PLATO'S PHILEBUS

BADHAM
THE

PHILEBUS OF PLATO

EDITED BY

CHARLES BADHAM.
THE

PHILEBUS OF PLATO,

WITH

INTRODUCTION, NOTES, AND APPENDIX;

TOGETHER WITH A

CRITICAL LETTER ON THE LAWS OF PLATO,

AND A CHAPTER OF

P A L A E O G R A P H I C A L R E M A R K S;

BY

CHARLES BADHAM, D.D.,

PROFESSOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY, NEW SOUTH WALES.

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1878.
TO THE REV. W. H. THOMPSON, D.D.,
MASTER OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

My dear Master,

A vivid remembrance of you arises in my thoughts whenever I am called upon to occupy myself with Plato; and now that I am once more editing the Philebus, I cannot but revert to the time when I derived so much help and encouragement from you in the execution of my earlier task. What then is more natural than that I should wish to see your name appearing in the present work, which is not merely a new edition, but an attempt to redeem a hasty and crude performance by something which I shall be content to leave behind me? There are many reasons why I desire to make this record of our friendship; one is the intrinsic worth of the friendship itself as it affects me. During the two and twenty years which have passed since the First Edition, your good will has never flagged. First you spared no pains to enable me to remain in England; and afterwards when some διότι παντί πάντως became expedient, it was through your good opinion and the weight of your authority, at least as much as through any other cause, that I found my way to a haven not altogether undesirable. You also were one of the few who understood that among the trials of banishment not the least is the fear of being utterly forgotten; so while many good friends, and some very eminent scholars, have scarcely ever found sufficient leisure to prove that fear to be groundless, your letters have sustained my hopes. One other English Scholar, of whose friendship we are both proud, was not less considerate; and now I must record my great affection for him in a Book which he will not read. Never did any one so generously interpret the obligations of his high place to the prejudice of his own ease and comfort, and in favour of all who claimed his help, as the late Lord Lyttelton. He was,

Platonis Philebus.
as you well know, a man of infinite modesty; and of the genuineness of that modesty none could doubt, who saw how perfectly free he was from any sickly fear of publicity. He took his place in the world with frank boldness, and did his work in it according to his sense of right. As an excellent scholar, and as a champion of scholarship, he did good service to a cause not overburdened with defenders; but while he was glad to seek refuge from sadder thoughts in Classical studies, he never hid himself in them to escape from any troubles or labours which could make him useful to mankind. There is yet another common friend of ours, who needs my praise as little as the other, and who is equally removed from all human comments; but this is probably the last time I shall ever publish anything, and I will not lose my only chance of glorying in his friendship. Frederick Denison Maurice was, as he informed me many years ago, an enthusiastic admirer of Plato's Philebus. He saw more deeply into it, and indeed into all Philosophy, by reason of that devout humility which made him so accurate an observer of many things which a man who is thinking half of his author and half of himself is sure to overlook. Where other men perplexed themselves with their own ingenuity and love of systems, his teachable sympathy with all that he studied led him into truths which they had neglected as unmeaning. But it is not for me to celebrate that great Heart and Mind. I merely claim him as one of those friends for whom my affection revived with peculiar vividness while I was busied with the preparations for this Book.

As for the Book itself, you will perhaps have leisure to decide, whether on the whole it contains many improvements on its predecessor: but having once addressed myself to you, I am loth to let you go, without taking some note of certain Platonic lucubrations, the fruit of the past year. They are verbal criticisms; but verbal criticisms which make an author more legible, seem to me no barren exercise. Nor will you think so, who have never had any lot or part with the supercilious and ignorant dogmatisers who have brought scholarship to so low an ebb in England. You will be glad to find any text made a little more worthy of its author, than the Greculi have made it; and will rejoice for the sake of those who are to come after us, if they are not scared away from important works by the almost hopeless state in which
they have been left. This is why I have again taken up the same inquiry into the later books of the Laws, which I commenced in a certain Epistola. My belief is now stronger than ever, that three fourths of the bad grammar, obscurity and nonsense which we find in good authors is due to nothing more than interpolations, whether purposely inserted or accidentally derived from the Margin. Not that the other part of criticism which detects the right word lurking under the wrong has done all its work; very far from it. Take the following example from the Sophist, p. 218, α. 'Αρα τολινν, δ. ξένε, οὔτω καὶ καθάπερ ἐπὶ Σωκράτης πάση κεχαριμένης ἔσσι; if you will read Heindorf's note, you will see that second thoughts are not always wiser. One easily confounded letter has caused all this trouble. Theaetetus says: Ἀρά τολινν, δ. ἤ, οὔτως—Or take this in the Politicus, 286, ν; where for ἔφαινεν δεῖν μεμνήσθαι, it is self-evident that you want ἐφ. δ. μεμνήσθαι.—In the Laws, 904, δ where we now read διαφέροντα καὶ μετέβαλτο τόπον ἄγιον ἄλον μετακομισθείσα, common sense bids us read, δ. κ. μετέβαλε τόπον, ἀγιαν ἄλον μετακομισθείσα, leaving out what follows. I do not know whether you have seen a striking proof of the audacity of interpolators, which I adduced to him; and all for what? Because the two forms ἔφας ἄν and ἔφης ἄν were disputing for admission, some one inserted both, but one with a change of accent and breathing, and then another came and changed χαίρειν ἔφης ἄν to τά ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὑμηρόθη, χαίρειν ἔφης ἄν καὶ οὕτω ἄποκριναι, ἐσά ἄν τά ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὑμηρόθη σκέψαι. And on this rubbish Wytenbach comments as on a sound logical precept. Another such forgery occurs in Euthydemos 305, c, ν. Here ἄν δὲ τοῖς ὕλοις λόγοις and so forth down to κολούθεσαι, ought to be removed back so as to precede ὅστις παρὰ πάσην. But because it was inserted out of its place, in order to give it some air of continuity, the scribe built for it this beautiful bridge: ἔσαν μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἁληθείᾳ σφαῖρας σοφωτάτους: which Cobet, little dreaming whose work he was correcting, altered into σφαιρίσσοσαρώτατος. In the same dialogue 287, β, c, we have these glaring interpolations: [ὡ τὸ πρῶτον

1) P. 101, d.
IV

LETTER TO THOMPSON.

εἴπομεν νῦν ἀναμμηνοκαὶ καὶ —[ὁ λέγεις]—[ἐπεὶ εἰπὲ . . . . . τοῖς λέγοις.]

But I must now enter upon the Laws. Shall I follow Pindar’s precept of πρὸς ὅπως τοιοῦτος; or that given in Troilus and Cressida, which I will quote, ut obiter emendem?

1) Let us like merchants shew our fouler wares
And think perchance they’ll sell: if not, the lustre
O’th’ better yet to shew will shew the better
By shewing the worse first.

I will not presume to say that the following correction is better or worse than the general run, but the passage is at all events a strikingly corrupt one, and so an emendation of it, if tenable, deserves a special place.

In the twelfth Book p. 960, c, d, of Stephens we find the following passage, which looks at first impenetrable; but by and by we discern a kind of bush-track, and at last, if I am not altogether mistaken, with a very little thought and very sober dealing with difficulties, we are able to restore an old highway in all its completeness.

ἈΘ. Ὡ Κλεσία, πολλὰ τῶν ἔμπροσθέν καλάς ὑμνηται, σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ ἡμιστα τα τῶν μοιρῶν προφήματα.

ΚΛ. Ποιὰ δὴ?

ἈΘ. Τὸ Λέγεσιν μῖν τὴν πρῶτην εἶναι, Κλεσία δὲ τὴν δεύτεραν, τῆν Ἀτρόπον δὲ τρίτην, σώτειραν τῶν λεγέντων, ἀπεικονίσαν τῇ τῶν κλωσθέντων τῷ πυρὶ, τὴν ἀμετάστροφον ἀπεραγομένων δύναμιν. ὡ δὴ καὶ πόλει καὶ πολιτείᾳ δὲ μὴ μόνον ὑγίειν καὶ σωτηρίαν τοῖς σώμασι παρασκευάζειν, ἄλλα καὶ τοὺς ἴσον ἔν τοῖς ψυχαῖς, μάλλον δὲ σωτηρίαν τῶν νόμων. ἡμῖν δ’ ἂν μοι φαίνεται δοκεῖ τοῦτ’ ἑλλείπει τοῖς νόμοις εἶναι, ποῖς ηλικίᾳ τῆ ἀμετάστροφον αὐτοῖς ἔγγυνεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν δύναμιν.

