to explain epulas, § 1 *id est principium philosophiae to explain the allusion to the Academics, § 28 *praeterea added to correct omne, § 25 *alia added to escape apparent inconsistency.

(4) owing to controversial gloss: see on § 19 *animi added as an answer to the question quibus oculis, on § 21 *quod ne—tempus esset possibly an answer to the preceding intellegi potest.

I proceed now to discuss the question of spelling. This has caused me some difficulty, as I am aware that my own feeling, or perhaps I should rather call it my prejudice, is opposed to the theory and practice of the most eminent both amongst our own and foreign scholars. I think however it is not mere obstinacy which prompts me to follow my own course in this matter, even
against the advice of friends for whose judgement I have the highest respect, and who have studied the subject far more deeply than I can pretend to have done.

It appears to me that this apparently unimportant question is not obscurely connected with the larger question whether the Classics are still to form the staple of higher education amongst us. If their claim to do so is to be allowed, they must show good reasons for it, and they must at the same time leave room for other more immediately pressing studies. I believe that this claim will be allowed in so far as the study of the Classics supplies the necessary instrument for entering into the life and thought of the ancient world, and one of the best instruments for learning the laws which regulate the expression of thought. But the Universities will have to see to it that this is done far more thoroughly than it has yet been done; and for this purpose it will be necessary to drop some of the impedimenta which now occupy the time of the learner without tending, in any corresponding degree, to discipline and feed the mind. Yet, of late years, it seems to me that the burden of the impedimenta has been added to rather than reduced by the new importance which has been given to questions of etymology and orthography. No doubt a wonderful advance has been made in these departments, and, as special subjects for investigation, they naturally and rightly attract to themselves the attention of leisured scholars, but I cannot think they should be made so prominent as they have been in College and University examinations. Viewed in relation to the main ends of a classical education, I hold that spelling is simply a necessary evil, and that, for practical purposes, the best spelling is that which obstructs itself least, and least diverts the attention of the reader from the thought of the writer. In books therefore which are printed for ordinary reading, we should not seek to reproduce the spelling of a particular age or of a particular author, except where, as in Chaucer, it may be needed to show the scansion of a line, but we should endeavour to give the normal spelling of the language after it assumed a fixed and stationary form; just as we do not in our common Shakespeares reproduce the inconsistent spelling of the early folios and quartos, though for the purpose of studying the history of the language we rightly print facsimiles of these. In Latin it is generally agreed that the

1 See on this subject the very sensible remarks of Ritschl, Opusc. ii pp. 722 foll. and 728. I can but echo his final words, spoken with reference to the
TEXT AND ORTHOGRAPHY.

language attained its highest formal development in the period which may be named after Quintilian, between Nero and Hadrian, according to Brambach (Hülfsbüchlein f. Lat. Rechtsreibung, p. vii), between the death of Augustus and that of Trajan, according to L. Meyer (Orthographiae Latinae Summarius p. 5). The latter lays down the following rules for our modern spelling of Latin: ne inaequalitate scribendi aut oculi offendatur legentium aut in errorem inducantur animi, scriptura nostra reddi oportet ad certae usum ac morem aetatis, et quidem ejus, qua ipsa lingua scriptorum pariter ingeniis et studiis grammaticorum ad summam est adducta perfectionem; and in p. 6, praeterea ut in sermone, ita in scriptura tamquam scopulum nos fugere oportet quaevis inusitata.

Adopting these rules, it will follow first, that we need not trouble ourselves to frame a conjectural text, such as Cicero might have written, but should use the undoubted spelling of the latter half of the first century A.D.; and secondly, that where this spelling itself was variable, as in the u or i of the superlative terminations, and the i or e of the accusative plural of i-nouns, we should select one mode and adhere steadily to that. In making the selection I should myself wish to apply to our own case the principle suggested by Meyer’s second rule, that, of two allowable spellings, that should be preferred which is usitatius, least of a novelty to ordinary English readers.

Turning now to Müller’s text I find there several examples of inconsistent, and some of unusual and, as I believe, incorrect spelling. This is the more to be wondered at, because in his excellent review of Baiter and Halm’s ed. in the Jahrb. f. Cl. Philol. for 1864, vol. 89, p. 261 f.oll. he condemns a similar inconsistency in them.

The following are the points in which the spelling in my edition will be found to differ from that in Müller’s:

(1) I have always given the superlative termination in -imus; Müller at times has the form in -umus. Thus we find facillum § 9, but facillimum § 61; turpissumus § 29, but turpissimum § 93; similimus § 49, but similimum § 98; praestantissumus § 47, but praestantissimus § 96; also levissumus § 13, vaferrumus § 39.

attempt to expel the old German forms ‘genitiv’, ‘Virgil’: möge doch nicht deutscher Pedantismus einen Schatten auf deutsche Wissenschaft werfen, der gegen diese selbst den Spott des weiten Kreises der Gebildeten herausfordern muss!
INTRODUCTION.

(2) I have always written u after v; Müller generally does so, e.g. vult in § 13, 33, 34, 69; vultis in §§ 89, 103, 107; Vulcanus § 81; but vol in § 41; voltis § 93; Vulcanus §§ 83 and 84.

(3) I have always written es in the Acc. Pl. of the i-declension; Müller usually has is, but we find utiles, salutares, § 38, inmortales § 45, leves § 59, similes §§ 90, 91, venerantes § 85, noctes § 54 though partis comes just before. Baiter consistently gives -is in all cases.

(4) I have regularly assimilated, where it was allowable, because there is no doubt that assimilation was the tendency of the Latin language, and was practised in speaking even in the exceptional cases where it was necessary to preserve the spelling unaltered for the purpose of distinctness or to show the etymology, as in adsum (Roby, Vol. I. p. 49 n.); Müller as a rule does not assimilate, but we find exceptions, as in regard to the assimilation of in before labials:

before b; inbecillus § 122, but imbecillus § 45.

p; inpurus § 63, inpudenter § 69 &c., but impius § 63, impendo § 45. (Baiter in both cases keeps in.). So comprehensio § 94, but comprehendo § 30.

m; immensus § 22, and inmortalis frequently.

in before linguals:

l. inlustris § 12; so contigatus § 9, but colligo § 4, comparo § 10 (where Baiter has contigo and comparo).

r. inrhigo § 120, inrdeo § 101.

Assimilation of d:

before p. adpeto § 104, but appeto immediately after; so adpulsus, adprehendo, but appareo § 37, apparatus § 20, appello § 36.

f. advluo § 49, but afluo § 114 and afluentia § 51, adfectus § 36, but afficio § 19; so adfloro, adflrmo &c.

r. adrideo § 17 and § 97, but arripio § 77.

l. allicio § 116.

s. adsecior § 12, adsequor § 23, adsidius § 114.

t. attinet § 84.

n. annuo § 113.

c. accurate § 15.

g. adjredior § 57.

(5) I have always preserved an s following x in composition; Müller varies, giving existunt § 97, existat § 49, existit § 12 and § 21, existit § 55 and § 91, extingui § 29.
TEXT AND ORTHOGRAPHY.

(6) In regard to nouns borrowed from the Greek I have followed Madvig's rule (Gram. § 33 obs. 3), 'Where both forms are in use, it is better to adhere to the Latin', in accordance with the principles laid down by Quintilian i 5 § 63 and Cicero Att. vi 9, (see the quotations in Roby §§ 471, 482). Thus I have always used the termination -em for the Acc. of Greek nouns in -es, whereas Müller writes, at one time, Socratēn (i 93), Timocratēn (i 93), Simonidēn (i 60), Nausiphanēn (i 93), Cleanthen (III 5), but more generally Socratēm (i 31), Timocratēm (i 113), Simonidēm (Div. I 56), Empedoclem, Aristotelem, Ganymedēm, Archimedes, Euphratem, Xenophanēm &C. So I have written ibim, Apim in i 82, where Müller has Apim but ibin: I have uniformly written Zeno, but in § 70 Müller gives Zenon.

(7) I have always written di in the Nom. and dis in the Abl.; Müller uses di or dei, dis or deis indiscriminately.

(8) I have written Lyceī in § 72 where Müller has Lycio, but in Div. I. 8 and 22 he gives the spellings Lyceum, Lyceō. Where he writes opportune § 15, opportunitas § 92', benivolentia § 58, Xerxes § 115, Argia § 82, I have written with Bater opportune, opportunitas, benevolentia, Xerxes, Argiva. In one instance, inchoō, I have preferred the less usual spelling to the ordinary inchoō (which Müller keeps) not merely on the ground that it has most authority in its favour, but because it is the more rational, as showing better the etymology and probably also the pronunciation.

Thus far I have not departed much from the prevalent usage in the latest editions. I have now, to plead guilty to two heresies. The first is that I have used the character J for the consonantal I. My reasons for doing so are as follows: (1) the use of J, to distinguish the consonant from the vowel I, seems to me to stand on the same footing with the use of V to distinguish the consonant from the vowel U. Neither use was known to the ancients, but convenience has led most editors to preserve the distinctive V, indeed Madvig, who had dropped it in his first edition of the De Finibus, returned to it in the later editions; and all who write on the phonetics of Latin are compelled to mend the unscientific orthography of the Romans by treating the J and V as distinct letters known by distinctive characters. (2) It might perhaps be

1 See his own remarks on the untrustworthiness of MSS in their spelling of double letters, l. c. p. 138.
somewhat bold for us in the nineteenth century to commence a
reform of the alphabet which Cicero used, but in the first place
we do not commence the reform, we merely keep the spelling
which the common sense of preceding centuries has handed down
to us; and in the next place we know from Quintilian i 4 § 11,
that Cicero himself felt the need of distinctive marks for the con-
sonantal and the vowel I, and that it was his practice to double
the I in writing such a word as Ajax. Though this symbol did not
pass into general use, yet it was felt by others that some sort of
distinctive mark was needed, and a tall I was occasionally employed
in the imperial times to denote the consonantal sound of I. If the
intervening generations have provided us with a more convenient
character, I do not see why we are to throw away this advantage,
any more than we do those of punctuation or of the discriminating
types, which were equally unknown to the Romans. I may be
allowed by the way to express my regret that Baier, in common
with many German editors, has ceased to mark the beginning of
the sentence by a capital letter, thus making it more difficult
to glance rapidly over a page and catch the general sense. What
was the motive for this beyond a mere love of change in trivial
details I am unable to conjecture.

If I may hope that my use of the letter J, as above explained,
may be conceded, as at worst a venial error, I fear that the par-
ticular use of it, which I am about to confess, can only be viewed
in the light of a mortal sin by philologists of the modern school.
I refer to my retention of the oldfashioned spelling of the compounds
of jacio, conjicio rejicio diejicio for conicio reicio dissicio. As there
can be no doubt that the latter was the usual spelling of the
Quintilian age, how am I to defend the infringement of the rule,
which I have myself laid down above? My answer is that rules
must give way to principles, and the principle of good spelling
is that it should represent correctly the etymology and the pronuncia-
tion of the word, neither of which is done by the spellings in ques-
tion. Another inconvenience arising from the omission of the J is
that the laws of prosody will thus be broken in almost all the cases
in which the compounds of jacio appear in Latin verse. In urging
these objections I do no more than repeat what was said by the
ancients themselves. Gellius has a chapter on this very subject
(N. A. iv 17) in which he finds fault with the omission of the con-
sonantal i in the compounds of jacio, as confusing versification
APPENDIX ON DAVIES’ MSS.

and giving rise to a wrong pronunciation. He quotes hexameter lines containing the words obiciēbat, conicere, subicit, and says many readers lengthen the first vowel in order to make the lines scan, but ob, con and sub are essentially short syllables and only lengthened by the consonant which follows, secunda enim litera in his verbis per duo i, non per unum scribenda est; nam verbum ipsum non est ‘icio’ sed ‘iacio’ et praeteritum non ‘icit’ facit, sed ‘icit’. Id ubi compos-
situm est, ‘a’ litera in ‘i’ mutatur, sicuti fit in verbis ‘insilio’, et ‘incipio’, atque ita’ vim consonantis capit, et idcirco ea syllaba pro-
ductus latiusque paulo pronuntiata priorem syllabam brevem esse non
patitur. Then he goes on to say that quod apud Vergilium positum
invenimus ‘inice’, sic esse ‘iniice’, ut supra dixi, et scribendum et
legendum sciamus. I should wish therefore to keep the spelling
with j in all except the rare cases in which the consonantal i ceases
to exercise any influence on the quantity of the preceding syllable, as
in reice Verg. Ecl. iii 96, ddict Mart. x 82 l. In such exceptional
cases the spelling would be changed as in other cases of syncope
or diaeresis.

APPENDIX ON DAVIES’ MSS.

It is a curious fact that, of the six MSS used by Davies for his
edition of the Natura Deorum, viz. the Codex Regius, Bp. Moore’s
copy of the Stephanus edition containing two marginal collations
("styled by Davies Codices Elienses), the ms lent to him by Dr Richard
Mead (Med.) and those belonging to the Cambridge University
Library (Cant.) and to the Library of Lincoln College, Oxford (Linc.),
all but the two last have disappeared. In order to save trouble to
others who may be interested in the text of Cicero, and also in the
hope that possibly some one among my readers may be able to sup-
plement my account with further information, I print here all that
I have been able to ascertain about the history of the lost ms.

In the Preface to the 1st edition of the N.D. 1718, Davies de-
scribes the Codd. El. as follows: usum editionis Stephanicae cum
duobus optimis ms collatas dedit summus mei, dum in vivis erat,
patronus, Joannes Morus, nuper Eliensis Episcopus. Ten years
later, in the Preface to his edition of the De Legibus, he speaks more

1 Fortassì legendum ‘itaque prima i vim’: ‘ita’ videtur enatum ex more
librariorum exarantium l pro ‘prima’. Otho’s note in loc.
slightly of the value of these readings: 'Eliae,' varias lectiones significat, quas ex ms quodam vir doctus editioni Roberti Stephani A.D. MDXXIX adlevit. Iste codex, quantum judicare datur, non magnam prae se tuiti vetustatem. It will be seen that Davies here employs the Sing. Codex, as he also does in the list of mss used by him for the Academica I, A.D. 1725 (collationem ms factam in exemplari editionis Stephanicae) while for Academica II he mentions on the same page varias lectiones ex duobus mss excerptas et aditas orae editionis Stephanicae. Yet again, after having stated in the Preface to the 1st ed. of the Tusculans 1708, that Bp. Moore had lent him his Stephanus cum duobus optimis mss collatam, he adds in the 2nd ed. 1723 hos Elieneum primum ac secundum nominavi: iis nunc accessit ab evadem manu tertius in pergamina scriptus, and cites all three together in his notes as Elienees tres, e.g. on nisi haeret I § 27. From this it would appear that the collations of the two codices were in the same handwriting, and that Davies, after he had brought out his 1st ed., discovered in Bp. Moore’s Library a complete text of the Tusculans copied out by the writer of the collations. No mention is made of these mss in the Preface to either of the editions of the De Divinatione and De Fato 1721 and 1730, nor have I come across any reference to them in the notes to the De Divinatione, but Cod. El. appears frequently in the notes to the De Fato.

Bentley’s Life and Letters furnish some additional information on the earlier history of the Codices. In July 1692 Bentley, writing to Graevius, who was then engaged on a new edition of his Cicero, informs him that Moore, at that time Bishop of Norwich, is prepared to send him lectiones variantes in Libris Philosophicis Ciceronis, quas ex vetusto codice descipserat quidam in ora ed. Rob. Stephani in fol. Graevius, in his reply (Sept. 1692), accepts with thanks the Bishop’s offer, but says that he must finish the orations before he can proceed to the Philosophical works. In Jan. 1693 Bentley writes again to say that the Bishop will send the volume itself, and remarks in reference to the value of the readings quantivis esse pretii re ipsa comperies. Graevius, writing in the following December, acknowledges the receipt of the volume, which, he says, he will guard nigris diligentius uiris; all posterity shall know how grateful he is to the lender. Frequent allusions to the book appear in the subsequent correspondence, but Graevius is still too busy to make use of it, until at last the Bishop becomes impatient, and Bentley writes in Aug. 1702 saepe mihi aurem vellit celeberrimus Praesul Norvicensis de
Codice suo, quem jam per decennium, opinor, apud te detinere. Optimum esset si velles tibi describere, et codicem huc remittere; dolet enim tam bonum librum tam diu bibliothecae sua locupletissimae deesse. To this Graevius replies Nov. 1702, descriptendas varias mandari juventi, ne longius justo retineatur hic liber. Proximo vero ut salvus Viro Summo reddatur mihi erit curae; and again in December Cicero in quo nunc describendo sudat adolescens redibit ad vos proxima cum hirundine. The correspondence closes with a letter from Burmann in the following month, Jan. 15 1703, announcing Graevius' death.

It would be interesting to know whether the collation made by the adolescens was ever completed, and whether it is still in existence at Utrecht or elsewhere. The volume itself must have been returned to its owner, as it was lent by him to Davies for his 1st ed. of the Tusculans, which appeared in 1709, and seems to have been used by the latter until his death in 1732. As Bp. Moore's Library was purchased by Geo. I and presented to the University of Cambridge in 1715, the Stephanus ought to have found its way to the University Library, and to be now safely locked up in one of the cases there, but Mr Bradshaw, the present learned Librarian, informs me that he can discover no trace of it, nor is there anything to be heard of it at Queens' College, of which Davies was President.

I turn now to the Codex Regius which is described as follows in Davies' preface to the N.D., mss Elienses exsipt Codex membranaceus in Bibliotheca Regia Londini servatus, cujus mihi copiam fecit Richardus Bentleius. The same MS is described in the Preface to the De Legibus as belonging to the Royal Library at St James'; mutius est, nec ultra medium partem libri secundi progreditur. Est annorum, ut videtur, cccc. It was also used for the Academica Bk. ii and for the De Divinatione and De Fato, but apparently not for the Tusculans, where Reg. stands for a Paris Codex. Bentley who succeeded Justell as "Library Keeper to His Majesty at St James'" in April 1694, wrote in May to Graevius, offering to send him variantes lectiones ex duobus vetustissimis Codd. ex Bibliotheca Regia Sancti Jacobi, but it does not appear whether they were ever sent. As the King's Library was removed in 1752 to the British Museum, these two codices ought now to be there, but by a strange fatality these also have disappeared. Is it possible that they were among the 200 volumes 'destroyed or greatly injured' by the fire at Abingdon House in 1731, on which see Monk's Life of Bentley, ii 308.
INTRODUCTION.

Of 'Med.' I know nothing beyond the fact that it was used by Davies for the Tusculans, De Legibus and De Divinatione as well as for the Natura Deorum, and that in the preface to the De Legibus he describes it as a ms of about 300 years old.

As regards the value of these mss, Madvig in his Preface to the De Finibus makes a broad distinction between Cod. El. 1 and Cod. El. 2, considering the latter to belong either to the better or to the mixed class of mss, while he has no hesitation in classing the former with the inferior mss. He finds fault with Davies for so frequently confounding the two. In the 1st book of the N.D. I notice three generally accepted readings, which rest either wholly or chiefly on the authority of Cod. El., inscientiam § 1, vim § 39, esse § 86; and two in the 2nd Bk. resting on Cod. Reg., nuptam dicunt § 66, hic quae quae quae sit quae § 133. It is evident from these facts that it would be of great service to Ciceronian criticism, if the ms could be recovered and carefully collated.

EXPLANATION OF SYMBOLS.

A. Codex Leidensis (Vossianus) no. 84, written in the xth century (C in Moser's ed.).

B. Codex Leidensis (Vossianus) no. 86, written in the xth century (B in Moser).

C. Codex Leidensis (Heinsianus) no. 118, written in the xth century (A in Moser; H in Baier).

C. Codex Erlangenensis no. 38, written in the xth century (N of Moser).

P. Codex Palatins no. 1519, a defective but very ancient ms, containing § 1 27—75, 11 16—68, 111—156, 162—168, 111 6—95.

V. Codex Vindobonensis no. 189, written in the xth century. Defective, wants the whole of Bk r, and Bk II §§ 1—16, and 86—92.

U. Codex Uffenshachianus, formerly in the possession of Creuzer, now the property of Samuel Allen, Esq., written in the xth century, collated by Mr J. S. Reid and myself (G in Moser).

T. Another xth century codex belonging to Mr Allen; small 4to. parchment; injured by late corrections, which often make it impossible to decipher the original reading; collated by myself.

1 The account of the first six mss is taken from the 2nd ed. of Oreill as revised by Baier 1861.
2 Müller says of this N. Jahrh, x 144 'A is an arbitrary text, inferior to both B and V. The writer omits what he could not make sense of.'
3 'B is taken directly from the archetype of the existing ms, according to Halm, but the writer mistakes the abbreviations &c.' Müller l.c. From the description in Oreill it would seem as if §§ 64—91 of Bk r were wanting, but B is often cited in the critical notes on these §§, and it is evident from Baier's ed. of the De Legibus p. 108, that these pages are simply misplaced in the Codex.
4 'C is carelessly written, but without deliberate alteration of the older ms.' Müller l.c.
5 'V is the nearest approach to the archetype. Its marginal readings of the first hand are corrections from the archetype.' Müller l.c.
EXPLANATIONS OF SYMBOLS.

Oxf. e. o. u. ψ. Four Oxford codices, e in the Bodleian bears date 1459, o at Merton stated in Coxe's Catalogue of mss to belong to the 12th century, u at Lincoln (Line. of Davies) assigned to the 15th century, ψ at Balliol also of the 15th century. These are collated in the Oxford edition of 1783.

G. Codex Glogavensis, used by Heindorf, 'contains certissimas emendationes,' Baier pref. to De Finibus.

Red. Codex Beuldigerianus, used by Heindorf.


Reg. Codex Regius belonging to the Royal Library of St James', used by Davies, now lost.


The letters 'BHIKLNO' in thick type denote the mss (all but C contained in the British Museum), and RVV, the editions collated by Mr Swainson. See his description of these prefixed to the collations given at the end of this volume. B and K are the most important of these mss. Sometimes readings will be found in my critical notes, which are not given in Mr Swainson's collation. These have been added by myself from personal examination of the mss.

The consensus of Orelli's mss. Mus. denotes the consensus of the Museum mss, so far as the contrary is not stated.

[ ] The present editor, thinking it more satisfactory that the evidence for each reading should be given in a positive form, has made use of square brackets to signify that the mss denoted by the inclosed letters are presumed, ex silentio on the part of previous editors, to show a given reading.

+ denotes that the same reading occurs in other mss besides those cited.

Or. The revised Orelli, 1861.

Ba. Stereotype ed. of Baier, 1864.

Sch. Schömann's 4th ed. 1876.

Mu. C. F. W. Müller's ed. 1878.

ed. denotes the consensus of the four editions. It is always stated when the reading in one of these differs from that of the text.

Ed. denotes that the present editor is responsible for a reading.
M. TULLII CICERONIS

DE NATURA DEORUM.

LIBER PRIMUS.

I. Cum multae res in philosophia nequaquam satis adhuc 
explicatae sint, tum perdifficilis, Brute, quod tu minime ignoras, 
et perobscura quæstio est de natura deorum, quae et ad agnitionem 
animi pulcherrima est et ad moderandam religionem 
5 necessaria. De quà tam variae sunt doctissimorum hominum 
tamque discrepantes sententiae, ut magnis argumento esse debeat causam [id est, principium philosophiae] esse inscientiam, 
prudenter Academicos a rebus incertis assensionem cohbuisse. Quid est enim temeritate turpius, aut quid tam temere 
10 tamque indignum sapientis gravitate atque constantia 
quam aut falsum sentire aut, quod non satis exploratae perceptum 
sit et cognitum, sine ulla dubitatione defendere? Velut in hac 2

2 sint X, sunt Asc. K.  3 agnitionem [ACE] Mus. cognitionem BO. 
5 qua tam XBEKL, qua quod tam several of Moser and HMNCE, qua quidem 
tam G Heind., qua cum tam Ba. sunt Asc. [B'CE][KVO'][U'], sint AB'CHMO'Ba. 
after Ernesti. esse debeat—sententias (§ 2) om. AC'BKMR. debeat BC'E 
and ms generally, debeat L Sch., debant M (of Moser) Ba.  7 causam 
id est principium Asc. C³ (recenti manu margini adscriptum) El. UTHILNV, causa 
principium B¹E, causa et principium B³O, causam Or., principium Ba, causam 
et principium Sch. Mu., causam esse inscientiam Wytt. Heind. Creuz. id est
—inscientiam om. C. esse inscientiam El., esse scientiam mss generally, esse sen-
tentiam KN.  9 turpius Asc. Palat. 3 Herv. El. Oxf.ψC³, fortius mss generally, 
foedius Manutius, Klotz.

M. C.
DE NATURE DEORUM.

quaestione plerique, quod maxime veri simile est, et quo omnes
duce natura trahimur, deos esse dixerunt, dubitare se Protagoras,
nullos esse omnino Diogoras Melius et Theodorus Cyrenaicus
putaverunt. Qui vero deos esse dixerunt, tanta sunt in varie-
tate et dissensione, ut eorum molestem sit dinumerare senten-
tias. Nam et de figuris deorum et de locis atque sedibus et
actione vitae multa dicuntur, deque his summa philosophorum
dissensione certatur; quod vero maxime rem causamque con-
tinet, utrum nihil agant, nihil moliantur, omni curatione et
administratione rerum vacent, an contra ab iis et a principio 10
omnia facta et constitueta sint et ad infinitum tempus regantur
atque moveantur, in primis magna dissensione est, caque nisi di-
judicatur, in summo errore necesse est homines atque in maxi-
marum rerum ignorance versari. II. Sunt enim philosophi
et fuerunt qui omnino nullam habere censerent rerum humana-
rum procurationem deos. Quorum si vera sententia est, quae
potest esse pietas, quae sanctitas, quae religio? Haece enim
omnia pure atque caste tribuenda deorum numini ita sunt,
si animadvertuntur ab iis et si est aliquid a dis immortalibus
hominum generi tributum. Sin autem de neque possunt nos 20
juvare nec volupr nec omnino curant nec quid agamus animad-
vertunt nec est quod ab iis ad hominum vitam permanare
possit, quid est quod ullos dis immortalibus cultus, honores,
preces adhibeamus? In specie autem fictae simulationis, sicut
reliquae virtutes, item pietas inesse non potest, cum qua sim
sanctitatem et religionem tolli necesse est, quibus sublati pe
4 turbatio vitae sequitur et magna confusion; atque haud scio an
pietate adversus deos sublata fides etiam et societas generis
humani et una excellentissima virtus, justitia, tollatur. Sunt
autem alii philosophi, et ii quidem magni atque nobiles, qui 30
dorum mente atque ratione omnem mundum administrari et

2 trahimur Cobet Va. Lect. p. 460 (tra- lost after natura cf. Off. 18 trahimur
et ducimur), vehimur Asc. U. Mus. Klotz, venimus BECO Or. Ba. Mu. Sch., veni-
imus C3. 3 Cyrenaicus mss, Cyrenaicus G. Ba. 4 [putaverunt] Ba. after
Bake. 5 dinumerare B3C3EC, annumerare Asc. UHIX, innumerare B1, enumerare
O Klotz. 7 his Asc. CUB, is (superscr. k) A, tis BN+ Or. Ba. Sch. 9 con-
tinet mss generally, cont. est Asc.U+, cf. the next note. 12 in primis C
Oxf. y Manutius, in primisque CEU Mus, in primis quae AB. dijudicatur AB;
regi censeant, neque vero id solum, sed etiam ab isdem hominum vitae consuli et provideri; nam et fruges et reliqua, quae terra pariat, et tempestates ac temporum varietates caelestis mutationes, quibus omnia, quae terra signat, maturata pubescent, a dis immortalibus tribui generi humano putant multaque, quae dicitur in his libris, colligunt, quae talia sunt, ut ea ipsa di immortales ad usum hominum fabricati paene videantur. Contra quos Carneades ita multa dissersuit, ut excitaret homines non societates ad veri investigandi cupiditatem. Res enim nulla est, de qua tanto opere non solum indociti, sed etiam docti dissentiant; quorum opiniones cum tam variae sint tamque inter se dissidentes, alterum fieri profecto potest, ut earum nulla, alterum certe non potest, ut plus una vera sit.

III. Multum autem fluxisse video de libris nostris, quos 6 complures brevi tempore edidimus, variumque sermonem, partim admirantium unde hoc philosophandi nobis subito studium exstitisset, partim quid quaque de re certi haberemus scire cupientium. Multis etiam sensi mirabile videri eam nobis potissimum prosteram esse philosophiam, quae lucem eriperet et quasi noctem quandam rebus offenderet, desertaeque disciplinæ et jam pridem relinquæ patrocinium necopinatum a nobis esse susceptum. Qua quidem in causa et benevolos objurgatores placare et invidos vituperatores confutare possimus, ut alteros reprehendisse paeniteat, alteri didicisse se gaudeant; nam qui admonent amice, docendi sunt, qui inimice insectantur, repellendi. Nos autem nec subito coepimus philosophari nec mediocrem a primo tempore actatis in eo studio operam curamque consumpsimus, et; cum minime videbamus, tum maxime philosophabamus, quod et orationes declarant referentæ philosophorum sententiæ et doctissimorum hominum familiaritates, quibus semper domus nostra floruit, et principes illi, Diodotus, Philo, Antiochus, Posidonius, a quibus instituti sumus. Et si 7 omnia philosophiae praecipita referuntur ad vitam, arbitramur nos et publicis et privatis in rebus ea praestississe, quae ratio et 35 doctrina praescipserit. IV. Sin autem quis requirit, quae causa

6 ea ipsa mss, corr. ead. m. in et ipsi B, et ipsi Bouh, ea ipsi Heind. after Ernr. 14 multum—susceptum follows after repellendi (l. 26) in all the mss and edd. See Comm.
nos impulerit, ut haec tam sero litteris mandaremus, nihil est, quod expedire tam facile possimus. Nam cum otio langueremus, et is esset rei publicae status, ut eam unus consilio atque cura gubernari necesse esset, primum ipsius rei publicae causa philosophiam nostris hominibus explicandam putavi, magni existimi- mans interesse ad decus et ad laudem civitatis*res tam graves tamque praeclaras Latinis etiam litteris continerit; eoque me minus instituti mei paenitet, quod facile sentio, quam multorum non modo discendi, sed etiam scribendi studia commoverim. Complures enim Graecis institutionibus eruditis ea, quae didicerant, cum civibus suis communicare non poterant, quod illa, quae a Graecis accepsent, Latine dici posse diffiderent. Quo in genere tantum profecisse videmur, ut a Graecis ne verborum quidem copia vinceremur. Hortata etiam est, ut me ad haec conferrem, animi aegritudo fortunae magna et gravi commota injuria; cujus si majorem aliquam levationem reperire potuissem, non ad hanc potissimum confugisse; ea vero ipsa nulla ratione melius frui potui, quam si me non modo ad legendos libros, sed etiam ad totam philosophiam pertractandam deditsem. Omnes autem ejus partes atque omnia membra tum facillime noscum- tur, cum totae quaestiones scribendo explicatur; est enim admirabilis quaedam continuatio seriosque rerum, ut alia ex alia nexa et omnes inter se aptae colligataeque videantur. V. Qui autem requirunt, quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciant, quam necesse est; non enim tam auctores in disputando quam rationis momenta quaerenda sunt. Quin etiam obst plurumque ipsis, qui discere volunt, auctoritas eorum, qui se docere profitentur; desinunt enim suum judicium adhibere, id habent ratum, quod ab eo, quem probant, judicatum vident. Nec vero probare solem id, quod de Pythagoreis acceimus, quae ferunt, si quid affirmarent in disputando, cum ex ipsis quaerere retur, quare ita esset, respondere solitos: 'Ipse dixit'. 'Ipse' autem erat Pythagoras. Tantum opinio praecipuata poterat, ut etiam sine ratione valeret auctoritas. Qui autem admirantur nos hanc potissimum disciplinam secutos, iis quattuor Acadet-
micis libris satis responsum videtur. Nec vero desertarum relictarumque rerum patrocinium suscepi mus; non enim hominum interitu sententiae quoque occidunt, sed lucem auctoris fortasse desiderant; ut haec in philosophia ratio contra omnia disserendi nullamque rem aperte judicandi profecta a Socrate, repetita ab Arcesila, confirmata a Carneade usque ad nostram viguit aetatem; quam nunc prope modum orbam esse in ipsa Graecia intellego. Quod non Academiae vitio, sed tarditate hominum arbitror contigisse. Nam si singulas disciplinas per
cipere magnum est, quanto magius omnès? quod facere iis necesse est, quibus propositum est, veri repertiendi causa et contra omnes philosophos et pro omnibus dicere. Cujus rei tantae
tamque difficulti facultatem consecutum esse me non profiteor, secutum esse prae me fero. Nec tamen fieri potest ut, qui
hac ratione philosophentur, ii nihil habeant quo sequantur. 
Dictum est omnino de hac re alio loco diligentius, sed, quia
nimis indociles quidam tardique sunt, admonendi videntur sae-
pius. Non enim sumus ii, quibus nihil verum esse videatur, sed ii, qui omnibus veris falsa quaedam adjuncta esse dicamus
tanta similitudine, ut in iis nulla insit certa judicandi et assen-
tiendi nota. Ex quo existit illud, multa esse probabilia quae,
quamquam non perciperentur, tamen, quia visum quendam
haberent insignem et illustrem, iis sapientis vita regeretur.

VI. Sed jam, ut omni me invidia liberem, ponam in medio
sententias philosophorum de natura deorum. Quo quidem loco
convocandi omnes videntur; qui, quae sit earum vera, judicent.
Tum demum mihi procax Academia videbitur, si aut consense-
rint omnes, aut erit inventus aliquid, qui, quid verum sit, inve-
nerit. Itaque mihi libet exclamare, ut est in Synephebis:

Pro deum, popularium omnium, omnium ædilescentium
Clamo, postulo, obsecre, oro, ploro atque imploro fidem,
non levissima de re, ut queritur ille in civitate fieri facinora capitalia,
ab amico amante argentum accipere meretrix non vult;

14 sed ut adsint, cognoscant, animadvertant, quid de religione, pie-
tate, sanctitate, caerimoniiis, fide, jure jurando, quid de templis, delubris sacrificiiisque sollemnibus, quid de ipsis auspiciis, quibus nos praesumus, existimandum sit; haec enim omnia ad hanc de dis immortalibus quaeestionem referenda sunt. Profecto eos ipsos, qui se aliquid certi habere arbitrantur, addubitare coget doctissimorum hominum de maxima re tanta dissensione.

15 Quod cum saepe alias, tum maxime animadverti, cum apud C. Cottam, familiarem meum, accurate sane et diligenter de dis immortalibus disputatum est. Nam cum feriis Latinis ad eum ipsius rogatu arcessitque venisset, offendi eum sedentem in exedra et cum C. Velleio senatore disputantem, ad quem tum Epicurei primas ex nostris hominibus deferebant. Aderat etiam Q. Lucilius Balbus, qui tantos progressus habebat in Stoicis, ut cum excellentibus in eo genere Graecis compararetur. Tum, ut me Cotta vidit, Peropportune, inquit, venis; oritur enim mihi magna de re alercatio cum Velleio, cui pro tuo studio non est alienum te interesse. VII. Atque mihi quoque videor, inquam, venisse, ut dicis, opportune. Tres enim trium disciplinarum principes convenistis. M. Piso si adset, nullius philosophiae, eorum quidem quae in honore sunt, vacaret locus. Tum Cotta: Si, inquit, liber Antiochi nostri, qui ab eo nuper ad hunc Balbum missus est, vera loquitur, nihil est, quod Pisonem, familiarem tuum, desideres; Antiocho enim Stoici cum Peripateticis re concinere videntur, verbis discrepare; quo de libro, Balbe, velim scire quid sentias. Egone? inquit ille: miror Antiochum, hominem in primis acutum, non vidisse interesse plurimum inter Stoicos, qui homina a commodis non nomine sed genere

toto disjungerent, et Peripateticos, qui honesta commiscerent cum commodis, ut ea inter se magnitudine et quasi gradibus non genere different: haec enim est non verborum parva, sed rerum permagna dissensio. Verum hoc alias; nunc, quod coepit 17 mus, si videtur. Mihi vero, inquit Cotta, videtur; sed ut hic, qui intervenit (me intuens), ne ignorant, quae res agatur, de natura agebamus deorum, quae.cum mihi videretur perobscura, ut semper videri solet, Epicuri ex Velleio sciscitabar sententiam. Quam ob rem, inquit, Vellei, nisi molestum est, repete, quae 10 coeperas. Repetam vero, quamquam non mihi, sed tibi hic venit adjutor; ambo enim, inquit arridens, ab eodem Philone nihil scire didicistis. Tum ego: Quid didicerimus, Cotta viderit, tu autem nolo existimes me adjutorem huic venisse, sed auditorem, et quidem aquam, libero judicio, nulla ejus modi 15 adstrictum necessitate, ut mihi, velim nolim, sit certa quaedam tuenda sententia.

VIII. Tum Velleius fidenter sane, ut solent isti, nihil tam ve- 18 rens, quam ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur, tamquam modo ex deorum concilio et ex Epicuri intermundiis descendisset, Audite, 20 inquit, non futiles commentaciaquae sententias, non opificem aeificatoremque mundi, Platonis de Timaeo deum, nec anum fatidicam, Stoicorum πρόνοιαν, quam Latine licet providen- tiam dicere, neque vero mundum ipsum animo et sensibus praeditum, rotundum, ardentem, volubilem deum, portenta et 25 miracula non disserentium philosophorum, sed somniantium. Quibus enim oculis intueri potuit vester Plato fabricam illam 19 tanti operis, qua construī deo atque aeificari mundum facīt? Quae molitio, quae ferramenta, qui vectes, quae machinae, qui ministri tanti muneris fuerunt? Quem ad modum autem oboo- 30 dire et parere voluntati architecti aër, ignis, aqua, terra potuerunt? Unde vero ortae illae quinque formae, et quibus reliqua formantur, apte cadentes ad animum afficiendum pariendoque sensus? Longum est ad omnia, quae talia sunt, ut optata magis

20 quam inventa videantur; sed illa palmaria, quod, qui non modo natum mundum introduxerit, sed etiam manu paene factum, is eum dixerit fore sempiternum. Hunc censes primis, ut dicitur, labris gustasse physiologiam, id est naturae rationem, qui quicquam, quod ortum sit, putet aeternum esse posse? Quae est enim coagmentatio non dissolubilis? aut quid est, cujus principium aliquid sit, nihil sit extremum? Πρόσονιa vero si vestra est, Lucili, eadem, requiro, quae paulo ante, ministros, machinas, omnem totius operis designationem atque apparatum; sin alia est, cur mortalem fecerit mundum, non, quem ad modum Plato 21 nicus deus, sempiternum. IX. Ab utroque autem sciscitor, cur mundi sedificatores repente exstiterint, innumerabilia saecula dormierint; non enim, si mundus nullus erat, saecula non erant. [Saecula nunc dico non ea, quae dierum noctiumque numero anuis cursibus conficiuntur; nam fataor ea sine mundi conversione effici non potuisse; sed fuit quaedam ab infinito tempore aeternitas, quam nulla circumscriptio temporum metiebatur; spatio tamen qualis ea fuerit, intellegi potest. [Quod ne in cogitationem quidem cadit, ut fuerit tempus aliquid, nullum cum tempus esset.] Isto 15 igitur tam immenso spatio quaero, Balbe, cur Πρόσονιa vestra cessaverit. Laboremne fugi? At iste nec attingit deum nec erat ullus, cum omnes naturae numini divino, caelum, ignes, terrae, maria, parerent. — Quid autem erat, quod concupisceret deus mundum signis et luminibus tamquam aedilis ornare? Si, ut deus ipse melius habitaret, antea videlicet tempore infinito in tenebris tamquam in gurgustio habitaverat. Post autem varietatene eum detectari putamus, qua caelum et terras exornatas videmus? Quae 25 ista potest esse oblectatio deo? Quae si esset, non ea tam diu carere potuisset.

1 illa palmaria Dav. ed. 1, illud palmare Dav. ed. 2, illa palmaris MSS Sch. 3 dixerit MSS, dixit Mu. (Adn. Cr.). 7 πρόσονιa Manutius, pronoea MSS Sch. Mu. vero si vestra est Lucili eadem requiro ABC Mus., si vero vestra est lucili eadem require E, vero si vestra est Lucili eadem eadem requiro Heind., vero vestra si eadem est, Lucili, eadem requiro Sch. after Lambinus, vero vestra si, Lucili, eadem est, eadem requiro Madv., vero vestra, Lucili, si est eadem, eadem requiro Or. Ba. Mu. 9 designationem CE + dissignationem ABBK Mu. 18 intellegi potest XBEKLO, intellegi non potest Asc. UCIMNV + Sch. Or. Ba. Mu. (who also suggests qui potest). quod ne—esset transposed by Wytenbach before sed fuit l. 18 (perhaps better before spatio), see Comm. 21 πρόσονιa see above.
An haec, ut fere dicitis, hominum causa a deo constituta sunt? Sapientiumne? Propter paucos igitur tanta est facta rerum molitio. An stultorum? At primum causa non fuit, cur de improbis bene meretur; deinde quid est assecutus? cum omnes stulti sint sine dubio miserrimi, maxime quod stulti sunt; miserius enim stultitia quid possumus dicere? deinde quod ita multa sunt incommoda in vita, ut ea sapientes commodorum compensatione leniant, stulti nec vitare venientia possint nec ferre praesentia. X. Qui vero mundum ipsum animantem sapientemque esse dixerunt, nullo modo viderunt, animi natura intelligentiis in quam figuram cadere posset; de quo dicam equidem paulo post; nunc autem hactenus admirabor eorum tarditatem, qui animantem immortalem et eundem beatum rotundum esse velint, quod ea forma neget ullam esse pulchrior-rem Plato./ At mihi vel cylindri vel quadrati vel coni vel pyramidis videtur esse formosior. Quae vero vita tribuitur, isti rotundo deo? Nempe ut ea celeritate contorqueatur, cui par nulla ne cogitari quidem possit; in qua non video ubinam mens constans et vita beata possit insistere. Quodque in nostro cor-pore si minima ex parte significetur, molestum sit, cur hoc idem non habeatur molestum in deo? Terra enim profecto, quoniam mundi pars est, pars est etiam dei. Atqui terrae maximae regiones inhabitabiles atque incultas videmus, quod pars eorum appulsu solis exarserit, pars obrigerit nixe pruinaque longinquo solis abscessu; quae, si mundus est deus, quoniam mundi partes sunt, dei membra partim ardentia, partim refrigerata dicenda sunt.

Atque haec quidem vestra, Lucili. Qualia vero sint, ab ultimo repetam superiorum. Thales enim Milesius, qui primus de talibus rebus quaesivit, aquam dixit esse initium rerum, deum autem eam mentem, quae ex aqua cuncta fingeret. Si

di possunt esse sine sensu, mentem cur aquae adjunxit? Menti autem cur aquam adjunxit, si ipsa mens constare potest vacans corpore? Anaximandri autem opinio est nativos esse deos longis intervallis orientes occidentesque, eosque innumerabiles esse mundos. Sed nos deum nisi sempiternum intellegere qui possumus? Post Anaximenes aëra deum statuit, eumque digni esseque immensum et infinitum et semper in motu; quasi aut aër sineulla forma deus esse possit, cum praesertim deum non modo aliqua, sed pulcherrima specie decent esse, aut non omne, quod ortum sit, mortalitas consequatur. XI. Inde Anaxagoras, qui accept ab Anaximene disciplinam, primus omnium rerum discretionem et modum mentis infinitae vi ac ratione designari et confici voluit; in quo non vidit neque motum sensui junctum et continentem in infinito ullum esse posse, neque sensum omnino in eo quod non ipsa natura pulsa sentiret. Deinde si mentem istam quasi animal aliquod voluit esse, eit aliquid interiorius, ex quo illud animal nominetur; quid autem interiorius mente? cingatur igitur corpore externo. Quod quoniam non placet, aperta simplexque mens nulla re adjuncta, qua sentire possit, fugere intellegentiae nostrae vim et notionem videtur. Crotoniates autem Alcmaeo, qui soli et luinae reliquisque sideribus animque praeterea divinitatem dedit, non sensit sese mortalibus rebus immortalitatem dare. Nam Pythagoras, qui consuet animum esse per naturam rerum omnem intentum et commanem, ex quo nostri animi carperetur, non vidit distributione humanorum animorum discerpi et lacerari deum et, cum miseri animi essent, quod plerisque contingere, tum dei

partem esse miseram: quod fieri non potest. Cur autem quicquid quam ignoraret animus hominis, si esset deus? quo modo porro deus iste, si nihil esset nisi animus, aut infinus aut infusus esset in mundo? Tum Xenophanes, qui mente ad- juncta omne [praeterea, quod esset] infinitum, deum voluit esse, de ipsa mente item reprehenditur ut ceteri, de infinitate autem vehementius, in qua nihil neque sentiens neque congruentia potest esse. Nam Parmenides quidem commenticium quiddam corona similis effect (στεφάνην appellat) continente ardore lucis orbem, qui cingat caelum, quem appellat deum; in quo neque figuram divinam neque sensum quisquam suspiciari potest. Multaque ejusdem monstra, quippe qui bellum, qui discordiam, qui cupiditatem ceteraque generis ejusdem ad deum revocet, quae vel morbo vel somno vel oblivione vel vetustate delentur; eademque de sideribus, quae reprehensa in alio jam in hoc omitantur. XII. Empededolus autem multa alia peccans in deorum opinione turpissime labitur. Quattuor enim naturas, ex quibus omnia constare censet, divinas esse vult; quas et nasci et extingui perspicuum est et sensu omni carere. Nec vero Protagoras, qui sese negat omnino de dis habere quodlique, sint, non sunt qualesve sint, quicquam videtur de natura deorum suspicari. Quid? Democritus, qui tum imagines earumque circuitus in deorum numero refert, tum illam naturam, quae imagines fundat ac mittat, tum scientiam intellegentiamque nostram, nonne in maximo errore versatur? Cum idem omnino, quia nihil semper suo statu maneant, neget esse quiquam sempiternum, nonne deum omnino ita tollit, ut nullam opinionem ejus reliquam faciat? Quid aequi pro Diogenes Apolloniates utitur deo, quem sensum

habere potest aut quam formam dei? Jam de Platonis in-
constantia longum est dicere, qui in Timaeo patrem huius
mundi nominari neget posse, in Legum autem libris, quid sit
omnino deus, anquiri oportere non censeat. Idem et in Timaeo
dicit et in Legibus et mundum deum esse et caelum et astra
et terram et animos et eos, quos majorum institutis accepimus;
quae et per se sunt falsa perspicue et inter se vehementer
repugnantis. Quod vero sine corpore ullo deum vult esse, ut
Graece dicunt, ἀσώματον, id quae esse possit, intelligi non
potest; careat enim sensu necesse est, careat etiam prudentia, 10
careat voluptate; quae omnia una cum deorum notione com-
prehendimus. Atque etiam Xenophon paucioribus verbis eadem
fere peccat; facit enim in iis, quae a Socrate dicta rettulit.
Socratem disputatam formam dei quaeri non oportere, 15
etdemque et solem et animum deum dicere, et modo unum, tum
autem plures doce; quae sunt idem in erratis fere, quibus 19
quae de Platone diximus. XIII. Atque etiam Antisthenes in eo
libro, qui physicus inscribitur, populares deos multos, naturalem
unum esse dicens tollit vim et naturam deorum. Nec multo
secus Speusippus, Platonem avunculum subsequens et vim 20
quandam dicens qua omnia regantur, eamque animalem, evel-
lera ex animis conatur cognitionem deorum. Aristotelesque in
tertio de philosophia libro multa turbat a magistro non [Platone]
dissentiens; modo enim menti tribuit omnem divinitatem, modo
mundum ipsum deum dicit esse, modo aliquam quendam praeficit
mundo eique eas partes tribuit, ut replicatione quodam mundi
motum regat atque tueatur, tum caeli ardorem deum dicit esse
non intellegens caelum mundi esse partem, quem alio loco ipse
designarit deum. Quo modo autem caeli divinus ille sensus
in celeritate tanta conservari potest? ubi deinde illi tot di, si
numeramus etiam caelum deum? Cum autem sine corpore
idem vult esse deum, omni illum sensu privat, etiam prudentia. Quo porro modo deus moveri carens corpore aut quo modo semper se movens esse quietus et beatus potest? Nec vero ejus discipulus Xenocrates in hoc genere prudentior, cujus in libris, qui sunt de natura deorum, nulla species divina describitur; deos enim octo esse dicit, quinque eos, qui in stellis vagis nominantur, unum, qui ex omnibus sideribus, quae infixa caelo sunt, ex dispersis quasi membris simplex sit putandus deus, septimum solem adjungit octavumque lunam; qui quo sensu beati esse possint, intellegi non potest. Ex eadem Platonis schola Ponticus Heraclides puerilibus fabulis referit libros, et modo mundum, tum mentem divinam esse putat, errantibus etiam stellis divinitatem tribuit, sensuque deum privat et ejus formam mutabilem esse vult exodemque in libro rursus terram et caelum refert in deos. Nec vero Theophrasti inconstantia ferenda est; modo enim menti divinum tribuit principatum, modo caelo, tum autem signis sideribusque caelestibus. Nec audiendus ejus auditor Strato, is qui physicus appellatur, qui omnem vim divinam in natura sitam esse censet, quae causas gignendi, augendi, minuendi habeat, sed careat omni sensu et figura. XIV. Zeno autem, ut jam ad vestros, Balbe, veniam, naturalem legem divinam esse censet, eamque vim obtinere recta imperantem prohibentemque contraria. Quam legem quo modo efficiat animantem, intellegere non possimus; deum autem animantem certe volumus esse. Atque hic idem alio loco aetherae deum dicit, si intellegi potest nihil sentiens deus, qui numquam nobis occurrit neque in precibus neque in optatis neque in votis; aliis autem libris rationem quandam per omnem naturam

rerum pertinentem vi divina esse affectam putat. Idem astra hoc idem tribuit, tum annis, mensibus annorumque mutationibus. Cum vero Hesiodi θεογονία, id est originem deorum, interpretatur, tollit omnino usitasque cognitiones deorum; neque enim Jovem neque Junonem neque Vestam neque quemquam, qui ita appelletur, in deorum habet numero, sed rebus inanimis atque mutis per quandam significationem haec docet tributa nomina. Cujus discipuli Aristonis non minus magno in errore sententia est, qui neque formam dei intellegi posse censeat neque in deis sen-

sum esse dicat, dubitetque omnino, deus animans necne sit. Cleanthes autem, qui Zenonem audiuit una cum eo, quem proxime nominavi, tum ipsum mundum deum dicit esse, tum totius naturae menti atque animo tribuit hoc nomen, tum ultimum et altissimum atque undique circumfusum et extre-

num omnia cingentem atque complexum ardem, qui aether nominetur, certissimum deum judicat; idemque quasi delirans in iis libris, quos scripsit contra voluptatem, tum fingit formam quandam et speciem deorum, tum divinitatem omnem tribuit astra, tum nihil ratione censeat esse divinius. Ita fit, ut deus ille, quem mente nascimus atque in animi notione tamquam in vestigio volumus reponere, nusquam prorsus appareat. XV. At Persaeus ejusdem Zenonis auditor, eos dicit esse habitos deos, a quibus magna utilitas ad vitae cultum esset inventa, ipsaque res utiles et salutares deorum esse vocabulis nuncupatas, ut ne hoc quidem diceret, illa inventa esse deorum, sed ipsa divina. Quo quid absurdius, quam aut res sordidas atque deformes deorum honore afficere aut homines iam morte deletos reponere in deos, quorum omnis cultus esset futurus in lactu? Jam vero Chrysippus, qui Stoicorum somniorum vaferrimus habetur.
interpres, magnam turbam congregat ignotorum deorum, atque
ita ignotorum, ut eos ne conjectura quidem informare possimus,
cum mens nostra quidvis videatur cogitatione posse depingere.
Ait enim vim divinam in ratione esse positam et in universae
5 naturae animo atque mente, ipsumque mundum deum dicit
esse et ejus animi fusionem universam] tum ejus ipsius [princi-
patum], qui in mente et ratione versetur, communemque rerum
naturam universitatemque omnia continentem] tum fatalem vim
et [necessitatem rerum futurarum] ignem praeterea et eum, quem
10 ante dixi, [aethera] tum [ea] quae natura fluèrent atque manarent,
ut et aquam et terram et æéra; [solem, lunam, sidera universi-
tatemque rerum, quà omnia continenterunt, atque etiam homines
eos, qui immortalitatem essent consecuti.] Iademque disputat
æthera esse eum, quem homines Jovem appellarent, quique
15 aër per maria manaret, eum esse Neptunum, terramque eam
esse quae Ceres diceretur, similique ratione sequitur vocabu-
40 lula reliquor omnium. Iademque etiam legis perpetuae et
æternae vim, quae quasi dux vitae et magistra officiorum sit,
Jovem dicit esse, eandemque fatalem necessitatem appellat,
20 sempiternam rerum futurarum veritatem; quorum nihil tale
est, ut in eo vis divina inesse videatur. Et haec quidem in
primo libro de natura deorum; in secundo autem vult Orphei,
Musaei, Hesiodi Homerique fabellas accommodare ad ea, quae
ipse primo libro de dis immortalibus dixerat, ut etiam veterrimi
25 poëtae, qui haec ne suspicati quidem sint, Stoici fuisse vide-
antur. Quem Diogenes Babyloni us consequens in eo libro, qui
inscribitur de Minerva, partum Jovis ortumque virginis ad
physiologiam traducens disjungit a fabula.

XVI. Exposui fere non philosophorum judicia, sed deli-
30 rantium somnia. Nec enim multo absurdiors sunt ea, quae
poëtarum vocibus fusa ipsa suavitate nocuerunt, qui et ira in-
flammatores et libidine furentes induxerunt deos feceruntque, ut
eorum bella, proelia, pugnas; vulnera videremus, odia praeterea,

8 universitatemque odd. after Heind., universam atque mss. vim El. Sch.
Mu., umbram mss see Comm., *umbram Or., normam Ba. after Madv. 19 ean-
generally Or. 25 sint mss, sunt CI Or. Ba. Sch. after Ern. 27 partum—
ortumque [BE +], partu—ortuque ACPEK +. 28 disjungit Aso. V, dejungit
mss generally Or. Ba. Sch., disjungit Mu. after Heind. and Ern.
discidia, discordias, ortus, iteritus, querellas, lamentationes, effusas in omni in tempertantia libidines, adulteria, vincula, cum humano genere concubitus mortalesque ex immortali procreatos.

43 Cum poëtarum autem errore conjungere licet portenta magorum, Aegyptiorumque in eodem, genere dementiam, tum etiam vulgi opiniones, quae in maxima inconstantia veritatis ignoratione versantur.

Ea qui consideret quam inconsulte ac temere dicantur, venerari Epicurum et in eorum ipsorum numero, de quibus haec quaestio est, habere debeat. Solus enim vidit primum esse deos, quod in omnium animis eorum notionem impressisset ipsa natura. Quae est enim gens aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam deorum? quam appellat πρόληψιν Epicurus, id est antecipat animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intellegi quicquam nec quaer inter nec disputari potest. Cujus rationis vim atque utilitatem ex illo caelesti Epicuri de regulas et judicio volumine accepimus. XVII. Quod igitur fundamentum hujus quaestionis est, id praclare jactum videtis. Cum enim non instituto aliquo aut more aut lege sit opinio constituta, maneatque ad unum omnium firma consensio, intellegi necesse est esse deos; quoniam insitas eorum vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus, de quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est; esse igitur deos confitendum est. Quod quoniam fere constat inter omnes non philosophos solum, sed etiam in doctos, fateamur 25 constare illud etiam, hanc nos habere sive anticipationem, ut ante dixi, sive praenotionem deorum (sunt enim rebus novis nova ponenda nomina, ut Epicurus ipse πρόληψιν appellavit, quam antea nemo eo verbo nominarat)—hanc igitur habemus, 45 ut deos beatos et immortales putemus. Quae enim nobis natura informationem ipsorum deorum dedit, eadem insculpere in mentibus, ut eos aeternos et beatos haberemus. Quod si ita est, vere exposita illa sententia est ab Epicuro, quod beatum

3 immortalis mss generally, immortalibus CNO Dav. Heind. 14 πρόληψιν Red (see Moser) edd., prolem ein (but prolepsin 1. 28) A, prolempein B, prolepsin CE, prolepsin EP, pro plebs in B (but prolepsin 1. 28), prolepsin Asc. 24 esse om. Or. (by mistake)? fere BE, fere ACPBk. 25 fateamur B (corr. from fatemur) edd., fatemur mss. 31 ipsorum deorum [X] B, d. i. U Asc. [Mus.] Sch.
LIB. I CAP. XVI—XIX §§ 42—49.

aeternumque sit, id nec habere ipsum negotii quiquaque exhi- 5 bere alteri, itaque neque ira neque gratia teneri, qui- quae talia essent, imbécilla essent omnia/ Si nihil aliud quae- reremus, nisi ut deos pie coleremus et ut superstitione libe- 10 raremur, satis erat dictum; nam et praestans deorum natura hominum pietate coleretur, cum et aeternam esset et beatissima (habet enim venerationem justam, quicquid excellit), et metus omnis a vi atque ira deorum pulsus esset; intellegitur enim a beata immortalique natura et iram et gratiam segregari;

15 quibus remotis nulos a superis impedere metus. Sed ad hanc confirmandam opinionem anquirit animus et formam et vitae actionem mentisque agitationem in deo.

XVIII. Ac de forma quidem partim natura nos admonet, 46 partim ratio docet. Nam a natura habemus omnes omnium 15 gentium speciem nullam aliam nisi humanam deorum; quae enim forma alia occurrit umquam aut vigilanti cuiquam aut dormienti? Sed ne omnia revocentur ad primas notiones: ratio hoc idem ipsa declarat. Nam cum praestantissimam naturam, 47 vel quia beata est vel quia sempiterna, convenire videatur ean- dem esse pulcherrimam, quae compositio membrorum, quae con- formatio liniamentorum, quae figura, quae species humana potest esse pulchrior? Vos quidem, Lucili, soletis (nam Cotta meus modo hoc, modo illud), cum artificium effingitis fabricamque 20 divinam, quam sint omnia in hominis figura non modo ad usum, verum etiam ad venustatem apta, describere. Quodsi omnium animantium formam vincit hominis figura, deus autem animans est, ea figura profecto est, quae pulcherrima est om- nium; quoniamque deos beatissimos esse constat, beatus autem esse sine virtute nemo potest nec virtus sine ratione constare 25 nec ratio usquam inesse nisi in hominis figura, hominis esse specie deos confitendum est. Nec tamen ea species corpus est, 49 sed quasi corpus, nec habet sanguinem, sed quasi sanguinem.

XIX. Haec quamquam et inventa sunt acutius et dicta sub-
tilius ab Epicuro, quam ut quisvis ea possit agnos cere, tamen

11 anquirit [XBEK], inquirit Mus. vitae actionem mentisque agitationem
Beier (Off. i 17), vitam et actionem mentis atque agitationem mss. 27 pul-
cherrima est Mad. see Comm., pulcherrima sit mss. Mu. 30 nisi in [BJUT+,
nisi ACREPBK, sine others.

M. C.
DE NATURA DEORUM.

fretus intellegetia vestra dissero brevius, quam causa desiderat. Epicurus autem, qui res occultas et penitus abditas non modo viderit animo, sed etiam sec tractet, ut manu, docet eam esse vim et naturam deorum, ut primum non sensu, sed mente cernatur, nec soliditate quadam neque eadem ad numerum sit, ut ea, quae ille propter firmitatem στερεύμα appellat; sed, imaginibus similitudine et transitione perceptis, cum infinita simillimarum imaginum series ex innumerabilibus individuis existat et ad nos affluat, cum maximis voluptatibus in eas imagines mentem intentam infinamque nostram intelle- 10 gentiam capere, quae sit et beata natura et aeterna. Summa vero vis infinitatis et magna ac diligentior contemplatione dignissima est, in qua intellegi necesse est eam esse naturam, ut omnia omnibus paribus paria respondeant. Hanc ιονομιαν appellat Epicurus, id est aequabilem tributionem. Ex hanc igitur illud efficitur, si mortalium tanta multitudine sit, esse immortalem non minorem, et si, quae interimant, innumerabilia sint, etiam ea, quae conservat, infinita esse debere.

Et quaerere a nobis, Balbe, soletis, quae vita deorum sit, 51 quaeque ab iis degatur aetas. Ea videlicet, quae nihil beatius, nihil omnibus bonis affluentius cogitari potest. Nihil enim agit, nullis occupationibus est implicatus, nulla opera molitur, sua sapientia et virtute gaudet, habet exploratum fore se semper 52 cum in maximis, tum in aeternis voluptatibus. Hunc deum rite beatum dixerimus, vestrum vero laboriosissimum. Sive enim ipse mundus deus est, quid potest esse minus quietum quam nullo puncto tempore intermisso versari circum axem caeli admirabili celeritate? (nisi quietum autem nihil beatum est); sive in ipso mondo deus inest aliquis, qui regat,

8 viderit CEK, viderat APB Asc., videat BU. ut manu docet C Man., ut manu doceat MSS, ut duceat nos manu eam docet esse vim G, ut manu nos duceat docet eam esse vim Heind. 5 cernatur Sch. neque eadem ad numerum sit Ed., nec ad numerum MSS, see Comm. 6 στερεύμα [P], steremnia ABCE, steremnia ASC. 7 cum MSS, cumque Or. Ba. Sch. after Walker, cum enim Dav. 8 series Mn. after Brieger and Hirtz, species MSS. Or. Ba. Sch. 9 ad nos Lamb., ad deos ACBEP Mus., ad eos GUB 1 a, deo Man. Or. Ba., a des Dav., a dix ad nos Heind. 10 defixamque A. W. Zumpt conj. 10 beatae naturae et aeternae Sch. conj. 11 beatae naturae et aeternae Sch. conj. 12 ιονομιαν Bed. U, isonomiam MSS generally. 29 [ipso] Sch.
qui gubernet, qui cursus astrorum, mutationes temporum, rerum vicissitudines ordinesque conservet, terras et maria contemplans hominum commoda vitasque tueatur, ne ille est implicatus molestis negotii et operosis! Nos autem beatam vitam in animi 53 securitate et in omnium vacacione munerum ponimus. Docuit enim nos idem, qui cetera, natura effectum esse mundum, nihil opus fuisse fabrica, tamque eam rem esse faciendam, quam vos effici negatis sine divina posse sollertia, ut innumerabiles naturae mundos effectura sit, efficiat, effecerit. Quod quia quem ad 10 modum natura efficere sine aliqua mente possit non videtis, ut tragici poëtae, cum explicare argumenti exitum non potestis, confugitis ad deum; cujus operam profecto non desideraretis, 54 si immensam et interminatam in omnes partes magnitudinem regionum videretis, in quam se injiciens animus et intendens

ita late longeque peregrinatur, ut nullam tamen oram ultimi videat, in qua possit insistere. In hac igitur immensitate latitudinum, longitudinum, altitudinum infinita vis innumerabilium volitatis atomorum, quae interjecto inani cohaerescunt tamen inter se et aliae alias apprehendentes continuantur; ex quo 20 efficiuntur eae rerum formae et figuralae, quas vos effici posse sine follaribus et incudibus non putatis. Itaque imposuistis in cervicibus nostris sempiternum dominum, quem dies et noctes timeremus. Quis enim non timeat omnia providentem et cogitantem et animadvertentem et omnia ad se pertinere putantem, 25 curiosum et plenum negotii deum? Hinc vobis exstitit primum 55 illa fatalis necessitas, quam eιμαρμένη dicitis, ut quicquid accidat, id ex acterna veritate causarumque continuatione fluxisse dicatis. Quanti autem haec philosophia aestimanda est, cui tamquam aniculis, et iis quidem indoctis, fato fieri videantur omnia? Sequitur ματωρίκτα vestra, quae Latina divinatio dicitur, qua tanta imbueremur superstitione, si vos audire vellemus, ut haruspices, augures, harioli, vates, conjectores nobis essent colendi. His terroribus ab Epicuro solutis et in liber 56 tatem vindicati nec metuimus eos, quos intellegimus nec sibi 35 fingere ullam molestiam nec alteri quaerere, et pie sancteque

7 faciem [BC], facile AEP. 8 negatis El. GU, negatis nss generally. 15 ulitii nss, ultimam 0 Dav. Heind. Ba. 26 eιμαρμένη edd., in Latin letters nss. 30 ματωρίκτα edd., in Latin letters ABCE Mus. Asc. 34 metuimus B\UpsilonM, metuemus AB\CE\PEK.
colimus naturam excellentem atque praestantem. Sed elatus studio vereor ne longior fuerim. Erat autem difficile rem tantam tamque praeclaram incoghatam reliquere; quamquam non tam dicendi ratio mihi habenda fuit quam audiendi.

57 XXI. Tum Cotta comiter, ut solebat: Atqui, inquit, Vellei, nisi tu aliquid dixisses, nihil sane ex me quidem audire potuisse. Mihi enim non tam facile in mentem venire solet, quare verum sit aliquid, quam quare falsum; idque cum saepe, tum, cum te audirem, paulo ante contigit. Roges me, qualis naturam deorum esse duacam, nihil fortasse respondeam. Quae ras, putemne talem esse, qualis modo a te sit exposita, nihil dicam mihi videri minus. Sed ante quam aggrediar ad ea, quae a te disputata sunt, de te ipso dicam quid sentiam. Saepe enim de familiari illo tuo videor audisse, cum te togatis omnibus sine dubio anterret et paucos tecum Epicureos e Graecia compararet, sed, quod ab eo te mirifice diligi intellegebam, arbitraber illum propter benevolentiam uberius id dicere. Ego autem, etsi vereor laudare praesentem, judico tamen de re obscura atque difficili a te dictum esse dilucide, neque sententiis solum copiose, sed verbis etiam ornatus, quam solent vestri. Zeno, 59 nem, quem Philo noster coryphaeum appellare Epicureorum solebat, cum Athenis essem, audiebam frequenter, et quidem ipso auctore Philone, credo, ut facilius judicarem, quam illa bene refellerentur, cum a principi Epicureorum accepisset, quem ad modum dicerentur. Non igitur ille, ut plerique, sed 25 isto modo, ut tu, distincte, graviter, ornate. Sed quod in illo mihi usu saepe venit, idem modo, cum te audirem, accidebat, ut moleste ferre tam tantum ingenium (bona venia me audies) in tam leves, ne dicam in tam ineptas sententias incidisse. Nec ego nunc ipse aliquid afferam melius. Ut enim modo dixi, 30 omnibus fere in rebus, sed maxime in physicius, quid non sit, citius, quam quid sit, dixerim. XXII. Roges me, quid aut

quale sit deus, auctore utar Simonide, de quo cum quaesivisset hoc idem tyrannus Hiero, deliberandi sibi unum diem postulavit; cum idem ex eo postridie quaereret, biduum petivit; cum saeptius duplicaret numerum dierum admiransque Hiero requireret, cur ita faceret, 'Quia, quanto diutius considero', inquit, 'tanto mihi res videtur obscurior'. Sed Simonidem arbitrur (non enim poëta solum suavis, verum etiam ceteroqui doctus sapiensque traditur), quia multa venirent in mentem acuta atque subtilia, dubitamem, quid eorum esset verissimum, desperasse omnem veritatem. Epicurus vero tuus (nam cum illo malo disserere quam tectum) quid dicit, quod non modo philosophia dignum esset, sed mediocri prudentia?

Quaeritur primum in ea quaestione, quae est de natura deorum, sintne di necne sint. 'Difficle est negare'. Credo, si in contione quaeratur, sed in hujus modi sermone et consessu facillimum. Itaque ego ipse pontifex, qui caerimonias religiosae publicas sanctissime tuendas arbitrur, is hoc, quod primum est, esse deos, persuaderi mihi non opinione solum, sed etiam ad veritatem plane velim. Multa enim occurrunt, quae conturbent, ut interdum nulli esse videantur. Sed vide, quam tecum agam liberaliter; quae communia sunt vobis cum ceteris philosophis, non attingam, ut hoc ipsum; placet enim omnibus fere mihique ipsi in primis deos esse. Itaque non pugno; rationem tamen eam, quae a te affertur, non satis firmam puto.

XXIII. Quod enim omnium gentium generumque hominibus ita videretur, id satis magnum argumentum esse dixisti, cur esse deos confiteremur. Quod cum leve per se, tum etiam falsum est. Primum enim unde tibi notae sunt opiniones nationum? Equidem arbitrur multas esse gentes sic immanitatem efferatas, ut apud eas nulla suspicio deorum sit. Quod? Dia-63 goras Æthes, qui dictus est, posteaque Theodorus, nonne aperte

6 res Ascc. Red. EMU, spec. XBB.
8 ceteroqui Moser's E and M Oxf. u, ceteroque XBB Oxf. æ, cetera quoque UO El. Dav.
deorum naturam sustulerunt? Nam Abderites quidem Protagoras, cujus a te modo mentio facta est, sophistes temporibus illis vel maximus, cum in principio libri sic posuisset: 'De divis, neque ut sint neque ut non sint, habeo dicere', Atheniensium jussu urbe atque agro est exterminatus, librique ejus in contione combusti. Ex quo equidem existimo tardiores ad hanc sententiam profitendam multos esse factos, quippe cum poenam ne dubitatio quidem effugere potuisset. Quid de sacri-legis, quid de impii perjurisque dicemus?

Tubulus si Lucius umquam,
Si Lupus aut Carbo, Neptuni filius,
ut ait Lucilius, putasset esse deos, tam perjurus aut tam impurus fuisset? Non est igitur tam explorata ista ratio ad id, quod vultis, confirmandum, quam videtur. Sed quia commune hoc est argumentum aliorum etiam philosophorum, omissam hoc tempore; ad vestra propria venire malo.

Concedo esse deos; doce me igitur, unde sint, ubi sint, quales sint corpore, animo, vita; haec enim scire desidero. Abuteris ad omnia atomorum regno et licentia; hinc quodcumque in solum venit, ut dicitur, effingis atque efficis. Quae 20 primum nullae sunt. Nihil est enim quod vacet corpore; corporibus autem omnis obsidetur locus; ita nullum inane, nihil esse individuum potest. XXIV. Haec ego nunc physicorum oracula fundo, vera an falsa nescio, sed veri tamen similiora quam vestra. Ista enim flagitia Democriti, sive etiam ante 25 Leucippe, esse corpuscula quaedam levia, alia aspera, rotunda alia, partim autem angulata et pyramidata, hamata quaedam et

5 exterminatus est GUC (possibly the position of est in other mss is owing to a dittographia of ext.).
quasi adunca, ex his effectum esse caelum atque terram nulla co-
gente natura, sed concursu quodam fortuito,—hanc tu opinionem, 
C. Vellei, usque ad hanc aetatem perduxisti, priusque te quis de 
omni vitae statu quam de ista auctoritate dejecerit; ante enim 
5 judicasti Epicureum te esse oportere, quam ista cognovisti. Ita 
necessa fuit aut haec flagitia concipere aut suspectae 
philosophiae nomen amittere. Quid enim mereas, ut Epicureus 67 
esse desinas? ‘Nihil equidem’, inquis, ‘ut rationem vitae beatae 
veritatemque deseram’. / Ista igitur est veritas? Nam de vita 
10 beata nihil repugno, quam tu ne in deo quidem esse censes, 
nisi plane otio langueat. Sed ubi est veritas? In mundis, 
credо, innumerabilibus, omnibus minimis temporum punctis alii 
ascentibus, alii cadentibus. An in individuis corpusculis tam 
praecclare opera nulla moderante natura, nulla ratione fingenti-
15 bus? Sed oblitus liberalitatis meae, qua tecum paulo ante uti 
coeperam, plura complector. Concedam igitur ex individuis 
constare omnia. Quid ad rem? deorum enim natura quaeitur. 
Sint sane ex atomis; non igitur aeterni. Quod enim ex atomis, 68 
id natum aliquando est; si natum, nulli dei ante quam nati; et 
20 si ortus est deorum, interitus sit necesse est, ut tu paulo ante de 
Platonis mundo disputabas. Ubi igitur illud vestrum beatum 
et aeternum, quibus duobus verbis significatis deum? quod 
cum efficere vultis, in dumeta correpitis. Ita enim dicebas, 
non corpus esse in deo, sed quasi corpus, nec sanguinem, sed 
25 tamquam sanguinem.

XXV. Hoc persaepe facitis, ut, cum aliquid non veri simile 69
dictatis et effugere reprehensionem velitis, afferatis aliquid, quod omnino ne fieri quidem possit; ut satius fuerit illud ipsum, de quo ambigebatur, concedere, quam tam impudenter resistere. Velut Epicurus cum videret, si atomi ferrentur in locum inferior-rem suopte pondere, nihil fore in nostra potestate, quod esset earum motus certus et necessarius, invenit, quo modo necessita-tem effugere, quod videlicet Democritum fugerat; atit atomum, cum pondere et gravitate recto deorsus feratur, declinare pau-llum. Hoc dicere turpius est quam illud, quod vult, non posse defendere. Idem facit contra dialecticos; a quibus cum tradi- tum sit in omnibus disjunctionibus, in quibus 'aut etiam aut non' poneretur, alterum utrum esse verum, pertimuit, ne, si concessum esset hujus modi aliquid, 'Aut vivet cras aut non vivet Epicurus', alterutrum fieret necessarium: totum hoc 'aut etiam aut non' negavit esse necessarium; quo quid dici potuit obtius? Urgebat Arcesilas Zenonem, cum ipse falsa omnia diceret, quae sensibusc viderentur, Zeno autem non nulla visa esse falsa, non omnia; timuit Epicurus, ne, si unum visum esset falsum, nullum esset verum: omnes sensus veri nuntios dixit esse. Nihil horum nimis callide; gravirem enim plagam accipiebat, ut leviorem repelleret. Idem facit in natura deorum; dum individuorum corporum concretionem fugit, ne interitos et dissipatio consequatur, negat esse corpus deorum, sed tamquam corpus, nec sanguinem, sed tamquam sanguinem. XXVI. Mirabile videtur, quod non rideat haruspex, cum haruspicem viderit; hoc mirabilius, quod vos inter vos risum tenere possitis. 'Non est corpus, sed quasi corpus'. Hoc intellegerem quale esset, si in ceris diceretur aut fictilibus figuris; in deo quid sit 'quasi corpus' aut 'quasi sanguis', intellegere non possum; ne tu
quidem, Vellei, sed non vis fateri. Ista enim a vobis quasi 72
dictata redduntur, quae Epicurus oscitans halucinatus est, cum
quidem gloriatetur, ut videmus in scriptis, se magistrum habu-
isse nullum. Quod et non praedicant queram facile equidem
crederem, sicut mali aedificii domino glorianti se architectum
non habuisse; nihil enim olet ex Academia, nihil ex Lyceo,
nihil ne ex puerilibus quidem disciplinis. Xenocratem audire
potuit, quem virum, di immortales! et sunt quia putent audisse;
ipse non vult; credo plus nemen. Pamphilum quendam, Pla-
tonis auditorem, ait a se Sami auditum; ibi enim adolescens
habitatbat cum patre et fratribus, quod in eam pater ejus Neocles
agripita venerat; sed cum agellus eum non satis aleret, ut
opinor, ludi magister fuit. Sed hunc Platonicum mirifice con-
tenit Epicurus; ita metuit, ne quid umquam didicasse videatur.

In Nausiphane Democriteo tenetur; quem cum a se non neget
auditum, vexat tamen omnibus contumeliis. Atqui si haec
Democritea non audisset, quid audierat? quid est in physicis
Epicuri non a Democrito? Nam etsi quaedam commutavit, ut
quod paulo ante de inclinatione atomorum dixi, tamen plerque
dicit eadem, atomos, inane, imagines, infinitatem locorum innum-
erabilitatemque mundorum, eorum ortus, interitus, omnia fere,
quibus naturae ratio continentur. Nunc istuc 'quasi corpus' et
'quasi sanguinem' quid intellegis? Ego enim te scire ista 74
melius quam me non fateor solum, sed etiam facile patior; cum-

quidem semel dicta sunt, quid est, quod Velleius intelleger
possit, Cotta non possit? Itaque corpus quid sit, sanguis quid
sit, intellego; quasi corpus et quasi sanguis, quid sit, nullo pror-
sus modo intellego. Neque tu me celas, ut Pythagoras solebat
alienos, nec consulto dicis occulte tamquam Heraclitus, sed
(quot inter nos liceat) ne tu quidem intellegis. XXVII. Illud 75
video pugnare te, species ut quaedam sit deorum, quae nihil concrèti habeat, nihil solidi, nihil expressi, nihil eminentis, sitque pura, levis, perluxida. Dicemus igitur idem, quod in Venere Coa: corpus illud non est, sed simile corporis, nec ille fusus et candore mixtus rubor sanguinis est, sed quaedam sanguinis similitudo; sic in Epicureo deo non res, sed similitudines rerum esse. Fac id, quod ne intellegi quidem potest, mihi esse persuasum; cedo mihi istorum adumbratorum deorum linimenta atque formas.

76 Non deest hoc loco copia rationum, quibus docere velitis humanas esse formas deorum; primum quod ita sit informatum anticipatumque mentibus nostris, ut homini, cum de deo cogit et, forma occurrat humana; deinde quod, quoniam rebus omnibus excellat natura divina, forma quoque esse pulcherrima debeat, nec esse humana ullam pulchriorem; tertiam rationem affertis, quod nulla alia figura domicilium mentis esse possit. Primum igitur quicque considera quale sit; arripere enim mihi videmini quasi vestro jure rem nullo modo probabilem. Omnino quis tam caecus in contemplandis rebus unquam fuit, ut non videret species istas hominum collatas in deos aut consilio quodam sapientium, quo facilius animos imperatorum ad deorum cultum a vitae pravitate converterent, aut superstitione, ut essent simulacra, quae venerantes deos ipsos se adire crederent? Auxerunt autem haec eadem poëtae, picture, opifices; erat enim non facile agentes alicui et molientes deos in aliarum formarum imitatione servare. Accessit etiam ista opinio fortasse, quod homini homine pulchrius nihil videatur. Sed tu hoc, physice, non vides, quam blanda conciliatrix et quasi sui sit lena natura? An putas ullam esse terra marique beluam, quae non sui generis belua maxime delectetur? Quod ni ita esset, cur non gestiret 30


 Constiteram exorientem Auroram forte salutans, Cum subito a laeva Roscius exoritur. Pace mihi liceat, caelestes, dicere vestra, Mortalis visu pulchrior esse deo.