I will not trouble you with the attempts already made: they are one and all random guesses, only half serious, rather indications of an obstacle than attempts to remove it. We see thus much; that as the destiny Atropos preserves the work of her sisters, τὰ κλωσθέντα, so he wishes that his and his friends’ work, τὰ λεγέντα, should be made ἀμετάστροφα. Now Atropos cannot be σώτειρα τῶν λεγέντων; it is therefore safe, at least provisionally so, to write τὴν Ἀτρόπον δὲ τρίτην σώτειραν. τῶν ΔΕΛΕΓΕΓΕΝΤΩΝ—

1) Act 1. Sc. 3.
LETTER TO THOMPSON.

The allusion to the well known τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτηρί is obvious, and justifies us in placing σώτηρι thus by itself. Then we come to ἀπεικοσμένα τῇ τῶν κλασθέντων—, and the question is; who or what is made like to what? But that question is soon answered. The preservation of their statutes is to be made like to the preservation of the fatal thread. But as ἀπεικοσμέθα must be the act of the old men, and as in these Books we find five or six instances of μὴ ἂν being confounded with the participial ending, μὴν ἂν, it is worth while to try ἀπεικοσμέθα, and therefore to adapt ἀπεικοσμένοι to it. The moment this is done the rest of the sentence corrects itself. τῶν δὲ λεγόντων, ἀπεικοσμένοι τῇ τῶν κλασθέντων σωτῆρ. Ἀδ, τὴν ἀμφιστροφον ἀπεικοσμέθα δύναμιν. The remainder is likewise faulty; but in the first place a little thought will soon shew us how this sentence is to be connected with the foregoing, and a little more will suffice to clear away what is at once an impropriety and a tautology. εἰ δὴ καὶ πολλαίς καὶ πολιτικάς δεῖ μή μόνον ύπείρακα ν. τ. ἐ.

A shorter but equally corrupt passage is in the tenth Book, p. 905, c. γιγνώσκειν δὲ αὐτήν, ὡς πάντων ἀνδρεύτατε, πώς οὐ δεῖν δοκεῖς; ἢν τις μή γιγνώσκων υπὸ ἀν τύποι ἱδον ποτὲ, οὐδὲ λόγον κυμβάλλεθα περὶ βλου δυνατός ἦ γένοιτο εἰς εὐθαίρεταν τι καὶ δυσθαίρετας τύχην. This αὐτήν refers to τὴν συντέλειαν. "What you call the neglect of the Gods, you so call, because you do not understand that all which they do contributes to a great whole." We may therefore translate συντέλεια by joint action. This then the youth is told that he must know. But it is precisely what he cannot know, and, not knowing, ought to distrust his own judgment concerning the prosperity of the wicked. Eusebius in quoting this passage has πρὸς υπὸν, the MS Ω has as a correction in the Margin πόσου δεῖν, and although this rests on MS authority, and is confirmed by the corrupt reading in Eusebius, and yields the only admissible sense, the Editors have passed it over. Again though we may use ἀνθρεῖος ironically of an unabashed man, this is not the language of monitors to a youth of infidel tendencies; and here, where they are reminding him of his weakness and incapacity, the word is altogether unsuitable. I have no hesitation in reading; γιγνώσκειν δ' αὐτήν, ὡς πάντων ἀνδρεύτατε, πόσου δεῖν δοκεῖς; You will observe that the mere substitution of χ makes the whole difference of the
reading.—I have before me the larger Zurich Edition; what may have since happened to the text of the Laws I know not; but I can scarcely conceive that such obvious blunders as the following can have been left as they were by any subsequent Editor. 878, ο. τρειμάτων οὖν ἑνεστότων ὅργῃ γενομένων γιὰ τὴν οὖν ἢ ἢ ἢ τῶν Δ. ἢ. Thus also in 829, ζ we read ταύτῳ δη τούτῳ ἦτε καὶ πάλαι ὑπάρχει, γενομένῃ μὲν ἀγαθῆς βίου εἰρημόνος κ. τ. ἐ. in place of ἦτε καὶ πάλαι. ὑπάρχει γ. μ. ἀ. κ. τ. ἐ. and in 837, ζ, ἢρῶν δὲ μᾶλλον θιρών τῇ ψυχῇ, δεδομένως τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπι- τετευρμηναίς κ. τ. ἐ., ἤ ἢ ἢ ἢ θιρών, τῇ ψυχῇ γ. δὲ ὑπάρχει τ. ψ. ἐ. 836, κ. ἀκόλουθον, and πιθανὸν for ἀκολούθον, and πιθανὸν for ἀκολούθον. 898, κ. περι- περισσεύει (an absurd repetition of π) for περισσεύει. 899, α, ἀν- τοῦ δὴ ἡμείνων for ἂν αὐτὸν ἡμείνων, omitting χρείαν. 903, κ. μετασχηματίζων τὰ πάντα, οἷον εἰ πυρὸς ψάφω ἀμφότερος, καὶ μὴ ἐκκοπάλλω ἐκ εὐνόοις—μὴ ἐκκοπάλλω καὶ μή, ἐκκοπάλλω ἐκ εὐνόοις. and lastly, in 904, κ. δὲν ἢρῶν ψυχῆς, διενοθήκη—δὲν ἢρῶν ἢρῶν ψυχῆς διενοθήκη. But I will pass to other places, where the correction is not so self-evident. In 829, ζ, for τοῦτο ἀπο- δίδοντων, the sense requires οὕτως δ' ἀποδίδοντων, and in ζ, for τοῦ λόγου, τοῦ λόγου. In 832, ζ, we find: τοῦ δὲ τῆς νεἰν πολιτείας, ἢν νομοθετούμενον λέγομεν, ἐπεξερεύνω ἐμφώτερα. There will be no more harshness or obscurity, if we read ἢν νομοθετούμενα, ἢ λέγομεν ἐπεξερεύνω ἐμφώτερα. In 833, ζ, for σύστασις which is quite foreign to the purpose, for even if you interpret it according to προστάτωσαι in the Philebus, it would amount to συμ- πλοκῆ, so that we should have, ἢν συμπλοκᾶς συμπλοκῆ, read σύν- τασις, contenio. 834, κ. τάξις καὶ πάλτος καὶ ἀκοντίς. This would do very well if the peltasts threw their targets at the enemy. Till this is shewn to be the case, I should vastly prefer καὶ πάλτος. There is a strange order of words a few lines further: τὸ δὲ μετὰ ταύτα ἢπεκοινωνὶς δὴ πορεύομαι γλυκὸ τοῦ ἡσύχας ἢν νομοθετούμενα. The first DH is nothing but ΔΝ in its right place, and ἢν νομοθετούμενα is a corruption from δὲ νομοθετούμενα. 836, κ. I have no doubt that the nearest approach to the true reading now possible, is πρὸς δὲ τοῦτο, ὃ διὰ πάντος . . . τούτῳ ἢ τούτῳ τῆς ὧν ὑμῶν ὑπολογήτω, τοῦτο is the aim, τοῦτο the advocate of purer manners, τοῦτος are the measures he recommends. 839, κ. For λήψαται γόνιμον κ. τ. ἐ., a new light breaks in upon us, if we read γονίμων δ' ἀπεξομένους ἀροῦφος Θ. πάσης. Thus
we have the opposition between the absolutely sterile, and that which though fertile in itself, we do not mean to use as such. 841, c, For περιλαβὼν read παραλαβὼν, and for τὰ νῦν λέγομεν έστιν εὐχαί, read τανῦν λέγομεν εἰς ἐστιν εὐχαί. τ. τ. The interpolations which spoil the next sentence were probably only meant for the margin. You will see that I mean παλαιῶν and ἄφρινων. Who can suppose that Plato would speak of their σπάματα? 844, ν, I am altogether for the other reading, παιδίων Διονυσίαδα, and in place of Ἑκεί κάριτος αὕτη, I have no scruple in writing Ἡ Θείς έχωσσασα αὕτη. The copyist wrote εὐχαί and forgot to put his dots under the first χα. Then came another, and made this absurd correction, παιδιὰ Διονυσίας is a very suitable expression for all the fruit obtained by grafting. 846, α, For διόμενον ἐπιθεδευίν, read διόμενον ἐπιθεδεύειν. 864, η, ἔσεσθαι τούτων should be ἔσεσθαι τούτω. 898, ν, The displacement of two words has caused a woeful confusion in an otherwise simple passage. I will merely indicate it. [μηδ’ ἐν ἐνὶ] φε-φαμένη . . . . μηδ’ ἐν (ἐν) τιν νόμο κλησις—. But I must break off from this desultory work, which is fatiguing to any reader who shall be good enough to verify my references, and keep on steadily through one Book; and as the Seventh is that on which I have been very recently engaged, I will ask of you to accompany me through it.