Huic deo pulchrior; at erat, sicuti hodie est, perversissimis oculis. Quid refert, si hoc ipsum salsum illi et venustum videbatur?
80 Redeo ad deos. XXIX. Ecquo, si non tam strabones, at pae-
tulos esse arbitrarmur? ecquos. naevum habere? ecquos silos,
flaccos, frontones, capitones, quae sunt in nobis? an omnia
emendata in illis? Detur id vobis; num etiam una est omnium
facies? nam si plures, aliam esse alia pulchriorem necesse est. 5
Igitur aliquis non pulcherrimus deus, Si una omnium facies
est, flore in caelo Academiam necesse est; si enim nihil inter
deam et deum differt, nulla est apud deos cognitio, nulla per-
81 ceptio. / Quid, si etiam, Vellei, falsum illud omnino est, nullam
aliem nobis de deo cogitantibus speciem nisi hominis occurrere? 10
tamenne ista tam absurdæ defendes? Nobis fortasse sic occurrit,
ut dicis; a parvis enim Jovem, Junonem, Minervam, Neptunum,
Vulcanum, Apollinem reliquosque deos ea facie novimus, qua
pictores factoresque volunteering, neque solum facie, sed etiam
ornatu, astate, vestitu; at non Aegyptii nec Syri nec fere cuncta 15
barbaria; firmiores enim videas apud eos opiniones esse de
bestii quibusquam quan apud nos de sanctissimis templis et
82 simulacris deorum. Etenim fana multa spoliata et simulacra
deorum de locis sanctissimis ablata videmus a nostris; at vero
ne fando quidem auditem est crocodilum aut ibim aut faciem
20 violatum ab Aegyptio. Quid igitur censes? / Apim illum,
sanctum Aegyptiorum bovem, nonne deum videri Aegyptii? 25
Tam hercle quam tibi illam vestram Sospitam, quam tu num-
quam ne in somnis quidem vides nisi cum pelle caprina, cum
hasta, cum scutulo, cum calceolis repandia. At non est talis
Argiva nec Romana Juno. Ergo alia species Junonis Argivis,
alia Lanuvinis, alia nobis. Et quidem alia nobis Capitolini, alia

1 ecquos corr. from etquos B, et quos ACEBK+; et quasi Asc. 2 ecquos—
equos AB5, etquos—etquos B'CEUBK+. 9 quid si E Asc., quod si ACU +,
quo si B. 11 defendes TUL, defendens XBK+, defenderes V Asc. sic BGC,
si ACEUTB Asc. +. 12 a parvis enim Klotz (who compares a similar
Junonem ms. generally, om. CB. 13 reliquosque AB+, reliquos CEBK,
16 eos opiniones—quem apud om. C. 18 spoliata XBK+, expolita Asc.
OLYTU. 20 ne fendo [BCEBK +, nefandum UO Asc. HERV. +, nefandâ A.
auditum B[CE], auditu ABU ASC. MEBRO. crocodilium see ii 129. 21 Aegyptio
Asc., Aegypto ms. generally. censes Apim illum [ABF]CM, censes apud nullum
CB. 26 Argiva G. Red.+ Wesenberg (quoted by Orell on Tusc. i 118) Sch.
Ba., Argia ms. generally Or. Mu. 27 alia nobis edd. after Ursinus, om. ms.

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DE NATURA DEORUM.

Atheniensium caderet, verbis reliquiisse deos, re sustulisse. Itaque in illis selectis ejus brevibusque sententiis, quas appellatis kupias δῆξας, haec, ut opinor, prima sententia est: 'Quod beatum et immortale est, id nec habet nec exhibet cuiquam negotium.' XXXI. In hac ita sortentia sententia sunt qui existimant, quod ille inscitia plane loquendi fecerat, fecisse consulto; de homine minime vafro male existimant. Dubium est enim, utrum dicat aliquid esse beatum et immortale an, si quid sit. Non animadvertunt hic eum ambigue locutum esse, sed multis aliis locis et illum et Metrodorum tam aperte quam paulo ante te. Ille vero deos esse putat, nec quemquam vidi, qui magis ea, quae timenda esse negaret, timeret, mortem dico et deos. Quibus mediocres homines non ita valde moventur, his ille clamat omnium mortuam mentes esse perterritas. Tot milia latrocinantium morte proposita, aliis omnia, quae possunt, fana compilant. Credo, aut illos mortis timor terret aut hos religionis.

Sed quoniam non audes (jam enim cum ipso Epicuro loquer) negare esse deos, quid est, quod te impediat aut solem aut mundum aut mentem aliquid sempiternam in deorum numero ponere? 'Numquam vidi', inquit, 'animam rationis consiliique participem in ulla alia nisi humana figura'. Quid? solis numquidnam aut lunae aut quinque errantium siderum simile vidisti? Sol duabus unius orbis ultimis partibus definiens motum cursus annuos conficit; hujus hanc lustrationem ejus- dem incensa radiis mensuro spatio lunar compleit; quinque autem stellae eundem orbem tenentes, aliae propius a terris, aliae remotius, ab isdem principiis disparibus temporibus eadem spatio conficiunt. Num quid tale, Epicure, vidisti? Ne sit

igitur sol, ne luna, ne stellae, quoniam nihil esse potest, nisi quod attigimus aut vidimus. Quid? deum ipsum numne vidisti? Cur igitur credis esse? Omnia tollamus ergo, quae aut historia nobis aut ratio nova affert. Ita fit, ut mediterranei mare esse non credant. Quae sunt tantae animi angustiae? Ut, si Scriphi natus esses nec umquam egressus ex insula, in qua lepusculos vulpeculasque saepe vidisses, non crederes leones et pantheras esse, cum tibi, quales essent, diceretur; si vero de elephanto quis diceret, etiam rideri te putares. An quicquam tam puerile dici potest (ut eundem locum diutius urgeam), quam si ea genera beluarum, quae in rubro mari Indiave gignantur, nulla esse dicamus? Atqui ne curiosissimi quidem homines exquiere audire tam multa possunt, quam sunt multa, quae terra, mari, paludibus, fluminibus exsistunt; quae negemus esse, quia numquam vidimus.

Et tu quidem, Vellei, non vestro more, sed dialecticorum, quaè funditus gens vestra non novit, argumentis sententiam conclusistis: beatos esse deos sumpsisti. Concedimus. Beatum autem sine virute neminem esse posse. XXXII. Id quoque damus, et libenter quidem. Virtutem autem sine ratione constare non posse. Conveniat id quoque necessè est. Adjungis: nec rationem esse nisi in hominis figura. Quem tibi hoc daturum putas? Si enim ita esset, quid opus erat te gradatim istuc pervenire? sumpsisses tuo jure. Quid autem est istuc gradatim? Nam a beatis ad virtutem, a virtute ad rationem

video te venisse gradibus; a. ratione ad humanam figuram quo modo accedis? Praecipitare istuc quidem est, non des-

cendere. Nec vero intellego, cur maluerit Epicurus deos hominum similis dicere quam homines deorum. Quaeres, quid
intersit; si enim illi simile sit, esse illusion. Video; 5 sed hoc dico, non ab hominibus formae figuram venisse ad
deos; di enim semper fuerunt, nati numquam sunt, siquidem
aeterni sunt futuri; at homines nati; ante igitur humana
forma quam homines ea, qua erant forma di immortalis. Non

ergo illorum humana forma, sed nostra divina dicenda est. 10
Verum hoc quidem, ut voletis; illud quaero, quae fuerit tanta
fortuna (nihil enim ratione in rerum natura factum esse vultis),
sed tamen quis iste tantus casus? unde tam felix concursus
atomorum, ut repente homines deorum forma nascenetur?

91 Seminane deorum decidisse de caelo putamus in terras, et sic 15
homines patrum similis extitisse? Velem diceretis; deorum
cognitionem agnoscerem non invitus. Nihil tale dicitis, sed
casu esse factum, ut essemus similis deorum. Et nunc argu-
menta quaerenda sunt, quibus hoc refellatur! Utinam tam
facile vera invenire possim quam falsa convincere!

XXXIII. Etenim enumerasti memoriter et copiose, ut
mihi quidem admirari liberet in homine esse Romano tantam
scientiam, usque a Thale Milesio de deorum natura philosopho-

92 rum sententias. Omnesne tibi illi delirare visi sunt, qui sine
manibus et pedibus constare deus posse decreverint? Ne hoc 25
quidem vos movet considerantes, quae sit utilitas quaeque
opportunitas in homine membrorum, ut judicetis membris
humanis deos non egere? Quid enim pedibus opus est sine
ingressu? quid manibus, si nihil comprehendendum est? quid
reliqua discriptione omnium corporis partium? in qua nihil 30
inane, nihil sine causa, nihil supervacaneum est [; itaque nulla
ars imitari sollertiae naturalis potest]. Habebit igitur linguam
deus et non loquetur, dentes, palatum, fauces nullum ad usum,

9 ea qua mss generally, eaque CT (corr. to ea qua) Reg. Dav. Ba. 15 semi-
nane B, semina mss generally Sch. 20 possim mss generally, possem EE
Dav. Heind. Sch. 29 liberet mss generally, subiret conj. Moser and Cobet
30 discriptione ABC, discriptione E† Sch. 81 itaque—potest see Comm.
quaeque procreationis causa natura corpori affinit, ea frustra habebit deus, nec externa magis quam interiora, cor, pulmones, jecur, cetera, quae detracta utilitate quid habent venustatis?
quandoquidem haec esse in deo propter pulchritudinem vultis.

5 Istisne fidentes somniis non modo Epicurus et Metrodorus 93
et Hermarchus contra Pythagoram, Platonem Empedoclemque
ixerunt, sed meretricula etiam Leontium contra Theophrastum
scribent ausa est? scito illa quidem sermones et Attico, sed
tamen. Tantum Epicuri hortus habuit licentiae. Et soletis
queri; Zeno quidem etiam litigabat. Quid dicam Albuciam?
Nam Phaedro nihil elegantius, nihil humanius; sed stomacha-
batur senex, si quid asperius dixeram, cum Epicurus Aristotelem
vexarii, contumeliosissime, Phaedoni Socratico turpissime male
dixerit, Metrodori, sodalis sui, fratrem, Timocratem, quia nescio
quid in philosophia dissentiret, totis voluminibus conciderit, in
Democritum ipsum, quem secutus est, fuerit ingratus, Nausi-
planem, magistrum suum, a quo nihil didicerat, tam male accipe-
rit. XXXIV. Zeno quidem non eos solum, qui tum erant, Apoll-
odorum, Silum, ceteros, ficebat maledictis, sed Socratem ipsum,
parentem philosophiae, Latino verbo utens scurrum Atticum
uisse dicebat, Chrysippum numquam nisi Chrysippam vocabat.
Tu ipse paulo ante, cum tamquam senatum philosophorum reci-
tares, summos viros desipere, delirare, dementes esse dicebas.
Quorum si nemo verum vidit de natura deorum, verendum est,
25 ne nulla sit omnino.

Nam ista, quae vos dicitis, sunt tota commenticia, vix digna
lucubratione anicarum; non enim sentitis, quam multa vobis
suscipienda sint, si impetratis, ut concedamus eandem homi-
num esse et deorum figuram. Omnis cultus et curatio corporis
erit eadem adhibenda deo, quae adhibetur homini, ingessus,
cursus, accubito, inclinatio, sessio, comprehensio, ad extremum
etiam sermo et cratio. Nam quod et mares deos et feminas esse
dicitis, quid sequatur, videtis. Equidem mirari satis non pos-

3 est B&C, sit AB'EKB +. 17 nihil MSS generally, non nihil N Bed. add.
after Pearce. 19 Situm CBE, Sillum UHMR +, sillim A, Syllum As. + Sch.,
sive BE. 21 Chrysippam AUG, Chrisippam BfEK, crisippam CEGO, chry-
isippum BfEK, cesippum v As., Chresippum Dav. Heind.

M. C.

3
DE NATURE DEORUM.

sum, unde ad istas opiniones vester ille princeps venerit. Sed clamare non desinitis retinendum hoc esse, deus ut beatus immortalisque sit. Quid autem obstat, quo minus sit beatus, si non sit bipes? aut ista, sive beatitas sive beatitudo dicenda est (utrumque omnino durum, sed usu mollienda nobis verba sunt), verum ea, quaecumque est, cur aut in solem illum aut in hunc mundum aut in aliquam mentem aeternam figura membrisque corporis vacuum cadere potest? Nihil aliud dicis nisi: 'Numquam vivi solem aut mundum beatum'. Quid? mundum praeter hunc umquamne vidisti? Negabis. Cur igitur non sescenta milia esse mundorum, sed innumerabilia ausus es dicere? 'Ratio docuit'. Ergo hoc te ratio non docebit, cum praestantissima natura quaeratur, eaque beata et aeterna (quae sola divina natura est), ut immortalitate vincamur ab ea natura, sic animi praestantia vinci, atque ut animi, item corporis? Cur igitur, cum ceteris rebus inferiores simus, forma pares sumus? ad similitudinem enim deorum propius accedebat humana virtus quam figura. XXXV. Ipsa vero quam nihil ad rem pertinet, quae vos delectat maxime, similiduo! Quid? canis nonne similis lupo? atque, ut Ennius,

Simia quam similis, turpissuma bestia, nobis!

at mores in utroque dispare. Elephanto beluarum nulla prudentior; at figura quae vastior? De bestiis loquor; quid? inter ipsos homines nonne et simillimis formis disparis mores et moribus paribus figura dissimilis? Etenim si semel, Velleii, 25 suscipimus genus hoc argumenti, attende, quo serpat. Tu enim sumebas nisi in hominis figura rationem inesse non posse; sumet alius nisi in terrestri, nisi in eo, qui natus sit, nisi in eo,

qui adoleverit, nisi in eo, qui didicerit, nisi in eo, qui ex animo constet et corpore caduco et infirmo, postremo nisi in homine atque mortali. Quodsi in omnibus his rebus obsistis, quid est, quod te forma una conturberit? His enim omnibus, quae propusui, adjunctis in homine rationem esse et mentem videbas; quibus detractis deum tamen nosse te dicis, modo liniamenta maneant. Hoc est non considerare, sed quasi sortiri, quid loquare. Nisi forte ne hoc quidem attendis, non modo in homine, sed etiam in arbore, quicquid supervacuaneum sit aut usum non habeat, obstare. Quam molestum est uno digito plus habere! Quid ita? Quia nec ad speciem nec ad usum alium quinque desiderant. Tuus autem deus non digito uno redundat, sed capite, collo, cervicibus, lateribus, alvo, tergo, poplitibus, manibus, pedibus, feminibus, cruribus. Si, ut immortalis sit, quid haec ad vitam membra pertinent? quid ipsa facies? Magis illa, cerebrum, cor, pulmones, jecur; haec enim sunt domicilia vitae; oris quidem habitus ad vitae firmitatem nihil pertinet.

XXXVI. Et eos vituperabas, qui ex operibus magnificis atque praeclaris, cum ipsum mundum, cum ejus membra, caelum, terras, maria, cumque horum insignia, solem, lunam stellasque, vidissent, cumque temporum maturitates, mutationes vicissitudinesque cognovissent, suspicati essent aliquam excellentem esse praestantemque naturam, quae haec efficisset, moveret, regeret, gubernaret. Qui etiamsi aberrant a conjectura, video tamen, quid sequantur; tu quod opus tandem magnum et egregium habes, quod effectum divina mente videatur, ex quo esse deos suspicere? Habebam, inquis, in animo insitam informationem quandam dei. Et barbari quidem Jovis, galeatae Minervae; num igitur esse tales putas? Quanto melius haec vulgus imperatorium, qui non membra solum hominis deo tribuant, sed usum etiam membrorum. Dant enim

arcum, sagittas, hastam, elipeum, fuscinam, fulmen, et si, actiones quae sint deorum, non vident, nihil agentem tamen deum non queunt cogitare. Ipsi, qui irridentur, Aegyptii nullam beluam nisi ob aliquam utilitatem, quam ex ea caperent, consecraverunt; velut ibes maximam vim serpentium conjiciunt, cum sint aves, excelsae, cruribus rigidis, corneo proceroque rostro; avertunt pestem ab Aegypto, cum volucres angues ex vastitate Libyae vento Africo inventas interficiunt atque consumunt; ex quo fit, ut illae nec morsu vivae noceant nec odore mortuae. Possum de ichneumonum utilitate, de crocodilorum, de faelium dicere, sed nolo esse longus. Ita concludam, tamen beluas a barbaris propter beneficiam consecratas, vestrorum deorum non modo beneficium nullum existare, sed ne factum quidem omnino. Nihil habet, inquit, negotii. Profecto Epicurus quasi puti delicati nihil cessatione melius existimat. At ipsi tamen pueri, etiam cum cessant, exercitacione aliqua ludicra delectantur; deum sic feriatum volumus cessatione torpere, ut, si se commoverit, vereamur, ne beatus esse non possit? Haec oratio non modo deos spoliat motu et actione divina, sed etiam homines iner tes efficit, siquidem agens aliquid ne deus quidem esse beatus potest.

Verum sit sane, ut vultis, deus effigies hominis et imago; quod ejus est domicilium? quae sedes? qui locus? quae deinde actio vitae? quibus rebus, id quod vultis, beatus est? utatur enim suis bonis oportet et fruatur, qui beatus futurus est. Nam locus quidem iis etiam naturis, quae sine animis sunt, suus est cuique proprius, ut terra infimum teneat, hanc inundet aqua, superior aer, aetheris ignibus altissima ora reddatur. Bestiarum autem terrenae sunt aliae, partim aquatiles, aliae quasi anciptes in utraque sede viventes; sunt quaedam etiam, quae igne nasci putentur apparentque in ardentibus fornacibus saepe volantantes. Quaerit igitur, vester deus primum ubi habi-

tet, deinde quae causa eum loco moveat, si modo movetur aliquando, porro, cum hoc proprium sit animantium, ut aliquid appetat, quod sit naturae accommodatum, deus quid appetat, ad quam denique rem motu mentis ac ratione utatur, postremo quo modo beatus sit, quo modo aeternus. Quicquid enim horum attigeris, ulcus est. Ita male instituta ratio exitum reperire non potest. Sic enim dicebas, speciem dei percipi cogitatione, non sensu, nec esse in ea ullum soliditatem, neque eandem ad numerum permanere, eamque esse ejus visionem, ut similitudine et transitione cernatur, neque deficiat umquam ex infinitis corporibus similium accessio, ex eoque fieri, ut in haec intenta mens nostra beatam illam naturam et sempiternam putet. XXXVIII. Hoc, per ipsos deos, de quibus loquimur, quale tandem est? Nam si tantum modo ad cogitationem valent nec habent ullam soliditatem nec eminientiam, quid interest, utrum de Hippocentauro an de deo cogitamus? Omne enim talem conformationem animi ceteri philosophi motum inanem vocant, vos autem adventum in animos et introitum imaginum dicitis. Ut igitur Ti. Gracchum cum videor contionantem in Capitolio vide re de M. Octavio deferentem sitellam, tum eum motum animi dico esse inanem, tu autem et Gracchi et Octavii imagines remanere, quae, in Capitolium cum pervenerint, tum ad animum meum referuntur; hoc idem fieri in deo, cujus crebra facie pellantur animi, ex quo esse beati atque aeterni intellegantur. Fac imagines esse, quibus pulsantur animi; species dumtaxat objicitur quaedam; num etiam, cur ea beata sit, cur aeterna? Quae autem istae imagines vestae aut unde? A Democrito omnino, haec ligentia; sed et ille reprehensus a multis est, nec vos exitum reperitis, totaque res vacillat et claudicat. Nam quid est, quod minus probari possit? Omnium

in me imaginibus, Homerii, Archilochi, Romuli, Numae, Pythagoraei, Platonis, nec ea forma, qua illi fuerunt! Quo modo 8 illi ergo? et quorum imaginibus? Orpheus poëtam docet Aristoteles numquamuisse, et hoc Orphicum carmen Pythagorei ferunt cujusdam fuisset Cercopis. At Orpheus, id est imago ejus, ut vos vultis, in animum meae saepe incurrit.

Omnis tamen ista rerum effigies ex individuis quo modo cor- 110
poribus oritur? quae etiamsi essent (quae nulla sunt), pellere se
ipsa et agitari inter se concursu fortasse possent, formare, figu-
rare, colorare, animare non possent. Nulla igitur modo immor-
talem deum efficitis. XL. Videamus nunc de beato. Sine
virtute certe nullo modo; virtus autem actuosa, et deus vester
 nihil agens; express virtutis igitur; ita ne beatus quidem. abundat
Quae ergo vita? 'Suppeditatio', inquis, 'bonorum nullo malorum
interventu'. Quorum tandem bonorum? Voluptatum, credo;
10 nempe ad corpus pertinentium; nullam enim novistis nisi pro-
spectam a corpore et redeuntem ad corpus animi voluptatem.
Non arbitror te, Vellei, similem esse Epicureorum reliquorum,
quos pudet quarundam Epicuri vocum, quibus ille testatur se
ne intellegere quidem ullam bonum, quod sit sejunctum a deli-
catis et obscenis voluptatibus; quas quidem non erubescens
persequitur omnes nominatim. Quem cibum igitur aut quas
15 potiones aut quas vocum aut florum varietates aut quos tactus,
quos odores adhibebis ad deos, ut eos perfundas voluptatibus?
ut poētae quidem [nectar ambrosiam] epulas comparant et aut
Juventatem aut Ganymedem pocula ministrantem; tu autem,
Epicure, quid facies? Neque enim, unde habeat ista deus tuus,
video, nec quo modo utatur. Locupletior igitur hominum
natura ad beate vivendum est quam deorum, quod pluribus
generibus fruitur voluptatum. At has leviores ducis voluptates,
quibus quasi titillatio (Epicuri enim hoc verbum est) adhibetur
sensibus. Quosquaque ludis? Nam etiam Philo noster ferre non
poterat asperrnì Epicureos molles et delicatas voluptates;

1 ex individuis Herv. V, ex dividuis La and M of Moser, ex divinis mss
generally. 2 quae nulla sunt UTQ[B], om. ACHEBEK + Sch. Or. Ba., quae
nulla sunt trans. after corporibus E. 3 ipsa Asc. CR, ipsa ABEBE, ipsae C.
agitis conj. Mu. 12 Vellei MEVY +, velle XBK. 13 pudet mss, non
Sch. epulas mss generally, epulas ULSINO Asc. Heind., in epulas J. S. Reid
conj. 20 juventatem [AB]EKE, juventutem CE. 26 nam etiam Philo G,
nam enim Philo (or filo) XBK +, nam Philo LEVT.
DE NATURA DEORUM.

summa enim memoria pronuntiabat plurimas Epicuri sententias iis ipsis verbis, quibus erant scriptae; Metrodori vero, qui est Epicuri collega sapientiae, multa impudentiora recitabat; accusat enim Timocratem, fratrem suum, Metrodorus, quod dubitet omnia, quae ad beatam vitam pertineant, ventre metiri, neque id semel dicit, sed saepius. Annuere te video; nota enim tibi sunt; proferrem libros, si negares. Neque nunc reprehendo, quod ad voluptatem omnia referantur (alia est ea quae stio), sed doceo deos vestros esse voluptates expertes, ita veste judicium

114 beatos quidem. XLI. At dolore vacant. Satin est id ad illam abundanter bonis vitam beatissimam? Cogitat, inquint, assidue beatum esse se; habet enim nihil aliud, quod agitet in mente. Comprehende igitur animo et propone ante oculos deum nihil aliud in omni aeternitate nisi 'Mihi pulchre est' et 'Ego beatus sum' cogitatem. Nec tamen video, quo modo non vereatur iste deus beatus, ne intereat, cum sine ulla intermissione pulsetur agiteturque atomorum incursione sem completa, cumque ex ipso imagines semper affluant. Ita nec beatus est vester deus nec acternus.

115 At etiam de sanctitate, de pietate adversus deos libros scrispisit Epicurus. At quo modo in his loquitur? Ut Ti. Coruncanum aut P. Scaevolam, pontifices maximos, te audire dicas, non eum, qui sustulerit omnem funditus religionem, nec manibus, ut Xerxes, sed rationibus deorum immortalium templum et aras overerit. Quid est enim, cur deos ab hominibus colen- dos dicas, cum di non modo homines non colant, sed omnino nihil curent, nihil agant? At est eorum eximiam quaedam praestansque natura, ut ea debeat ipsa per se ad se colendum allicere sapientem. An quicquam eximium potest esse in ea natura, quae sua voluptate laetans nihil nec actura sit umquam neque 30

\[2 iis BB, his mss generally. 10 at A^1CBEK+, a A^1BEKHC. 14 pulchre Asc. C^1HLO, pulchro XRSKM. 15 cogitatem here K ends. 16 non vereatur ABHLO Sch. Mu., non moveatur CEB, videatur MROVU Asc., non pereat Or. Ba., non conteratur Madv. ne intereat B Sch. Mu., om. ACE Mus. Or. Ba., Heind. suggests quomodo videatur sibi iste deus beatus, aut quomodo non vereatur, ne intereat, Allen quod modo sibi videatur i. d. b. nec, ne intereat, vereatur. 21 Ti. edd. after Heind., om. mss. 28 allicere GHBR, alicere U, elicere XOB+. 30 voluptate UOLMNRE, voluptate XTBHC+.\]
LIB. I CAP. XL—XLII §§ 113—119.

agat neque egerit? Quae porro pietas ei debetur, a quo acceperis? aut quid omnino, cujus nullum meritum sit, ei deberi potest? Est enim pietas justitiae adversum deos; cum quibus quid potest nobis esse juris, cum homini nulla cum deo sit communitas? Sanctitas autem est scientia coelorum deorum; qui quam ob rem colendi sint, non intellego, nullo nec accepto ab iis nec sperato bono.

XLII. Quid est autem, quod deos veneremur propter ad-117 mirationem ejus naturae, in qua egregium nihil videmus? Nam superstitione, quod gloriari soletis, facile est liberari, cum sustuleris omnem vim deorum; nisi forte Diagon aut Theodorum, qui omnino deos esse negabant, censes supersticiosos esse putuisse. Ego ne Protagoram quidem, cui neutrum licerit, nec esse deos nec non esse. Horum enim sententiae omnium non modo superstitionem tollunt, in qua inest timor inanis deorum, sed etiam religionem, quae deorum cultu pio continetur. Quid? 118 ii, qui dixerunt totam de dis immortalis opinionem factam esse ab hominibus sapientibus rei publicae causa, ut, quos ratio non posset, eos ad officium religio duceret, nonne omnem religionem funditus sustulerunt? Quid? Prodicus Cius, qui ea, quae prodessent hominum vitae, deorum in numero habita esse dixit, quam tandem religionem reliquit? Quid? qui aut fortes 119 aut claros aut potentes viros tradunt post mortem ad deos pervenisse, eosque esse ipsos, quos nos colere, precari venerarique soleamus, nonne expertes sunt religionum omnium? quae ratio maxime tractata ab Euhemerost, quem noster et interpretatus et seclusus est praeter ceteros Ennius. Ab Euhemeru autem et mortes et sepulturae demonstrantur deorum. Utrum igitur hic confirmasse videtur religionem an penitus totam sustulisse?

Omitto Eleusinam sanctam illam et augustom;

Ubi initiantur gentes orarum ultimae,

praetereò Samothraciam eaque, quae Lemni

Nocturno aditum occultà coluntur,
Silvestribus saepibus densa.

Quibus explicatis ad rationemque revocatis rerum magis natura
cognoscitur quam deorum.

120 XLIII. Mihi quidem etiam Democritus, vir magnus in pri-
mis, cujus fontibus Epicurus hortulos suos irrigavit, nutare
videtur in natura deorum. Tum enim censet imagines divini-
tate praeditas inesse in universitate rerum, tum principia men-
tis, quae sint in eodem universo, deos esse dicit, tum animantes
imagines, quae vel prodesse nobis soleant vel nocere, tum ingen-
tes quasadim imagines tantasque, ut universum mundum com-
plexantur extrinsecus; quae quidem omnia sunt patria Demo-
121 criti quam Democrito digniora. Quis enim istas imagines com-
prehendere animo potest? quis admirari? quis aut cultu aut
religione dignas judicare? Epicurus vero ex animis hominum
extraxit radicitus religionem, cum dis immortalibus et operae
et gratiam sustulit. Cum enim optimam et praestantissimam
naturam dei dicit esse, negat idem esse in deo gratiam; tollit
id, quod maxime proprium est optimae praestantissimaeque
naturae. Quid enim melius aut quid praestantius bonitate et
beneficentia? Qua cum carere deum vultis, neminem deo nec
deum nec hominem carum, neminem ab eo amari, neminem
diligis vultis. Ita fit, ut non modo homines a dis, sed ipsi di
inter se ab aliis alii neglegantur. XLIV. Quanto Stoici melius, 25
qui a vobis reprehenduntur! Censent autem sapientes sapien-
tibus etiam ignotis esse amicos. Nihil est enim virtute amabilis;
quam qui adeptus erit, ubicumque erit gentium, a nobis
diligetur. Vos autem quid mali datis, cum in imbecillitate
gratificationem et benevolentiam ponitis! Ut enim omissam 30
vim et naturam deorum, ne homines quidem eensetis, nisi imbe-

9 mentisquae [B] (cf. Augustin Ep. 118) Dav. Heind., mentesquae ABCEUOT1+,
mentesquae quae Asc. TRMBMV Allen. 10 sitc odd. after Heind., sunt MSS.
29 adeptus erit MSS generally, adeptus fuerit EL. Reg. Dev. 29 in imbecilli-
tate Lamb., inbecillitate G Moser's MN, inbecillitate ABUT, inbecillitate CE
Mus.
cilli essent, futuros beneficos et benignos fuisse? Nulla est caritas naturalis inter bonos? Carum ipsum verbum est amoris, ex quo amicitiae nomen est ductum; quam si ad fructum nostrum referemus, non ad illius commoda, quem diligemus, non erit ista amicitia, sed mercatura quaedam utilitatum suarum. Prata et arva et pecudum greges diliguntur isto modo, quod fructus ex iis capiuntur; hominum caritas et amicitia gratuita est. Quanto igitur magis deorum, qui nulla re egentes et inter se diligunt et hominibus consulant! Quod ni ita sit, quid veneramur, quid precamur deos? cur sacris pontifices, cur auspiciis augures praesunt? quid optamus a dis immortalibus? quid vocemus?

At etiam liber est Epicuri de sanctitate. Ludimur ab homine non tam faceto quam ad scribendi licentiam libero.

15 Quae enim potest esse sanctitas, si di humana non curant? quae autem animans natura nihil curans? Verius est igitur nimium illud, quod familiaris omnium nostrum Posidonius disseruit in libro quinto de natura deorum, nollos esse deos Epicuro videri, quaeque is de dis immortalibus dixerit, invidiae detestandae gratia dixisse. Neque enim tam desipiens fuisse, ut homunculi similem deum fingeret, liiamentis dumtaxat extremis, non habitu solido, membris hominis praeditum omnibus, usus membrorum ne minimo quidem, exilium quendam atque per lucidum, nihil cuiquam tribuentem, nihil gratificantem, omnino nihil curantem, nihil agentem. Quae natura primum nulla esse potest, idque videns Epicurus re tollit, oratione relinquit deos. Deinde, si maxime talis est deus, ut nulla gratia, nulla hominum caritate teneatur, valeat; quid enim dicam 'propitius sit'? Esse enim propitius potest nemini, quoniam, ut dicitis, omnis in imbecillitate est et gratia et caritas.

PREFACE TO THE COLLATIONS.

The following is Mr Swainson's account of the mss and editions collated by him.

B. Burney ms No. 148, small quarto, parchment, probably belongs to the 13th century, but appears from the handwriting to be copied from a ms of the 11th. This is the best of the British Museum mss. It agrees closely with Orelli's Cod. C. (the Leyden ms 118), which belongs to the 12th century; thus in I 25 both omit adiunxit, I 26 for discriptionem both have discrepationem, I 36 for pertinentem, pertingentem, I 95 for bipes, impes, II 37 quodque... expletumque sit om., II 147 epicuarem for disputarem, III 86 protulisse for P. Rutilii sim. [Add I § 17 fretum for aequum, § 18 descendens sed for descendisset, § 23 naturam intelligentis, § 25 curaque for cur aquae, § 37 sentias qui for sententia est qui, § 43 nec intelligi quicquam om., § 63 a parte for aperte, § 66 foramata for pyramidata, § 81 Junonem om., § 82 censes apud nullum for censes Apim illum, § 85 GR. added after sententiae, § 93 Sihum, § 102 ratio for oratio, § 115 excesses for Xerxes. Ed.] The De Legibus which follows is styled "De iure civili et naturali iusticia." (Written in Italy.)

H. Harleian ms 2465, late 15th cent. Parchment for the first 21 folios, the rest paper written in a different and later hand commencing with -pites of ancipites in I 103. Followed by "libellus de mondi essentia," i.e. Timaeus. A parchment leaf at the end (part of a legal instrument) gives the date 1418. The first part agrees mainly with Cod. G. of Moser; thus both give causarum for rerum in I 9, Jouem ignem for Jouem in I 40, insert immittendique after minuendi in I 35. It has also much in common with Cod. Rad. of Heindorf. Where it is corrected it is often impossible to decipher the original reading, and, as many of the corrections are
wrong, this is to be regretted. The paper part of the MS. agrees most closely with Cod. Fa. of Moser and Cod. Glog. of Heindorf, e.g. in 106 diisserentem for deferentem sitellam. (Written in Italy.)

L. Harleian ms 2511, 15th cent. Parchment quarto very clearly written. Followed by the De Divinatione of which Book II is styled. "De Fato," at the end of this is Finis, 1404; then comes "De Essentia Mundi," at the end TEAOC. This is a very worthless MS with constant omissions and blank spaces and seems to have been written by a scribe ignorant of Latin. After Ch. 10 of Book I, I have only noted the more extraordinary readings. It agrees mainly with Moser's Codd. G. and K. (Written in Italy.)

K. Harleian ms 2622, end of the 11th cent., parchment, medium quarto; unfortunately ends with the word "Neo" in 114. Preceded by "Paradoxa Stoicorum Sex." Though the transcriber is careless and the MS. is full of his corrections, yet this is the best of the Harleian mss, often closely agreeing with B. and Cod. C. of Orelli. (Written in Flanders or Germany.) The united testimony of B and K is almost always decisive as to orthography.

L. Harleian ms 4662, latter part of the 15th cent., parchment. The present chapters are marked in the margin by a later hand. Followed by the De Divinatione (which is full of lacunae) and the Paradoxa. It abounds with transpositions and mainly agrees with L. [Notwithstanding its eccentricities, it contains some valuable readings. Ed.] (Italy.)

M. Harleian ms 5114, latter part of the 15th cent., parchment folio, very clearly written. Contains De Legibus, De Achademicis, De Natura Deorum, De Divinatione, De Officiis. The MS comes nearest to O. below and Oxf. e. In many places it agrees with the readings of Thanner's edition of 1520. (Italy.)

N. Additional mss 11932, middle of 15th cent. Paper, small folio, from the library of Bishop Butler. Followed by the De Divinatione, De Fato, De Creations Mundi (Timaeus). This agrees most closely with Cod. Red. of Heindorf and Cod. O. of Moser. [The scribe is more intelligent than the writer of L, but very unconscientious. Ed.] (South Germany or North Italy. I am indebted to Mr E. M. Thompson for this information, and for the correction of the dates in the Catalogue.)
[0. Additional mss 19586, end of 14th cent. Finely written on vellum, folio; is closely allied to L and I but less eccentric than either. It also agrees frequently with H and U; has been a good deal altered by the corrector. Contains De Inventione, Rhetoricorum Lib. IV., De Oratore, Oratoris ad M. Brutum liber, De Optimo genere Oratorum, De partitione Artis Oratoriae, De Officiis, De Amicitia, De Senectute, Tusculanae Disputationes, De Creatione Celi, De Divinationibus, De Natura Deorum, Orationes. Collated by Mr Bickley of the British Museum, and compared by myself. Ed.] The preceding eight mss are all in the British Museum.

C. MS 790 Dd. xiii. 2, in the Cambridge University Library, 15th cent. Finely written on parchment, folio. See the Catalogue of the mss preserved in the Library of the University of Cambridge, i 507. The MS was written “per manus Theodorici Nycolai Werken de Abbenbroek (in S. Holland): liber explicit anno domini MCCCXLVII alias 1444.” It is the Cod. Cantabrigiensis of Davies, who says of it on i 20, “codex est perparvi pretii,” but it has some excellent and unique readings. [A remarkable feature of this MS is the frequency of small alterations, either in the order of the words, or in the words themselves, as igitur for ergo &c. Ed.] It is divided into chapters, Book i into the prologue (which absurdly ends with the word repellendi in ch. 3 § 5) and 62 chapters; Book ii into 68, and Book iii into 77 chapters. The collation given by Davies is imperfect and often wrong.

R. The Roman edition of 1471 of the Opera Philosophica. Vol. i contains the N. D.: there are two copies of it in the British Museum, in one of which (N. 720, 1. 6) a folio, containing i 25 § 69 effugeret to i 27 § 77 sodem modo, is wanting, but the other (C. i. c. 11) is perfect. It was printed by Sweynheym and Pannartz, as the lines declare at the end of the Cato Maior; “Hoc Conradus opus Suwenheym ordine Miro Arnoldusque simul Pannartz una aede colendi Gente Theotonica: Rome expedieris sodales.” Then follows the date “Anno Xvii MCCCLXXI die vero xxvii mensis Aprilis Rome in domo magnifici viri Petri de Maximo.” The text is generally very good, many of the best readings in the edition of Hervag (Baale, 1534), praised by Moser and Creuzer, seem taken from it, and many of the conjectures attributed to Lambinus may be already found there. It was probably printed from the MS in the
Vatican called La. by Moser, or from some ms from which La. was derived, hence the reading Antenulus for a nonnullis in III § 53, &c.

V. The Venice edition of 1471 printed by Vindellinus de Spyra. There is a copy of this in the Grylls Collection in the Library of Trinity College, Cambridge. The volume contains a life' taken from Plutarch, then the lives of Cornelius Severus which are found in M. Ann. Seneca, Suasor. vii (given by Orelli, Ecl. Poet. Lat. p. 261, Anthol. Lat. 2. 155), "Oraque magnanimum...sub umbras," with the date at the foot A.D. M.CCCC.LXXI. The volume ends with a treatise "de disciplina militari," which is found in several of the older editions. [Generally agrees with the edition of Ascensius. Ed.]

V¹. By this I denote the ms corrections in the Grylls copy of V which are often of great value.

Z denotes the consensus of all the above mss.

There is a copy of the Bologna edition of 1494, in the Library of Trinity College, Cambridge, bound up with the edition by Victor Pisanus of the Orator, &c., printed at Venice, in 1492. This copy belonged to R. Laughton, and is the one used by Davies who frequently gives its readings. It is noticeable for the reading in III 63 "et Orbonae ad," but otherwise generally agrees with V.

[I have printed Mr Swainson's collations in full for all the mss as far as § 12, but after that only for B and K, giving selected readings of the others, except in doubtful and disputed passages, where all the readings are given. I have also occasionally added authorities for the reading in the Text, where Mr Swainson had only noticed the variants. Ed.]
COLLATIONS OF ENGLISH MSS.


BOOK I.


COLLATIONS OF ENGLISH MSS. 53


infixa caelo] infixaque quasi e. 

sunt] sint 

octavumque] octauumque

qui quo...non potest] om. LO. 

possunt] possunt

Hermiones] Er. BMC, Eratetus N. 
Hercules] B. 

modo] tum modo

KMB, inde modo

L. 
tum] tum

dum in L. 

etiam] om. LO. 

in libro] in om. 

LNBV, rest. V. 

divinum] diuiniae

tum] tum modo

Strato 35 

is] Strato his B, Stratori LV, text V. 

minuendi] minuendique NB, immittendique add HV.

XIV. obtinere] opt. HLV, retinere N. 

intelleger...animantem] om. c. 36 

alia] in alio V. 

sit] sed N. 

potest] qui potest N. 

omnem naturam] V, naturam omnium H, omnium naturam all others. 

pertinentem] pertingentem

BKCG, continentem O. 

vi] ut Z, except et N. 

divina] divinam

KMNC

BV, text V. 

esse] sit HLV, om. O. 

daffectam] affectum H, effecta V, 

theogoniam id est originem deorum] E (but id est originem is only in marg. 

of L. 

usitatas] insitas HV, usitas V. 

appellatur] HLMCRV, appell- 

latur ELO. 

sententia est] sentias B, sentencias K. 

Cleane thes] Cleantes

37 

KPCBC, Cloantes I. 

mendum deum M, d. m. BHK. 

undique] atque

om. c. 

undique] indecumque 

cingentem] cingente B, agentem L. 

qui aether] quia ether B. 

nominatur] nominatur L. 
deliratis] deliber- 

antis K. 

his BV. 

voluptatem] voluntatem HLMOV. 

divinitus

diuinus K, diinus LO, diuinum V. 

ani] animo K. 

notione] rationem 

H, ratione LNO, nazione C. 

XV. at Persaeus] atque persedius N, at Perses O. 

dicit] HLMCRV, 38 

om. BKL, vult O. 
a quibus] e quibus K. 

quo quid] quiequid K. 

morte] leto K. 

Chrysippus] chrisippus B. 

vaferimius] vaferimius HN, 39 
aufferimus O, uera referimus L, uetherimius MO, "uaferimus al." O, vaferi- 

mus B. 
es] nos nec HLMCR, nec nos N. 

cogitationem] cognitione O. 

posse] posset K. 

universitatemque] universam atque Z, except uniusera 

atque B. 
fatalen] facienc K. 

vim et necessitatem] umbrae et nec Z. 

ut et aequam] et om. HOV. 

et terram et terram N. 

solem et solem LO. 

continenterunt] continentur H, continentur N. 

eum] deum eum H, deum 

ipsum N, deum V. 

appellarent] appellat M, appellat B. 

manaret

40 

maneret B. 

Neptumnum] Neptunnum B (Corssen i. 485). 

reliquorum

ceterorum] etiam] om. CO. 
et aeterneae] et om. B. 

Orphel K. 

Musaei] Musi K. 
dizerat LO, dixerat all others. 

sunt] IO, sint all others. 
eso] om. LO. 
de] om. C. 
partum...ormque 

partu...ortique BHLK. 

traducens] transducens B, deducens LOG. 

deiungit 

traungit H (diinuent marg.), disiungit V. 
a) om. O. 

XVI. delirantium] deliberantium K. 
multo] multa K. 

inducerunt 42 
deos] inducerint d. O, d. introduserunt N. 

fecerunt] fecerint O. 

que- 


concubitus] cumcubitus B. 

immortalibus] NOO, immortalati others. 

in maxima inconstantia] m. in con- 

stantia H. 

veritatis] veritatiisque V. 

ignoratione] ignorantiae K, 43 

ignorantiaque LO. 

versatur] versamur B. 

Epicurum] Epicurum H. 
et] ut HMNN. 

habere] haberi HLMNV, text V, bene L. 

propleis in B, problemi H, proplepin K, prolepsin L, prolepsin MO, proplebim N, 

prolepsim BV. 

id est anteceptam] id est ante coeptam BK, om. L. 

in-
56

COLLATIONS OF ENGLISH MSS.


46 XVIII. natura...partim] om. L. ratio] nos ratio V. quae] qua B.


52 XX. mundus deus] d. m. HN. admirabil] mirabil O. sive in ipso] si uero in ipso BK, siue ipso in V. hominem] omnium O. ne]

53 nec HV, text V. fabrica tamque eam] fabricamque eam HN, fabricatam eam L, fabricatam eamque V, text V. facile] facile HO. negatia]

COLLATIONS OF ENGLISH MSS.

om. O. hinc hic O. vobis nobis HV. existiit existit NO. fatalis f. illa C. elaqwému hi marmanem B, (lacuna) manen B, hmarmanen K, himarimanem N, himarimanem C, hmarmanen EV, himaímanem V, hemorvenen V. ex aeterna externa HNO, ex externa L. aemistanda obstructa BM, existit HNV, text V. est sit BHKNBO. antiquus B, a vinculis H. marírhi mantice Z, except ma (lacuna) I. vindicati uend. LMNV text V, indicati N. metuimus MCV, metuemos 58 BHKO. tantam tamque tantamque B, incohómatam L, incohómatam BHK MNOR, incohotam V (see Corssen t. 105, 106, 109; Laechmann and Munro give inchoate in Hor. Od. 4. 15, Ribbeck incohóat Verg. Aen. vi. 252.).

XXI. atqui atque KV, text V, om. O. quidem om. RO. cum 57 saepe tum tum saepe H. audirem audire HK. naturam deorum d. n. ILMNV. dicam HNOR. sunt sint K. aggrediar ad aggrediar 0. de de Lucio Crasso de OL, de luciló grasso de LN, de L. Crasso V. familiari illo BKB, illo familiari L, familiari illo others. et paucus et om. KO. benevolentiam benuvolentiam Z except K (see III. 5). difficilis difficilima MNOR, facillima C. kórafbóv corifeum BO, coriphaeum 59 HR, Orpheus K, corifeum K, corripheum V, coripeium V. ille om. O. ornare et ornate HNO. saepe uenit saepe uenit MNOR, uenit C. accedebat acciderat BHKNORB. audies audies H, audias G. nunc ipsa 60 ipse om. K. non ipse 0, ipse nunc B. sed et II0, om. V.

XXII. quale quare HNOR, quals V, text V. mihi res HM, mihi espes BIKLO, res mihi C. ceterogui ceteroque BK, ceterorum qui H, cetera quoque 0, caetera quae IL, coetera qua M, cetera qui N, ceterum quia O, cetera quam R, caetaraque V, text V. mediocris etiam med. HB, ne mediocri N. contentionem contentione SILOV, text V. et 0, et in all others. consensu B, consensu BHKLMNOR. ipse ille RV, om. O. is hoc ex his hoc HN, is om. C, is hoc V. opinione ad opinionem V.

XXIII. argumentum esse esse om. HH. leve Lene B. Diogaras 62 Diogara B. abeo qui acteos qui B, acaos 0, qui atcheos C, atcheos qui 63 others. postaeque postea quod 0. aperte aparte B, a parte K. nam nam et HNOR. Aderites aderites H, adherites N, Aderides V, text V. quidem quidam qui H, quidem qui et MNOR, quidem et V. Protagoras pitagoras HO, pitagorases M, patagoras dicur N. a te ante H, a te ante V, text V. sophistes sofitas K1, sofitas K2. habeo abeo 0, audeo vel habeo LLO. est externatum ext. est C. librique librique B, libereque C. equidem quidem HCV. tardiores B, tardiores K. quid 64 sed quid 0. sacrilegiis sacrilegeis H. quid de impitis quid om. V. peririannrique peririannrique BH. dicemus dicendum est K1, text K2. aut Carbo ut Carbo B. Neptuni aut Neptuni Z. omittam emittam B. concedo concede B. doce HCL, doces BKN, doceas 0. et licentia vel de LV lumine vel licentia V (a gloss to explain some abbreviation such as lina in Cod. O of Moser), text V.

XXIV. oracula oraca BKN, uocabula I. veri tamen similiora 66 simile tamen si meliora B, merismi tamen similiora HNOV, merismi tamen merismi B, merismi tamen similiora KN, tamen merismi similiora C,


COLLATIONS OF ENGLISH MSS.

cium N, lenonum L, leontinum after contra M, lenocinium V. Theophrastum

teostratum B, Theopastum V. est sit HMKOCR. illa quidem illa L, illa O, quidem illa ORY. Attico attice L sed tamen tantum BXLK

MB, sed tamem unde I, sed tamem cur tantum N, sed tantum C, sed cur tamen

tum V. hortus ortus KOV, text V, queri quaeret M, quaerere NV, text V. Phaedro fadro B, fadone C. Aristotlem Aristotelem BKC, Aristolem V. Phaedoni fadroni C, phadroni V, text V. Timocratem quia Timocratem guia BO, Timocratemque H. conciderit contgenderet BN, concideret O. nihil non nihil N.

XXXIV. Silium BK, sillum H'MB, sollum (but second l marked as spurious)


om. B. Chrysippam asippum M, crisisippam C, Cerippum V, Crisippam V.

94 ne om. B. impetraetis interpretacuritis H, impetraetitis K'MNOCR. eandem hominum esse esse eandem hom. H, esse hom. eandem C. adhibetur]

95 ahibetur B, om. O. accubio accusatio HMKOCR. maris B, maris

others. videtis videbis B. estas has C. non desinitis non om. K,

bipes impes BK. beatitas beatas B, bonitas H. est sunt BLMCV, sit

BO. molienda molienda BK. nobis om. H. solem sole B.

96 aiquam mentem m. al. H. figura figuram BO. guid quod B, qui

MR. unquamne B, numquamne HMKLC, numquam ne INV. vidisti

vidistis H. igitur non autem non K, non igitur BV. sessenta sex-
centa BLMCRV, centum IO, cetera L, sex N. ratio ratio inquis O.
eaque ea quae NV. divina natura in div. nat. O, divinae naturae HM

ORV. est sunt Z. vincamur vincimur C. cum om. B. ceteris
certis O. deorum B, deo Z.

97 XXXV. ut et B. urgeam BKM, urgeam others. in rubro in-
buro B. ne] nec BK. audire tam multa] tam m. audire H, adire

ait CO. elefantas] elephantes B. at figura LHOV, ad figuram BK.

98 moribus paribus] par. om. HMKOCR. qui natus quantus B. omnibus

his] hominibus his B, his his H. forma una OR, una f. others. rationem

99 ratione B. loquare] loquere B, loquar K. superwaanecum] superwa-
aenec BK, supervaecum O. nec ad speciem nec ad usum alium] nec speciem

nec ad usum alium B, nec speciem nec ad usum alium HMKOCR, nec usum alium

nec speciem C. poplitibus] popl B, pollitibus LN. feminibus] femoribus

HNO. pulmones pulmone VO.

100 XXXVI. et] at HGBV. horum] eorum BO. vicissitudinesque] que

om. L. efficisest B, feecisset others. aberrant aberrant BKM, aberr-
rant IO. a coniectura] Z esse deos] deos esse H. hededam

habemus H', habeo LO. inquis] inqui B. num] non L. esse tales

101 tale esse C, esse om. MBV, rest. V. tribuant] BKMOCR, tribuant LO.

vident] videt BK. ibus] ibides H', ibes quae C. Libiae] Libiae BKC.

possam] possem O. ichneumonum] inchnemonum B, ichneumonum H. croco-
dilorum] crocodilorum BV, crocodilorum HV, crocodilorum C, crococilorum B.

faelium] HMKL, felifus others. longus] longior B. conclam] con-


COLLATIONS OF ENGLISH MSS.


118 quae C. quid iti] hi uero BN, qui duo ILO, quid it duo V. Prodicius] Prodigus ENC, prodigis HI. Citius] V₁, chius BLO, chius HIMNCEV.


121 patria] paria BN, paria with uel puero written above H. idem] is idem MClV, tis idem C. quid enim] quid est O. praestantius] pr. est H.


NOTES.


a. Dedication to Brutus. The importance and difficulty of the subject; variety of opinions; some asserting the existence of the gods, some doubting, some denying it. Those who believe in their existence differ as to their nature; the Epicureans denying that they pay any regard to human affairs, the Stoics affirming that the universe is ordered by them for the good of man, while the Academy holds that man has no right to dogmatise, and confines itself to the criticism of the other schools. §§ 1—5.

Cum sint—tum est. Heindorf with some of the less important mss reads sunt, ‘sermonis legi conveniunt’; but both constructions are allowable, see Madv. Fin. i 19, Roby Gr. §§ 1734, 1735. The Ind. which is found in the very similar passage Divin. i 7 cum omnibus in rebus temeritas turpis est, tum in eo loco maxime which concerns religion, is more naturally used in comparing particular cases (‘as—so’ ‘both—and’); the Subj. views the particular case in relation to the general principle, as in Off. iii 5 cum tota philosophia frugifera sit, tum nullus feracior in ea loco est quam de officiis, and Lael. 23 with Seyffert’s note. Translate, ‘while there are many questions in philosophy which are far from having been fully cleared up, there is one of special difficulty, I mean the inquiry into the nature of the gods’. [‘I think that in nearly all the passages where cum—tum is used by C. there is a contrast between a general statement and a particular case, whether the clause with cum contains an Ind. or a Subj. If the cum clause introduces a fact viewed as a concession made by the speaker, then the Subj. is necessary; otherwise not’. J. S. R.]

Ad agnationem animi pulcherrima: ‘ennobling as regards our recognition of the soul’s nature’. For construction cf. i 98 ad figuram quae vastior? ii 87 ad speciem pulchriores, 155 nulla species ad rationem praestanter. The thought is that expressed by Minucius Felix 17 nisi divinitatis rationem diligenter excusseris, nescias humanitatis, and by C. himself in the Tusculana, written a few months before the N. D. animus divinus est...si deus aut anima aut ignis est, idem est animus hominis i 65; ut deum agnoscis ex...
operibus ejus, sic ex memoria vim divinam mentis agnoscite i 70; ut ipsa se mens agnoscat, conjunctamque cum divina mente se sentiat v 70; also N. D. i 91, Div. i 64 and the striking passage in Leg. i 8 24, 25. See too the fragment of the Consolatio quoted on § 9, and Somn. Scip. 24 deum te scito esse: ut mundum ex quadam parte mortalem ipsa deus aeternus, sic fragile corpus animus sempiternus movet. If the soul is divine, either as being in itself divinae particula auras (the Stoic view) or as of kindred nature (τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γενός έσμεν, παρη ἄνθρωπ τε θεόν τε) or as capable of being made like to God (Plato's θυγιός τε θεός), it is evident that the inquiry into the divine nature will throw light upon our own, and will at the same time raise our ideas as to the dignity of man. See on the general subject the introductory Sketch of Greek Philosophy and Krische Die theologischen Lehren der Griechischen Denker p. 7. The word agnítio is not used elsewhere by C. On the distinction between it and coginitio (read by Wolf and others) see Schömann's Opusc. iii 291, Heidtmann sur Krit. d. N. D. Neustettin 1858.

pulcher: for spelling, see Orator 160 cum scirem ita majores locutos esse ut nusquam nisi in vocali adspiratione utterentur, quebar sic ut pulceros, Oetogas, triumphos, Karthaginem diuorem: aliquando, idque soro, convicium aurium cum estorta nisi veritas esset, usum loquendi populo concessi, scientiam mihi reserveavi. Roby Gr. § 132. ['That the e passed into ch in pulcer and not in ludi-er is no doubt due to the l as in sepulchrum'. J. S. R., who refers to Corssen ii 180, Ribbeck Verg. ProL p. 424, and quotes Boscher in Curtius' Studien p 145, scripturam 'pulcher' non probant Varro (cf. Charis. p. 73, 17 K) et Scaurus (p. 2256 Pu.), probaverunt Probus (cath. 14, 38 K) Santra (ap. Scaurus l. l.) qui vocabulum a Graeco πολύχρωος derivandum esse censeet, Velius Longus (2230 Pu.), Marius Victorinus (2466 Pu.).

ad moderandum religionem: 'for regulating religious observances.' These will vary according to the idea we have of God: contrast the worship of a Bacchus and an Apollo, still more of Juggernaut and of Christ. The same idea is expressed in the words 'God is a spirit, and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth'. Cf. Divin. i 149 ut religio propaganda est quae est juncta cum cognitione naturae, sic superstitionis stirpes omnes ejiciendae. C. lays down rules for religious rites in Leg. i 19—22, and Seneca in Epp. 41 and 95 (primus est deorum cultus deos credere, satis illos coluit quisquis imitatis est, &c.) and other passages cited by Zeller Stoics, p. 326 Eng. tr. See for Epicurean view Lucr. v 1198 nec pietas ulla, &c.

de qua: the relative refers to the remoter antecedent quaestio. Heidtmann, who would himself omit quae—necessaria, quotes exx. from Lael. 76, 97, 100. Cf. Dietsch ad Sall. Cat. 48.

tam variae—inscientiam. The mss are very corrupt here: A and B read sint for sunt; ut is omitted in most; A and C omit ten lines from esse debeat to sententias; Ursinus tells us that the words causam—scientiam and the que after prudenter did not exist in a ms used by him; B E have
cause principium, B², causa et principium, C³ causam id est principium; last but one appear to have scientiam for inscientiam. Wytttenbach followed by Heindorf and Creuzer omits the clause id est principium philosophiae, which is usually explained by a reference to Arist. Met. 1 2 10 διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν ἀγνωσίαν ἐδιδοκόφησαν, 'the great discrepancy of opinions is an evidence that the cause or starting-point of philosophy was the painful consciousness of ignorance, and that the Academicians are justified in refusing to make any affirmation on points where certainty is unattainable'. (See Krische p. 7.) But this explanation is unsatisfactory on several grounds; (1) there is no reason for making any reference to the origin of philosophy, (2) the present discrepancy of opinions is no argument as to what may have been the origin of philosophy, (3) the origin of philosophy is in no way connected with the Academic principle (itself the result of a long history of philosophy) that man must be content with probability, (4) bare ignorance is very far from being the cause of philosophy, and it would be an altogether wrong use of words to make inscientia—to φεύγειν τὴν ἀγνωσίαν, (5) principium philosophandi would have been a more appropriate expression for the supposed sense. Nor is it much more satisfactory to interpret the clause as affirming that the Socratic confession of ignorance is the starting-point of philosophy in the individual (cf. Δ. c. 44). If we retain the ordinary reading, I think it is best to take it as giving the sceptical view, 'the cause and origin of this whole windbag of philosophy is ignorance', cf. Sext. Emp. Math. 1 x 29 τὸ πολύτροπον τῆς ἀποφάσεως (παρὰ τοῖς δοματικοῖς φιλοσόφοις) τὴν ἀγνωσίαν τοῦ παντός ἀληθοὺς ἐνισχυμένην. But though such language may have been used by Hortensius and others (Fin. r 2), it is hardly conceivable that C. should have adopted it as his own. I should prefer therefore to follow Ursinus (if one only knew what his ms. was²) or Heind., whose reading gives an excellent sense though somewhat clumsily expressed: 'the discrepancy of opinions proves that they all sprang from ignorance, and that the Academicians are right in refusing to make any positive assertion'. The interpolation of the clause omitted by him would be easily accounted for by the supposition that id principium philosophiae was a gloss on the words Academicos assensionem cohibusse, meaning that this was the leading principle of their philosophy. The variety of opinions was the 10th of the common-places used by the Sceptics to prove that knowledge was unattainable, see Sext. Emp. Hyp. 1 14 145. Baiter, in order to keep the sint of the majority of mss., inserts cum, reading debent for debeat in apodosis, but this is awkward after cum multae; and it is also more natural to introduce the discrepancy of opinion as a distinct statement to be proved by what follows, velut in hac quaestione, rather than to refer to it as already known. Orelli follows Ernesti in inserting it before magno, an

¹ 'Magna est suspicio eum virum quae sibi placerent finxisse', Moser, Praef. ad Tusc. p. xviii; 'Ursini codices, qui ubicunque haeserat praesto erant, commemorane nihil attinet', Madv. Praef. ad Fin. p. xxxix.

5—2
alteration which Sch. also (Opusc. III 294) thinks required unless debeat is substituted for debat of MSS. Might not the subject of the verb be supplied from the preceding clause (tam varias esse)? ['I take the words causam—inscientiam to mean that the true theory of philosophy is that which denies errorem, in other words that which the Academicians oppose to the Stoics'. J. S. R.]


ass. coh: the ετυρχη of the Sceptics and Academicians, Ac. II 59.

turpius: most MSS have fortius from which Manutius conjectured foedius, but Sch. (Opusc. III 358) points out that this word, which implies something shocking or disgusting, would be far too strong for the occasion. Turpius is used in similar passages, e.g. I 70 hoc dicere turpius est, Ac. I 45 (Arcesilas negat) quicquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et perceptioni adsessionem approbationemque praecurrere, Divin. I 7 omnibus in rebus tementem in adseriendo errorque turpis est.

percepsitur et cognitum: the two verbs serve to translate the single Gr. v. καταλαμβάνειν. See Reid on Acad. II 34 percipi atque comprehendit. C. proceeds as usual on the principle described Fin. III 14 erit notius quale sit, pluribus notatum vocabulis idem declarantibus'. The Academica are occupied with the discussion whether our knowledge amounts to a perc. et cog., i.e. whether we can arrive at real certainty both by sense-impressions and by reasoning, as the Stoics affirmed, or must be satisfied with a greater or less amount of probability, according to the Academic view. The word explorare has a half-technical force: Quid habemus in rebus bonis et malis explorati? is the exclamation of the Academic (Ac. II 129).


§ 2. velut: 'for instance', introducing an example of a general principle already stated, cf. § 101 velut ibes, II 124 veluti crocodili.

quod—traheimur: relative clause explained by the following deos esse.

quo = ad quod. The argument from universal consent is urged § 43, II 12, Leg. I 24, Tusc. I 30.

plerique deos esse dixerunt, dubitare se Protagoras, nullo esse Diogoras: 'While the majority have maintained the existence of the Gods, Prot. (see Introduction) doubted, &c. On the asyndeton see § 20 cuius principium; on Diog. and Theod. § 63. All three names are referred to by Min. F. c. 8.
sunt in variestate: § 31 sunt isdem in erratis, § 37 magno in errore sententia est, § 29 in maximo errore versatur, so § 43.

ut molestum sit: ‘that it would be troublesome’. The Subj. belongs to the clause independently of its consecutive subordination, unless we include (as we probably should do) molestum est in the class of cases, such as longum est, in which the Latin idiom has the Ind. where we use the Subj. See n. on § 19.

dinumerare: ‘to reckon up in groups’, see Sch. Opusc. III 359.

figuris: e.g. round or in human shape, § 46; locis ‘regions’, e.g. the intermundia; sedes implies a closer connexion, as of Neptune with the sea, of Juno with Argos, see § 103.

actio vitae: verbal from agere vitam; see §§ 17, 45, 103, Div. II 89, actio rerum Ac. II 62, with Reid’s n. [and cf. actio vitae Off. I 17; actio rerum Off. I 83, 127, 153; agitatio rerum De Or. III 88; actus rerum Suet. Claud. 15, 23, Nero 17, Aug. 32. J. S. R.]

quod—continet: relative clause explained by following substantival clause utrum—moveantur ‘as to that which’. The proper antecedent is de eo omitted after dissensio est.

rem causamque: ‘the matter in dispute’.


moliantur: ‘attempt’, used of a laborious undertaking.

curatione: less common in this sense than procuratio, but found in II 158.

facta: not creation out of nothing—no philosophy had broached this idea, see Mosheim in Cudworth III 140 foll.—but the bringing of order out of Chaos.

errore: ‘uncertainty’, see Fin. v 6 15, Liv. i 21 in re tam clara nominum error manet, utrius populi Horatii, utrius Curiatii fuerint, with Seeley’s note, Ov. Fast. iv 669; and the exx. in Sch.’s note here. [As error is coupled here with ignorantio, so with insecundia in Sull. 40. J. S. R.]

Ch. II. § 3. fuerunt qui censerent: the proper Perf. is strictly followed by the Pres. or Perf. Subj. but the fact that the same form stands for Perf. and Aor. in Latin often leads to a confusion in the construction; cf. § 8 tantum profectione videmur ut vinceremur, 54 impoeusissim quem timoremus, II 153 satis docuisse videor quanto anteiret, and exx. in P. S. Gr. § 229, where this is stated to be the prevailing idiom in C. (we have the Perf. however in § 7 praeproscripseris). See also Roby p. 194 n. and § 1510. [Cf. Hugo Lieven Die Consecutio Temporum des Cicero Riga 1872 esp. exx. in p. 45 (2). J. S. R.]

pietas: duteous affection towards those to whom we are in any way bound, our relations, benefactors, our country, the Gods; sanctitas purity, uprightness, dignity of character, the disposition which seeks to fulfil all righteousness; religio (in its subjective meaning) a sense of obligation, not necessarily accompanied by personal attachment. The definitions given by C. himself elsewhere do not seem very applicable, e.g.
§ 116 quas piesas ei debetur a quo nihil acceperis?......est enim piesas justitia 
adversum deos......sanctitas autem est scientia coelorum deorum where 
see nn.; and Top. 23 90 sanctitas = sequitas erga manes.

pure atque caste: a phrase properly used of the white garments and 
ceremonial washings of the sacrificer, but also of the mind, as in Div. 1 121 
castus animus purusque, Leg. II 24 caste jubet lex adire ad deos, animo 
videlicet in quo sunt omnia.

tribunda: not a very appropriate word in reference to what precedes 
(sanctitas, &c.) the euthisesis requires that the same word should be 
used of man and of God; see the following tributum and cf. III 24.

ita—si: with a limiting force, ‘it is our duty to render these only on 
the supposition &c.’ See Holden on Off. III 13 cetera ita legere si ea virtuti 
non repugnarent. Mayor’s Second Philippic p. 128, and Alanus (Allen) on 
Div. 1 10 ita exponam si vacas animo. Also cf. n. on ita ut § 54.

permanare: strictly ‘to percolate’, to find its way from some Epicurean 
intermundia to the earth.

quid est quod: ‘what ground is there for’, lit. ‘what is there in 
respect of which’. Cf. § 22 quid erat quod concupiscent s and 74, 117; so 
nihil est quod § 16, quid est cur § 115, III 7. The answer of the Epicureans 
is given § 45: we naturally adore the divine perfections without thought of 
any advantage to ourselves, see Ovid ex Pont. II 9 23, foll.

in specie fictae simulationis: ‘in a mere empty profession’, lit. ‘the 
outside show of a made-up pretence’. The epithet ficta adds emphasis 
without introducing any new conceptions, as in Off. III 39 ficta et commen-
ticia fabula. The reference is to the Epicureans (see §§ 56, 115 seq. III 3,
Plut. non posse suav. p. 1102 B), but the remark applies also to C.’s friends, 
the Academics, see § 61, III 5, and the polemic of Cotta throughout.

sicut—item non potest: ‘there is no room for piety any more than 
for the other virtues’. For ut—item see Madv. Fin. III 48, Acad. II 110.
For the negative understood in the first clause from the second, see N. D. 
III 68 huc ut secus, sic ne ratio quidem defuit.

quibus sublatis—confusio: this would come more naturally at the 
end of the sentence after tollatur, as Wytenbach remarks; but Lactantius 
quotes it (De Ira c. 8) in relation to religion, Epicurus religionem funditus 
delet, qua sublata confusio ac perturbatio vitae sequitur. We must consider 
therefore the following clause to be added by an afterthought, atque hav-
ing its strong force, ‘and indeed’. On the general phrase, cf. Ac. I 99 with 
Reid’s n.

§ 4. hand scio an: with its usual positive force ‘it may be that’, 
Roby Gr. § 2256.

fides—tollatur: much the same is said of parental affection, Att. vii 
2 laetor probari tibi φωνα βρές τιν αν δια τινα. Etenim haec si non est, 
nulla potest esse homini ad hominem naturae adjunctio, qua sublata vitae 
societas tollitur. On the relation of religion to morality, see II 153, Leg. I 
43, Fin. III 73, Off. III 28, quae (i.e. justice and the social virtues) qui
tollunt etiam adversus deos impii sunt. Ab his enim constitutam inter homines societatem overtunt. In Fin. iv 11, the knowledge of the Deity gained through the observation of nature is said to produce moderation, magannimity and justice; in Leg. ii 15 seq. the moral influence of religion is based more on the sanctity of oaths, and the fear of divine vengeance; elsewhere it is the aspiration to imitate the divine life which is morally influential, Tusc. i 72, v 70: in Rep. vi 13 seq. we read that nothing is more pleasing to God than a life devoted to the good of our fellow men, that it is the path of justice and piety which leads to heaven. If such sentiments as these were in any degree fostered by the ancient religions, —and what reader of Herodotus can doubt that this was the case even before they had undergone the rationalizing and purifying influence of philosophy? —I think it must be allowed that Bp. Lightfoot (note on Galatians iv 11) has taken too narrow a view in confining their propaedeutic influence to their ritual. There is of course another side which is well shown in Tholuck’s tract on the Moral Influence of Heathenism, but in judging of this we must not forget the crimes and the immoralities which have resulted from the antinomian and the ecclesiastical spirit in Christianity itself, in spite of the stress which it has always laid on good works as the test and fruit of religious faith.

una excellentissima: ‘the most preeminent of all’, see Mayor Sec. Phil. p. 127. So Aristotle Eth. v 1 15 justice in the wide sense ἀρετή μὲν ἐστὶ τελεία, δὲ λ’ οὐκ ἀπλῶς δὲ γὰρ πρὸς ἑρων καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλὰς κρατὶσσας τῶν ἀρετῶν δοκεῖ νὴ δικαστών, κ.τ.λ. Cf. Off. i 20 justitia, in qua virtutis splendor est maximus, ex qua viri boni nominantur; III 28 omnium est domina et regina virtutum.

nobles: i.e. the Stoics, as taking an exalted view of human nature, in opposition to the Epicureans whom he calls plebei, Tusc. i 55.

ab isdem vitae consul: as an intransitive verb, consul has to be used impersonally in the passive, like noose, persuadeo, &c., see Roby § 1422.


tempestates: ‘changes of weather’. Like the Germ. wetter, temp. has a neutral as well as a bad sense.

temporum varietates: ‘the alternations of the seasons’.

caeli mutationes: ‘the varying phenomena of the heavens’, cf. Tusc. i 68.

maturata pubescant: ‘ripened by which all that the earth produces bursts into leaf.’

1 See more on this subject in Nägelsbach Nach-Homerische Theologie pp. 191—318, Plut. Mf. 1125.
colligunt: ‘adduce’; so Div. II 33 multa Stoici colligunt.

his libros: see II 151—168.

fabricati paene: ‘one might almost say, to have constructed these precise things for the good of man’. The word is used with a sneer at any thing which implies personal agency on the part of the Creator in § 19, where see n., and Acad. II 87. (see too §§ 30 and 119) natura quae finxerit, vel ut tuo verbo utar, quae fabricata sit, hominem. Cf. N. D. I 20 mundum manu paene factum.

ita: to be taken with dixeruit, not with multa, ‘alleged many arguments so as to stimulate men’s inquiry after truth’, see Off. II 8. This was the proper use of the Socratic elenchus (see the admirable chapter on Socrates in Grote’s Greece, also his Plato I 241 foll.) but it had been misapplied by the later Academics. For the collocation ita multa, see ita late § 54, and Sch. here. [So in Senect. 12 ita cupide where ita refers to quasi below. J. S. R.]


alterum fieri—vera sit: We find the same thought, Acad. II 115, 147, Plut. Pl. Q. p. 1000. It is an Academic common-place, inconsistent with C.’s own belief, cf. Leg. I 47 perturbat nos opinionum varietas, hominumque dissensio, et quia non idem contingit in sensibus, hos natura certos putamus, illa, quae aliis sic, aliis secus nec idem semper uno modo videntur, ficta esse dicimus. Quod est longe alter. Though none of the theories propounded were perfect, yet any one of them was better either than blank ignorance and indifference, or than a dilettantist scepticism. A fairer view of the varieties of belief is taken by Aristotle, Metaph. I 992 b, and even by the Epicurean Philodemus περατευμένοι. p. 108 Gomp. ‘those who have written about the Gods deserve admiration for their intention, καὶ μὴ διὰ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ἀνόσια νομίζοντας πάντας δὲ ἀνθρώπους μαριά λέγων ἀνόσιον, ἵππειδῆς οὐδεὶς ἰκνωμένης περὶ τοὺς θεούς ὑπάρχει ἤγουν ἀνοικίζεις . . . ὅμως δὲ σίζοντα παῖσες εἰ μὴ παράκεισοι τινες’. Similarly the Christian Lactantius, VII 7 Facile est docere paene universam veritatem per philosophorum sectas esse divisam. Non enim sic philosophiam nos everimus ut Academici solent, quibus ad omnia respondere propositum est, quod est potius calumniari et illudere . . . Quod si estitisset aliquis qui veritatem sparsam per singulos, per sectas diffusam colligeret in unus, is profecto non dissentiret a nobis, as he then proceeds to show in detail.

b. Cicero’s defence against his critics. He had always been a student of philosophy, but had only lately begun to write upon it, partly by way of useful employment in his enforced absence from public life, partly as a solace under his heavy loss. His manner of expounding the different tenets of each school, without stating his own opinion, was intentionally adopted in order to provoke thought. The Academic
school to which he belonged was unfairly branded as sceptical. It simply maintained the doctrine of Probability in opposition to Stoic dogmatism. III § 5—v § 12.


*brevi tempore*: C.'s purely philosophical works all belong to the interval between the death of his daughter Tullia, Feb. 45 B.C., and the end of 44 B.C. Teuffel arranges them chronologically as follows: *de consolatione, Hortensius, de finibus, Academica, Tusculanae disputationes, Timaeus, de natura deorum, Cato, de divinazione, de fato, Laelius, de gloria, de officiis, de virtutibus*. It must further be remembered that Caesar's death occurred about the time of the publication of the present work, March, 44 B.C., and that C. was much occupied with politics from that time until his death, at the age of 65, on Dec. 7, 43 B.C.

*quid certi haberemus*: 'what positive belief I held'. So *aliquid certi haberet* § 14. Livy seems to make *certi* predicative (complement) in v 33 *si quicquam humanorum certi est, capi Roma non potuerat*; cf. the use of *pesi haberet*. I do not know of any similar case in C. He generally uses *habeo certum* or *pro certo* to express 'I am positive of a thing'. The word formed a battle-ground between the Stoics, who maintained *sapientem nihil opinari, nulla in re falli* (Mur. 61), and the Academics, *qui nihil affirmant et, quasi desperata cognitione certi, id sequi volunt quodcumque verisimile videatur* Fin. II 43, cf. De Orat. III 67. [C. is exceedingly fond of the Gen. after *quid*, cf. Ac. II 25 *quid offici sui sit* 'what belongs to one's duty'. J. S. B.]

*eam potissimum*: 'that rather than any other', 'precisely that'. Cf. *hanc potiss. § 9 and 11.*

*quae lucem eriperet*: 'which in their view &c.' The charge is one continually made against the Academy: see *Acad. ii 16 Aresillas conatus est clarissimis rebus tenebras obducere*; § 61 *eam philosophiam sequere quae confundit vera cum falsis, spoliat nos judicio: ... tantis offusis tenebris ne scintillulam quidem ullam nobis ad dispiciendum reliquerunt*; 26 si ista vera sunt, ratio omnis tollitur quasi quaedam lux lumenque vitae 30.

*desertae et relictae*: so Ac. i 13 *relictam a te veterem, tractari novam*, II 11 *prope dimissa revocatur*. Cf. § 11 and Ac. II 129 *omito illa quae relictam jam videntur, ut Herillum. Dee. refers to desertion by an adherent, such as Antiochus; rel. to general neglect.

*qua quidem in causa*: Heindorf and Schömann have in vain done their best to find some reference for these words in their ordinary position at the beginning of the chapter; and the sentence beginning *multum autem*

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1 Reid (Introd. to Laelius p. 9) more correctly puts *Hortensius* first, B.C. 46, then the *Consolatio* and next to that the *Academica*.
comes in equally abruptly after repellendi. It appears to me that the	natural connexion may be restored by transposing them, so as to make quae
quidem—repellendi follow esse susceptam (cf. § 30): multum autem then be-
tcomes the commencement of a new paragraph in which C. leaves the general
subject and proceeds to defend himself against attacks made upon him;
causa will refer to the criticism passed upon his philosophical studies,
while objurgatores and vituperatores are two classes of critics. [I have
always taken these means to mean 'now in dealing with the case at issue
between the dogmatists and Academics, I have an opportunity of soothing
my kind reprovers, &c.' One object C. has in view is to set himself right
with the public, cf. § 13 ut omni me invidia liberem. J. S. R.]

benevolos objurgatores placare: 'pacify friendly critics'.

invidios vituperatores: 'malicious fault-finders'. We find C. de-
finishing himself against the same charges in Fin. i 1, Div. ii 4, Acad. ii
5—9, Off. ii 2—8, Tusc. iv 4 which should be compared for the whole
passage.

referantae ... sententias: so Brut. 65 (of Cato the Censor) referantae sunt
orationes et verbis et rebus illustribus. In his rhetorical treatises C. recom-
mands the study of philosophy as necessary to the orator (De Orat. i 83,
III 85 seq.) and takes credit in a letter written to Cato, B.C. 50, for in-
roducing in forum atque in rem publicam atque in ipsum aciem that
philosophy quae quisdam osti esse ac desidiae videtur, Fam. xv 4 ad fin.,
cf. Quintil. xii 2 § 5 foll. Weidner remarks on the philosophical tone of
his youthful treatise De Inventione in contrast with that of Cornificius on
the same subject. Cicero was one of those who led the way in bringing
about that transmigration of Roman technicalities by the spirit of Greek
philosophy which made Roman law so important a factor in our modern
civilization. [Probably C. alludes to such passages as Sest. 3, Balb. 3, Pis.
37, Post red. 14, Pro domo 47, Caec. 39—42, Mur. 63, Phil. xi 28, Deiot. 37,
Marcell. 19. J. S. R.]

fioruit: 'has been honoured', Nägels. Stil. § 128, 3.

Diodotus the Stoic lived with C. from the year 84 B.C. till his death in
59 B.C. He is spoken of in high terms Ac. ii 115 D. a quero amavi; mecum
vivi tot annos; cum et admiror et diligo; Tusc. v 113 D. Stoicus caecus
multos annos nostrae domi vixit; is vero, cum in philosophia multo etiam
magis assidue quam antea versaretur, et cum fidibus Pythagoreorum more
uteretur, cumque et libros noctes et dies legerentur; tum, quod sine oculis fieri
possit vix videntur, geometriae munus tuebatur, verborum praecipiens disinhibit,
unde, quo, quamque lineam scriberent. On his death he left C. HS fortasse
centies, Att. ii 20. On the other names cf. Introduction and Dict. of Biog.

§ 7. referuntur ad vitam: 'if, as we are agreed, all philosophy has a
practical aim (cf. Fin. iii 4 ars est philosophia vitae, i 42 Madv., Tusc. iv 5,
v 5), I can point to my life as a proof of my philosophy'. The interest in
pure speculation hardly survived the death of Aristotle.

praestitisse: 'to have carried out', 'made good'. In praesc. we have
an example of the Perf. Subj. after proper Perf. praestitissee, see n. on censerent § 3.

Ch. iv. otiō langueremus: so § 67 'Epicurus denies happiness to God, nisi plane otio languerat', Off. iii 1 duae res quae languorem afferunt ceteris, illum (Scipionem) acuebant, otium et solitudo. C. elsewhere pleads otium, his forced inaction under the autocracy of Caesar, as an excuse for turning to literature, e.g. in a letter to Varro, Fam. ix 6 quis non dederit ut, cum opera nostra patria ui nolit, ad eam vitam revertamur quam multis rei publicae praeponendum putaverunt?

necesse esset: evidently written before the Isey of March.

ipsius rei publicae causa: cf. Div. ii 1 seq. quaerenti mihi multumque et dixi cogitanti quamam re possem prodere quam plurimum, ne quando iterim consulem rei publicae, nulla major occurrerat quam si optimarum arietum viae traderem meis civibus; and a letter to Varro, Fam. ix 2 nobis stat illud, una vivere in studiis nostris ... et si minus in curia atque in foro, at in litteris et libris gubernare rem publicam et de moribus ac legisbus quaerere; [Phil. ii. 20. J. S. R.], also the opinion of Athenodorus, a friend of C.'s, quoted by Seneca Trag. 3.

§ 8. multorum—scribendi studia: repeated in Off. ii 2, but, as Sch. says, we have no certain information of any to whom it would apply. Lucretius, Varro, and the Pythagorean Figulus wrote without waiting for any impulse from C. The prose expounders of the Epicurean philosophy, Amafinius, Rabirius and Catius, are always mentioned in terms of contempt, as in Acad. i 5, Fam. xv 16 and 19, Tusc. iv 6 (where the popularity of the first is said to have produced a crowd of imitators). Probably Brutus, to whom the N. D. is addressed, may be one of those referred to, cf. Ac. i 12. [Mr Reid doubts this, as it appears from Fin. i 8 that Brutus had the start of C. in writing, and is rather disposed to think that Varro is alluded to, as in the Acad. he is said to have only made a beginning of philosophy, philosophiam incohasti i 9, so that C. may have here claimed credit for inducing V. to bring out some of those philosophical treatises which are included in the list of his works.]

instituti: 'resolution'; institutionibus: 'trained under Greek teachers', lit. 'by Greek methods'. C. elsewhere speaks of them as men qui se Graecos magis quam nostros haberi volunt Fin. iii 5.

quod—diffiderent: 'because, as they said'. Roby §§ 1744.

profecias—vinceremur: the tense of a Subj. after Perf. Inf. is determined by the Inf. not by the principal verb; see P. S. Gr. § 229 8 and Draeger Hist. Synt. § 126, also n. on § 3 qui censerent. [The exx. of this sequence quoted by Lieven from N. D. are i 6, 8, 10, 16, 58, 60, 63, 85, 90, ii 8, 72, 96, 150, 153, 157, iii 12, 20, 50, 54, 70, 84, 88. J. S. R.] On the general subject of translation from Greek into Latin, and the comparative merits of the two languages at this time, see Munro's Lucretius (Introduction p. 100 seq.) 'in his day the living Latin for all the higher forms of composition both prose and verse, was a far nobler language than the
living Greek. ... When Cicero deigns to translate any of their sentences (Epicurus, Chrysippus, &c.) see what grace and life he instils into their clumsily expressed thoughts! How satisfactory to the ear and taste are the periods of Livy when he is putting into Latin the heavy and uncouth clauses of Polybius! ... Whatever Greek writer Cicero wishes to explain, he can find adequate terms to express the Greek: is it a new sense given to a word in common use? he can always meet λόγος or εἴδος with ratio or species: is it a newly coined word? his qualitas is quite as good as Plato's προάρσε.; C. makes the same boast of the superiority of Latin in Fin. i 10 and elsewhere; Lucretius on the contrary bewails the patri sermonis egestas i 832, and so Seneca Ep. 58.

§ 9. fortunae—injuria: his daughter's death, [so Ac i 11 fortunae gravissimo percussus vulnere. J. S. R.]. See the letters written in the following months, Att. xii 14 (March 45 B.C.) omnem consolationem vincit dolor; xii 20 (same month) quod me hortaris ut dissimulem me tam graviter dolere, possunme magis quam quod toto dies consumo in litteris?; xii 40 (May 45 B.C.) quod scribis te vereri ne et gratia et auctoritas nostra minuat, ego quid hominem aut reprehendant aut postulent necio: ne doleam? qui potest? ne jaceam? quis unquam minus? Legere isti laeti qui me reprehendant tam multa non possunt quam eam scripsi; xii 26 (same month) credibile non est quantum scribam, qui etiam noctibus, nihil enim somni; cf. too Fam. iv 5. 6, v 15. Some of the fragments of the Consolatio preserved by Lactantius illustrate C.'s language in this treatise, e.g. fr. 5 Orelli, 'if we are right in believing that human beings have been exalted to heaven and in raising shrines to their memory, the same honour is assuredly due to my Tullia, quod quidem faciam, teque omnium optimam doctissimamque approbantibus dis immortalibus ipsis in eorum coetu locutam ad opinionem omnium mortalium consecrabo'; and in fr. 6 he declares that the good levi quodam ac facili lapeu ad deos, id est ad naturam sui similem, p ervolare.

animi aegritudo commota injuria: Allen notices the carelessness of construction by which the adj. is made to agree with the governing case instead of the governed. See his n. on Div. i 62 faba habet inflationem tranquillitati mentis quarenti vera contrariam. It may be explained as an extension of the use of abstract for concrete which we find in such passages as Off. iii 36 error hominum arripuit, for errantes homines, Hor. Ep. i 191 trahitur manus regum fortuna retortiis. [Cf. Leg. i 8 occupata opera for occupatus, Fat. 42 assensio non posit fieri nisi commota viso=nisi is qui adventietur commotus fuerit. The best collection of exx. of hypallage adjectivii which I know is in Kühner Ausf. Gram. vol. ii p. 1689. J. S. R.]

[quam si me dedissemp: quam fruaturus fui si dedissemp. Dedissemp is a completed future (fruar si dedero) from a past point of view; and subjunctive because protasis to a future participle understood. R.]

totam philosophiam: cf. Div. ii 4 ut nullum philosophiae locum esse
pateremur qui non Latinis litteris illustratus pateret; Tusc. II 1 difficile est in philosophia panae esse ei nota cui non sint aut pleraque aut omnia. C. accepted the tripartite division, of post-Aristotelian philosophy, into ἰδεώματι (under which may be grouped the De Finibus, De Officiis, Tusculanae Disputationes, De Legibus, De Republica, Laelius, Cato, Paradoxæ), διάλεξει (discussed in the Academica, with which may be connected the rhetorical treatises, see Ac. i 32), φροσυρι (to which belong the present treatise and its adjuncts the De Divinatione and De Fato): see Fin. iv 3, v 4, Ac. i 19, De Orat. i 68, Leg. i 23.

membræ: so De Orat. ii 79 quinque faciunt quasi membra eloquentiae.
alia ex alia: 'mutually', so § 54 aliae alias apprehendentes.
aptæ: the proper passive force, as in Tusc. v 62 gladium saeta equina aptum, N. D. iii 4 apta inter sese et cohaerentia, Leg. i 56, Tusc. v 40.
Ch. v. § 10. qui requirunt...curiosius faciunt: 'those who want to know my own private opinion on each point, show themselves more inquisitive than there is any need for'. See Madv. Fin. i 3.
auctores: Heind. reads auctoritates with B, quoting iii 10 tu auctoritates comentnis, ratione pugnas, Leg. Man. 51 and Leg. i 36 et scilicet tua libertas disserendi amissa est, aut tu is qui in disputando non tuum judicium sequare, sed auctoritati aliorum parares. We find the same sentiment in Min. F. 16 and in Jerome as there quoted by the editors.
momenta: 'weight of argument', lit. 'what turns the scale'. Cf. Ac. i 45 cum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus momenta rationum inventur, facilius ab utroque parte assensio sustinatur.
ipse dixit = aoros εξα, 'the master said it'. So Socrates is referred to as aoros by his disciples in the Nubes 196, cf. Diog. L. viii 1, 46. Both the Greek and Latin pronouns are used colloquially by slaves of their masters. Bentham coined the word ipse-dixitum to express excessive deference to authority. It was the boast of the Academics to be nullius addicii jurare in verba magistri, see Tusc. v 83, Ac. ii 8, 120, Grote's Plato i 238 foll.
§ 11. quattuor Academici: see Reid's Introduction to the Academica p. xxxi foll. There were two editions, the first appeared in two books, entitled Catilus and Lucullus, in the spring of 45 B.C., the second, which was divided into four books and dedicated to Varro, was published in the following August. We possess only the Lucullus and chapters 1—12 of the first book of the second edition.
lucem desiderant: 'the doctrines do not perish though they want the light that might be thrown upon them by a living expositor'. Auctor: subjective genitive, like lucem ingenii perrigentem et tendentem, De Orat. i 184. For the meaning of auctor here cf. Off. ii 8, where C. says of his son then studying the tenets of the Peripateticus under Cratippus at Athens, in antiquissima philosophia Cratippo auctore versaris. The expositor, no less than the founder, may add weight to the doctrine by the authority of his name.
aperte judicandi: i.e. of speaking one's opinion frankly, not imitating the Socratic εἰρωνεία. See Augustin Ac. iii 43 ait Cicero Academicis morem fuisse occultandi sententiam suam nec eam cuquam nisi qui secum ad senectutem usque vixisset aperire consuisse. So we read (De Orat. i 83) of Charmades who spoke non quo aperiert sententiam suam, for negative criticism is the mos patrius Academicis; and Ac. ii 139 of Clitomachus who confessed his ignorance of the real opinions of his master Carneades. [Cf. Ac. ii 60 quae sunt tandem ista mysteria? seq., Euseb. Praep. Ev. xiv 8 of the δρόμητα of Carn., also xiv 6, Sext. Emp. P. H. i 234, Diog. L. iv 33, August. Ep. 118 § 16. This notion of Academic mysteries was no doubt fostered by Plato's half jocular use of the words δρόμητα (Phaedo 62 b), δρόμητος, μυστήρια (Theaet. 155 b). J. S. R. See also Lobeck Agl. p. 127 foll.] According to Augustine (Ac. iii 41) Metrodorus of Stratonic asserted that the Academicians used their negative doctrine (nihil percipi) merely as a weapon against the Stoics, and Aug. believes that they still held, as an esoteric doctrine, all that Plato had taught about the ideal world, in which exists the real truth of which the shadow alone, the veri simile, is to be found on earth (Ac. iii 37 seq.). Though C. professes here to practise the same reserve, he states his views plainly in his Aristotelian dialogues; and even in the Heraclidian dialogues like the present (see n. on Heraclides § 34) he lets it be seen to which side he thinks the probability inclines (see iii 95). However it must be owned that he succeeded in mystifying Abp. Whately in regard to his belief on such an important matter as the immortality of the soul, (see W.'s Essays on Peculiarities of the Christian Religion, App. B. on Cicero).


singulas disciplinas percipere: 'to master each system separately'.


§ 12 nihil—sequuntur: 'nothing to guide them'. The word occurs constantly in the Academica (alluded to just below as also loco) in this sense, e.g. ii 8, 24, 33, 36, 99, &c. The Academicians maintained in opposition to the Stoics that we can do very well without absolute certainty, in Bp. Butler's words that 'probability is the (only and the sufficient) guide of life'. In the previous sentence we have sequitur used in another sense 'aimed at'. For similar careless repetitions see § 13 inventus—invenirit, and Allen on Div. i c. 35.

omnino followed by sed: 'it is true', lit. 'by all means' 'I quite allow'. Cf. § 95 utrumque omnino durum sed..., § 107, Off. i 83, 120, ii 62, 71, Plin. Ep. ii 4; omnino—autem Lael. 98; omnino—samen Plin. Ep. vi 15; also without adversative particle Lael. 69 Reid.
non enim sumus—nota. The Stoics held that we could distinguish true from false sensations (phantasia, visum) by an infallible criterion (σημεῖον, nota, also translated signum and insigne Ac. II 34, 36) termed by Chrysippos καταληπτικὴ phantasia, visum comprehensibile, a sensation in which the soul grasps reality: this is followed by σοφοκαθαρσία, assensio, a declaration to ourselves that the sensation is true. See Ac. i 41, ii 17, 18. The Academics denied the existence of such a criterion, but allowed that some sensations were probably true, others the contrary, id autem non esse satis cur alia posse percipi dicas, alia non posse, propter eam quod multa falsa probabilia sint, nihil autem falsi perceptum et cognitum possit esse (Ac. ii 103, and 32—36); the wise man will be guided by what seems most probable, Ac. ii 99. Carneades distinguished three degrees of probability, that which was plausible phantasia πιθανή (1), that which was also uncontradicted πέπληκτος (2), that which being both of these was further thoroughly examined διέξοδουμένη (3), Sext. Emp. Math. vii 166—169.

veris falsa adjuncta: see Ac. ii 42.

ex quo existit—regeretur: 'from which fact (viz. the close resemblance between true and false sensations) follows the conclusion stated in the Academica, that there were many things of a probable nature, such that though not amounting to a full perception, they could nevertheless, since they had a marked and distinct appearance, serve to direct the conduct of a wise man'. Heind., who is followed by Or. and Ba., proposed to omit this sentence as unsuited to the context, and un-Ciceronian in language. The first difficulty of construction arises from the change of case in the relative clause (quaes—iis) which may probably be explained by the wish to substitute the weaker Pass. for the personifying Act. (regeretur for regerent). It may be said, Why not then begin the clause with the Abl. quibus instead of quae, omitting iis and understanding ea before perciperentur? The answer is that in these complex relative clauses, in which the verbs require different cases, we commonly find the relative attracted to the subordinate clause (as quaes here to perciperentur for quibus), see Madv. § 445, Zumpt § 804, where this passage is quoted. The case of the second verb is sometimes expressed by the demonstrative as Fin. i 1, qui nos cum a posterioribus non esse retentus, Arcesilas eum revocavit, sometimes understood from the relative, as N. D. iii 35 Heraclidum non omnes interpretantur uno modo, qui quoniam intellegi nonuit, omittamus (sc. eum), Sall. J. 102 qui quanquam acciti ibant, tamen placuit (sc. iis) verba facere; see Dietrich on Sall. J. 93, Nägelsbach Stil. § 164. The second difficulty is the Subj. regerentur: if we take quae to be merely connective =et ea, and suppose the clause in orat. rect. to be multa sunt probabilia, quae...percipiventur...habent...regitur, we should have expected regi in orat. obl., cf. Roby § 1781. But the Inf. construction is not always used in these cases, see § 106 tu autem (dicis) imagine remanere quae cum pervenerint tum referantur for eas referri, ii 44 continget, Div. i 46 (Heraclides describes a dream) Mercurium e patre sanguinem visum esse fundere, qui cum terram attigisset referescere
videtur, where we should have expected quem referre cerce; Tac. Agric. 15
the Britons complained that they had now two kings over them a quibus
legatus in sanguinem, procurator in bona saeviret instead of legatum saevire,
see also quotations in Draeger § 447, 2, Reid on Lael. 45 caput esse ad beate
vivendum securitatem qua frui non possit si quasi parturiat for frui non posse;
Madv. Fin. i 19 and 30, Ac. i 28 and 41. In the present sentence however
there was a Subj. previous to subordination (multa sunt probabilia quae ha-
beant), the relative having a definitive, and not merely a connective force. It
is only a certain kind of probabilia, of a very distinct appearance and there-
fore leaving on the mind a distinct impression, which can afford practical
guidance. Again there is a third difficulty if we read existit with the
majority of mss. I think Klotz (Ann. Crit. iv 5) is right in saying
that the pronoun (illud) may carry back the thought to a past time (in
this case to the writing of the Academica alluded to just before in the
words alio loco) and so justify the following Imperf., cf. Ac. ii 86 jam illa
praecleta quanto artificio esset sensus fabricata natura, De Orat. i 63 illud
est probabilium (quod Socrates dicere solebat) omnes in eo quod scirent satis
esse eloquentes, cf. Draeger § 152, Madv. Fin. iii 67, also Fin. ii 21, 34, 42,
iv 20, Div. II 96. [The phrase hinc vobis exstitit occurs also § 55 where it
is followed by Pres. Subj. ut quicquid accidat id fluxisse dicatis, which how-
ever is probably to be explained as an attraction to the parenthetic Pres.
(quam dicatis).] Heind. found another stumbling-block in the form visus
instead of visum, C.'s regular equivalent for passio: Wolf met the objec-
tion by instancing similar double forms, but the fact is that we want here
a distinct word for a distinct thing. Visum is a particular effect of the
abstract visus, which has both the active and passive force of our word
‘look’. Habeo could only be used with the latter (cf. hab. venerationem
§ 45) not with the n. visum. Of course visus has here a wide sense given
to it corresponding to the use of visum for sensation in general. Lastly
H. alleges that the clause is superfluous and too technical. Kl. rightly
answers that without it the thought would be left incomplete. It is not
enough to say that true and false impressions are almost indistinguishable:
that by itself would confirm the opponent’s charge that the Academics
leave themselves no grounds for action: you must go on to affirm the
existence of probable impressions marked out from others by their clear-
ness, so as to afford sufficient practical guidance to the wise. Compare
with the whole the very similar passage Ac. ii 99 quicquid acciderit specis
(visus in N. D.) probabilis, si nihil se offeret quod sit probabilitiati illi
contrarium, utetur eo sapiens ac sic omnis ratio vitae gubernatur.

insignem: ‘marked’, lit. ‘bearing a stamp’. Cf. Ac. ii 101, the Aca-
demic sage movetur mente, movetur sensibus, ut ei multa vera videantur,
neque tamen habere insignem illam et propriam percipiendi notam, i.e.
though they do not answer to the Stoic criterion.

illustrem: ‘clear’ = perspicuum, Ac. ii 34. Cf. Ac. ii 94 etiam a certis
et illustrioribus cohibes assensionem, Fin. ii 15 Epicurus nec de re obscura, ut
BOOK I CH. VI § 13.

physici, aut artificiosae, ut mathematici, sed de illustri et facili loquitur. It corresponds to the Gr. ἐναργής, as in Sext. Emp. vii 161, ἣ αἰσθησις ποιεῖ παθοῦσα, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐναργῶν ὑπόστασις ἑνδεικνύει τὰ πράγματα. ἐν ἀρὰ τῷ ἄρῃ ἐναργεῖς πάθει τῆς ψυχῆς ζητητικῶν ἐστὶ τὸ κριτήριον, and § 171 where he distinguishes between the ἀμοιβαῖα φαντασία and that which σφοδρῶν ἱκέσει τὸ φαινόμενα αὐτὴν ἀληθῆ πληκτρικόν (ἰσιγνητικ). Ἡ ἵκη ἰσίγνητι, also § 257. Similarly Descartes (Meditation 4) made the clearness and distinctness of the idea his criterion of certainty, see Locke bk ii ch. 29.

c. Preamble to the dialogue itself. In order that the reader may be enabled to form his own judgment on the matter, Cicero reports a conversation held at the house of the pontifex C. Aurelius Cotta in which the Epicureans were represented by C. Velleius, the Stoics by Q. Lucilius Balbus, and the Academics by Cotta, Cicero forming the audience. vi §§ 13—17.

Ch. vi. § 13. invidia liberem: ‘to free myself from the odium of maintaining the Academic or negative position that we can know nothing about the Gods, I will lay before my readers the positive views of various schools’. On the invidia attaching to the Academics see Ac. ii 105 sint falsa sane, invidiosa certe non sint: non enim lucem eripimus; Augustine Ac. ii 12 hinc ipsis invidia magna constata est: videbatur enim esse consequens ut nihil ageret qui nihil approaret; on the contrary they affirmed nullo modo cessare sapientem ab officiis cum haberet quid sequeretur; Lact. iii 6 if Arcoesilas had confined his scepticism to physics et se ipsum calumniæ invidia liberasset et nobis certe dedisset aliquid quod sequeremur.

quo loco: ‘and in this matter’. On the omission of in see Madvig § 273 b.

qui judicent: ‘I invite all the world to listen and decide which of them is true’; not as Sch. ‘die Dogmatiker, alle Solche die ein bestimmtes Urtheil aussprechen’.

tum demum procax: ‘then only shall I allow that the Academy is too saucy (wanting in respect for the other schools) if someone shall have been found to have discovered the truth’. So in Leg. i 13 the Academy is said to be perturbatrix omnium rerum. Cf. Div. ii 53 at impudentes sumus qui, cum tam perspicuum sit, non concedamus, Rep. iii 9 Carneades saepe optimas causas ingenii calumniarudiscari solet: Augustine however makes Arcoesilaus the chief offender, Ac. iii 39 Carneades illum velut calumniandi impudentiam qua videbat Arcoesilam non mediocrer infamatum deposuit, ne contra omniam vello dicere quassi ostentationis causa videtur. [I suspect servicius is the true reading. The obstinacy of the Academics in refusing to see the truth is the point insisted on by the dogmatists, cf. Ac. ii 65, Fis. i 2, August. Ac. ii 1. J. S. R.]

ut est in Synepehis: ‘as we read in the Comrades’, a fabula palliata

M. C.
of Caecilius Statius translated from Menander. Other quotations are given N. D. III 72, Senect. 25. C. blames his style (Brut. 74) but still places him first of Latin comic poets (Opt. Gen. Or. 2). Like Terence he was a foreigner (an Insubrian Gaul) and a slave: he died B.C. 168, cf. Teuffel R. L. § 95. The metre of the lines quoted is troch. tetr. cat. As regards the reading I have preferred to insert est after ut, as in Tusc. III 21 ut est in Melanippus, rather than adopt the ille of Ursinus, which seems to me less suited to the following ut queritur ille. [Ut est may also be the true reading in Tusc. I 31 ut ait in Synephebis, where edd. supply ille. J. S. R.]

fidem: 'protection', lit. 'good faith'. He who forgets the common bond of fellowship which unites men together is guilty of a breach of faith: even the Gods would be 'unrighteous' if they neglected the suppliant.

in civitate—non vult: the lines may be reduced to metre by a slight alteration, e.g.

hic in civitate fiant fäcinora capitälia:
abd amico amänte meretrix accipere argentum non vult.

Ribbeck Com. Fr. p. 70 reads nâm ab amico amänte argentum accipere meretrix noënum volt.

§ 14. religione, pietae, sanctitate: see n. on § 3 and on § 116.

delubris: 'shrines'. The word is commonly used in connexion with the image, whether of a God or hero, which was placed there. Acc. to its etymology (lurum, pollubrum) it must originally have meant a place of expiation. See Dict. of Ant. under Templum.

auspicis quibus praesumus. C. was elected a member of the college of Augurs B.C. 53 in place of the younger Crassus killed at Carrhae. How highly he appreciated the dignity of the office may be seen from Leg. II 31 maximum et praestantissimum in re publica jus est augurum.

addubito: 'to be inclined to doubt' (towards doubt), cf. adlubescio, addormio.

aliquid certi: see n. § 6 quid certi, and Div. II 8 si aliquid certi haberem.

§ 15. accurate et diligentiter: 'with careful attention to each point'.

feriis Latinis: the annual festival of Jupiter Latiaris on the Alban Mount lasted for four days. It was one of the class of f. conceptivae, the time for its celebration being determined by agreement between the two consuls, who regularly presided at it, see Dict. of Ant. and Preller Röm. Myth. p. 1863. Besides the N. D., C. represents the dialogue De Republica as having been held on occasion of a Latin holiday.

ad eum: 'to his house.' So just above apud Cottam 'at his house'.

arcessitutu: found only in the Abl. like many similar verbals, e.g.

1 Since writing the above I find that this is the reading adopted in the text of C. F. W. Müller.
BOOK I CH. VII § 16.

injussu, coactu, concessu. On its relation to accersitu see Wilkins in *Journal of Philology*, no. xii. p. 278.

offendi: 'found', lit. 'stumbled across'.

exedra: 'saloon', lit. 'a sitting out', used not so much, I think, of 'out-of-door seats' (*D. of Ant.*) as of bays or projections from a central hall or court (περιστράτων), which were sometimes very small (Guhl and K. § 80) but more frequently of considerable size with semicircular apses and stone seats along the walls. Vitruvius in his description of the *palaestra* or *gymnasium*, such as were attached to Roman villas of the higher class (*Att. i 4, Fam. vii 23, De Orat. i 98, Divin. i 8*) recommends that in three of the cloisters surrounding the court there should be *exedras spatiosae in quibus philosophi, rhetores, reliquique qui studiis delectantur sedentes disputare possint* v. 11. (Readers of Plato will remember that he places the scene of several of his Dialogues in the Palaestra.) For the use of the word in ecclesiastical writers cf. Bingham Bk. viii c. v. § 4, and c. vi. § 9, c. vii. § 1. C. uses the word *De Orat. iii 17, Fin. v 4*, and the diminutive *exedrium Fam. vii 23*. For the spelling (*exedra or exhedra*) see Sch.'s n. with the reff.

ad quem: C. often uses *ad* after *defero*, otherwise the Dat. would have seemed more appropriate to express honour done to a person, cf. Draeg. § 186, 3.

primas: *sc. partes, περιστράτων*, a metaphor from the stage frequently used with *agere, ferre, dare, concedere, tenere, &c.* *Secundas* is similarly used by Seneca.

progressus habebat: *so progressus facere Tusc. iv 44.*

Ch. vii. § 16. Piso: M. Pupius Piso Calpurnianus consul in B.C. 61. We learn from Asconius that C. in his youth was taken to him by his father to receive instruction in oratory. His style of eloquence is described in the *Brutus* § 236, where he is said to have been *maxime omnium qui ante fuerunt Graecis litteris eruditus*. He was instructed in the Peripatetic philosophy by Staseas (*De Orat.* i 104) and is introduced as the spokesman of that school, as modified by Antiochus, in the 5th bk. of the *De Finibus*. As consul he deeply offended C. by favouring Clodius. In the letters written to Atticus about that time he is spoken of as one *a quo nihil speres boni rei publicae quia non vult; nihil metuas malii quia non audes*, *Att. i 13; uno visio minus visio minus quiad iners, quod somni plenus, i 14*. He died before the writing of the *N. D.* as is shown by *Att. xiii 19*. Krische p. 19 thinks that C.'s reason for omitting the Peripatetic school was the obscurity of Aristotle's teaching on the points which are here discussed. A more probable reason is that on these points he accepted Antiochus' identification of the Stoic with the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy (*§ 33*) and thought it unnecessary to treat separately of the latter.

nullius philosophiae—locus: on the supremacy of the four great schools see R. and P. § 2 n., Lucian *Hermot.* 16, *Ciris* l. 14 *si me jam summa Sapientia pangeret arce | quattuor antiquis quae heredibus est data consors,*

6—2
De Oratore III 16. Professorships of these four schools were established at Athens by M. Antoninus. Besides these there was the Pythagorean school which was ably represented at Rome by P. Nigidius Figulus (Tim. i 1) but had few adherents among the public. A little later we read of the Cynics and the Sextii (R. and P. §§ 469, 473). Sch. thinks that the Academy, which has been just spoken of as orba and relicta, cannot be included in the schools quae in honore sunt; to which Heidtmann replies (p. 28 foll.) that different times are referred to: at the supposed date of the conversation, while Cotta and perhaps Philo were living, the Academy was still flourishing: the case had altered when C. wrote twenty or thirty years later. Perhaps this is pressing C.'s language too far, especially in a hasty composition like the present. Speaking generally, every one living at that time would have counted the Academy among the great schools, though it might be declining in comparison with its former glory. About one hundred years later Seneca (Nat. Quaest. vii 32), deploiring that tot familias philosophorum sine successoribus deficiunt, mentions that the Academy in particular had been overthrown by the usual fate of merely negative schools, Academici et veteres et minores nullum antistitium reliquerunt.

missus est: 'addressed to', cf. Senect. 3, Div. II 3, Reid on Lael. 4.
nihil est quod desideres: 'you have no reason for regretting the absence of'. See n. on § 3 quid est quod.

re—verbis: 'really—nominally', § 124 re tollit, oratione relinquit deos. Cf. § 85 verbis religiisque deos, re sustulisse. So Fin. iv 2 Cato is made to say non verbis Stoicos a Peripateticis, sed una vera re et tota sententia dissentire. The relation of the Stoics to the Peripatetics and the old Academy is discussed in the 3rd and 4th books of the De Finibus and Leg. i 54 foll. On the eclecticism of Antiochus see Introduction. For the musical metaphor contained in concinere and discrepare cf. Off. i 145, III 83 (of honestas and utilitas) verbo inter se discrepare, re unum sonare, and Fin. iv 60. [So συγκλίνω Plat. Phaed. 92 c, рα ὀρασία ή Sext. Emp. P. H. i 200. J. S. R.]
egone: cf. iii 8. Sch. quotes Leg. i 14, Fin. iii 11.
magnitudine et quasi gradibus. The distinction between degree and kind not being yet familiar to the Romans C. employs this periphrasis for the former, [similar periphrases occur Fin. iii 45—50. J. S. R.]

§ 17. verum hoc alias: sc. tractemus, Roby § 1441, Draeger § 116, Nägelesb. § 183, Madv. Fin. i 9, iv 26. Exx. of similar elliptical constructions are found in §§ 19, 47, Lael. 1 with Reid's n.
nihil vero: 'to be sure it does', so repetam vero just below, 'to be sure I will'; cf. iii 65, Div. II 100, Pat. 3, Lael. 16, Ac. i 4 &c.

ut hic—ne ignorant: depends not upon the principal verb agebamus, but upon the unexpressed 'I will explain', Zumpt § 772, Roby § 1660. When a negative is added to ut final (in), ne is used; when to ut consecutive (Scire) non. Later writers use ne by itself for the earlier ut ne. C. uses either, form, the fuller where he wishes to separate the connective and negative force of the conjunction: this is seen most clearly when several
words intervene between ut and ne, as in this instance. Cf. Zumpt § 347, Madvig § 456 and Fin. II 15 n.

me intuens: 'with a glance at me'. Sch. refers to II 104, Brut. 253.
nihil scire: referring to the Academic doctrine of human nescience, ἀγαθοκρις. So Fin. v 76, 'would you send a youth to receive instruction in doctrines quae cum plane perdidicerit nihil sciat?'

Cotta viderit: 'that is Cotta's business', lit. 'he will have looked (must look) to that', i.e. I leave it to him to show whether we have learnt anything or not. Cf. III 9 quam simile istud sit tu videris, Fin. x 35 quae fuerit causa max video, Liberius in Gall. xvi 7 duas uxoribus hoc herdes plus negoti est, inquit cocio; sed aediles viderint, 'it is their look-out'. Some scholars, as Seyffert ad Lael. 10, have maintained that the mood is Ind. in the 1st and Subj. in the 2nd and 3rd persons, but see Madv. Opusc. II pp. 92, 96, Roby §§ 1593 and 1595 (where exx. of the simple Fut. similarly used are given) and Pref. cv. foll., cf. also Mayor Sec. Phil. p. 158.

nolo—auditorem. Both the Romans and Greeks preferred to negative the principal verb where we should join the negative particle with the Inf. as in the well-known instances of nemo, ou φημι: so here nolo—adjudorem instead of volo—non auditorem. If the subordinate sentence is composed of two members, one negative, the other affirmative, the negative verb is still retained, the corresponding affirmative being suggested in thought before the second clause, as here nolo suggests volo before auditorem (sc. existimes me venisse). See Heind. here and on Hor. Sat. i 1 3, and Madv. § 462.

adjudorem—auditorem. The antithesis is pointed by the paronomasia (quaquam tate) cf. Herenn. iv c. 20, Orat. c. 12, Brut. 38 suavis quam gravis, Mayor Sec. Phil. ind. s. v. annominatio. [A curious ex. is Div. II 34 concentu atque consensu. J. S. R.]

et quidem—sae raśra 'and that too', see § 78 n.

libero judicio: the constant boast of the Academics, Ac. II 8, Tusc. II 5, Off. III 20. On the contrary the Epicureans are charged with a slavish adherence to their master's teaching, §§ 66 and 72, Fin. II 20 quis enim vestrum non edidit Epicuri κυπάς δόξας? Seneca Ep. 33, contrasting Stoic freedom with Epicurean subjection to authority, non sumus sub rege: sibi quisque se vindicat. Omnia quae quisquam in illo contubernio locutus est unus ductu et auspicis dicta sunt; (quoted by Zeller, Stoics tr. p. 394 foll.) [But C. does not spare the Stoics either, cf. Ac. II 120, Tusc. v 33. J. S. R.]

velim nolim: 'will I nill I', 'should I wish it or should I not'. On the omission of the conjunction in short antithetical phrases see Zumpt § 782.

B. EPICUREAN ARGUMENT. VIII 18—XX 56. (C. commences with the Epicureans as being the easiest to deal with, so as to leave the ground clear for the more serious struggle between the Porch
and the Academy. Cf. Fin. i 3 ut autem a fucillimis ordiamur, prima veniet in medium Epicuri ratio.)

a. Polemic of Velleius against the Platonic and Stoic views of Creation. §§ 18—24.

Adenter ut solent: cf. Diog. L. x 121, (Epicurus affirmed that the sage δόξαν τινα δοξάντον καὶ οὐκ ἀειμόρφως.) Self-confidence is the natural characteristic of the materialistic or anti-spiritualist philosophers, a Hobbes, a Bentham, a Comte, who see clearly because their field of view is limited. Those who have had a deeper feeling of the littleness of man in contrast with the vastness of the universe have been fain to take refuge in a docta ignorantia, professing with Socrates that they know nothing, or with Plato seeking to find the best of human reasonings and use it as a raft for the voyage of life, εἰ μὴ τις δύναντος δαπαλίστερον καὶ δαπαλιστέρον ἐνὶ βεβαιώτου δύναμιν, λόγον θεοῦ τινός, διατομευόμενα (Phaedo 86). Compare the manner in which the latter enters upon the discussion of this subject in the Timaeus as translated by C. (c. 3) si forte de deorum natura ortuque mundi disserentes minus id quod avenus consequerem, haud sans erit mirum, contentique esse debeat si probabila dicentur. Aequum est enim meminisse et me qui disseram hominem esse et vos qui iudicaretis. It is probable that in his representation of Velleius C. had in his eye the sophists of the Platonic Dialogues, such as Thrasymachus, and intended to exhibit him rather as the butt of the company; but the arrogant, bantering tone, and the misrepresentation of opponents, are quite in accordance with what we are told elsewhere of the Epicureans: cf. what is said of Zeno and others § 93, and Hirzel p. 28 foll. On C.’s own position with regard to Epicureanism see Introduction.

Ex deorum concilio: see n. on § 43 venerari Epicurum. It is curious that C. was attacked for using the same phrase of himself, probably in his poem on his Consulship, see Quintil. xi 1 24 Jovem illum a quo in concilium deorum advocat us foll.

Intermundia =μετακόσια, the empty spaces between the innumerable worlds of Ep. (§ 53) where he supposed the Gods to have their habitation, apart from all cares and dangers (Diog. L. x 89). It is the Homeric Olympus, rationalized by Aristotle, and adapted, or rather forced into the Epicurean scheme, cf. Arist. Cael. ii 1. The word occurs again Fin. ii 75, and is referred to Div. ii 40 deos ipsos jocandi causa induxit Epicurus perduticos et perfadiles et habitantes, tamquam inter duos luocos (the famous asylum of Romulus), sic inter duos mundos properetur metum ruinarum. Compare an interesting passage of Seneca, Benef. iv 19 tu denique, Epicure, deum inermem facis: omnia illi tela, omnem detrasisti potentiam, et ne cuit quam metuendus esset, projectisti illum extra mundum. Hunc igitur insaeptum inventi quodam et inexplicabili muro, divisi umque a contactu et a conspicuo mortalium, non habes quae verearis: nulla illi nec tribuendii nec nocendi materia est. In medio intervallo hujus et alterius
BOOK I CH VIII § 18.

caeli desertus, sine animali, sine homine, sine re, ruinas mundorum supra se circaque se cadentium evitat, non exaudiens vota, non nostri curiosus. It is to these Lucretius alludes III 18 apparat divum numinem sedeque quietae, v 147 illud item non est ut possis credere, sedes | esse deum sanctas in mundi partibus uillos. | Tenuis enim natura deum longeque remota | sensibus ab nostris animi vis mente videatur, where see Munro.

futiles (fundo χίον): 'baseless', without solidity or substance; hence effutio 'to babble', § 84; II 94, see Vanier Ety. Wört., Roby § 878.

commenticias: 'imaginary' from comminiscor (mens) 'to invent', cf. N. D. II 5, 59, 70, III 63.

opifex: a less dignified word than artifex by which C. (Tim. 2) translates the Platonic δημιουργός. Ambrose (Hex. I 1) states plainly the difference between the Christian and Platonic ideas of creation. Plato held deum non tantum creatorem materias sed, tantum artifex ad exemplar facisse mundum de materia, thus assuming three First Principles, God, Matter, the Ideas, instead of one. [There is the same contemptuous use of opifex Ac. II 144 and in the well-known description of Zeno as ignobilis verborum opifex. J. S. R.]

de Timaeo. Heind. following Walker, reads in for de as in Tusc. I 63.

Sch. understands Timaeo of the Locrian philosopher who is said to have instructed Plato in the tenets of Pythagoras (Cic. Rep. I 16). But the particular doctrine here referred to is not especially Pythagorean: we find it attributed to Socrates by Xenophon (Mem. I 47) πάντως ταύτα σαφῶς δημιουργούσα καὶ φίλος τεχνῆς. And there is no objection to taking de simply as a reference to the Platonic dialogue, cf. Tusc. III 53 hi poterant omnis illa de Andromache deplorare, 'haec omnia vidi' (those lines from the Andromache), Off. III 82 in ore semper Graecos versus de Phoenissis habebat, Rep. I 30 in ore semper erant illa de Iphigenia, Leg. I 1 de Mario with Dumesnil's n.

anus fatidica = χρησμοδογος γραφής, Plut. de Nob. c. 13 (with an allusion to the Stoic belief in divination, cf. Div. II 19 anile fati nomen ipsum); elsewhere sneered at as ξυνούσα ἢ ποιή διστρέφεις καὶ τροχυκτ., Plut. Mor. 1101 δ. Balbus in his reply (II 73) explains that πρόφορος is not a person but an attribute of the Deity. C. sometimes translates it by prudencia, N. D. II 58, Ac. I 29 Reid.

neque vero: 'no, nor yet the world itself', see Madv. Fin. I 25.

mundum—praeditum: a doctrine common to both Plato and the Stoics, cf. Tim. 30 b, de lógoi τόνικ των κόσμων ζεύγον ξυμφόρον ἐννοοῦ το τῆ διήθεια διὰ τῆ τοῦ θεοῦ γεννᾶθαι πρόφορον.

rotundum. See Tim. 33 b and, for the Stoics, N. D. II 46, 47, where reference is made to this passage.

ardentem. This was not Platonic, but borrowed from Heraclitus by the Stoics, see II 23 n.

volubilem. According to the general belief of antiquity it was the heaven that revolved, the earth being fixed in the centre. For exceptions to this belief cf. Ac. II 123 and n. on celeritate § 24.

§ 19. quibus enim oculis. The reading animi after oculis is doubtless a gloss intended to be an answer to the question in the text; Sch., who retains it, translates 'mit was für Geistesaugen', but such a guarded complex phrase would be inconsistent with the form of the question, quibus implying, like the Gr. σοιος, a palpable absurdity. It could only have been used if an objector in reply to the simple question 'with what eyes could he have seen it?' had already answered 'the eyes of the mind'. Then the latter phrase might have been attacked as itself incongruous, σοιος ψυχής δυμασω; but Vell. is made far too simple-minded to guard himself beforehand against any such answer. On the correctness of the phrase oculis animi instead of oc. mentis, see Sch. and Heidmann p. 31, Klotz Adn. Cr. ii 3, Wittk. on Plut. Num. Vind. p. 94. In Rep. i 56 we read that the Stoics tanquam oculis illa viderunt, quae nos vix audiendo cognoscamus.

vester Plato: addressed not only to the Academica C. and Cotta, but to Balbus the Stoic, who speaks of Plato as deus philosophorum, ii 32.

fabricam tanti operis qua construi mundum facit: 'the construction of so vast a work, I mean the putting together and building up of the world in the ways which he describes'. The relative clause serves rather awkwardly to explain what is meant by tanti operis. The construction fabrica qua construendae, instead of f. construendi, may be illustrated by the sentence in which Vitruvius defines the term (i 1), Fabrica est continuata et trita usu meditatio, qua manibus perficitur e materia unius cujusque generis opus, et ad propositum deformationis. The word fabrica is used in the N. D. (a) for the workshop or forge (III 55), Vulc anus Lemni fabricae traditum praefuisse; (b) for the working or art itself, II 150 the fingers are useful ad omnem fabricam aeris et ferris 'for every kind of working in iron or brass, II 35 ut pictura et fabrica ceteraque artes habent quendam absoluti operis effectum 'as in painting and architecture we look to the general effect', (so more generally II 138 incredibilis fabrica naturae and Div. I 116 fabrica consecutionis 'the art of cleaving wood', used much as it is here); (c) for the completed work, II 121 subtilis discriptio partium, admirabilis fabrica membrorum 'structure'. In this passage it has a sneering force (like H. Spencer's 'carpenter-theory of creation' First Principles p. 120) as in § 53 natura effectum esse mundum, nihil opus fuisse fabrica, and Ac. II 87 Qualis ista fabrica? ubi adhibita? quando? cur? quo modo? cf n. on § 4 fabricati. If the elaborate constructive processes of the Timaeus had been meant to be taken literally, the Epicureans would have had some ground for objecting to their anthropomorphic character, but there can be little doubt that they are figurative like the myths in the Gorgias and
Phaedrus, cf. Grote's Plato Vol. III ch. 36 p. 282 foll. Ambrose, coming from the Christian side, says (Hex. i 3) 'the Creator had no need of quae molitio—fuerunt. The objection is 'if we take the term δημόουργός literally and look on the Creator as a gigantic builder, where was the needful machinery to be found? or if we accept Plato's view that the δημόουργός was incorporeal, and therefore incapable himself of touching or being touched, whom did he employ as his agents? If on the other hand we think of a divine fiat, how could senseless matter act in obedience to this, and what was the origin of those four elements themselves?' See the answer to this, together with a fragment from N. D. III, in Lact. Inst. Div. II 8.

mol. ferr. vect. mach. 'His mode of building, tools, levers, scaffolding'.

muneris: used of a public spectacle or a building made over to public use. So in C.'s translation of the Timaeus (c. 2), is qui aliquod munus efficere molitur=δημόουργός (Pl. Tim. 26 a). It is joined with opus in reference to the creation, N. D. II 90 architectum tanti operis tantique muneris, and Tusc. I 70. Cf. Vell. Pat. II 48 and 130. [Mr Roby suggests that munus in this sense may be etymologically connected with munio and moenia.]

illae quinque formae: Plato represents the Demiurgus as educating the four elements out of the primaevi chaos (materia prima, δινη, χερα, τὸ δεκάμενον) by stamping upon it certain geometrical forms, the combination of which gave rise to the five regular solids. The material particles which received the form of the cube constituted earth, those which were in the form of a pyramid constituted fire, the octahedron was the basis of air, the icosahedron of water, while the dodecahedron was the basis of the universe itself, cf. Tim. 48 b, 53 c foll., Grote's Plato III p. 266 foll., R. and P. §§ 269, 270, Phaedo 110 b δεκάμεστον σφαιρα with Wytt.'s n., Plut. Def. Or. 34 p. 428, Qu. Conv. VIII 2, 3. This theory was borrowed from the Pythagoreans (Plut. de Pl. Ph. II 6). In the Epinomis 981 c aether appears as a fifth element, quinta essentia, corresponding to the dodecahedron, and this agrees with the statement of Xenocrates preserved in the Scholia to Arist. Phys. p. 427 Brandia. It is strange that none of the editors before Sch. saw the right meaning of the present passage. The reference to the five solids is unmistakable by any reader of the Timaeus, if it is once recognized that reliqua can only be the four elements just spoken of. Davies however seems to have been thinking more of the latter part of the sentence where the mss have  

Instead of constituents of
matter. Sch.'s emendation afficiendum is generally accepted and gives the required sense. Thus we read, with regard to the origin of sensation and the manner in which it affects the reason, Tim. 64—68 'such parts of the body as are composed of the finer particles of air and fire readily propagate the impulses from without μέχρι περὶ ἄν ὑπ᾽ ἃ φρονιμία ἀλήτου ἐξαιρετεῖν τοῦ πουήσαντος τὴν δύναμιν: cf. also Tim. 42 c speaking of the irrational accretions which gather round the soul from fire and water and air and earth. The only defence for efficiendum would be that it is a simple misunderstanding of Plato, which would be natural enough on the part of an Epicurean, as we shall see when we come to the historical section, but C. had just been translating the Timaeus and he could scarcely have inserted a palpable blunder without correction or notice. Add that the phrase apte cadentes ad is not only more appropriate for a continuous influence than for a single creative act, but that it appears to refer to the correspondence between the organs of sense and the external cause of sensation, according to the principle 'like is known by like'; see Tim. 68 of the sense of sight, and p. 37 of the soul's power of cognizing various kinds of objects in virtue of its own constitution from corresponding elements.

apte cadere: lit. 'to fall into its niche', here 'nicely adapted to affect the soul'. Cado by itself has nearly the same force, e.g. § 95 ous ista beatitudo in solem cadere non potest, 'why is that blessedness unsuited to, incongruous with, our idea of the sun?' So just below in figuram cadere. We are now in a position to reply to the off-hand Unde of Velleius. The five solids are all generated according to Plato (Tim. 53) out of two sorts of right-angled triangles, τὰς ἡ ἀρχαὶ ἀρχαὶ ἀρχὴν θεὸς οἷς καὶ ἀνδρῶν ὡς ἁν ἐκείνη φιλος ὑπὲρ, that is, they belong to the ideal, supersensual world, from which the Deity took his pattern for making the sensible world, and of which the rational soul is cognizant, unless it has been so much steeped in sense as to have lost its original faculties.

longum est. The Ind. is generally used where we might have expected the Subj. with verbs or phrases expressing duty, necessity, possibility, &c., especially when sum is employed with the Fut. Part. or Gerundive, the predication being made absolutely and not in reference to a particular hypothetical action; see Roby §§ 1535, 1566, 1570, Key § 1214 foll., Draeger § 145, Krueger's Untersuchungen (of Ind. in past tenses) Vol. ii pp. 333—388. Other examples of longum est are found N. D. i 30, N. 159, of possum i 101; ii 121, 126, 131, so bellum erat i 84, opus erat 89. For the similar Greek use of the past tense of the Ind. without ἐν in such words as ἐδεῖ, ἐχρῶν, ἐξῆν, διέαν ἀν, see Madv. Gr. Gr. § 118, Jelf § 868.

ad omnia: so dicere 'it would take long (to speak in reference to) to comment on all his theories'. Cf. Last. 32 nisi quid ad haec forte multis with Reid's n, and my n. on § 17 alias.

optata: 'castles in the air' 'dreams', so Rull. 1 utrum cogitata sapientum an optata furiosorum videntur? Ac. ii 121 somnia censest haec esse
BOOK I CH. VIII § 20.

Democriti non docentis sed optantis; Pat. 46 optare hoc quidem est non disputare, Tusc. ii 30, Læd. 18. Cf. the use of εὑρίσκει as in the phrase εὑρίσκει διώκει Plato Rep. vi 499.

§ 20. Sed illa palmaria: 'but the prize for absurdity is due to what we have still to notice'. Pol. has the same ironical force in the only other passage in which it is used by C. sed illa status palmaris, Phil. vi 15. It has been vainly sought to defend the ms reading palmaris by a reference to the sententias of § 18. On the use of the plural where only one proposition follows, we may say with Sch. that it may be intended to imply Plato's expression of the same thought under various forms (e.g. Tim. 32 c, 33 a, 41 a), or we may be satisfied with the more general explanation given by Madv. (in Orelli), 'illa Cicero posuit tanquam plura eadem orationis figura enumeraturus. Vid. Opusc. Acad. i 360 not. et illis quae ibi collegi add. N. D. ii 147 guanta vero illa sunt quod et sensibus...Phil. v 17 an illa non gravissimis ignominias sunt notanda quod...'. See also Ac. ii 86 jam illa praecursora quanto artificio esset sensus nostro fabricata natura, a sarcastic reference to the remarks of Lucullus in § 30. [For omission of sunt cf. N. D. i 25 haec quidem vestra; iii 80 sed haec vetera; Off. ii 19 haec ergo variora; iii 47 illa praecursora; iii 69 quam illa aurea &c. J. S. R.]

Quod qui introduxerit is dixerit: Heind. followed by C. F. Müller Pref. iv objects to the Subj. dixerit which Draeger explains (§ 151 5 b) as an attraction to the preceding introduxerit. I should be disposed to regard it as an instance of the ordinary confusion by which the verb of saying is put in Subj. instead of the thing said (Roby §§ 1742, 1746). Omitting dixerit we should necessarily have had sempiternus futurus sit to show that this was a supposition of Plato's.

Manu paene factum: see n. on § 4 fabricati paene.

Primis labris gustasse: 'to have the slightest taste of', lit. 'with the surface of the lips', primus being used in a sort of restrictive opposition to express not the first of a number of similar things, but the foremost part of one thing, as Fam. iii 6 prima provincia 'the nearest part of the province', Catull. iii 3 primus digitus 'the tip of the finger'. The more common form in this use is primoris, cf. De Oraiat. i 87 primoribus labris attingere. Similarly we find imus monis, media urbe, &c. Roby § 1295. Cf. the Gr. δι’ ἔρων χειλῶν φιλοσοφεῖν.

Physiologicam: 'natural philosophy' including theology, according to the Stoics and Epicureans, but distinguished from it by Aristotle. Heind. following Manutius omitted the explanatory clause (nat. rat.) as a gloss, but Klots (Ad. Crit. iv 5) successfully defends it by a large induction of passages, e.g. the explanation of the same word Div. i 90, of πρόληψις N. D. § 43, of ἐρωμένα §§ 50 and 109, of εἰμαι καὶ ἡμετέρων § 55, again of the latter Div. i 1, of physicus N. D. i 83, of κύριον δόξα § 85 and Fin. ii 20.

Quod ortum—seeternum. So Tusc. i 79 vult enim, quod nemo negat, quicquid naturae sit interire. This principle is often asserted by Plato, as in Rep. viii 546 a, Phaedrus 245 c d (translated by C. Tusc. i 53), where it is
distinctly stated that that alone is eternal which has in itself the principle of self-movement, ἀριθμὸς διασχίστων iatō, while that which is moved by another (life being regarded as a species of movement) ceases to live when it ceases to be moved, and is therefore in itself mortal. What is compounded is especially liable to this law, see Tim. 41 A τὸ δὲθὲν πῶς αὐτὸν, and Phaedo 78 c τὸ μὲν ἐνενέκριντο δι' ἄντων προσηκεὶ τούτῳ πάσχειν, διαιρεδέημα ταῦτα ἤπει ἐνενέκριντο ἐτι δὲ τι τυχαίαν δι' ἐνενέκρισον τούτῳ μόνος προσηκεὶ μὴ πάσχειν τούτῳ. How then does the universe being compounded and receiving its principle of movement from without, and therefore essentially mortal, escape dissolution? Because the First-Mover and Compounder eternally wills to keep it together as a living unity, and his will is stronger than any band, Tim. 32 c, 33 A, 41 A B. This Platonic principle is of course the only ground for the Christian belief in the continuance of any created existence. Bp. Butler, it is true, in defending the doctrine of Immortality against the Materialists (Anal. ch. i) makes use of the argument from indiscreptibility; but this is only to show that, even supposing the soul material, it need not necessarily perish in death, of which the only known effect is to dissolve what is dissoluble: he is far from maintaining, as some have done, that each individual soul possesses an inherent immortality a priori, so as to render its extinction impossible even to the Almighty. The argument here used by Velleius is taken from Aristotle De Caelo i 10 where he maintains the eternity of the universe in opposition to the Platonic doctrine of creation. [Cf. for the whole passage Ac. II 119 and Bernays' Dis. Dial. d. Arist. 99—114. J. S. R.]

cujus principium aliquod sit, nihil sit extremum: 'such as to have a beginning without having an end'. An example of adversative asyndeton equivalent to the opposition of clauses by the use of μὲν and δὲ in Greek; see just below sapientes leniant, stultti nec viare possint. In both instances the first clause is introductory to the second and would be unmeaning without it. For other examples of coordinate propositions, where we should have expected one proposition to be subordinated to the other, see § 23, Roby § 1027, Nügels. § 160, Madv. § 438, and his Gr. Gr. § 189 b, also indices (under Coord.) to Mayor’s edd. of Juvenal and the Second Philippic of C. Logically such clauses would come under the head conjunctionum negantia Cic. Top. 57, Fam. 15, cf. Heidt. l. c. 34 foll. On the repetition of sit cf. Tusc. i 76 vereor ne homini nihil sit non malum aliud, certe sit nihil bonum potius, Tusc. iv 50 vereor ne fortitudo minime sit rabiosa, sitque iracundia tota levitatis.

si est eadem: 'if your Pronoea is the same, then I want to know all I asked about before, the agents, engines, &c.' There does not seem to be any need to insert a second eadem, to be the object of requiro, as most of the recent edd. have done (see Sch. Opusc. III 283). Klotz, on the other hand, retaining the ms reading, makes vestra predicative, which gives no meaning, for there has been no allusion to any but the Stoic Pronoea, who is here compared with the Platonic Demiurgus. The difference between
them is that the Demiurgus is pure spirit and exists apart from the
world which he creates, while Pronoea is strictly an attribute of the fiery
soul which animates the world, and from which the world grows as a plant
from a seed. [This again shows that vestra cannot be predicative, for there
is no place for agents and instruments (ministros, machinas) in this natural
and necessary growth.] The Stoic Providence therefore is not eadem, but
alia, and Vell. asks why, if the universe thus contains in itself its own
principle of life, it should fail to be eternal; for the Stoics thought (N.D.
118) that it was destined to be destroyed by fire. The answer is that
this destruction is merely the cyclical re-absorption of the universe, as
it grows old, into its original form of fire, from which it issues forth in
renovated strength and beauty.

designationem atque apparatum: ‘the planning and arrangement’.
fecerit: indirect question after require.
mortalem non sempiternum: adversative asyndeton answering to
Gk. ἄλλα, Zumpt § 781.

Ch. ix. § 21. aedificatores extiterint: ‘(Dem. and Pron.) rose up
exstiti.

extiterint—dormierint: adversative asyndeton answering to πιέω and
σιέ. For the argument see Plut. Plac. Phil. 17, Lucr. v 168 quidve novi
potuit tanto post ante quietos | indicere ut cuperent vitam mutare priorem?
Mansel endeavouring to show that reason cannot judge of the contents of
religion, admits the justice of this objection against a creation at any par-
ticular moment of time, and quotes an interesting passage from Neander
in reference to Origen’s opinion on the subject: ‘supposing that to create
is agreeable to the divine essence, how is it conceivable that what is thus
conformable to God’s nature should at any time have been wanting? Why
should not those attributes which belong to the very essence of the Deity,
his almighty power and goodness, be always active? a transition from the
state of non-creating to the act of creation is inconceivable without a
change, which is incompatible with the being of God’, Bampton Lect. ii
n. 23. The difficulty seems to arise from a failure to recognize that God is
omnipresent in time as in space. We go back in thought to the commence-
ment of finite existence, and imagine a boundless solitude anterior to this,
but all past, present and future events are at every moment equally before
the eye of God, in the same way that all points of space are at all moments
equally near to him. Cf. A. Butler Anc. Phil. ii 185, Cudworth iii 490 foll.

saecla: acc. of time. The word means originally ‘generation’ (sēro),
then the greatest extent of a life-time, 100 years according to Varro L. L.
v i 11, cf. Mayor’s Juvenal xiii 28 n.

quae dierum—conficiuntur: ‘which are made up of a number of days
and nights by means of the annual revolutions’.

fateor—potuisse. So Celsus ap. Or. vi 60 sneers at the mention
in Genesis of the 1st, the 2nd and the 3rd day before the creation of
the lights to which the division of night and day is owing. Plato would not have allowed that time existed even as indefinite duration before the universe came into being. 'With the rotation of the Kosmos began the course of time, days, months and years: anterior to the Kosmos there was no time, no past, present or future, no numerable or measurable motion or change.' Grote's Plato iii 256. In Plato's own words ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζωοῦ φύσις (the ideal) ἐνέχυλλεν οὗσα αἰώνως, καὶ τούτῳ μὲν δὴ τῷ γεννητῷ (the material copy of the ideal world) παραλέγεται προσάντευ, οὐκ ἦν δυνατόν· εἰκά δ' ἐπικοίνων τινα αἰώνας ποιήσαι, καὶ διακοσμών ἀμα ὀφρανόν ποιεῖ μένος αἰώνας ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ ἀριθμὸν λούσαν αἰώνων εἰκόνα, τούτων δὲ χρόνων ἀνωνάκαμεν, καὶ τὸ τ' ἦν τ' ἰσταί, χρόνου γεγονότα ἑλθη, φέροντες λαβώμενην ἑνὶ τὴν ἀπίνον ὀυίκε οὐκ ἀρθών, Tim. 37 D, cf. 39 C translated by Cic. i 9 nesciunt hos siderum errores id ipsum esse quod rite dicitur tempus, cf. Varro L. L. vi 3 tempus esse dicunt intervallum mundi motus; id division in partes aliquot maxima ad sole et lunae cursum. So also Arist. De Caelo i 9 7 'there is neither place nor time outside the circle of the heavens (for time is but the measure of motion) but only a divine unchanging eternity.'

mundi: here used in the narrower sense 'the heavens'.

spatio tamen—tempus esset. I have followed Davies in omitting non before potest with all the best mss, and followed Heidt. p. 36 in regarding the words quod ne—esset as a gloss. The meaning of the passage is then simple and consistent, 'what was the creator doing during all the ages which preceded the making of the world'? For though time was not then portioned out by the movements of the heavenly bodies, yet there must have been a boundless eternity which we can conceive as extended. Well, I ask why was your Pronoea idle in all that vast extent of time'? But with the ordinary reading (defended by Sch. in his note and also in Opusc. iii 299) we have a thought introduced which is not only out of place, but totally inconsistent with the argument. It is not for Vell. to dwell upon the difficulty of conceiving the existence of time prior to creation: that is a point for his opponents to press. According to the reading which I have adopted he merely alludes to it to show that it does not invalidate his argument, and proceeds with an igitur which would be very ill-suited to the other reading. The particle tamen just above would be equally inappropriate after quam nulla—metiebatur: there is no opposition between the clauses if we read intellegi non potest, and it is harsh to carry back the opposition to the previous sed fuit quaedam. Independently of the inappropriateness of the proposition in the mouth of Vell. the language is too verbose for the short staccato style of the rest of his speech. Yet again, the sentiments in themselves are non-Epicurean. Infinite time and infinite space are not unintelligible to an Epicurean. Lucretius has no hesitation in telling us what was the state of things before the atoms happened on the existing cosmos with its sun and moon and stars. Sch.'s references to Aristotle and Sext. Emp., as proving the inconceivability
of time in itself, are quite beside the mark. No one disputes that
this was the view of many philosophers; the question is, what was the
Epicurean view? No doubt Vell. just below uses non-Epicurean argu-
ments, but that is where he can turn them to his own purpose, and make
his adversary’s case destroy itself. Here it is his own case which is
weakened by the insertion of what I hold to be a gloss. As regards the
language of the gloss itself, ne in cogitationem quidem odati is equivalent
to ne cogitari quidem potest (Ac. II 82) ’it is impossible even to imagine
how there could have been (lit. was) anything of the nature of time before
time existed’ (I prefer to take it thus rather than to make ut fuerit—fuisses
with Sch. in loco and Draeg. § 407). It only remains to account for the
gloss, and this seems, like animi after oculis § 19, to be easily explained
as a correction of the Epicurean doctrine in the text, made by a follower
of Plato or Aristotle, who inserted a non before potest, and gave as his
reason for negating it quod—esse. For the use of intellego = ‘conceive’
Heidt. quotes Fin. I 17 evumque motum atomorum nullo a principio sed ex
aeterno tempore intellegi convenire (where see Madyr. s. n.), N. D. I 73 istud
quasi corpus et quasi sanguinem quid intellegis? III 38 qualem autem deum
intellegere nos possumus nulla virtutis praeditum? II 54 hanc igitur in stellis
constantiam non possum intellegere sine mente (sc. othav).

§ 22. isto spatio. Why the Abl. when we have the Acc. of duration
just before, (sedea dorm.)! Because in that case the sleeping is viewed as
extending right through the ages, while here the action is viewed as con-
fined within this time, not extending over it; so in tempore infinito just
below, cf. hoc spatio (in the interval) concave concidissee (De Orat. II 353),
causa autem innumeris paene saeculis in omnibus plura mirabilia quam
in somniatorum visis efficit (Div. II 147). The same difference is found in Gr.
between the Acc. of duration and the (inclusive) Gen. of time. Practically
of course the two very much overlap, see Roby §§ 1182, 1185. Or we might
take spatio as the Abl. of Attendant Circumstances, ‘though there was all
that time’, Roby § 1248.

at iste—paterent. Heidt. (p. 39) has called attention to the ap-
parent inconsistency of this sentence with the tenets of the speaker. That
we cannot connect the idea of toil with our idea of the divine nature is of
course of the essence of Epicureanism; but this is bound up with the idea
of the divine inactivity, whereas here it is assumed that the work of creation
may be accomplished without toil to the creator owing to the willing co-
operation of the elements, a supposition which has been just ridiculed by
Vell. § 19. There is however no reason to suppose any corruption of the
text, as H. does. The argument throughout is ad hominem as shown by
the repeated isto, iste, ista. To this H. opposes the language used by
Balbus of the labour of creation II 133 tantatarum rerum molitio, tantum
laborasse; the answer to which is that B. there speaks rhetorically in a
manner opposed to the general spirit of the Stoic philosophy to which Vell.
here appeals.

ignes, terrae, maria. The singular is more naturally used of the simple elements, as in § 19; the plural of the lands and seas which constitute our globe. Perhaps the latter is employed here to give a certain inflation to the style suited to the ironical force of the sentence. So in § 100 and Leg. i 61 it may be explained as poetical hyperbole, 'all lands, all seas', or are we to consider it only the expression of the naive view which makes our earth the chief member in the universe? Caelum stands for sir, ignes for the aetherii ignes (the stars) of § 103. Cf. Draeg. § 4.

quid—quod: see n. on § 3.

signis et luminibus. I think Ernesti right (against Heind.) in supposing a play on words here. It suits the jocular tone of the passage and particularly the reference to the aediles. The constellations (cf. § 35, Lucr. i 2, v 691) and luminaries of heaven are compared to the statues and illuminations with which the aediles adorn the public buildings of Rome on festal days. The custom originated according to Livy (ix 46) with the victory of the Samnites a. c. 307, when the buildings in the forum were decorated with the gilded shields and other spoils; inde natum initium fori ornandi ab aedilibus cum tensae ducentur. So Suetonius tells us (Caes. 10) that Julius Caesar, when aedile, praetor comitium ac forum basilicasque etiam Capitolium ornavit. We learn from Asconius ad Verr. i 22 that statues and ornaments were borrowed from Greece and elsewhere for these decorations, olim cum in foro ludi populo darentur signis ac tabulis pictis partim ab amicis, partim e Graecia commodatis uelabantur; cf. Pro Domo § 111, Verr. iv 3, Orator 131 (explaining the metaphorical use of the word lumen in oratory) reliqua ex collocatione verborum quae sumuntur quasi lumina magnum afferunt ornatum orator. Sunt enim similia iis quae in amplo ornatu scenae aut fori appellantur insignia; non quod sola ornant, sed quod excellunt. On the illuminations see Friedländer Sitt. Röms ii 144 ed. 1, who refers among other passages to Lucil. Sat. iii 23 Romanis ludis forus olim ornatus lucernis. Nocturnal spectacles were not uncommon, especially at the Flavian, the Secularia, and the Saturnalia, cf. Ov. Fasti v 361, Dio Cass. lviii 19, Suet. Aug. 31, Stat. Silv. i 6 85. They were much patronized by Caligula (Suet. Cal. 18), Nero (Tac. Ann. xiv 20) and Domitian (Suet. Dom. 4).

si: sc. ornavit. For similar omissions after si cf. § 99 si, ut immortalis sit, iii 81 si, quia Drusum ferro sustulerat, Div. ii 55 si enim, ut intellegeremus.

gurgustio: 'a hovel', 'don', 'cellar'; used of a low tavern, Piso 13 meministine nescio quo e gurgustio te prodiri involuto capite, soleatun et cum isto ore fetido taeterrimam nobis popinam inhalasses...which is referred to again in 18 tu es tenebrosa popina extractus; of a miser's dwelling, Apul. Met. i 71 brevitatem gurgustioli nostri ne spernas peto; of the poor cottage in which Valerius Cato ended his days, Suet. Gram. 11; of a close bower or
arbour, Ambr. *Hex.* 18 32 ut si quis in campi medio, quem sol meridianus illumina vit, locum aliquem obsapiaet et densis ramos frondibus tegat: nonne quo splendidior foris species loci ejus effulget, hoc horrenti desuper scena gurgustium ejus intus obscurius sit? where gurg. ejus seems to mean the hollow depth of the arbour, agreeably to Vanôck’s account (*Etym.* Wort. p. 50) where it connects it with *gurges*, *voro*, &c. and supposes it to mean a ‘swallow’ ‘abyss’, ‘hole’ and then ‘a dark mean dwelling’.

**variâtate.** C. translates Plato’s περιόδιμον by *variâtate distinctum* *Tim.* c. 10. On the position of *ne* cf. *Leg.* II 13 with Dumesnil’s *n.*

**quaes si esset:** ‘had it been a delight, he could not have dispensed with it so long’; cf. *Lact.* I 7 *fortasse quaerat aliquis a nobis idem illud, quod apud Ciceronem quaerit Hortensius: si deus unus est, quae esse beata solitudo quaeat?* The Epicureans following Aristotle made the happiness of God consist in the contemplation of his own perfection § 51, which is not however inconsistent with a delight in his perfection as reflected in the creation.

§ 23 *ut fere dicitis.* The Stoic belief that the universe was made for man is stated at length II 133, 154 foll. where see notes.

**sapientiumne.** The earlier Stoics divided all mankind into the wise or virtuous (for Zeno summed up all virtue in practical wisdom *φρονήσις*) and the fools or wicked, allowing of no mean between these extremes, cf. *Ac.* II 136, *Parad.* 5, 6, *N. D.* III 79, *Fin.* IV 74: the later Stoics confessed that the Sage was merely an ideal not to be found on earth, and introduced an intermediate class of the *προσόντων*, those who were on the way to wisdom.

**propter paucos:** the universal complaint, or boast, of philosophers, see III 79 *sapientiam nemo asseguitur, Div.* II 61 *si quod raro fit id portentum putandum est, sapientem esse portentum est,* Zeller *Socrates* tr. p. 313, *Stoics* tr. p. 254, Lucian *Hermotimus I*, Mayor’s *Juvenal* xiii 26 n.

**de improbis bene mereretur.** Absence of compassion, contempt for ignorance and weakness, despair of reformation, were characteristic marks of the old aristocratic philosophies, in contrast to the new religion which was to be preached in the first instance to the poor. The Epicurean here thinks it impossible that God should do a kindness to bad men or fools, who in the same breath are spoken of as most miserable: the Gospel recognizes human misery and sin as the strongest claims to the divine compassion. Cf. Orig. c. *Cels.* III 59 and 62.

**deinde quod:** the 2nd *deinde* is opposed to *maxime*, the 1st to *primum.*

**ita multa=tot:** so *Att.* VI 2 8 *inclusum senatum habuerunt ita multos dies ut interierint nonnulli.* Cf. *tam multa=quam multa N. D.* I 97.

**ut ea sapientes—leniant, stulti nec vitare possint:** ‘there are so many troubles in life that all the wise can do is to alleviate them by a balance of good, the foolish can neither avoid their approach nor endure”

M. C.
their presence': see n. on § 20, *caius principium*. The evils of life were
often urged in opposition to Stoic optimism, see *N. D. III* 65 seq., *Ac. II* 120,
and the interesting remarks of Pliny *N. H. VII praef*. Of the two reasons
assigned for the misery of fools the 1st, though mainly Stoic, is also in ac-
cordance with Epicurean teaching, e.g. *Fin. I* 57 *stulti malorum memoria
torquentur: sapientes bona praeterita grata recordationes renovata delectant;
59 nemo stultus est non miser, and the boasts of Lucretius *II* 7 &c.: the
2nd is distinctly Epicurean cf. *Tusc.* v 95 (Epicurus held) *hac usurum
compensationes sapientem ut et voluptatem fugiat si ea majorem dolorem
effectura sit, et dolore suscipiat majorem efficientem voluptatem*, and the
quotation from a letter of Epicurus written in great pain, *Fin.* II 96 com-
prehensabatur tamem cum his omnibus animi laetitia quam capiebam memoria
rationum inventorumque nostrorum (quoted by Heidt. p. 42, see also R. and P.
§ 388, 389).

Ch. X. qui vero dixerunt. That the world was a rational creature
was the doctrine both of Plato and the Stoics, cf. § 18.

*animi natura intellegentia*. Davies' objection to the use of intel-
legens for *intellectua particeps* seems to be answered by the sentence
in the *Timaeus* c. 3 where C. translates οὐδὲν ἀντιγραφή τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος
καλλίων ἱστασθαι by nihil inintellegens intellegens praestantius. Most ms
have naturam, which is very possibly right, the subject of the subordinate
clause (posset) being attracted into the object of the principal (viderunt)
see *Div.* II 103 videe Epicurum quem ad modum concursentur with Allen's
n. and Sch. *Opusc.* III 301 foll. The latter thinks intellegentes was inserted
by way of simplifying this construction; but a distinctive epithet is wanted
for animus: otherwise, as it is found apart from rationality in brutes (see
*Tusc.* i 80 bestiae quarum animi sunt rationis expertes) there would be no
meaning in the words in *quam figuram cadere posset*. On the periphrastic
use of *natura* cf. *II* 136 alvi natura, and *Fin.* v 33 hoc intellegant, si quando
naturam hominis dicam, hominem dicere me; nihil enim hoc differt, Nägelsb.
*Stil.* § 50 4.

*in quam figuram cadere*: cf. n. on § 19. Vell. refers to the human
figure § 48.

§ 24. *nunc autem hactenus admirabo*: 'on the present occasion
I will content myself with expressing my surprise at their stupidity'.
Most of the edd. place a colon after *hactenus*, to which Heidt. p. 44 rightly
objects that, wherever *hactenus* is used thus abruptly with the verb omitted,
it implies a change to a new topic, 'so much for that, and now to turn to
He further points out that *nunc* must be taken with *admirare*, if that is
to refer to the immediate present, and ends with the ingenious suggestion
that *hactenus* is simply the marginal note of a reader to mark where he
had left off. Curiously enough it does appear thus in the margin of one of
the Harlesian ms. I believe however that *hact. adm.* is an abbreviated
phrase for *hactenus dicam ut admirer* (Klotz's explanation is not unlike,
as he refers hactenus to qui velint—quatenus illi volunt, Adn. Cr. II 5) but I am not able to point to a parallel case. For the general form of the sentence Sch. compares Div. I 132 nunc illa testabor following haec habui de divinatione quae dicerem.

qui animantem—velint: (their stupidity) in being ready to predicate roundness of a being who is immortal and blessed into the bargain'. I take animans as a Subst.; Vell. had previously stated that the Stoics considered the world to be alive; here he adopts their view and shows its absurd consequences. Velint subj. after qui=quod ści, Roby § 1740; neget subj. as dependent on subjunctival clause.

Plato: Tim. 33 b, cf. Ν. D. II 46 foll. where Balbus criticizes Vell.

ut: so. ciusmodi ut.

celeritate. As the earth was generally assumed to be at rest in the centre of the universe it was supposed that the heavens made a complete revolution about it every 24 hours. Aristarchus (280 B.C.) propounded the Copernican or heliocentric hypothesis, and was charged with impiety by Cleanthes as κωφήρα τοῦ κόσμου τῆν ἀσίαν. Hicetas the Pythagorean (about 400 B.C.) and Heraclides of Pontus (350 B.C.) are said to have accounted for the apparent movement of the heavens by attributing rotation to the earth, and this is discussed as a legitimate hypothesis by Aristotle. See Lewis Astronomy of the Ancients pp. 170, 189, 262. The question, already debated by the ancients, whether Plato held the same doctrine, is discussed by Lewis p. 142, and at greater length by Grote in a paper contained in his Minor Works.

contorquestur: used with a Middle force.

mens constans: that 'a steadfast mind' is essential to vita beata is asserted §§ 34 and 52. The objection is taken from Arist. Cael. II 1 'nor can we suppose that the heaven is kept eternally in its place by the coercive influence of a soul: it is impossible that a soul thus engaged should enjoy happiness, for, if we assume the heaven to have a different natural movement of its own, such coercive movement must necessarily be ἀγολον καὶ πάντες ἀπηλλαγένες ἡκτένες ἁμφρόνοις to a soul which has no refreshment of sleep, like the souls of mortals, but is for ever spinning round like Ixion on his wheel'.

insistere: 'find a foot-hold'.

quodque—in deo. The natural way of taking this sentence is certainly to suppose that it continues the argument against a rotatory God. 'The motion would be destructive of the tranquillity we ascribe to God, and, if we may judge from our own feelings, it would also be very uncomfortable'. But then how are we to explain the enim of the next sentence? for the earth is supposed to be immovable; it is the mundus which moves. Sch. therefore following Madv. Fin. III 73, understands quae as passing on to another point in the argument, and makes the clause refer to the extremes of heat and cold spoken of below. To this Heidt. p. 46 objects that the reference of quod must have been made clear by the addition of
some such clause as molestum autem est in nostro corpore nimio affici aut calore aut frigore. He would therefore omit quodque—etiam de al-
gether, considering the first part a gloss on the preceding sentence, and
the latter part a gloss to give precision to the argument of the following
quoniam mundi partes sunt; (it would also be necessary to change the
following atqui into atque). I see no objection to the former clause, if
we accept Lachmann's emendation sic incitetur 'if it is carried along so
fast' instead of the ms reading significantur, which there is no authority
for interpreting (with Wytenbach in loc. and Beier Off. i 46) to mean 'if
there were the slightest hint (faintest trace) of it'. Sch.'s emendation
(Opusc. iii 284, 303) sic afficiatur only adds an obscurer sic to the obscure
quod. Another objection to the ms reading might be that minima ex
parte, though true enough if we imagine our body hurried along by itself
with the velocity then attributed to the sphere of the fixed stars, would
be absurd exaggeration if spoken with reference to our power of enduring
tropical heat or arctic cold; but we must remember that the ancients,
in their ignorance of geography, really believed that human life was in-
supportable except in the temperate zones. On the whole I have thought
it better to follow the mss, though I am not satisfied that the text is
correct.

minima ex parte: 'in the slightest degree'.


appulsus: 'by the sun's rays beating upon them', cf. ii 141 frigoris et
caloris appulsus.

exarserit. Heind., with whom Müller agrees, says conjunctivi rationem
nullam video. Is it not the Subj. in orat. obl. after videmus? Previous to
subordination the clause would be incultaes sunt quod exarserit. The mood is
changed, not because the speaker disclaims responsibility for the statement,
but merely to show that quod gives the reason for incultaes, not for the
principal verb.

si mundus est deus. Probably C. meant to have continued dei mem-
bra sunt, but interposed quoniam—sunt to make the argument clearer.
Lactantius dwells upon the same point Inst. vii 3. See also Aug. C.D.
iv 12.

B. b. Historical Section x 25—xvi 43. See Introduction.

i. Epicurean polemic against the theological tenets of 27 philosophers
from Thales to Diogenes of Babylon § 25—41.

§ 25. The mode of argument adopted by Vell. is extremely simple. He
begins by assuming the truth of the Epicurean definition of God as a per-
factly happy eternal being, possessed of reason, and therefore in human
shape (cf. the words of Epicurus in Diog. L. x 123 πρῶτον μὲν τὸν θεόν ἡμῶ
ἀφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον νομίζων, ἡ δὲ κοινὴ τοῦ θεοῦ νόησις ὑπεγράφη, μὴδὲν
BOOK I CH. X § 25.