798, η, καὶ ἐν ποι’ ἄρα ἀναγκασθῇ μεταβάλλειν αὖθις—The sentence, having up to this point turned upon σώματα as the subject, is now varied, and we look for an individual to whom to refer ἀναγκασθῇ, συναραξθῆς and ἀπολαβών. But he is not far off. For αὖθις let us read αὐ τίς, and there he is. In c we have παιδῶν where it is certain that the author meant us to understand ἔνδρον. When these children who have made innovations in their games and amusements grow up to be men, they are different from former—children! Who can be expected to treat copyists with any respect, after such a taste of their quality? In ν the same mala sedulitas has bestowed on us the word μεταβαλλόμενα which is out of its place, and the sense of which is expressed by ὅσα . . . . πάσχει τὸ τοιοῦτον which is in its place. In ε, the faulty redundancy in οὖν ἀμῶς ἀλλας πως may be accounted for, if we suppose that οὖν ἈΛΛΑΛΩΣ was copied twice and subsequently changed by a would-be corrector.
799, v. In speaking of νόμοι he says, οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν περὶ θαρσόδαιν οὐτὰ πας, ὡς δεικνυ, οὐνόμασαν. By reading TOTC in place of TOTE we make the sentence clear and get rid of a then which points nowhere. "The ancients were not ignorant of the connexion between νόμοι and φίδαι," says he; καθ' ὑπὸν δὲ oἶνον ποὺ τὶς ἡ καὶ ὑπαρ [ἐγγεγοροῦ] ἀντιλαμβὲς μαντευόμενος αὐτῷ. If he only dreamed it, he would have no right to μαντευόμεθα; but I presume he dreamed it καθ' ὑπὸν ὘είς ὄν. 800, v. I see here as elsewhere the utmost confusion between δὲ and δὴ, but it would be rather dull sport to fly the falcons of criticism upon such exiguous game. c. For φαίμεν, I should much prefer φαμέν in a parenthesis, though I am aware that he has already used it. d. A slight transposition will give the θήματα and the θυσιαίοι their fair share in a necessary epithet. I read αἵμονίας γοιο- στάτας. x. I hope you will consent to the removal of χειροῦς. The gibe is all the more bitter when he substitutes these funeral singing men for the Tragic Chorus. I note et . . . ἐν νῦν . . . καίσω as a confirmation of Elmsley's οἶσθ' ὡς μίντιζαί.

801, a. Instead of μυθόν ἑπανεργατᾶ, which would mean, "am I to ask no question"? I propose μηθέ. "An ne rogare quidem oportet"? We may surely venture to restore δὲ to the margin where it must have stood as a help to beginners. c. He says that τὸ τῶν ποιητῶν γένος is οὐ πάντα ἰκανόν in judging what men should or should not pray for: and that they might put into our mouths prayers for wealth, though we have already decreed that we shall have no gold or silver statue of Plutos in our City. What will be the result? They will make us contradict ourselves in our prayers. This is logical; but not so, that they will make us pray εὐγείς οὐκ ὀρφαῖς, for they may be right, and we wrong. Therefore away with the insertion, which while it is not to the purpose of the argument, is a sore let and hindrance to the syntax. d. He has never appointed any νομοθέτας for the purpose mentioned, but certain ἀθλοθέτας, of whom he treats in 764, b & c.

802, v. For ἑπανερόμενον I venture to suggest ἑπανοικ(θαύσθευς διομένον. c. The direction, νομοθέτου βούλημα, cannot begin with πᾶσα δὲ. No wonder then that A and Ω omit the conjunction. The γε is also to no purpose. Ought we not to read, πᾶσα τακτή尤为 λαβοῦσα π. Μ. διατιβῆ;? This would refer to the originally proper compositions, and those that had been made.
so by adaptation. d. Sense and Grammar call for the change of ἐκατέρας into ἐκατέρα. e. The passage about suiting the compositions to the sexes looks very hopeless at first; but the observation of a frequent source of mistake in these books, the confusion between the participial endings and μέθα will at once set us on the right track. ἦστι δὲ ἀμφοτέροις μὲν ἀμφότερα ἀνάγκη κατεχόμενα ἀποδιδόναι, is nothing more than ἦστι δὲ ἀμφότεροις μὲν ἀμφότερα ἀνάγκη κατεχόμεθα ἀποδιδόναι. When this is replaced, and Αεττeus supplement introduced, we need only write τούτῳ for τούτῳ, and the passage is as simple as any in Plato.

803, Α. Having settled the general characters of both kinds of songs, he goes into the details of education. But here we are left suddenly in such darkness as this: τίνα τρόπον χρη καὶ οἴστις καὶ πότε πράττειν ἔκαστα αὐτῶν. What are ἔκαστα, and of what αὐτῶν are they the particulars? As to οἴστις and πράττειν they help out each other; for the dative gives us a palpable hint to change πράττειν into προσάπτειν, and the succeeding sentence about τρόποι and τροποθεία, and indeed the whole scope of what follows down to the end of this page of Stephanus, shew that our business is to ascertain τίνα τρόπον χρη καὶ οἴστις καὶ πότε προσάπτειν ἐκάστων αὐτών, i.e. τῶν ἀφενόν τε καὶ ἐκείνων, Α. Β. οἷον δὴ τις ναυπηγός τὴν τῆς ναυπηγίας ἀρχήν καταβαλλόμενος τὰ τροποθεία ὑπογράφεται τῶν πλοίων σχήματα, ταύτων δὴ καὶ πάνω φαλ- νομα ἐμπνεῦ ὑμῖν τὰ τῶν βίων πειρόμενος σχήματα διαστήσασθαι κατὰ τρόπον τουτὸ τῶν φυγών, ὅπως αὐτῶν τὰ τροποθεία καταβαλ- λέσθαι, πολὺ μηχανὴ καὶ τίσι ποτὲ τρόποις ἐνυώντες τὸν βίον ἀριστα διὰ τοῦ πλοῦ τούτου τῆς ζωῆς διαικομηθεσίμεθα, τούτῳ σκόπειν άρι- θνως. In this passage it is a matter of controversy whether τρο- ποθεία is governed by καταβαλλόμενος or by ὑπογράφεται, and the rest of the construction will depend on this. But as Αεττεύς appo- sitio, that is, that την τῆς ναυπηγίας ἀρχήν is a sort of anticipating description of τροποθεία, is in itself unlikely, for then the words might just as well be away; and seeing that, if καταβαλλόμενος governs τροποθεία, and ὑπογράφεται governs τῶν πλοίων σχήματα, we have this result; that a man is sketching the ship's hull at the same time that he is laying down its timbers, which is at least a day too late, and lastly since the play on words re- quires that the stress of the antithesis should fall on τροποθεία
LETTER TO THOMPSON.

ὑπογράφεται = βιον σχῆματα κατὰ τρόπονς τούς τῶν ψυχῶν δια-
στήσονται, I leave σχῆμα to find a regimen where it can, only
not in this text, to which it is a stranger, and I conclude that,
just as the interpolator borrowed the word σχῆματα from the
following clause, so when he inserted ὅντως αὐτῶν τὰ τροπιδεῖα
καταβάλλεσθαι, he helped himself from what preceded. Who needs
such an explanation of a play upon words? and is not ταῦταν
κ. υ. ἤ δραν enough? Then again what have we to do with any
μηχανή? I think it certain that πολύς μηχανή was added, because
some one did not see the purport of καὶ in καὶ τίς πολὺ τρόπως.
Of course μοι ought to be expelled, and as for τὸν βιον it looks
very like a wish to bring back the τῶν βιων which we had be-
fore.—The next sentence but one ἵπποι ἔν ἱππασθάλεσθαι, εἰ ποις
διὰ προσήκοντος των αὐτὸ πράττομεν, ἵππος ἐν ἱπποῖς σύμμετρον ἐν
εἰς is not very clear, nor will the Græcius of διὰ προσήκοντος
των commend itself to you. But AIA is the palaeographical twin
of APA, and εἰ ποι ἄρα προσήκοντος αὐτὸ πράττομεν seems all
that is required. p. “We are the playthings of the Gods, and
our best earnest, such as it is, consists in acting as such, and
rejoicing before them. People now-a-days say that War is the
serious part of life, and Peace the playful part; thus they make
the serious to be for the sake of the playful.” τὸ δ’ ἴν ἐν πο-
λίμῳ μὲν ἄρα οὐ’ ὄν παιδιὰ περυκνία οὔ’ αὖ παιδία ποτὲ ἤμι
αξιόλογος, οὔτε οὔσα οὔτε ἱσομην. τὸ δὴ φαιμὲν ἤμιν γε εἶναι
πονδαιώτατον, δεὶ δὴ τὸν καὶ εἰρήνην βιον ἐπαυτὸν πλειστῶν τὶ καὶ
ἀμφότερον διαμεθηεῖν. τὶς οὖν ὑθής τοι ἤποντα ἔστι διαβιώσκον, τίνας
δὴ παιδιὰς θύσοντα καὶ θῦντα καὶ ὑραύμενον. τὸ δ’ ἴν ἄρα means
more than Cornarius understood by it. I should render it: “Whereas
we have found that in war &c.” The stop should be removed
from ἵσομην, and we must read, δὲ φαιμὲν ἤμιν γ’ εἶναι πον-
δαιώτατον. “War has no sport nor education worth mentioning,
and to have that was just what we affirm to be most serious.”
But if you insist upon preferring ὡ ... σπονδαιώτατω, non re-
pugnabo. The rest I read thus: τὶς ὨΤΝ ὑθής; τίνας δὴ
παιδίας παιζοντα ἔστι διαβιώσκον; θύσοντα κ. υ. δ. It is incredible
that any one should have attempted to correct this passage, and
that others should have adopted his correction, and yet all have
consented to leave such an absurdity as παιδίας θύντα in the
text.
LETTER TO THOMPSON.