μήτε τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἀλλύτρων μήτε τῆς μακαρίτητος πρόσαπτε· πάντι δὲ τὸ φυλάττειν αὐτοῦ δυνάμενον τὴν μετὰ ἀφθαρσίας μακαρίτητα περὶ αὐτῶν δόξας·

All opinions which are inconsistent with this are ridiculed as absurdities: as we read in Philodemus¹ p. 96 ‘the Epicureans condemn all who differ from them ὡς ἀν ὑπεννατία τῆς προλήψεις δογματιζόντων’. Further there is no attempt at accuracy in giving the opinions of the earlier philosophers: rather they are intentionally caricatured in order to make them more open to attack. C. in fact has put into the mouth of Vell. a speech suitable to his own description of the Epicurean mode of controversy; fide tert sane, ut solent isti, nihil tam verens quam ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur N. D. 1 18, vestra solum legitis, vestra amatis, ceteros causa incognita condemnatis (spoken by Balbus N. D. π 73). If Cotta afterwards praises the speech (ut tu, distincte, graviter, ornate § 59; enumerasti memorior et copiose, ut nihili quidem admirari laberet in homine esse Romano tantam scientiam, usque a Thale philosophorum sententias § 91;) this is a part of his well-known courtesy (comitum ut solebat § 57). How far the inaccuracies of the speech are to be attributed to C. himself or to his Epicurean authorities is discussed in the Introduction. Minucius (c. 19) gives a summary of this section to prove an opposite conclusion, viz. that all philosophers agree in asserting that God exists and that he is a spirit, cf. § 42 n.

quaestio vero—repetam. The text is uncertain, and presents difficulties whichever reading we adopt. If we insert adia after vero with two of Orelli’s ss, this is in the first place hardly a suitable term for what promises to be an exhaustive disquisition on the earlier systems (ab ultimo repetam); Sch. therefore (Opusc. III 305 and 359) would prefer either to read cetera for adia, or to transfer superiorum with Döderlein, placing it before ab ultimo, which would then be taken absolutely as in Invent. I 28 brevis erit, si unde necesse est, inde initium sumetur, et non ab ultimo repetetur; and, in the second place, all these readings are inconsistent with the fact that a large part of the subsequent polemic is directed against the Stoics. I am inclined therefore to retain the old reading, translating ‘Such is a general statement of the Stoic doctrines: I will now proceed to show how they are related to the older philosophies’; more literally ‘to show what their character is, I will trace back their history to its earliest source’. Probably there may have been some Stoic history of philosophy professing to show that their doctrines could only damage their cause. Förtsch (Quaesit. Tull. 1837) explains it differently, cujus vero generis sint, ita nunc ostendam ut exordiar ab ultimo superiorum, i. e. ea ejusdem generis esse, ita nihilis esse; but Vell. has been proving that the Stoic doctrines nihilis esse for the last page or more.

¹ The references are to Gomperz’s edition of the Herculanean treatise πεπλεύσθης, on which see Introduction.
Thales. The statement here made as to the two principles assumed by T. is opposed to all the more ancient authorities. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. A. 3) makes him the leader of those who started from one material principle, and contrasts Anaxagoras with all his predecessors as having first felt the need of a separate intelligent principle. It is true that by water T. understood something more than mere lifeless matter moved by mechanical causes, like the atoms of Democritus. Water was a living substance endued with a θεία δύναμις κινητική (Stob. Ed. i 56) whence Aristotle says (de An. i 5 17) καὶ εἷς τῷ ὄλῳ τινίς ἤψων μεμιχθαὶ φασιν, ἀλὼν λογος καὶ Θελής φύσι πάντα πλήρη θεάν εἰναι, to which C. alludes Leg. π 26; but the system was a pure ‘hylozoism’. It was therefore by a mere misunderstanding that later compilers such as Stobaeus, I. c. and Plutarch Plac. Phil. i 7 p. 881 ε, attributed to T., who left no writings behind him, (Diog. L. i 23) the statement that God was the soul of the world. C. here departs even further from the truth in his phrase quae ex aqua cuncta fingere, implying a distinct creation out of inert matter by some external force. Elsewhere he gives the usual account, Ac. π 118 Thales ex aqua dixit constare omnia. [Mr Reid would get rid of the inconsistency in C.’s account of Th. by inserting et between eam and mentem ‘that water was the first principle, and that it (water) was God and the mind which produced all things out of water’. One would be glad to relieve C. from the charge of talking nonsense, but it is a question here whether he would object to put nonsense into the mouth of Vell., and it must be remembered that we have the evidence of Minucius in favour of the existing reading.]

si di possunt—vacans corpore. The reading of most mss, et mente, cur aquae adjunxit, si ipse mens &c., teems with difficulties. To what does di allude? According to the preceding sentence T. only attributed divinity to mind, and here we have just the opposite supposition of deities without mind: then we find a transitive verb without an object, and lastly another supposition as to the possibility of mind existing apart from body, this supposition standing alone as a protasis without an apodosis. If, setting aside the grammatical difficulties, we endeavour to establish a general connexion in thought with what precedes, we have to consider whether the argument is direct, or ad hominem, whether corpus is used in its wider sense (= matter), or its narrower (= animated body), lastly how we are to understand the words deus and sensus. It will help to clear the ground if I first give Epicurus’ own account of sensation (Diog. L. x 63) καὶ μὴ ὃτι ἔχει ἡ ψυχή τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὴν πλειστὴν αὐτίαν δει κατέχειν. οὐ μὴν εἰλήφει ἀν αὐτήν εἰ μὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ λοιποῦ ἀδρόμιωτος (i.e. the body) ἠτεγέρα.

1 On the historical section compare throughout Zeller’s History (Germ. Vol. i 4th ed. 1877, Vol. ii 3rd ed. pt. 1, 1875, pt. ii 1879, Vol. iii in two parts, 1869; the parts treating of Socrates, of Plato, and of the Stoics and Epicureans have been translated into English), and my introductory sketch of Greek philosophy. I have thought it worth while to add special references to Krische, as his valuable book is in the most repulsive German form, without headings or index or table of contents.
BOOK I CH. X § 25.

ζητὸ πως τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἀδρούσαμα παρασκεύασαν τὴν αἰτίαν ταύτην μετέληψιν καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον συμπτώματος παρ' ἑκείης, οὐ μετοκύκλῳ δὲ ἑκείης ἐκέπαιν τὸν ἀναλλαγής τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔχει τὴν ἀνάθεσιν οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ταύτῃ ἐκέπαιν τὴν δυνάμειν κ.τ.λ. from which it appears that the fine atoms which form the soul and especially its purest part, the mind or reason, which has its seat in the heart, (I.c. 66) are the true source of sensation, but that they can only act when confined within the body, on leaving which they are immediately dissipated and no longer exist as soul. Body by itself, i.e. the compound of grosser atoms known to us by the name of body, is incapable of sensation, but when united with the finer atoms of mind, it becomes sensitive to a certain degree. On the general subject of the relation of soul and body, cf. Lucr. iii esp. 230—287, where he shows that either by itself is alike incapable of sensation. Taking this as our clue, I think the only satisfactory way of getting over the difficulties of the sentence is to suppose that the apodosis to the 2nd protasis has been lost. This was the view of Lambinus who inserted the clause cur aquam menti before adjunxit, changing et mente into mentem. Most of the modern editors have followed in the same track. The text which I have given is that of Baiter except that I go with Lamb. in omitting et mente, which seems to have arisen simply from a misreading of the abbreviated mentē: when this was once taken as an Abl. it would naturally be joined with the preceding sensus by an et. Sch.'s reading runs the first question too much into the second; the first cur must certainly be followed by an adjunxit: and it is also easier to account for the loss of the 2nd clause, if its end was an echo of the 1st. How then will the argument stand? The dogma attacked is, in its most general form, that the first principle is divinely animated water; to which it is objected that we have here an unnecessary combination of two principles: 'if divinity is possible without feeling, why add mind?' Why may not simple water stand for the first principle? On the other hand, if mind is capable of existing alone, unconnected with any body, why tie it down to water?' It is difficult to deal with the argument from the ambiguity in the use of the word 'god.' If by 'god' is meant the first principle, then the Epicureans would have allowed that this may exist sine sensu. In their view senseless atoms are the first principles, and they could have no a priori objection to senseless water holding the same office. On the other hand, if the name 'god' implies personality, then it is plain that the first principle of Thales was not a god. Divine persons such as those whom the popular religion recognized were as subordinate in his philosophy as they were in that of Epicurus, but they are certainly not more opposed to the former system than to the latter. The point of the objection seems to be that a dynamical principle, like that of the older Ionic philosophers, as opposed to the mechanical principles of Democritus, is an irrational blending of two contrary principles, the materialistic and the idealistic. In this objection Plato and Aristotle would concur, both holding that the universe took shape under the influence of eternal, self-
existential, incorporeal mind\(^1\), whereas Epicurus of course preferred the other alternative and proclaimed the priority of matter. But the form given to the doctrine of Thales in the preceding sentence would not be inconsistent with a pure idealism; indeed Minucius c. 19, quoting this passage says that T. copied the Mosaic account of the Spirit of God moving upon the face of the waters. We may therefore conclude that this form is due to C. himself, and that the author whom he follows could have said nothing of ‘mind making all things out of water’; but only described in general terms the combination of two principles. The use of the plural \textit{di} after the sing. \textit{deus} may be intended to heighten the supposed absurdity of the dogma, or it may be an allusion to the words already quoted \textit{πάντα πλήρη θεών}. Another way of dealing with the sentence is to regard \textit{si ipse—tempore} as an example of repeated protasis: so Heind., Moser, Krische, Kühner. As the repetition of the protasis would be only admissible here, if the 2nd protasis were really a restatement of the 1st, (see Madv. \\textit{Fin.} i 7, who calls this passage \textit{graviter mendoicus}) we should then have to take \textit{mens} as explaining \textit{di}, and \textit{sine corpore} as explaining \textit{sine sensu}, interpreting as follows, ‘if the gods, i.e. pure mind, can exist apart from feeling, i.e. from a human body (we must take \textit{corpus} thus if it is essential to sensation, for body in the wide sense, including the elements, is \textit{sine sensu}; see below on Empedocles and Diogenes) why did he add mind to water?’ But it is plain that there is no logical connexion here between protasis and apodosis. Nor is anything gained by reading \textit{motu} for \textit{mentis} with Moser, Krische, Kühner. Kr. defends the change by a reference to the polemic against Anaxagoras just below, and to a passage in Philodemus p. 88 l. 30, where allusion is made to philosophers who deify \textit{τοὺς ουὶ ἐκκυμνήθης δυναμένους ἡ τοὺς ἐγαργῶς διαστήμους}; and explains as follows ‘if it is possible for gods to exist without feeling or movement, i.e. as pure incorporeal spirit, why did he link them to water, if mind can exist apart from body’, an interpretation which is open to the same charge as Heindorfs.

Lastly it may be worth mention that three of the best \textit{ms} read \textit{sic} for \textit{si}, on which Davies followed by Allen founds the text, \textit{sic di posseunt esse sine sensu}. \textit{At mentem cur aquae, &c.}, and similarly Becker Comm. Crit. p. 14 \textit{sic di—sensu! sed mentem—corpore?} Krische points out the objections to this. See for a discussion of the whole passage his \textit{Theol. Lehren} pp. 34—42, and Sch. \textit{Opusc. iii} 359. Other suggestions are given by Försch \textit{Quaes. Tull.} 5—8, and Stamm \textit{De libr. de N. D. interpolations} 16—21.

\textbf{Anaximander.} See Krische pp. 42—52. C. gives the ordinary account of his doctrine in \textit{Ac. ii} 118 \textit{infiniätem naturae dixit esse a qua cuncta gignerentur}. If there were any consistency in the Epicurean polemic, A’s first principle \textit{τὸ ἀπειρον} (like the Water of Thales) should

\(^{1}\) Though the latter held at the same time the eternity, not of unformed chaotic matter, as Plato, but of the universe itself, still he constantly affirms that \textit{τὸ κυοῦν} (mind) is \textit{φόντες πρότερον τοῦ κυνουμένου} (body).
have been identified with God, since we learn from Aristotle (Phys. iii 4) that A. considered this to be τὸ θεῖον and to govern (κυβερνᾶς) all things. True, the ἄπειρον was impersonal, but so was ἐνόφρος; and therefore Augustine (C. D. viii 2) is justified in saying that neither A. nor Thales were theists in the proper sense. It seems however that later writers gave a more mechanical aspect to the physical theory of Anaximander, which they regarded as differing from that of Anaxagoras only in the fact that the latter recognized νοῦς where the former had seen only an ἄκοφος κίνησις, cf. Ritter and Preller § 18 foll. with the notes from the Aristotelian commentators. So Plutarch (Plac. Phil. i 3, 4) finds fault with Anaximander, but not with Thales, for making no mention of an efficient cause.

nativos—mundos: so Stob. Ecl. i 56 Ἀναξ. ἀπεθάνατο τοὺς ἄπειρους ὀφθαλμοὺς θεῶς, and Plut. Plac. Phil. i 7 τοὺς ἄρτιπας ὀφθαλμοὺς θεῶς, cf. Zeller 1° 211. The words orientes occidentales are to be understood of the worlds which are continually evolving out of the ἄπειρον and again absorbed into it.

deum intellegere: ‘we can only conceive of God as eternal’, any other supposition being opposed to the Epicurean πρόληψις, cf. § 43, and on this use of intellegere § 21 n.

§ 26. Anaximenes: ἀπεθάνατο τούς ἄρχοντες ἔρμα, έξ οὐ γύνομεν, τά γεγονήτα, καὶ τά ἐσόμενα, καὶ θεῶς καὶ θεία γίνεσθαι, τά δὲ λουτά ἐκ τῶν θεών ἀπογόνων, Hippol. 1 7. This agrees with Philodemus p. 65, so far as it is legible (see Lengnick Ad em. lib. de N. D. ex Philodemo p. 15) and with Aug. C. D. viii 2 omnes rerum causas infinito aeri dedidit, nec deos negavit aut tacuit (in contrast to his predecessors), non tamen ab ipsis aere factum, sed ipsis ex aere ortos credidit; also Plut. Plac. Phil. i 3 ἐκ τούτων τὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν πάλιν αναλύσθαι· οὖν ἡ ψυχή ἡ ἡμετέρα, ἢρος ὁμός, συγκρατεῖ· μᾶς, καὶ δολὸ τὸν κόσμον πνεύμα καὶ ἄρτι περιέχει. Stobaeus (Ecl. i 56) further tells us that he gave the name of God to Air, and he adds the explanation that when the elements are thus deified we must understand that divinity is attributed to the power which has its seat in the element. How then are we to account for C’s extraordinary assertion that the air from which all things proceed and into which they are absorbed is not itself eternal, but had a beginning in time (gigni)? Kr. p. 55 holds that it arises from a confusion between the divine air and the subordinate Gods who are produced from this air: a more probable suggestion might be that it is a misunderstanding of the Greek, ἢρο πάντα γένεσθαι ‘passes into all forms’. [Mr Reid indeed thinks C. meant gigni to be taken in this sense = ἐν γενέσει εἶνα, but this seems hardly consistent with the following quod ortum sit.] I believe that C. is here giving the view, which is stated more at length by Lucretius ν 318, (of the ether) denique jam tuere hoc, circum supraque quod omnen | continet amplissam terram: si procreat ex se | omnia, quod guidam memorant, recipitque perempta, | totum nativum mortali corpore constat; | cf. what is said of air L 279, haud igitur cessat gigni de rebus et in res | recidere, assidue
quoniam fluere omnia constat. In the Acad. II 118 the doctrine is correctly stated infinitum aera, sed ea quae ex eo orerentur definita: igni autem terram, aquam, ignem, tum ex his omnia. See Krische pp. 52—60.

immensum et infinitum: two words employed to express the single Gr. ἄπειρον cf. n. on § 2 perceptum et cognitum. The former brings into prominence the idea of space itself, the latter the boundaries which we seek in vain. They are often joined, as in Div. II 91, so immensam et interminatam N.D. I 54. [It seems to me to introduce the stronger word. To say that a thing has never been measured, is not so strong as to say that it is without end; cf. Ac. II 127 exigua et minima. J. S. R.]

semper in motu: κίνησιν δὲ καὶ ὀρές ὀφθην τοις δὲ ἦν καὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν γίνεσθαι, Simpl. in Arist. Phys. 6 a (quoted with other passages by Zeller I 221).

quasi: Heind. adds vero, but Förtsch cites several passages in which quasi by itself has the ironical force, e.g. Verr. v 169, Planc. 62.

cum praestim: 'as if formless air could be a God, whereas it is fitting that God should be of the most perfect shape'. Cf. III 88 praestim cum sint illa perfecta quam haec simulata sollicitus, and see Madv. (Fin. II 25) and Mayor (2 Phil. § 60) on this use. Literally it means 'particularly when we consider that', but this often refers to a thought unexpressed, as here the logical form of the preceding clause would be 'as if we could possibly believe air to be a God'.

The criticism on the doctrine of Anaximenes, like that on Anaximander, is nothing more than an assertion of its irreconcilability with the Epicurean assumption of the eternity and human form of the Gods. In this C. copies Philodemus, who charges the Stoics with denying the Gods whom all worship and whom the Epicureans allow, ἀνθρωποειδεῖς γὰρ οὐ νομίζουσιν, δὲλὰ δέρας καὶ πνεύματα καὶ ἄλθες (p. 84). For pulcherrima specie see n. on § 23 in quam figuram; for the arg. that all that is born must die, n. on § 20 quod ortum.

Ch. XI. Anaxagoras: see Krische 60—68, Hirzel 90—97. His fragments are collected and explained by Schaubach and others. There is little probability in the tradition (Diog. L. II 6) which C. here follows, of the connexion between Anaximenes and Anaxagoras. The doctrines of the latter bear a much stronger resemblance to the Sicilian than to the Ionic school.

primus voluit. This is in accordance with the statements of Aristotle and the best authorities, but is in flat contradiction to the account of Thales given above. The doctrine alluded to is summed up in the words ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα ἦν, νοὺν δὲ αὐτὰ διακρίνει διεκόμησε (Simpl. de cael. f. 145) also in Arist. Met. A 3, νοὺν ἐκεῖν ἐλθε, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔφοι, καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει τὸν αἴτιον τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῆς τάξεως πάντας. Apparently C. meant to paraphrase διεκόμησε by the words dispositionem et modum designari et confici, 'the order and measure of all things was marked out and effected by the power and the wisdom of the infinite mind'. But.
though this reading is supported by all the MSS, yet most of the editors have followed Rigalt and Davies in substituting *motum* for *mense* in order to suit the following *motum sensui junctum*. In confirmation of this emendation they quote Arist. *Phys.* viii 1, φαινει 'Αρχαίοι πάνων ἄνων καὶ ἡμεροῦντων κίνησιν ἐμπούνται τῶν νοών, but as Bouhier, Heind. and Lengnick point out, the original motion by which the cognate particles were brought together was certainly not accompanied by feeling, and therefore cannot be alluded to in C's phrase *m. s.* In the *Acad.* ii 118 C goes more into particulars with regard to the ὁμοομερεία, *A. materiae infinitam sed ex ea particulias, similis inter se, minutias, eas primum confusas, postea in ordinem adductas esse a mente divina* cf. Zeller i 880.

**discriptionem.** Bücheler has shown (*Rh. Mus.* n. s. xiii 600) that the word formerly written *descriptio* should be written *dier.** whenever it implies distribution or arrangement, as in *Senect.* 59 where it is equivalent to the *diastáseus* of Xenophon.

**in quo—sentiret.** Epicurean objection: 'activity and feeling, i.e. rational life, cannot have its seat in what is infinite, nor is feeling possible without impact'. This is again an appeal to the Epicurean assumption, that rationality is only possible in a being of human form. The *nōs* of An. is described by himself in the words ἄνευρὸν ἄτονοι καὶ αὐτοκράτεις καὶ μέμικται συθελθεν χρήματι, ἀλλὰ μοῦνοι καθίς ἐφ᾽ ἐνυτὶ ἄτονοι... ἄτονοι γὰρ λαπτότατον πάνων χρημάτων καὶ καθαρώτατον καὶ γνώμην γε περὶ παντὸς πάσων ἴσχει καὶ ἴσχει μέγιστον (C.'s vi ae ratione) καὶ ώρα ἐμπληθεὶς ζωοειδεΐς, καὶ ἐκείνη ἐν, καὶ ἐκείνη ἐνί, καὶ ἐκείνη ἂστα, πάντα διεκθέμοντον νόος, *Simpl.* in *Phys.* f. 336. The last sentence reminds one of the fragment of Philodemus p. 66, where we read that 'mind was, and is, and will be hereafter', and that 'it rules and governs all things and superintends their infinite combinations'. Though it is doubtful whether An. himself expressly deified Nous, later writers were certainly justified in regarding it as divine (*Sext. Emp. Math.* ix 6, *Cic. Ac.* l.c.) as is practically done by Vell. here. On the other hand he is said to have been banished from Athens for impiety in asserting that the sun was a red-hot stone (*Schaubach Anax. frag.* pp. 38—52, 139—142), since as Plutarch says (*Pericles* 23) they could not endure the substitution of irrational causes and blind forces in place of the old divinities.

**in quo non vidit:** 'in making which statement he failed to observe'.

So *non sensui, non vidit*, of Alcmaeon and Pythagoras below.

**motum sensui junctum:** this is the distinctive property of *mens* (*senefer unde ortur primum per viscer a motus*, *Lucr.* iii 272). Thus Aristotle says (*Anim.* i 2) that the ἰψώνων is thought to be distinguished from ἰψώνων by two marks *μνήσεις* καὶ τῶν αἰσθάνεσθαι.

**continentem:** here intrans. but trans. in § 39. It may be taken with *sensui*, repeating the notion of *junctum*, as we find *marí aer continens* ii 117, cf. *Ac.* ii 105, *Fat.* 44 where it stands with *prosimus*; or we may take it absolutely in the sense of 'continuous' 'without break' whether in
time or space. Taking it in the latter sense it will refer to the one all-pervading movement initiated by the Anaxagorean Nous, in contrast to the innumerable disconnected movements of the Epicurean atoms. Hirzel compares Cleomedes Μετ. i 1 διειπον γάρ ουδενός φύσις είναι δυνατόν δει γάρ καταραπτειν τιν φύσιν ουτως έστιν.

in infinito: ‘in an infinite subject’, a more general expression for the preceding mens infinita, not, as Hirzel, p. 94, with a distinct reference to the universe considered apart from mind, though when the unintelligible mens infinita had been changed into the abstract infinitum, it could not fail to suggest to an Epicurean the thought of the infinite void as its only legitimate interpretation. To Anaxagoras the infinity of mind meant its unlimited wisdom and power: here it is understood of a mind not bounded in space or inclosed in body, but the Epicureans recognized no immaterial existence except έσχεια, which can neither affect nor be affected, but merely makes movement possible to bodies, έσχεια η γένους διάφανον εληφα τιν ψυχήν μακαρισθηναι. ουδέν γάρ άν έκδρατο ποιειν ουτε πάρει (Επικ. in Diog. L. x 67). Cf. below on Pythagoras § 28, Plato § 30, Aristotle § 33.

neque sensum—sentiret. The reading of the mas is omnino quo translated by Kühner ‘a sensation which the nature of the infinite mind would experience without being itself moved by it’, governing quo by pulsa. Sch. makes natura pulsa Abl. Abs. (rightly, as I think) and governs quo by sentiret: he proposes also to substitute ipsius for ipsa. The meaning then would be ‘a feeling with which it would feel without its own nature being moved’. Heind. inserts tota from the quotation in August. Ep. 118 and takes sensus of the infinitus ille sensus mentis divinarum which penetrates all things, a quo sensu si pelletur natura tota ipsa sensum acciperet. Hirzel p. 95 agrees with him in making ipsa natura pulsa Nom. and opposing it to the mens infinita. ‘It is denied’, he says ‘dass es überhaupt eine andere Empfindung als die in der Natur selber lebendig ist, in der Welt gäbe’; and to prove that natura may be thus opposed to the divine Mind, he quotes § 53 natura effectum esse mundum. Comparing the objection to the pantheism of Pythagoras § 28, cur autem quicquam igno-raret animus hominis si esset deus ?, he considers that the present objection is equivalent to saying dass jedes Wesen nur ein einziges Empfinden, nicht neben dem einigen noch ein fremdes, das göttliche, in sich haben könne. None of these explanations seem to me satisfactory: Sch. and Ku. give a very harsh construction, and the latter’s quo (sc. sensu) pulsa makes sensus the cause, not the result of impact. Hirz. agrees with Sch. in retaining the awkward construction quo (sensu) sentiret, and his explanation seems to make the Epicureans attribute feeling to inanimate nature, a conception as abhorrent to them as that of a soul of the universe. Heind. gives a good sense, ‘if there were an all-pervading mind then every thing would be sensitive’, but if that were what C. meant, he would hardly have expressed it so obscurely. I think a clause is wanted to balance in infinito, and
should propose to insert in eo after omnino and to change quo into quod\(^1\), translating 'nor did he see that feeling of any kind is impossible unless the feeling subject is of such a nature as to be capable of tangible impression', lit. 'nor feeling at all in that which did not feel from its very nature receiving a shock'. *In eo—sentiret is a general expression for that which is immaterial. [I understand the ordinary reading as follows, 'nor can there be sensation at all, without the sentient creature becoming sentient by an impulse from without', taking quo non=quín, and ipse as merely emphasizing the subject. J. S. R.]

deinde—videtur: 'in the next place, if he intended the infinite mind to be a separate living creature (a ζών ἄφθαρτον like the Gods of Epicurus, as opposed to an element pervading all matter) it must have an inner and an outer part: but mind itself is the innermost seat of life, so it must be clothed with a body. Since he objects to this, we are left with nothing but bare unclothed mind, unprovided with any organs of sense, a notion which it passes the force of our understanding to grasp'. Epicurus speaks to the same effect in Diog. L. x 66 (of disembodied soul) οὐ γὰρ οἶν τι νοεῖν αὐτὴν αἰσθανομένην μὴ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ συντήματι καὶ ταῖς κυψείς ταῖσις χρωμένην. That 'animal' is a name for the compound of soul and body appears from Arist. Pol. i 5 τὸ ζών πρῶτον συνιότητι ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σῶματος, and C. Tim. 4 interlegentiam in animo, animum includit in corpore ... quam ob causam non est cunctandum profiteri. Hunc mundum animal esse. In Lucr. iii 136—144 we read that mens or animus has its seat in the breast, while the rest of the soul (anima) is disseminated throughout the body; in 230 foll. one ingredient in mens is said to be a nameless element, not found in the anima, nam penitus prorsum latet haec natura subestque | nec magis hac infra quia quae est in corpore nostro | atque anima est animae proporro totius ipse | 273—275

ex quo nominetur: 'to justify the name'. [Cf. iii 36 animus ex quo animal dicitur, Tusc. i 21 if animus non est, then frustra animalia appellatur. J. S. R.]

§ 27. quoniam: properly gives the reason for aperta mens, but the contemptuous brevity with which the Epicurean argument is stated has compressed two clauses into one, and quoniam placet now serves as a protasis to the principal sentence.

qua sentire possit: Bouhier adopted this reading from the quotation in Aug. Ep. 118, in place of the quae of the mss.

fugere—notioem: 'to transcend the comprehension of man's understanding'. For fug. cf. Tusc. i 50 tanta est animi tenuitas ut fugiat aciem, Leg. Mon. 28 hujus viri scientiam fugere. Vim et notionem is a sort of hendiatys for vim noscendi.

Alcmæo: a younger contemporary of Pythagoras (Krische pp. 68—78). He held the soul ἄθανων ἴδια διὰ τὸ ζωίκειον τοῖς ἄθανάξοις, τούτο

\(^1\) The two words are constantly confused in the mss, see C. F. W. Müller *Fleck. Jahrb*. 1864.
nam Pythagoras. On the elliptical use of nam, in passing from one point to another, like autem, quid, jam, see Nägels. Styl. § 196, Draeg. § 348 4. Mayor on Juv. x 204. Here the thought omitted is ‘why speak of his friend Π. for he is guilty of even greater absurdities’. Of nam Parmenides just below; nam Abderites § 63, in a list of irreligious philosophers; nam Phaedo § 93, in a list of Epicureans; nam justitia... nam fortis in recounting the virtues III 38; nam quid ego de Consolatione dicam? in giving a list of his writings Div. ii 3; nam de angue, nam Dionysi equs, nam quod stellas aureas in a list of portents Div. ii 65, 67, 68, nam Strato Ac. i 34. I think it is a mistake in Shilleto (Thuc. i 25) to endeavour to explain this use both in nam and γιο by referring to a supposed earlier meaning of the two words—nam, he says, is nearly equivalent to the German nämlich—for, whatever may have been the original meaning, the word is coloured by its preponderating use, which gives it its special sprightliness as a particle of transition.

animus—carperentur. See Krische 78—80, Zeller i 395 f. fol. 412 foll. Heinez Logos 179. This doctrine is also ascribed to P. in Senec. 78 Pythagoras Pythagoreique numquam dubitarunt quin ex universa mente divina delibatas animos haberemus, and in Sext. Emp. Math. ix 127 ἐν ὑπάρχειν πνεύμα τὸ διὰ πάντα τοῦ κόσμου διὴκτον ψυχὴς τρόπον, Diog. L viii 25 ἀνθρώπου εἶναι πρὸς θεοῦ αυτογνώμαν κατὰ τὸ μετέχιον ἄνθρωπον θεμοῦ... εἶναι δὲ τῆν ψυχήν ἀπόστασις αἰθέρος καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ... ἀδιάκοπον δὲ εἶναι αὐτῆς ἐπειδήτερ καὶ τὸ δῆtick ὁ δὴ αἴσθησιν ἀδιάκοπον ἑστιν. This is the exoteric side of the Pythagorean doctrine modified, as is probable, by some Stoic commentator who wished to claim the authority of P. for his own pantheistic system. The statement in the Ac. π 118 Pythagorei ex numeri et mathematicorum initii proficiis volunt omnia is more in accordance with Arist. (Met. i 5, xiv 3, &c.), who also gives a different account of the Pythagorean psychology (Ac. π 4 compared with Plato Phaedo 85), ‘some call the soul a harmony; some say that it consists of the motes in the sunbeam or the cause of their movement’. On the religious ideas of the Pythagoreans see Zeller i 418 foll. and cf. C. Leg. ii 26 bene dictum est ab eo tum maxime et pietatem et religionem versari in animis cum rebus divinis operam daremus. The most complete account of the Pythagoreans is to be found in Chainget Pythagore et la philosophie pythagoricienne, 1873.

intentum per: ‘pervading’, lit. ‘stretched through, like the warp in the fabric’.
BOOK I. CH. XI § 27.

non vidit—mundo. Epicurean polemic: if each soul is a part of the divine soul, then (1) the separate existence of human souls must cause a laceration of the universal soul, (2) when the individual soul is conscious of pain, a part of divinity is in pain, (3) each soul must partake in the infinite knowledge of the universal soul, (4) it is impossible that an incorporeal soul could be united with a material world. For obj. (1) cf. § 24 dei membri ardentia: it is of course merely straining the metaphor of carpenitur. Both this and the following obj. are based on the Epicurean assumption of perfect happiness as essential to divinity. On the Epicurean pessimism (quod plicisque contingere) see § 23 n. Obj. (4) is inapplicable: the writers who attribute to P. the derivation of the human soul from the divine represent him as materializing both under the form of fire or aether.

distractio: Ba. adopts Ruhnken's conjecture distractio referring to the separation of each soul from the universal soul; but the ms reading may be defended as expressing the division of the universal soul among a number of human souls: animus distractitur de deo, but deus distractitur in animos.

§ 28. Infixus properly of a solid; infusus, of a liquid.

Xenophonae. Krische 86—97. Elsewhere C. gives a more correct account, cf. Ac. π 118 Xen. unum esse omnia, neque id esse mutabile, et id esse deum, neque naturam unquam et semiplerum conglobata figura; De Orat. iii 20 veteres ili (sc. Eleatae) omnia haec quae supra et subter, unum esse et una vi atque una consensione naturae consticta esse dixerunt, &o. As to the infinity of the universe Arist. (Met. λ. 986 b.) distinctly tells us that while Parmenides made the One πεπερασμένος, regarding it from the ideal side, and Melissus, regarding it from the material side, made it διπερος, Xenophonae oieον διστοφήμενον ἄλλ' εἰς τὸν διὸν οὐφανὴν ἀνοβληθες τὸ ἐν ἐναλ ϕησι τὸν θεόν. In the Aristotelian treatise, Melissus, however (c. 4) it is argued that, if God is spherical (as X. affirmed) he must also be finite, σφαιροειδ' άνταγκη πέρας ἧχεο, whence later writers attributed this doctrine to him, e.g. Galen, Hist. Ph. π 24 ενει πάνω ἐν, καὶ τούτο ἕναρχους θεον πεπερασμένον, λογικόν, ἀναβλήγον. On the other hand we read (Meliss. 2) that X. supposed the earth to extend downwards and the air upwards to infinity which may have given rise to the representation of his doctrine here followed by C. or this may have arisen, as Krische thinks (p. 91) from the confusion between the infinite in time (ἄθροος) and the infinite in space (ἄπερος) cf. Meliss. 1, and Zeller i 494. One might have expected to find some reference here to the noble protest made by Xen. against the debasing ideas connected with the popular religion, but the Epicureans in their allusions to other philosophers only thought of exalting their own master, and Xen.'s ridicule of anthropomorphism would make his writings especially distasteful to them. The fragments of Xen. were collected and explained by Karsten, 1830.

qui mente—voluit esse. Sch. (in loc. and Neues Jahrb. 1875 p. 685 foll.) takes praeterea—infiniitum as a separate clause, translating 'he held
the rational universe to be not only infinite but God'; he allows however that he knows no example of *praeterea quod* used in the sense of *praeter quam quod*; and if C. had meant this, why should he not have said simply *et inf. et d.*? I think too the context shows that *infinitum* must be taken as belonging to the subject; Vell. objects not to τὸ πᾶν being called ἄνευρον, but to τὸ ἄνευρον being called θέων. And the same appears from the quotation in Minucius c. 19 *Xen. notum est omne infinitum cum mente deum tradere.* I believe that C. is translating some such original as τὸ πᾶν, λογικῶν δὲ καὶ ἄνευρον, θεῶν εἰμι, and that he has here turned a quality into an independent substance, as was done above in the case of Thales, and also of Democritus (§ 29). Then *praeterea quod esset* (or perhaps *praeterea* alone) seems to me a gloss intended to soften the apparent contradiction in the idea of τὸ πᾶν in which mind is not included. For *omne = τὸ πᾶν,* cf. *Div. II. 103 quod in natura rerum omne esse dici mus, id infinitum esse.* [I am inclined to think that X. used ἄνευρον in the sense of 'indefinite', and that the true reading here is propterea, not praeterea; X.'s God was God just because he had no definite organs (οὕς ὁρᾶ κτλ.) like the anthropomorphic Gods. J. S. R.]

de ipsa—potest esse. Epicurean polemic: as regards the divinity of mind, *Xen.* is open to the same criticism as Thales and Anaxagoras (for why did he combine mind with infinity? and if it is unbodied mind, how can that feel?); as regards the divinity of the infinite, he is even more to blame, for vacancy is the only infinite, and in this there can be no feeling and no connexion with anything external (such as mind) since it includes all things in itself. There seems no ground for Kr.'s supposition that *coniunctum* is used in the Lucretian sense (l 450) of a property; for void, no less than the atoms, has *coniuncta* in this sense; nor again for Hirzel's view that it is synonymous with *continens* in § 26. The easiest reference is plainly to the preceding *mente adjuncta,* and if so, it is an additional argument against the genuineness of the weak addition *praeterea quod esset,* which would just serve to turn the edge of the criticism.

**Parmenides:** see Krische 97—116. The fragments are collected and explained by Karsten (Amsterdam 1835) and Mullach *Frag. Phil.* vol. I 109—130. As X.'s theology was found in his account of τὸ ἄριστος, any rational investigation of the development of theological thought would have shown us in what respects his disciple's view of the τὸ ἄριστος differed from his; but the Epicurean critic has no eye for anything but names, and finding the word θέοι occurring frequently in P.'s popular account of the phenomenal world, he confines his attention to this, regardless of the fact that, whether named or not, the idea of divinity is as much involved in P.'s higher philosophy as in that of many of his predecessors, and also forgetting that the cosmical system of Parmenides is in the main taken from Pythagoras and should have been criticized under his name. The doctrine here alluded to is given by Stob. *Ed. I c. 22, II. οστεοφάνας εἶναι περιπετειμένας ἑμαλῆσσε, τὴν μὲν ἐκ τοῦ
BOOK I CH. XI § 28.  
113

ἀραιω (the fine element of fire) τὴν δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πυκνοῦ (the gross element, earth,) μικτὰς δὲ ἄλλας ἐκ φωτὸς καὶ σκότους μεταξὺ τοῖτων καὶ τὸ περίχον δὲ πάσας τείχους δικεν, στερεῶν ὑπάρχειν, ψῆφο δὲ πυρότης στρεφάνι καὶ τὸ μεσαίτατον πασῶν (is solid also) περὶ δὲ πάλιν πυράδη τῶν δὲ συμμετὸν τὴν μεσαίτατην (the fiery ring just mentioned which lies in the middle of all the composite rings) ἀπάσαις τοικε πάσης κυνήσεως καὶ γενέσεως ὑπάρχει, ἥτινα καὶ δαίμονα καὶ κυβέρνητον καὶ κληρονόμον ὅμοιας, δικεν τε καὶ ἀνάγκην. From this it is plain that C. is mistaken in ascribing divinity to the orbem qui cingit caelum. It is the innermost fiery circle surrounding the dark globe of the earth which is divine according to P. Probably C. in his haste confused this with the ninth all-embracing sphere of the Somn. Scip. 4 summus ipse deus, arcens et continens ceteros, in quo inflexi sunt illi qui voluntur stellarum cursus sempiterni. In Ac. π. 118 we read that P.'s first principle was ignem qui moveat terram quae ab eo formetur, which agrees fairly with Theophrastus quoted in Zeller 1 p. 522 δῦο ποιήτας ἐρχαίς πυρ καὶ ἡμῖν, τὸ μὲν ὁς εἰρῆ, τὸ δὲ ὁς αἰτίων καὶ ποιηθήν. Colotes, one of the leading disciples of Epic., wrote against Parm. as we learn from Plut. M. p. 1113 foll., but there is no resemblance between the criticisms which we find there, and those contained in this passage.

nam : see n. on § 27.

commenticium : see § 18. It suggests the more fanciful character of the tenets here discussed in contrast to the preceding. For essicit we should rather have expected essigit, unless we retain the old reading similitudine (preferred by Sch. Opusc. π. 360) in the sense ‘he makes out a fanciful sort of thing by the help of the similitude of a crown’.

continentem—orbem : ‘a shining ring of unbroken fire’, i.e. not composite.

qui cingat. The later editors have followed Ernesti and Heind. in reading cingat required by the or. obl. instead of the cingit of the mss. Sch. Opusc. π. 307 gives many exx. of the interchange of the moods in mss.

in quo—potest. Epicurean polemic: this offends against our assumption as to the human form of the Gods and the impossibility of sensation except through the medium of bodily senses.

multaque—monstra : modi is inserted after ejusdem by most edd. and no doubt the omission would be easy before monstra, which in that case would be the Acc. governed by essicit. The monstra however which follow (bellum, &c.) are hardly ejusdem generis with the strefhant; and the recurrence of the phrase immediately below inclines me to adhere to the mss. Ejuusdem will then refer to P. and form part of a new sentence, of which monstra will be the subject. On portenta cf. § 18 n.

quippe qui—delentur. This is distinctly stated with regard to cupiditas by Aristotle Met. 1 4, where he says that some approach to the recognition of a final cause was made by those who assigned as a first principle ἐρωτα ἢ ἐπιθυμεῖν, οἶον καὶ Π. from whose poem perì φύσισι he then quotes the line πρῶτον μὲν Ἐρωτα θεῶν μυθιστο πάντων.

M. C.  
8
Though the contrary principle bellum did not play so important a part in P.’s system as in that of Empedocles, yet it may easily have been introduced in the description of the mingling of Light and Darkness, Male and Female, of which the following lines are preserved to us (R. & P. § 151, Mullach Frag. I p. 127) εν δὲ μῦσι τούτων δαίμων ἡ πάντα κυβερνᾷ. Πάντη γὰρ συναγεροιτο τόκον καὶ μίξις ἀρχή | περιπτου άρρεν θηλη μεγάλα, επανα δ’ αΰτως | ἄρσεν δηλουσα. A fragment of Philodemus probably refers to this part of P.’s doctrine, as the name Παμμενίδης occurs just before (p. 65), τὸν τε πρώτον θεὸν άφυκον ποιεῖν, τοὺς τε γεννωμένους ὑπὸ τούτου τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ τοῖς πάθεσιν τοῖς περὶ άνθρώποις. From this we may explain the Epicurean polemic in the text: ‘if P. deified human passions our experience shows that these are liable to be affected by disease, sleep, old age, &c’.

cetera: e. g. δικυ and ἀνάγκη mentioned in Stob. I. c.

ad deum revocet: ‘brings them under the head of deity’, i.e. makes them divine, cf. § 119 ad rationem revocantis, Div. II 66 ostenia ad conjec- turam revocantur. The later edd. have corrected the Ind. of the mss in accordance with Ciceroonian usage, see Draeger § 491, Sch. Opusc. III 308.

eademque—omittantur. Parm. is said to have written largely περὶ άστρων but we are not told elsewhere that he attributed divinity to them. On the omission of dicit (with eadem) cf. § 17 n. The reference is to ad deum revocet. In alio i.e. in the case of Alemecnon.

ch. xii § 29. Empedocles: see Kirsche 116—130. The fragments are collected and explained by Karsten (very full notes), Mullach and others. Lucretius I 716—733 speaks in a very different tone of ‘the glory of Sicily whose inspired verses set forth his discoveries in such wise ut vix humana videtur stirpe creatus’, but we learn from N. D. I 93 that Epicurus and some of his disciples wrote against him. In Ac. II 74 C. says of him dignissimum rebus ii de quibus loquitur somnum fundere videtur. The numerous fragments of E.’s poem περὶ φύσεως show how circumspectly he possessed the authority, whom C. follows, selected his facts. In addition to the four elements, deified under the names of Ζεὺς or Ἡφαιστός (fire), Ἡρα (air), Νήστες (water), Ἀδωνίς (earth) E. treats as divine the active principles Νῦκος and Φύλος (also called Ἀφρόδη), the all-including Sphere Σφαῖρας (ὁ εὐδαμονίσταρος θεός Arist. Met. III 4), the supreme Law (Ἀνάγκη), the gods and daemons of the popular religion, the souls of good men. The criticism is equally careless.


naturas: cf. § 22 n.

quas et nasci—perspicuum est. Lucretius, who gives what is on the whole a fair criticism of the system of Empedocles in I 752—802, urges the same objection, but E. himself distinctly asserts the opposite, φύσες οὐδενός
BOOK I CH. XII § 29.

115 ἐστιν ἀπάντων | θυμητῶν οὔδε τις οὐλομένου βακάτου τελευτή | ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξις τε μυγέτων | ἐκ τοῦ γαρ μὴ ἐόντος ἀφθαρσίαν ἐστὶ γενέσθαι | τὸ τ' ἐάν ἐξολοθρεύσθαι ἀφθαρσίαν καὶ ἀπήρκτων | 98—108 Mullach.

sensu carere: the same argument as before: there can be no sensation without a sensuous organism.

Protagoras: see Krische 130—142. The theological views of P. are stated again in §§ 63 and 117, but without the words qualesque sint, which are also omitted by Diog. L. IX 51 peri μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι οὐδ' ὡς εἰσὶν οὐδ'. ὅσ' οὐκ εἰσίν· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ καλύττα εἰδέναι, ἡ τε ἀδηλότης καὶ βραχύς ὁ ν' ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. The first writer who gives the fuller form is Timon the Sillograph (a.c. 279) quoted by Sext. Emp. IX 57 Π. θεῶς κατέγραψε οὔ' εἰδέναι οὖτε δύνασθαι | ὅπτοι τινὲς εἰσί καὶ ὡς ἄδρησασθαι. It is probable that Philodemus reported the doctrine in this form, for though there is no direct mention of Prot. in the existing fragments, yet in the summary at the end of the controversial portion of his treatise, allusion is made to τὸν ἀγνωστὸν εἰ τινὺς εἰσὶ θεαὶ λέγονται, ἡ ποιοῖ τινὲς εἰσίν, p. 89, which can only refer to him.

habere quod liqueat: 'to be able to make up his mind'. Cf. II 3 ei haberem aliquid quod ligeret. Ac. p. 94, and the legal N. L. (Cluent. § 76).

quicquam suspicari: 'to have the faintest idea'.

Democritus: see Krische 142—163, and nn. on N. D. I 120 where his theology is more fully discussed. Epic. is charged with ingratITUDE towards him § 93. Lucretius though often dissenting from him in points of detail always speaks with respect of that Democriti quod sancta viri sententia ponit.

imaginines earumque circuitus = imag. circumventes. On the use of hendiadys cf. Zumpt § 741, Seyffert Læl. pp. 191, 198, Draeger § 311, 9. It is a figure often employed by C. in translating from the Greek, and not unfrequently we find a complex idea misinterpreted by being thus broken up into its component parts, see nn. on § 25 (the mentem et aquam of Thales) § 28 (mentem et omne of Xenophanes). Here it is intended to have a burlesque effect.

in deorum numero refert. Heind. followed by Klotz (Adn. Crit. i 5) reads numerum against the MSS, as we have ref. in deos § 34, repono in deos § 38; but the Abl. is the more common construction after repono, e.g. in vestigio reponere § 37, sidera in deorum numero reponere II 54, so III 47, 51, cf. Zumpt § 490 on the compounds of pono, Draeger § 298 c. We might make a distinction between the meanings of refero as it was followed by Acc. or Abl. translating the former 'to put him on the list of the Gods', the latter 'to return his name in the list of the Gods'.

scientiam intellegentiamque nostram: again hendiadys = animum nostrum scientem et intellegentem, Sch.

neget esse quicquam sempiternum: i.e. any compound. Atoms and void are of course eternal to D. as to Epicurus, but the former had not thought of saving his Gods from wasting and disturbing influences by

8—2
placing them in the *intermundia*. They are therefore mortal, ὄντος ἄθρωται δὲ (Sext. Emp. *ix* 558) and cannot pass the Epicurean test.

**Diogenes** (Krische 163—177) distinctly attributed reason to the air, making it the principle of life and understanding in man, and the sovereign of the universe; in his own words quoted by Simplicius (R. and P. § 63 foll.) ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὰ ἄλα ἐπὶ ἀναπνεύσα τὸ ἄρτι καὶ τοῦτο αὐτοῖς καὶ ψυχὴ ἐστι καὶ κόσμος ‒ καὶ πολλοί ὡσαν πάντα κυβερνῶν. We also learn from Theophrastus that he attributed sensation to air (R. and P. § 66) ἀνεπε τὸ ἁπλό καὶ τὸ φιλοκόμον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀνέπε, and spoke of ὁ ἀέρ ἁπλό (the breath or spirit of man) as μόρον τοῦ θεοῦ. In the Philodemian fragment p. 70 he is referred to in the following terms, Δ. ἐπαινεῖ τὸν Ὄμηρον ός οὐ μυθικὸς ἀλλ' ἀληθικός ὑπ' ὄντος τοῦ θεοῦ διελεγμένον τὸν ἁπλό γὰρ αὐτὸν Δία κομίζεις φαινεῖ οἰκεῖ ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐλέγει; with which Nauck on Philodemus, in *Melanges Grecos—Romains*, St. Petersburg, 1864, compares the interesting passage in the comic poet Philemon (Meineke p. 391) ἐν οὐδὲ εἰς θεῖον οὐδὲ εἰς τοιῶν | οὐδὲ ἐν ποιήσεω, οὐδὲ πηγαίνως πάλαι | οὕτωθεν, οὐδὲ ἄνθρωπος, οὗτος εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἔγερε | 'Αέρ, ὃς ὡς τίς εἰσελθείς καὶ Δία.

*quam sensum*—dei: reiteration of the old polemic, see under *Empedocles, Parmenides, Anaximenes for sensum*, under Parmenides and Anaximenes for *figuram*.

§ 30. *jam*: a transitional particle like nam, which some read here: lit. 'by this time' 'next' we come to Plato.

**Plato**: Krische 181—204. The fact that we have, in this 2nd criticism of Plato, no reference to the former contained in §§ 18—24 is one of the arguments alleged to show that this whole section was inserted as an afterthought. The charge against Plato is (1) inconsistency: at one time he denies the possibility of naming God and forbids us to inquire into his nature, at another he tells us that the heaven, the stars, the souls &c. are Gods; (2) these assertions are not only inconsistent but false in themselves; (3) particularly the assertion that God is incorporeal. With the exception of Sch. all the edd. seem content to understand *inconstantia* of the first two assertions, that God cannot be named and that he ought not to be made the subject of investigation; but as these are evidently quite consistent, Sch. holds that the opposition lies between them on the one hand and the assertion of the incorporeal nature of God (*quod vero—δοσάματον*) on the other. He allows that the grammatical connexion of the two sentences is very different from what we should have expected if they were intended to have this relation to one another, but offers no explanation or suggestion. It seems to me plain that, as the latter stands, it is impossible to suppose them thus related; and no less plain that the sentence beginning with *īdem* (a word constantly employed to mark the coexistence of two apparently inconsistent facts) refers back to the *qui in Timaeo* of the first sentence. The opposition between
the 1st (ms) sentence and the variety of positive assertions as to the Deity in the 3rd (ms) sentence, is much more glaring than the opposition between the 1st sentence and the one negative assertion of the 2nd sentence. Besides the idea of inconsistency runs through the 3rd sentence, whereas it is entirely absent in the 2nd. I think also that the repetition of et is intended to point the contrast, ‘after having spoken as he did in the Timaeus and Laws, we find him in both asserting not only that we can name God, but that there are any number of substances which we may call by that name’. Taking it then as certain that the opposition lies between the 1st and the 3rd sentences, I have little doubt that the 2nd and 3rd have got misplaced. Compare the transposition in § 5 of the sentences beginning qua guidem and multum autem, that in § 88 and § 97, and many similar instances in Munro’s Lucretius, see his Introduction p. 20 foll. ed. 1, also Müller in N. Jahrb. for 1864, p. 144. In the present case and also in § 5 the transposition may be explained by supposing the misplaced clauses (Sunt vero and Qua guidem) to have been added on revision by C. himself, but wrongly inserted by the scribe. See below on idem in Timaeo.

longum est: see § 19 n.

inconstantia: Grote (Plato ii 161) applies this censure more generally. The discrepancy between different dialogues is partly to be accounted for by the change in Plato’s own sentiments during the course of a long life, partly by the different aim and style of the particular dialogues, scientific, popular, allegorical.

in Timaeo: p. 28 c. τον μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τούτου πατὸς εὐρέως τε ἐργὼν καὶ εὐρύτα εἰς πᾶντας αὖθισαν λέγειν, translated by C. Tim. 2 atque illum guidem quasi parentem hujus universitat is invenire difficile, et cum inveneres indicare in vulgus nefas. The passage was much quoted by the early Christian writers, e.g. Minucius c. 19 Platonis deus est mundi pares, artifex animae, coelestium terrenorumque fabricator, quem et invenire difficile praesacramet et incredibili potestate, et cum inveneras in publicum dicere impossibile praefatur. Eadem fere et ista quae nostra sunt. On the other hand Celsus made use of it against the Christian preaching of the Gospel to the poor, to which Origen (vii 42) replies that the Christians not only affirmed with Plato that it was difficult to discover the Creator, but that it was even impossible for man to do this, except for those to whom the Son revealed Him. Clement of Alexandria, commenting on the words of Plato, says that, in using of the Ineffable such names as ἐν ἡ τόγαθεν ἢ νόον ἢ αὐτό τοῦ διὸν ἡ πατέρα ἡ θεὸν ἡ δημιουργον ἡ κύριον, we do not profess to name Him truly, but employ various terms as a help to the feebleness of our own understanding, Strom. v 12 83.

in legum—censeat. As we have had occasion to suspect misrepresentation in cases where it was difficult to arrive at complete certainty in regard to the doctrines referred to, it is a satisfaction to be able here to confront the accused with the accuser, and prove the groundlessness of the
charge. The passage alluded to is vii 821, where ὁ Ἀθηναῖος, speaking the author's sentiments, says 'there is something very surprising in our notions about astronomy, τὸν μέγατον θεόν καὶ ὅλω τῶν κόσμων φαύνῃ οὕτω ζητεῖν δειν οὕτω συλλυθαγμονίν τὰς αἰείς ἱππεύσιν· οὐ γὰρ οὐδ' δειον εἶναι, but true piety requires just the opposite. We ought to carry our inquiry into the nature of the celestial deities (the Sun, Moon, &c.), at least so far as to enable us to avoid such blasphemy as men are guilty of, when they call them wandering stars, and confound the rates of their movements'. It is plain that the word φαύνῃ introduces, not a sentiment of Plato's, but that of the Athenian public, who had banished Anaxagoras and put Socrates to death on a similar charge. Plato's own view comes out still more clearly in bk xii 966, where he argues that astronomy rightly studied is the foundation of true piety.

non censeat: negative used as in ov φημ, cf. Off. i 39 Regulus captivos reddendos non censuit.

idem et in Timaeo. Assuming that quod vero—comprehendimus has been misplaced in the MSS, we may suppose that the present clause was originally connected with the preceding, (jam de Platonis—censeat) either by a cum which has dropped out between qui and in Tim. so as to make idem dicit the apodosis, or simply by the continuance of the Subj. constr. in dicit. The former would be after the pattern of § 121 cum enim optimam naturam dicat esse, negat idem &c. the latter of Off. i 84 inventi multi sunt qui non modo pecuniam sed vitam etiam profundere pro patria parati essent, idem ('but yet') gloriae jacturam ne minimam quidem facere vellent. After the dislocation had taken place, the sentences would naturally be altered so far as to enable them to stand alone.

et mundum—accepimus: see § 18 n. These are all subordinate divinities owing their existence to the good pleasure of the one Father and Creator. So we read (Tim. 34) of the plan pursued by the everliving God in forming the God who was to be (i.e. the world), and in p. 92 this created God is called the visible image of the invisible God. The name ὄφανος is sometimes used of the κόσμος, at other times confined to the starry heavens as opposed to the earth. Beside the passages already quoted, showing the divinity of the stars, see Tim. 40, where the Demiurgus is said to have made the earth, our nurse, the guardian of day and night, the first and oldest of the gods ὃν ἵνα ὄφανον γεγόνα. In the same passage Plato affirms his belief in the deities of the traditional religion (eos quos majorum instituitis accepimus) the children of Heaven and Earth, and tells us that they, like the celestial deities, acted as subordinate agents in the creation of man and the other animals, receiving from the Demiurgus a separate divine particle to be the nucleus of each human soul (41 c. foll.) But when C. says that Plato deified animos, he probably alludes to Leg. x. 892 foll. where it is proved that soul, as the self-moving substance, must be prior to body, and then (899 b) the conclusion is drawn that, since soul or souls have been shown to be the cause of all movement, and since they are
ut Graeci dicunt deo: there seems no reason for doubting the
genuineness of these words, as Heind. and Ba. have done; see n. on physio-
logiam § 20. There is a special reason for adding the Greek here, as the
Latin equivalents were not introduced till later, incorporalis appearing
first in Seneca, incorporare in Gellius. The doctrine that all that is
corporeal is in its own nature mortal, γεννητόν καὶ φθαρτόν, runs through
the whole of Plato (see § 20 n.) and we find the unseen, which is eternal,
contrasted with things seen and temporal in Tim. 28; but it is only the
Demiurgus who is essentially incorporeal; many of the inferior deities
are clothed in bodies.

Id—Intelligi non potest: ‘a divine incorporeity is inconceivable,’ cf.
§ 27 on Thales. The absence of feeling involved absence of forethought and
absence of pleasure, see § 48. C.’s own opinion is given Tusc. 1 50, where
speaking of those qui sequuntur qualis animus sit vacans corpore intellegere et
cognitione comprehendere, he says quasi vero intelligant qualis sit in ipso
corpore; and a little further certe et deum ipsum et divinium animum corpore
liberatum cognitione complecti volumus. AGAIN Tusc. 1 71 dubitare non
possimus quin nihil sit animis admixtum, nihil concretum, nihil copulatum,
nihil coagumentum, nihil duplex. Quod cum ita sit, certe nec secterii nec
dividit nec discerpi nec distrahi potest, ne interire quidem igitur. Plato
argues against those who identified matter and existence, ταύτων σώμα καὶ
ουσίαν ὄργανοι in the Soph. 246 foll. where the term deo: occurs.

§ 31 Xenophon: see Krische 204—234, Philodemus p. 71 εν τοῖς
Εὐνομίωντος ἀπομνημονεύμασιν οὖχ ὀράσιβαλ φησιν τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν μορφήν ἀλλὰ
tάργα. The passage referred to is quoted by Clem. Al. Protr. § 71, Strom. v
§ 109, and by others among the early Christian writers: it occurs in Mem.
iv 3 § 13, where Socrates says that Euthydemus will soon be convinced of
the providential government of the world, if he is content to see the
Gods in their works without waiting to see them in bodily form, ἀν μὴν
μην θαλάμης ἐστιν ἀν τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν ἔσαι, ἀλλ’ ἐκείρη σοι τὰ ἐργα
αὐτῶν ὄργανα σέβεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς θεοὺς, a very different assertion from
that of the Epicurean critic here, who would identify this with the view
just before attributed to Plato (deum nominari non posse, anquiri non
debere). The next assertion et solem et animitum deum is founded upon
the same passage of the Memorabilia, where Socrates illustrates our
inability to look upon God by the parallel case of the sun, ὁ πάσιν
φανερὸς δοκῶν εἶναι ἤλιος οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει τοῖς ἄνθρωποις εαυτὸν ἀκριβῶς ὁρᾶν,
ἀλλ’ ἐϊν τις αὐτῶν ἀναδοθείς ἐγκεκριμένος ὑπάρχει, τὴν ὄψιν ἀφαιρεῖται, and of the
soul ἄνθρωπον γε ψυχή, ἢ ἐπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἄνθρωπων τῶν θεῶν.
metέχει, ὅτι μὴν βασιλεύει ἐν ἕμνω φανερῷ, ὀρᾶται δὲ οὐδ’ αὐτῷ. It is unne-
necessary to say that in neither case does X. make the assertion attributed
to him in the text. Thirdly it is stated that X. speaks of God at one
time in the singular, at another time in the plural. This no doubt is true,
not exclusively of X, but of the greater part of the Greek philosophers (as even of the critic here § 25) both in popular speech (in Plato Epist. 13 p. 363 b it is made the sign to distinguish between the esoteric and exoteric, τὸς μὲν γὰρ σπουδαῖος ἐπιστολὴς θεός ἢρξεν, θεοὶ δὲ τῆς ἡς τοῦτον) and in their more scientific treatises, where they speak, now of the Supreme Deity himself, now of the subordinate gods who are his agents. This distinction appears in the same passage of the Memorabilia, οὗ τε γὰρ ἄλλοι ἡ πρῶτη διδότοις οὐδὲν τούτων εἰς τοιμασίας λόγος διδάσκαν, καὶ ὁ τὸν διὸν κόσμον συντάγμα τοῦτον ἡμῖν ἐνέγορος ἔστιν.

facit Socratem disputantem...suntidemque dicere. Either the Inf. or Part. may follow facio in the sense of ‘to represent’. Of the former we have an ex. in III 41 quem Homerus conveniri facit ab Uilxe, and I 19 construi mundum facit; of the latter in Brut. 218 colloquem facit; of the two combined in this passage and in Tusc. v 115 Polyphemum Homerus cum ariete colloquem facit ejusque laudare fortunas quod qua vellet ingredi posset; cf. Madv. § 372 obs. 5, Drag. § 442. 2.

sunt idem in erratis quibus; cf. sunt in varietate § 2 n. For the omission of the preposition before the relative see Zumpt § 778, Madv. § 323 obs. 1, Nægelsab. Stil. § 121. 2, Moser ad Tusc. i 94, and Heindorf’s n. here.

ch. xii § 32 Antisthenes. Krische 234—246. C. is here translating from Philodemus p. 72 παρ’ Ἀντισθένει οὐ̨ ἡς ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ λέγεται τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι πολλοὺς θεοὺς, κατὰ δὲ φύσιν ἐνα (compare Varro’s classification of theology as fabulosum, naturale, civile Aug. C. D. vi 5). Before the decipherment of this fragment, Ζ.,s statement was unsupported by any independent authority, but we have a saying of Ant. reported by Theodore (Gracc. Aff. i 14) which agrees very well with it, θεός ἀπὸ εἰκόνος οὐ γνωρίζεται, διδάξεις οὐ ρήται, οὐδεὶς διδάσκει διὸ ἀπὸ αὐτῶν οὐδεὶς ἐκμαθεῖ ἐξ εἰκόνος δύναται.

tollit vim—deorum: that is, of the anthropomorphic gods of Epicurus and of the popular belief.

Speusippus: cf. Krische 247—258, Spengel and Sauppe in their editions of Philodemus find an allusion to Sp. in the lines just preceding the account of Aristotle (Gomp. p. 72) but there is nothing there which could illustrate the account here given, which is in fact unsupported by any ancient authority. We know hardly anything of Sp. except that he modified the teaching of his master in the Pythagorean direction. The criticism here is as reckless as in the case of Antisthenes.

vim quandam dicens: understand the predicate deum as in § 28 on Pythagoras.

§ 33 Aristoteles: cf. Krische 259—311. The treatise here referred to is no longer extant. It is also cited by Philodemus p. 72, but unfortunately the fragment gives no more than the words παρ’ Ἀριστοτέλει οὐ̨ ἡς ἐν τῷ τοιχῷ περὶ φιλοσοφίας. Diog. L v 22 tells us it consisted of three books; see Zeller III p. 58, foll. who shows that Krische is wrong in
identifying it with the books referred to by Arist. An. i 2 in the phrase ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας λεγομένοις. Bernays gives a full account of it in his Dis Dialoge d. Aristoteles pp. 95—114. From this it appears that the 1st book was concerned with the præ-philosophic speculations of the East and of Greece: the discussion respecting Orpheus N. D. i 107 is supposed to have belonged to this. The 2nd book dealt with the earlier philosophers, including Plato; the quotation in Tusc. iii 68 is probably taken from it. The 3rd book, in which Aristotle gave his own view, is largely quoted from in the speech of Balbus, N. D. ii 42, 44, 95 and without reference in §§ 37, 51, cf. Bywater in Journal of Philology vol. vii pp. 64—87, and the fragments as they are given by Heitz in the Paris, or Rose in the Berlin, edition of Aristotle.

non dissentiens. Colotes is attacked by Plutarch M. 1115 for identifying the doctrines of Plato and the Peripatetics. It was the view of Antiochus and the eclectics, and is often propounded by C. as his own, cf. Fin. iv 5, Ac. i 17, Leg. i 38.

menti tribuit divinitatem. In Met. xii 6, 7 foll. God is defined as ζωον αἴδων ἀριστον, pure incorporeal reason, νόησις νοησεως, ever engaged in contemplation of himself, who himself unmoved has from all eternity moved all other things by a divine attraction (κατὰ τὰς ἐρώμενον, cf. Gen. et Corr. ii 10 εἰς ἅπασιν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ὀρέγεσαι ἡ φύσις). Noble as this view is, it yet presents some points of contact with the Epicurean theology, which might have been taken advantage of, if the critic had had any other object beyond that of depreciating all who preceded his master.

mundum ipsum deum. Compare Eth. Nic. vii 14 πάντα γὰρ φύσιν ἵκνει τι θεον; Cael. ii 1, where ὁ πᾶς οὐρανός is said to be δαίμονας καὶ θείον, and just below ‘we shall speak most suitably about it if we regard it as God’; again c. 3, τινι ἑκατέρας ἀθανασίας · ἀπό τὴν ἀνάγκη τοῦ θείος κινησιν οὐρανος ὑπάρχειν· ἑκς δ’ ὁ οὐρανός τοῦ οὐρανοῦ (τοῦμα γὰρ τι θείον) διὰ τούτων· καλώς δὲ καὶ κινεῖαι; also Met. xii 8 ‘it has been handed down in mythical form from ancient times that the first mover, and the world which it sets in motion, are Gods, and that all nature is encircled with divinity: but this high doctrine was mixed up with anthropomorphic conceptions. Eliminating these, we shall hold that it was a divine inspiration which led our ancestors to the conclusion θεῶς τὰς προτές ὁμιας εἰρεῖν’. These expressions however are not to be understood in a Stoic sense as though Aristotle identified the world and God. Transcendence is a distinct feature of the Platonic and Aristotelian theology as opposed to the Stoic Immanence.

alium quendam: Sch. understands this of the quinta natura, the aether of which the heaven itself and the heavenly bodies are composed, but this is the ardor of the next clause: besides, Aristotle never represents it as presiding over the universe or setting it in motion. Krische is, I believe, right in taking it of the one supreme God, who has been already referred to as mens, but now appears in another character as the First-mover, cf. Arist. Met. xii 6 p. 1071 foll. Phys. viii 5 διὸ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας ὅρθως λέγει,
replications: identified with conversio by Sch. but Krische is, I think, again right in regarding it as a translation of the term ἀνελίξεις used of the retrograde movement of the planets: see Met. xii 8 where Aristotle explains the apparent irregularity in the planetary movements by assigning to them distinct ‘spheres’ for the forward and retrograde movements, the latter being called σφαίρας ἀνελίξουσα ‘the reversing spheres’ (Lewis Astronomy of the Ancients p. 163 foll.). The same word is used by Plato of the counter-rotation of the Kosmos in the Politicus 270 D. ξυνοικοῦσα τῇ τοῦ παντός ἀνελίξεις τότε ὅταν ἡ τῆς νῦν καθεστηκέαις ἐναρτία γίγνεται τροπῆ. Of course it is an absurd blunder in C. or his authority to make the motion of the entire universe depend upon this partial subordinate movement, but we have seen too much of the critic to be surprised at any blunders, and the word replicatio does not seem to admit of any other interpretation; it means ‘folding back’, ‘rolling back’, ‘inverse rotatory movement’. Freund (Andrews), it is true, translates ‘winding up’, which to us, familiar with watches, might be suggestive of the action of the First-mover, but could hardly be so to the ancients: moreover a periodical winding up is not consistent with the constant unchanging attraction ascribed to the First-mover by Aristotle. The addition of quaedam is perhaps a sign that C. had no very clear idea of what he was talking about.

cæli ardorem: cf. § 37 omnia cingentem ardorem qui aether nominatur, also II 41, 64, 91, 92. The proof of its existence is given Arist. Caeo. i 2 (cf. N. D. ii 44) where it is argued that ‘as it is the nature of earth to move towards the centre and of fire to move to the circumference, so there must be a body which has by nature a circular movement, and that this body must be θεωτέρα καὶ προτέρα than the others because its motion is more perfect. To this eternal celestial substance the ancients gave the name aithip ἀπὸ τοῦ ἅν θεῖον, but Anaxagoras wrongly identified it with fire and derived it from aitho’. (C’s translation ardor shows that he followed Anax.) The divinity of Aether is proclaimed by Euripides in the verses quoted N. D. ii 65. Elsewhere C. speaks of it as a quintum genus e quo essent astra mentesque Ac. i 26 and Tusc. i 65 sin est quinta quaedam natura, ab Aristotle inducta primum, haec et deorum est et animorum: but Aristotle (Gen. Anim. ii 3), while he allows that in the generation of soul there enters in an element akin to that of the stars, finer and more divine than the other four, adds λέκτος τῶν νοιῶν μοῦν ὄφραν ἐπιεικοῦ καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μοῦν’ οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεί σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια. If we take mundus above to represent ὁπαρόν, we may understand ardor cæli here to represent some such original as ὁ τε aithip καὶ τὰ ἂνω σώματα, of which Arist. says Eth. vi 7 that ‘there are many things of a diviner
nature than man, as most evidently those διό κόσμος συνίστηκεν', and in Phys. π. 4 they are called τὰ θείατα τῶν φανερῶν. Taking it thus as a collective expression (simplex ex dispersis membris as is said of Xenocrates) we might find in it an explanation for tot δὲ immediately below, but see n. there.

celeritate: 'like a dancing dervish making himself giddy by his rotatons' Lescaloperius in loc. See on § 24.

ubi tot δὲ: Heind. (followed by Sch. Opusc. iii 311) thinks that, as tot cannot apply to the four above mentioned (which in reality are only two, the κινοῦν and κινούμενον), something must have been lost from the text; and as Arist. is said non dissentire from his master, he suggests that the lost clause may have corresponded with § 30 quos majorum institutis acceperimus. But why may we not give the same meaning to ills tot viz. 'all those many Gods of the popular religion', without supposing an omission? (So Allen.) The Epicurean objection would then be that 'these gods are supposed to exist in heaven, but if heaven itself is God, how can one god live in another'? If we accept Sch.'s conjecture that the lost clause referred to the stars, the objection would merely be a repetition of caelum mundi esse partem: 'they are already included in caelum, how can they be separate and independent Gods'?

numeramus: similarly iii 40, 43.

semper se movens: these words are in direct opposition to Aristotle's κινεί δείντος, which is further explained (Caed. π. 12) ἵνα τῷ μὲν ἀριστα ἔχοντι ὑπάρχειν τὸ εὖ ἄνευ πράξεως...ἐστι γὰρ αὐτῷ τὸ οὐ ἑνεκα. The Epicurean views of incorporeal substance (sensu privat) have been sufficiently illustrated already.

§ 34 Xenocrates: cf. Krische 311—324 N. D. i 72. C. alludes more than once to the compliment paid to Xenocrates by his countrymen in accepting his word in lieu of the customary oath Balb. 12, Att. i 16; he reports his answer as to the aim of his teaching, ut id sua sponte facerent quod cogerentur facere legibus Rep. i 3; and describes his psychology in the words animi figuram et quasi corpus negavit esse, verum numerum dixit esse; cujus vie, ut jam ante Pythagorae visum erat, in natura maxima esset. Tusc. i 20. The account given in the text omits all that is characteristic in his philosophy: see Stob. Ed. 1 p. 62 Εἰν. τὴν μονάδα καὶ τὴν δύαδα θεοῦ (ἀπεφήνετο) τὴν μὲν ὡς ἄρενα πατρὸς ἵναν τὰς ἐν οὐρανῷ βασιλεύουσαν ἡμῖνα προσαγορεύει καὶ ζῆνα καὶ πέριτον καὶ νοῦν, δεικτικὸς ἀυτῷ πρώτος θεός τὴν δὲ ὡς θελεῖαν, μυθὸς θεὸν διὰρ (Zeller notices that Philolaus also gave the name of Rhea to the dyad) τῆς ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν λήξεως ἔγνωμέν (presiding over the middle region or province) θεὸν δὲ ἔλει καὶ τῶν οὐρανῶν, καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας πυρᾶνες τοῖς Ολυμπίους θεοῖς, καὶ ἑτέρους ὑποστήνυ, διάμονας ἀναγόνου. Some of these last were of a malignant character, φύσει ἐν τῷ περιχόντει μεγάλας μὲν καὶ ἴχνας, δυστρόπους δὲ καὶ σκυθρωπάς (Plut. Is. et Os. ch. 26 p. 361) whose wrath had to be propitiated by sacrifices. Xen. also gave
the name of Poseidon, Demeter, &c. to the divine power pervading each

element.

nulla species divina: 'no divine form' i.e. no anthropomorphic God.

in stellis nominantur: 'which we name in naming the stars.'

qui ex omnibus—deus: 'whom he would have us believe to be a
single uncompounded God made up of all the fixed stars, as of dismembered
limbs'. Zeller suspects an allusion to the original to the Orphic myth of
Zagreus, which was interpreted by later philosophers of the anima mundi
pervading the universe (Plut. M. 389 b). Simplex is an ironical substitution
for concretus, to which it is opposed in iii 34; cf. also ii 11, where it
is opposed to cum aio juncta atque conexa. The phrase mundi membra
occurs again § 100.

Heraclides: a native of Heraclea in Pontus, pupil of Plato and Speus-
sippus and afterwards of Aristotle (Krische 324—336). In the letters to
Atticus there are many allusions to the Dialogues of Her. which were
distinguished from those of Aristotle by the fact that in the former (as in
the N. D.) the author was made a κωφὸν πρόσωπον, while in the latter he
was the principal interlocutor (as in the Tusculan). C. speaks of him with
respect as vir doctus in primis (Tusc. v. 8), and quotes from him Div. i 46
and 130. The views here ascribed to him are common to the Platonic
school. We are further told that he held with Ecphantus, the Pythagorean,
that all material objects were compounded of atoms, and that the apparent
movement of the heavens was caused by the rotation of the earth.

puerilibus fabulis: Plutarch (Camill. c. 22) describes Her. as μυθωδή
kai πλασματικόν, and the names of the treatises preserved by Diog. L. v
6, 87 are suggestive of a predilection for the marvellous. Like Empedocles,
he is said to have been ambitious of being worshipped as a god after his
death, Diog. L. v 90.

modo mundum tum mentem: cf. § 31 modo unum tum autem plures,

sensu—vult: a criticism interposed; 'neither pure mind, nor gross
matter, such as the stars are composed of, is separately capable of feeling :
and to suppose that the moon and planets with their changing phases are
divine, is to deny the immutability of the divine nature', cf. Plato Rep. ii
381, St James i 17 τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν φώκων, παρανόμου ὑπὸ ἀνακλασμάτων.

refert in deos: cf. n. on § 29.

§ 35 Theophrasti: see Krische 337—349, Bernays Th. Ueber From-
migkeit, Cie. Fin. v 9 foll. He appears to have carried further his master's
investigations upon particular points without diverging from his general
principles. C. charges him with assigning too much weight to fortune as
an element of happiness, Ac. i 34 and elsewhere. Gomperz thinks that
the words ἐγκαμηθεὶς τῶν θεῶν, found in a fragment of Philodemus p. 73, refer
to a treatise of Théophrastus's mentioned by Diog. L. v 47.

inconstantia: the charge previously brought against Plato.
BOOK I CH. XIII § 35.

**divinum**: 'such as belongs to a god'. Heind.'s correction *divinae* is unnecessary.

*signis sideribusque*: a pleonastic expression 'star-clusters (*sidus*) (*stella*) which constitute a sign', cf. n. on § 22.

Strato: (Krische 349—355, Cudworth i 144—153). He succeeded Th. as head of the Lyceum B.C. 287, and changed the theism of Aristotle into a system variously described as pantheistic or atheistic. Cudworth calls him 'the first asserter of hylozoic atheism', and says that while 'nature according to Democritus was the fortuitous motion of matter, Strato's nature was an inward plastic life in the several parts of matter, whereby they could artificially frame themselves to the best advantage according to their several capabilities without any conscious or reflexive knowledge'; a view which appears closely to resemble the ordinary notion of Evolutionism. Cic. says of him that he is *omnino semovendus* from the true Peripatetics, as he abandoned ethics, and departed very widely from his predecessors in physics, to which branch he confined himself; again, Ac. π 121 Strato *negat opera deorum se uti ad fabricandum mundum*. Quaecumque sint docet omnia effecta esse natura... *naturalibus fieri ponderibus et motibus*, but notwithstanding he was an opponent of the atomic philosophy. Similar views are advocated by the Academic Cotta *N. D. III* 27.

**minuendi**: some edd. insert after this *immutandi*, a correction of *immittendi* which occurs in one or two ms, but it is probable that this is merely due to a careless repetition of the preceding word.

*careat—figura*: of course from the Epicurean point of view, cf. n. on *species* § 34; but, as Strato, according to Plutarch *adv. Col. c. 14*, denied that the world was a living creature, *careat sensu* is probably correct in this case. Strato's *deus* seems to have been much the same as Prof. Tyndal's *Matter* 'containing the promise and the potency of all existence'.

ch. xiv § 36. The absence of any allusion to the previous criticism of the Stoic philosophy in §§ 18—24, just as in the parallel case of the Platonic philosophy § 30, is an instance of the carelessness which characterizes the composition of the whole treatise, and particularly of the present (historical) section.

Zeno: (Krische 356—404, Brandis in *Dict. of Biog.*). He is quoted *N. D. II* 57 (definition of nature), 20 (arguments to prove the rationality of the world), also in i 70, π 63, ππ 18, 22, 63.

*naturallem legem*. Heraclitus was the first who expressly identified the law of nature with the word and will of God; cf. Fr. 91 Bywater, ἐνοῖ ἐστι πάσι τὸ φρονέων ἐν νόῳ λέγουσα ἵσχυς ἐσθάι κριτικὴ τῇ ἐκ νου ἃ πάσιν, ὅπως κρίνει πολὺ καὶ πολύ ἵσχυς ἐσθάι. Τρέφουσα γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώποι νόμοι ύπό ἐνοι τοῦ θείου κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτο ἐκεῖνο ἐβελεῖ καὶ ἐξάρκιες πάσιν καὶ παρεῖναι. Fr. 92 τοῦ λόγου δ' ἐνοῖ τοῦ ἐκ νου ἐσθάι, ἐκ νομίμων οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἑδιν ἐχοντες φρονήσων. Fr. 65 τὸ σοφὸν μοῦ ἐκ νομίμων λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐβελεῖ καὶ ἐβελεῖ, Ζηνὸς οὐνομα. This view, popularized by the Stoics, was passed on by them to the Roman jurists and so to their modern successors. Thus
C. Leg. 18 lex est summa ratio insita in natura quae jubet ea quae facienda sint, prohibetque contraria; also § 42, and more explicitly Π 8, 'the wisest have held that law is no device of man, but that it is aeternum quiddam quod universum mundum regeret imperandi prohibendique sapientia. Ita principem legem illam et ultimam sententiam esse dicebant omnia ratione aut cogitatis aut vetantis dei'; and § 110 erat enim ratio profecta a rerum natura ...quae non tum denique incipit lex esse cum scripta est, sed tum cum orta est; orta autem est simul cum mente divina. Quamobrem lex vera atque princi pes, apta ad judendum et ad vetandum, ratio est recta summi Jovis. Stobaeus Ecd. Π 6 p. 204 gives the Greek definition (δ νόμος) λόγος ὄρθος ἐστι προστατικὸς μὲν ἄντι ποτηρίου, ἀπαρχατικὸς δὲ ἄντι τοὐρήματος. See Hooker, Ecd. Pol. Ι ch. 2—6, and Wordsworth, Ode to Duty, where God is regarded as the common source of the natural and the moral law. Probably Zeno would not have objected to a definition of God with which we have been made familiar of late, 'a stream of tendency which makes for righteousness'.

eamque vim obtinere = ἰδρυμένη, 'it (the law of nature) has its force in commanding', 'its function is to command', so vim habere Leg. Π 9 (of law, quae vis est aequalis, 'coeval with', illius caelum atque terras tuentis et regentis dei).

animantem. But the Stoic lays it down as the first attribute of Deity ut sit animans N. D. Π 45. The use of the abstract name Nomos is no more inconsistent with the idea of a living God, than the similar use of the abstract Logos. Compare the misunderstanding of the term πρόβοντα § 18.

aethera: the physical, as Law is the moral manifestation of God, cf. § 33 on Aristotle, and below on Cleanthes and Chrysippus, also Π 23 foll.

si intelligi potest: see Sch. Opusc. III 311, who compares Fam. ΙΧ 17 de lucro prope jam quadrennium vivimus, si aut hoc lucrum est, aut haec vita. The phrase is properly used when we doubt about the correctness of some expression without questioning the fact stated, as in Juvenal's si rixae est. Its use here is a piece of colloquial carelessness, but there is no need to alter it, as Heind. and others have done. For intel. cf. §§ 25, 27, 30.

qui numquam occurrat: 'never comes across one', cf. §§ 46, 76 foll.

rationem—pertinentem: 'the all-pervading reason' is of course only another name for the lex naturalis. For omnem some edd. have omnium: both forms are found, e.g. Π 36 rerum omnium natura, so Leg. Ι 61 and Π 16; on the other hand we have naturam rerum omnem, N. D. Ι 27; cf Munro on Lucr. Π 646, Sch. Opusc. ΙΙΙ 330 and 361. Pertinentem = δικορασμένη as in M. Aurel. π 32 ὁ δὲ ἡγεῖται υἱῶν λόγος. Virgil gives it a poetical form Geo. IV 220 foll. deum namque ire per omnes: terrasque traciosque maris caelumque profundum, and Aen. VI 724, cf. Heinze Logos p. 85 foll.

vi divina esse affectam. Sch. Opusc. ΙΙΙ 313, doubts the correctness of the phrase, thinking such a use of afficer e unfitted to express a natural
attribute; nor is this disproved by the passages quoted by Klotz Adm. Cr. iv 4, e.g. Tusc. v 81, optima quiesque valetudine affectus potest videri natura ad aliquem morbum proculior. May it not be used here with an intentional impropriety to suggest the impossibility of reason possessing the attribute of divinity?

astris: cf. ii 39 foll.

annis—mutationibus: see Zeller Stoics tr. p. 121 foll. who mentions, among other extravagant conclusions drawn from the Stoic axiom ‘all that exists is material’, the statement attributed to Chrysippus that the voice was a body, that qualities are bodies, nay rational creatures (Plut. Comm. Not. 45), that diseases, vices and virtues are bodies (Seneca Epp. 106, 117, and especially 113 animal constat animum esse. Virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus quodam modo se habens: ergo animal est). He quotes also the words of Chrysippus (ap. Plut. l. c.) in which it is distinctly asserted that night and day, the month and the year, summer and autumn, &c., are bodies, adding that ‘by these unfortunate expressions Chrys. appears to have meant little more than that the realities corresponding to these names depend on material conditions, e.g. by summer is meant the air heated by the sun’.

θεογγία—interpretatur. The device of allegorical interpretation is naturally resorted to when it is desired to retain old forms which are felt to be inconsistent with new beliefs. As Philo allegorized the Jewish Scriptures in order to bring them into harmony with his own Platonism, so the Stoics allegorized the Hellenic Scriptures (Homer and Hesiod) with the view of hiding the divergence between their own philosophy and the popular religion, cf. Heraclides All. Hom. proem. "Ομηρος ἄριστου κινήσει, ὁ μή ἄλληγορος", Orig. c. Cels. i 17, iv 48 (where Cels. says the more respectable Jews and Christians take refuge in allegory, being ashamed of the literal sense of their sacred books, to which Or. replies in the following chapters), Lobeck Aeq. pp. 133, 155 foll., Zeller Stoics tr. ch. 13, p. 334 foll. Plato alludes to the allegorizing process as already rise in his time, Rep. ii 378, Phaedrus 329. For Stoic exx. see below § 41 seq. ii 63 seq.

usitat aest perceptasque: ‘the ordinary well-understood notions of gods’ = usu perceptas ii 91, Fin. v 3. See Sch. Opusc. iii 314 who defends this reading against Lambinus’ emendation insitas perceptasque.

neque enim—appellatur: ‘neither (the actual) Jupiter nor any one who is addressed in that way, i.e. as a person’, [or ‘who bears a name of such a kind, i.e. a proper name’. R.] Davies, followed by Heindorf and Schöemann, reads appellatur against the best mss. I understand the Subj. in its ‘limiting force’, cf. Madv. § 364 obs. 2, Roby § 1692.

significatio = οὐ&να, Plato Rep. ii 378, a figure of speech quae plus in suspicione relinquit quam positum est in oratione, Herenn. iv 53, ‘where more is meant than meets the ear.’

quandam: ‘a sort of’, Zumpt § 707. [Often used to mark a translation from the Greek. J. S. R.]
§ 37 Aristo: of Chios (Krische 404—415) represents a Cynic reaction in the Stoic school; he confined himself exclusively to ethics on the ground that logic was a spider’s web, curious but useless, and that physics were beyond our faculties: Stob. Floril. 80, 7 πρὸς ἡμᾶς μὲν ἐλεύ τα ἡθικά, μὴ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὰ διαλεκτικά: μὴ γὰρ συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς ἑπαρβόθεντος μίναν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς δὲ τὰ φυσικὰ αὐτῶν ἐὰν ἐγνώσθαι καὶ οὐδὲ παρέχειν χρήσει. It is therefore probably correct, though we have no actual confirmation from other sources, that he denied the possibility of our knowing anything about God. The particular form given to the denial is of course due to the Epicurean reporter.

Cleaneathes: Krische 415—436. He is referred to N. D. ii 13, iii 16 (the four grounds of religious belief) ii 24 and 40 (all-pervading heat) ii 63, iii 63 (allegorical interpretation). Cleaneathes is more distinguished for moral strength and religious earnestness than for any speculative advance: none of the doctrines here mentioned are peculiar to him: one in fact is wrongly ascribed to him. While holding with the rest of his school that the universe was divine in virtue of the aetherial soul by which it was animated, he placed the source and seat of aether in the sun, and not as the others (agreeing with Aristotle) in the furthest heaven, cf. Ac. ii 128 Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoiciis aether videtur summus deus, mente praeditus qua omnia regantur; Cleaneathes, qui quasi majorum est gentium Stoicums, solem dominari et rerum potiri putat; Stob. Ecl. i 21 Κλ. ἐν ἡλίῳ ἐφησον εἶναι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου.

extremum: to be taken predicatively with cingentem, ‘inclosing on the outside.’

qui—nominetur. Heind. prefers the Ind. considering that this is an addition of the reporter’s, and not a part of the speech reported; but the Subj. is an exact translation of such a speech as we find Diog. L. vii 137 λέγει Ζήνων ἰσωτέῳ μὲν εἶναι τὸ πύρ, ὡς ἀθέρα καλείσθαι, ἐν τῷ πρῶτῃ τῆς ἀπλανοῦ σφαίρας γενήσαται, εἰτα τῆς τῶν πλαυμένων. C.’s own view is nearly the same Rep. vi 17 novem tibi orbibus conexa sunt omnia, quorum unus est caelestis, extimus qui reliquos omnes complectitur, summus ipse deus arcens et continens ceteros.

quasi delirans—voluptatem. The word del. is properly used of dotage, as in Senect. 11 ista senilis stultitia quae deliratio appellari solet: so anus delira Div. ii 141, Tusc. i 48. For the tropical use see § 42. Vell. waxes vehement as he thinks of the attack made upon the Epicureans in Cle.’s treatise περὶ ἡδονῆς Diog. L vii 37, 175.

fingit formam quandam: this probably refers to the anthropomorphic language used by Cle. in speaking of God, as in the grand hymn to Zeus, τοῖον ἐχεῖς υπόργυον ἀνίχνευος ἐνὶ χρόνῳ | ἀμφίκη, πυρόντω, ἀεὶ ὑφοντα κεραινῶν. In such words Cle. gives, as it were (quandam, cf. n. on quandam § 33) a human form (cf. nulla species § 34) to Zeus.

divinitatem omnem: ‘complete divinity’; omnis qualitative, not quantitative.
in animi notione—reponere. Here at last we have the open avowal of the principle on which the criticism is founded; all is false which disagrees with our πρόληψις. According to Epicurus repeated impressions (sensations) fix a type (πρόληψις) in the mind, to which we attach a name, and when any new object offers itself, claiming to be called by this name, we must measure it by the type. So Cleanthes said that each perception (φαράσια) made an impression on the soul like that made by a seal on wax; and Cic. notices a theory memoriam esse signatarum rerum in mente vestigia Tusc. i 61: cf. also Orator 19 and 133 (in reference to a speech of Demosthenes) ea oratio in eam formam quae est insita in mentibus nostris includi sic potest, ut major eloquentia non requiratur, and Plato Rep. v 462 α ἀρντι εὐφράσους eis τὸ τοῦ ἄγαθου ζῆν· ἢ μὴ ἄρμάτει, quoted in Sch.'s n. On constr. repono in notione see § 29 n.

Ch. xv. § 38. Persaenus: see Krische 436—443. What is here said of his opinions agrees with the account in Philodemus pp. 75, 76 Περσαίως δὲ δηλῶσιν ὡτι... αφαιρεῖν τὸ δαμάνιον, ἣ μηθίν υπὲρ αὐτοῦ γινόσχων, ὅταν ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν θεῶν λέγη φαίνεσθαι τὰ περὶ τὰ τρέφοντα καὶ αὐθέντων θεοῖς. νομισμάθαι καὶ τετυμήθαι πρῶτον, κατὰ τὰ ὑπὸ Προδίκου γγεγραμμένα (Ν.Δ. i 118), μετὰ δὲ ταύτα τούτοι εὑρόντας ἢ τροφάς ἢ σκίπας ἢ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, ὡς Δήμητρα καὶ Δίονυσος. These opinions were common to many of the Stoics, see Π 60—62, ΠΠ 41, Leg. Π 27. C. himself desired to erect a temple to Tullia after her death (Att. ΠΠ 36, &c.) and frequently asserts his belief in the divinity of the souls of the good, (Consol. fr. 5,) which was indeed a part of the ordinary Roman belief, and is recognized as such in Leg. Π 22 deorum manium jura sancta sunt. Bonos leto datos divos habento. Sometimes C. puts forward opinions closely approaching those of Euhemerus (§ 119) as in Tusc. Π 28 quid totum prope caelum nonne humano generi completum est?......ipsi illi majorum gentium di, qui habentur, hinc a nobis profecto in caelum reperientur. Quaerae quorum demonstrantur sepulchra in Graecia; reminiscere quae tradantur mysteriiis: tum denique quam hoc late patet intelleges.

quo quid absurdius quam: Heind. quotes the foll. exx. of a clause with quam added after a comparative to explain a preceding ablative, Fin. Ι 19 quo nihil turpius physico quam fieri quiquam sine causa dicere (where see Madv.), Orat. Ι 169 quot ergo hoc fieri turpius potest quam...ita labi; see also Orat. Π 38 and 302, and Allen's n. here. [Ac. Ι 45 hoc quidquām esse turpius, quam praecurrere. Parallels in Greek are common. J. S. R.] We have had similar exx. of quod explained by a succeeding clause, § 2 n.

res sordidas. The Stoics, sensible of the mischiefs which might arise from disturbing the religious beliefs of the vulgar, endeavoured to find a place for these in their philosophy, explaining each divinity as a separate manifestation of the one supreme God, and getting rid, as far as they could, of immoral or degrading superstitions by the free use of allegory. But it was scarcely possible to do this with the mass of the inferior deities, Epona, Cloacina, and others such as Augustine sums up, C. D. vi 9, and to
which Pliny alludes N. H. ii 5 gentes vero quaedam animalia et aliqua etiam obsecra pro dis habent, ac multa dictu magis pudenda, per fetidas cepas, alia et simulia jurantes. A similar charge is made by Clemens Strom. i 295 (οι θεοίκοι) σώμα δυνά τον Θεόν διά της ατμοτάτης ήλης πεφοστηκέναι λέγοντες οὐ καλῶς.

honore afficere: see n. on vi affectum § 33.

reponere in deos: the force of re- is the same as that of ἀπό in ἀποδίδομαι, 'to put them among the Gods as their right'; cf. res vocet § 28.

quorum—esse futurus: 'dead men, whose worship, if they had been raised to the rank of Gods, must have borne exclusively the character of mourning.' Cf. Plut. Is. 70 p. 378 Πεπαθόμενος ἦσσεως τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους, εἰ θεοὺς νομίζεσθαι, μηθρηνεῖαν, εἰ δὲ θρηνοῦσα, θεοὺς μηνομείν (told with slight variations by Arist. Rhet. bi 23) and the remarks in the First Philippic 13 on the Supplicatio to Caesar, an me censeis decreturumuisse ut parentalia cum supplicationibus miscrementur? ut inexpliabilis religiones in rem publicam inducerentur? ... adducis non posse ut ququam mortuum conjungerenrum cum immortalium religionem; ut cujus sepulcrum nusquam extet, ubi parentes tur, ei publice supplicetur. The use of mourning garments at a supplicatio was entirely forbidden, see Vatin. 30 foll. During the Feralia and Lemuria the temples of the Gods were closed, Ov. Fast. i 563, v 491. The worship of Zagreus, Adonis, and Osiris might fairly be described as a cultus in lectu.

Chrysippus: (Krische 443—481) called the second founder of the Stoic school, εἰ μὴ γάρ ἦν Χρύσιππος, οὐκ ἦν ἤσθο. His importance is marked by the emphatic jam vero with which the sentence begins. Philodemus says of him (Gomp. p. 77 foll.) ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ Χρύσιππος [τὸ πᾶν ἐπὶ Δία ἀναφέρον] εἰν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ θεῶν Δία φοινί εἶναι τὸν ἄπαντα διοικοῦντα λόγον καὶ τὴν τούτου φύσιν, καὶ τῇ τούτου μὲν [τῷ πάντῃ τοῖς ...] καὶ τοὺς λίθους, διὰ καὶ ἦν καλείσθαι, Δία δὲ ὅτι πάντων αἱτίω καὶ κύριος: τὸν τε κόσμον ἐφικός εἶναι καὶ θεῶν καὶ τὸ ἄγεμον καὶ τὴν τούτου φύσιν καὶ εἰμαρμένη καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι καὶ εὑρομαι καὶ δίκη καὶ ὁρόσποι και εἰρήνη καὶ Ἀρφοδίνη καὶ τὸ παραπλήσιον πᾶν καὶ μὴ εἶναι θεοῦ ἄρρενας μονή σθελείας, ὁς μὴ πόλεις μηδ' ἀρετάς, ὁμοίασθαι δὲ μόνον ἄρρενικάς καὶ θηλυκάς ταὐτά ἄτις, καθάπερ σελήνη καὶ μῆρα καὶ τῶν Ἀρη κατὰ τὸν πολέμον τετάχθαι καὶ τῆς τάξεως καὶ ἀντιτάξεως· Ἠφαιστον δὲ πῦρ εἶναι, καὶ Κρόνων μὲν τὸν τοῦ ἰεύματος ροῦν, Ἄρεα δὲ τὴν γῆν, Δία δὲ τοῦ αἰθέρα (τοὺς δὲ τῶν Δαύλολα, καὶ τὴν Δίημηρα γῆν ἢ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ πνεῦμα) καὶ παιδιαρώδες λέγονται καὶ γράφονται καὶ πλάττονται θεοὺς ἄνθρωποι ἄταξιν τρόπων καὶ πόλεις καὶ ποταμοῖς καὶ τόποις καὶ πάθη καὶ Δία μὲν εἶναι τὸν περὶ τῆς γῆς ἀείρα, τὸν δὲ σκοτεινοῦ "Αἰθήν, τὸν δὲ διὰ τῆς γῆς καὶ

1 This is the emendation suggested in the excellent article on the Herculanen Fragments which appeared in the Quarterly Review, Feb. 1810. German writers who have referred to this, have attributed it to Elsmayre and others. I am informed by the present Editor of the Q. R. that it was really written by that extraordinary man, Dr Thomas Young, and indeed it is so stated by Dean Peacock in his memoir.

2 Sauppe suggests ρώγι πάντα διαχείδαι, comparing C.'s fusionem universam.

ejus animi fusionem universam: ‘abstr. for concr. = ejus animum ubique fusum’, Sch. Ejus i.e. mundi, cf. § 29 imagines earumque circuitus; and for fusio II 28. Probably this represents some words which have been lost in Philod. I do not think it can stand for διάχεισθαι suggested by Petersen and Sauppe, as that would rather mean ‘crumbling away’ than ‘pervading’. Compare on the ‘universal intermingling’ κράσις de’ οἶνων, Zeller Stoics tr. p. 131.

principatum = ἰγμανικόν II 29.

universitatemque: Heind.’s emendation for the universam atque of the mss.

fatalem—futurum: a rounded phrase for Philod.’s εἴμαρμένην καὶ

1 So Sauppe fills the gap left by Gomperz.

2 So I propose to read. Gomperz has λόγου ἐρωτῇ περὶ τὸν τόν, Sauppe and Bücheler ἔρωτα τῶν τῶν, but nothing can be plainer than πάντας in the facsimile: ἐνάγεσθαι is used in the sense of ‘adduce’ with μαρτίρα, Xen. Symp. 8, 84, with μίδους and δόσες, Plut. II 975 π. For the use of πάντας cf. πάσας προφάσεις προφασίζοντε Plato Rep. v 475.
[Text is not visible]
reddi ab eisum cernat!); the fact that fishes hear and smell (super omnia est, quod esse auditum et odoratum piscibus non erit dubium; ex aeris urum-queue materia). In the Times for Sept. 13, 1879 there is a short notice of the investigations made in the Challenger and other expeditions, to determine the amount and composition of the air in sea-water.

terram quae Ceres: cf. π 67, 71.

legis vim. C. supplements the brief mention of νόμος in the original from his own studies for the De Legibus.

eandemque necessitatem appellat: ‘gives to law the name of destiny’. Mr Roby suggests eundem, which seems more appropriate, as Vel- leius is here dealing with the Stoic misuse of mythological names. [Cf. the parallel passage in Δα. 1 29 deum omniumque rorum prudentiam...quam eandem necessitatem appellat. J. S. R.]

sempiternam veritatem : cf. § 55, π 14, Div. 1 125 fatum id appello quod Graeci ἐμαρμήνη, ὐδ εστ, ordinem seriemque causarum cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat. Ec est ex omni aeternitate fluens veritas sempiterna; Zeller Stoics tr. p. 141 foll.


accommodare: a translation of συνοικισσαν.

qui suscipiati sint: Sch. Orpuc. π 310 argues against the Subj. here, but qui is characteristic, not merely connective, ‘though they never dreamt of such a thing’.


Diogenes: Of Seleucia on the Tigris, pupil of Chrysippus, and afterwards head of the Stoic school (Krische 481—494), called magnus et gravi Stoico in Off. π 51. Philodemus proceeds to speak of him immediately after the quotation given above: Διογένης ὤ ο Βαθυλάνος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τῶν κόσμων γράφει τῷ Διὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν ἡ περιέχειν τῶν Διᾳ καθάπερ ἀνθρωπος ψυχὴν: then, after describing how different names were given to different parts of Zeus, he says that the part which was manifested in the aether was called Athenes, τούτῳ γὰρ λέγεσθαι τὸ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς, καὶ Ζεὺς ἀρρη τε Ζεὺς ἠλιος των ἑξακοσίων φάσκειν ὅτι τὸ ἱμερον ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ, φρονίσαν γὰρ εἶναι, διὸ καὶ Μήτιν καλεῖσθαι. Χρύσιππος δὲ ἐν τῷ στίβῃ τὸ ἱμηρον εἶναι κακεῖ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶς γεγονέοι, φρονίσαν συναξί, τῷ δὲ τὴν φωνήν ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐκκρίνεσθαι λέγεσθαι ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς, ὅπε δὲ Ἡφαιστοῦν, διὸ μὲ τὸ τεῖχος ἐγένεθον ἡ φρονίσα, καὶ Αθηνᾶς μὲν αὐτῶν Ἀθηνᾶς ἐρήμωθαι, Τριτονίδα δὲ καὶ Τριτογένειαν διὰ τὸ τὴν φρονίσαν ἐκ τριῶν συνεστηκέναι λόγων, τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ τῶν ἄθροι καὶ τῶν λογικῶν καὶ τὰς ἄλας δὲ αὐτὴς προσηγορίας καὶ τὰ φορίματα (e.g. the Λεγεῖς) μᾶλλα καταρχύσας τῇ φρονίσαν συνοικίσαι.

disjungit: this form seems more suited to the metaphorical sense than the dejungit of the mss. Müller Adn. Crit. p. iv. cites other passages in

1 So in the facsimile, but, as a compliment to Diog. would be quite out of place, I should amend either καταρχυστικος (employed by Sext. Emp. P. H. 1 191 in treating of the improper uses of words) or κατακεφαλος.
which do- is wrongly read for di-, e.g. degrediens N. D. ii 103, demetata ii 110, delabi Off. ii 64.

B. b. ii. Erroneous views of the poets and of eastern sages. §§ 42, 43.

Ch. xvi. § 42. The follies of the popular mythology form the subject of the first sixty pages in Gomp.'s ed. of Philodemus. We read there of the adulteries (pp. 10—12) and wars (pp. 28, 32, 40, 45) of the Gods, of their frauds, cruelties, weaknesses, sufferings, their enslavements to each other and to men. Compare Plin. N. H. ii 7 super omnem impudentiam est adulteria inter ipsos fingi, max etiam jurgia et odia, atque etiam furtorum esse et scelerum numina.

exposui. In similar language, though to very different effect, Minucius begins his 20th ch. (after concluding his summary of the Philodemian section) with the words exposui opiniones omnium ferme philosophorum quibus industrior gloria est, deum unum multis licet designasse nominibus, ut quives arbitretur aut nunc Christianos philosophos esse aut philosophos fuisse jam tunc Christianos.

delirantum: §§ 37, 92, 94. somnia: § 39, Ac. ii 121. Varro Eumenides (ap. Non. s. v. infans) postremo nemo aegrotus quicquam somniat | tam infandum quod non aliqus dicit philosophus.

fusa: so § 66 oracula fundo. Sch. quotes Fin. iv 10 poetarum more verba fundere, Div. ii 27 concitacione mentis edi et quasi fundi. [Add Div. ii 110, De Or. iii 175, 194, Tusc. i 64, iii 42. J. S. R.]


ortus: Philod. p. 31 mentions particularly the birth of Athene and of Dionysus; pp. 7 and 13 he notices the death (interitus) of Asclepius; Minucius loc. speaks of the alternate deaths of Castor and Pollux.


ex immortalis: Davis and Henid. read immortalibus; but the Sing. may be taken either indefinitely 'from an immortal', or generically τῶν ἀθανάτων. On the general subject cf. Tusc. i 28 foll., Nāgelsb. Nach homerische Theol. pp. 10—13.

§ 43. magorum Aegyptiorumque: there is no allusion to the former and very slight to the latter, in what remains of Philod. The Magi ('great ones', Sana. magha, Lat. magnus) were the priestly caste of Media.
Their religious system was the Zoroastrian dualism of the Iranian conquering race, modified to suit the subject Turanian population. The serpent God of the latter was identified with Ahriman, who was then raised to an equality with Ormuzd, both being viewed as emanations from the absolute first principle, Zerwan-Akaran, i.e. eternity. In course of time the Magian religion incorporated many polytheistic elements, as the worship of the Planets, of Mithras, and of Mylitte, also known as the Phrygian mother of the Gods. The religion of the Persians was pure Zoroastrianism and, as such, opposed to Magianism, as is shown in the overthrow of the Magi by Darius Hystaspes; but it was confounded with the latter by Herodotus and other writers. See Lenormant Manual of Ancient History, tr. II 21—47; Rawlinson’s Herodotus I Essay 5, on the Religion of the Ancient Persians; Hardwick, Christ and other Masters, Pt. iv. Medo-Persia. C. speaks of their dislike to inclosing in temples the Gods quorum hic mundus omnis templum esset, Leg. II 26; and of their skill in interpreting dreams, Div. I 46, 47. His younger contemporary Strabo (xv 3. 13) describes their manner of worship and tells us that they offered sacrifices to Heaven, the Sun (whom they called Mithras), the Moon, Aphrodite, Fire, Earth, Winds and Water. On the Egyptian religion, see § 101, Juvenal Sat. xv, Herodotus II 37—76 with Rawlinson’s notes and Append. ch. 3, also Hardwick and Lenormant.

veritatis ignorantiae: causal ablative, cf. § 1.

B. c. Epicurean Exposition, xvi § 43—xx § 56.

Universal consent is a sufficient proof of the existence, blessedness and immortality of the Gods. Being such, they must be free from care and passion; and are therefore to be regarded with reverence, not with fear. Testimony and reason both assure us that they are formed like men, but their bodies are of far finer texture than ours. Their life is one of contemplation, not of action.

qui consideret—debate: ‘whoever (=if any one) should consider this would be bound to pay honour to Ep. and hold him as a God’. On the hypothetical use of qui with Subj. see Madv. § 367, who quotes N. D ii 12 haec qui videat, nonne cogat, confiteri deos esse? (repeated almost in the same words § 44), also Draeg. § 493 and Roby § 1558. On the extravagant terms in which the Epicureans spoke of their founder see Gys. i 48 quae quidem cognitis soleo saepe mirari nonnullorum insolentiam philosophorum, qui naturae cognitionem admirantur, ejusque inventori et principi gratias exultantes agunt eumque venerantur ut deum, liberatos enim se per eum dicunt gravissimis dominis, terrene semipaterno et diurno ac nocturno metu; Fin. i 14, 32, 71; In Pis. 59; Lucr. v 8 deus ille fuit, deus, indict Memmi, | qui princeps vitae rationem invent eam quae | nunc appellatur sapientia; and iii 15 nam simul ac ratio tua coepit vociferari | naturam
rerum, divina mente octorta, | diffugiant animi terres; Plut. adv. Colot. 17
(Metrodorus speaks of) τα Ἑρμικοῦ ὄς ἀληθείς ἄδικαι ἡρώα; ib. Colotes
kneels and adores Epicurus; Epic. himself writes to a disciple πάντα ὦν
ἀπαρχή ἢμίν εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἱεροῦ σώματος θεραπείαν. His disciples kept sacred
to his memory, not only his birthday, but the 20th day of every month,
in accordance with the instructions in his will, Diog. L. x 18, Fin. ii 101,
Zeller Stoics tr. p. 394.

primum esse deos: the 2nd point is given below, ut deos beatos et im-
mortales putasmus.

in animis impressisset: this is the usual construction, like inculpavit
in mentibus just below, but we find imprimit. with Acc. in Ac. ii 58.

quae est enim gens: universal belief was alleged by the Stoics, no less
than by the Epicureans, as the strongest proof of the existence of the Gods,
see § 5, 12, Seneca Ep. 117 6 multum dare solemus praescriptionem omnium
hominum: apud nos argumentum veritatis est aliquid omnibus viserit: tan-
quam deos esse inter alia sic colligimus, quod omnibus de dis opinio insita
est, nec ulla gens eisquam est adeo extra leges moreisque projecta, ut non aliquos
deos credat; and so of the immortality of the soul. It is often urged by C.
as in Leg. i 24 nulla gens neque tam mansuetus, neque tam fera, quae non,
etiamis ignoret qualem habere deum deceat, tamem habendum sciat; Tusc. i 30
multi de dis prave sentiant; id enim vitioso more efficie soleit; omnes tamen
esse vim et naturam divinam arbitrarent...omni autem in re consensus omnium
gentium lex naturae putanda est; and by Plut. adv. Colot. 1125 d.
The same argument is employed in defence of divination Div. i 11, and met
in the following book (π 39) by a reference to the universality of the desire
for pleasure as the chief good, quasi vero quicquam sit tam valde quam nihil
saper e vulgare! Cf. the objections in N. D. i 62, iii 11. Aristotle const-
stantly appeals to the common belief in confirmation of his own reasonings:
the justification is given Eth. Eud. i 6 κράτεσατο μὲν πάντας ἀνθρώπους φα-
néshai synnomologouñta tōs μηθησομένοις, εἰ δὲ μή, τρόπον γε τινά πάντας, ὅπερ
μεταβαβλομένους ποιήσων εἴχει γὰρ ἐκαστὸς οἰκεῖον τι πρὸς τὴν ἄληθείαν...
ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶν μὲν λεγομένων, οὐ σαφᾶς δὲ, προοίμων ἤταν καὶ τὸ σαφῆς,
μεταλαμβάνοντων αἱ τὰ γνωριμίητα τῶν εἰσθόρων λέγεσθαι συγκεκριμένως.
See on the general subject Hamilton's Reid Supplementary Dissertation A
(On the philosophy of common sense) esp. § vi (Chronological series of testimo-
nies), H. Spencer First Principles p. 4 foll. (who grants the universality of
religious ideas), and the very fair and able discussion in Jellett's Efficacy of
Prayer p. 70 foll. and App. on General Consent. The analogous ecclesiasti-
cal doctrine formulated by Vincent of Lerins in the words quod ubique,
quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est, or in the more sounding phrase
of Augustine securus judicat orbis terrarum, is of far more doubtful value,
as it refers not to the primitive instincts of mankind, but to abstract
dogmas, received on authority, and often very little understood by those
who professed to hold them.

BOOK I CH. XVI § 43. 137

quoted on § 25; it is defined by Diog. L. x 33 as ‘a general conception retained in the mind’, ‘the memory of what has been often perceived’; ‘on uttering the word *man*, the type at once rises up κατὰ πρόληψιν (i.e. prior to logical analysis) in accordance with our previous sensations’. Hence ὁδε γιττεὶν οὖτε ἀπορεῖν ἀνεύ προλήψεως Sext. Emp. Math. i 57 ( sina qua... proeto), cf. Clem. Al. Strom. ii 157. Chrysippus appears to have borrowed the word from Ep. (see § 54), defining it as ἐννοια φυσική τῶν καθόλου Diog. L. vii 54. In an interesting chapter of Epictetus (Diss. i 22) we read that πρόληψεις, general principles, are common to all men, and consistent with each other: differences arise when we attempt to apply them, e.g. all allow that ὁδοίων must be preferred to all things, but it is a question between Jews and Romans whether it is ὁδοίων to eat swine’s flesh. Education consists in learning to apply τὰς φυσικὰς πρόληψεις ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους συνήσις καταλήλλως τῇ φύσει. Prolepsis then, whether as understood by the Epicureans (the permanent image), or with a more ideal colouring by the Stoics, corresponds to the Idea of Plato, the Form of Aristotle, the Innate Idea of later times: by some of the Fathers (e.g. Theod. Gr. Aff. p. 16, 9; Clem. l. c.) it was identified with Faith. Besides the terms *informatio*, *praemotio* and *anticipatio*, C. uses for it *notio* and *notitia*, which are generally equivalent with the more general *ennoia*, cf. Ac. ii 30 *notitiae rerum quas Graeci tum ennoias tum prōlēpseis vocant*; Tusc. i 57 (of the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence) nec fieri ullo modo posse ut a pueris tot rerum atque tantarum insitas et quas consignatas in animis notiones, quas ennoias vocant, haberemus, nisi animus, antequam in corpus intravisset, in rerum cognitione vixisset; Top. 31 *notionem appelló quod Graeci tum ennoias tum prōlēpseis dicitunt: ea est insita et praecipua suaque forma cognitionis, *modationis indiciens*; Madv. Fin. iii 21, v 59; Bake on Leg. i 26, 30, 59, where *incohabatae intellegentiae=prōlēpseis.*

**informatio**: ‘shaping’, ‘outline’, then ‘conception’.

**caelesti volume**: entitled *peri krēmpion & kanoiv*, ‘the test or standard of truth’ Diog. L. x 27, Zeller Stoics tr. p. 400 foll. We find it referred to as τοὺς διοιστεῖς κανόνας Plut. adv. Colot. 19.

Ch. xvii. § 44. **non instituto**: so Tusc. i 30 nec enim id (esse debo) conlocutio hominum effect, non institutis opinio est confirmata, non legibus, i.e. οὐ νόμος ὄλλα φύσει. So Philod. p. 128 (we worship the Gods) οὐ μόνον διὰ τοὺς νόμους ὄλλα διὰ φυσικὰς αἰρέσις, Diog. L. x 123 θεοὶ μὲν γὰρ εἰσόν ἐναργῆς μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἡ γνώσις.

**ad unum omnium**: ‘all without exception’.

**insitas vel potius innatas**: ‘implanted or rather inbred’. The two words are often joined to express natural growth as opposed to artificial training, e.g. Fin. iv 4 *insitam quandam vel potius innatam cupiditatem scientiae*; Verr. iv 48 the belief that Sicily is sacred to Ceres and Libera is so firmly held by the natives ut animis eorum insitum atque innatum esse videatur, also v 23; in Top. 69 the opposite quality is expressed by the phrase *adsumptis atque adventiciis*. It does not seem necessary to suppose
any error on the part of C. as though he ascribed to Epic. the doctrine of
'innate ideas' in the sense in which Locke (certainly not Plato, for with
him the idea was latent till developed by \maevus; nor Descartes, see
Huxley's Hume p. 83) understood the term. All that is implied is that
our religious ideas are not arbitrarily imposed from without, but grow
up within as a natural and necessary result of experience. We must
understand innatum in the same sense in \pi 12, cf. Sch. Opusc. iv 345, who
reminds that \textit{a principio innati} is the phrase used (\pi 34) of what is
strictly inborn.

\textit{de quo autem—confitendum est.} [The argument is obscured by the
ordinary punctuation. Putting a comma after \textit{habemus} we get the follow-
ing syllogism: We all have from nature an idea of Gods: what all men's
nature agrees about is true: \textit{ergo} we must admit the existence of Gods. R.]

\textit{omnium natura—omnes naturā}, cf. n. on § 36.

\textit{hanc igitur habemus:} resumes \textit{fateamus habere}. For the resumptive
use of \textit{igitur} after parenthesis and for the change from Inf. to Ind. cf.
Draeger § 355, Madv. § 480. A close parallel occurs in \textit{Fin. \pi 22 quid
enim mereri velis...quid merearis igitur &c.}

\textit{ut putemus:} explains \textit{hanc}, which has the force of \textit{talem}, cf. § 55 \textit{illa ut.}

\section*{§ 45. \textit{ipsorum:}} the existence of the Gods, as opposed to their
attributes.

\textit{insculpsit in mentibus: so in animo quasi insculptum est esse deos \pi 12.}

\textit{quod beatum—essent omnia:} quoted from the \textit{kupias δόξας}, an epitome
of the ethical principles of Epicurus, which he intended to be committed
to memory by his disciples, see § 35, \textit{Fin. \pi 20 quis enim vestrum non
edidicit Epicuri kupias δόξας? Diog. L. \x 35. It is preserved by Diog.
x 139, and commences with the words here translated τὸ μακάριον καὶ
δόξαν ὄντε αὐτῷ προγνωτα ἣξιν, ὡσα ἀλλα παρέχατι, ὡσε ὡσα ὅργαις ὡσε
χάρις συνέχεται ἐν ἀθενεὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τούτουν, cf. Philod. p. 123 χαρίς
ὁργῆσ καὶ χάρις ἀθενεοῦσιν, Lucret. \textit{πi 646 omnis enim per se divom natura
necesset | immortali aequo summa cum pace fruantur | semota ab nostris rebus
saejunctaque longe; | nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis | ipsea suis
pollens opibus, nihil indigā nostrī, | nec bene promeritis capitum, necque ta-
gitum iva.} The argument in full is: the Gods are happy; happiness con-
sists in the absence of trouble, whether experienced in oneself or inflicted
upon another; therefore the Gods neither feel nor cause trouble; hence
the motive of anger, which might lead to their infliction of trouble, and the
motive of favour, which might lead to their taking trouble for others, are
alike manifestations of weakness, and inconsistent with our idea of the
Divine majesty. The answer to which is that (1) the word 'trouble' is
unmeaning in reference to our idea of God: if we suppose him to be
almighty, thought and action are as easy to him as breathing to us:
(2) while it is true that passion and caprice are marks of weakness and, as
such, inconsistent with our idea of God, yet a righteous government, re-
warding virtue and punishing vice, is a natural corollary to the belief in a
good and powerful God. When Seneca says deos nemo sanus timet (Benef. iv 19) it is not from any notion of the Gods being indifferent to the actions of men, but he is simply asserting the Platonic doctrine that God never harms any (Rep. ii 379 foll.), that His acting is always for the best both to the universe at large and to each individual in it. In Philod. p. 94 we read that it was charged against the Epicureans, that their doctrine deprived good men of their religious hopes, προσεκτήθειν δὲ καὶ διϊτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαιῶν παραμονείν τὰς καλὰς ἀπώλειας ἢν τῶν θεῶν ἐξοντεῖ, to which it is replied p. 97 that the vulgar ideas of reward and punishment are abandoned by all philosophers, and that many go so far as to deny them any power to hurt, οὐδὲς γὰρ ἐς εἰπέν ῳν ἀμφελεῖ καὶ ἐπάντων εἰρηκτών φιλοσόφων τοῖς θεοῖς, ὡμοία ταῖς χοῦναι (the vulgar) ὑπελείπεν τάς ἀμφελίας καὶ τάς ἁλάβαις, πολλοὶ δὲ οὐδὲ ἐπάντων ἄλος ἀφασαν αὐτοῖς, but the true and just are rewarded as Polyaeus has stated in his 1st book: p. 100 ἀμφελίας ἐκ θεῶν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ ἁλάβαις τοῖς κακοῖς καταλείτουσι (i.e. apparently the Epicureans): p. 124 καὶ σωτηρίας αὐθώντων διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καταλειτύτων ὑπογράφει (i.e. Epicurus) διὰ πλεῖστον, ἐν δὲ τῇ προσκυνεῖσθαι περὶ τῆς οἰκουμενής ἐν πρὸς των ἁθεῶν ἑκεῖ καὶ τῆς ἀλλοτριώτητος: p. 125 ‘with the favour of heaven (θεῶν διὰν συνεκυρίων) we need not fear war, with the favour of heaven we shall pass our lives in purity’: pp. 86—89 ‘the Stoics deny that the Gods are the authors of evil to men and thus take away all restraint on iniquity and degrade men to the level of the brutes (for who would be balked of the injustice for which he craves, from the fear of air or ether?), while we say that punishment comes to some—some from the Gods, and the greatest of good to others’: also p. 145. It is difficult to see how this approach to the common opinion (which goes much beyond what Lucr. allows vii 70) can be reconciled with other positive statements of Epicurus or with his general principles as given in the text. See the Academic, or rather Stoic, criticism in § 121. For the form of expression ( nec habet ipsum nec exibere alteri) we may compare St James i 13 ὁ γὰρ θεὸς ἀπηρηματὸς ἑτοι κακῶν, πιθανόν ἐν αὐτῶς oúdē, Plut. Mor. 1102 Ε καὶ φαῖλον oúdē nómoi αὐτῷ ϑέμας, ὡσπερ oúdē πάσχειν, Sen. De Ira i 27 natura illis (dis) mutis et placida est, tam longe remota ab aliena injuria quam a sua.

sit—esse—esse: the Pres. Subj. is allowable because it is a general proposition having no more reference to the past than to the present: the Imperf. is afterwards used in order to remind the reader that this is a statement made in the past by Epic., not necessarily adopted by the writer; see Draeger § 131, and (on the mixed construction) § 124 B c, where it is pointed out that when there are two subordinate clauses, standing in different degrees of subordination, the more remote subordination is frequently expressed by the Imperf. the less remote by the Pres. Subj. Compare for the corresponding use of the Subj. and Opt. in Greek, Jelf § 809, Arnold on Thuc. iii 22, p. 370.

talis imbecilla: Seneca De Ira i 20 ira muli brbre maxime et pu rile vitium est, Juv. xiii 190 with Mayor’s n.
si nihil—erat dictum: 'if we had had no other aim beyond that of piety in worship and freedom from superstition, we might have ended here'. On the Ind. in apodoni see § 19 longum est, n.

cum aeterna esset: we need not (with Draqg. § 151. 3) explain the Imperf. as attracted to the tense of the principal verb (coleretur). It expresses a consideration belonging to and contemporaneous with the supposed action (coleretur) and carefully to be distinguished from the new consideration with which we are now occupied (anquirit animus below).

habet venerationem: Nägels. Stil. § 95 quotes this as an example of the way in which the Romans supplied the absence of a Pass., and compares Ora. III 11, Phil. I 7, Marcell. 26. [cf. aiónnhαν pαρέξειν which is the regular passive of aiónnhανεια. J. S. R.] Sch. in his note cites other phrases in which habeo has the same force, e.g. lactitiam, spem, timorem habere 'to inspire', like the Gr. ἑξειν = pαρέξειν. On the grounds of the Epicurean worship cf. §§ 56 and 118, and Philod. 128 προσεύχεσθαι γάρ ἐν τῷ περὶ θεῶν φήμῃ, οὐχ ἐν λυπουμένοις τῶν θεῶν εἰ μὴ ποιήσωμεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐνίον τῶν ὕπερβαλλόντων (praestans, quicquid excellit, praestantissima natura § 47, naturam excellentem § 56) δύναμι καὶ σπουδαώρητον φύσεων. Defective as was the Epicurean conception of God, it was so far right that they could see in Him an ideal perfection worthy of the reverence and imitation of men, see Zeller Stoic. tr. p. 439, Philod. p. 148.

metus a vi: cf. § 42 concubitum cum genere. Allen quotes Liv. xxxiii 15 metus a praetore, where see Weissenborn, also Madv. § 298. 2, on verbal substantives followed by prepositions. The verbs timeo and metuo are used absolutely with ab.

quibus impendere: on the Inf. with relative in Ora. Obl. see n. on § 12 ex quo existit.

vita actionem mentisque agitationem: Beier's correction for vitam et actionem mentis atque agitationem, see his n. on Off. I 17 and compare actio vitae in § 103, and Div. II 89; see too Sch. Opusc. III 315 and 363 and my n. on § 2.

Ch. xviii. § 46. admonet: 'gives a hint'.

speciem humanam deorum: see Cotta's criticisms § 77 foll.

occurrat. For exx. of such appearances see Ov. Met. viii 626 foll., Liv. xxi 62, xxiv 10, Dion. Hal. A. R. II 68, Nägelsb. N. Theol. p. 2, and nn. on Acts xiv 11. Celsus ap. Or. vii 35 says that in the sanctuaries of Amphiaras, Mopsus, and Trophonius ἀνδροποιεῖται θεωρεῖται θεοίν, οὐ ψευδομένοις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναργείς, and (III 24) that there were many living in his time to whom Asclepius had appeared, and granted healing; again (viii 45) 'all life is full of such divine manifestations'. Cf. also § 36, II 6 saepe voces exaudita, saepe visae formae deorum, 166, and Lucr. v 1161 nunc quae causa deum per magnas numina gentes perrugari et ararum compleverit urbes, | ...non ita difficile est rationem reddere verbi. quippe etenim jam tum divom mortalia saecula | egregias animo facies vigilantes videbant | et magis in somnis mirando corporis auctu | foll. This
is an explanation of the belief of the vulgar, the absurdities of which are shortly after pointed out: how far Lucretius himself allowed eviden-
tial weight to these visions is not clear. In iv 26 foll. he gives as his rea-
son for discussing the nature of the images (simulacra) the fact that
they take the shape of the dead and cause terror by presenting themselves
to us both awake and asleep, *ne forte animas Acheruntae reamur | effugere aut
umbrae inter vivos volitare*, and in 722 foll. he shows how such simulacra
may arise spontaneously in the air. It seems therefore that these images
can only be trusted in so far as they are supported by abstract reasoning.
Compare also Sext. Emp. Math. ix 25 (quoted by Munro) *'Επίκουρος δὲ ἐκ
tῶν κατὰ τοὺς ἄνων φαντασιῶν οἶεται τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐννοιαν ἐπικεῖσαι θεοῦ*
μεγάλων γὰρ εἴδεσθαι, φησὶ, καὶ ἄνθρωπομορφῶν κατὰ τοὺς ἄνων προσπεποτό-
tων ὑπέλαβε καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις ὑπάρχειν τῶν τοιούτων θεων ἄνθρωπομορ-
φῶς. The Stoic Balbus is in agreement with Epic. on this point; and
Aristotle (quoted by Sextus 1. c.) made these appearances one of the two
causes to which he traces the origin of religion, ἀπὸ δυοὶ αρχῶν ἐννοιαν θεῶν
Ἀλγε γεγονέναι, ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχήν συμβασιόντων καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μετεί-
ρων, the former owing to those ἐν τοῖς ἄνωι γεγονόμενοι ταύτης ἔνθυσιασμοὶ
cαὶ τὰς μαντείας: ὡς γὰρ, φησίν, ἐν τῷ ὑπνοῦ καθ’ έαυτὴν γένηται ἡ ψυχή,
tότε τὴν ιδιὰν ἀπολογοῦει φῶνα it exercises a prophetic power, just as
Homer tells us it does at the moment of death; ἐκ τούτων οὖν ὑπενόθην αἱ
Ἀνθρώποι εἴη τι θεῶν καθ’ έαυτὸν έικός τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ πάνω στηθημονικά-
τατον. See H. Spencer Principles of Sociology ch. x and Tylor quoted
below.

**primas notiones**: answering to *natura* above. We find the correspond-
ing Greek term used of the *προλήψεις* in Diog. L. x 38 ἀνάγει γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον
ἐννοίμα καθ’ ἓκαστον φθόγγον ἀλήθεσθαι καὶ μηδὲν ἀποδείξεως προσδείθαι
(if we have to any standard of reference).

**ne omnia—ad primas notiones.** The *προλήψεις* which arises instinct-
ively from the repeated appearances of Gods is contrasted with the ab-
stract reasonings which follow. The Gods must be of human shape, for
the most perfect nature must be also the most beautiful, and the human
shape is more beautiful than any other; again, happiness cannot exist
without virtue, nor virtue without reason, nor reason except in human
shape. The former argument is criticized § 77—86, the latter § 87—89.

§ 47. praestantissimam: ‘we are justified in believing that the most
exalted of beings, whether we regard his happiness or his eternity, must be
also (eodem) the most beautiful’. It would seem that both here and in § 45
we must explain the causal clauses vel quia and cum et aeterna by a reference
to praestans.

**figura:** the mathematical outline, a matter of fact; species, outward
appearance as distinguished from the inner nature; *forma* (§ 48), the form
artistically viewed as symbolizing the inner nature.

**vos quidem—divinam:** ‘you Stoics at least are wont, in displaying
the skill of the divine artificer’, see ii 87 and 134, and for *fabr*. § 19 n.
modo hoc, modo illud: so (Tusc. v 33) when charged with contradicting what he had said in the De Finibus, C. replies in diem vivimus; quocumque nostros animos percussit, id dicimus, itaque soli sumus liberi, cf. Att. xiii 25 O Academiam volatam ac sui similim, modo hoc modo illuc, also Div. i 62; and, of the Socratic irony, Læc. 13 qui non tum hoc tum illud, ut in plerisque, sed idem semper. [Add Ac. ii 121, 134, Tusc. i 40, Att. ii 15, Parad. 14, Div. i 120, ii 145. J. S. R.] For omission of verb, see § 17 n.

§ 48. pulcherrima est: so Madv. Fin. iii 58 in place of the sit of mss, on the ground that quae means quam pulcherrimam esse posui, humanam, not tali ut sit pulcherrima, cf. Sch. Opusc. iii 310.

ratio—hominis figura: cf. kai el logosmvnu ouk εχομεν εν αλη margin by dia tov anagrapson, phanerwv ou kal των θεων αναρωτομορφων χρη καταλειπεωv la συν logosμον την υποστασιν εχει Vol. Her. vi pt. 2 p. 21 (conjecturally assigned to Metrodorus). Here as elsewhere the Epicurean refused to go beyond his own experience: ‘numquam vidi’ (§ 87) thought apart from a human body, or as it would now be worded, ‘apart from brain’.

hominis esse specie. The Gen. is sometimes substituted for the adjective with the Abl. of Quality; cf. R. P. ii 28 § 48 (tyrannus) quamquam figura est hominis tamen immaneit vicit belias, Caes. B. G. vi 27 (uris) specie sunt et colore tauri, and Liv. xxxi 62 quoted below under niv soliditate. This arg. is criticized in § 89.

§ 49. quasi corpus: like the ειδελα of Homer and the ghosts of later times, cf. the interesting chapters on Animism in Tylor’s Primitive Culture esp. vol. i p. 449. The Epicurean Gods are of course material, but they are composed of the finest ethereal atoms, similar to those which constitute the rational soul, and are therefore capable of acting immediately upon it: see the passages quoted in n. on intermundia § 18, and the criticism by Cotta in §§ 71, 75, by Balbus in ii 59. Hirzel (p. 77 foll.) thinks that C. confounded the images which reveal the Gods to us with the actual Gods; and that the latter had more approach to substance than he allows them, as Philodemus (quoted by Zeller Stoics tr. p. 441) speaks of their taking food, and conversing together probably in Greek, cf. also Sch. Opusc. iv 336—359. The subject is discussed below. For the expression cf. Sen. Contr. i 12 § 11 quasi dissertus es, quasi formosus es, quasi dives es; unum tantum es non quasi, vappa (quoted in Roby § 1583), Pl. Stids. 552 foll., Plin. Ep. viii 16 quasi testamenta, quasi civitas, and the legal fictions quasi possessor, quasi pignus ece.

Ch. xix. quavis = ὅ ἡχόν, ‘every one’.
agnostere: ‘to feel their force’, Sch. Opusc. iii 315 and 363.
qui viderit: causal relative.
sic tractet ut manu: so R. P. i 15 (of Panaetius) qui quae vix conjectura qualia sint possimus suspicari, sic adfirmat ut culus ea cornere videatur aut tractare plane manu; Brut. 277 cum indicia mortis se compersisse et manu
tenere disceret. Lucretius speaks in equally high terms of his masters' speculations, i 74 omne immensum peragravit mente animoque formosam docet eam esse vim—ae ternae. This extremely difficult passage has been discussed by many writers, esp. by Sch. Opusc. III 315, and Neum. Jahrb. for 1875 pp. 687—691, as well as in the notes and app. to his ed.; but the first to give a satisfactory explanation of the whole was Hirzel in his Untersuchungen pp. 46—90. He translates as follows (p. 68): 'Epikur lehrt die Natur der Götter sei der Art, dass sie erstens nicht mit den Sinnen, sondern nur mit dem Geiste erfasst wird, und dass sie ausserdem weder Solidität noch individuelle Identität besitzen, wie die sogenannten οτρίμανα; vielmehr gelängten wir zur Erkenntnis des Göttlichen (denn das besagen die Worte quae sit et beatae naturae et aeterna) durch Bilder, die wir wahrnehmen' &c. I had long taken the same view of the construction of capere, and of the needlessness of Sch.'s emendations cernantur, cumque, beatae naturae. The clue to the right interpretation is to be found (1) in § 105, where the account here given is criticized by Cotta, and (2) in Diog. L. x 139 ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ φησι τοὺς θεοὺς λόγοι θεωρήτους, οὐ μὲν καὶ ἀριθμὸν ὑφεστῶτας, οὐ δὲ καθ’ ὁμοιοίοις ἐκ τῆς συνεχείας ἐπιρήμωσε τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτελεσμένων ἄνθρωποις. Philodemus seems to have treated of the subject in his περὶ εὐσεβείας, but unfortunately the passages relating to it are too corrupt to afford much help. See p. 110 δύναται γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ὁμοιότητος (συμβαθεία) ὑπάρχοσα (ἴδιοτης) διαμιῶν ἐκ τῆς τελείας εὐδαιμονίας, επειδὴ ἐν ἦπτον ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων συνεχείων ἑκάστης ἀποτελείσθαι δύναται. Gomperz despair of the passage (see his n. 'dieser mir zum kleinsten Theil verständlichen Columne') but it would appear to be a comparison between our ordinary modes of perception and the mode in which we arrive at a consciousness of deity; just as in the next page it is said 'if opponents charge Epicurus with denying the existence of the Gods, why might they not on the same ground charge him with denying the existence of horses and men, καὶ πάνθος ἀπλῶς τὰ κατὰ μέρος αἰσθητὰ τα καὶ νοτα φύσεων ἔδη?' The same subject is discussed in pp. 132—138, but only occasional phrases are legible, as τὴν καὶ ἀριθμόν στόχησον (C.'s ad nummum) in pp. 134 and 138, μήτε γὰρ ἀπόνων νομίζειν τοὺς θεοὺς μὴν συνῆθεν p. 136, apparently an exhaustive argument to prove the atheism of Ep. 'his Gods are neither atoms nor compounds of atoms, and what other entities are admitted by him?'

non sensu sed mente cernatur: cf. Lucretius quoted on quasi corpus, and § 105 speciem dei percipiendo cognitione non sensu. Sch. points out that while L. speaks of the tenuis natura and Cotta of the species, both referring only to the fine etherial body of the Gods, Vell. speaks more generally of vis et natura. This is because he is about to refer, not merely to the

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1 He calls it locum omnium difficilimum cuius certam omnibusque numeris absolutam interpretationem vis quisquam, ego certe hoc tempore proponere non possum.
immediate sensuous impression produced on the mind when its fine atoms are struck by the cognate atoms which constitute the divine \textit{imaginēs}, atoms which pass unperceived through the coarser sieve of the bodily senses, but also to the conception of blessedness and immortality to which the mind attains by reflecting upon the impressions it has received. It is the latter process which is properly expressed by \textit{cogitatio}.

\textit{nec soliditate—appellat.} At first sight it seems natural to take \textit{sol.} as an abl. of cause after \textit{cornmentur}; and so Sch. explains it by a reference to the distinction between the \textit{imaginēs} thrown off from solid bodies (the \textit{στερεόμανα}), which \textit{imaginēs} are described in Diog. \textit{L. x} 46 as \textit{ἀκρόρισσα τὴν ἕξις βίων καὶ τάξιν διαγρηγοῦν, ἣντερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς στερεομικοῖς έικον}, and a finer class of \textit{imaginēs} which reveal to us the shadowy form of the Gods. The expression would not be quite accurate, for even the finest images must in the end consist of atoms (since all that exists is summed up under atoms and void, according to Epic.) and \textit{soliditas} is essential to atoms of every kind; still in popular language (\textit{quadam=ut ita dicam}) it might be said that the images perceived by the bodily senses were perceived in virtue of a massiveness which was not shared by the images which were perceptible by the mind alone. The objections to this interpretation are (1) that it really adds nothing to what has been already said in the previous clause, though apparently contrasted with it by the word \textit{primum}, (2) that it is difficult to connect it with what follows, (3) that it is inconsistent with the words of § 105 \textit{nec esse in ea (specie) ullam soliditatem, neque eandem ad numerum permanere}, in which the absence of \textit{soliditas} is predicated of the divine form itself, not of the image, as distinguished from the form, in virtue of which negative property the image is perceived in a particular way. Accordingly Peter (\textit{Commentatio de N. D.} Saarbrücken 1861) and Hirzel take \textit{soliditate quadam} as a predicative Abl. of quality, of which the former cites several exx. (\textit{N. D. i} 12 \textit{veris falsa adjuncta tanta similitudine, 28 continentē ardore lucis orbem, 81 reliquos deos ea facie novimus, 84 his vocabulis esse deos facimus, 107 imaginēs ea forma, Liv. XXI 62 in agro Amīerno multis locis hominem specie procul candida veste visos nec cum ullo congressos, where there is the same accumulation of ablatives as here) and further illustrates by the following parallel \textit{in somnis mīhi oblata est imago leonis, ut non oculis sed mente cerneretur, neque ingenti corporis magnitudine neque densa juba, sed ferocitatem oculorum splendor prodiit}. Taking \textit{soliditate} thus as referring to the substance of the deity which has \textit{nihil concretī, nihil solidī} in it (§ 75), it is opposed to the previous clause which referred to the mode in which that substance was perceived. It cannot be denied that there is something very harsh in the construction of such an Abl. with \textit{cornmentur}, and I think it possible that \textit{sit} may have been lost after \textit{numerum} before \textit{ut}. The term \textit{στερεύμων} occurs repeatedly in the fragments of Epic. \textit{περὶ φύσεως} and in his Epistle to Herodotus preserved in Diog. \textit{L. x}.

We come now to the more difficult \textit{ad numerum}, which must evidently
be explained from the fuller expression in the parallel passage neque eandem ad numerum permanere, and this again, as Hirzel shows p. 55, is a translation of the Greek ταύτων καὶ ἀριθμὸν διαμένει 'remains numerically and identically the same', ἐν or ταύτων καὶ ἀριθμὸν being distinguished from ἐν or ταύτων καὶ ἐδοσ 'the same in kind', see Arist. Met. iv p. 1016 b, π p. 999 b, Categ. i 3 with Waitz's n., Themist. ad Nat. Quaest. iv 9, and Whately's Logic App. (on the ambiguity of the word 'same'). But will καὶ ἀριθμὸν carry this meaning by itself? For proof of this Hirzel refers to Bonitz's Index Aristotelicus s. v. ἀριθμός, see particularly Anal. Post. i c. 5, p. 74 where the phrase καὶ ἀριθμὸν is used of argument which applies only to a single individual triangle, as opposed to proper geometrical reasoning which deals with the triangle, quae triangle, universally. Similarly we have καὶ ἀριθμὸν ὑφεστώρας in the passage already quoted from Diog. L. It is impossible however to suppose that ad numerum standing alone could convey this meaning to a Roman; and though it is conceivable that C. may have put an unmeaning phrase into the mouth of the Epicurean advocate, it seems hardly credible that he should, without remark, have supplied the interpretation afterwards through the mouth of the Academic critic. I believe therefore that eadem has been lost between neque and ad, and that the true reading is neque eadem ad numerum sit. I postpone to the end of the paragraph the question, how we are to conceive of Gods not possessed of personal identity or individual existence. [Soliditate cannot possibly be an abl. of quality. Soliditatem quaedam might be taken as such with esse or a substantive, but not with a verb like cernatur. Why not treat it as abl. of cause, (cf. § 105 simulitudine cernatur) translating 'so that it is not perceived by sense or by mind, nor in consequence of any sort of solidity which it possesses, nor numerically, i.e. individually'? A causal abl. gives indirectly what is wanted, a description of the object which is the source of the cause. .R.]

sed—in intelligendam capere: the construction is made to depend immediately upon docet instead of being subordinated to ut. Sed contrasts the following positive with the previous negative description of the divine nature.

imaginibus simulitudine et transitione perceptis: the sense must be ascertained by a comparison of the parallel passages, § 105 eamque esse ejus visionem ut simulitudine et transitione cernatur, § 109 fluentium frequenter transitio sit visionum ut e multis una videatur, and shortly after innumerabilitas suppededita atomorum; Diog. L. l.c. οὕς δὲ (sc. θεῶν) καθ ἀμ-

1 A. Becker (Comm. Crit. 1865) gives a careful analysis of the passage and strongly condemns Sch.'s interpretation. He proposes to add permanere (of which he thinks primum a corruption) after numerum. Few will follow him in this.
pare also the very similar language used of perception and images generally, Diog. L. x 48 τῶν σωμάτων τού ἑντολής συνεχῆς σωμάτων αἷς ἐπιθέλεις ἀτιθήσαι διὰ τῆς ἀταναλήψεως, Lucr. iv 26 foll. esp. 87 ‘outlines of shapes fit about so exquisitely fine as each by itself to be invisible’, 104, 256 ‘the things themselves are seen, though the images which strike the eye are invisible’, 190 ‘the images succeed one another like the rays of light’, suppediatur enim confestim lumine lumen, 714 (accounting for the movements of shapes seen in dreams) ‘so great is the velocity, so great the supply of things’, tantaque sensibili quois est tempore in uno | copia particularum ut possit suppediatur; and see the passages quoted from Philodemus under docet eam esse vim. From these it would appear that the phrase must mean ‘when the images have become perceptible through their mutual similarity and their uninterrupted succession’. Any one image would be too fine to attract the attention, but the repetition of similar images ever streaming onwards, produces on the mind the impression of one unchanging object. A familiar illustration would be the rainbow, or the wheel of fire produced by rapidly whirling round a burning stick. I agree with Hirzel in rejecting Sch.'s explanation of similitudo as referring to the likeness between the images and the mind on which they impinge; on the other hand transitio, lit. ‘the passing before the eyes’ (as in Ovid Rem. Am. 615 multaque corporibus transitione nocent) appears to me to be a translation of the Gr. φοβά, not (as Hirzel takes it) of ἀταναλήψεως which is rather suppediatio. There is a slight inaccuracy here in the use of trans., it is applied as though by an ab extra spectator to a stream of images, not passing before, but coming full into the eyes or the mind.

cum infinita—affluat. Hirzel and C. F. Müller have adopted Brieger's emendation series, which certainly reads more easily with infinita. On the other hand species is the technical term to denote the mental impression produced by the imagines (cf. § 107 fac imagines esse...species dumtaxat obicitur; Div. ii 137 nulla species cogitari potest nisi pulsus imaginum; Fat. 43 visum objectum imprimit et quas signat in animo suam speciem) so that I should have been inclined to keep the old reading, translating ‘there rises up a never-ending impression of exactly similar images produced from countless atoms’, were it not for the following affluat, which is very suitably used of the series imaginum flowing in upon the mind (cf. Div. i. c.), but less suitably of the species which springs up within the mind itself as a result of the inflowing imagines. Still we have fuentium visionum § 109 where see n.

ex individuis: so § 110 effigies ex individuis corporibus eritur. The images were composed either of the surface atoms of the στρεφόμεν (Lucr. iv 67 praeassertum cum sint in summis corpora rebus | multa minuta jacae possint ordine eodem | quo fuerint et formati servare figuram) or of loose atoms floating about in the air (Lucr. iv 129 foll.). Zeller (Eng. tr. p. 443) strangely translates ‘pictures emanating from innumerable divine individuals’ (göttlichen Individuen in the original).
ad nos: the ms read ad deos which makes no sense; possibly it is due to a comparison of § 114; nor is Manutius' a deo, though supported by the quotation in Augustine Ep. 118, suitable after ex individuis; we want the terminus ad quem, that a quo being already supplied.

mentem intentam infixamque. The independent action of the mind is needed (1) to distinguish particular images; so Lucretius iv 802, explaining how it is that the mind only perceives a small part of the images which throng to it from all sides, quia tenuia sunt, nisi quae contendit, acuès cernere non potis est animus; praeordine omnia quae sunt praeterea pertinent, nisi si quae ad se ipse paravit; (2) to interpret them by meditation (ειροληθ' Epic. in Diog. L. x 62, lit. 'throwing oneself upon them', as in § 54 se injiciens animus et intentus, Lucr. v 740 animus injectus and 1047 with Munro's notes). Hence the expressions already discussed cogitaciones percipi, λυγεθεορτούς.

intellegentiam capere—aesterna: 'comes to understand what that being which possesses the divine attributes of blessedness and eternity', cf. § 96 praestantissima natura, eaque beata et aesterna, quae sola divina natura est, § 105 beatam illam naturam et sempiternam putet.

To treat now of the whole passage together, it may be thus translated, 'Epicurus teaches that the essential nature of the Gods is such as, in the first place, to be perceptible by the mind alone, not by the external senses; and in the next place, to be without the solidity, so to call it, and the individuality belonging to those bodies to which he gives the name of στερέμμα on account of their hardness: but (his account is) that through the perception of a long train of similar images, when an endless succession of such images forms itself out of countless atoms and streams towards us, then our mind intent and fastened upon these images apprehends with rapture the idea of a blessed and eternal being'. Comparing this with the parallel passage from Diog. L. we shall see that, supposing the latter to be correct, C. here confines his attention to the second class of Gods there mentioned, i.e. Gods who exist for us in

1 A writer in the Rev. de Philologie for 1877, p. 264 keeps the reading ad deos and explains as follows. The atoms flow together 'vers le point où ils constituent eux-mêmes par leur passage continuer l’existence des dieux...Les images qui se détachent sans cesse des dieux, après avoir formé un instant les dieux eux-mêmes, sont bien celles qui se rendent ensuite vers nous, et qui nous font connaître.'

2 Sch. altogether objects to the supposition of there being two classes of Epicurean gods, and would accordingly change ois μὲν, ois δὲ, reading ois μὲν (Gassendi's unsatisfactory suggestion) καὶ ἄφθιεν ὑφεκότας, γνωστοῦ δὲ καὶ διωκέον ἐκ τῆς συνεχούσ ἐνεργούσ κ.τ.λ. I see no reason for doubting the genuineness of the passage. It simply asserts in definite terms the conclusion which an attentive consideration of C.'s language forces on the reader, viz. that there were two distinct systems of theology recognized in the Epicurean school, one of a more esoteric nature, taken mainly from their great authority Democritus, the other more suited to the popular belief; which two systems have been not unnaturally confounded together by C.

10—2
virtue of a continuous stream of images combining to produce in us the impression of a human form. Such a description suits fairly with the account given of Democritus' theology (N. D. i 120) according to which the Gods are nothing more than combinations of ethereal atoms floating about as imagines; but it is difficult to see how it could be reconciled with the ordinary account of Epicurus' innumerable Gods of the intermundia, far removed from the sphere of those atomic storms which are ever making and unmaking the surrounding worlds. If the imagines which appear to men are composed of atoms thrown off from the Gods of the intermundia, why may not atoms find their way back again from our world to them, as in fact is asserted by Cotta § 114? How can beings which have no soliditas be continually throwing off those myriads of atoms of which the images are formed, especially when we consider the vast distance of the intermundia from the earth, and reflect that, radiation being equal in all directions, there must be the same crowding of divine images at every point of this immense circumference? Again, if the Gods have no separate individuality, how are they capable of conversing together and exhibiting an ideal of the philosophic life, as Philodemus asserted? And how are such Gods in any degree truer to the popular conception than the ἀέας καὶ πνεύματα which Philodemus charges the Stoics with worshipping (p. 84 foll.)? See Munro on Lucr. v 152. Assuming then, as we apparently may, that either Epicurus himself or some of his followers acknowledged a divinity of a more spiritual type, distinct from those of the intermundia, there is much in the description which is curiously suggestive of a theology with which we are familiar in the present day. When people understand by the name God 'a stream of tendency which makes for righteousness', or in other words, a predominating character in the events of life and the phenomena of the universe which answers to and calls out in us an ideal of goodness (and why not also which answers to and calls out our ideals of beauty and of wisdom?) they do not at first ascribe to God personality or numerical identity, but as they meditate on the impressions which they receive, they become gradually conscious of a unity, shaping itself, for some at least, ἀνθρωποειδές, into a human form, in which they recognize the features of the judge, the ruler, the father. Some such idealistic interpretation of the physical formularies of his school was certainly not more difficult to a religious Epicurean than the spiritualization of the myths was to a Stoic, and however far removed from ordinary Epicurean belief, it is not altogether inconsistent with some of the citations from Philodemus given under quod beatum § 45.

§ 50. summa vis infinitatis: suggested by the use of infinita just before. On the way in which Ep. connected the idea of infinity with the distribution of life, see Lucr. ii 522 foll., where he argues that the deficiency of animals, e.g. elephants, in one country is made up for by their excess in another, and that for the generation of any particular kind of animal it was necessary that there should have been an infinity of the atoms which
were capable of producing it by their union; and otherwise they could never have met together in the infinitude of space; and otherwise all infinites are equal according to Ep. (no doubt one of the points alluded to in the phrase *magna contemplatione dignissima*) it follows (I. 569 foll.) that the different kinds of atoms are equal in number, and that the elements of production and destruction wage an equal war (Lucr. v 392). Munro finds a further allusion to the law of *lovoquía* in vi 542; see his notes, and Hirzel 85—90.

*eam esse naturam—respondeant*: ‘such is the constitution of the infinite whole that all its parts are exactly balanced one against the other’. On the repetition of words in distributive phrases see Beier *Off.* 1 53.

*aequabilem tributionem*: ‘equal distribution’, a very rare meaning of *tributio*. [It is meant to be a literal translation of *lovoquía*. R.] See the Academic criticism in § 109, where *aequilibritas* is used to translate *lovoquía*. C. is the only authority who formally attributes this doctrine to Ep.; the word is used by Plut. *Def. Or.* 34 εἴσορ οὖν ἡ φύσις ὑπάρχει τῇν *lovoquían* ἐν πᾶσι, and the equilibrium of positive and negative forces is often referred to in the early philosophers, as Heraclitus and Empedocles; cf. too Plato *Theaet.* 176 on the necessary existence of an opposite to good, and Pseudo-Arist. *De Mundo* c. 5, Heracl. *Alleg.* 444, Orig. c. *Cels.* iv 63 (quoted by Sch.) on the necessary equipoise of the four elements.

*quaé interimant—quaé conservant*: this is not to be understood of substances or persons, but, as Lucr. ii 569 more accurately expresses it, of movements; *nece superare sequunt motus itaque exitialis | perpetuo neque in aeternum sepelire saltem | nec porro rerum genitalis auetificique | motus perpetuo possunt servare creata*. Since on the whole the destructive and conservative forces are equal, and since the destructive prevail here, there must be elsewhere a region where the conservative forces prevail, and what can this be but the *intermundía*? And, since mortals and immortals are equally balanced, and here experience shows that all is mortal, where can we find these immortal beings but in the Gods? In ii 1105 foll. Lucr. describes how a world gradually grows up under the shaping blows of the atoms, and then how, when it has once attained maturity, the destructive movements gain the upper hand, the constituent atoms fly apart, the external blows no longer weld the mass together, but break it down in ruin, a process of which, he says, we may already see the beginning in our earth. It is unkind to touch the card-castle of the Epicurean philosophy, or one might be disposed to ask why there might not be sufficient employment for the conservative forces in the constant building up of new worlds as the old ones perished, without finding a special seat for them in the *intermundía*; and how these *auetifici motus* are to show themselves in a place sacred from the intrusion of atoms.

*et quaerere*: proceeding to a new topic ‘and then’, so § 100 *et eos vituperabas*. 
Balbe, soletis: 'your school B. are accustomed'. Sch. compares De Orat. i 160 quid est? Cotta, quid tacetis? On the general question of the mixture of Sing. and Pl. see below, deorum and iis followed by agit, and so frequently in speaking of the Gods, e.g., § 101 deorum—habet, 106, 114 (vacant—cogitat), cf. 31 n. Madv. Fin. ii 22: Davies in loc. gives illustrations from the Greek.

quae degatur setas: 'how they spend their days'.

§ 51. nihil agit. Cotta's answer to this §§ 110, 114, 116, also Seneca Benef. iv 4 quae maxima Epicuro felicitas videtur, nihil agit, Diog. L. x 97 ἡ θεία φύσις πρὸς ταῦτα μηδαμή προσαγίσθει διὰ δεισιάρχης (vacatione munere below) διανοείσθαι καὶ ἐν πᾶσῃ μακαρίᾳ. That the divine happiness consisted in self-contemplation was asserted by Aristotle Met. xii 1072 b see n. on § 33. In accordance with this belief the wise man of Epicurus withdrew as far as possible from public life (Zeller Stoics p. 463).

implicatus: so Off. ii 39 negotiis implicantur, Acad. i 11 officiis implicatum.

exploratum habet: cf. § 1 n., Draeger § 143, Roby § 1402.

Ch. xx. § 52. sive enim—celeritate: see § 24 n. and the Stoic answer ii 59.

nisi quidem nihil beatum: Ep. held that happiness consisted mainly in drapagia. Cf. § 24 mens constant et vita beata.

in ipso mundo. According to the natural order this clause should have preceded its correlative, sive mundus deus est; it would then certainly not have had the ipso, and the force of ipso in the related clause would have been clearer. As it is, C. has carelessly repeated the emphatic pronoun, which has no meaning here, though there seems no reason for doubting its genuineness, as Sch. has done.

mutationes temporum: cf. § 4 n.

vicissitudines ordinesque: 'hendiadys=via. ordinatas', Sch.

ne ille est implicatus. Cf. ii 1 ne ego incaecus. In Cicero's writings ne is always followed immediately by a pronoun, and it usually occurs in the apodosis of a conditional or quasi conditional sentence. [I think that the rule about the pronoun holds good for Latin prose generally. The two passages of Livy formerly quoted for the absence of the pronoun, xxvi 31, xxxiv 4, have both been altered by Weissenborn. The rule as to the conditional has many exceptions, e.g. Att. iv 4 b ne tu eris; cf. Fleckeisen in Philol. ii 61—130. J. S. R.]

§ 53. beatam vitam in animi securitate: Fin. v 23 Democriti securitas, quae est animi tamquam tranquillitas, quam appellantur eβυπλα... ea ipsa est beata vita.

natura: not in the Stoic sense, but as used by Strato § 35, of a blind force, cf. Lucr. i 1021 foll.

fabrica: see § 19 n. Off. i 126 principio corporis nostri magnum natura ipsa videtur habuisse rationem;...hanc naturas tam diligentem fabricam.
imitata est hominum verecundia. It is what the Stoic means by his periphrasis *vim quandam incredibilem artificiosi operis* π 138.

innumerabiles mundos: Diog. x 45 ἀλλὰ μῆν καὶ κόσμοι ἄπειροι ἐστιν, εἰδ' ὅμοιο τούτῳ εἴτε ἀνόμωλοι ἢ τε γὰρ ἄτομοι ἄπειροι οὐδενὶ φέρονται πορφο-τάτοι, οὐ γὰρ κατατείχαται αἰ τοιάστω ἄτομοι ἐξ αὐτὸν ἄν γένοιτο κόσμος...οὔτε εἰς ἐνα σωτὴν εἰς πεπερασμένους...οὔτε οὐδὲν τὸ ἐμπόδιον ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν κόσμων.

ut tragici poetae: copied from Plato Crat. 425 u ὄστερ οἱ τραγῳδοποιοί, ἐπεὶ δὲν τι ἀφοροῦν, ἐπὶ τάς μηχανές καταφεύγουσι, ἔνιοι αἰνοῦν. So Arist. Met. i 4 p. 985 b Ἀραξαγόρας μηχανὴ χρήται τῷ νῷ πρὸς τὴν κοσμωπολίαν, καὶ ὅταν ἀφορήσῃ διὰ τὸν αὐτόν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑστὶ, τότε παρελθεὶ αὐτὸν, cf. Orelli on Hor. A. P. 191 and Erasmus Adag. on deus ex machina. ‘This device was so abused by Euripides that, in nine out of his eighteen tragedies, a divinity descends to unravel the complicated knot’, Schlegel Dram. Lit.

explicit — exitum: ‘to disentangle the issue of the plot’ ‘bring about the final development’, so fabulae exitus, Cael. 65; cf. the δίσις and λύσις of Aristotle, Poet. c. 18.

potestis: posseunt would be more correct, but C. compresses into one the clause of comparison and the principal clause, by the attraction of the verb of the former into the construction of the latter: the converse attraction is more common in Greek, esp. with ocy δεσπερ. In this way a simile passes into a metaphor, as in Hor. Ep. i 10. 42 quoted by Sch.; cf. too Ep. i 1. 2; 2. 42; 7. 74.

§ 54. non desideraretis: ‘you would not have missed’ ‘felt to be needed’.

se injiciens: see n. on mentem intentam § 49.

ita — ut: restrictive force, ‘however far it wanders, is still unable to reach the end.’ Cf. Zumpt § 726, Roby § 1704, and my n. on ita si § 3, and ita multa § 4, and the exx. in Sch.’s n. here.

nullam oram ultimi: ‘no limit of furthest’; Gen. of Definition, sometimes called Epeægetic. Sch. compares fines montium ‘the boundary formed by the mountains’: see Mayor’s Second Philippic, index s. v. genitive, Roby § 1302, Draeger § 202. For the thought compare Lucr. i 158 foll., esp. 980 oras ubicunque locatis | extremas, quaeram quid telo demiqué fiat. | Fiet uti nusquam possit consistere finis | effugiumque fugae prolatet copia semper; | also l. 72 and Fin. π 102.


follibus et incudibus: belonging to a fabrica, cf. § 19.

itaque: ‘by your notions of a creation’.

imposuitis in cervicibus: see Zumpt § 490 on the compounds of pono, Draeg. § 298 α and c, and my nn. on § 29 in deorum numero refert, and § 45 inculpisit in mentibus.

timeremus: on the Imperf. Subj. used after the true Perf. see Zumpt
§ 514 and my notes on § 3 fuerunt qui censerent, and § 8 profiscisse—vinceremur.

quis non timeat: cf. Acad. π 121 (of Strato who explained the origin of the world from natural causes) ne ille et deum opere magno liberat et me timore. Quis enim potest, cum existimet curari se a deo, non et dies et noctes divinus numen herreret et, si quid adversi acciderit—quod cui non accidit? extimescere ne id jure evenerit? To remove this fear was the pressed object of the Epicurean philosophy, as Ep. himself says in Diog. L. x 112 ει μηθεν ἡμᾶς αἱ περὶ τῶν μετεξώρων ὑποψίαι ἴνα ἀλλοι καὶ αἱ περὶ ἄνευτον, οὐκ αὐτῷ προσεπέμβα φυσιολογίας. Cf. Lucr. i 62 foll., II 1090, III 15, v 1194, vi 35 foll., Virg. Geo. π 490, Mart. Ep. iv 21.

curiosum et plenum negotii deum: 'a busy praying god.' According to the Epicureans the government of the world was both too small and too great a thing for God, see Lucr. II 1095 foll. quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi | indu mansu validas potis est moderanter habeas, quo pariter caelos omnis convertere? vi 68 quae (i.e. the idea of special providence) nisi respuit ex animo longeque remittis | dis indigna putare alienaque pacis eorum, | deliberata deum per te tibi numina sancta | saepe obseruat, and compare Div. π 105 negant id esse alienum magistate deorum. Seiicios casus omnium instrosicere, ut videat quid cuiusque conducat, and § 129 deosne immortales, rerum omnium praestantia excellentes, concursare circum omnium mortalium non modo lectorum, verum etiam abbas, et cum stertentem aliquem viderint, objiceris sus visum quae ampla tortuosa et obscure? Plin. N. H. π 5 irrideendum vero agere curam rerum humanarum illud quidquid est summum. Anne tam tristi atque multiplici ministerio non selling credamus dubtemus?