804, B. πρὸς τὸν Θεόν ἄπιθον καὶ παρὰ ὑμῶν—Was it once εἶ-κότα παθεῖν? B. Perhaps you will approve of οὖτι ὃν μὲν ἄν ὅ παθην βούλησαν [φοιτάντα] ὃν ὃ ἡ γλυκανας [τας παιδεῖας]. δ & εν. τα αὐτά δὲ δὴ καὶ περὶ Θηλείων ὃ μὲν ἐμὸς νόμος ἄν εἴ-ποι πάντα, ὅσα περ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀφθάνων, Ἰσα καὶ τὰς Θηλείας ἀσκεῖν δεῖν. καὶ οὔδὲν φοβηθῆς εἰπομεν' ἐν τούτον τόν λόγον οὕτε ἐπηκεῖσθ' οὔτε γυμναστικῆς, ὡς ἀνθράκε μὲν πρέπον ἐν εἴρ. γυναιξι δὲ οὔτε ἄν πρέπον. Never was a passage more miserably inter-poleted than this. First his law speaks, and then he speaks; his law would say the same about women as about men, that women ought to be trained and drilled as much. Any one who knows what Ἰσα καὶ is, will welcome the conjecture, which joins Ἰσα καὶ with οὔδὲν φοβηθῆς 1), and so gets rid of this repetition about women; and as the law is still the subject, the spurious εἴπομεν ἄν absconds from before it.

805, B. ἐν τῶν αὐτῶν τελῶν καὶ πάνων. This is untrue; for the women add their labour to that of the men. Read πόρων. C. ἐν τούτων. Perhaps εν τούτῳ γ; in the meanwhile, till he has found some better reasons.

806, A. Ἄν ἄρρυντος μὲν ταλασσάς is opposed to ἑρματεῖας δὲ, and not to ἀσκητικῶν τινα βιον, for δὲ τινα we should read δὴ τινα. Then follows a passage which must be given in its whole state. τῶν δὲ εἷς τῶν πόλεμου μὴ κοινωνοῦσας, ἢ̄ς ὁδ' εἰ̄ τὶς ποιεὶ δια-μάζεσθαι περὶ πόλεως τις καὶ παιδῶν ἀναγκα λύηγη τῆς γλυκνυτα, ὡς ὁ ἄν τῶν, ὡς τινες ἢρμαζόνες, ὡς θεός κοινωνησίαι ποιεῖ βολῆς μετὰ τέρης δυνάμειν, οὔδὲ ἄστικα καὶ δόρῳ λαβοῦσα μιμήσασθαι τῷ Θεόν, ὡς πορθυμάνης αὐτίκας τῆς πατρίδος γυναικος ἀντιστάσας φό-βον γε, εἰ μοῖχον μείζον, πολεμίοις δύνασθαι παρασκευὴν ἐν τέξει τινα κατορθείας; Ἐαυτομάτης δὲ οὐ̄δ' ἀν τὸ παράπτω τολμήσαι μι-μήσασθαι τούτων τῶν τρόπων διαβοῦσα, πορα γυναικάς δὲ αὐτάς ἀνδρέας ἂν ἀλ ἴκεινον γυναικῶν φανεῖν. I need not point out the impossibilities of this passage, nor refute their champions. One specimen of their logic will suffice. We have κοινωνοῦσας, δυ-νάμεναι, λαβοῦσαι, ἀντιστάσας, κατορθείας. "It is nothing: the nominative may precede the infinitive". Yes! and so may the accusative; but can both do so indifferently—and in one and the same sentence? This, and the barbarism of οὗς οὔ̄δ' suffice to show the condition of the text; but where is the remedy to

1) Omitting τὰς Θηλείας ἀσκεῖν δεῖν.
come from? From the nature of the argument. Which is the worse case? that described by πορθομένης τῆς πατέριδος, or that which is here called διαμάχεσθαι περί τῶν φιλίτων? The latter. Which demands most courage, to appear ἐν ταξίν, or to use the weapons of close fighting? The latter. Then why does he weaken his sentence by putting the worse case, and the greatest instance of courage, first? Moreover what a clumsy arrangement is this, that he should interrupt his examples of warlike females, the Amazons, Minerva, the Sarmatian women, by a long sentence which might have as well appeared elsewhere?—It did appear elsewhere, till some blunderer left it out, and the same or some equal blunderer brought it back, not postliminio, but through a breach in the text. By re-transposing what has been displaced we surmount nearly all these difficulties, grammatical and rhetorical; for the rest we must trust to probable conjecture. τῶν δ' εἰς πόλεμον μη κοινωνούσας, ἄστε (πορθομένης αὐτῶς τῆς πατέριδος, γενναίως καθιστάσας φόβον γε εἰ μηδὲν μετέχων πολέμους δύνασθαι παρασχεῖν ἐν τάξει τινι κατοφθάλοις);—all this depends upon φόρμων δεῖν ἵνα; Then follows the direct. οὐδ' εἰς ποτέ διαμάχεσθαι περί πόλεως (πόθεις;) τε καὶ παίδων ἀναγκαία τύχη γλυκοῖτο, σύν τέξεων, ὡς τινες Ἀμάζωνες, οὐν' ἄλλης κοινωνίας ποτὲ βολής μετὰ τήν τχήν δυνάμειν (φανεῖεν ἄν) οὐδ' ἀσπίδα καὶ δορὰ λαβοῦσα μημήσασθαι τὴν θεόν, Σαφροματίδας δὲ οὐδ' ἄν το παράπτω τολμήσαι μημήσασθαι κ. τ. ἐ. c. No one need despair of making a brilliant correction; Stallbaum's στραγγεῖα founded on the reading of the best MSS, οὐ Δι' ἢμανν is deserving of much praise. x. For ἀποτελοῦσιν it is absolutely necessary that we read ἀποτελοῦσιν. The explanation offered by Ast of αὐτώς in παιδών τε ἢμα θηλίων καὶ τῶν μητέρων αὐταίς, that it is put for αὐτῶν, is only too like many of his notes on the Laws; αὐταίς, as I need not tell you, is ἵπποι sceorsim. But this leads me to offer a conjecture on the words immediately preceding. ξυσσίτια δὲ κατεσκέυασμα εἰς ταῖς μὲν τα τῶν ἄνδρων, ἔγγυς δ' ἐγόμενα τα τῶν νεὼν, αὐτοῖς, instead of τα τῶν αὐτῶς οἰκίαιν which is a most vague designation. For what can οἰκίαιν mean? Not a man's household, for his wife and daughters are provided with a mess-table apart; certainly not his domestics, who are not members of a συστήνον; and certainly not his friends who, being citizens, would sit with him. Of course τῶν αὐτώς οἰκίαιν is not so bad as τῶν
LETTER TO THOMPSON.

αὐτοῖς μητέρων, but what writer would ever dream of putting more than τῶν οἰκεῖων in such a case? Why the youths are apart from their fathers, but the girls are with their mothers, is obvious to that great umpire in all truisms, the meanest capacity.

807, a. Having provided the members of his city with their public meals and festive occupations, he asks whether each member has no needful and suitable work left him to do, ἀλλ’ ἐν τρόπῳ βοσκήματος ἤκαστον παινόμενον αὐτῶν δεῖ ξῆν; I shall offer you no excuse for altering this into, ἀλλ’ ἡ τ. β. ἡ. ἡ. π. διαζήν. Immediately after, we have ὑκεύον τό γε δίκαιον σφαμέν συδε καλόν, υδα οἰόν τε κ. τ. ἐ. where again the explainers τολμάσειν ἀδύνατα. I read, ὑκεύον, (τό γε δίκαιον ΦΑΝΑΙ) οὐσε καλόν, υδα οἰόν τε—. το τεργυμένων. Pray do not alarm yourself: I am not going to discuss the merits of the word; I simply copy it from the Zurich Edition and set it up as a mark to unwary readers; who, while sliding over the smooth surface, will, unless warned, find themselves suddenly in a very comfortless chasm. One whole paragraph is missing, either because a page in the source of our MSS was lost, or because the page was too-tergyumówn to be deciphered. How is this to be proved? By unfulfilled promises. He asks τίς δή τρόπος τοῦ βίου and the rest, and after a description of their messes, he again asks ἄρα συδέν λαπομένων ἵσιν κ. τ. ἐ. This question he does not answer, nor has he told us how he proposes to escape from his own prophecy, that these well-conditioned citizens of his will necessarily became the prey of some wiry hungry daredevils. And yet that he has pointed out some escape is evident from the sequel, which whether corrected or left as it is, can yield but this sense. “We cannot hope that all this will be done with great minuteness, as long as citizens have separate houses.” All what? “But if the other second-best measures were tried”,—What other? “But men living so have yet another duty and that not a small one”—Living how? Hardily; as is plain from the context, and from the sequel; but these precepts of hardihood, voluntary penances or whatever they were, and their effects on the character, are all gone, and as a proof of the diligence with which Plato is read, not an asterisk marks where they were. There is some broken ground, as you would expect, on the brink of this chasm; but if I am not mistaken,
I have pointed it out before. \( \epsilon \iota \zeta \tau \rho \omicron \epsilon \mu \nu \alpha \nu \) stands its ground in all editions just now before me. The right reading seems to be; ταύτ' ὑπ' δὴ δεί ακριβείας μὲν ἱκανής, ὡς καὶ νυνὶ ζητούμεν' ἂν, ἦσας ὑπ' ἂν πυτε γένοιτο. c. If the Zurich Editors had thought for a moment, they would have adopted Αἰτ's emendation εἰς ἀρετήν. Of course the scribes wrote ἀρετής, because it was next door to ἐπιμέλειας, and they looked no further.

808, c. Are you very tired of proofs of the lacuna? Just one more, and I have done. νυὲ μὲν δὴ διαγομένη τοιαύτη τις πρὸς πᾶσι τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἀνθρεῖαν ἂν τίνα προσκαρέβοιτο κ. τ. ¼. For the miserable πως βιωτέον, I have exhausted every verb beginning with π that I could think of, and found no plausible substitute, except perhaps προλογιστέον, which the scribes would very readily change to προλογίστεον. But a certain form of the β, now out of use, is very like the seminuncial λ and one form of π is an ο with a lid to it. But this is dwelling in the “Meadow of Conjecture.” d. ὅ δὲ παῖς πάντων θηρίων ἐστὶν δυσμενείσμενον· διὰ γὰρ μάλιστα ἦκε πηγὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν μηχανενεμήν, ἐπισοῦον καὶ δριμύ καὶ υβριστότατον θηρίον γίγνεται. To speak frankly, this is downright nonsense. “A boy is of all animals the hardest to manage: because having a germ of reason, he becomes the most rebellions of all creatures.” This any one can see to be far from neat: but how much worse it becomes if we write;—“having his germ of reason not yet daunted and tamed”? Nor is the grammar a whit better: διὰ μάλιστα with two positives and one superlative; the latter probably contrived “to meet the demand”. Again why use μηχανενεμήν for ὑπέμικα in a direct declaration such as this? There can surely be no doubt that Plato wrote: ὅ δὲ παῖς πάντων θηρίων ἐστὶν δυσμενείσμενον, διὰ γε μάλιστα ἦκε τινὰ πηγὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν. μηχανενεμήν δὲ, ἐπισοῦον καὶ δριμύ καὶ υβριστότατον θηρίον γίγνεται. e. One is rather taken aback by the statement that the lad is to be sent tois διδάσκοντες καὶ ὁμιλοῦν. (Τι γὰρ; ἢ καὶ τοῖς ἐπιτίμεσκοι καὶ ἐπιτιμοῦκεν διδάσκοντες;) And why is καὶ μαθημάτων added? Grant that they are bonds; they are surely not so in the sense in which εἰς διδάσκοντες are so. Consider, pray, whether we have not here a corruption of καὶ ὁμιλεῖν ΚΑΛ' (καλῶν) ΜΑΘΗΜΑ.

1) Book 10. 905, d. εἰς ἐπιδηθεὶς εἰς λόγον τινὸς ἢ ἑτη. Read ἕλ. τ. ἐλλον εἰ.
LETTER TO THOMPSON.

809, B. τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ χρησάζας πέρι μελῶν τε καὶ ὀργήσατος ἐφη. Not even a Dithyrambic poet, unless very drunk, would sing of the χρησάζας μελῶν τε καὶ ὀργήσατος. Plato had discussed the question concerning their employment: χρησάζας πέρι. c. καὶ τοι τὰ μὲν περὶ τὸν πόλεμον, ὃ δὲ μανθάνειν τε αὐτοῦ καὶ μελετήν ἔχεις τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰ γράμματα πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον λύφας πέρι καὶ λογισμῶν, ὃν ἔφασε δεῖν, ὃσα τοὺς πόλεμον καὶ ὀικονομίαν καὶ τὴν κατὰ πόλιν διοίκησιν χρήναι ἐκάστους λαβεῖν, καὶ πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ ταύτα ἔτι τὰ χρήσιμα τῶν ἐν ταῖς περιόδοις τῶν θείων, ὀστραγόν τε πέρι καὶ ἴλου καὶ σελήνης, ὃσα διοικεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ἢτι περὶ ταύτα πασῆ πόλεις . . . ταῦτα ὑπάρχουσα σοι πάντα ἰκανός, ὃ φίλε, παρά τοῦ νουμοθέτου διείρθηται. In this sentence, δοκεῖ to points to things unknown and beyond discovery, χρήναι is out of structure, διοικεῖν occupies a place where μανθάνειν alone is apposite, and this mention of arrangement seems to have dropped from the clouds. The chief author in all this mischief is the man who introduced δοκεῖ τε: λογισμῶν ὃν ἔφασε δεῖν πρὸς πόλεμον καὶ ὀικονομίαν καὶ τὴν κατὰ πόλιν διοίκησιν is in perfect order. Then follows, somewhat loosely, but in a highly Platonic manner—χρήναι δ’ ἐκάστους λαβεῖν καὶ πρὸς ταύτα ταύτα ἔτι τὰ χρήσιμα τῶν ἐν ταῖς περιόδοις τῶν θείων, ὀστραγόν τε [πέρι] καὶ ἴλου καὶ σελήνης, ὃσα [διοικεῖν] (oh! these interpreters!) ἀναγκαῖον ἢτι [περὶ ταύτα] πάση τῇ πόλει. (Subaudi λαβεῖν.)—I take this opportunity of observing that in Thuc. II, 102, where we now read, Λέγεται δὲ καὶ Ἀλκιμάονι τῷ Ἀρχιμάοι, ὃτε δὴ ἄλλοι ἅρμα ἄλλοι μετὰ τὸν φόνον, τὸν Ἀπόλλων ταύτην τὴν γῆν χρῆσαι οἰκεῖν, the right reading is ὃτε ἄλλοι ἄλλοι ἀλλοίσται.—Soon after the sense is obscured through faulty punctuation; it ought to be pointed: ἵππας ὑπάρχουσα τῇ γῇ λέγει; τοῖς: ὃς ὑπάρχει διείρθηκε κ. τ. ἦ. In the next sentence we have προσοιτίζων twice; in the first place it occurs in connexion with ἱππόν: πότερον ἱππόν, ἢ τῷ παράπαν ὑπὸ προσοιτίζων. And these two verbs have the common complement of εἰς ἀκρίβειαν; the second προσοιτίζων is followed by εἰς γράμματα. It cannot be denied that such a verbal may be used in a passive sense; but who ever heard of such an expression as προσφέροις ἐκείς γράμματα? My own persuasion is that the Margin of the Vossian MS offers a right conjecture in προσοιτίζων. The passage in the beginning of the Republic, τὸς μὲν εὐ ἱππότες, νῦν δὲ ὑπὸ ἱππότες is in favour of repeating the same verb, and the pre-
position is added because the verb would look too bald when separated from εἰς. In the very next sentence (810, A) we have a marginal note which changes the construction for the worse. The commands of the law are in the infinitive. προστεθῶν μὲν τοινυν φανείν εἰς μὲν γεγόματα παιδί δεκατεί σχεδὸν ἐνιαυτοῦς τρεῖς, λύμας δὲ ἀψωσθαί τριά μὲν ἦτα καὶ δέκα γεγονόσων ἀρχεθαί, [μετριος ὁ χρόνος] ἐμμεῖναι δὲ ἔτερα τριά. I point out paraφομον which ought to be παρὰ νόμου, and, in ν, τισιν οἷς, which should be οἷσιν, and proceed to lay before you as corrupt a passage as any in the Book. πρὸς δὲ δὴ μαθήματα ἄνω τοιήθων νεμένα ἐν γράμμασι, τοῖς μὲν μετὰ μέτρων, τοῖς δὲ ἄνευ δυνάμων τηρητῶν, δὴ δὴ συγγράμματα κατὰ λόγον εἰρημένα μόνον, τητώμενα δυνάμοι τε καὶ ἐρμολάς, σφαλαρα γράμμαθ᾽ ἡμῖν ἔστι παρά τιναν τῶν πολλῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων καταλείπωνα τοῖς, δὲ πάνων βέλτιστοι νομοφύλακες, τί ἐρώτησθε; To what interpreter shall we betake ourselves for help in this labyrinth, saying ἐν σοι κείμεθα τιμῷνες? But behold our very invocation has helped us so far, that we may confidently read, ποιήσον νεμέθα ἐν γράμμασί! But what are we to do with δυνάμων τηρητῶν? I should certainly reject the former and retain the scornful expression τηρητῶν, more especially as δυνάμος occurs very soon after. Then I propose to separate the text from the gloss upon it, thus: δὴ [συγγράμματα] κατὰ λόγον εἰρημένα μόνον, τητώμενα δυνάμοι καὶ ἐρμόλας, [σφαλαρα γράμμαθα] ἡμῖν ἔστι παρὰ τιναν [τῶν πολλῶν] τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων καταλείπωνα. He cannot call them σφαλαρα γράμματα as yet, for though τοιούτων (i.e. τητώμενων δυνάμω καὶ ἐρμόλας) is a sneer, he does not prejudice the question whether they shall use those books. v. The commentators may settle it among them, whether the faulty construction of this sentence is a piece of graceful negligence, or of corruption: but τῆς συνής is very awkward, even if we understand it to mean that the same way pleases some and displeases others, and κείνεις γὰρ is certainly faulty, for this has no connexion of cause and effect with ἐνιαυτὸς λέγεις. The simplest correction would be, κείνεις δὲ με, ὡς Ἰ. φ., ταύτης τῆς ὁδοῦ κ. τ. ἓ. 811, v. The parts of the dialogue are so distributed, that Clinias becomes the protagonist. The persons ought to stand thus: ἈΘ. . . . τί δ᾽ οὖν τοιῷ ἦτη, καὶ δυνάμων φημε εἶναι φέρονσαν τοῖς παιδί τῆν πολυμαθίαν. Παῖς οὖν καὶ τί παρανοίας ἐν τῷ νομοφυλάκι;
LETTER TO THOMPSON.