§ 55. hinc volbis exstitit. 'The Stoic doctrine of necessity was the direct consequence of the Stoic pantheism. The divine force, which governs the world, could not be the absolute unifying cause of all things, if there existed anything in any sense independent of it,' Zeller Stoics tr. p. 166. Fate is nothing but the will of God, which reveals itself as the reason and law of the universe, cf. § 40 n.

primum: taken up by sequitur materially below.

ut dicatis: depending upon and explaining dicitis 'in the sense that'.

aeterna veritate. That which is fated always has, is, and will be true, see Aristocles ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. τεται 14 τιν δε τοτων (things past, present and future) τιπλωκήν καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ οἴμαμέν καὶ ἐπιστήμαν καὶ ἀθέτεσαν καὶ νόμον εἴναι τῶν δύναμεν διάδραστων τυς καὶ ἀφυγον, Stob. Ed. i 180, Cic. De Fato 17, 29, 37.


aniculis: the stock example of credulity and superstition both among Romans (§ 94, π 5, Div. π 36, 141, Tusc. i 48; anialis N. D. π 70, π 12,
BOOK I CH. XX § 55. 153

92, Div. i 7, π 19) and Greeks (Plato Theae. 176 ο δ λεγόμενον γραφεί τόθεσιν, Gorg. 527, Wetstein on 1 Tim. iv 7 γραφής μυθου). In the treatise De Fato C. gives the academic argument against necessity, agreeing so far with Epic., but he strongly condemns the doctrine of the declinatio atomorum by which the latter endeavoured to disprove necessity, N. D. i 69, 73, Fat. 22. haec cui videantur: 'such a philosophy as this which holds'. sequitur: opp. to exstitit primum. qua tanta—colendi: 'through which, if we had been willing to listen to you, we should have been so infected with superstition that we should have had to pay regard to soothsayers, augurs, fortune-tellers, seers, interpreters of dreams'; har. (root ghar. hirae hillae ilia, χολιξ, cf. Curtius and Vaniček) foretold the future from the appearance of the entrails in sacrifices and from the phenomena of nature; aug. from the appearance and movements of animals, esp. from the flight of birds. These two were regarded as scientific modes of divination, in contradistinction to the un-scientific, uttered μανομένω στόματι, such as the Sibylline prophecies, and harialorum et vatum (on this word see Munro Lucr. i 102) furibundas prae-dictiones, and dreams, cf. Div. i 3, and Marquardt Röm. Staatsv. iii pp. 90, 393 foll. On the meaning and etymology of the word superstition see n 72 n. si vos audire vellemus. The Stoics strongly maintained the truth of divination, and urged the fact of its existence as one proof of the existence of the Gods, quorum enim interpretes sunt, eos ipso esse certe necessae est. C. argues against them in his treatise on the subject. § 56. his terroribus solut: see n. on § 54 quis non timeat and Zeller Stoics tr. p. 399. Cotta charges Ep. with imputing his own fears to others, § 86. in libertatem vindicati: 'claimed for freedom'; cf. Liv. iii 45 fin.; hence the verb by itself acquired the meaning 'to liberate', and the liberating rod was called vindicata. nec sibi fingere: see n. on § 45. naturam excellentem: so Seneca Benef. iv 19 'Epic. worshipped God propter majestatem ejus eximiam singularumque naturam'. See n. on § 45 habet venerationem. incohatam: 'incomplete'. In the Past Part. the verb always has a negative force, 'commenced, but no more than commenced'. dicendi ratio habenda fuit: 'it was my business to hear rather than to speak'.
C. Academic Criticism of the Epicurean Theology,
Ch. xxi § 57—Ch. xliv § 124.

**Preface.** Cotta, while expressing his belief in the existence of
the Gods; refuses to make any positive assertion as to their nature, but
altogether dissent from the Epicurean view. §§ 57—61.

atqui: 'nay'.

nisi dixisses—potuissēs: quoted in P. S. Gr. p. 472 as an ex. of the
Subj. of possum in apodosis where the ability to perform the action is
strictly conditioned, and cannot be viewed absolutely, as in the passages
cited in my n. on § 19 longum est. [There is a good ex. of the Subj. in
Quintil. v 11 § 29. R.]

roges—respondeam: 'should you ask me, I should reply'. On the
use of the hypothetical protasis without relative or conjunction see Roby
§ 1552. So just below quaereras—dicam, roges—utar.

aggregiar ad ea: so in III 7 agg. ad disputatianem.

§ 58. familiari illo tuo. Some MSS insert L. Crasso, but Madv. (Fin.
14) points out that a Roman orator (who in De Orat. III 77 foll. is made to
disclaim any special knowledge of philosophy) would be out of place here,
and that it would have been unnecessary to qualify one so well known by
the addition fam. i. t. He further mentions that one ms gives the alterna-
tive de Lucilio, de Crasso. There can be little doubt therefore that he
is right in considering L. Crasso a gloss taken from De Orat. III 78, where
the speaker Crassus alludes to Velleius as meus familiaris. The person
here referred to is, acc. to Madv. Phaedrus, whom C. had heard in Rome,
cum puero essesum Fam. XIII 1, but the conjecture is chiefly founded on the
supposed fact of Phaedrus being the author of the treatise now attributed
to Philodemus. As the latter appears to have resided in Italy for a longer
time than the former, some might prefer to explain the allusion of him.
I doubt however whether C. would have given such a vague reference to
either, and think it more likely that a name has been lost from the text.
Whoever he was, he must probably have been one who held the same
position in the house of Vell. which Diodotus held for more than 20 years
in the house of C., Antiochus in that of Lucullus, Philodemus in that of
Piso.

togatis: does not necessarily imply a Greek speaker (as Madv. i. c.).
In the Rep. I 36 Scipio speaks of himself as unum et togatis.

videor audisse: 'if I am not mistaken I often heard'. On the omiss-
on of mihi after vid. see Zumpt § 380 and Sch. here.

cum te—anteferret—anteferente. For the apparently intransitive use
of audio cf. De Orat. II 22 ex soeceru audivi cum dicetum, Parad. 45 multi ex
ter audierunt cum diceres; for the use of de, Brut. 100 audivi de majoribus,
and Draeg. § 286. 2; for the postponement of the cum-clause, see Roby
§ 1722, and for its use as a secondary predicate § 1724, also Draeger § 498, who says that it is usually preceded by saepe, as in Fin. v 54, De Orat. II 22, 144, 155. [His exx. are confined to C., add Virg. Aen. III 623 vidi egomet cum frangere. R.]
sine dubio. On the substantival use of the Neuter Adj. with prep. see Nüg. Stil. § 21, Draeg. § 23 foll.
dilucide, copiosae. Similar compliments are paid to the speaker in Fin. iv 1, 7, Acc. i 43, II 63. As Zeno is praised for the same merits below, and is equally censured for asperity in § 93, it has been supposed that C. intended Vell. to represent Zeno.
quam solent vestri: sc. dicere understood from dictum est. Epic. was as contemptuous of the beauties of composition as Bentham, cf. Fin. i 14 orationis ornamenta neglexit; in Brut. 131 Albucius (mentioned below § 93) is said to have turned out perfectus Epicurus, minime aptum ad dicendum genus; in Pia. 70 Philodemus is mentioned as litteris, quod fere ceteros Epicureos neglegere dicunt, perpolitus; Tusc. ii 7 (of the Latin Epicureans generally) quos non contemno equidem, quippe quos numquam legem; sed quia proficiunt ipsis illi se neque distincte neque distribute neque elegantem neque ornate scribere, lectionem sine ulla delectatione neglego; also Tusc. i 6, iv 6, Fin. i 26, Zeller Stoics tr. p. 385.
§ 59. Zenonem: cf. § 93, a native of Sidon born about 150 B.C. Atticus and C. attended his lectures at Athens 73 B.C. (Fin. i 16, Tusc. iii 38). In the latter passage, where he is called acrículus senex iatrum acutissimus, C. maintains a particular interpretation of the Epicurean doctrine of pleasure on the strength of his recollection of Z.'s lectures. Philodemus made great use of his writings, see Introduction on the sources of the N. D., and Hirzel p. 27 foll.
corophaeum. Κοροφαιος, from κοροφή (itself used metaphorically like vertex and apex), has the general sense of 'a leader' in Herodotus; but in later writers is commonly employed in the narrower sense of 'leader of the chorus' (the ἐσαρχειον of older poetry), cf. Donaldson Theatre of the Greeks pp. 29 and 215. From this special meaning the word again passes to a wider metaphorical sense, and is used of philosophers by Plato Theaet. 173 c, of Demosthenes by Dion. Hal. Rhet. i 8 (ἢν τοῦ ἡμεδαστοῦ χοροῦ ἡγεμόνα νε καὶ κοροφαιοῦ), of St Peter and St Paul by the ecclesiastical writers, cf. Erasmus Adag. pp. 485, 1079, 1497, Suicer a. v. Πάρης. The Latin form does not seem to occur elsewhere in the Classical writers.
cum Athenis essem. Though C. introduces himself to us at the beginning as an impartial auditor (§ 17) and though at the end (III 95) he says that his sympathies are more with Balbus than with Cotta, yet it is to the latter that he ascribes his personal experiences both here and in §§ 79, 93. So we learn from Att. xiii 19 that he had some thought of transferring to Cotta his own part in the Academica.
andiebam: 'attended lectures'.
et quidem—Philone: 'and in fact on P.'s own recommendation'.
usu venit: cf. Roby § 1238.

bona venia me audies. A wish is here implied by the Fut. Ind. as in the English idiom; cf. Roby §§ 1589, 1590.

§ 60. maxime in physicis. It will be remembered that this includes theology.


Ch. XXII. Simonides: the lyric poet of Ceos, b.c. 550—470, one of the illustrious circle (including Pindar, Epicharmus, Aeschylus) whom Hiero tyrant of Syracuse (d. 467 B.C.) attracted to his court. In Xenophon's Hieron Sim. is introduced as conversing with H. on the advantages and disadvantages of tyranny. Some of his gnomic sayings are discussed in Plato's dialogues, e.g. Protag. 339 B, Rep. I 331 B. Minucius (c. 13) reports the story correctly, but Tertullian carelessly assigns the words to Thales in answer to Croesus (Apol. c. 46, Ad Nat. II 2). On the general subject see Arnob. III 19 quidquid de Deo dixeris, quidquid tacites mentis cogitationes conceperis, in humanum transiet et corrupitur sensum... unus est hominis intellectus dei natura certissimus, si scias et sendias nihil de illo posse mortali oratione depromi; and the refl. in Church's n. on the famous passage of, Hooker I 2, 'our soundest knowledge is to know that we know him not as indeed he is, neither can know him'; also the catena on Docta Ignorantia in Hamilton's Discussions p. 634 foll. But this assertion that the Cause of all things passes understanding is not (as H. Spencer, for instance, maintains First Principles p. 101) inconsistent with the further assertion that he is possessed of certain attributes. A cause may be unknown in itself, but if we know its effects we can argue back from their qualities to its qualities, with a confidence proportioned to the number and variety of its ascertained effects. A child may be incapable of forming a general estimate of his father's character, but he is not thereby precluded from trusting and loving him as faithful and good. The opposite view leaves men helpless victims to any superstition, agnosticism being merely an exceptional and superficial phase, possible in the study or laboratory, impossible to retain and act upon amid the trials and difficulties of real life.

doctus—traditur: sc. fuisse. On such ellipses cf. Draeger § 116, P. S. Gr. p. 346, and Reid's Lat. index under 'ellipse'.


dicit—esset. This apparent exception to the Sequence of Tenses is generally explained on the principle that dicit=dixit, as in § 39 fluenter (where see n.), § 40 appellarent, Fin. III 71 verissime defenditur quidquid sequum esset id honestum fore with Madv.'s n., Draeg. § 152. 1, Krueger's Untcr. II 49 foll. Should it not rather be treated as a case of suppressed
protasis, 'which, if it had been used, would have been unworthy of a man of ordinary understanding'?

non modo philosophia sed prudentia: 'such as would have beseeamed, I do not say, a philosopher, but &c.' See Div. i 124 non modo plur a sed etiam pauiora with Allen's n. and Roby § 2240. For exx. of non modo in the 2nd clause cf. Mayor's Second Philippic § 107.

difficile est negare. Compare for a similar objection similarly met Div. ii 70, where C. the augur, is arguing against auspices 'difficilis auguri locus ad contra dicendum'. Marso fortasse, sed Romano facillimus.

credo si in contiones: 'I grant you it would be if the question were put in a public assembly, but in a party of friends, such as this, it is easy'. Cf. Div. ii 28 solis sumus, licet verum inquirere sine invidia, mihi praesertim de plerisque dubitantes, i.e. we may inquire whether divination is a reality without being called impious; also Varro ap. Aug. C. D. vi 5, where, after giving the famous division of religion into mythical (of poets), natural (of philosophers), political (of statesmen)—a division which we may compare with Gibbon's language 'the various modes of worship which prevailed in the Roman world were all considered by the people as equally true, by the philosopher as equally false, and by the magistrate as equally useful'—he goes on to say of the 2nd facilius inter parietes in schola quam extra in foro ferre possunt aures. So Torquatus is challenged to assert the doctrines of Epicurus in conventu aut, si coronam times, in senatu Fin. ii 74.

ego ipse pontifex. Besides representing the academic doctrine, Cotta, if we may judge from such passages as iii 5, 43, is intended to express the opinions of an older pontifex, Q. Mucius Scaevola, the friend and patron of C. and the author, according to Aug. C. D. iv 27, of the triple division of theology given above. While condemning the vulgar (mythical) theology as immoral and degrading, he preferred that the philosophic view should be held as an esoteric truth only, not communicated to the mass for whom stronger stimulants were necessary, which were to be provided in an innocent form by the State-religion. Varro describes it as follows, tertium genus est quod in urbisbus cives, maxime sacerdotes, nosse atque administrare debent. In quo est quos deos publice colere, quae sacra et sacrificia facere quamque par sit, Aug. C. D. vi 5. But as Augustine shows, it was impossible to purge this of the evils charged against the vulgar belief without entirely altering its character, a task which was beyond the power of any magistrate to effect. In the De Divinatione C. has the same rôle as Cotta here, and puts forward political expediency and popular belief as the reasons for upholding religion, retinetur et ad opinionem vulgi et ad magnas utilitates reipublicae mos, religio, disciplina, jus augurium, collegii auctoritas, Div. ii 70. It was the policy of the Empire, introduced by Augustus on the advice of his minister Maecenas; cf. the speech put into the mouth of the latter by Dion. Cass. iii 36, where the maintenance of the national religion and the prohibition of strange rites are recommended as the best protection against political revolution or conspiracy. But the attempt to retain religion simply as an
instrument of police has never succeeded. Without belief it is too weak
to be of service; with belief it is too powerful.

ego—is. On the use of is in reference to the First and Second Persons
see Draeg. § 40.

non opinions sed ad veritatem: 'not as a matter of faith merely (lit.
in the way of belief', Abl. of Manner, Roby § 1236, or possibly Abl. of
Instrument 'by means of belief') but in accordance with the actual truth',
cf. the opposition of καὶ δόξαν and πρὸς ἀλήθειαν συλλογιζομαι Arist.
Anal. Post. 1. 19 p. 81 b.
nulli esse: 'not to exist at all'. So § 65 quae nullae sunt, § 97 nulla
esse dicamus, cf. Madv. § 455 obs. 5.

§ 62. placet mihi deos esse. So we read of the Sceptics εὐσφήστη
tai ὁ Σκέπτικος κατά μὲν τὰ πάτρια θεό καὶ τοὺς νόμους λέγων εἰσιν θεοὺς καὶ
πάν τὸ εἰς τὴν θεωτικὴν βροχερεῖαν καὶ εὐσφήστην συντικὸν ποιῶν, τὸ δὲ δοσιν ἐπὶ
τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ζητοῦσι μὴν πρὸς τὴν σκεπτικοῦς, Sext. Emp. Math. II § 49. The
Academics' acceptance of the traditional creed 'on the authority of our
ancestors' (majoribus nostris atiam nulla ratione reddita credere debem, N. D.
I. 3) reminds one of Hume's scoffing patronage of Christianity against
'those dangerous friends who have undertaken to defend it by the principles
of human reason'. 'Our most holy religion', he says, 'is founded
on faith not on reason; and it is a sure method of exposing it, to put it to
such a trial as it is by no means fitted to endure'. There is a natural
affinity between the extremes of scepticism and of authority, as there is
between democracy and despotism.

C. b. Weakness of the argument derived from universal consent:
negatively, such consent is unproved; positively, many have held a
contrary opinion, ch. xxiii §§ 62—64.

Ch. xxiii. equidem—deorum sit. The question whether religious
belief is universal, is very fairly considered in Tylor's Primitive Culture
vol. 1 p. 377 foll. He gives the following as the result of his investigations,
as far as I can judge from the immense mass of accessible evidence, we
have to admit that the belief in spiritual beings (termed by him 'animism')
appears among all low races with whom we have attained to thoroughly
intimate acquaintance' p. 384. The doubtful nature of the facts alleged
by Sir J. Lubbock, in favour of the opposite view, is conclusively shown in
Flint's Antitheistic Theories ch. vii. See too Roskoff Das Religionswesen
der rohesten Naturvölker, and cf. n. on § 43 quae est enim gens. Simplicius
on Epict. p. 222 and Porphyrius Aebst. II 8 quote from Theophrastus
πελανείοιο (see the fragments collected by Bernays p. 56) an account
of a 'pre-Hellenic Sodom and Gomorrah'; the Thoes of Thrace who
were swallowed up by the earth in punishment for their atheism;
but Simp. says this is the only exception to the universality of belief.
Cotta's classification of atheists agrees with that given by Clarke Being
and Attributes ch. I, 'Atheism arises from stupid ignorance', i.e. from
stunted development, moral and intellectual (gentes efferatas of C.); 'or from gross corruption of manners', i.e. from abnormal moral development (sacrilegis of C.); 'or from false philosophy', i.e. from abnormal intellectual development (Diagoras, &c.): Plato Leg. x 886 & foll. assigns the two latter causes for the educated unbelief of his time, (1) ἀπερεία ἢδουντι τε καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦν ἕπι τῶν ἰσείβι βιον ὄρμανθαι τάς ψυχάς, (2) ἐμπλα τις μᾶλα χαλεπά, δοκοῦσα εἶναι μεγίστη φρόνησις; he further states that though he had known many who had professed atheism in youth, he had never met with one who retained this opinion in old age.

suspicio deorum: cf. opinio deorum § 29 n.

immanitate efferatas: 'so utterly barbarous', lit. 'run wild in savageness'. The words are often combined, e.g. πε ἐκκατοντ ἀπερεία καὶ τοῦτον ὄρμανθαι τάς ψυχάς, Tusc. iv 32 efferata et immania.

§ 63. Diagoras: cf. §§ 2, 117, 113 89. He was a native of Melos (hence the epithet ὁ Μήλιος = atheist, used by Aristophanes of Socrates Nub. 830), a disciple of Democritus, resided in Athens for several years, but fled from it to avoid an action for impiety in 411 B.C.; a price was set on his head for divulging the mysteries, cf. Schol. on Arist. Av. 1073 and Stahr's Art. in Dict. of Biog. Philodemus p. 85 maintains that he was a better theist than the Stoics, and says that any supposed writings of his which appear to show the contrary are either spurious or mere jeux d'esprit; in proof of this he quotes in the following from his genuine poems, θεός, θεὸς πρὸ παντὸς ἔργου βροτίαν νομᾶ φρένα ἑπερπάταν καὶ κατὰ δαίμονα καὶ τύχαν τὰ πάντα βροτίαν. Sext. Emp. Math. ix 53 says that he lost his faith after this was written, ἐδώκατος ὑπὸ τινὸς ἐπισημαντος, see Fabricius in loc.

Theodorus: see Introduction under Aristippus, Zeller's Socrates tr. pp. 342, 376 foll. and Dict. of Biog. Many striking sayings of his are recorded, as that on his banishment from his native country, κακῶς ποιώτερον ἱσείβω Κυρηνεῶν ἐκ τῆς Διβής εἰς τὴν 'Ελλάδα με ἐξορίωσε Diog. L. Ì 103, and his answer to Lyssimachus who threatened to crucify him, ἰστὶς quaeo ista horribilia minitire purpuratis tuis; Theodori quidem nihil interest humine an sublime putreascat (Tusc. I 102). He is said to have been saved through the influence of Demetrius Phalereus from being cited before the Areopagus, circ. 310 B.C.

nam Abderites: cf. § 27 n. Expressed in full the thought would be 'I need not ask the question about Prot. for he was condemned on that ground by the Athenians'. On Prot. cf. § 29.

neque ut sint neque ut non sint. The Greek is given by Diog. L. Ì 51 γερι μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἐν τοῖς εἶδόθων οὐθὲ εἰς εἰσιν οὐθὶ οὐκ εἶρεν. πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ καλῶτα εἰδέναι, ἦ τε δηλότησε καὶ βραχὺς ὅν ὁ βιος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, cf. Plato Theaet. 162 d. According to the ordinary use of words, C.'s translation could only mean 'I am unable to say either how they exist or how they do not exist', which is of course not the sense of the Greek. Are we to consider it a mistranslation, or a forcing of the usage of the language in order to give a closer representation of the Greek? The latter is the view
taken by Sch. in loc. and by Draeg. § 408, who calls it ‘ganz vereinzelt,’ but classes it with such essentially different uses as pugnare ut N. D. i 75, retinendum esse ut 95.

habeo dicere. This construction instead of the usual habeo quod dicam is said (Draeg. § 413) to be found only in Cic. Suet. and Gell., but Allen quotes Hor. Epod. xvi 23 melius quis habet suadere, Ov. Trist. i 1. 123 plura mandare habebam, [to which add Metam. ix 658 dare habebam, Pont. iii 1. 82 laedere habet, Lucr. vii 711 dicere habebam. J. S. R.] See N. D. iii 93 haec dicere habui de natura deorum (compared with haec habui quae dicerem, Lael. 104; Cato 85), and other exs. in Draeg.

Athemiensium—combusti. So Diog. l. c. diα ραωτην δε την δρωλην του συγγραμματου ἡμιληθη προς Αθηναιας και τα βιβλια αυτου κατεκισαν ει τη ψυχα, see the nn. in Hübner’s ed. We find the same names mentioned by Sext. Emp. Math. ix 51 foll. in a list of atheistical philosophers, but he adds Prodicus, Euhemerus and Critias, all of whom are introduced, the last without name, by C. in § 117 foll. where see nn. Fabricius in his note on Sext. l. c. mentions several other philosophers against whom the same charge was brought. Clem. Al. Protr. 2 p. 7 Sylb. gives a similar list, but will not allow the justice of the charge: ‘the true δεοε are not those who deny false gods, but those who deny the true and worship the false’. This is a retort upon the heathen, whose name for the Christians was δεοε, but Clemens fails to distinguish between the denial of what was false in the heathen religions, and the denial of religion in itself. There can be little doubt that in some cases, e.g. that of Theodorus, the denial was of the latter kind.

§ 64. quippe cum—potuisset: ‘seeing that in the case of P. the mere expression of a doubt had been punished’.

Tubulus: (L. Hostilius) cum unum ex omni memoria sceleratissimum et audacissimum fuisse accipimus, Scarr. i 5; Cui Tubuli nomen odio non est? Fin. v 62; cum praetor quaestionem inter sicarios exercuisset, ita aperte cepit pecuniias ob rem judicandam ut anno proximo P. Scaevola tr. pl. ferret ad plebem vellentem de ea re quaeri. Quo plebiscito decreta a senatu est consuli quasi et nulli. Caecioni; prefectus in exilium Tubulus statim, nec respondere ausus; erat enim res aperta, Fin. ii 54; N. D. iii 74; Gell. ii 7.

Lupus: Horace (Sat. ii 1. 68) and Persius (i 114) also speak of a Lupus satirized by Lucilius. He is generally supposed to be L. Cornelius Lentulus Lupus, Aedile b.c. 163, Consul 156, Censor 147, but Munro has shown that this can hardly be the case (Journal of Philology vol. viii p. 217). In the first book of his Satires Luc. made the Gods hold a council concerning his death, Serv. ad Aen. x 104.

Carbo: (C. Papirius) the partisan of the Gracchi who suddenly changed sides after the death of C. Gracchus, and defended his murderer Opimius; cf. Fam. ix 21 is et tribunus plebis seditionis et P. Africano vim attulisse existimatus est. Accusante L. Crasso cantharidas sumpsisse dicitur. In the
same letter C. says that with one exception all the Carbos had shown themselves bad citizens.

Neptuni filius: cf. Gell. xv 21 praestantissimos virtute, prudentia, viribus, Jovis filios poetae appellaverunt, ut Aeacum et Minoc et Sarpedon; fercissimos et immanes et alienos ab omni humanitate, tamquam et mari gentibus, Neptuni filios dicerunt, Cyclopa et Cercyona et Scirona et Laestrygones; Serv. ad Aen. iii 241 alii dicunt Harpyias Neptuni filias, qui fere prodigiorum omnium pater est,... sic et peregrinos Neptuni filios dicimus quorum ignoramus parentes; Cornutus 22 πάντας τῶν βιαίων καὶ μεγαλεπιβολῶν γενομένους, ὃς τὸν Κύκλωπα καὶ τῶν Λαιορναίων καὶ τῶν Ἀλκίδας, Ποσειδώνος ἑμίθεναν ἐγκόνων έίναι. Welcker Göttlerlehre ii 678 adds the names of Procrustes, Sinis, Amycus, Antaeus, Busiris, and refers to the various sea-monsters of fable: he also cites the phrase Neptuni nepos used of the Miles Gloriosus i. 15, and the reproachful words of Patroclus to Achilles, γλαυκή δὲ σε τικε θάλασσαν, περαι δ᾽ ἔβλασαν, δει τοι νόσοι ἀοτρίς δαμητρίς | ii. xvi. 34. Mr Gladstone (Juventus Mundi 241—251) connects this with his theory of the Phoenician origin of the worship of Poseidon, and suggests that there may be some allusion to ‘the rough manners of a seafaring and buccaneering people’. For the form of expression we may compare fortunae filius, ζωρράκων παιδε, and the Hebraistic viol φωτός &c. (Winer's Gram. p. 298 ed. Moulton.)

Lucilius: on the date of his birth see Munro l. c.; the best ed. of his fragments is by L. Müller, 1872, who has also written on his Leben und Werke 1876.

explorata: ‘clearly made out,’ §§ i, 51.

C. c. The atomic doctrine is opposed to science: if it were true, it would be inconsistent with the immortality of the Gods. When Epicurus, by way of evading the difficulty, speaks of quasi-corporeal Gods, he becomes unintelligible. xxiii. 65—xxvii. 75.

§ 65. unde: their origin from atoms; ubi their abode in the intermundia § 103 foll.; quales corpore human shape § 76 foll.; animo perfection of rationality and virtue § 87 foll.; via a blessed and everlasting repose, § 102, 111. The confused order of the book is shown in the repetition of these queries § 103.

atomorum regno et licentia: ‘the lawless rule of the atoms’, referring to their capricious and irregular movements, cf. § 69, and Fin. i 20 ‘if some atoms swerve, while others keep the direct line, primum erit hoc quasi provincias atomis dare quae recte quae oblique ferantur’, so Fat. 46 num sortiuntur inter se quae declinet, quae non? For the hendiadys cf. § 29 imagines earumque circuitus n.; for the use of licentia § 107 a Democrito omnis habe licentia, § 109 at quam licenter, Div. ii 127 ista designandi licentia ‘arbitrary apportionment’, also 150, and Fat. 15.

M. C. 11
in solum venit: 'turns up', 'is brought on the tapis'. The origin of the phrase is doubtful: Manutius, in his n. on Fam. ix 26 in convivio logouer quod in solum, ut dicitur, suggests that it refers to chance-sown weeds, but I think the word solum would be more naturally used in reference to what comes from above than from below; perhaps it may be connected with the legal res soli 'whatever comes on the ground' (counts as real property). [May not the phrase mean literally 'meets the foot', ἐμφοδέω γυρεύομαι? Cf. quidquid in buccam, in mentem venit. J. S. R.]

quae primum nullae sunt: 'for in the first place there are no such things as atoms', cf. § 61.

nihil est enim—corpore. Lambinus saw that some words must have been lost between enim and quod, and the gap has been supplied as follows by Sch. (partly from the parallel passage in Ac. i 27) quae primum nullae sunt: nihil est enim 'in rerum natura minimum quod dividit nequeat', to which he adds deinde, ut sint, moveri per inane non possunt, sicut et id dicit inane quod vacet corpore, thus providing an intelligible meaning for enim and primum, see his Opusc. III 287. Primum however might correspond to § 68 concedam—quid ad rem? And the autem which follows corporibus (unless with Heind. we read enim instead, according to one of the Codd. Eliens, so as to give a reason for moveri non potest) would suit better with some such context as this, moveri nisi per inane non possunt; inane autem id dicis esse quod vacet corpore; corporibus autem, &c. On the existence and indivisibility of atoms see Lucr. i 483—635; on the existence of void as essential to motion 329—397. For the views of Leucippus and Democritus cf. Introduction and R. and P. §§ 79, 80.

Ch. xxiv § 66. physicorum oracula fundo: 'in this I am merely the mouthpiece of our scientific oracles'. On orac. cf. Orat. i 200, domus juris consulti oraculum, Plin. Nat. Hist. xviii 6, and 8 (of the precepts of Cato and other writers on agriculture), cur non videantur oracula?...ex oraculo scilicet;...inde illa reliqua oracula; Quintil. xi 11 (of the help which a young orator might receive from an experienced pleader) juvenes veram dicendi viam velut ex oraculo potent; x 1 § 81 (of Plato). On fundo cf. § 42 poetarum vocibus fusa. C. gives the same report as to the views of the natural philosophers in Fin. 1 20 ne illud quidem physici (est) credere aliquid esse minimum, Fat. 24 physici quibus inane esse nihil placet, Ac. ii 125 tune aut inane quiumquam putes esse, cum ita completa et certa omnia, ut et quod movebitur corporum cedat, et quia quidque cesserit alius dico consequatur? The majority of the ancient physici1 followed Aristotle in (1) affirming the infinite divisibility of matter, Phys. vi 1 πάν σωμάτων διαπέρτων εἰς ἐν διαπέρα. Cael. iii 4 (of Democritus and Leucippus) ἀνάγκη μάχεσθαι ταῖς μαθηματικάς ἐπιστήμαις ἀτομα σώματα λέγονται, Gen. et Corr.

1 'The Platonists however showed some tendency towards atomism; compare the indivisible triangles of Plato, the ἄτομα γραμματικά of Speusippus, and the θύρα of Heraclides'. J. S. R.
BOOK I CH. XXIV § 66.

12 ὡς ὃτι καὶ διάκρισις καὶ σύγκρισις ἄλλ᾿ ὃτι εἰς ἄτομα καὶ ἐξ ἄτομων, πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ διάνομα: and (2) denying the existence of vacuum, Phys. iv 6—9 (where the conclusion is given in the words ὃτι ἀποκεκρυμένον κενὸν ἐστιν, ὃι ἀπλῶς, ὃτι ἐν τῷ μανθῷ ὀφεῖ θέαμει, i.e. void does not exist either separately or inclosed in bodies as a cause of rarefaction), see also Cleomedes i 1. The Stoics held that the world was a plenum, but that outside of it there was an infinite vacuum Diog. vii 140, Zeller Stoics tr. p. 185—192.

Dr Whewell (Scientific Ideas ii 48—63) while allowing the value of the molecular hypothesis as an instrument of discovery, points out many difficulties which stand in the way of our accepting it 'as a philosophical truth respecting the constitution of the universe'; cf. also Veitch Lucretius and the Atomic Theory and Clerk Maxwell's Art. on 'Atom' in the Encyc. Brit. As to the existence of vacuum the results of modern science are thus stated, 'the undulatory theory of light supposes the whole of the celestial spaces to be filled with the luminiferous ether. The astronomical argument therefore in favour of absolute vacuum has fallen; but the views of the constitution of matter which have grown with the rise of the molecular sciences of chemistry, light, heat, electricity, &c., have supplied its place with much more effect. The inference to which the modern philosophy would give the greatest probability is that all space is occupied by particles of matter with vacuous interstices, showing all degrees of density'. English Cyclopædia under Vacuum.

vera an falsa nescio. In the Introduction reasons are given for believing that Cotta's speech is borrowed from a Stoic source, but C. adds clauses like this to impart to it an Academic colouring.

flagitia: 'atrocities'; so just below and iii 91, cf. the use of monstrosa, portenta, &c., § 18 n.: one may excuse such scurrilities in the mouth of the Dogmatists, but they are scarcely appropriate for an Academic. The construction is resumed in hanc opinionem.

sive etiam ante Leucippi. C. expresses himself doubtfully because Epicurus denied that Leucippus had ever existed, Diog. L. x 13, Hirzel p. 184.

corpuscula—adunca. Lucretius ii 333 foll. shows how the qualities of bodies are derived from the various shapes of the constituent atoms, some levia and rotunda, some aspera and hamata, mucronibus unca or angellis prostantibus; cf. Theop. Caus. Plant. vi 6 (quoted in Mullach's Democritus p. 217) Δημόκριτος δὲ σχῆμα περιτίθει ἐκάστῳ γυλύκῳ μέν τὸν στρογγύλον καὶ εὔμεγεθείς ποιεῖ, στριφύλων δὲ τὸν μεγάλασχημον τραχύν-τε καὶ πολυγώνων καὶ ἀπεριφερῆ, μὲν δὲ τὸν ὁξύν τῷ ὄγκῳ καὶ γωνοειδῆ καὶ καμπύλων κ.τ.λ.; Cic. Ac. ii 121) fr. 28 (where uncinatus answers to aduncus here), Lactant. De Ira x. In Pseudo-Plut. Plac. Phil. i 28 p. 877 it is denied that the atoms were ἄκυκτοι ὡς τριαμοειδῆ μήτε κρικοειδῆ, ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ σχῆματα ἐφάραντα εἶναι, αἱ δὲ ἄτομα ἀπαθεῖς ἀδρανοῦτοι; but Aristotle (Frag. 202 p. 1514) distinctly says that, according to Democritus, the atoms were τὰ μὲν σκαλνά, τὰ δὲ ἄκυκτρωδῆ, τὰ δὲ κολά, τὰ δὲ κυρτά, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀναρίθμουσα

11—2
ἔχωνα διαφόρας, a point in which he differed from Epic. who made the atoms infinite in number, but limited the variety of shapes, see Lucr. l.c. The text here is extremely doubtful. Heind., who re-writes the sentence, pertinently asks what is the force of quae before a simple word such as adunca. Ang. and pyr. are both Ær. ley.

quaedam—alia—partim—quaedam: cf. § 103 Tusc. v 38. Similarly we have modo and tum irregularly combined for the sake of variety in § 34. [I think it is necessary to insert another alia before levia. Quaedam merely marks the unfamiliarity of corpusculeum to translate ἀτόμος (so first used by Amafinius, see Ac. l 5). Also the pause seems to come after quaedam. J. S. R.]

nulla cogente natura, sed concursu quodam fortuito. This is a correct statement of the theory of Epicurus, but is inapplicable to Democritus, who spoke of chance as the fiction of human inconsiderateness (ἀνθρωπος τύχης εὐδοκῶν εὐλαβείρα πρόφασιν ἰδιός ἐξουλίης Mullach p. 167) and said that nothing was made at random (οὐδὲν χρῆμα μάτην γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης Mullach p. 226). So Arist. Gen. An. v 8 Δυσκόριτος δὲ, τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἀδείας λέγειν, πάντα ἀνάκει εἰς ἀνάγκην οὐ πρὸ φῶς, and Π 6; though he elsewhere censures him for naming no cause, Phys. vii 1 ad fin. θλος δὲ τὸ νομίζειν ὁρκὴν εἶναι ταύτην ἰκανήν, ὅτι ἄει ἡ ἰστίν οὐσιω ἡ γίγνεται, οὐκ ἄρθρον ἔχει ἐπολαβεῖν, ἐφ’ ὅ Δυσκόριτον πᾶς περὶ φῶςος αἰρεῖ, σὲ οὐ τι καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἐγινέρα, which (in Phys. Π 4 and 5) he treats as equivalent to making τὸ αὐτόματον the cause. While C. uses the word fortuitus of the atoms of Democritus in Tusc. i 22, 42, Ac. i 6, as well as here; in the De Fato 23 and 39, he more correctly connects the universal perpendicular movement of the atoms with the doctrine of fate, id Democritus accipere maluit, necessitate omnia fieri, quam a corporibus individuis naturales motus avellere, cf. § 69 below.

hanc tu. So in Div. ii 73 the apodosis commences with hoc tu auspicium.

priusque te quis—dejecerit. The indefinite quis is rarely found except in connexion with conjunctions or relative pronouns or with the verb dixerit, see Zumpt § 708, Drasig. § 44. [It is not easy to say whether dejecerit should be classed as Subj. or Ind., see Gr. §§ 1540, 1541. I am inclined to take it as Ind. cf. Liv. viii 40 vos prius in me strinxeritis ferrum quam in vos ego, Verr. iv 59 dies me citius defecerit quam nominam, Planc. 79 sed me dius fidius multo citius meam salutem pro tu abjecerem quam Con. Plancii salutem tradidero contentioni tuae. The comparative adverb is frequent in these sentences. R.]

vitae statu: a common phrase in C., e.g. Verr. ii 10 ‘the lamentations of the Sicilians made me abandon my rule of never taking part in a prosecution’ (de vitae meae statu deducerent ut ego istum accusarem). Deiocere de statu (Orator 129) is a metaphor borrowed from the ring ‘to knock a man out of his attitude’. ‘It would be easier to make you change your whole posture of life than to stop you from following his teaching’.
ante enim—amittere. Cf. n. on § 17 libero judicio, and Zeller Epicureans, tr. p. 394, where many passages are quoted in illustration of the rigid dogmatism of the Epicurean school. Thus the last words of the founder to his disciples were τῶν δογμάτων μεμνήσθαι Diog. L. x 16; any divergence from the dogmas was looked upon as παρακόμημα, μάλλον δὲ ἀνέκδημα, καὶ κατέγραφαι τὸ καυσομοδένε, Euseb. Praep. Ev. xiv 5; and Philodemus (quoted by Hirzel p. 107) says that Epicureans who are guilty of schism o ν τῶν μακρὸν τῆς τῶν παρακολούθων κατάδειξαι ἀρεστήκασιν. Hirzel however has shown (pp. 98—190) that there was more of movement and variety in the Epicurean school than has been generally recognized. Quintilian xii 2 says the same of philosophers in general, hoc inter ipsis qui, velut sacramento rogati vel etiam superstitione constricti, nefas ducant a suscepta semel persuasione discedere.

§ 67. quid enim mereas: 'what would tempt you to abandon the system?' lit. 'what would you take as pay, what bribe must one offer you?' Sch. quotes Fin. II 74 quid merearist ut dicis te omnis voluptatis causa facturum? Verr. IV 135 quid arbitramini Reginos merere velle ut ab illis marmoreas illa Venus ausseratur? cf. also Phil. I 34 putamine illum immortalitatem mereri voluisse ut propter armorum habendorum licentiam metueretur, where see var. nn. It is a colloquial phrase and occurs not unfrequently in Plautus.

 nihil—deseram: 'nothing would tempt me to forsake happiness and truth'.

 ista—est veritas: for the attraction of istud see §§ 77, 122, and Roby § 1068.

 nam de vita—langueat: 'as to happiness I make no objection; your system may be productive of that inactivity which you call happiness'. Plane otio langueat: 'absolutely dying of ennui', cf. § 7.

 sed ubi—fingentibus: 'can unchanging truth exist in those ever-changing worlds, or in senseless atoms?'

 mundis innumerabilibus: cf. Fin. I 21 innumerabiles mundi qui et orientur et intercet cotidie and my n. on § 53. Epicurus defines the term in his epistle to Pythocles (Diog. L. x 88) κόσμος οἵ τις οὐρανοῦ ὄστρα τα καὶ πάντα τὰ φανόμενα περιέχουσα, ἀποτομημέν ἔχουσα ἄνθρωποι. Worlds are infinite in number, of all shapes and sizes, and perish, not as Democritus said from collision with other worlds, but from their own perishable nature (Diog. 90, cf. Lucr. v 235 foll.).

 omnibus minimis: so II 141 omnes minimos frigoris appulseus, III 86 in regnis omnia minima curant, cf. Madv. on Fin. III 3.

 nulla moderante natura: apparently contradictory to § 53, where Vell. says the world is natura effectum: but there natura is opposed to an intelligent agent, here it is used rather in the Stoic sense and opposed to the capricious movements of the atoms, cf. Sch.'s n. here and my n. on § 65.

 liberalitatis: his promise in § 52 to pass over all that was common to
Ep. with other philosophers, including therefore his atomic doctrine so far as it was the same with that of Dem.; cf. Fin. 18 sed hoc commune vitium (the general atomic doctrine), illae propriae Epicuri ruinae (the declinatio).

[tecum uti: 'employ in my dealings with you', cf. hoc tecum oro Pl. Bacch. 491, doce atque aequi misti capiendum est cum illo Most. 1055 with Lorenz's n. Ussing on Asin. 655, and my Gr. § 1885. R.]

§ 68. sint sane—ante quam nati. For the ellipse of the verb with aeterni, nulli dei, and especially in the subordinate clauses quod ex atomis, si natum, see Draeg, § 116, (who compares ut tu Velleius and quod hominum linguae § 84) and Roby § 1443, who cites § 110 sine virtute certe nullo modo foll.

Paulo ante—disputabas: see § 20. To avoid this palpable inconsistency, some Epicureans appear to have introduced a third principle, besides atoms and void, in the ὀμοιότητες, otherwise called ὀμοιόμερα or στοιχεῖα, Plut. Plac. Phil. p. 882 A, Stob. Ed. p. 66; but if we arrived at a right conclusion in our discussion of § 49, this 3rd principle consists only of a subordinate class of atoms composing the divine images which are always streaming in upon the soul. It might be argued that these have nothing concreti about them, but merely produce an impression of a continuous form by their ceaseless repetition; that they have never coalesced into an actual whole, and are therefore in danger of no dissolution. It is doubtful how far such a defence could apply to the images; in any case it is not applicable to the ordinary Epicurean Gods of the intermundia. The considerations which seem to have been urged for the immortality of the latter by the disciples of this school are (1) the equilibrium described in §§ 50, 109, (2) the preservative influence of goodness alluded to in Plut. Def. Orac. p. 420, where the Epicurean argues against the demons of Empedocles on the ground ἀτις οἱ δυνάτων έστιν φαύλοις καὶ ἁμαρτητικοὶ διὸς μακαρίους καὶ μακραίων εἶναι πολλῆς τυφλότητα τῆς κακίας ἐχοῦσης καὶ τὸ περιστρατικὸν τοὺς ἀναρτητικοὺς ('susceptibility to destructive influences'). To which it is replied that goodness has nothing to do with the duration of the bodily organism, δεν οὐκ εἰ τῷ θεῷ τῆς ἀδιότητα ποιουσίν ἐκ φυλαξίς καὶ δικαιούσεως τῶν ἀναρτητικῶν.

Quod cum efficere vultis: 'for when you would prove this' (that the divinity is possessed of such attributes).

In dumeta correpitis: 'you hide yourself in the thickets'. Cf. Ac. π 112 cum sit enim campus in quo exsultare possit oratio, cur eam tantas in angustias et in Stoicorum dumeta compellimus? So often spinæs and spinosus with a slightly different force, of the perplexing arguments of the Stoics.

Ita: explained by the following infinitival clause, as in Fat. 24 τα dicitur, ulla aliquad sine causa, Tusc. 171 τα dixerat, duas esse viae, III 41 ita—taetiam esse, see Madv. Fin. π 13, 17, III 58, v 77; and compare the use of the epexegetical clause after a demonstrative or relative, Draeg. § 484.
CH. XXV § 69. hoc persaepe facitis—possit. Three examples follow, (1) the declination of atoms, (2) the denial of the disjunctive judgment (§ 70 idem facit contra dialecticos), (3) the assertion of the infallibility of sensations (§ 70 omnes sensus veri sensus), all preparing the way for (4), with which we are here concerned (§ 71 idem facit in natura deorum). The same points are criticized elsewhere by C. e.g. (1) in Fin. i 19, Fat. 22, 46; (2) in Ac. ii 97, Fat. 18 foll.; (3) Ac. ii 79, see the following notes.

ut satius fuerit. Satius est being used in the Ind. like aequius est, melius est, where we might have expected the Subj. (see n. on longum est § 19), satius fuerit would mean ‘would have been better’. It is here subordinated to ut, like molestum sit in § 2.

si atomi—nupte pondere. This was the only natural and necessary movement of the atoms according to Dem.; but since the larger and heavier atoms overtook the smaller and lighter in their downward descent, by striking against them, they initiated a secondary movement, which might be in any direction, but which resulted finally in the creative vortex. The authorities on which this account rests are given by Zeller, who points out that some of the ancient writers neglected to notice the original movement, and made Dem. assume as his first principle, either the motion of mutual impact, ἀθραφή (as Cic. Fat. 46 aliam quandam vim motus habeant (atomi) a Democrito impulsionis, a te Epicure grativatis et ponderis), or even the resulting vortex, δει (e.g. Diog. L. ix 44 φέρεσθαι ἐν τῷ διπλ δινομένας τὰς ἀτόμους).

nihil fore in nostra potestate. Epicurus ap. Diog. L. x 134 speaks of the blessedness of the man who has learnt that necessity, to which others assign a despotic power, is only a name for the results of chance or of man’s free will, ἐπει κραίττων ἵν τῷ περὶ θεῶν μέγω κατακολουθήν ἡ τῇ τών 

v.i. euiарμπή δουλείας ὅ ἡν γὰρ ἐπίθετα παρατήρεις ἡπογράφει θεῶν 

διὰ τιμῆς, ἢ δὲ ἀπαρατήτων ἔχει τῷ ἀνάγκην. The same reason is assigned for the introduction of the ὅλον in Fat. 22 foll. (cf. 46 foll.) Epicurus veritus est, ne, si semper atomus gravitate ferretur naturali ac necessaria, nihil 

liberum nobis esset, cum ipa moveretur animus ut atomorum motu cogitaret, to which the Academic disputant replies (1) that the single downward movement does not necessarily involve the doctrine of necessity, and (2) that in any case the supposition of the ὅλον would not avert such a consequence. Philodemus, in his treatise περὶ σημείων (Gomp. p. 44), allows that this movement cannot be proved from the fact of free will, unless it is consistent with our experience on all points, οὔ ἔκαστον εἰς τὸ προσδείασθαι 

tάς ἀτόμουν παρεγκλίασε τῶν ἀτόμων διὰ τὸ τυχρόν καὶ τὸ παρ’ ἁμαρτί αἱ ἔνωσις (causal use of παρά) ἀλλὰ δεὶ προσεπεδείξα μας καὶ τὸ μηδαμόν ἐπερωθιόμεθα τῶν ἐναργῶν. Accordingly we find another reason given in Fin. i 19 viz. that as all atoms move at the same rate in vacuo (οὕτω γὰρ τὰ βαρέα διὰ τῆς ὄσις των μικρῶν καὶ κούφων, δεν γε δὴ μηδεν ἀπαρτιν αὐτοῖς Diog. L. x 61)—a point in which Ep. corrected the erroneous doctrine of his predecessor—there was no possibility of one overtaking the other, but all must move
downwards in parallel lines without any meeting or collision. Both reasons are combined in Lucr. ii 216—293.

nihil fore—quod esset: in direct speech, nihil erit quod est.


decinunre paululum = κυνιόστατον κατά παράγλασιν Stob. Eel. p. 346; cf. Fat. 22 cum decinat atomus intervallo minimo, id appellat ἀλαχολον. [Similarly Fin. i 19 decinare atomum perpaulum, quo nihil fieri positum minus; Lucr. ii 219 paulum, tantum quod nonem mutatum dicere possis. J. S. R.]

§ 70. hoc dicere turpiter est: cf. Fin. i 19 ait enim decinare atomum sine causa; quo nihil turpiter physico, quam fieri quiaquam sine causa dicere, and Fat. 18.

dialecticae. The word διαλεκτική, used by Plato for philosophical discussion and then for philosophy itself, was restricted by Aristotle to the Logic of Probabilities, while he gives to Formal Logic the name ἀριθμητική or ἐπαθετική ἐπιστήμη. By the later schools (excepting the Stoics who gave a wider meaning to λογική) λογική and διαλεκτική were used indiscriminately for the science of reasoning generally, as in Fin. i 22 in altera philosophiae parte, quae est quaerendi et dissersendi, quae logiçi dicitur, iste vester (Epicurus) plane inerminus ac nudus est; Fat. i tota est logiçi, quam rationem dissersendi voco; De Orat. ii 157 videos Diogenem fuisses qui diceret artem se tradere bene dissersendi et vera ac falsa dijudicandi, quam verbo Graeco dialekτικη appellaret? cf. Fin. ii 17 foll., where we find also the term dialectici used of logicians in opposition to rhetores; so in Div. ii 11 it is opposed to physici, see Zeller Stoics tr. p. 69 foll.

disjunctionibus, in quibus aut etiam aut non poneretur. Cf. Ac. ii 95 fundamentum dialecticae est, quidquid enuntiatur—id autem appellant αξιωμα—aut verum esse aut falsum; § 97 etiam cum ab Epicuro, qui totam dialecticam et contenit et irritat, non impetrent ut verum esse concedat quod ita effabimus ‘aut vivet crus Hermarchus aut non vivet’, cum dialectici sic statuant omne quod ita disjunctum sit, quasi aut etiam aut non, non modo verum esse sed etiam necessarium; (vide quam sit catus is quem isti tardum putant. Si enim, inquit, alterutrum concessero necessarium esse, necesse erat crus Hermarchum aut vivere aut non vivere. Nulla autem est in natura verum talis necessitas)—cum hoc igitur dialectici pugnent, id est Antiochus et Stoici; totam enim evertit dialecticam. Nam si e contrario disjunctio (contraria autem ea dico cum alterum atit alterum negat) si talis disjunctio falsa potest esse, nulla vera est; Top. 56 dialecticorum modi plures sunt qui ex disjunctibus constant: aut hoc aut illud: hoc autem: non igitur illud. Itemque, aut hoc aut illud: non autem hoc: igitur illud. Quae conclusiones idcirco ratae sunt, quod in disjunctione plus uno verum esse non potest. It is the principle now known as the Law of Excluded Middle (see Hamilton Logic vol. i pp. 83, 90 foll., Ueberweg Log. tr. pp. 235—284, Mansel Prod. Log. p. 208 foll., Arist. Met. iii 7 p. 100, Prantl Gesch. d. Log. i pp. 143, 403, 449 foll.), and upon it is grounded the dichotomic or bifurcate division so
much favoured by Plato (e.g. *Sophist*, p. 282 foll.) and in later times by Bentham. For an account of the Disjunctive Judgment, see Mansel *Proleg. Log.* p. 236 foll., Hamilton i 239. The Stoics, who prided themselves on their logical refinements and were especially distinguished by the name dialectici, called it δὲ ημια διεξεγέρσαν, thus explained by Diog. L. vii 72 διεξεγήσαν δείκτην ό ύπ’ τού “ήμια” διαζευγματικού συνδέσμου (‘disjunctive conjunction’) διεξεγήσαν, ούν “ήμια ήμερα δείκτην ή νικής δείκτην.” επαγγέλλεται δὲ δ’ συνδέσμος ούτος τό έτερον τόν απεικόνισαν ψευδός ειναι. For etiam cf. Madv. § 45 (on affirmative and negative answers).

**pertinuit ne—fieriet necessarium.** The Stoics held that their principle of Necessity was involved in the Disjunctive judgment applied to future events, as may be seen argued at length in *Fat.* 20 foll., e.g. Since it is absolutely necessary that a man now living must at a given date in the future be either dead or alive, whichever of the two proves eventually to be true must be now a necessary truth though unknown to us; or, more shortly, his existence or non-existence at that date is a necessary truth; which of the two it is, will be made apparent by the event. Aristotle discussed the point in his treatise *De Interpretatione* ch. 9 foll. ‘in regard to the present or past, affirmative or negative judgments of existence are necessarily true or false; but it is not so with regard to the future, otherwise all future events would be fixed by necessity (ὅστε εἰ εν ἄπαντι χρόνῳ οὔτως εἴχεν ἢ όστε τό έτερον ἀληθεύσαι, ἀναγκαῖον ή τούτο γενέσθαι) which is contrary to our own experience of deliberation and action.’ Ης then solves the difficulty as follows, τὸ μὲν οὐ εἶναι τὸ δὲ έτερον ἢ, καὶ τὸ μὴ δὲ μὴ εἶναι ἕτερον μη ἢ, ἀνάγκην οὐ μὴν οὔτε τὸ δὲ έτερον ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὔτε τὸ μὴ δέ περὶ τῆς αντιφάσεως ὅ αὐτὸς λόγος εἶναι μὲν εὐθείᾳ ἀπαν ἀνάγκη καὶ έσεθαι γε ἡ μη οὗ μέτοι διελάται γε εἰπεὶ όμοιον ἀναγκαίον (i.e. the necessity belongs to the compound judgment not to its parts taken separately); λέγω δὲ οὖν ἀνάγκη μὲν έσεθαι ναυαχίαν αὖριον μὴ έσεθαι, οὐ μέτοι έσεθαι γε αὖριον ναυαχίαν ἀναγκαίον οὔτε μὴ γενέσθαι. In the *De Fato* 21, C. says that he would rather accept the teaching of Epicurus et negare omnem enuntiationem aut veram esse aut falsam than allow that all things happened by necessity, but he cites Carneades to prove that no such consequence as necessity is really involved in the Disjunctive Judgment.

In reality Epicurus seems to have taken much the same view as Arist., see *Fat.* 37 nisi fortis volumus Epicureorum opinionem sequi, qui tales enuntiationes nec veras nec falsas esse dicunt (i.e. not yet corresponding to fact but only capable of becoming so) aut, cum id pudet, illud tamen dicunt, quod est impudentius, veras esse ex contrariis disjunctiones, sed quae in his enuntiata essent, eorum neutrum esse verum and cf. Zeller Stoics tr. p. 435, and Ueberweg Lc., who points out the qualifications required in applying the Disjunctive Judgment. Johan. Siceliota, quoted by Prantl p. 360, says that Epicurus instanced the famous riddle ὁριδά καὶ οὕτος ὁριδά ἐτερ ἐξολο καὶ οὗ ἑξεῖν καθήμεν ὁριδός καὶ οὗ ὁριδός βαλέν διελεύσεν as contravening the principle of Contradiction.
negavit. For the asyndeton after pertinuit cf. the next sentence urquebat Arcessilas—timuit Epicurus—dixit, and § 106 motum dico esse inanem, tu imaginis remainere quae referantur—hoc idem fieri, § 121 cum dicat—negat idem esse—tollit id. The effect is to give rapidity and energy to the sentence and to heighten the antithesis.

Arcessilas: the regular Doric and Aeolic contraction for Ἀρκεσίλαος, cf. Ahrens Dial. Dor. p. 199. On the Stoic and Academic theories of perception see § 12 n. Ac. i 40 foll., π 79 foll.: the controversy between Arc. and Zeno is constantly referred to in the Academica. [Strictly taken, the text misrepresents A. since he did not say omnia falsa esse, but omnia non magis falsa esse quam vera. But possibly Cic. uses the word falsus in the sense of 'fallacious', as often in the Academica. J. S. R.]

omnes sensus veri nuntios. Cf. Madv. Fin. i 22, Ac. π 79 co rem demittit Epicurus, si unus sensus senset in vita mentitus sit, nulli unquam esse credendum; Zeller Stoics tr. p. 402 foll. 'to avoid doubt we must allow that sensation is such as is always, and under all circumstances, to be trusted; nor ought the delusions of the senses to shape our belief; the causes of these deceptions not lying in sensation as such, but in our judgment about sensation. Lucretius iv 463 after instancing a number of optical illusions, says that they seek in vain to shake the credit of the senses quoniam pars horum maxima fallit (propter opinatus animi quos addimus ipsi) pro visis ut sint quae non sunt sensibus visa. Here too Ep. might quote Arist. on his side, cf. De Anima iii 3 § 3 ὥς μεν αἰσθήσεως τῶν ἱδών ἔτι ἀληθός, διανομήθει δ' ἐνδίκηται καὶ ψυχῶς. To the same effect Augustine (quoted by Lescaloperius in loc.) says sensus non est falsus inter-nuntius sed falsus judex.

nullor horum nimis callide. This is Allen's emendation, put forward in his ed. 1836, for the nisi callide of the ms. The same emendation was made by Sch. Opusc. iii pp. 317 and 364. For the use we may compare our 'not over cleverly'. In the comic poets nimis often occurs in the sense of valde, which is substituted for callide in some of the ms here, but in later writers it can only bear this force when combined with a negative. [For the form of sentence, cf. Orator 82 nihil horum parum audacter. Moser ms.]

plagam accipiebat: so Fat. 21 (of the denial of Disjunctive Judgments) eam plagam potius accipiam quam fato omnia fieri comprobum.

§ 71. dum individuorum—tamquam sanguinem. This is not quite the same as the reason assigned for the quasi-corpus in § 49. There it was used to explain the fact that the Gods were not objects of bodily sensation, but perceptible only to the mind. In a treatise, conjecturally assigned to Metrodorus, which is contained in vol. vi pt. 2 of the first series of Herculaneensia, we find both reasons conjoined (p. 35) διὰ τούτο γάρ οὐδὲν αἰσθητὸν ἄδεικνυται, ἢ πυκνότης γάρ ἀντικόπτεται πρὸς τούτο δεχόμεθα πλῆθος λαγνῶς ἰσχυρὸς. Sch. in his n. and also in Opusc. iv 342 maintains that concretio here must be taken in a narrow sense =nulla solidior et crassior atomorum
condensatio, 'because all the ancient writers (except Lactantius De Ira x 28 who was no doubt misled by the ambiguity of C.'s words in this passage) agree that the Epicurean Gods were corporeal and compounded of atoms'; and he defends his interpretation by the use of concretus in such passages as II 43, 101, Div. i 130. I do not think we can argue from the use of the Past Part. concretus, which implies the completion of the process, to the verbal, implying the process itself; and besides, the reference is plainly to the sint sane ex atomis of § 68, where it was shown that any such compound must be liable to interitus: to avoid this danger Ep. had recourse to his quasi-corpus § 69: then came the parenthesis illustrating hoc persaepe facit, and now in § 71 the subject is resumed in the words ind. corp. concr. fug. 'he tries to escape from the aggregation of indivisible particles (with its consequences as above pointed out)'. The only concretio implied in the Gods of § 49 was that of the images, involving superficial area but not depth, cf. monogrammata II 59. The tamquam sanguis was probably suggested by the Homeric ichor, Il. v 340 πέι & δίμυθον αἷμα θεοίο, | ίγώρ, οἱς πέρ τε πέιε μακάρεσθαι θεοίσι υ' ώ γάρ σίτον ἱδουν', υ' πίνουσ' αἰθωνα ἵνον | τοῦτον δαιμόνις ἵναι καὶ δήλατον καλέσοναι.

sed tamquam corpus: supply dicit esse from the preceding negat, and see n. on nolo § 17.

Ch. xxvi mirabile videtur—viderit. This saying of Cato the Censor (Div. II 51) was probably inspired by a feeling of contempt for the Tusci ac barbari, as they are styled by the jealousy of a Roman augur N. D. II 11. Cic., who prided himself so much on being a member of the augural college, is indignant when a haruspex is admitted into the Senate, Fam. vi 18. In the De Divinatione II 28 foll. he states the Academic argument against haruspicina, in answer to his brother Q. who, as a Stoic, was bound to defend every kind of divination.

si in ceris fingeretur. If the reading is correct, the sense and construction require that fing. should be taken metaphorically 'if such a body were fancied in the case of wax figures': otherwise the literal sense is suggested by fictilibus and ceris (used as in Juv. viii 19, where see Mayor's n., and ceris fingendis oblectari Justin xxxvi 4). I am inclined to think however that the true reading is si IN CER[IS DICER]ETUR 'if the phrase were used in connexion with wax figures', cf. dicemus in Venere Coa just below. The repetition of cer explains the omission of the letters in brackets, and the remaining letters would be taken for si fingeretur, which would be likely to maintain its ground against the true reading, even after the insertion of in ceris from another text. Plin. N. H. xxxv § 4 speaks of the expressi cera vultus which were used in funerals, and in § 147 of modelling in clay, fingere ex argilla similitudines.

ne tu quidem: 'no, nor you either'. The phrase occurs in this weaker sense § 110 ne beatus quidem, § 113, II 87, III 23, 43, 47, 49, 68, 86, see Madv. Fin. Exc. iii p. 816.

§ 72. quasi dictata redduntur: 'you repeat your lesson like parrots'.
Cf. 

Cf. Fin. ii 95 istic vestra 'si gravis brevis, si longus levis', dictata sunt; Fin. iv 10 isdem de rebus semper quasi dictata decantare neque a commentariolis suis sidereore; Fin. ii 20 quis vestrum non edidicit Epicuri usurias doces! Juv. v 12 2 peragant dictata magistry, wit Mayor's n. The letters of Ep. preserved by Diog. L. abound in admonitions to his disciples to commit to memory what they had heard from him, see esp. x 35. [See also Fin. i 27, Ac. ii 8. J. S. R.] 

oscitans: cf. Orat. ii 144 istic oscitantem et dormitantem sapientiam Scæmostrarum et ceterorum beatorum (jurists as opposed to pleaders) otio concedamus.

halucinatus est: (connected with harilis) by Vanicke, but the meaning seems to suit better the old etymology connecting it with dæum), properly used of a mooning dreamy state, as in Col. vii 3 ne fur aut bestia halucinatam pastorem decipiat; then of idle random talk as here and (without blame) Q. Fr. ii 11 epistulae nostrae debent interdum halucinari 'descend to prattle'; Seneca uses halucinatio of silly abuse, Vit. Beat. 26.

cum quidem glorietur: 'boasting all the time'. Cf. Fam. x 32, Nep. Tras. 2 ad fin., and see Roby §§ 1722, 1732, Draeg. § 570, also § 497 D 3 on the Ind. with cum quidem.

se magistrum habuisse nullum: cf. Diog. L. x 13 τοῖς 'Απόλλωνος ἐν Ἑρωδίᾳ Ναυσιπάους ἀκούσας φησί καὶ Πραξιφάους' autès de o φησιν, ἀλλ' ἐνυτί ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἑυριδίκων ἐπιστολῇ...Δημήτριος δέ φησιν ὁ Μάγνης καὶ Σενοκράτους αὐτῶν ἀκούσα. Plut. M. 1100 A.

et non praedicanti. Baiter and Müller accept Klotz's emendation of ei for et, in obedience to Valla's dictum that et is never used in the emphatic sense (=etiam) by C., but, if we allow any weight to MSS, we must admit the use not only here, but in § 83 age et his vocabulis, in Tusc. iii 28 et illa laudantur, Leg. i 33 ergo et lex, Fin. iii 27 ergo et probandum, Div. i 34 et auctoritatem. See further Draeg. § 312 (some of whose exx. however are more properly explained on the principle of anacoluthon treated of in Madv. Fin. Exc. i), Roby § 2198, Moser on Tusc. 1 c., Munro's Lucr. ind. under et, Dumesnil on Leg. i 33, and a copious list of exx. in Kühnast's Liv. Synt. p. 371 foll.

nihil olet ex Academia: 'he has not the slightest flavour of the Academy'. Sch. Opusc. iii 365 defends and illustrates the construction against Klotz. Compare the similar uses of redundo, sapio, odor (urbanitas Orat. ii 161, dictaturas Att. iv 11), and Gr δειος.

puerilitus disciplinis: the ordinary school lessons, ἐγκυκλίου παιδείᾳ, consisting of Reading, Writing, Arithmetic (included under γραμμα), Poetry and Music (included under μουσική), see Becker Charides tr. p. 231 foll. On the view of Ep. cf. Diog. L. x 6 (the words of Epicurus to a disciple) παιδειαν δε πάναν, μακάρε, φεύγε, with the notes in Huenneber's ed., and Athenaeus xiii 588 there quoted. 'Ep. ἐγκυκλίου παιδείας δύνατος ὡν ἐμακάριζε καὶ τοῦς δόμους αὐτῷ ἐπὶ φιλοσοφιαν παρεργοῦν; Fin. i 26 vellem quidem aut ipse doctrinis fuisse instructior (est enim non satis politus ii
artibus, quas qui tenent eruditi appellantur) aut ne deterruisset alios a studiis, with Madv.'s n. and id. 72 where Torquatus defends his master's neglect of puerile studies; also Zeller Stoics tr. p. 397 foll., and Düning Metrodorus p. 64 foll. on the esteem in which the Epicureans held the poets. Gassendi in his treatise De vita et moribus Epicuri examines at length the charges here made against Ep. and endeavors to show that they are mere slanders of rival philosophers. In dealing with such a question, there are two points which should be borne in mind, (1) that knowledge which has been systematized and authoritatively taught is liable to a sort of ossification in the hands of formalists and pedants, and (2) that, as each fresh advance in knowledge bears more or less the character of a revolt against knowledge established and authoritative, a certain amount of self-confidence and want of appreciation for previous knowledge is not unusual in reformers or discoverers. So Hobbes 'boasted of the smallness of his acquaintance with preceding writers, declaring that if he had read as much as other men he should have been as dull of wit as they were', Whewell Lect. on Mor. Phil. p. 43. We may therefore excuse Ep. if he condemned too severely the artificial poetry, the frivolous rhetoric, and the hair-splitting logic of his time. If he spoke contemptuously of these as of no use for life, he has done no more than the Stoic Seneca in his 88th epistle, unum studium vere liberale est quod liberum facit: cetera pussilla et puerilia sunt; and again, quid quod ista liberalium artium consecratio molestos, verboros, intempestivos, sibi placentis facit, et ideo non discendae necessaria quia supervacuas didicerunt? as he shows in detail in the same epistle. That the 'liberal arts' were not entirely neglected by the followers of Epicurus appears from the large number of treatises on rhetoric, music, poetry and dialectic, which have been found among the Herculanean papyri. But Philodemus, to whom most of them are assigned, shares his master's contempt for a profession of universal knowledge (such as was made by Hippias), comparing the 'polyhistora' of his time to the Homeric Margites, see his De Vitiis x col. 20 Ussing p. 55, Rhetorica Gros p. 52. See more under incitatio logendi § 85, dialecticorum—novit § 89.


credo plus nemini. On this use of plus (=magis) see Madv. Fin. i 5.

agripeta: 'settler', one of the καὶποῦχοι sent from Athens after the conquest of Samos by Timotheus 366 B.C. cf. Grote ch. lxxxix vol. x p. 406, Boeckh Publ. Econ. of Athens, Bk. iii ch. 18. The word is apparently peculiar to C., who uses it (Att. xv 29, xvi 1) of the soldiers of Caesar to whom lands were assigned in Epirus after the Civil War.

Indi magnus fuit: 'turned schoolmaster'. I do not remember any other instance of this particular use of fuit, but it may be compared with such cases as Att. x 16 commodum ad te dederam litteras, cum ad me bene
mane Dionysius fuit, and the somewhat doubtful esse in potentatem, for which see Roby § 1962 n. Does not Timon’s epithet for Epicurus γραμμο-
διδασκαλίας (Diog. L. x 3) refer to the calling of the father, not of the son
only (as the lexicons and translations take it), ‘a pedagogue by descent’? [Weissenborn (Lat. Gr. § 182 n. 2) quotes, for fui—‘ich bin geworden’, Liv.
xxxiv 21 locupletior indies provincia fuit, Sall. Cat. 20 § 7 volgus fuimus
sine gratia, and compares the Fut. Perf. in Fam. xiv 7 fundo Arpinati bene
poteris uti si annona carior fuerit. This use of fui has been most com-
monly discussed in connexion with the past participle. Madvig (Opusc. ii
p. 218) denies that latus fui=latus sum except in Plautus, &c. Neue (vol. ii
p. 352 ed. 2) has a discussion on the same point; and Brix on Mil. Glor.
102 legatus fuit, quotes exx. where the sense would be naturally expressed
by the Eng. ‘became’. But in reality fui merely denotes past time ab-
solutely, and the notions of attainment, continuance, completion, &c. are
only developed from the context, cf. my Gr. §§ 1451 and 1454, 2. We may
compare the use of εδεικλευεν ‘I became king’; I doubt however whether it
would be possible to find Marcus consul fuit similarly used. R.]

§ 73. in Nausiphane tenetur: ‘he is convicted (cannot free himself)
in the case of N.’ Sch. quotes Caecin. c. 2 facile honestissimus testibus in re
persepicua tenetur: when thus used, ten. is often followed by a Gen. of the
crime. Some explained Ep.’s depreciation of education by his dislike for
Naus. πολλούς γαρ τῶν νεών πνεύματος, καὶ τῶν μαθημάτων σπουδαίως ἐπεμε-
λείτο, μάλιστα δὲ ἤτοι τοῦ καθῆκτος; γενόμενον δὲ τούτῳ μαθητής ὁ Ἐπ. ὑπὲρ τοῦ
δοκίμων αὐτοδίδακτος εἶναι καὶ αὐτοφυής φιλόσοφος, ἠρμήν ἐκ παιδείας τρόπου,
tὴν τε περὶ αὐτοῦ φήμην ἐξαλάβειν ἐπιπεδεῖ, πολὺς τε ἐγκεκριμένως τῶν μαθημάτων
κατήγορος, Sext. Emp. Math. i p. 216. It was also asserted that the ‘canon’
of Ep. was copied from the ‘Tripod’ of Naus. Diog. L. x 14.

Democriteo. Elsewhere (Diog. L. ix 64, 69, Sext. Emp. l.c.) he is
called a disciple of Pyrrho, who was however himself reckoned among the
followers of Dem.

21 c) αὐτῶν ἐκάλει καὶ ἀγράμματον καὶ ἀπαρχαία καὶ πόρον, also § 7 and Sext.
Emp. l. c.

si—non audisset, quid audierat: ‘supposing he had not heard these
lectures, what other teaching had he received’ (to make him so well ac-
cquainted with the doctrines of Dem.)? The connexion of thought is very
much broken. Heind. following Davies proposed to improve this by reading
enim after quid. Hermippus, ap. Diog. x 2, says that his philosophical
interest was aroused, not by hearing the lectures of Naus. (hac Democritio),
but by reading the actual books of Dem. περιτυχώς τοῖς ∆ημ. βασιλίοις ἐπὶ
φιλοσοφίαν οἴοι. See below, § 93 n.

quibus—continentur: ‘which form the subject-matter of natural philo-
sophy’ (§ 20).

1 So Hirzel p. 110 n.
istuc quasi corpus—quid intellegis: 'What do you understand by this phrase?' For the construction see exx. in n. on spatio tamen § 21; and Fin. II 50 quid intellegit honestum? Parad. 42 quem intellegimus divitem, quoted in Sch.'s n. here.

§ 74. cum quidem semel dicta sunt. A continuation of the previous abrupt and disjointed style. There seems no reason for Heindorf's supposition that the text is corrupt.

quid est, quod Velleius intelligere possess, Cotta non possit? 'Once spoken, what reason is there why one should understand them better than another?' For the asyndeton cf. § 20 cuius principium n., and for the particular opposition (possit—non possit) Plin. Ep. II 16 § 1 potestis enim efficiere ut male moriar, ut non moriar non potestis and Corte on Lucan i 200; for quid quod § 3 n. and § 117; for the thought, Fin. II 12 hoc frequentior dicit solum a vosia, non intellegeres nos quam dicat Ep. voluptatem...
egone non intellegam quid sit ἥδεις Graeco, Latine 'voluptas'? utram tandem lingua necio? Deinde qui sit ut ego nesciam, sciant omnes quaecunque Epicurei esse voluerint? also § 15 and § 21.

tu me celas, ut Pythagoras: a reference to the mystical and esoteric character of the teaching of P.; see Diog. L. viii 16 with the nn.

consulto tamquam Heraclitus. The same assertion is made III 35, Fin. II 15 vide ne, si ego non intellegam quid Ep. loquatur, sit aliqua culpa ejus qui ita loquatur ut non intellegatur. Quod duobus modis sine reprehensione fit, si aut de industria facias, ut Her. cognomento qui σκοτεινός perebatur, quia de natura nimirum obscure memoravit, aut, &c., Diog. ix 1 § 6 ἑπιγνώσας ἀσαφειότερον γράφαι ὅπως οἱ δυνάμεις προσίνειν αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ ἐκ τοῦ δημόσου εὐκαταφρόνητον ἡ, Lobeck Agl. p. 160 foll. The real cause of his obscurity is the difficulty experienced by all early writers in attempting to give an outward form to philosophical ideas before the formation of a philosophical language, and the special idiosyncrasy of Her., his depth and fulness of thought, his strong imagination, his love of proverbial, enigmatic and metaphorical expressions.

quod inter nos liceat: 'let us use this freedom towards each other' cf. Ter. Halv. v 2 20 here liceatne? and Liv. vii 13 si liceat (for scilicet, Madv. emend.); the fuller phrase liceat dicere occurs § 80 and Att. II 4. Klotz Adn. Crit. II 8 points out the error of Hand's interpretation ‘entre nous’, and defends the ms reading liceat, which he explains to mean qua de re inter me et te nulla dubitatio sit. We had a similar apologetic phrase § 59 bona venia me audies. [I incline to liceat as contrasting with the preceding celas and occulte. J. S. R.]

Ch. xxvii § 75. illud pugnare ut: 'the point you fight for is', 'your contention is this': so Fam. III 10 illud pugna et entere, Rosc. Am., 3 hoc solum pugnatur ut, and (without an object-clause) N. D. III 1 videtur Epicurus de dis immortales non magno opere pugnare. In this sense it is used with an Inf. by the poets. We have had it used in an opposite sense
in § 62. Cf. the similar metaphorical use of *vinco* and *repugno*. For the Acc. of Extent (*illiud*) see Roby § 1094.


conc. properly used of that which has grown together, crystallized; so water is said *concrecere pruina* II 26; *expr. of* that which has had a pattern stamped upon it, as opposed to a flat surface; so Quint. viii *Pref.* 19 speaks of *corpora faceritis expressa* (cf. Tennyson ‘arms on which the standing muscle sloped; as slopes a wild brook o’er a little stone’); *em. of* any protuberance which breaks an even line, as the circle is said to have *nihil eminens* II 47. *[So eminentia is used to express the foreground in a picture, as opposed to umbra, Ac. II 20; cf. the Gr. ἐξοχαί and ἐξοχαί. J. S. R.]*

*sitque per lucida*: ‘but free from gross admixture, volatile, transparent’, so in *Div.* II 40 the Gods are called *perluvido et perflabiles*. For the adversative force of *que* see Draeg. § 314 10.


*Venere Coa*: the *Ἀφροδίτῃ ἀναβούλε[ν] painted by Apelles for the temple of Aesculapius at Coa, afterwards removed by Augustus to Rome and placed in the temple of Divus Julius. Apelles left unfinished a second Venus Coa, which was intended to surpass the first. Allusion is made to it in *Off.* III 10, where see Beier’s n. The masterpiece of Apelles is mentioned here, of course, only as a typical painting, as in *Div.* I 23; cf. *in cœris* above.

*non res—esse*: ‘nothing real but only a semblance of reality’. The change from the direct to the indirect construction after *dicemus* marks the difference between the actual and the supposed description.


C. d. Weakness of the argument in favour of anthropomorphism. *If the Gods only present themselves to our minds in human form, that is because our ancestors, whether from superstition or policy, established that belief amongst us: elsewhere the case is different. If that form*
BOOK I CH. XXVII § 76.

seems to men the most beautiful, that is merely the prejudice of race. If it is said that experience shows rationality to be confined to that form, on the same ground we might attribute all the properties of man to the Gods; but reason shows the danger of drawing negative conclusions from our limited experience, and it shows also that a body which is suitable for man is unsuitable for such a being as God is supposed to be. Ch. xxvii § 76—xxvii § 102.

§ 76. hoc loco—valritis: 'here you are at no loss for arguments by which you would fain make out', cf. quo loco § 13 n.

primum quod—occurrat humana: cf. § 46. 'Such is the shaping of our minds (i.e. the προληψις, cf. §§ 43, 45, 100) that in thinking of God a human form presents itself to us'.

nec esse—pulchriorem: for the loose infinitive after non deest copia rationum cf. res esse after dicimus just above; the infinitive clause here represents a parenthetic clause in the original direct sentence, thus humanae sunt formae, quod ita est informatum;...quod forma esse pulcherrima debet (pulchrior autem humana nulla est). This argument is given § 47.

domicilium mentis: cf. § 48; and, for the phrase, § 99 domicilia vitae.