ΚΑ. Τού πέρι λέγεις;
ΑΘ. Τού πρόσ τι παράδειγμά ποτε ἀποβλέψας ἢν τοῦ μὲν ἐφ' ἕκτας μανθάνειν τούς νέους, τὸ δ' ἀποκολύουι.

ΚΑ. Λέγε καὶ μηδὲν ἀπόκενε λέγων.

812, n. c. AΘ. Ἐφαμεν, οἷμα, τοῖς τοῦ διονύσου τοὺς εξεκοντοῦτας φόδους διαφερόντως εὐνοεῖτες δεῖν γεγονέναι περὶ τοὺς ἐφθαμοὺς καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀμοινοὺς συστάσεις, ἵνα τὴν τῶν μελῶν μίμησιν τὴν εὗ καὶ τὴν κακῶς μεμιμημένην, ἐν τοῖς παθήμασιν ὅταν ψυχή γίγνεται, τὰ τῆς ἀναθήσεως ὀμοιώματα καὶ τὰ τῆς ἐναντίας ἐκλέξασθαι δυνατός ὑπὲρ τῶν τὸ μὲν ἀποβάλλει, τὰ δὲ προφέρουσι εἰς μέσον ψυχῆς καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ τοῖς τῶν νέων ψυχαῖς, προκαλοῦμενοι ἐκάστους εἰς ἀρετῆς ἐνεργεῖται κτῆσιν συνακολουθοῦντας διὰ τῶν μιμήσεων. Can any one believe, that in toioi pathēmasin otan psyche ingenetai is correct, or that mi-mhēs meiitai to omoisamata means anything conceivable? When a comic actor imitates popular tragedians in a burlesque, he may be said to imitate their imitations; but the province of music is meiōsthai ta pathēmata; and this is, I think, enough to justify us in expelling omoismata, which was invented to fill up a fancied gap in the sense, and in reading: ἵνα τὴν τ. μ. μίμησιν, τὴν εὗ καὶ τὴν κακῶς μεμιμημένην ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι, δὲ ἄν ἐν ψυχῇ γίγνεται, τὰ τῆς ἀναθήσεως καὶ [τα] τῆς ἐναντίας, ἐκλέξασθαι δυνατός ὑπὲρ τ. τ. ε. By this very slight change we have the true object of imitation, pathēmata; and the construction δυνατός ἐκλέξασθαι μιμησιν μεμιμημένην τα καὶ τα ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι is complete and satisfactory. d & x. The grammar requires πορεχομένου and προστράπτοντος. Πυκνότης καὶ μακρόθυμος appear to be well explained by Mr. Chappell, History of Music, p. 144.

στρατοπεδῶν is of no better origin; but the worst corruptions are those in the following passage. τῶν γὰρ τούτων διδασκάλως τε εἶναι δι' ἱκανοῦσιν, ἀρνώμενους μισθόν παρὰ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ τούτων μαθητὰς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει παθῶς τα καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ κόρας καὶ γυναῖκας πάντων τούτων ἐπισκόμηνος ἡμέρας, μὲν οὖ καὶ θεάσασθαι τῆν ὑπόλοιπον δράσειν καὶ θέσεως καὶ ἀναφέσεως ὑπαρχὸν ἡμέρας, εἰ μηδὲν οὖν, ἀλλ' εἰ ποτὲ δεύτερεσ

Platonis Philebus.
LETTER TO THOMPSON.

πανθημεὶ [πάση τῇ δυνάμει] καταληπτόντας τὴν πόλιν ξεστρατεύ-σθαι τοὺς φυλάκας παιδάς τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν, ἵκανας εἶναι τὸ γε τοσοῦτον—I offer you the passage unaltered, but for the brackets, except that I change καταληπτόντας into καταληπτόντας; that I follow A and Ω in φυλάκας, (those who had kept guard, youths and others, are gone out, and the women must supply their place); and that I read ἰκανάς, for which there is no authority except the sense. These then are to be sufficient at least for this purpose: and again, ὃν οὐδὲν ἀπώμοσον, it being an inevitable chance, that an enemy should some day break into the town, and force them to fight pro aris et focis, πολὴ ποιον κακία ν. τ. ἐ.

814, ν. Read, if you approve, Νῦν δὴ τῆς μὲν παλαιότερης περὶ δυνάμεως—. Soon after follows a long passage, which I am tempted to place before you, not in its present state, but as it must have been before it met with any misfortunes either from wounds or surgery. He is speaking of κίνησις of the body and observes: δῶ μὲν αὐτᾶς χρῆ νομίζειν εἶναι, τὴν μὲν τῶν καλλιόνων σωμάτων τὸ σιμνὸν μιμουμένην, τὴν δὲ τῶν αἰσχρῶν τὸ φαίλον· καὶ πάλιν τοῦ φαύλου τε δύο, καὶ τοῦ σπουδαίον δύο ἑτέρας, τὴν μὲν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ ἐν μισίοις ἐθελεκόντων πόνοις σωμάτων μὲν καλῶν, ψυχῆς δὲ ἀνδρικῆς, τὴν δ᾽ ἐν εὐπραγίαις τε ὑπὸς σῶ-φρονος, ἐν ἄδοιαί τε ἐμμέτρων. εἰρηνικῆ δ᾽ ἂν τὴς λέγων κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοιαύτην ὁρκησιν λέγω. τὴν δὲ τούτων ἄλλην οὖσαν τῆς εἰρηνικῆς πυφότητον ἂν τὰς ὀρθὰς προσαγορεύοι, ταῖς τε εὐλεκτίαις πεπαῦχων, καὶ βολῶν ἐπενύσει, καὶ ὑπεξείρει πᾶσα καὶ ἐκπρόσθει ἐκ ἡγούμενης καὶ ἡγούμενης καὶ ταῖς τούταις ἐναντίαις ταῖς ἐπὶ τὰ δραστικὰ φερο-μέναις αὐχεματα, τόξον βολαῖς καὶ ἀκοντίας, καὶ πεπαύχων πληγῶν μιμηται, ἐπιδειροῦσα μεμείθαι τὸ ὀρθὸν ἐν τούτοις καὶ τὸ εὐτο-νον. τῶν οὖν ἡγούμενοι σωμάτων καὶ ψυχῶν ὁπόταν γίγνησι πάμμα, εὐθυρεῖς ὡς τὸ πολὺ τῶν τοῦ σώματος μελῶν γιγνόμενον, ὀρθὸν μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον, τὸ δὲ τοῦτοις τοῦναίνον ἀποδιδόν σὺν ὀρθὸν ἀπο-δεχόμεθα. Though I do not suppose that you ever joined in the charge against me, that I did not sufficiently explain the reason of my corrections, others who read this will perhaps be nursing the accusation, and if I should now leave the above passage without other comment but a recommendation to compare it with the received text, many will say, There, there! and a few will even go further and say, So would we have it. And yet what a misery it is that a man cannot change τε into γε, or ΠΑΘΟΣ
into *ΠΛΗΘΟΣ*, without turning showman, and pointing out what every body can see for himself. To explain an emendation is as ungraceful a performance as to comment on a joke, and as *this* is seldom done except when the joke is *ψυχρότερον τῶν Πλάτωνος νόμων*, as that ribald Lucian has it, so *that* had better be reserved for sorry specimens of criticism. But, assuming that any chance reader will take the same trouble as yourself, to compare the received text with that here given, I will observe that *αὐτῆς τῷ εἴδη* is an explanation of *αὐτᾶς*, that *ἐπὶ τὸ σεμνὸν* is a Platonic elegance adapted to a wrong place, that *ἐμπληκένταν* is an Attic form preserved in our oldest copies, as likewise in the best MS of Thucydides, that *νὴνον* are *μετρίαι*, but men are *ἐμμετροί*, that *ταπεινώσει* is probably the gloss of *ἐγκυψει*, or else the substitute for it when it had disappeared into *ΕΝΓΨΕΙ*, that the pyrrhic dance and *that alone* can undertake to imitate skill and vigour, and can only do so by a twofold representation, namely of defence and of attack, that, if I am wrong in inserting *οὖν*, I have no objection to any better mode of conjunction, that, if *ἀποδείξον* is rash, you can leave a mark of hiatus, or else read *εναντιον*, (in which I should not follow you) and that *ἀποδείξε- μέθα* was first discovered by Ast, and is the fourth instance in this Book of similar confusion of terminations.

In turning over some loose papers, I find the following observations bearing on the next few pages of our author. They are written in Commentator's Latin or an imitation thereof, but with the help of the text, it is to be hoped that they will be intelligible. I present them as they are.

815, c. δὴν μὲν βασιλεία τ' ἔστι, καὶ τῶν ταύτως ἐπομένων, ὡς Νύμφας τε καὶ Πάνας καὶ Σειληνοῦς καὶ Σατύρους ἐπονομάζοντες, ὡς φασί, μιμοῦνται καταρακτίνους, περικαθαρμόντας τε καὶ τελετάς τινας ἀποτελοῦντων, ξύμακαν τούτο τῆς ὁρχήσεως τὸ γένος κ. ὑ. Ἐ. Dies mihi suspectum fuit verbum ἐπονομάζοντες. *Saltationes quasdam Nympharum et Faunorum aliorumque nominum nominibus appellant. Fac Platonem illud voluisse. Sed quid porro imitantur? Eadem haec numina ebria. Quae est haec negligence, ut eadem vocabula utpote ab *ἐπονομάζοντες* pendentia saltationum nomina significant, ad μιμοῦνα autem relata de numinibus ipsis capiantur? Adeque quod *ἐπονομάζοντες*, ὡς φασί, ita conjuncta sunt, ut hoc ad illud necessario referatur. Quasi his saltatoribus proprium esset, ut his
nominibus uterentur; vel potius non uterentur, sed uti se dictata-
rent. Quod vero ad Nymphas attinet, quis unquam illas ebris
finxit, nedum saltatione imitatus sit? Quid vero sibi volunt tān
παιδῶν ἔποιήσαν; Si sic interpretaberis: "qui Bacchas sequun-
tur", praesto erit Astius, qui te commonefaciat, ut referendum
esse ad ταύτας. Quod quoniam rectissime et ex lingue norma
dictum est, sequitur ut ēs etiam de Bacchabus ipsis intelligi
opteat, non de saltatoribus. Atqui si hoc concesseris, quid de reli-
quia sententia fieri? Quid multa? Corruptam orationem agnoscas
neesse est; vel si forte etiamnum dubitas, vide num vero lectio
te ab ista religione liberet. ὃς μὲν βαχχεία τ' ἔστι, καὶ τῶν ταύ-
tας ἐποίησαν, ὡς Νῦμφας ἐποιομάζοντες, Πάνας καὶ Σευληνός καὶ
Σαῦρος ὃς φασὶ μημοῦται κατηνομάζουσι. Mulieres Nympharum
partes agunt: viri Faunos temulentos Nympharum fugientium ama-
tores imitantur. In verbis τοῦ ἑχθέσως τὸ γένος, quæ
et infra repetuntur, non difficile est Platonem ab interpolatore
ignoscere.

Ibid. τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπόλιμον Μούνης, ἐν ὀρχήσει δὲ τούς τε Θεοὺς
καὶ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν παιδῶν τιμῶν—Si scriptum esset ἀπόλιμον μὲν ἐν
ὀρχήσει δὲ τιμῶν, vel ἀπόλιμον μὲν ἐν ὀρχήσει δὲ σπουδαίοις
timōn, quidquid de reliqua oratione statueremus, δὲ saltem suo
locō positum videretur. Nunc autem plane supervacaneum est.
Vide, num aliquando a margine in orationem inventum fuerit.
Nam in Cod. Ψ scriptum est τὸ δὲ τῆς τῆς ἀ. Μ.: unde suspicio,
dubitasse librarios utrum δὲ an δὲ scribendum esset. Equidem
neutrum probō. Ad propositum redeuntes μὲν οὖν usurpant. Sed
timōn longē gravior est controversia; quæ lectio nullus dubi-
bito quin alteri, τιμῶνταν, præferenda sit. Sed unde factum
est ut illum nullus bone note Codex praet er Ψ præberetur? Scie-
lies qui illum librōm exaravit, ipse finxit. Minime; nam si ita
esset, verba illa quae Bekkerus ex illo codice enotavit, "τὸ τιμῶν
ουδετέρως", in margine, non in orationis serie, scripta fuissent.
Itaque hoc statuendum; vel lectionem τιμῶν etiam in Α vel Ω
exstare, sed a Bekkerō prætervisam fuisset, vel Ψ non totum ab
illis pendere, sed habere propriam auctoritatem, utpote ab anti-
quiores libro, qui nonnumquam meliores lectiones præberet, de-
scriptum. Μοι γρὰ τὸ μὲν ἐκ πόνων τιμῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ κινδύνων
dιαπεργοτόνων, λέος: τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ, τὸν ἐκ πόνων τιμῶν κ. ι. ἐ.
816, c. ἐν τάξει. Hoc non intelligo. Aliud est παθητευούν,
alid tāττεν, neque illud fieri potest nisi hoc præecesserit. Quae vero ad tātīn pertinent omnia supra memorata sunt; ut jam nihil supersit quam nāvem nūm pānta, ἐν τάξιν.


818, ο. ὡς ἀκριβεῖα ἐξήκοντα. “Cum perfectione conjuncta, h. e. perfecte s. exacte, ἀκριβῶς s. δι’ ἀκριβείας”. Sic Astius, falsa veris permiscens. Lege: ταῦτα δὲ ἐξ ὑμμαυτῶν οὐχ ὡς ἀκριβείας ἐξοµένους δὲ διαπονεῦτοι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἄλλα τινάς ὀλίγους.—Mox sequuntur hæc: οὕτω γὰρ πρήκτων ἐν εἰσ. τῷ πλὴθῳ δὲ ὅσα αὐτῶν ἀναγκαία καὶ ποις ὀρθῶς λέγεται μη ἐπίστασθαι μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς αἰσχρῶν, δι’ ἀκριβείας δὲ ἐφοίτητο πάντα οὕτε ἐξίδιον οὕτε τὸ παράπαν ὁματίαν. Quam sit horum verborum grammatica ratio, οὕτε ἐξίδιον οὕτε τὸ παράπαν ὁματίαν ἐξηγεῖσθαι. Locus sic mihi constituendus videtur: τῷ πλήθῳ δὲ ὅσα αὐτῶν ἀναγκαία ποις ὀρθῶς λέγεται; ὃ μη ἐπίστασθαι μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς αἰσχρῶν, κ. τ. ἐ.

Ibid. c. οἷος δυνατός. “Alterutrum fortasse delendum est”. Ast. Imo δυνατὸς quantocùs expellendum. De Dis loquens consulto maluit oĩος h. e. idoneus dicere, quam de potentia eorum videri dubitare.