§ 77. primum quicque: 'each in turn', lit. 'as it comes to the front'; cf. iii 7, Ac. ii 49 with Reid's n., Madv. Fta. ii 105; most mss have the archaic quicquid, which is used by Lucretius in this sense, see Munro's n. on 1 389.

arripere—vestro jure rem nullo modo probabilem: 'you act as if none could dispute your right to snatch up an hypothesis which is in no way to be allowed'. Arr. stronger than sumo in § 89: Lucr. uses corripi in the same way v 247 illud in his rebus ne corripiasse rearis | ne mith quod terram atque ignem mortalium sumpti, which Munro illustrates from Sext. Emp. Hyp. i 90 πρὶν ἄρξασθι τῆς κρίσεως τὰ φαινόμενα συναρματάζωιν, ἵνα τῆς κρίσεως ἐπιτρέπωσιν. The phrase suo jure (nearly equivalent to suo arbitrio) means properly 'of his own right', i.e. on his own authority, without asking leave or being liable to be called to account by another, and then, uncontrolled, without hindrance, as in Florus i 17 in subjectos suo jure detonuit, where see var. va.

species istas—convertendent. So Arist. Met. xi 8 p. 1074 b. (of the origin of religion) τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μυθικὰ ἡδη προσοχῆται πρὸς τὴν πνειω τῶν πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐκ τῶν νόμων καὶ τὸ συμφέρων χρήσιν: ἀνθρωποιδεῖς τε γὰρ τούτους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὀμολογεὶ τοια Λέγουσι, and Critias quoted on § 118. No one in the present day, theist or atheist, would assign an artificial cause for so primitive and general a phenomenon. The highest personality being involved in the idea of God, it was natural to attribute to him the form in which personality was most clearly shown, more particularly if Mr Herbert Spencer is right in supposing that ancestor-worship was the earliest form of the heathen religions, cf. Sociology, p. 440.

M. C.
ut essent simulacra. The second explanation of anthropomorphism is no better than the first. The images which bring the Gods near need not be in human shape, witness the Gods of Egypt referred to in § 82.

deo ipse se adire: cf. Leg. II 26 (religion is felt most strongly in temples) est enim quaedam opinione species deorum in oculis, non solum in mentibus; Sch. compares the complaint of the Sicilians in Verr. Div. 3 see jam ne deos quidem in suis urbis ad quos confugiant habere, quod eorum simulacra sanctissima C. Verres e delubris religiosisimis abstulisset; Plut. Mor. p. 379 reprobes those who thought the images to be not ἀγαθαμαρα καὶ τιμᾶς θεῶν ἀλλὰ θεῶν. See Nägelsb. Nach-Homerische Theol. p. 5.

auxerunt...opifices: cf. Quintil. xii 10 9 (of the Zeus of Phidias) οὐ δόξα pulchritudo adiectisse aliquid etiam receptae religioni videtur, quoted by Nägelsb. l. c. p. 6. Poets and artists in giving expression to the popular conception of divinity, added to it clearness, elevation and refinement, but they did not change its nature.

erat enim non facile—servare: 'It was not easy to give a consistent representation of divine activity under any other form than that of man'.

accessit...quod...videatur. The Subj., which is found in all the mss, is changed into videtur or videbatur by the later editors. May it not be explained on the same principle as dixerit in § 201 where see n.; 'perhaps too the idea to which you referred (§ 48) may have contributed to this result, I mean man's belief in his own superior beauty'. Videretur would have been more regular after accessit; the Pres. is used in order to denote that the proposition is of general import, not limited to the time of its original utterance. For the pleonasm with opinio cf. Nägelsb. Stil. § 186 2.

physice. So Metrodorus, in the ep. alluded to § 113, addresses his brother as ἦ θυσιλογές, and Timon (ap. Diog. L x 3) styles Epic. ἦστατος ἦ θυσιλογές καὶ κύριος τοις ἰτήροις. The Epicureans prided themselves on their physics as the Stoics on their dialectics, see § 83, II 48, Fin. II 102, 163 in physicis plurimum possit Ep., Plut. Def. Or. p. 434 ὁ Ἔπικοουρεύς διὰ τὴν καλὴν δὴ φιλοσοφίαν ἐνσπισιφότατος, ὡς αὐτὸν λέγουσιν, τοῖς τουτούσι (oracles); Zeller Stoics tr. p. 399, and esp. Hirzel p. 157 foll.

quam blanda—lena: 'What an insinuating go-between, or pander, if I may say so, of her own charms'. Cf. Sest. 21 (alter) erat hominum opinione nobilitate ipsa, blanda conciliatrix, commendatus; Lael. 37 conciliatrix amicitiae virtutis opinio; Ov. A. A. III 315 res est blanda canor, discant cantare queulas, pro facie multis vox sua luna fuit; Acad. fr. 34 quasi lenocinante mercede; N. D. II 147 corporum lenocinia.

an pntas.—delectetur? So Epicarmus ap. Diog. L. III 16 θαυμαστὴν οὐδὲν ἵτοι με ταῦτα οὕτω λέγει, | οὐδ' άνέκει αὐτοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ δοκεῖν | καλώς περίκειν καὶ γαρ ἣ κόνων κυνί | κάλλιστον εἶμι φαίνεται, καὶ βούς βοῦ | ἄνεος δ' ὅρω καλλιστῶν ἵτοι, ὃς δ' ἵτι.

beluam: apparently used synonymously with bestia, cf. § 78, 97, and esp. 101, and II 100 (of shellfish).

contractatione: properly 'stroking' 'caressing'; for its force here cf.
R. P. iv 4 quam contrectationes et amores soluti et liberis so contracto frequently.

eam esse causam—putaremus. Med. thinks that this clause was added by a reader who misunderstood the construction mirum si (?) and it has accordingly been bracketed by later editors. The objections as stated by Sch. Opusc. iii 317 foll. are (1) that it is superfluous in sense; we had already been told that man’s self-admiration was one of the grounds of anthropomorphism; (2) that in reading the sentence, we naturally take si as depending on mirum, and it causes an awkward surprise when we find that it is intended for the protasis of the sentence; (3) that the sequence of tenses is violated by putaremus after esse. Kl. (Adn. Crit. iii 7) defends the mss reading, and I am inclined to think he is right. The clause may be superfluous in reference to what precedes, but if we look to the following sentence, we shall see that it is needed in order to explain the introduction of si ratio esset. Cicero is seeking to prove that the reason why man attributes his own form to the gods whom he worships, is because he, in common with other animals, loves his own form best; and he proceeds to argue that this common incident of animal nature would, if acted upon by reason, lead the other animals each to glorify (plurimum tributuras) his own nature in like manner, cf. the passage from Xenophanes quoted below. If there is any corruption in the text, one might suggest the loss of a sentence referring to the 3rd reason for anthropomorphism (domicilium mentis). At present this is passed over without notice, and O. returns to the first reason in §§ 81—85, only introducing the 3rd in § 87 mixed up there with another argument from experience. As to the 2nd objection, there is no doubt a slight awkwardness in separating si from mirum, but this is certainly not a fatal objection to the correctness of the sentence. Or it might be possible to take si as depending on mirum, and then to suppose the construction broken, eam esse causam being introduced as a sort of exephegetic clause, also dependent on mirum. Such a change of construction might be compared with that after facit § 31 facit Soc. disputantem eundemque dicere, after dico mus § 75 illud non est ...sic rem esse, after docere § 76. Thirdly the tense of putaremus is attracted to praeceptum, as in Lael. 2 meministi...quanta esset quereda, where the tense is attracted to an intermediate Imperf., see Draeg. § 151 5 c, and Roby § 1517. For the attraction of the pronoun (eam for id) see § 67 and Roby § 1068.


12—2
referred to, 'a lion has courage, God has courage, therefore God should be in the shape of a lion.' [Quaque is used not quamque, because it is equivalent to quodque genus. R.]

at mehercule: et would be more suitable here; if we retain at it must refer back to the last sentence but one.

taurus—Europam. This was the subject of a statue by Pythagoras the sculptor, see Varro L. L. v 351 and Müller Ancient Art § 351. A painting of the same is described by Achilles Tatius at the beginning of the Leucippe.

ingenii—orationibus: the plural of the concrete is often used for the abstract, see Nägelsb. Stil. § 12, and compare Div. II 55 conjectura ingeniis didicitur ‘by man’s ingenuity’, Arch. 17 celeritatem ingeniornum (of Roscius). I suppose orat. here to mean the faculty of speech, but I cannot cite a parallel. [Mr Roby would prefer to translate it ‘by our intellects or modes of articulation’. But the general tenor of the passage requires that the comparison should lie between man, on the one side, and all other animals, on the other; whereas, if we give the ordinary force to the plural, it seems to me that the use of the word nostris here draws our attention to differences existing amongst men themselves. Also the following singulars specie figuraque suggest a singular force for the preceding plurals.]

quodsi—velimus. Quod is connective not adverative, Madv. § 449, ‘and then if we choose to (go further and) invent and combine forms for ourselves’.

natantibus invehens bellus. Triton was represented with a human body ending in a fish’s tail; sometimes the legs are replaced by two fish-like bodies, between or upon which the man appears to ride, as in the beautiful painting at Herculaneum (Roux Aïné Recueil Général vol. v 36, M. Borb. viii 10). It is to the latter form that C. alludes, and also Apoll. Rh. IV 1608—1614 αὐτὸν ὡς ἄγαμον δικαραὶ αἱ θέα καὶ θέα | κτήσεως ἄραινη μηκένερο, &c. Cicero would be familiar with the Triton which formed a vane on the top of the horologium of Cyrrhestes, ‘the tower of the winds’, at Athens, cf. Müller Anc. Art § 402. For the intransitive use of the participle cf. R. P. III 14 invehens altium anguivm curr, Phil. III 32 (Antoniuus) in me absentem invehens, Brut. 331 per medias laudes quasi quadrigis vehentem (but invehens se Liv. xxx 11, xxxi 35, curr invectus R. P. vi 11); so vertens, volvens, rotans, and the Pres. Part. in Deponenta.

nolis esse. I think Sch. is right in taking this interrogatively, so carrying on the argument of the sentence at mehercule, &c. ‘I dare not call myself more beautiful than Europa’s bull; if you could be metamorphosed into a Triton, would you refuse?’ Otherwise surely the opposition must have been more strongly marked, ‘and yet one would object to a change even into the still more beautiful Triton’. As to construction, I think qualis refers to the preceding formas, and that we must supply tali forma with esse.

difficili—versor: ‘I am on ticklish ground, I confess’. 
homo nemo: 'no one who is a man', not simply = nemo or nullus homo.

§ 79. et quidem: 'yes, and ant like ant'. This formula is often used to express an ironical acceptance of an opponent’s argument, professing to carry it further but really showing that it is applicable in an opposite sense to that intended by the user; cf. Div. ii 114 (in answer to an argument for divination) nonne ea praedixit quae facta sunt? Ille vero; et ea quidem quae omnes timebamus; N. D. i 100 (against the argument for anthropomorphism from innate ideas) habebam informationem quandam dei. Et barbari quidem Jovis; Fin. i 35 (to prove that Torquatus was not forgetful of expediency) torquem detraxit hosti. Et quidem se textit, ne interiret, (see Madv. in loc. and Emend. p. 90 foll., Moser on Tusc. iii 48, Draeg. § 311 13). It is used to emphasize without irony in §§ 55, 59, 82 et quidem alia, 83 et quidem laudamus, 89 et libenter quidem. The ironical meaning is also found in quidem alone, as iii 82 at Phalaris, at Apollodorus poenas sustulit. Multis quidem ante necatis et cruciatis; and in et alone, as iii 27 at enim quaserit Xenophon unde animum arripuerimus. Et ego quero unde orationem; also in scilicet et Lucr. i 809, vi 574; see Draeg. § 341, Bake and Dumestin on Leg. iii 24.

formica: allusion is again made to the ant in ii 158, iii 21; similarly Celsus ep. Orig. compares it with man as affording an instance of civil life (iv 77, 81), and of foresight (ib. 83), and argues that in the sight of God the two must be much on a level (ib. 85).

quotus quisque. As tertius q., quartus q. mean 'each third', 'each fourth man', so q. q. means strictly 'each how-many-eth', i.e. 'one out of how large a number', 'what a small fraction'.

Athenis cum essem: probably referring to 79 n.c., when C. attended lectures there in company with Atticus and other friends; so in § 59 and § 93 he ascribes his own experience to Cotta.

e gregibus—singuli: 'scarce one in each company' (the σπάρτημα numbering about 15 privates, see Dumont Essai sur l'Éphèbe Attique), so Tusc. v 77 adulcens centum greges Lacochaemone victimus ipsi incredibili contentione certantes. An Athenian was strictly ἰθηβαι from the age of 18 to 20, during which time he had to serve as πειροδος, but the term was loosely used of youths after 16, when they commenced their regular training in the gymnasia. Hermann Gr. Alt. i § 176 speaks of the increased importance attached to the organization of the Ephebi after the loss of liberty and under the Roman power. The Latinized form is freely used by Varro and the comic poets. Grex here just corresponds to the Cretan δύναμις: it is technically used of a company of actors.

arriseris: 'you smile at the confession of my weakness'.

concedentibus—delectamur. Compare the partly ironical and playful professions of admiration which abound in the Platonic dialogues, e.g. Charm. p. 154 c, Lysis 204 b; and see Thompson's Phaedrus App. i, Zeller Socrates tr. p. 75 foll., Tusc. iv 70 foll. philosophi sumus exiti, et avuncore quidem nostro Platone, qui amori auctoritatem tribueremus, Fin. iii 68
where Madv. quotes Diog. L. vii 129 καὶ ἔφασθεν ὑπὲρ τῶν σοφῶν τῶν νόμων τῶν ἔμφασισει τὸν εἶδος τὴν πρὸς ἀρτιὰν εὐφυίαν, ἄα φησι Ζήμνη... καὶ Χρύσιττος... καὶ Ἀπολλάδωρος, εἶναι δὲ τὸν ἑρωτο ἐπιβολὴν φιλοσοφίας διὰ κάλλος ἔμφασισεν, καὶ μὴ ἔηαν σωφροσύνης, ἀλλὰ φιλια. [Cf. the very similar passages in Stob. Eth. §§ 118, 238, Sext. Emp. Math. vii 239 and Sen. Ep. 123 § 15 ἵλος quoque nocere nobis existimo qui nos sub specie Stoicæ sectæ horantur ad vivâ, seq. J. S. R.]

faævus—Alcaem. Alc. of Mitylene fl. 600 B.C. canebat Lyceum nigris oculis nigroque crine decorum Hor. C.r 328; Cic. says of him fortis vir in sua re publica cognitus, quae de juventum amore scribit Alcaem! Tusc. iv 71. The name Λύκος occurs in one of his fragments (58 B.), where Bergk proposes to emend this passage by inserting Lyci before pueri. As it stands, it is a broken hexameter, which might be completed by reading amantem for ALC. Probably C. altered the verse to suit his context, as in § 13. illi—lumen; 'the mole seemed to him a beauty', cf. P. red. in Sen. 8 Lentulus hoc lumen consulatus sui fore putavit, si me rei publicae reddidisset, Q. Fr. ii 10 illorum praediorum scito mibi vicinum Marium lumen esse, 'the neighbourhood of your friend M. gives a new charm to my fields', Senec. 35 lumen civitatis with Reid's n. : for its rhetorical use see Piderit's index to the De Oratore s.v. On the general subject see Plato Rep. v 474 δ ὁχύρωστων ποιεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς καλοὺς; ἀ μὲν, ὅτι συμός, ἐπίχρισε κληθείς ἐπανερθήστηκα foll., Lucr. iv 1154—1170, Hor. Sat. i 3 38 foll., Ov. A. A. ii 657.

Catulus. Both the father, Q. Lutatius Q. F., and the son, Q. Lutatius Q. F. Q. N., were highly respected members of the party of the Optimates and special objects of C.'s admiration. The former was a colleague of Marius in the consulsip and joint-commander in the war against the Cimbri B.C. 102. His death in the Marian proscription (B.C. 87) is mentioned N.D. iii 80. His uprightness of character is witnessed to by the saying (Orat. ii 173) hoc verum est, dixit enim Q. Catulus, and C. continually praises his purity and elegance of style both in Greek and Latin (Or. ii 28, Brut. 132). He is one of the speakers in the De Oratore, where some of his witty sayings are reported (Orat. ii 220 and 278). Galliæ xviii 9 quotes with extravagant praise a jaw-breaking epigram addressed by him to the beautiful youth Theotimus. The younger Catulus was a warm supporter of C. against Catiline and was the first to salute him as pater patriæ. He died B.C. 60. He was one of the interlocutors in the 1st ed. of the Academica, but Atticus persuaded C. that the subject was too technical to suit him, and C. took his part himself in the 2nd ed. See Reid's Introd. to the Acad.

hujus: used of time, not of place, 'now living'. Sch. compares ii 6 avus huæs adolescentis and Off. iii 66 Cato, huæs nostri Catonis pater; so N. D. i 107 hoc Orphicum carmen, 'the hymn which now goes under the name of Orpheus'; his moribus, 'in the present state of morality'. [Add De Or. ii 270, Cato M. 50. J. S. R.]

municipem tuum. Vell. and Rosc. were both natives of Lanuvium, an ancient and famous municipium, situated to the south of Alba and often
mentioned by C. Milo was its chief magistrate or ‘dictator’, and was going there to offer sacrifice and consecrate flamenps to Juno Sospita when he met and killed Clodius. In his speech for Murena, who was also a Lanuvian (§ 90), C. makes his appeal to the jury, nobilis a sacris patriis Junonis Sospitae (for which see below § 82) cui omnes consules facere necessae est, domesticum et suum consulem avellere. It continued in a flourishing condition down to a late period of the Empire, and was the residence of Antoninus Pius and his two successors, see Dict. of Geog. In Div. i 79 and II 66 we read of the prodigies which announced the future greatness of Roscii, quid? amores ac deliciae tuae, Roscii, num aut ipse aut pro eo Lanuvium totum mentiebatur? qui cum esset in cunabulis educareturque in Solonio, qui est campus agri Lanuvian, nocte lumine apposito, egressa nutrix animadvertit puereum dormientem circumcircutum serpentis amplexu. Quo aspectu exterrita clamorem sustulit. Pater autem Rosci ad horas piares retulit; qui responderunt nihil illo pruero clarius, nihil nobilius fore. Atque hanc speciem Pausiles caelavit argento, et noster expressit versibus Archias.

Cic. received instructions from R. in his youth and always speaks of him in the highest terms, e.g. Orat. i 130 videtimus quam nihil ab eo nisi perfecte, nihil nisi cum summa venustate sit, nisi ita ut decent, et uti omnes moveat atque delecet? Itaque hoc jam diei est consecutus, ut, in quo quiesque artifici excellenter, is in suo generis Roscius diceretur. Pro Quini. 78 cum artifex ejus modi sit (Roscii) ut solus dignus videatur esse qui in scenae spectat; tum vir ejus modi est ut solus dignus videatur qui eo non accedat. In 68 B.C. he was engaged in a law suit connected with the profits of his teaching and was defended by C. in the speech which is still extant: he died in the year 62 B.C.

Auroram salutans. On the habit of praying at sunrise see Plato Leg. x 887 E ἀνατλάλοντος τε ἦλιον καὶ σελήνη καὶ πρὸς δυσμᾶς λύσεων προκυλλον πόλεως ἀμα καὶ προσκυνήσεως ἑκάστου τε καὶ ὁμοίως Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ βασιλέων πόλεων ἐν συμφοραῖς παντοῖοι ἢμεῖς καὶ ἐν συνεργείαις, and the account given of Socrates in the Symp. 220 ‘he remained standing there till sunrise, then ὑπὲρ ἀνίμων προσφυγών τῷ ἡλίῳ’, Lucian De Sult. 17 ἤδη ἐπείδη ἔσοβεν ἀναστὰτες προσεύχοντας τῷ Ἠλίῳ, οὐχ ἄνωτέρω ἡμῖν τὴν χεῖρα κυντος ἤγονμεθα ἐντελῶς εἰς τὴν εὐχήν, (while they salute his appearances with dances); Tertull. Apol. 16 plerique vestrum (the heathen) affectationes aliando et caelestiaadorandi ad solis ortum labia vibratis; also the saying of Pompeius to Sulla, ‘more worship the rising than the setting sun’, Plut. P. 14; but Tacitus speaks of it as a peculiarity of Orientals, Hist. iii 24 orientem solem (ita in Syria mos est) tertiani salutavere. We have a survival of this solar worship in the orientation of churches and the practice of turning to the East at the Creed, see Tylor i 260—271. For saluto in the sense of ‘worship’ cf. Rosc. Am. 58 deos salutatum venerint, Cato R. R. i 2 pater familias ubi ad villam venit, ubi laem familiarum salutavit, fundum circumeat, Seneca Ep. 95 § 47 vetemus salutationibus matutinis fungi et foribus assidiere templorum: humana ambitio istis officis captivur.
a laeva exortitur: 'Roscius dawns upon me from the propitious quarter, fairer than the god of day'.

licet dicere: cf. § 74.

hunc—pulchrior: sc. visus est.

perverissimis oculis: 'a villainous squat'.

salsum et venustum: 'piquant and charming'; cf. Att. xvi 12 de 'Ἡρακλείδης Varronis negotia salax; me quidem nihil unquam sic delectavi.'

Ch. xxix § 80 equos—arbitramur: 'do we actually suppose that there are any of the gods who, if not quite a match for Roscius, have still a slight cast of the eye?' For the use of the Ind. where we might have expected the Subj. cf. § 83 facimus n., § 91 putamus, Roby §§ 1609, 1611, and Dumezil on Leg. i 56 quamnam igitur sententiam diximus? (the Ind. is 'lebhafter als das Fut. oder Conj. dub. mit dem Gedanken dass die Entscheidung unzweifelhaft und unverzüglich gefällt werden könne'). [Add Lael. 24, Verr. iii 156, and the rare consensus Lael. 14. J. S. R.] On the difference between et and p. cf. Hor. Sat. i 3 44 strabonem appellat paetum pater, Ov. A. A. ii 659 et paeta est, Veneri similis (vocatur). Other reff. to the Venus paeta will be found in the lexicons; so used the word implies a side-long, languishing glance, what was called 'pink-eyed' by the older writers. For tam Heins. on Ov. l.c. suggested jam.

silos—capitones: with 'snub noses, flat ears, beetle-brows, big heads'. The anonymous translator, Lond. 1683, is not behind the Latin in his racy vernacular 'shooing-horn-nosed, bangle-eared, jobber-nolled, bittle-browed'. It will be noticed how many Latin names are borrowed from personal defects, cf. Roby § 851 a, b.

quae sunt: 'defects) which are found amongst us men'. Sch. compares ii 21 omnia haec meliora, referring to sapientia &c. involved in the preceding sapientem. For instances of this loose connexion between the relative and antecedent see n. on § 89 quae, Reid on Lael. 14, Madv. § 317. It is more common in Greek than in Latin.

alia aliav pulchrioram: 'there must be degrees of beauty among them'.

una—necesse est. The ground of the Academic scepticism was that every true sensation has side by side with it a false one indistinguishable from it. 'One who has mistaken P. for Q. Geminius could have no infallible mode of recognizing Cotta', Ac. ii 83; cf. § 55, where the Academician borrows an argument from the innumerable identical worlds of Democritus, and asks why there may not be as many individuals indistinguishable from each other. Arnobius, who has paraphrased this passage in his 3rd book, has fallen into the same error of supposing that perfection can only be of one kind, and therefore that variety can only arise by way of defect, c. 14.

§ 81. Cic. now reverts to the 1st ground of anthropomorphism mentioned in § 76, and shows that there was no such thing as a general consensus in regard to the appearances or names of the gods.
tamene: so Flac. 21, Ac. 26 and without ne, Fam. ix 19; see Lewis and Short s. v. ii c; for the position Div. in Cae. 21, Att. iv 16.

ea facie novimus: Abl. of Quality, cf. § 49 soliditate quadem carnatur (according to Hirzel’s interpretation). In such cases we supply in thought some part of the verb substantive.

at non Aegyptii. So Xenophon, according to Theodoret iii p. 49, θιν διδομα μελαμα και σωμα γραφων ιφις των ομοιων θεου, όπως δε και αυτω πεφυκασι’ των δε γε θρακας γλαυκους τε και έρφους καί μενου καὶ Μέδους καὶ Ποροας σφίνων αυτως οκτώσας, καὶ Αλγυρίων οσιατώς. Cf. Tylor Prim. Cult. i p. 278 ‘the South-African, who believes in a god with a crooked leg, sees him with a crooked leg in dreams and visions’ (quoted from Livingstone); ‘when the Devil with horns, hoofs and tail had once become a fixed image in the popular mind, of course men saw him in this conventional shape’.

barbaria: ‘the uncivilized world’, a collective name like our ‘Christendom’, cf. Fin. 49 non solum Graecia et Italia sed etiam omnis barbaria.

opiniones de bestis: ‘beliefs in certain brutes’, cf. 29 n.

§ 82. fana spoliata: cf. Sall. Cat. v 6 of the evil effects of Sulla’s conquests ibi primum insuevit exercitus P. R. delubra spoliare, sacra profanaque omnia miscere, and the 4th Verrine Oration.

fando auditum: ‘none have heard tell’, cf. Roby § 1239, Pref. lxv.

crocodilum. See more in § 101 and iii 47 and compare Tusc. v 78 Aegyptiorum morum quis ignorat? quorum imbutas mentes gravitatis erroribus quamvis carnisfocinam prius subierint, quam ibim aut aspidem aut fœdem aut canem aut crocodilum violent, quorum etiamse imprudentes quippeiam fecerint, poenam nullam recusent, Herod. π π 65 τδ δ’ άν τις των θριων τοιων άσκοτειν, ην μεν έκαν, βάσεως ή ζυμή, ή δε δέκων, αποτείς ζυμήν την αν οι ιρες ταξιώνται δε δ’ άν ζωη θηρια αποτείνη, ήν τε έκαν ήν τε δέκων, τεσσάρας ανάγην. Cambyses is said to have taken advantage of this superstition, and placed dogs, sheep, cats and ibises in the van of his own army, Αλγυρίων δε βάλλοντες ἑκαίσαντα, φύζον τον πληξα τοι των ιερων θεων, Polyaeus vi c. 9. See also Diod. i 83 and the quotations from the comic poets in Athen. vii 55, esp. that from Timocles, which is given also in Philodemos p. 86. Different animals were counted sacred in different parts of Egypt as appears from Juvenal Sat. xv; see the very full notes, and reff. on the Egyptian religion generally, contained in Mayor’s ed., and for the crocodile, his n. on crocodilon adorat. In Wilkinson’s Ancient Egyptians (ch iv. small ed.) there is a list of the sacred animals, mentioning where they were worshipped—with what deity each was associated. The later mythology explained this animal-worship by the transformations which the Gods underwent in their fear of Typhoeus, cf. Öv. Met. v 325 huc quoque (to Egypt) terrigenam venisse Typhoea narrat—et se mentitis superos celasse figura, Jupiter in the ram, Mercury in the ibis, &c. For the modern views see Tylor P. C. ii 208—224.
ibim aut faelem: see § 101 n.
violatum. Unless C. contravenes usage in making faelem common, we have here an ex. of agreement with the more remote word, as in Leg. r 1 lucus ille et haec quercus agnoscitur lectus, where see Dumesnil. For the omission of esse see n. on doctus § 60.

quid censes—nonne deum videri? For the form of sentence cf. § 78 n. For Apiis see Dict. of Bibg.

illam vestram Sospitam. The temple of Juno Sospita or Sispita, 'the Saviour', at Lanuvium, was one of peculiar sanctity, being visited annually by the consuls like that of Jupiter Latialis. Livy often speaks of prodigies occurring there, and C. (Div. i 99) tells us that the outbreak of the Marsic war was signified by mice gnawing the shields suspended there. It was rebuilt in obedience to a vision B.C. 90 (Div. i 4). For the special ceremonies belonging to it see Art. on Lanuvium in Dict. of Geoq., and Preller Röm. Myth. p. 246. For the attraction quam Sospitam instead of quam Sospita videtur cf. § 86 tam aperte quam te, and Zumpt § 603 b.

cum pelle—repandis. Preller l.c quotes an inscription relating to a priestess quae in aede Junonis Sospitae Matris Reginae scutulum et clypeum et hastam et calceos rite novarit voto. The Goddess appears in this garb on the coins of the Rosci and other families connected with Lanuvium. See Müller Anc. Art. § 353. The goat-skin, which Preller considers to be a symbol of fertility, and connects with that worn by the Lupercli, covered the head and breast; the scutum was oblong as opposed to the round clypeus; an engraving of the shoe with the upturned toe, calcoxus repandus (pandus), is given in Rich's Comp. to Dict. p. 99; I think the diminutive implies a low shoe, not (as Rich) one worn by a female, as we read of calcei multebres in Varro L. L ix 29 and elsewhere; the hasta marks protection, it was also borne by the Juno Curitis. Moser (ma) notices the recurrence of the termination -am seven times in ten words.

alia nobis: is added by Ursinus, and seems required if the preceding sentence is right, but Sch. Opusc. iii. 287 denies the existence of a 'Romana Juno' distinguished as such by special attributes, and thinks that nec Romana may have been added by some reader who stumbled at the omission of any reference to the Juno Capitolina. On the other hand Klots Adn. Crit. i 6 proposes to insert alia Romanis between Argivis and alia Lanuvinis. It seems to me that et quidem (on which see § 78 n.) comes in very naturally with a repeated alia nobis, and the fact of the repetition facilitates the omission in the first instance. In speaking of the Juno Argiva C. no doubt had in his mind the famous statue by Polyclitus, the contemporary and fellow-pupil of Phidias. It was made of ivory and gold, and represented the goddess seated on a throne, her head crowned with a garland, on which were worked the Graces and the Hours, the one hand holding the symbolical pomegranate, and the other a sceptre, surmounted by a cock, a bird sacred to Hera, on account of her having been once changed into that form by Zeus (Pausan. ii 17 quoted in Dict. of B.). It does not appear that
there was any single type known under the name of Juno Romana; C. probably refers to the general difference between the Greek Hera and her Roman counterpart; cf. Müller A. A. § 120.

Ch. xxx § 83. physicum: see § 77 n. and Wilkins on Orat. i 217, where the Gk. form is used.

venatorem: cf. the metaphorical use of ἡροδίων in Plato, and especially the ‘view-hollo’ on the discovery of justice, Rep. iv 432 c; so Hume ‘there cannot be two passions more nearly resembling each other than hunting and philosophy’, Huxley’s Hume p. 141.

consuetudine imbutis: Bacon’s idola tribus. See N. D. ii 45.

laudamus Athenis Vulcanum: ‘yes, and at Athens we admire’ i.e. ‘there is a statue of V. at Athens’; cf. Mayor on Juv. v 42 praeclara illie laudatur iapis who quotes Fin. iii 63 illa quae in concha patula pinna dicitur, and compares (index s. v.) the poetical construction with καλείσθαι =iēsas, as in Soph. Trach. 639.

Alcamenes: a pupil of Phidias and one of the greatest of Greek sculptors. A list of his works is given in Sillig’s Dictionary of Artists. Some of these have been lately discovered at Olympia, casts of which may be seen in the Fitzwilliam Museum at Cambridge. The Vulcan is thus described by Val. Max. viii 11 tenet visentes Athenis Vulcanus Alcamenis manibus fabricatus. Praeter cetera enim perfectissima artis in eo praecurrentia indicia etiam illud miratur, quod stat dissimulatae claudicationis sub veste leviter vestigium reprezentans, ut non exprobans tamquam vitium, ita tamen certam propriamque dei notam decorum significans.

age et his—facimus: passing on to the names of the Gods, ‘do we suppose (are we such fools as to suppose? cf. n. on arbitrariam § 80) that they have also the same names as those by which they are known to us?’ The first Abl. is that of Description (Roby § 1232) the second that of Manner (Roby § 1234). On age Orelli quotes from Madv. Op. Ac. ii 40 ‘de “age” interrogationi praesposito, cf. ii 120 Tusc. iii 49 Phil. v 28;’ see Roby § 1609. On the adverbial use of et see § 72 n., and Hand ii 513, 517, Kühner on Tusc. iii 28 referred to by Sch. Many exx. are given by Dumeenil on Leg. i 33. The argument as to names is added as a sort of corollary to the previous argument on the appearance of the Gods. That was a fair enough criticism on the prolepsis, and this, though, at first sight, a mere reductio ad absurdum, is to some extent justified by the Epicurean doctrine that names existed φόρεσι οὐ βιβεῖν.

§ 84. quot hominum linguæ: sc. sunt; ut tu Velleius: sc. eris; cf. §§ 68, 90, and Draeg. § 116.

idem Vulcanus: ‘you are always Velleius, but Vulcan (i.e. the God of fire) does not bear the same name in Italy as in Africa or Spain’. Four different Vulcans are distinguished in iii 55, one of whom is the Egyptian Phthas, but we have no information as to a Spanish Vulcan, though it is natural to suppose that there may have been a god of mining in a country so rich in metals.
in pontificis, sc. libris, cf. the similar kinds of books, according to Mar-quadri Ἱβ. ὑ. Ῥῶμ. Ἀλτ. vi p. 287: one of these consisted of indigiamenta, forms of prayer, of which Augustine says C. D. iv 8 nomina deorum aut deorum, quae illi grandibus voluminibus vix comprehenderet potuerunt, singulius rebus propria dispertientes officia numinum. Sch. quotes Serv. ad Georg. i 21 nomina haec numinum in Indigamentis inveniuntur, id est in libris pontificalisibus; qui et nomina deorum et rationem ipsorum nominum continent (e.g. Occator, Sarritor, Sterculius).

innumerabilis: i.e. in the Epicurean view, cf. §§ 49, 50 and 53. So Philod. p. 84 'The Epicureans believe that the gods οὐ μόνον δοκεῖν φασίν of Παντάλλυρες ἄλλα καὶ πλειονάς εἶναι.'

istud—ita: Sch. quotes Div. ii 21 quod certe vobis ita dicendum est. and refers to Hand. Turs. iii 485. See also Madv. Fin. ii 17 and quod ita just below. Ita is not merely pleonastic but adds precision; indeed in this place I should prefer to give it a more distinct force 'that doctrine of yours (una facies § 80) requires such a corollary (sine nominibus), for what is the good of a multitude of names, where there is but one form?' [We sometimes find eodem modo used as ita is here, e.g. § 77, Div. i 29; so isto modo Tusc. v 23; cf. Plato Philob. 20 b εἰδεῖ τοῦτο ἐνός εἶναι. J. S. R.]

quam bellum erat: 'how much prettier it would have been', see n. on longum est § 19.

confiteri nescire: 'If the subject in an Acc. with Inf. is a personal or reflexive pronoun referring to the subject of the principal verb, this pronoun is sometimes left out with verba declarandi et putandi esp. when one Inf. is dependent upon another having the same subject' Madv. § 401, cf. Roby § 1346 Krueger Unters. iii 337 foll. who quotes N. D. i 109 puderet me dicere non intellegere; the same construction is found with confiteor, Rosc. Am. 61.


nauseae: Forcellini and Freund take this to mean 'to utter': the former compares Phil. v 20 orationem ore inpurissimo evomuit, and Fam. xii 25 vinolentum fuorem effunderet. As both passages refer to Antony, (of whom nauseo is also used in its literal sense 2 Phil. 84, and Fam. l.c. quem ego ructantem et nauseantem conjeci in Octaviani plagas), there is some excuse for violence of language there: here, in a quiet discussion with a friend, such a use of the term (even if possible elsewhere, which I doubt,) seems almost beyond Roman bad taste. May it not mean 'to feel disgust at having to utter such nonsense' as Epicurus puts in your mouth? So Heind. takes it, and would even omit the following words as a gloss. Phaedrus iv 6 25 has si qui stulte nauseant of over-critical readers who are disgusted with everything, which Lewis and Short wrongly translate 'to cause disgust'; (the reading is however doubtful).

sibi dispricere: the change to the 3rd person is allowable, as the use of
the 2nd person was merely indefinite 'to confess one's ignorance' and a similar change from the 1st to the 3rd, § 122 utilitatum suarum.

an—sapientia: 'Or (am I mistaken in supposing you to be dissatisfied with your position?) do you really believe God to be a man like you or me? That is impossible. Then am I to call the sun or moon God? But you Epicureans have yourselves shown that the divine attributes of happiness and wisdom are incompatible with such deities'.

truncio: 'a senseless block', contrasted with man's powers of feeling and motion, as in Last. 48, where see Seyffert, and Juv. viii 53 truncio Hermae with Mayor's n.

haec vestra: this may refer to such passages as the criticism on Zeno § 36 rebus inanimis et mutis.
§ 85. visu: cf. § 12 n. and Ruhnken on Pater. p. 94. On the omission of the verb, see § 68 n.

tali aliquo: if the reading is right, this must refer to the heavenly bodies just mentioned, but I prefer Heind.'s alio aliquo.

quod—ita: see above on istud—iit.

hoc loco: see § 13 n. and § 76. It is equivalent here to the in hujus modi sermone of § 61.

omnia sigilla: 'even the least images', not merely statuettes, but emblems on rings or other ornaments.

Epicurum—deos sustulisse: this is asserted by Posidonius below § 123, cf. Plut. M. p. 1102 b, 1112 d.

reliquisse is regularly opposed to relinquere in the Academica, as εναρπειν to επολείπειν in Sext. Emp., Philodemus and elsewhere. verbis—re: cf. § 16.

itaque: the particle properly refers to the sentence beginning in hac iia exposita, to which this should have been subordinated. For exx. of similar looseness of construction, which makes two separate and independent sentences out of the protasis and apodosis of a compound sentence, and yet leaves the original introductory particle in the protasis, see etenim § 91, nam § 93, and Madv. Fin. i 18, where censet enim properly refers to itaque attulit in the next sentence.

κυπις διὰς 'articles of belief' see § 45 quod beatum n. In Fin. ii 20 C. gives, as an explanation of the title, quasi maxime ratas, quia gravissimae sint ad beate vivendum breviter enuntiatae sententiae.

Ch. xxxii. inscitia loquendi: cf. §§ 58, 72 nn. Diog. L. x 13, says that he employed words in their strict literal sense (λέξει κυπία), and that his style was blamed by Aristophanes the grammarian as being ἰδιωτάτης, (does this mean too much given to the use of ηδια εὐθυμαται or 'a marked individual style'? or should we read ἰδιωτικάτης, 'an untrained style') σαφῆς δ' ἕν οὖσος ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς ἠρτορικῆς ἀξιοί μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ σαφῆναι ἀπαινεῖν. Rhetoric he called κατεχεργία Amm. M. xxx 4, and said that φῶς ἐστιν ἣ κατορθοῦσα λόγου τίχην δὲ οὐδεμία, Val. ad loc. Elsewhere C. allows the merit of perspicuity, Fin. i 15 oratio me istius philosophi non
offendit; nam et complectitur verbis quod vult, et dicit plane quod intellexit, and Seneca speaks of a nobilis sententia, apertior quam ut interpretanda sit, et disertior quam ut adjuvanda Ep. 21. Gellius II 9 defends his style from some attacks of Plutarch. [Theon the rhetor blamed Epic for an excessive attention to rhythm, see Blass Die Attische Bereedsamkeit, p. 52. J. S. R.]

hominem minime vafri: cf. Tusc. II 44 venit Epicurus, homo minime malus vel potius vir optimus; tantum monet quantum intelligit. In B. P. III 26 the Epicureans are described with the same contemptuous good-nature as si qui minime sunt in disserendo mali, qui non sunt in disputando vafri, non veteratores, non malitosi, and in Tusc. III 50 as viri optimi, nam nullum genus est minus malitiosum.

§ 86. an si quid sit. There is the same ambiguity in the original ῥὰ μακάριος as in C.'s translation quod beatum est; both assert that ἀπεργομένὴ is a necessary accompaniment of blessedness and immortality, without positively asserting the existence of a blessed and immortal being. The apodosis omitted after si quid is of course id nec habere—negotium. The ms reading id esse immortale is an attempt to supply the apodosis by a reader who misunderstood the sense, see Sch. Opusc. III pp. 318, 366.

non animadverterunt hic—sed: 'they do not observe that, though he speaks ambiguously here' &c., cf. the use of μίν and ἄ, and see nn. on § 20 eivus principium, § 23 ut ea sapientis.

Metrodorum: see § 93 n.

quam—te: the correct construction tu locutus es is subordinated to animadverterunt, see § 82 n.

ille vero: 'no, no! he is a believer'. The argument is 'Ep. is eager to do away with religion because, he says, it inspires such overwhelming terrors; but experience does not show these terrors at work in ordinary men; Ep. must be judging others from himself'.

quibus mediocres—perterrítas. For the feeling as to religious terrors among Epicureans and others see §§ 45, 54, 56, Tusc. I 10 nam te Íllya terrent? triceps apud inferos Cerberus?... Adeone me dèlarer censes ut ista credam?... Aequi pleni sunt libri contra ista ipsa disserentium. Inope sane; quis est enim tam exors quaem ista movemant? Tusc. I 48 liberatos se dicunt (Epicurei) gravissimis dominis, terrore sempiterno et diurno ac nocturno metu. Quo terrors? quo metu? Quae est anus tam deliria quae timent ista quae vos videlicet, si physica non didicissetis, timentis? foll.; Fin. I 64 e physicis et fortiúdo sumitus contra mortis timorem, et constantia contra metum religions, et sedatio animi, omnium rerum occultarum ignorations sublata, et moderatio, natura cupiditatum generibusque earum explicatis; Lucr. I 62, 103, 110 aeternas quoniam poenas in mortis timendumest, 146 foll.; above all the very interesting discussion on the nature and effects of religious fear in Plutarch's treatise, Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicureos, pp. 1101—1107, of which the purport is given in the following, βίβλιαν χάριν ευναχρέχι τι καὶ συγκεκριμένα τῇ περὶ θεῶν δόξη κοινών αλλοιῶν καὶ φώσου πάθος, ἢ τούτο φεύγοντας μὴν ἐλπίδα μὴν χάριν ἑαυτῶν μὴν
BOOK I CH. XXXI § 86.

§ 87. *cum ipso Epicuro loquar*: see § 67 n.

*in deorum numero ponere*: for const. see § 29 n. *Numero* is Walker's corr. for *natura* of mss [written nā in U and therefore easily confounded with nd. J. S. R.].

*numquam vidi—figura*: see § 48 and § 76.

*quid? solis—vidisti?* C. has made a mess of his argument. Ep. says 'I do not believe in the existence of reason apart from human shape, for I have no experience of it'. The answer is 'You have never seen anything like the sun and stars moving in regular order, therefore you must disbelieve their existence'. Of course the cases are entirely unlike: in the latter case the senses, which (acc. to Ep.) always tell truth, assert the existence of the sun; in the former they assert nothing, and we have to proceed by general reasoning from analogy. What C. was really aiming at may be gathered from the remarkable treatise of Philodemus, *peri σμείων καὶ σμείωσεων*, where we find it stated (p. 37 Gomp.) that 'the opponents of Epic., in arguing that there may be unique existences in the unseen world, are employing the Epicurean argument from analogy', and (in p. 19) that *Epicureans allow that ήλιος εἰς ἐστιν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ κελήμη καὶ πλήθος ἄλλων ὑπάρχον ἥνωσιν* (e.g. the magnet as contrasted with other stones), but they hold that when certain properties have been found constantly united, where one exists the other will exist, *μηδένος ἄνθρωπος*. The anti-Epicurean argument therefore must evidently have been of this nature, 'there may be rational beings without human shape, though our experience presents no parallel, for many things in our experience are unparalleled, and, on this principle, would have been incredible prior to experience'.

*quinque errantium*: so Milton speaks of 'five other wandering fires', vis. Mars, Venus, Mercury, Jupiter, Saturn, see *N. D.* ii § 52 foll.

*sol duabus—conficit*: 'the sun completes his annual revolutions, confining his motion within the limits of the ecliptic at either solstice' (lit. 'by the two extreme points of one circle'), cf. ii 49, 50, 101 foll.

*hanc*: 'under similar limitations'; see ii 50 in *lunae quoque cursu est et brumae quaedam et solstitii similitudo*.

*lustrationem*: cf. the use of *lustro* in ii 53, 106.
a terris: the plural is unusual in this sense, though in Agr. II 62 we find in terris, meaning 'the whole world'.

ab idem principis: 'starting from the same point they finish their course in longer or shorter time'. For the PL cf. Orat. I 121 exalbescam in principiis dicendi.

numine: found also in Last. 36, where see Seyffert.

§ 88. ergo: 'on this principle of experience we must disbelieve everything unusual in history or science'.

ita fit: 'it follows from this', cf. §§ 37, 121.

mediterranei: Verr. v 70 homines mediterranei are opposed to homines maritimis just before.

quae sunt tantae animi angustiae: 'what an excess of narrow-mindedness is this'? cf. § 90 quis iste tantus causa? and Virg. Geo. iv 495 quis tantus furor? Heind. following Davies and Walker took quae as the relative and joined these words to the following sentence, but the exclamation is more Ciceronian here, and the connexion tantae ut putares would be very harsh, especially coming after the comparison as to the mediterranei.

ut—non crederes: 'in like manner (lit. just as), supposing you had been born in Seriphus and had never seen any animal larger than a fox, you would never have believed in the existence of lions'. Sch. compares III 86 ut, si qui dentes natura dicit existere, Div. I 96 ut, si magnetem lapidem esse dicam, and refers to Modv. Fin. iv 30 ut...si vita jucunda addatur, where other exx. are given.

Seriphi: one of the Cyclades, used as a place of banishment under the Empire, proverbial for its insignificance and the borné tone of its inhabitants, cf. Mayor on Juv. x 170, Ael. H. A. III 37, Plato Rep. I 329 (the famous story of Themistocles and the Seraphian, which is also given by C. Senect. § 8).

§ 97 an quicumque—vidimus. I have followed Bake (Mnemos. II 4 p. 414) in transposing this passage, which comes in very inappropriately where it is placed in the mss, separating two sentences which clearly belong to each other, and having itself no proper connexion with what precedes; while here, on the contrary, it serves to round off what was previously abrupt, and makes an easier transition to the new topic introduced in et tu quidem Vellei. Connecting it thus I understand an to refer to quae sunt angustiae? 'is it not narrow-mindedness) or (still to press the same point) can we imagine anything more childish than to deny the existence of the animals which inhabit the Red Sea'? an implying 'the needlessness of the preceding remark', Roby § 2255.

quae gignantur: there is no occasion for reading the Ind. with Sch., or for any elaborate explanation, such as Müller gives Adm. Crit. p. vi: the Subj. is that which naturally belongs to a subordinate relative clause in Orat. Obl. For nulla esse cf. § 61.
rubro mari Indiave: a sort of hendiadys for the ἰρυθρὰ θᾶλασσα of the Greeks, which comprehended the Indian Ocean together with the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. The allusion is probably to the whales, of which Pliny says (N. H. ix 2) plura maxima in Indico mari animalia, e quibus balanae quaternum jugerum, pristes ducenum cubitorum; and further on, speaking of Cadara, rubri mari paeninsula ingens, he says that hujus loci quiete ad immobilem magnitudinem beluae adolescent; so Strabo xv 2 12 mentions among the difficulties experienced by Nearchus, in his voyage from the mouth of the Indus to the Euphrates, the shoals of enormous whales (φυσηρίων); he continues λέγουσι μὲν οὖν καὶ οἱ πλέοντες εἰς Ἰνδοὺς μεγάθη θηρίων, 'which are however frightened by shouting and the sound of the trumpet'.

curiosissimi: used in a good sense as of Chrysippus, Tusc. i 108, in omni historia curiosis.

tam multa—quam sunt multa quae existunt: this somewhat verbose expression is intended, I suppose, to give greater prominence to the idea of multitude, cf. Orat. 108 nemo orator tam multa scripsit, quam multa sunt nostra. For the substantive use tam multa is more common than tot, which is so used however in Cae. 66 tot unum superare posseunt.

negemus esse, quia numquam vidimus: cf. Locke's story of the King of Siam, who refused to believe the Dutch Ambassador's description of the ice in Holland; and the controversy on the value of experience, as opposed to testimony, between Hume, Campbell and others. In Ep.'s argument against the Stoics, who are here speaking through the mouth of Cotta (see Introduction), the point debated is the value of particular experience as opposed to general reasoning. 'The universe', said the Stoics, 'exhibits the working of what we call reason (this is shown at length in Bk. ii), therefore it must be animated by a rational soul': 'no', replies the Epicurean, 'experience shows that a rational soul can only exist in human form'; which the Stoic meets by a reference to the limited nature of our experience, and the vastness of the universe, pointing out the erroneous conclusions which would necessarily flow from the assumption that there can be nothing in the infinite unknown but what is a repetition of the infinitesimal known. In point of fact the Epicureans did not themselves adhere to this principle: their doctrines of atoms, of images, of the gods, of the origin and growth of the world, were anything but matters of ordinary experience (as Lactantius points out De Ira 10 quis illa vidit umquam? foll.); nor did they care about their scientific truth, except in so far as it offered an escape from the acknowledgment of a divine government of the universe.

§ 89. et tu quidem: 'yes, and you Vell. have gone further and given us a syllogistic proof of anthropomorphism'; see this in § 48.

non vestro more, sed dialecticorum. Cf. § 70 n. Hirzel p. 177 foll. argues that Zeno is here alluded to, and that there was an important section of the Epicurean school, commencing with Apollodoros ἐν εὐτυχόρανοι, who set a

M. C. 13
higher value on logic and on literary culture generally than Epicurus did; he thinks these are referred to by Diog. L. x 25, when he speaks of those disciples οὐ καὶ γνησίοι Ἐπικούρειοι σοφιτὰς διακαλοῦν. It is certain that C. (Fin. i 30 foll.) contrasts the procedure of Ep. himself, who held that his doctrine of pleasure was self-evident and needed no proof (negat opus esse ratione neque disputatione, quamobrem voluptas expetenda, fugiendus dolor sit: sentiri hoc putat ut calere ignem), and that of some of his followers who, having regard to the criticisms of other schools, non existimant oportere numquam nos causae confidere, sed et argumentandum et accurate disserendum et rationibus conquisitis de voluptate et dolore disputandum putant.

quae agrees with the neuter dialectica, implied in the preceding masculine. The neuter is also found Off. i 19 al.: elsewhere we have the feminine, both in a Gr. form, dialectica, and in the Latin, see Fin. ii 17 dialecticum pugni similis esse dicebat, III 41 &c. Sch. illustrates the construction from Tusc. i 4 in Graecia musici forserunt discebatque id omnes, cf. also ib. iv 45 gladiatorum id quidem; quamquam in ipsius videmus saepè constantiam, N. D. i 80 equos silos—quae, Brut. 112 ad senatoriam sententiam, cuius (sc. senatus) erat ille princeps, (aptum videbatur), Fin. i 17 Democrita dicit...ille, v 16 Carneadia divisio est—ille (where see Madv.), and a remarkable instance in Sall. Cat. 18 antea conjuravere pauca: in quibus Catilina fuit; de qua dicam, where see Dietzsch. [Perhaps however it is better, as Mr Roby suggests, to refer quae to argumentis, translating 'and you V.,' deviating from the custom of your school, have logically stated your opinion in arguments of the Dialecticians, totally unknown to your tribe'; though it must be confessed there is some harshness in the position of the relative.]

gens vestra non novit: cf. § 70 nn., Ac. ii 97, Zeller Stoics tr. p. 399. C. goes more into detail Fin. i 22 (Epicurus) tollit definitiones, nihil de dividendo ae partiendo docet, non quo modo efficaciter concludaturque ratio tradit, non qua via capti'sa solvantur, ambiguam distinguantur ostendit. According to Seneca Ep. 89 the Epicureans at first made philosophy consist of Ethics and Physics only, but afterwards cum ipsis rebus cogitandum ambigua secernere, falsa sub specie veri latentia coarguere, ipsi quoque locum, quem de judicio et regula appellant (N. D. i § 43) alio nomine rationalem inducerunt; sed eam accessionem esse naturalis partis existimant. We may take Gellius' statement (ii 8) that Ep. inverted the order of the syllogism, as a sign that he had treated the subject with his usual independence and originality of thought; and the treatise of Philodemus περὶ ονείων καὶ ονειώσεων shows that the Inductive Logic at any rate was deeply studied by some of the later Epicureans. gens vestra 'your people' is used, like natio (cf. ii 74 salem istum, quae caret vestra natio) and ἄριστος, for a set or class of people: similarly familia, of a philosophic sect, Div. ii 3.

argumentis sententiam conclusisti. Most maes have argumenti, but this could only mean 'the general sense of the argument,' which does not
suit the context. What is wanted is a phrase to express strict logical procedure as opposed to a mere statement of belief, and I think this is better expressed by the Abl. than by Sch.'s *argumenta* (or *summarum*) *sententiae*, see his *Opusc.* III 289 and 328. Madv., it is true, denies the possibility of this reading, see his note on *Fin.* i 30 Latine 'rationem, argumentum concludere' dicimur, etiam 'aliquis concludere' ut accusativus pronominis addatur; 'sententiam rem' non magis 'concludere' dicimur quam 'rem negare' aut 'veritatem rei'. But negative statements of this kind are to be received with very great suspicion even when made about the writer's own language, and the correctness of the expression is, I think, shown by the citations in Müller *Adn.* Cr. v, e.g. *Ac.* i 32 itaque tradetur omnis dialectae disciplina, id est, orationis ratione conclusae, which Reid translates 'speech drawn up in syllogistic form'; cf. too *Div.* i 82 quam (divinationem) esse re vera haec Stoicorum ratione concluditur, where we might surely have had quae sententia rat. concluditur. The phrase occurs in the more general sense of 'rounding off' in *Brutus* 34 ipsa natura circumscriptio quadem verborum comprehendit concluditque sententiam, Orator 230 aptius explet concluditque sententias, so Quintil. senex numen numeris concludere.

**Ch. xxxii. beatos esse—hominis figura.** This is an example of the composite or chain syllogism (see Hamilton *Logic* i pp. 366—385), also called the 'sortes', though that term is confined to the synonymous sophism by C., unless we except the doubtful passage in *Fin.* iv 50. The simple syllogisms of which the sortes is composed are as follows, (1) All that are blessed are virtuous, the gods are blessed, therefore the gods are virtuous; (2) all that are virtuous are rational, the gods are virtuous, therefore rational; (3) all that are rational are in the shape of man, the gods are rational, therefore in human shape.

*et libenter quidem:* cf. §§ 82, 83 and n. on § 79.

*conveniat—necesse est:* 'we cannot but agree to that.'

*quem—daturum.* The Epicureans no doubt would answer, not perhaps with the French materialist, that thought was a secretion of the human brain, but that experience told us nothing of the operations of reason except as contained in a human body; and so in fact we find it stated in a Herculanean treatise, quoted on § 48.

*opus erat:* so bellum erat § 84 n.

*sumpsiisses tuo jure:* Madvig on *Fin.* ii 35 gives this as an example of the jussive use of the Subj., on which see Roby § 1604 and my n. on *dedisse* iii 76. Thus taken it would mean, 'if reason were confined to human shape, you should have assumed the doctrine of anthropomorphism on your own authority' (without all this reasoning). Otherwise we might take it as an ordinary apodosis after si *ita esse*, 'you would have been justified in assuming it.' Sch. suggests that it is equivalent either to debebas or to poterat numere. The second no doubt gives the most natural sense, 'you might have assumed it on your own authority, without asking
any one’s leave’; but, though the Inf. with poteram sometimes stands where we might have expected the Plup. Subj., is there any instance of the converse? On tuo jure see § 77 arripere vestro jure n.

quid est istuc gradatim: ‘what do you mean by this phrase of yours?’ In the mss these words stand before sumpsisses, and Walker followed by Davies and Ernesti omitted them as an expression of bewilderment on the part of some ignorant fraterculus, but gradatim is not a particularly puzzling word; and the clause comes in quite naturally with Faccioliati’s transposition. The emendation qui (Sch. Opusc. iii p. 325) is unnecessary: it only expresses in a literal prosaic way what is implied by quid; cf. N. D. iii 21 cum mundo negas quiquam esse melius, quid dicis melius? (Allen).

praecipitare istuc quidem: ‘that is not a step, but a plunge’, ‘herabstürzen nicht herabsteigen’, Kühner; cf. Ac. ii 63 sustinenda est omnis assenso, ne praecipites et temere processeritis. On the fallacy known as the saltus or hiatus in demonstrando see Hamilton Logic ii p. 51. For the form of expression cf. Tusc. ii 30 optare hoc quidem est, non doore (Heind.). The Nom. and Acc. N. both in S. and Pl. of the archaic istic are found in C, cf. Ac. i 13 istic quidem considerabo, Div. ii 35 istic quidem dicunt, Att. xiv 1 non posse istaeo sic abire.

§ 90. deos hominum similes—quam homines deorum. Cf. the language in which C. speaks of the anthropomorphic gods of the poets, fingebat haec Homerus et humana ad deos transferebat; divina mallem ad nos. Quae autem divina? vigere, sapere, invenire, meminisse, Tusc. i 65.

esse illud huic: Orat. Obl. in loose dependence on dices implied in quaeseris.

video: ‘I see your point’, almost equivalent to ‘granted’.

formae figuram: ‘the outline of their shape’, see § 47 n. If this is a genuine phrase, and not a gloss for formam, its precision was probably intended to prevent the misapprehension of formam in the sense of ‘beauty’. Sch. quotes Lucr. iv 67 formai servare figuram, and Off. i 126 formam nostram reliquamque figuram in qua esset species honesta, where see Holden.

nati numquam sunt. Immortality was the most universally accepted of the divine attributes, but this was not understood to mean eternity. On the contrary, detailed accounts of the birth of the reigning gods of Olympus were to be found in the poets, and even the praevalent gods were supposed to have sprung from Earth and Chaos. Yet we find traces of the higher doctrine, as in the oracle of Dodona reported by Pausan. x 12 5 Zeüς ἱ, Zeüς ἐτων, Zeüς ἵσοντας, Ἑ μεγάζ Zeü; and Plut. Stoic. Rep. 38 p. 1051 treats this as the universally accepted opinion, φθαρτῶν καὶ γεννητῶν οὐδεὶς, ὡς ἵσος εἰσιν, διανοοῦσαι θεῶν (Nig. N. Hom. Theol. pp. 9, 71).

siquidem aeterni sunt futuri: ‘that is, if they are to be eternal’ (as you Epicureans hold, cf. §§ 45, 49, 107, 109). The Fut. Part. is used because the question whether the gods are in future to be called aeterni
would be decided by the fact of their having been born in the past, cf. § 103 n.

ante igitur—immortales. Bake's reading eaque, adopted by Baiter, seems to me to give the thought rather awkwardly, as though the human form were something self-existent, and happened to be also an attribute of the gods. If an alteration is needed, I should prefer to insert a second di immortales before humana forma, translating 'so the gods existed in human form before men existed in that form which belonged to the gods'. With the present reading, humana forma must be Nom.; ea is also so taken by Moser and Seibt, and, if one may judge from the punctuation, by Schömann, but this seems to me extremely harsh; the only possible construction is quam homines ea (forma erant) qua erant forma di.

nosta divina: on the difference between this and the Christian doctrine, that man is made in the image of God, see below § 96 virtus quam figura, n.

hoc quidem: so. esto, cf. §§ 68, 84.

ut voletis: cf. Phil. II 118 with Mayor's n.

illud: 'that other point'; used, like iesevo, of that which follows, Madv. § 485 b.

sed tamen: 'however, not to dwell on this'. On this resumptive use of the particle after digression see Madv. § 480, and cf. De Orat. II 365 and Heind. on Hor. Sat. 1 1 27.

quis iste tansus casus: 'what is the nature of this chance which you tell us can produce such results?' cf. § 88 quae tansus angustiae, n.

§ 91. seminae deorum decidisse: cf. Ov. Met. 1 78 natus homo est, sive hume divino semine fecit | ille opifex rerum, mundi melioris origo, | sive recens tellus, seductaque nuper ab alto | aethere, cognati retinebat semina caeli, | quam satus lapeto mistam ferialibus undis | fexit in effigiem moderantum cuncta deorum; Leg. 1 24 extitisse quandam maturitatem serendi generis humani, quod spatium in terras atque satum divino auctum sit animorum munere, quaque alia quisque cohaerentes homines e mortali generre sumpsint, animum esse ingeneratum a deo, ex quo vere vel agnatio nobis cum caelestibus vel genus vel stirps appellari potest. It is in a different sense that the Epicurean poet says denique caelesti sumus omnes semine oriundi, Lucr. 1 991. The enolitic interrogative, when it is not attached to the principal verb, is often expressive of surprise, and suggests a negative answer (Madv. § 451 n), as here semianae, and omnesne below.

putamus: cf. § 80 arbitramur, § 82 facimus n.

deorum cognitionem agnoscere: cf. § 1 ad agnitionem animi, n.

et nunc: 'and after such absurdities as this'. Other examples of this exclamatory, or pathetic, use of et (= iva) are found § 93 et soletis gueri, § 100 et vivuperabas, Div. II 121 totas noctes somniamus, et miramur aliquid quando id quod somniavimus evadere? (where Allen cites Liv. II 38 et hanc urbem ducitis, III 19 et vos prius signa, etc.) Div. II 69 et negant historic, where Allen cites other passages; Tull. 42 et miramini (with Beier's n.),
Tusc. i 92 et dubitas, III 35 et tu oblivisci jubes, Phil. i 19 et vos acta Caesaris defenditis, see Draeg. § 311 11.

tam facile vera invenire: see §§ 57, 60 with nn. on quid non sit and Simonides.

Ch. xxxiii. etenim commences the refutation, showing how easy it is falsa convincere. Like itaque in § 85, its force spreads over to the sentences which follow.

memoriter: 'exactly' = μνημονεύως in Plato Polit. 257 n, see Rost and Palm's Lex. Madv. in his n. on Fin. i 34 shows that this is the only proper use of the word.

admirari liberet: Heind. takes offence at the phrase as implying that wonder was a matter of choice, and Cobet (Var. Lect. p. 461) proposes, with Moser, to read subiret = δοθ' ἰπότε τωμᾶς ἐπιλθόν; but perhaps we may translate 'I was fain to express my wonder' (referring to § 58 dilucide, copiosè &c.), see n. on admirabor § 24.

§ 92. omnesne—delirare visi: 'do you mean to say that you thought them all out of their senses?' Almost the same thing is said in § 94. See above on the use of ne and cf. istimn § 93. On delirare see § 42 n. and Ac. fr. 34 Orelli, roga nunc Stoicum quis sit melior, Epicurusne, quis delirare illum clamat, an Academicus.

qui—decreverint: 'for deciding'; even without this causal force, qui, being indefinite, would naturally be followed by a Subj.

ne hoc quidem vos movet considerantes: 'when you reflect on the special conveniences and adaptations of the limbs in man, are you still unconvinced (lit. does not even this incline you to judge) that the gods have no need of human limbs?' Hoc is explained by considerantes, the participle here taking the place of an infinitive or noun in apposition. The same thought (deos non egere membrii) appears in the Timaeus c. 6, where the formation of the world by the Demiurgus is described, nec enim oculis egebat, quia nihil extra, quod cerni posset, reliquum erat, nec auribus, quia ne quod audiretur quidem...nec manus affixit, quoniam nec capiendum quicum erat, nec repellendum, nec pedes aut alia membra, quidus ingressum corporis susinet.

ingressu: 'the act of walking'; so in § 94; incessus is used Off. i 128.

discipione: see § 26 n.

nihil supervacaneum occurs also in § 99, II 121; the form supervacaneus is more common in later Latin.

itaque nulla ars—potest: 'and so (since there is nothing without a reason in nature) no art can approach the cunning of her handwork'. The sentence comes in awkwardly, and Heind. proposed to read ut—possit for itaque potest: Stamm (De N. D. interpolationibus, Vratislav, 1873) thinks it is an interpolation from II 81 (naturam) cujus sollertiae nulla ars, nulla manus, nemo opifex consequis possit imitando; cf. 142 quis vero opifex praeter naturam, quia nihil potest esse calidius, tantam sollertiae persequi potuisse in sensibus. So Aristotle contrasts nature with art, Part. Anim.
§ 92.  

I. 1 μάλλον δ’ ἐστι τὸ ὅσον ἔσχε καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις ἢ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τέχνης, καὶ νέον. οὐδὲν ποιεῖν περιπετευόν οὐδὲ μάθει.  

Not unlike is Bacon’s famous aphorism (Nov. Org. i 10), subtilitas naturae subtiliitatem sensus et intellectus multis partibus superat.

habebit igitur—loquetur: but in the treatise by Philodemus περὶ τῆς τῶν θεῶν εὐτάξιαμης διαγωγῆς κατὰ Ζήνων (Herc. vol. vi, Naples, 1839) we read that the gods λέγονται μὴ πολὺ διαφεροῦσα κατὰ τὰς ἀδρόσεις χρήσιμα φαιναῖ, καὶ μόνον οἶδαν μεγαλύτερους θεούς Ἑλληνιδῆ γλώσση χρημάτων, quoted in Zeller Stoics tr. p. 442. From the fact that the author here followed by C. takes for granted that the gods are not endued with the faculty of speech, and that Carneades (ap. Sext. Emp. x 178) introduces the idea of their speaking either the Greek, or any other language, as an absurd consequence which would flow from the assumption of their having such a faculty, Hirzel (p. 172) argues that the dogma reported by Philodemus must have been a late development in the Epicurean school, and that it may possibly have been suggested to Zeno by the very argument which Carneades directed against the attribution of speech to the gods.

§ 93. istiane—dixerunt: ‘Was it in such dreams as these that they put their faith when they spoke against Pythagoras &c.?’ For sumnia cf. §§ 39, 42.

Metrodorus: the most distinguished of the disciples of Epic. d. n. c. 277. His fragments have been collected by Duening (Teub. 1870), cf. § 113.


Leontium. ‘Opponents charged the Epicureans with gross impropriety because they admitted not only women, but women of loose morality into the philosophic circle’, Zeller Stoics tr. p. 384. To judge this matter fairly we must remember (1) the strict seclusion imposed upon Athenian matrons, (2) the esteem in which such a man as Socrates held the Hetaeræ Aspasia and Diotima, (3) the slanderous pens of controversialists and anecdote-mongers, which left no philosophic reputation unassailed, and

1 His words are εἰ φωνᾶς ἔστι (ὁ θεὸς), φωνῇ χρῆται καὶ ἔχει φωνητικὰ ὀργάνα, καθάπερ πνεῦμα καὶ τραχεῖαν ἄρτριαν γλώσσαν τε καὶ στόμα. τούτῳ δὲ ἔστω καὶ ἐγγὺς τῆς Ἑπικούρου μυθολογίας. ταῖνων ῥητῶν μὴ υπάρχει τῶν θεῶν. καὶ γὰρ δὴ εἰ φωνῇ χρῆται, ὀμιλεῖ εἰ δὲ ὀμιλεῖ, πάντως κατὰ τὸν διάλεκτον ὀμιλεῖ. εἰ δὲ τούτῳ, τί μάλλον τῷ Ἑλληνιδῷ τῷ βαρβάρῳ χρῆσαι γλώσση; καὶ εἰ τῷ Ἑλληνιδῷ, τί μάλλον τῷ Ἑλληνίδῃ τῷ Ἑλληνίδῳ τῷ κατὰ τῶν ἑλλήνων; It is strange that Hirzel can have read the argument of Carneades, as given in the 9th book of Sext. Emp., and yet have believed that Cicero’s critique on the Epicurean theology was borrowed from him. Carn. is impartially destructive; his opponent is welcome to choose any view, and he will show that on that view, whatever it may be, the existence of a deity is impossible; Cic. on the contrary is fundamentally Stoica1 with a slight Academic varnish.
which, if we may believe Diog. x 3, were especially venomous in the case of Epicurus. Among the female members of the school were Themissta, wife of the Epicurean Leonteus, to whom C. jestingly alludes as a sort of female Solon in his speech against Piso, licet Themissta sapientior sis, and Leontium, the mistress of Epicurus, here mentioned. Her attack on Theophrastus is noticed by Plin. N. H. praeef. 53, who also mentions two portraits of her by distinguished artists (xviii 36 36 and 40 19).

scito illa—sed tamen: ‘in neat Attic style it is true, but still’ (mestricula contra Theophrastum, what a piece of impertinence!) Cf. the ellipse with διόμη δι Plato Parm. 137 a, δια διόμη Arist. Ach. 956.

tantum—licentiae: ‘such was the freedom of speech in which the Garden indulged’: tantum often sums up, or gives the moral, like adeo in Juvenal.

et soletis queri: ‘and then (after abusing others so freely) you complain (if you are attacked yourselves)’, cf. § 91 n. on et nunc.

litigabat: Demetrius Magnes, a contemporary of C. (who alludes to his writings Att. iv 11, viii 11) stated in his treatise Περί ομορφίαν that Zeno was successful in prosecuting Theotimus, who had attacked Epic., Θεοτίμου δὲ γράψας τὰ καὶ ἔκακον Εὐκαίρων βιβλία ὑπὸ Ζήνωνος ἐξαιρθείσι (cf. Eur. Or. 1657) ἀνηρίθη, Athen. xiii p. 611. It is supposed that ‘Dictimus’ should be read for ‘Theotimus’, as we are told that a Stoic of the former name fathered spurious letters on Ep. with the view of discrediting his moral character, Diog. L. x 3. For Zeno see § 59 n.

Albucius: praetor in Sardinia B.C. 105, condemned on a charge repetundarum in B.C. 103, after which he retired to Athens, where he had been educated, and devoted himself to philosophy. His name often occurs in C.’s writings, e.g. Brut. 131 doctus etiam Graecis T. Alb. vel potius paene Graecus...fuit autem Athenis adolescens, perfectus Epicureus evaserat; Prov. Cons. 15 where he is called Graecus homo ac levis; Tus. v 108 T. Alb. nonne animo aqueissimo Athenis exul philosophatatur? His Greek tastes were satirized by Lucilius, who makes Scævola address him as follows Graecum te, Albuci, quam Romanum atque Sabinum | ...maluisti dici; Graecus ergo praetor Athenis, | id quod maluisti, te, quom ad me addedis, saluto: | xaipe, inguam, Tite; licores, turma omnis cohorisque: | xaipe, Tite! hinc hostis mi Albucius, hinc inimicus | (quoted in Fvnia i 9); also his affected style Orator 149.

nam Phaedro—sed stomachabatur: ‘then as to Phaedrus, though nothing could be more refined or courteous, still he used to lose his temper’. Cf. Ac. ii 11 Antiochus, homo natura lenissimus, stomachari tamen coepit. On nam, as a particle of transition, see § 27 n.; on the attachment to the first clause, of a particle which properly belongs to the second, § 85 itaque n.; on coordination of contrasted clauses § 20 n.

Phaedrus: president of the Epicurean school, d. B.C. 70; C. says of him Fam. xiii 1 nobis cum pueri essens, antequam Philonem cognominus, valde ut philosophus, postea tamen ut vir bonus et suavis et officiosus probabatur.
This was at Rome about B.C. 88, but in 79 C. in company with Atticus attended lectures at Athens by Zeno and Phaedrus, Fīn. i 16 eos cum Attico nostro frequenter audivi, cum miraretur ills quoica utrumque, Phaedrum autem etiam amaret, cf. Fīn. n 3, Leg. i 50, and see Introduction.

cum—Aristotelem vexarit: 'and yet Epic. attacked A.'; cf. Roby §§ 1730, 1732. We find vexo similarly used in § 78 and Tusc. n 25 vexatur Theophrastus et libris et scholis omnium philosophorum. Diog. L. gives specimens of the abusive language which, he says, was falsely imputed to Ep. (μεμηναι δὲ οὖν τοι 9); Plato and his friends he styled Διοσοιωκδακας, Aristotle Δοσοτον, Democritus Δηρόκριτον, &c. x 8; cf. Plut. M. 1086 (speaking of Ep. and Metr.) τὰ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀσχίστα ῥήματα, βουμολογίας, ἡκυ- βισμοὺς, ἀλαζονιῶς, ... συναγαγόντες, 'Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Πυθαγόρας καὶ Θεοφράστου καὶ Ἡρακλείδου καὶ Ἰππάρχου, καὶ τίνος γὰρ ὀψὶ μὲν ἐπιθαυμασθαν κατεσκέδασαν; similarly Plut. (M. 1108) describes the treatise of Colotes, entitled περὶ τοῦ ὀτρι τὰ τῶν φιλοσοφῶν δόγματα οὐδὲ τίνι πάντως, consisting of parts of sentences wrested from their natural signification and spiced with rudeness and buffoonery. Even C., though far from mealy-mouthed, makes a protest against the abusiveness of Greek controversy, Fīn. π 80 sit igitur in Graecorum levitate perversitas, qui maledictis insectantur eos a quibus de veritate dissientiant.

Phaedon!—male dixerit: Ph. was a well-born native of Elis, taken prisoner and sold as a slave in Athens B.C. 401, where he attracted the notice of Socrates and was ransomed by one of his disciples. He was present whilst Soc. uttered the famous discourse on immortality which is known to us as the Phaedo. Some time after his master's death he returned to Elis, and founded the Elean school of philosophy, which appears to have been closely allied with those of Eretria and Megaris. We read of a treatise of Epicurus which bore the name of διαπορία πρὸς τοὺς Μεγαρικοὺς, and it is possible that Phaedo may have been criticized in this. The epithet τυρπίσσιν refers, we may suppose, to the degradation he underwent as a slave, as Diog. (π 105) tells us of another opponent who taunted him with this misfortune, cf. Zeller, Socrates p. 279 tr.

Timocratem: a disciple of Ep. described as fickle (Diog. x 6) and hot-tempered (Philod. De Ira Gomp. p. 48), who left him in consequence of a difference of opinion as to the grounds of happiness, cf. § 113. Duening (Metrodorus p. 23) thinks that the quotations there given are from a treatise by his brother Metrodorus περὶ τοῦ μείζων εἶναι τὴν παρ' ἑαυτὸν ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, and that Metr. is not there contrasting bodily and mental pleasure, but pleasure which originates ab intra with that which originates ab extra, but see Hirzel p. 165 foll. Other grounds of quarrel are mentioned by Duening p. 24. After this breach Timoc. seems to have used every effort to injure his former associates, charging them with debauchery of every kind in his Euphranta, as well as in inveighing against them in public, cf. Alciph. Ep. π 210 τι ποιεῖ, 'Επίκουρε; σὺν οἷοθα διτὶ διακαμψθεὶ ἐπὶ τούτως ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ἐν ταῖς
BOOK I  CH. XXXIII  § 93.

θεάρυος, παρά τοῖς ἄλλοις σοφοτάτης; To these attacks Ep. and Metr. published replies (Diog. L. x 24, 27, 136 and Plut. Col. p. 1126). The Timocrates mentioned by Ep. in his will is probably a distinct person, Zeller Stoics, tr. p. 387, Duen. p. 25.

condiderit: exactly answering to our 'cut him up'.

in Decrictum—ingratus: see above on Aristotelium, and §§ 29, 69, 73, Plut. M. 1101 ν, also Fin. i 21 Decrictum, laudatum a ceteris, ab hoc qui cum unum seos seet, nollem virtuperatum. Both Metr. and Ep. wrote against Democ. but this was probably to make it evident where their system differed from his, as opponents charged them with being mere plagiarists (Duen. p. 36). Plutarch, in reporting the charges brought against Democ. by Colotes, mentions that Epicurus long called himself a follower of Democ., and that Leontes, one of his most distinguished disciples, τυμάσθας φησί τῶν ἄνθρωπων ὧτο Ἐπικοτρῳ, while Metr. ἀντικρις ἐήρηκεν ἐς ἐς ἕ μη προκαθηγήσατο Δημ. οὐκ ἄν προῆλθεν Ἐπικοτρος ἐς τὴν σοφίαν. Nausiphanem—male acceperit: cf. § 73 n. and Epicurus' own words recorded by Sext. Emp. Math. i p. 216 πόροις ἀνθρώπος ὑπν καὶ ἀτρητικος τοιαῦτα ἐς ἐς οὐ διεκατοὶ ἐς σοφίαν ἀλλὰ. I agree with Kühner in rejecting Pearo's addition of non before nihili. Epic. spoke of the Pyrrhonist Naus. just as Vell. speaks of the Academic Philo in § 17, where see n. Nothing could be more inane than non nihili, which adds nothing to magistrum, and in fact rather suggests an excuse for the slighting terms in which Ep. speaks of his master. According to the true reading, C. ironically repeats the words of Ep.

tam male acceperit: 'treated so badly', a colloquial expression frequent in the comic poets.

Ch. xxxiv. Apollodorum. It is doubtful who is meant, but it is more likely to be Apollodorus the Stoic mentioned in Diog. L. vii 39, than Zeno's own teacher, ὃς ἔποιησεν, on whom see § 89 n.

Silum. The reading is very doubtful. In Diog. Lc. the name Ap. is followed by ὅς ἐκέλευσε, corrected by the edd. into καὶ Σύλλος from this passage. Heind. on the contrary supposes some corruption of a nomen gentilis here, but ceteros comes in more naturally after the mention of two distinct persons, as it is often used to close a list, cf. § 92. Krische's suggestion 'Syronem', the name of an Epicurean contemporary of C. and Virgil, is far from plausible.

scurrum Atticum. Cf. Brut. 292, where Ep. is said to have found fault with the irony of Socrates. Zeno, in addressing his Roman pupils, seems to have used the more expressive Latin for the Grk. γελωτοποιός, cf. Kr. pp. 25, 26. Colotes, who was reputed to surpass all other disciples of Epicurus in his powers of abuse, κομδῇ διαγελῇ καὶ φλανρίζει τὸν Σωκράτην in the treatise (ἐμόν πρὸς ἀντασθενος as Plutarch styles it) in which he endeavoured to show that οὐδὲ ἔν ξενοι on any other system than the Epicurean, cf. Plut. Col. p. 1118.
BOOK I CH. XXXIV § 93.

Chrysippam. The nickname was probably pointed at the verbosity and prolixity of his innumerable treatises, see Galen Plac. Hipp. iii p. 339, ‘Chrysa. himself confessed that some of his writings might seem to be the compositions γραμματιστοῦ τινος ὡς γραίς ἀδολεσχοῦση’; Zeller Stoics tr. p. 47, and cf. the phrase γραμματικὴ γραφολογία Sext. Emp. Math. i 141; so Zeno is styled λιγράφας by Timon sp. Diog. L v i 15.

§ 94. tamquam senatum—recitares: ‘like the censor when he reads out the list of the senate, cf. Liv. xxiii 23, xxix 37, Pro Dom. 84’. Sch. [Recitatio, the roll-call, is to be distinguished from lectio, the act of selection, which was the proper duty of the censor, cf. Liv. ix. 30. J. S. R.] Here C. returns from his digression to the point touched on in § 91.

ista—commenticia: reverting to § 93 istis somniis.

Incubratione anicularum: ‘hardly fit to amuse old women at their evening work’. Wytt. quotes Liv. i 57 (Lucretiam) inter lucubrantes ancilllas sedentem invent; cf. § 55 n.

suscipienda: ‘must be admitted’, so in § 98 and Plut. 18.

omnis cultus—oratio repeats what had been said in § 92. We have a similar list in Off. i 128 status, incessus, esseio, accubitio—manuum notus. These objections are noticed in the Herculanean De Sensionibus (H. V. vi pt. 2, col. xii) φασών γὰρ ὡς εἰ δολ τὸ λόγιον ἑκὼν ἀδραπόμορφος ἐστιν, καὶ τής ζωής κοινῆς οὐσίς συνάπτωμεν αὐτὴ καὶ πολλάς ἄλλας κοινώτητας μορφῶν, δόθην καὶ ψυχαῖς καὶ ἑαυτάς, and col. xiv ‘if God has the eyes of a man he will be liable to the diseases of the eye’. The same objections are urged by Arnobius, bk iii, esp. c. 12 foll.

§ 95. retinendum hoc esse—ut. See § 75 pugnare ut sit, and Leg. ii 11 assentior ut sit with Dumesnil’s n.

beatitas—beatitudo: cited by Quintil. viii 3, and i 5. Sch. gives exx. of similar double forms which continued in use, necessitas, necessitudo, claritas, claritudo, and others in Gell. xiii 3. Of the two forms offered by C. the latter won the day, beatitas being only found in Macrobi. Somn. Scip. i 8, and Apul. Dog. Plat. ii 10, but both writers take care to use the preferable form within a few lines of the other; see Nägels. Stil. § 33 n. In § 100 we have beatum used to express the same idea. [Beata vita is C.’s usual equivalent for εὐδαιμονία. J. S. R.]

omnia—sed: see § 12 n.

[usu mollienda]: cf. Ac. ii 18 vinum—jam enim hoc pro favrasiq verbum satis hesterno usu trivimus. J. S. R.

verum: resumptive after parenthesis, Madv. § 490.

quaequecumque est: ‘however you like to call it’.

in solem—cadere: ‘why is it incongruous with yonder sun?’ Cf. § 19 n. The Stoic origin of Cotta’s speech betrays itself here, as in § 87.

§ 96. sescenta. It is supposed that this numeral came to be used for a round number generally, in consequence of the cohort having originally consisted of 600 men.

quaes sola divina natura est: ‘for this blessed and eternal nature alone possesses the attributes of deity’. Cf. § 49 quaes sit beata natura. Sch. in loc. (and opusc. p. 319) strangely takes quaes as a neuter plural predicate, and sola divina natura as feminine singular subject. Can there be a doubt that quaes is Nom. Sing., referring to the preceding beata et aeterna natura, and forming the subject to the divina natura following, which is also Nom.?


ut animi, item corporis. So Xenophanes (R. and P. § 133) eis thei deis 
τε θεοις και ἀνθρώποις μέγαστος, | οὗ τι δέμας θυτοίσιν ὀμοίοις οὐδὲ νίπτα.

accedebat. The Imperf. refers back to the time marked by ratio docuit above, cf. Draeg. § 136, similarly videbas § 98, habebam § 100.

virtus quam figura. So Leg. i 25 virtus eadem in homine ac deo est,... est autem virtus nihil aliud nisi perfecta et ad summum peractum natura. Est igitur homini cum deo simulitudo. This was a Stoic doctrine contested by the Academics and Peripatetics, see III 38 n. So Origen against Celsius vi 63 ‘if man resembles God, it cannot be in the inferior part of his compound nature (i.e. the body) nor in both parts, for then God too would be compound, but in the inner man πεφυκλή γίγνεσθαι καὶ εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος, according to the words μιμηταί τοῦ θεοῦ γίνεσθε’.

Ch. xxxv. § 97. ipsa vero—similitudo: ‘how little to the point is even the argument from likeness of which you make so much’; ipsa contrasts the general theory with the special instance in dispute, viz. the resemblance between man and God. I understand here a reference to the Epicurean logic of induction, cf. nn. on 70, 87, 89.

simia quam similis: cf. Plin. N. H. xi 100, Arist. Hist. An. ii 8, and Top. iii 2 where Δ. discusses the Topic of Comparison (one ground of preference between two things compared is the degree of resemblance to a third object surpassing both of them; to which it is objected that the resemblance may be of the nature of caricature, as the ape is nearer to man than the horse, but is not therefore more beautiful), also Heracl. fr. xcviii, xcix Byw. πιθήκων ὁ κάλλιστος αἰσχρός ἄλλος γένεις συμβάλλει... ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφότατος πρὸς θεοὺ πιθῆκος φανερῶ καὶ σοφίᾳ καὶ κάλλει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πάσιν. [And Pindar Pyth. ii 131 καλός τοι πίθων παρὰ παισίν, ἀιτὶ κάλλος. J. S. R.]

vastior: ‘ungainly’, ‘clumsy’, cf. De Orat. i 115 (of awkward speakers) sunt quidam ita virtus motuque corporis vasti atque agrestes; 117 vastum hominem; Orator 153 vester ‘Azilla’ ‘Ala’ factus est fuga litterae vastioris (the awkward x).

§ 98. moribus paribus. I think Klotz’s suggestion paribus is better than simulilimus, which is usually supplied, not only because it would be
more easily lost after moribus, but because it makes a better antithesis to simillimis dispers.

suscipimus: cf. suscienda § 94.

quo serpat: ‘what it leads to’, so III 51 illa quae tu a caelo ducebas, quam longe serpat; Nääg. Stil. § 129.

quodsi—obstasis: ‘if you are proof against all these inferences (lit. hold your ground in all these cases), why should you be shaken by the figure only?’ i.e. why allow that inference to weigh with you?

his adjunctis—videbas: ‘you never saw human reason except in connexion with these qualities’.

sortiri, quid loquare: ‘to toss-up what you should say’; cf. Fat. 46 num (atomi) sortiuntur inter se quae declinet, quae non? and Xen. Cyrop. 1 § 46 ἡ αὐθρωπὴ σοφία οὐδὲν μάλλον οἴδε το ἀριστον αλείσθαι ἢ ἐν κληρού-

μανω, ὥστε λάχοι, τούτῳ τις πράττω.

§ 99. nisi forte—obstare: ‘unless indeed you have never noticed that whatever is superfluous is mischievous’ (in that case you may have considered, though to little purpose). For the ironical nisi forte cf. § 117.

uno digito plus: ‘a single finger too much’, Abl. of Measure. Cf. II 92 sol multis partibus major quam terra, Liv. II 7 uno plus Etruscorum occultis, Roby § 1204. We may understand quam satis est, as often, for the second member of comparison.

quia nec—desideras: ‘because the five leave no need for (lit. do not miss) another, either in respect of beauty or utility’.

capite—cruribus: repeating § 92.

si, ut immortals sit: ‘if he has these limbs (v. subaud. from redundat as from quaeres § 90) in order to make him immortal’; cf. for omission of verb after si, Draeg. § 119 3 b, and my n. on § 22.

illa: as usual, of what follows (cerebrum &c.), which are afterwards referred to as haec.


oris habitus: ‘the general set of the face’, Fin. III 56 hab. oris et vultus.

vitae firmitatem: ‘vitality’, so we find firm. joined with corporis, capitis, valetudinis.

Ch. xxxvi § 100. et eos vituperabas. The reference is to § 53. For the ‘et’ indignantis cf. et nunc § 91 n.
terras, maria: see § 22 n.
horum insignia: ‘their decorations’, so Lucr. v 700 calls the sun radiatum insigni diei.
suspiciati essent. The Ppf. is used because the action is conceived as anterior to that denoted by the governing verb vituperabas.
aberrant a conjectura: ‘miss their aim’. This is the reading of all the MSS, but Sch. following Walker omits the preposition, and translates ‘go wrong in their guessing’. In his Opusc. III 321 and 367 he stoutly maintains (against Wopkens, Heind. and Klotz Adm. Crit. III 12) that the other reading makes nonsense; and he would therefore correct 12 Phil. 23:23, quaeae, attendite num aberret a conjectura suspicio periculi mei, and Att. XIV 29:22 auctor ne nihilo a conjectura aberrem, where Weisenberg keeps the preposition. I have myself very little faith in these a priori reasonings as to the impossibility of a word acquiring any particular use. It seems to me more improbable that the scribes should in several passages have inserted the preposition, without any inducement that I can see, than that conjectura should come to mean ‘hitting the mark’, as in fact Quintilian says III 6:30: conjectura dicta est a conjectu, id est, directione quadem rationis ad veritatem, just as consequor has come to mean ‘I attain’, as the corresponding οὐκήμα means ‘I put things together rightly’, as conector itself means an ‘interpreter’ or ‘seer’. KL quotes Plin. Ep. IV 28:28 ab imitatione aberrare.

quod sequuntur: ‘what leads them to their conclusions’, cf. 12 n. Here again we see the Stoic.

quod opus tandem. So we find tandem separated from the Interrogative in Leg. I 9: quod tibi tandem tempus, where see Dumesnil.

et barbati quidem: ‘yes and of a bearded Jupiter’, cf. § 78 n. This is a repetition from § 83.

§ 101. quanto melius. For the ellipse of facit see Roby § 1441. It is especially common with words like bene, as in § 121: quanto Stoici melius, Orat. III 221:1 quon melius nostri senes; also with Acc., as in Hor. Sat. I 2 90: hoc illi recte.

qui tribuant: ‘in assigning’ = ωὴρ. ωὴρ.

qui irridentur Aegyptii: cf. §§ 43, 82, III 47. Plut. M. 379 D says that the Egyptians have made religion ridiculous by their worship of animals, and that, in consequence of this, men have fallen either into an irrational superstition or into atheism.

beluam: cf. § 77 n.

ob aliquam utilitatem: Herod. (I 75) asserts this of the ibis; Diog. L. (proem. 11) of animals generally, τὰ εὐχερητά τῶν ζώων θεοὶ εὐδοξασαι; Diodorus I 86 foll. gives various explanations of the worship of animals, e.g. that their images had been originally used as standards in war, but he appears to consider utility the main cause; Plut. I.C. laughs at the story of the transformation of the gods in fear of Typhon, and says the real causes are τοῖς χριστοὶ καὶ τοῖς συμβολικῶν, ἐν ἴνα διάτιρον, πολλά δ᾽ αμφοῖν μετέφραξε; as an example of symbolism he notes especially the scarabæus, and argues that the living symbol, though the resemblance may sometimes be fanciful and far-fetched, is no worse than the mystical emblems of the Greek religion or of the Pythagoreans. So Celsus ap. Orig. III 19 ‘the Christians deride the Egyptians, but their worship embodies a deep meaning (αὐτίμαμα), εἶναι ἰδεῶν ἄδικαι, καὶ οὐχ, ὅσα δοκοῦσιν οἱ πολλοί, τόμον ἐφημερίων τιμᾶς εἶναι
và τοιαύτα διδάσκουσιν’, and Arnobius uses similar language, Aegyptiorum videtis aenigmata quod mutorum animantium formas divinis inseruerint causis, iii. 15.

quam—caperent: Subj. after Indefinite Relativa.
velut: cf. § 2 n.
ibes: cf. Juv. xv 3 saturam serpentibus ibin with Mayor’s n. and the passage from Herod. quoted in my n. on § 82. In the notes to Rawlinson’s Herod. (Vol. ii p. 125) it is stated that the Turks still consider it a sin to kill an ibis, and that Cuvier found the skin of a snake in the stomach of a mummied ibis. Plut. l. c. mentions another reason for gratitude to the ibis, to which C. also alludes ii 126.

vim serpentium: see § 54 n.
cum sint: ‘being tall birds’, &c., explains how they were able to kill the snakes, Roby § 1728.
cum—interficium. The Pres. and Perf. Ind. are used with cum to express ‘identity of action’ (Roby § 1729). In killing the snakes they are averting the plague.

volucres angues: Herodotus (l. c. and iii 107 foll.) tells wonderful stories about the winged snakes, which guard the frankincense of Arabia and invade Egypt every spring, but are met and killed by the ibises. Sir G. Wilkinson (in Rawlinson, p. 124) discusses what amount of truth there may be in his account.

ex vastitate—invectas: ‘brought from the Libyan desert by the south-west wind’ (or more strictly W.S.W. blowing from Carthage to Sicily). This is in disagreement with Herod. and others, who represent them as coming from the east; Aelian H. A. ii 38 makes the black ibis guard the eastern, and the white ibis the southern, frontier. On the use of the abstract vastitas for concrete, see Draeg. § 8.

possum: see n. on longum est § 19.
ichneumonum: the ‘mangouste’ or ‘herpestes’, see Art. in Eng. Cycl. under the latter heading; and Rawlinson’s Herod. ii 67 n. Its utilitas was to destroy the eggs of the crocodile, which led to frequent quarrels between the people of Heracleopolis, the principal seat of the ichneumon-worship, and Crocodilopolis where the utilitas of the crocodile was similarly honoured. Extraordinary tales are told about it, as that it covers itself with a cuirass of mud before attacking the asp (Arist. H. A. ii 6), and that it enters the mouth of the sleeping crocodile and devours its heart and entrails (Strabo, xvii 39).
crocodilorum: see Herod. ii 68 foll. with Rawlinson’s nn. Diodorus tells us that the reply made to the question why creatures so injurious to men were worshipped, was that they formed a rampart to the country, and prevented invaders from crossing the Nile; another answer was that a crocodile had rendered a service to one of their ancient kings; Plut. on the other hand explains their worship as symbolical; the crocodile is μίμημα θεοῦ as being ἄγλωσσος and therefore silent, and as watching his prey,
himself unseen in the water, ὁ ἄγετος βαλευτὸς ὑπὸ βαλεύσαντος, ὁ τῷ πρῶτῳ θεῷ συμβείμανεν, I. c. 75, p. 381.

faetum: see Herod. ii 66, 67 with the notes in Rawlinson’s ed. and the exhaustive note in Mayor’s Juvenal, xv 7. The word appears to be used for a kind of wasset in Varro and Columella, but in other writers it stands for the Gr. αἰλουρός, the tame cat of the Egyptians; see the graphic description in Plin. N. H. x c. 94 faetas quidem quo silentio, quam levibus vestigis obreptum avibus / quam occulte speculatæ in musculos exsultant / excrementa sua effossæ obrutum terra. Even the Greek word is ambiguous, for though it is plain from the mummies and pictures that the sacred animal of Egypt was our cat, yet Plut. I. c. p. 381 calls it γαλῆ, on the other hand Diod. i 87 describes the αἰλουρός as useful πρὸς τὰς ἀντίδας ἀνάμυα δακρύσεις καὶ τάλα τὰς δάκτυλα τῶν ἱππευόν. The statement that it killed snakes is probably due to some confusion in the mind of Diod., but Sir G. Wilkinson (Birch’s ed. Vol. ii 106, iii 289) mentions that it is even now held in great favour by the Egyptians because it destroys scorpions and other reptiles. According to the old paintings it was employed as a retriever (ib. ii p 106).

longus: ‘tedious’, for the personal use cf. Quint. v 7 26 longus testis, and x i 118.

tamen belus. Fully expressed the thought is ‘ridiculous (irridentur above) as these animal gods are, there is still more to be said for them than for the Epicurean gods’. For a similar elliptical use of tamen—‘at any rate’ Sch. compares Div. ii 80 Etrusci tamen dabant autorem disciplinae. Nos quem? with Giese’s n.; Verr. Act. ii 1 2 si reticet et absit, tamen impudentiae nus studentem exitum quaesisses videatur; see also Munro on Lucr. ii 859, iii 553, iv 952. So ὡμες in Greek. For the position of tamen cf. § 81 n.

§ 102. nihil habet negotii: cf. § 45, and on the change from pl. deorum, to sing., § 50 Balbe soletis, &c.

quasi pueri delicati—existimati: ‘like spoilt children, thinks nothing better than idleness’. It is not cessatio however but atium, which is the proper contrary of negotium, and Ep. did not deny that activity might be essential to human happiness, cf. Plut. Trans. c. 2, p. 465.

Ch. xxxvii exerctiatione ludicra: ‘some active game’, see Madv. Fin. i 69. [Is it not rather some game which simulates real life? J. S. R.]

dem—possit: in or. rect. this would be deus sic torquet ut, si se commoverit, beatus esse non possit ‘such is the nature of the divine inertia that movement would destroy the happiness which is of the essence of deity’. In order that this may be stated as an opinion, not a fact, volumus is added to the 1st clause, and vereamur to the 2nd, but the latter is improperly made the governing verb, so as apparently to give the measure of sic, whereas it ought to have been introduced parenthetically ( quem ad modum nos vereamur), cf. Roby § 1746, Madv. § 357 obs. 2, and my n. on dixerit § 20, for examples of similar confusion. For exx. of adversative asyndeton
(deum contrasted with puerti) see Zumpt § 781. For the Ind. volumus see § 80 n. on arbitramur.

ne—non: used rather than ut after vereamur, because of the ut preceding. [Or perhaps to bring in the negative emphatically at the end of the sentence. J. S. R.]

C. e. Even if we grant that there are such images as Epicurus describes, what ground have we for assuming that there is any reality corresponding to them? And how is happiness, i.e. pleasure of sense, possible to his gods?

Ch. xxxvii § 103—Ch. xli § 114.

§ 103. domicilium—sedes—locus: proceeding from less to more general, ‘home, habitat, region’. [‘What is his home? where is he living? At any rate where is he? How does he spend his life? What are the sources of the blessedness you attribute to him?’ R.]

actio vitae: cf. § 2, n. § 45.

id quod vultis: i. e. beatus, cf. Madv. § 315 b.

[iutatur—fructur: perhaps an allusion to the legal usus fructus; he who is to be blessed must not be a mere owner, but have the present use and enjoyment of his goods. R.]

qui beatus futurus est=ὅτις μᾶλλος εὐδαίμων εἶναι, cf. Madv. § 341, Dumnesil on Leg. r 56.

naturis quae sine animis sunt: ‘the material elements’. According to Aristotle each of these has its natural place, to which it naturally moves, cf. π 44 n., τεκ. r 43, and Zeller iii 439 foll., Whewell, Hist. Ind. Sci. r 35 foll.

infimum: i. e. the centre, cf. π 84, 116 (medium infimum in sphaera est), Arist. Cael. iv 4.

inundet: more commonly used of excessive floods.

superior aeris, aetheris: Müller’s excellent emendation leaves no doubt as to the origin of the ms reading: the eye of the scribe passed from the eri of superior to the same letters in the following word. On the i. aeth. cf. π 101 foll.

reddatur: ‘given as its right’, Gr. ἀναδίδωμι.


quae igne nasci putentur. Sch. quotes a passage from Seneca Q. N. v 6, which illustrates both the sense and construction, ignis, qui omnia consumit, quaudam etiam creat; et quod videri potest non simule veri, tamen verum est, animalia igne generari; so we find caelo natus, Nilo natus, spuma procreata, Nilo orta, iii 55 and 59. Aristotle is the first authority for this statement.

He believed in spontaneous generation (Gen. An. iii 9, Hist. An. v 19) and reports that in Cyprus οὐ ἄλλα ἔρεια βράσκεται, γίγνεται θηρία ἐν τῷ πυρὶ, τῶν μεγάλων μυών μικρῶν τι μείζονα ὑπόπτερα, а ἔδει ταύτ
πυρὸς πυθὶ καὶ βαδίζεται; then to prove that some animals can exist in fire he refers to the salamander, αὐτί γὰρ, ὥς φασί, διὰ πυρὸς βαδίζουσα καρασθεί
νυν τὸ πῦρ. Pliny (N. H. xi 42) calls this fire-born creature pyrausta or pyralis: he has many wonderful stories about the salamander (x 86, xi 116, xxix 23) but never speaks of its being produced from fire, while Aelian expressly denies it (N. A. ii 31), ἡ σαλαμάνδρα οὐκ ἔστι μὲν τῶν πυρὸς ἐγγόνων, όλοὶ δὲ αὐτῶν τίκτηναι, ἄσπερ οἱ καλούμενοι πυριγόνοι, θαρρεῖ δὲ αὐτῷ, &c. In π 42 the stars are said to be the denizens of aether.

§ 104. naturae accommodatum = oikēion. On this Stoic doctrine cf. Madv. Fin. iii 16, v 24 (omni animali illud quod appetit positum est in eo quod naturae est accommodatum), Exc. iv, Ac. ii 38, N. D. iii 33.

denique—postremo: so Agr. ii 62 regna denique, postremo etiam vectigalia, Cat. ii 25 denique aequitas, temperantia certant cum iniquitate, postremo copia cum aestate,... bona denique opes cum desperatio, N. D. iii 23 omni denique doctrina eruditus, postremo philosophus erit mundus.

ulcus est: 'it will not bear handling', is 'unsound'; ulcus like vulnus is often used metaphorically, as in Pro domo 12 unguis in ulcere (of a fresh irritant added to previous discontent), Ter. Phorm. iv 4 10 ulcus (al. vulnus) tangeres 'to touch a tender spot'.

ita male—exitum reperire: 'reasoning which starts from such insecure premises can come to no result', so Orat. 116 in omnibus quae ratione docentur et via, primum constitutum est quidquid sit; nisi enim inter eos, qui discreptant, convenit, quid sit illud de quo ambigitur, nec recte disseri, nec unquam ad exitum perveniri potest (see Schütz Lex.), also N. D. iii 36 videamus exitum, i § 107 exitum reperitis, § 53 explicare argumenti exitum. [Add Ac. ii 36 exitum non habebunt. J. S. R.]

§ 105. sic enim dicebas: cf. § 49 with the notes.

speciem dei: in the parallel passage vim et naturam deorum.

equipe desicat umquam ex infinitis corporibus simulium accessio: cf. § 49 cum infinita similimarum imaginum series ex innumeralibus individuis existat.

Ch. xxxviii. si—ad cogitationem valent: 'if they are of force only for the production of mental (as opposed to visual) images' (lit. only for the thinking faculty).

eminentiam: see n. on eminentis § 75.

Hippocentaurus: prose writers usually employ the compound form both in Lat. and Gr.; thus we find ἵπποςκεντάυρος used by Plato and Xenophon, hipp. by Pliny and Quintilian. It is a stock word for a non-ens, see xi, 3, Sext. Emp. Math. ix 49, 123, Hirz. p. 42.

conformationem animi: cf. Top. 27 (of intangible things there is nevertheless) conformatio quaedam insignita et impressa in intellectus, quam notionem voco, Herenn. iii c. 20 rei totius imaginem conformabimus, 'we will imagine the whole scene'; the word informatio is more common in this sense, cf. §§ 43, 76, 101.

§ 106. *ut igitur* Ti. Gracchum—intellegantur. I am disposed to agree with Klots (*Aòm.* ii 15) as against Madv. *ap.* Orelli (who is followed by Sch. Baiter and Müller) and should translate the passage as follows: ‘In the same way then as, when I imagine myself to see Gracchus in his speech presenting the voting urn about (to decide the case of) Octavius, I at the time assert this to be a mere groundless fancy, while you on the contrary assert that the images of the two men continue to exist, and after arriving in the Capitol are then carried on to me,—so (you assert it to be) in the case of God, whose recurring likeness strikes upon the mind and leads it to recognize the divine blessedness and eternity’. The simple framework of the sentence would be *ut Ti.* Gracchum *cum videro videre...motum animi dico esse inanem, tu autem imaginem ad animum meum referri; sic in deo dicitur ego motum inanem fieri, tu crebra facie pelli animos,* but C. after giving both the Academic and Epicurean views in the compared case of Gracchus, omits the former, as obvious, in the case of the gods, and so confuses the construction. Madv. omits *igitur,* which connects the special application with the general principle, takes *ut = velut,* as in § 88 *ut Seriphi,* and changes *pervenerint* into *pervenerim,* making *hoc fieri* a sort of corollary depending on *dicis* understood, instead of the apodosis of the sentence. Sch. (*N. Jahrb.* 1875, p. 691) points out that there is no occasion for *pervenerim,* the scene might be imagined without going to the Capitol, though it is true a visit there might suggest it; on the other hand the vagrant images of G. and O. may be supposed to attach to themselves images of the Capitol by their visit there, cf. *Div.* ii 137 *ista igitur me imago Marii in cauponem Atinatem persequebatur?* The incident referred to is as follows. In 133 B.C. the passing of the Agrarian law of Ti. Gracchus was stopped by the veto of Octavius his colleague in the tribunate: after a vain attempt to induce him to desist from his opposition, G. proposed his deposition by the tribes. When 17 out of the 35 tribes had voted for the motion, G. once more urged O. to yield, but he answering ‘complete what thou hast begun’, the voting was continued and O. deposed.

in Capitolio. We read of the Comitia Tributa being held in the Capitol in *Liv.* xxv 3 *cum dies advenisset, conciliumque tam frequentis plebis adisset ut multitudinem areae Capitolii vis caperet, sitella lata est ut sortirentur urbis Latini sufragium ferrent,* xxxiii 25 *ea rogatio in Capitolio ad plebem lata est,* xliii 16 *ex Capitolio ubi erat concilium (plebis) obiit,* xlvi 36 *cum in Capitolio rogationem tribunus plebis ferret,* xxxiv 53 *ea bina comitia Ca. Domitius praetor urbanus in Capitolio habuit,* App. *Bell. Civ.* i 15 (Gracchus) *κατέλαβε τοῦ Καπηταλίου τῶν ζηων, ἥπα χιρουργήσεως ζεμμάτων, Plut. *Ti. Gracch.* 17 *προσε περὶ δέ δόμων αὐτ., τὸν δήμον ἢπροῖσθαι περὶ τὸ Καπηταλίου πυροπάμαν.* Cf. Lange *Röm. Alterth.* p. 442, and Burn’s *Rome* p. 84, ‘The Vulcanal must have been close to the Senaculum.
on the slope of the Capitol. It seems to have been originally an open space used for public meetings, especially those of the Comitia Tributa'. The Comitia Tributa were also held in the Campus Martius (Fam. vii 30), and the Circus Flaminius (Liv. xxvii 21) as well as in the Forum.

sitellum: (dim. of situla 'a bucket') an urn filled with water (υδρα) in which were placed the wooden lots to determine the order of voting of the tribes. The neck was made so narrow that only one lot could come to the surface, see Dict. of Ant.


quae referantur. We might have expected the Infinitival construction to be continued in the relative clause, as also in cujus pellantur below, but see n. on § 12 ex quo existit; perhaps too quae has more than a connective force here, implying a result 'so that they are carried to me'.

pellantur—ex quo—intellegantur. More simply pulei animi beatos intellectant. For the pl. beati after a. deo cf. § 50 Balbe soletis n.

intellegantur: for the personal, instead of the more common impersonal use, cf. Roby § 1353.

§ 107. fac imagines—quaedam: 'suppose that there are such images impending on the mind, that is merely the presentation of a certain form'.

num etiam cur: following objectur by a sort of seigma, cf. § 99 si ut n., Zumpt § 775. The answer to this objection would be, according to § 49, that the idea of eternity was suggested by the never-ending stream of images, and further confirmed by the doctrine of ὁμορροια (§ 109); and the idea of happiness by the delight afforded in their contemplation.


 nec vos exitum reperitis: 'you cannot find your way out', 'arrive at any satisfactory conclusion', see § 104 n.

tota res vacillat et claudicat: 'it is a lame and halting theory altogether', 'has no sure footing'. The lexx. supply many instances of the metaphorical use of these words.

quid est quod—fuerunt: 'what is more improbable than that the images of all men, Homer &c., should be coming in contact with me, yet not in the shape which they had when alive?' I have here accepted the emendation quam before omnium, but the reading of the mss is tenable if we put a mark of interrogation after posit, and take omnium incideres as an exclamatory Inf. This would justify the rather exaggerated omnium, which is placed in sharp contrast with me: there is no excuse for Baier's feeble hominum. In denying the resemblance between the image and the object, C. anticipates the result of the reasoning which follows: 'we see the images of that which is non-existent, and impossible, of scenes and persons unknown to us; and these images differ for different people;
therefore there can be no resemblance'. As the actual Epicurean view is that the image exactly resembles the reality, cf. § 81 foll., Zeller Epic. tr. p. 432, Lucr. iv 51, I was at one time disposed to read et quidem ex for nec ex of mss; to the same effect is Mr Reid's emendation given in the note below. Mr Roby thinks the ex forma of mss may be retained in the sense 'not cast by the form'.

quo modo illi ergo: sc. inciderunt, 'how then (if there is no resemblance between the images and their originals) did the originals come into my head?'

et quorum imagine. Allen considers the passage corrupt, as it has been already stated that the images are those of Homer &c. I think it may be defended as asking for a nearer definition of the omnium above, and so preparing the way for the question which follows: 'when you say omnium do you include, not only men now dead such as Plato, but imaginary characters such as Orpheus, or impossibilities such as the Chimaera?'
[Perhaps better as Mr Roby takes it: 'Cicero says, if images which you say are Homer's &c. come, but are not like Homer's real form, then two questions arise, 1st how do the originals come to you at all? 2nd whose are the images which do come? They are copied from some real form, whose was that form?']

Orpheum—fuisse. Cf. § 33 n., Bernays' Dialoge d. Arist. p. 95, Lobeck Aglaoph. p. 339. The reference is to the lost De philosophia, but it is quite in accordance with the manner in which Arist. elsewhere alludes to the Orphic poems, e.g. τὰ καλούμενα Ὀρφικὰ ἐπὶ Ἀν. i 5 15 with Tren- delenburg's n.; in commenting on which passage Philoponus says that Α. speaks doubtfully as to the authorship of the poems, σὶς καὶ αὐτῷ ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας λέγει: αὐτοῦ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὰ δόγματα ταῦτα δὲ φησιν'Ονομά- κρυπτον ἐν ἑκεί κατατείνα. This differs from C.'s account, in recognizing the existence of Orpheus and attributing certain doctrines to him, but there seems no reason to doubt that C. is here correct.

hoc Orphicum carmen—Cercopias. Philop., as we have seen, names Onomacritus, but, if Bernays is right in supposing that the 1st book of the Περὶ Φιλοσοφίας contained a general examination of the Orphic theology, it

1 [Accepting quam I would read omnino for omnium (a very common corruption). Then the ex of mss is evidently a mere doubling of the sc in nec. For nec ex I would read ncedum, which is very frequently written ncedum in mss. The meaning would be 'what is more improbable than that phantoms of Homer etc. should strike on my senses at all, to say nothing of their retaining just the shape those persons had when alive?' Then for illi I should read illus, referring on to Orpheus Scylla, etc. The ex would be easily dropped before ergo, and the unintelligible illus would be altered to illi which the scribes referred to Homer etc. wrongly. Thus the argument rises from one stage of difficulty to another, 'putting aside the cases of Homer etc. all of whom we admit to have once existed, what have you to say about persons and places which never existed at all?' It is quite in Cicero's style to break the continuity of the argument by the insertion of quid quod—sum. The De Finibus contains many things of this kind. J. B. K.]
is probable that different treatises may have been cited in it, some of which were attributed to Onom. as the Χρηστος and Τελεσκορ, and some to Cercops as the ιερος λαγος and (Θερμής) καταφεκτισ εις γονην, see Clem. Strom. I 397 and Suidas quoted in Lobeck I. c. On the Orphic doctrines generally, and on the connexion between the Orphic school and the Pythagoreans, compare Lobeck I. c. Zeller I p. 71 foll. Döllinger Gentile and Jew I bk. 3, p. 125, tr. Herod. II 81 (on the prohibition of woollen garments) ομολογουντες δε ταυτα τοις Ωρφικοις καλεομενοι και Βακχικοις, ειναι δε Αλωνητοις και Πνευμορειοις. The mass of what has come down to us under the name of ‘Orphica’ is probably of later Christian era, but some fragments may be as old as Onomacritus, see Hermann’s ed. Cicero’s friend, Nigidius, the Pythagorean, referred to the Orphic theogony in his treatise De dis (Serv. ad Verg. Ecl. IV 10).

hoc Orphicum carmen: cf. hujus § 79 n. and Krische p. 20.

§ 108. quid, quod ejusdem—Chimeraeae: cf. III 5, and Div. II 138 igitur imaginis sua nobis dicto audientes sunt, ut, simul atque velimus, accurrat? etiamne earum rerum quae nullae sunt? quae est enim forma tam invisita, tam nulla, quam non sibi ipse fingere animus possit? ut, quae numerum vidimus, ea tamen informata habeamus, oppidorum situs, hominum figurarum etiamnum cum aut muros Babylonis aut Homeri faciem cognito, imago illorum me aliquis pellit? omnia igitur, quas volumus, nostra nobis esse possunt. Lucretius IV 732 meets these and similar arguments. Centauros itaque et Scyllarum membra vidimus | Cerceraque canum facies simulacraque eorum | quorum morte obita tellus amplectitur ossa: | omnes genus quoniam passim simulacra feruntur, | partim sponte suae quae fiunt aere in ipso, | partim quae variis ab rebus cunque recondunt, | et quae conjunct ex horum facta figuris, | as the Centaurs from the mingling of human and equine images.

quas numquam vidimus: this argument, of which Sch. failed to see the force, is more fully stated at the end of the passage from the De Div. given above.

simul ac mihi collibitum est. So Lucr. IV 779 quaeritur in primis quare, quod cuique libido | venerit, extemplo mens cogit et ejus id ipsum | to which he answers that quovis in tempore quaeque | praesto sint simulacra locis in quisque parata. | but because they are so fine, the mind can only see those which it strains itself to see, 802; cf. Fam. xv 16.

ad dormantem: Lucr. IV 757.

invocatae: a compound of the negative in and vocatus, occurs also Nep. Cim. 4 quos invocatos vidisset, omnes devocaret, Ter. Eun. V 8 29, Plaut. Capt. I 1 2 (with a play on the double sense of the word); compare the similar case of immutatus, infectus, indictus, and even indicens: the verb ignoscō forms an exception to the rule that the negative in is only compounded with adjectives, adverbs and participles. [It is probably árakh elipnios in C. though it occurs in a letter of Caelius, Fam. viii 8. J. S. R.]

nugatoria: ‘it is a piece of humbug from beginning to end’; so nugatur means ‘a humbug’, in the sense of playing upon other people.
inculcatis: 'you cram these images into our minds as well as into our eyes'; cf. Fat. 6 quid attinet inculcare fatum, cum sine fato ratio omnium rerum ad naturam fortunamve referatur? Cotta in his jaunty way treats this quite as a new idea, but it has been assumed throughout the discussion; cf. § 105 intenta mens, ad cognitionem, adventum in animos, pellantur animi &c. It is one of the many marks of haste which disfigure the book.

impunitas garrundi: 'so little you care what you say'.

Ch. xxxix § 109. quam licenter: 'what extravagance it is!' cf. § 65.


visionum: here—imaginum the thing seen (as in Div. ii 120 animos externa et adventicia visione pulsarit), in § 105 the process of seeing.

diceré non intellegere: for the omission of the subject cf. § 84 confiteri nescire.

quo modo aeternae: the omission of sunt makes the change of construction unusually harsh.

suppeditat: 'there is an endless supply of atoms'.

inquit: 'quotha', this reading is better supported than inquis. Bentley, on Hor. Sat. i 4. 79 (cited by Creuzer on N. D. i 100), compares the use of φησιν, and says perpetua formula est, ubi aliquid ex adverso nobis objici et opponi fingimus, sive id ab uno suo pluribus, sive ab absentis seu presentis fiat, adding many exx.

num—sempiterna: 'do you mean to say then that everything will be eternal for the same reason?'. The infinity of the atoms is given by Vell. i. c. as an explanation of the continuous stream of images, and apparently as suggesting the eternity of the Being revealed to us in them; so Philod. p. 110 'the divine individuality (Δυνάμεις) having its origin in the resemblance of the images may exist in perfect blessedness for ever'. Sch. denies this, and says that the Epicurean argument for the eternity of the Gods is (1) the πρόληψις (2) ἱσονομία. But the πρόληψις is simply the unconscious effect of experience, i.e. of the impression of the images on the mind, and ἱσονομία is mentioned in § 50 as the ground of the infinite number, not of the infinite duration, of immortal beings. It is probable however, as stated in the note there, that C. has wrongly spoken of beings instead of forces, and we may therefore allow ἱσονομία to stand as one of the arguments. A third argument (denied by Sch.) was the fineness of the atoms of which the Gods were composed, see § 71 n.

aequilibritatem: cf. § 50; the word appears to be ἀν. λέγ. though Vitruvius uses aequilibris.

isto modo—sint aliiquai immortales: 'according to that, since men are mortal, some would be immortal'. Sint is the apodosis to a protasis contained in isto modo—si hoc igitur sit.

et quia sunt—sentio: 'and since there are destructive forces, there are also (or reading sint with some of the best ms., 'let there be also')
conservative forces. By all means, but let the conservative forces be exerted on what is actually in existence. I don't perceive that your Gods do exist.' So Davies, Madv. Sch. Opusc. iv p. 343; others take ea as subject of conservens ('let the conservative forces be such as really exist themselves') implying that the Epicureans identified these forces with their Gods; whereas the Epicurean Gods were confessedly free from the toils of superintending the universe. Still this is not conclusive, as the disputants in C.'s dialogue are quite capable of forgetting or passing over any point which might be inconvenient. The reference is to the words of Vell. § 50 si quae interimant innumerabilia sint, etiam ea quae conservent infinita esse debere.

§ 110. omnis tamen—ortitur: 'however (to leave the Gods and return to the question asked in § 107), how do you explain the origin of your object-pictures generally out of the atoms?' effigitis ortitur is a loose expression for effugit efficiatur (or effectio) fort.


Ch. xl. de beato. Cic. prefers to use the neut. adj. instead of his invention of § 95, so we find Tusc. v 45 ex bonis, quae sola honesta sunt, efficiendum est beatum, Fin. v 85 (virtutem) in quas sit ipsum etiam beatum.

sine virtute—vita: for the omission of the verb in these short clauses see § 68 n. That virtue is essential to happiness is asserted by Vell. § 48, and by Ep. himself in the 4th kuriak deka, Diog. L. x 140, oμε ζοιων ύδει την δε τον φονίου και καλοτ και δικαιος. The Academic disputant in iii § 38 endeavours to prove that we cannot ascribe to God any virtue known to us.

actuosa: but elsewhere C. recognizes the Aristotelian division of the moral and intellectual virtues (Part. Or. § 76) est igitur vias virtutis duplex: aut enim scientia cernitur virtus, aut actione. Nam quae prudencia...appellatur, haec scientia pollet una: quae vero moderandis cupiditatibus regendisque animi motibus laudatur, eis est munus in agenda, and it is the former virtue only which belongs to divinity, according to Aristotle, τά δι ζητετ τον πράττειν δαιμονιστων, τó δε μοιλιον τοι ποιει, το λειπεσα πληθ θεωρια; ὡσστῃ τό θεον ἐνίργεια, μακαριστη τε διαφέροντα, θεωρητη τον ειν, E. N. x 8.

et deus: Mr Roby proposes to read at (which might easily lose its vowel after actuosa, and change into et) as it introduces a minor premiss in a quasi-syllogistic argument. But where one syllogism is subordinated to another (as in this passage virtus autem—igitur represents the minor premiss in the syllogism of which sine virtute nullo modo is the major, and ne beatus quidem the conclusion) it is not uncommon to omit the signs of opposition between the propositions of the subordinate syllogism: thus, A, none are happy without virtue; B, but virtue is active and your God inactive, therefore not virtuous; C, therefore your god is not happy.

ne beatus quidem: 'not happy either' (wanting in happiness as well as in virtue), cf. § 72 n., and § 113.
§ 111. quorum tandem — pertinentium: 'what possible goods? pleasures, I presume; that is, of course, bodily pleasures'.

profectam a corpore: so Fin. 1 55quamquam et laetitiam nobis voluptas animi et molestiam dolor afferat, eorum tamen utrumque et etsi esse e corpore et ad corpus referri, see Madv. in loc. and on π 7 and 92, also Plut. M. p. 1089 το μην ηδομενον της σαρκις τη χαιροντι της ψυχης υπερειδοντες, αυθες δ' εκ του χαιροντος εις το ηδομενον τη ολιπιδ ενελπωντες quoted by Zeller Epic. p. 452 tr.

quos pudet: most of the editors spoil the irony of the passage by inserting non. Cotta is complimenting Vell. on his superiority to the scruples of the weaker brethren (called imperios Fin. 1 55) who think that there may be pure mental pleasures entirely unconnected with the body; cf. Fin. π 7 (Epicurus declares) ne intellegere quidem se posse, ubi sit aut quod sit uestum bonum praeter illud, quod cibo et potionis et aurium lectationes et obscena voluptate capiatur. An haec ab eo non discuntur? to which Torquatus replies quasi vero me pudet istorum, aut non possim quem admodum ea dicantur ostendere! C. rejoins that there is no reason why te pudet sapienti adentiri; also § 21 ille non pertinuit, § 28 est tanti philosophi audacter sua decreta defendere, 1 69 sunt quidam Epicurei timidiores contra vestra convicia. Just in the same way Socrates compliments Callicles on his freedom from false shame Gorg. 492 and 483. Klotz Adn. Cr. π 16 points out that if Vell. were ashamed of the doctrine referred to, there would have been no propriety in calling upon him to justify and explain it, as is done in the following sentence quem cibum igitur &c., also that his recognition of these doctrines is stated below, annuere te video § 113.

delicatis et obscenis: 'the pleasures of the voluptuary and sensualist', cf. Epic. περι ταλαντουs quoted by Diog. L. κατακλως and more fully by Athen. ν π. 280 ου γαρ ζωγραφις ζω του φοβου ταγαθου, αφαιρεω μην τας dia χυλων ηδονας, αφαιρει δε τας δι αφροδισιαν, κατ τας δι αφρομαχιων κατ τας δια μορφης, which is translated in the Tusc. 1 41, see Fin. π 29, Ac. π 7 with Reid's n.

§ 112. perfundas voluptatibus: 'to steep them in pleasure', cf. Tusc. 4 20 (the pleasures of sense) sunt omnes unius generis ad perfundendum animum tangquam illiquefactae voluptates.

ut poetae—comparant. I see no reason for changing the ut of the mss into ac or et; 'as the poets indeed do' is a very natural continuation of the question as to food and drink; quidem of course points the contrast to tu autem. On the other hand there is great harshness in the ms reading nectar ambrosiam before epulas. It can hardly be taken either as an instance of asyndeton, or of apposition (as Klotz Adn. Crit. π 18), while it would be a very natural gloss for a scribe to add. Omitting it, we must throw the stress of the sentence on the following clause, referring to the beautiful cup-bearers, otherwise the mere mention of epulas would scarcely add anything to what has been said before. For comp. ep. cf. κατ 68 funestas epulas comparans and comp. convivium Verr. A. π 1 65. For
the general sense cf. Tusc. i 65 non enim ambrosia deos aut nectar aut Juventate poca ministrante laetari arbitror, nec Homeroz audio, qui Ganymeden ab dis raptum aut proper formam ut Jovi bibere ministraret.

§ 113. at has—sensibus: ‘your answer is that you count these as inferior pleasures which merely tickle the sense’. Titill. is C's translation for Epicurus’ γαργαλομοι σεμαρας (Cleomedes Cycl. Theor. i 91, Athen. xii 546); he uses it always with the apologetic quasi (Fin. i 39, Tusc. iii 47, Off. ii 63, Senec. 47); in Leg. i 47 he employs the phrase dulcedo haec et scabies (=pruritus), see Dumesnil ad loc.; Lucr. also has titillare sensus ii 429.

quousque—scriptae: ‘when will you cease your mockery? (it must be such) for Ph. too could not stand Epicureans affecting to repudiate effeminate pleasures; he would quote verbatim many sayings of Ep. to the same effect’. For ludis cf. § 123: nam refers to pronuntiabat in the second clause, the first clause taking the place of some such form as indignatus, cf. n. on iugum § 85. Etiam implies ‘I am not the only one to feel impatience at this shuffling’. For Philo see § 6, 59.

Metrodori: cf. § 93 and Duening pp. 47—51, where the following fragments occur, peri γαστρε γαρ, δ φυσιολυγε Τιμοκρατε, τδ ουσιω (Plut. M. 1098 D), peri γαστρε, δ φυσιολυγε Τιμοκρατε, peri γαστρε δ κατα φυσιων βαδιςον λεγον την ἄπασαν ἵχιν σπουδήν (Athen. vii 280, xii 546), τα καλα πάντα και σοφα και περιτα την ψυχην ἐξευρήματα την κατα σάρκα ήδονην ένεκα και της σωσιδος της ὑπερ τασης συνεστανε και πων ελαι κενον έργον, δ μη εις τουτο κατατεινει (Plut. M. 1125 B), οι και χαρα και έθραυσμαν, άτοι έμαθον παρ’ Επικουρον όρθω γαστρι χαριζομαι (Plut. M. 1088 G), οιδαι δει σοιξων τοις Ελληνας, οιδαι επι σοφιας στεφανον παρ’ αυτων τυχανειν, αλ’ εσθιειν και πανειν ουν, δ Τιμοκρατε, αφλαβος τη γαστρι και κεφαλαμινος Plut. M. 1125 D, also Plut. M. 1087, 1108, and Hirzel p. 165, Tusc. v 27, Fin. ii 92.

collaga sapientiae: so Fin. ii 92 paene alter Epicurus. The two were often represented in a double bust.

dubitet—metiri: ‘hesitates to measure by the standard of the belly’, cf. Dostoth. Cor. p. 324 τη γαστρι μετρουτε και τοις αισχιστοις την ευδαιμονια. Allen quotes Varro ap. Non. i 273 quibus modulus est vita cuius. Dubito in this sense is generally followed by the Inf. in a negative sentence, more rarely in a positive sentence; Draeg. (§ 424 8 d) cites Curtius as the earliest instance of the latter, but, besides the present passage, Reid on Lael. i quotes Sall. Cat. 15. [See also Att. x 3 α, venire dubitarint quoted by G. Müller, Progr. d. Gymnas. zu Görlitz 1878. R.]

ne beatos quidem: ‘wanting in happiness also’ (as well as pleasure), cf. § 72.

Ch. xii § 114. abundantem bonis: cf. omnibus bonis aequus § 50.
cogitat: on the sing. following pl. vacant cf. § 50 Balbi soletis n.

mihi pulchre est: a colloquial phrase ‘how jolly this is!’ cf. Mur. 26 praeor interea, ne pulchrum se ac beatum putaret, Hor. Sat. ii 8 18 quies cenantis una pulchre fuerit tibi; nox laboro; Allen cites Mart. xii 17 9, Catull. xxiv 5. The reference is to § 51.
BOOK I CH. XLI § 114.

non vereatur—ne intereat. Klotz Adn. Cr. ii 19 has well defended this reading (supported by the quotation in Aug. Ep. 118) against Madv. and Ba. whose emendations are inconsistent with the general purport of the argument, viz. to prove that the Epicurean God is not beatus, it having been already shown (§ 110) that he is not immortalis.

pulsetur—sempiterna: cf. Or. c. Cels. iv 14 of τοῦ Ἐπικούρου θεοῦ, σύνθετοι ἢ ἄριστοι τυχανότητες, καὶ τό δοσιν ἄν τῇ συνταξις ἀνάλοιποι, πραγματεύοντας τὰς φθορασίοις ἀληθινοὶ ἄνωσεθαι, and my n. on § 49. The argument is fatal to the Gods of the internundia (see Lucr. v 351 foll.), but there was in all probability a party among the Epicureans who had accepted a modification of the less vulnerable Democritian theology (§ 120). This latter is apparently the view propounded in § 49, but the criticism here is directed against the former.

ex ipso imagines affluant: cf. Lucr. vi 76 nec de corpore quae sancto simulacra feruntur | in mentes hominum divinae nuntia formae, &c.

C. f. The Epicurean principles, if accepted, are fatal to religion. What inducement is there to worship beings without activity and without benevolence? xli § 115—xliii § 124.

§ 115. at etiam—everterit: 'but (you reply) Ep. wrote a work on piety. Yes, but how? In a manner entirely inconsistent with his general theory, so that you might fancy yourself listening to C. or S.' Diog. L. x 27 mentions a treatise of Ep. peri οὐσίας, and Philod. often refers to his teaching on the subject, as in p. 104 τι πόνος καὶ θεῶν ἐπιρρήσεων ἐπικιμαζον χρήσθαι, γελοιον ὑπομνήσκειν, ἀναμένον τῆς πραγματείας τῶν τοιούτων οὕτω, p. 118 peri τε γὰρ ἐρτῶν καὶ θυσίων καὶ πάντων καθὸν τοιούτων ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν ἐπραξεν οἷς ἐθνομάτων...ai Ζήνων γενομένα συναγωγα διασαϕότων, p. 120 (Ep. laid down the plain rule) τι δει πάντα πεθέοσαι τοις νόμοις καὶ τοῖς θεομοῖς ὡς καὶ τῶν ἄσεθὼν προστάτων, p. 125—132 (writing to Phryson he bids him to sacrifice according to the laws, as he himself observed the feast of Choes and the Mysteries, offering prayer, not only as a duty enjoined by law, but as a natural offering to beings surpassing in power and goodness).

Coruncanum: the first plebeian Pont. Max. 252 B.C. compared for his wisdom with Lycurgus, Solon, Cato, &c. (De Orat. iii 56), noticed as especially beloved by the gods (N. D. ii 165), as an authority in religious matters (iii 5).

Scævolam: P. Mucius Sc. (father of C.'s friend and patron the Pont. Max. Q. Mucius Sc.) was consul in B.C. 133, the year in which Tib. Gracchus lost his life, succeeded his brother Mucianus in the Pontificate B.C. 131, so famed for his knowledge of law that he is called one of the founders of the Jus Civile, cf. iii 5.

ut Xerxes: cf. Leg. ii 10 nec sequor Magos Persarum, quibus auctoris X. inflammasse templia Graecia dicitur, quod partibus includerent deos, quibus omnia deberent esse potentia ac libera, quorumque hic mundus omnis esset templum et domus, R. P. iii 14, Herod. viii 109 with Rawlinson's n.
hominem non colant: for the play on words cf. Ov. *Met.* viii 724
cura piii dis sunt et qui coluere coluntur; Sch. quotes Plaut. *Poem.* v 4 14
Juppiter qui genus colis alisque hominum; *σίμησις* has a similar reciprocal
use in Aesch. *Prom.* 545 ὁμαλοῦς δέχεται.

cujus nullum meritum sit. The reason for this relative clause being
prefixed to the antecedent, is probably to give it greater emphasis, as the
climax.

pietas justitia adversum deos. There is a great resemblance be-
tween this passage and Sext. *Emp.* Math. ix 123 where the existence of the
Gods is argued from the fact of *εὐσέβεια* and *σωτηρία*, the latter being defined
as *δικαστική* τις πρὸς θεοῦ. καὶ μὴ εἰσὶν καὶ ἡ *δικαστική* κατὰ τὴν ἐπικλημένην
τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τε ἄλλους καὶ πρὸς θεοῦ εἰσηγεῖται, εἰ μὴ εἰσὶν θεοῖ,
οὐδὲ δικαστική συνεργεῖται. The definition is attributed to the Stoics
by Stob. *Edt.* π 124, but it occurs (amongst others) in Plato *Euthyphro* 12,
where τὰ *εὐσεβεῖα καὶ δικαία* (they are not distinguished) is explained as that
part of justice (righteous dealing) which is concerned with τὰς τῶν θεῶν
θερίσεις, cf. *Protag.* 331. So we frequently find τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους
dicata contrasted with τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς δικαιοριστέοι. If one may venture to say
so, C. seems to have been unfortunate in his translation of the Greek terms:
pietas is certainly nearer to *εὐσεβεία* than to *σωτηρία*, but he makes it stand
for the latter both here and in r 3, π 153, cf. *Or.* Part. 78 justitia erga
deo religio; we find a different definition in *Pro Domo* 107 nec est ulla
ero eter pietas nisi honesta de numine eorum ac mente opinio, cum expeti
nihil ab iis, quod sit injustum atque inhumanum, arbitratrice, which approaches
more to Epictetus' definition of *εὐσεβεία*, *Ench.* 31, ὅρθως ὑπολήψεις περὶ
θεῶν ἔχεις, ὅ τι διδασκαλεῖ καὶ διοικοῦντος τὰ διὰ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως.

hominis—communitas. In the *De Legibus* r 21 foll. three grounds are
mentioned for this *communitas* (1) the benefits received from God; (2) the
common possession of reason, *inter quos autem ratio, inter eodem etiam recta
ratio est communis*. Quae cum sit lex, legem quoque consociati homines cum dis
putandi sumus, and so we arrive at the grand Stoic description of the
world as the *civitas communis deorum atque hominum* § 23; (3) their com-
mon kinship, ut homines deorum agnatione et gente teneantur, see Dumesnil
in loc.

sanctitas—deorum: so Sext. *Emp.* l. c. ἢτοι γὰρ ἐν σοφίᾳ ἐνσωστῆται
θεῶν θερασία, a Stoic definition, as we learn from *Stob.* l. c. and *Diog.* l.
vii.119, borrowed however from Socrates, see Xen. *Mem.* iv 6 4 ὅ ἅρα τὰ περὶ
τοὺς θεοὺς νόαις ἑώρως ἔριθος ἂν ἦμιν ἐντὸς ἡρῴδου ἄριστος εἶναι, and Plato
*Euthyphro* 14 (*σωτηρία*) ἐνσωστήματι τῶν τῶν θεῶν τε καὶ ἐνσωστήματι. The
explanation of this rather inappropriate definition must be sought in the
Socratic and Stoical identification of virtue and knowledge (Zeller *Socr.*
p. 143 tr., *Stoics* p. 239). In the *Planc.* 80 Cic. asks qui sancti, qui religionum
colentes nisi qui meritam dis immortalibus gratiam justis honoribus et memoria
mente persolvunt.
Ch. xlii § 117 quid est quod: see § 3 n. and compare the Fr. qu’est que c’est que.

videmus: Madv. Fin. π 15 says expectabam ‘videamus’, as we have actura sit in § 116 and videantur in § 55; but in both those passages the relative is general or indefinite, meaning ‘of such a kind as’; here there is no reason why we may not take quae as the simple relative referring to a particular known case.

nam. Its force seems to be as follows: ‘What reason is there for adoring the gods when you leave nothing adorablc in their nature? For in doing away with the divine attributes, you do away not only with superstition but with religion itself’.

quod—soleatis: referring to the following liberati. For the matter see nn. §§ 54 and 56.

Diagonam aut Theodorum: see on § 63.

Protagoram: see on § 29.

cui neutrum licuerit: cf. quod liqueat § 29, so deliguesco makes delicui,

Ov. Met. iv 253, vii 381.

superstitionem—continetur. On the difference between superst. and rel. see π 72 n. and cf. Plut. M. 1101 o δει μὲν γὰρ τὸν περὶ θεῶν δόξας, ἀναπερ ὅψεως λήμνην, ἀφαίρει τὴν δεισιδαιμονιάν’ εἰ δὲ τούτο ἀδύνατον, μὴ συνεκκόπτων μηδὲ τυφλοῖς τὴν πίστιν, ἢν ὁ πλείστοι περὶ θεῶν ἔχουσι.

§ 118. ii qui dixerunt—sustulerunt. Sext. Emp. (Math. ix 51, cf. 14 where Critias is alluded to without being named) giving a list of atheistical philosophers, mentions Diagoras, Theodorus, Protagoras, Prodicus and Euhemerus, as C. does here, and goes on to say that Critias, one of the Thirty, must be classed among them, as he held that of καλαίν νομοθετάν εἰπισκόπων τῶν ἀθροποιῶν κατορθομάτων καὶ ἀμαρτημάτων ἔπλασαν τῶν θεῶν, ύπερ τοῦ μηδένα λάβρα τούν πλησίων ἀδικεῖν, εὐλαβοῦμεν τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν θεῶν τιμωρίαν. In proof of this he quotes from the Σιγυρῆς (a δράμα Σατυρικοί attributed by others to Euripides, cf. Plut. M. 879 ι) ἢσσων’ ἐπειδὴ τἄμφατι μὲν οἱ νόμοι | ἀπῆγον αὐτοῦς ἔργα μὴ πράσσειν βία, | λάβρα δ’ ἐπρασσόν, τηρικαῦτα μοι δοκεῖ | πυκνός τοὺς ἄλλους καὶ σοφὸς γνώμην ἄνηρ | γεγονέαι, δὲ θυρυθούν ἐξειρωθήν ὅτως | εἰ ἄ ει δέια τοῖς κακοῖς, κάν ἀδύνατα | πράσσωσιν δ’ λέγωσιν ἢ φρονοῦσι τι, | ἐπειδὴν οὖν τὸ θεῖον εἰςαγήσατο | and placed the Gods in the region of storms and lightning in order to make them more terrible. Plato alludes to this theory of religion Leg. x 889 π, | θεοὺς εἶναι πραξίων φασιν οὐτοὺς τέχνης, οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ ται νόμοις, καὶ τούτους ἄλλους ἄλλους, ὅποι ἔκαστος ἑαυτῶς συνομολογήσας νομοθετούμενος καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ καλὰ φύσει μὲν ἄλλα εἶναι, νόμοι δὲ ἔτερα.

Prodicus: see Introd. and Art. by Brandis in Dict. of Biog. His name appears in the fragments of Philod. pp. 112 and 76 (quoted in n. on § 38), cf. also p. 71 and Sext. Emp. Math. ix 18 Πρόδικος ᾨ Κεῖος, ἡμῖν, φησὶ, καὶ σελήνη καὶ ποταμοῦ καὶ κρίνας καὶ καβόλου πάντα τὰ ἀφελοῦντα τῶν βίων ἡμῶν οἱ καλαίν θεοὺς ἐνόμισαν διὰ τὴν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀφέλειαν, καθάπερ Αἰγυπτιοὶ τῶν Νεῖλον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν μὲν ἄρτον Δήμητραν νομοθήκαν ὧν, and ὧν. 52, Min.
Fel. c. 21. Persaeus (§ 38) and other Stoics had the same belief (π 60, Plut. M. 378).

**habita:** referring to the time when the worship was introduced.

§ 119. **fortes ad deos pervenisse.** It has been already stated (§§ 38, 39) that Persaeus and Chrysippus held this view, which is also maintained by Balbus (π 62), cf. Zeller Stoics, p. 330, Döllinger *Gentile and Jew* i p. 343, π 32, 165 foll.; but it would seem that C. has wrongly identified with theirs the doctrine of Euhemerus, who acc. to Sext. l. c. supposed this worship to have been instituted during the life-time of its founders, οι περγεγενέκτενοι τῶν ἄλλων ἱεροχύρια καὶ συνέμενει, ὅστε πρὸς τὰν υπὸ αὐτῶν κελεύομαι πάντας βιοῦν, ποιεῖτε μὲνον θαμασμοῦ καὶ σεμνότητος τυχεῖν, ἀνέπλασαν πρὶν αὐτοὺς ὑπερβάλλουσαν τινα καὶ βεῖαν δύναμιν, ἣν θεοὶ πολλοὶ ἐνομίσθησαν θεοὶ.

**Euhemerus:** fl. 300 B.C., sent on an exploring expedition to the Red Sea by Cassander, the results of which he professed to recount in his *Sacred Records* (ἱερὰ ἀργαραφῆ). In this he gave a long account of an island named Panchala, lying towards the south, in which there was a temple of Zeus Triphylus, ubi auream columnam posivam esse ab ipso Jove titulus indicabat; in qua columna gesta sua perscripsit ut monumentum esset posteris rerum suarum, Lact. i 11. Euhemerus is the chief representative of the *pragmatizing* or rationalistic mythologists, but traces of the same tendency may be seen in Hecataeus and Herodotus, and much more in Ephorus, and Dionysius of Miletus, whose Atlantis is described by Diod. π 51, 55 foll. Cf. Keightley *Mythol.* c. 2, Döllinger l. c. i 345, Zeller *Soc.* p. 343 tr.

**interpretatus—Ennius.** The fragments (in Lactantius’ prose version) are given in Hessel’s ed. of Ennius p. 312 foll., in Vahlen’s p. 169 foll. As exx. we may cite fr. 13 *Venus artem meretriciam instituit, auctorque mulieribus in Cypro fut uti vulgato corpore quaestum facerent* (Lact. i c. 17), fr. 12 ‘the tomb of Jupiter is shown in the Cretan Cnossus, and on it is inscribed in ancient characters ZAN K Ponoy’ (Lact. i 11). The influence of Ennius’ work is seen in Virg. *Aen.* vii 47, 177, viii 355, *Geo.* π 139. It is constantly referred to by the early Apologists.

**sepulturae deorum:** cf. previous n. and π 53. It is of this that Callimachus wrote Κρήτης δέλ ψεύστας, καὶ γὰρ τάφον, δ’ ἰσα, σείον | Κρήτης ἐνεκτύμαντο’ σὺ δ’ οὐ δίανε, ἔσον γὰρ αἰτεί, quoted by Or. c. *Cels.* i 43.

**penitus sustulisse.** Though Euhemerus is often charged with atheism, as by Sext. l. c. ὡς ἐπικλείεις ἄρεος, and Plut. *M.* p. 360 A, πᾶσαι ἀθεϊστα κατασκευάννυς τῆς οἰκουμένης, τοὺς νομιζομένους θεοὺς πάντας ὁμολογεῖν, εἰς δύομα στρατηγῶν καὶ κατάρχων καὶ βασιλέως ὡς δὴ πάλαι γεγονότων, κ.τ.λ., yet he appears to have admitted the existence of the elemental gods, the sun, the heavens, &c. (Euseb. *Pr. Ev.* π 2) and to have represented Zeus as offering sacrifice to Aether (Lact. i 11).

**omnito Eleusinem.** As there is nothing corresponding to this in the parallel passage of Sext. Emp. who passes on at once from Prodicus
§ 18 to Democritus in § 19, Schwencke (p. 61) thinks that C. here departs from his author (as he often does where he wishes to enliven the discussion by a quotation) perhaps through a reminiscence of Tusc. i 29 quaere quorum demonstrantur sepulcrorum Graecia, reminiscere, quoniam es initium, quae tradantur mysteriis, where the tombs of the gods are also brought into juxtaposition with the mysteries. On the general subject of the mysteries, see Döllinger l. c. 130—200, and Lobec Aglaophamus.

sanctam illum et augustam. C. and Atticus were initiated, as we learn from Leg. ii 36, where the beneficial influence of the mysteries is thus spoken of: nam mihi cum multa eximia divinaque videntur Athenae tuae peperisse atque in vitam hominem attulisse, tum nihil melius illis mysteriis, quibus ex agresti immanique vita exculti ad humanitatem et mitigati sumus, initiaque ut appellantur, ila re vera principia vitae cognovimus, neque solum cum laetitia vivendi rationem accepsimus, sed etiam cum spe meliore moriendi; and in the preceding paragraph, discussing the prohibition of nocturnal worship, he asks quid ergo agit Iacchus Eumolpidaeque nostris et augusta illa mysteria, sit quidem sacra nocturna tollimus? On the special force of the word augustus see Ov. Fast. i 609 sancta vocant augusta patres, augusta vocantur | templum saeculorum rite dicata manus |; it is joined, as here, with sanctus in ii 62, iii 53.

ubi initiantur—ultimae. It is not known from whence this iambic line is taken. Orarum is the Inclusive (partitive) Genitive after ultimae, which I take as Nom. Pl. agreeing with gentes, not (as Sch. apparently) as Gen. Sing. It is loosely added, like locorum, terrarum, &c., to define the meaning of ult. With regard to the admission to the mysteries, Isocrates Paneg. 42 mentions that barbarians were not allowed to be initiated, but the rule seems to have been relaxed in later times, as in the case of C.; indeed Lobecck considers that any one already initiated was at liberty to introduce a friend of whatever nationality (p. 28 foll.), so that the word μονοταγγόρας came to mean no more than cicerone. But the form of initiation was always required, the uninitiated could only enter the temple at the peril of their lives, as is shown by the fate of the two Acarnanians whose death led to the war between Athens and Macedonia b.c. 200 (Liv. xxxi 14).

Samothraciam—Lemni: these islands together with Imbros were the seat of the Cabiric worship, on which see Döll. l. c. p. 164 foll., Lobecck Agl. p. 1109—1329, Peller Gr. Myth. i 660—673. Herodotus ii 51 is the first who mentions the Samothracian mysteries. Peller thinks that these were not of much importance till after the Persian War, and that they were partly copied from the Eleusinia. Aristophanæ (Pax 278) speaks of the Samothracian initiation as a safeguard in danger; especially at sea, as we learn from other sources, cf. N. D. iii 89. Under the Macedonian and Roman rule (partly owing to the supposed connexion of Rome with Troy) these mysteries were continually growing in importance. See Liv. xlv. 5, Galen De usu part. xvii 1, Juv. iii 144 jures licet et Samothracum et nos-
trorum aras. Lobeck denies that there was any difference between the Samothracian and Lemnian mysteries. The latter are only mentioned here and in another passage from the Philoctetes of Attius quoted by Varro L. L. vii 11 Lemnia praetor | litora rara, et cela Cabirum | delubra tenes, mysteria quaeis | pristina cistis consaepta sacris | Ribbeck Frag. Lat. p. 173.

nocturno—densa: anapaestic dimeter followed by the versus paroemiacus; probably a quotation from the Philoctetes of Attius: ‘those rites which are celebrated at Lemnos in nightly procession, deep shrouded in their leafy covert’ (silvestribus saepibus densa a sort of hypallage for densis silvis saepta).

quibus explicatis—deorum. Compare iii 63 on the allegorizing of the Stoica. The mysteries themselves appear to have been a kind of miracle play illustrative of the story of Demeter and of other deities, such as Zagreus, who were in later times associated with her. It is doubtful whether the symbolical action was accompanied by any authorized interpretation, but philosophers and moralists sought to explain the mysteries in such a manner as to recommend their own views. While the ordinary spectator, satisfied with the splendid and impressive scenes which passed before his eyes, carried away with him no distinct ideas beyond the suggestion of a future life of happiness which was in store for the initiated, the Stoics (as Döllinger says, p. 198) regarded them as symbolizing the truth that the gods were merely a portion of the material universe; the Peripatetics as showing that God had laid the foundation of civilization in agriculture; the Euhemerists that the objects of worship were only deified men; the Pythagoreans and New Platonists that the secret of all religions was contained in the ancient theology of Egypt and the East. Plutarch expressly says that he who would rightly understand and profit by the mysteries must take with him λέγον ἐκ φιλοσοφίας μυσταγωγών (Is. c. 68). For exx. of the ‘physical interpretation’ here referred to by C. cf. Lobeck l.c. p. 136 foll., who quotes Themistius Or. 29 for the view of Prodicus that the mysteries only referred to the operations of agriculture; similarly Cornutus c. 28, and Varro (ap. Aug. C. D. vii 20) V. de Eleusinis nihil interpretatur nisi quod attinet ad frumentum; Proserpinam dicit significare fecunditatem semenum, quas cum defuisse tempore, eorumpit esse opinionem quod Cereris filiam Orcus abstulerit, &c., ib. vii 28 V. Samothracum mysteria sic interpretatur; dicit se ibi multis indicis collegisse in simulacris aliud significare caelum, aliud terram, aliud exempla rerum, quas Plauto appellat ideas; caelum Jovem, terram Junonem, ideas Minervam vult intelligi; somewhat different is the account given by the same author in Ling. Lat. v 58, terra enim et caelum, ut Samothracum initia docent sunt Dei Magni et hi quos dixi multis nominibus; so Plut. (et ap. Delph. p. 389) speaks of the Zagreus myth as symbolizing the divine soul of the world which is ever clothing itself in new shapes.

1 See on the other side, Döll, p. 170.
ad rationem revocatis: 'rationalized', 'reduced to philosophy', cf. §§ 28, 66, 69, 73, 93, 107.

Ch. xlvii § 120. Democritus: cf. §§ 29, 76. His fragments have been edited by Mullach.

vir magnus: so Ac. p 73 quem cum eo conferre possumus non modo ingenii magnitudine sed etiam animi? where see Reid.

hortulos irrigavit: playing on the word, cf. § 93 and, for the metaphor, Ac. r 8 (I recommend my friends to study the Greek philosophers themselves) ut ea a fontibus potius hauriant quam rivulis consectur.

nutare: 'to waver', 'give an uncertain sound', cf. Fln. p 6 nunc autem dico ipsum Epicurum nescire (quid sit voluptas) in eoque nutare.

tum enim censet: see Sext. Emp. ix 19 Δημ. δὲ εἰδωλά τινά φησιν ἐμπελάζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι διαθεσθανα, τὰ δὲ κακοποια. ἦδην καὶ εὔχεται εἰδώλων 1 τυχεῖν εἰδώλων. εἶναι δὲ ταύτα μεγάλα τε καὶ ὑπερμεγέθη, καὶ δυσφθαρτα μὲν, οὐκ ἄφθαρτα δὲ, προσημαίνει τα τά μέλλοντα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, θεωρούμενα καὶ φωνάς αφείντα, and ib. 42 τὸ δὲ εἰδωλα εἶναι ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι ύπερφυή καὶ ἀνθρωποειδεῖς ἔχοντα μορφῶν παντελῶς ἐστὶν θυσιαρδέκτων. Cf. Plut. M. 361 of the daemons of Xenocrates. 'It will be obvious' (says Moesheim in his excellent note on Cudworth p. 644) 'from a comparison of these passages, that one and the same opinion of Dem. is here broken up into several tenets by C. Perhaps here, as in other cases, he has designedly perverted the opinion of this philosopher in order with better effect to confute him'. The principia mentis are the fiery particles of which soul is composed; these coalesce and constitute the imagines which float around us, and which, when they enter into our consciousness (itself composed of the same divine particles), are recognized as divinities. Democritus attributed to them vast size, a lengthened but not everlasting existence (see Plut. Def. Or. p. 415 ὅ δὲ Ησίοδος οὗτοι καὶ περίδοος τιλ χρῶν γίγνεται τοῖς δαιμοσί τὰς τελευτάς, thus the Naiad's life is ten times as long as that of the phoenix, which is itself nine times that of the raven), benignant or malignant influence, in order to agree with the popular theology: and for the same reason, we may suppose, he considered them to be perceptible by the lower animals (as Athene by the dogs in the Odyssey), cf. Clem. Strom. v 590 c, τὰ γὰρ αὕτα πεποίηκεν εἴδωλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις προστίθητον καὶ τοῖς ὀλόγοις ζῴους ἀπὸ τῆς θείας οὐσίας.

mundum complectantur. This absurd exaggeration probably arose from a careless reading of the Gr. quoted above, ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι ύπερφυίᾳ.

sint—soleant. Sch. (Opusc. iii 308, 368), in accordance with Heindorf's suggestion, changed the Ind. of the ms for the Subj., stating an opinion, not a fact, and has been followed by the later edd.

animantes: for the adjectival use cf. §§ 23, 123, 22, 11. 11.

patria Democriti. Abdera in Thrace had a reputation like our Gotham, cf. Juv. x 50 (Dem.) cujus prudentia monstrat | summus possis

¹ Al. εἰδώλων.
viros et magna exempla daturos, vercecum in patria crassoque sub aere nasci with Mayor's n.; the first instance of its proverbial use is in Cic. Att. iv 16 § 6, hic (Romae) Abdora non tacente me, and vii 7 § 4 id est 'Αδημηττικόν. Hirzel (in Herm. xiv p. 402) thinks that Abdora got its character from D.'s habit of ridiculing the follies of his neighbours; thus we have several fragmente (Mullach 16, 31, 51—56) commencing with ἀνοίμοι, e.g. 'fools, though they hate life, wish to live from fear of Hades', 'fools learn nothing all their life long', &c. He thinks that the reproach had reference rather to inconsistency (nudate) than stupidity.

§ 121. dis—gratiam sustulit. There seems no need for Ba.'s insertion of in before dis: the dative is simply 'for the gods', 'as far as they are concerned', cf. Att. xii 6 mihi quidem omnem dubitationem tolleret. So we find a dative with aufero, eripio, extorqueo, absolvo (Verr. ii 2 § 22 Dionem Veneri absolvit, sibi condemnat 'releases D. from his obligation to Venus'). The reference is to the κυρία δόξα quoted on § 45. Aristotle while allowing that God took care of men (Eth. N. x 8 εἰ τις ἐπιμελεία τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεοῦ γίνεται, ἀστερὶ δοκεῖ), denied that there could be any friendship between God and man, both on account of the inequality, and because God has no need of a friend, Eth. N. viii 9, Eth. Eud. vii 12, M. M. ii 11 ἀτοπον γὰρ ἰν εἰς εἰς τις φανερεί τῶν Δία.

cum enim—naturae: 'while asserting the perfection of the divine nature, he at the same time (idem, cf. § 30) denies to it the attribute of kindness, and thereby does away with that which is the essential characteristic of a perfect nature'. Heind. reads dicit after Walker, but that would imply the identity of the two actions, 'in asserting he denies'. For the asyndeton, cf. § 70.

quid praestantius bonitate: a Stoic utterance, as we learn from Plut. M. 1075, ou γὰρ αὐθάναντο καὶ μακάριον μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλάθρωπον καὶ κρηδευμένον καὶ ὠφελομένων προκλημάνεσθαι καὶ νοείσαι τὸν θεόν.

amari: used of the feeling, diligit of the judgment.

Ch. xliiv. consent autem: so δὲ sometimes, where we might expect γάρ, giving a sort of side explanation instead of a reason; 'they hold, you know'. Enim is reserved to give the proof of melius.


BOOK I CH. XLIV § 121.

quid mali datis: 'what mischief you cause' (= mali quid affert ista sententia? Tusc. i 82), a colloquial expression, so haud paternum istuc dedisti Ter. Adelph. iii 4 4, and malum dare frequently.

§ 122. in imbecillitate ponitis. Cf. Diog. L. x 77 & γὰρ συμφωνοῦσι πραγματεία καὶ φρονίδες καὶ ὑγεία καὶ χάριτες μακαρίτητι, ἀλλ' ἀσθενεία καὶ φθόνος καὶ προσδεχόμεθα τῶν πλησίον ταύτα γίνεται, Lael. 29 quam (benevolentiam) si qui putant ab imbecillitate proficiendi, ut sit per quem assequatur quod quisque desideret, humilem sane relinquunt et minime generosum, ut tis dicam, ortum amicitiae.

vim et naturam deorum: little more than a periphrasis for τὸ θεῖον as in § 32, cf. Nagelsb. Stil. § 3 2 d, Beier on Off. 1 18 honesti naturam vimque; 'setting aside the Gods and their attributes'.

ne homines quidem: 'do you think that even in the case of men it is true, that they would have been devoid of kindness, if it had not been for their weakness?'

nisi essent — futuros fuisses: orat. obl. for the direct nisi essent—fuisses, see Roby § 1784, Madv. 381, 409.

ista amicitia: on the attraction (ista for istud) cf. § 67.

mercatura—suarum. Cf. Zeller Stoics. p. 465 tr., on the Epicurean view of friendship, who quotes Ep. ap. Diog. L. x 120 τὴν φιλίαν διὰ τὰς χρειὰς γίνονται, δὲν μίνιον προκατάρχεονθαι, αὐταπόκειται δὲ αὐτὴν κατὰ κοινωνίαν ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, Fin. i 66, ii 78. In the parallel passage of Lael. 31, we read neque enim beneficium feneramur sed natura propensi ad liberalitatem sumus, where Seyffert quotes Fin. ii 117 (kindness done from interested motives is a feneratio not a beneficium), Sen. Ep. 9 ista, quam tu describis, negotiatio est, non amicitia. On the change of person, where the subject is indefinite (nos—suarum), see § 84 sibi disipicere.

§ 123. at etiam liber est: recurring to § 115.

ludimur: cf. § 113, iii 3.

non tam faceto: cf. ii 46 hic quam volet Ep. jocetur, homo non aptissimus ad jocandum, ii 74 salem istum, quo caret vestra natio, irridiendis nobis nolitote consumere foll., Div. ii 40 deos jocandi causa induxit perlocudos.

familiaris—Posidonius. He was sent as ambassador from Rhodes to Rome b.c. 86; Cic. attended his lectures at Rhodes b.c. 78, where Pompey also visited him on two occasions. Cic. in vain urged him to write a panegyric on his consulship. The fragments have been collected by Bake.

invidiae detestandae: 'deprecatio odium'. So Cat. i 27 ut a me patriae querimoniam detester et deprecer, lit. 'to call the Gods to avert'.

tam desipiens fuiisset. Strictly speaking this should have been expressed in the Inf. as a part of the argument of P. See Madv. Fin. iii 50.

exile: 'emaciated'.

omm insectum, 'in a word'.

omen: summing up, 'in a word'.

quid enim—propitius sit: 'for why should I offer the usual prayer?'
Cf. the formula in Cato R. R. 141 *Mars pater, te precor quaeque, uti sic volens propitius mihi domo familiaeque nostrae.*