Ibid. c. c. Lege: πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ περὶ λογισμοῦ ἀτεχνῶς πάραστιν ἐξηγηµένα μαθήματα μετὰ παιδίας τε καὶ ἕρων· μαθήνων. Vulgo nāvem. Tum enumerantur τὰ μαθήματα, τοι. μηλᾶν καὶ σεβάνων διανομαί, καὶ πυκτῶν ... ἐφεδρέατι τα καὶ συλλήξεις ἐν μέρει καὶ ἐρείξεις, [καὶ] οὐς σεβάσκας γλύνοσθαι. Vulgo ἐφεδρέας
—συλλήξεως; unde effectum est ut pereákeat sine nominativo esse, et genitivum a diuomai pendere crederentur; quasi quis pugiles spectantibus eodem modo quo poma vel coronas distribueret. Alterum ex omisit; quod qui inseruit, parum intellectit quid esset in mēres eis ἡπεξής; et tanquam inter se opposita essent, (quod fuisset, in μ. τ. και ἡ) tertium aliquid in ὡς pereákeat γίγνεσθαι contineri putavit. Sed unumquodque par et singuli tertiarii priores in mēres excipiebant, atque hoc in omnibus deinceps fiebat. ὡς pereákeat γίγνεσθαι adjectum est ut significaetur certam esse harum permutationum conjunctionumque rationem, si quidem numeri natura immutabiles essent. και δὴ και παῖζοντες, φιάλες ἔμα χειροῦ καὶ χαλκοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου καὶ τοιοῦτων τινῶν ἄλλων μεραννύτες, οἱ δὲ καὶ ὅλας ποις διαδιδόντες, ὅπερ εἰπον, εἰς παιδίων ἐναρμότοντες τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀριθμῶν χρήσεως—Tris hic precipue querenda sunt. 1. Quid sit φιάλας κεραννύτες, 2. quo modo ab ὅλας διαδιδόντες differat, 3. ubi dixerit, quod hic se iterum dicere ait. Duplex, nisi fallor, discrimen in pociolis fingitur; nam et e diversa materia facta sunt, et diversum liquorem continent. Si hoc verum est, recte opponuntur oę κεραννύτες τὰς φιάλας, h.e. qui pocula vino cum aqua permixta implent, et o φ. ὅλας διαδιδόντες, quod idem est ac φ. ἀρκάτου πότου πλήρες διαδιδόντες. Sed vocem ἄρκατος consulto vitavit, quoniam non minus de aqua pura quam de vino mero cogitabat. Quo autem spectant illa, ὅπερ εἰπον? Planissime ad verba ἀρκατοτόντων ἀριθμῶν τῶν αὐτῶν. At qui non prorsus idem est, sive numeros convenire dicas, sive numeros accommodari; et quoniam hoc varius, malis ἀρκατοτόνων. Nam qui hoc dixit, idem dixit quod infra, εἰς παιδίων π. τ. ἐ. Præterea cum prorsus otiosum sit ἄλλων, et o δὲ alterum quoddam sui simile flagitaret, logo: ἄλλω μὲν κεραννύτες. At unde illo, μὲν arripui? Nempe a Cod. Ξ, qui pro κεραννύτες μεραννύτες habere dicitur. Ceterum si quis inutile esse particularum non contendet, simulque ὅλας φιάλας sager foret, quidni ὅλας κύων repotat?

Ibid. δ. μετὰ δὲ ταύτα ἐν ταῖς μετρήσεσιν, ὅς, ὃς ἐξει μήκη καὶ πλάτη καὶ βάθη, περὶ ἀμαντὰ ταύτα ἐνοικάν τινα φύσι γελοῖαν τε καὶ αἷμαν ἀγνοιάν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάσι, ταύτης ἀπαλλάθουσιν. Supplevi εἰς. Idem valet ὅς ἐνοικάν atque κρίνοντες ἐνείναι. Μox pro ὅπων λογο ὑώνων.

820, δ. El δὲ ἦσσε μὴτε φρόνηµα μὴτε ἡρέµα [ὅµωτα ἐνια, ἄλλα]
Letter to Thompson.

To my dear friend, Thompson, this letter is written with the utmost respect and admiration. Your guidance and wisdom have been invaluable to me. I hope that this correspondence will serve to strengthen our bond.

In the realm of philosophy, Plato's works hold a special place. His dialogues, such as the Republic and The Symposium, explore the nature of reality, the soul, and the nature of justice. Your interest in these texts is commendable.

In the realm of mathematics, Euclid's Elements is a cornerstone. This work not only establishes the foundations of geometry but also demonstrates the power of deductive reasoning. Your engagement with such texts shows a keen interest in the logical structure of knowledge.

In the realm of literature, Homer's Iliad and Odyssey are timeless epics. They not only tell tales of heroism and adventure but also offer profound insights into human nature and society.

In the realm of science, Galileo's Principles of Physics is a seminal work. It laid the groundwork for modern physics and revolutionized our understanding of the universe. Your curiosity and openness to new ideas are commendable.

In the realm of art, Michelangelo's Sistine Chapel ceiling is a masterpiece. It is not only a testament to the beauty of human creativity but also a reflection of the artist's personal beliefs and values. Your appreciation for such works is truly admirable.

In the realm of architecture, the Parthenon is a symbol of classical beauty and harmony. Its design is a perfect example of the balance between human and natural forms. Your interest in such works is a testament to your appreciation for the beauty of the built environment.

In the realm of music, Beethoven's Symphony No. 9 is a profound work. It not only expresses the human condition but also demonstrates the power of music to move and inspire. Your engagement with such works is truly remarkable.

In the realm of politics, Plato's Republic is a foundational text. It explores the nature of justice and the ideal state. Your interest in such works is a testament to your commitment to the pursuit of wisdom and virtue.

In the realm of economics, Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations is a seminal work. It not only laid the groundwork for modern economics but also demonstrated the power of free markets. Your engagement with such works is truly admirable.

In the realm of ethics, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is a profound work. It explores the nature of virtue and the good life. Your interest in such works is a testament to your commitment to the pursuit of moral excellence.

In the realm of religion, the Bible is a sacred text. It not only expresses the beliefs of a people but also offers guidance for living a fulfilling life. Your engagement with such works is truly remarkable.

In the realm of history, the story of Rome is a testament to the power of human creativity and resilience. Your interest in such works is a testament to your commitment to understanding the human condition.

In the realm of philosophy, Bacon's Novum Organum is a seminal work. It not only laid the groundwork for modern science but also demonstrated the power of critical thinking. Your engagement with such works is truly admirable.

In the realm of mathematics, Fermat's Last Theorem is a profound mathematical challenge. It not only expresses the limits of human knowledge but also demonstrates the power of human ingenuity. Your interest in such works is truly remarkable.

In the realm of literature, Jane Austen's Pride and Prejudice is a timeless masterpiece. It not only explores the nature of human emotion and behavior but also demonstrates the power of storytelling. Your engagement with such works is truly admirable.

In the realm of science, Einstein's Relativity is a profound work. It not only revolutionized our understanding of space and time but also demonstrated the power of scientific inquiry. Your interest in such works is truly remarkable.

In the realm of art, da Vinci's Mona Lisa is a masterpiece. It not only expresses the beauty of human emotion but also demonstrates the power of imagery. Your engagement with such works is truly admirable.

In the realm of economics, Keynes's General Theory is a seminal work. It not only laid the groundwork for modern economics but also demonstrated the power of macroeconomic policy. Your interest in such works is truly remarkable.

In the realm of politics, the United States Constitution is a foundational text. It not only expresses the principles of democracy and liberty but also demonstrates the power of collective action. Your engagement with such works is truly admirable.

In the realm of philosophy, Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra is a profound work. It not only explores the nature of power and the will to power but also demonstrates the power of thought. Your interest in such works is truly remarkable.

In the realm of mathematics, Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems are a profound mathematical challenge. They not only express the limits of human knowledge but also demonstrate the power of logic. Your engagement with such works is truly admirable.

In the realm of literature, Shakespeare's Hamlet is a timeless masterpiece. It not only explores the nature of human emotion and behavior but also demonstrates the power of drama. Your engagement with such works is truly remarkable.

In the realm of science, Darwin's Origin of Species is a seminal work. It not only revolutionized our understanding of life and evolution but also demonstrated the power of evidence-based reasoning. Your interest in such works is truly remarkable.

In the realm of politics, the American Declaration of Independence is a foundational text. It not only expresses the principles of democracy and liberty but also demonstrates the power of revolutionary action. Your engagement with such works is truly admirable.

In the realm of philosophy, the works of Aristotle are foundational. They not only express the principles of logic and reasoning but also demonstrate the power of intellectual inquiry. Your interest in such works is truly remarkable.

In the realm of mathematics, Euler's identity e^πi + 1 = 0 is a profound mathematical challenge. It not only expresses the relationships between fundamental mathematical constants but also demonstrates the power of mathematics. Your engagement with such works is truly remarkable.

In the realm of literature, the works of Chaucer are a treasure. They not only explore the nature of human emotion and behavior but also demonstrate the power of storytelling. Your engagement with such works is truly remarkable.

In the realm of science, the work of Stephen Hawking on black holes is a profound challenge. It not only expresses the mysteries of the universe but also demonstrates the power of scientific inquiry. Your interest in such works is truly remarkable.

In the realm of politics, the work of Nelson Mandela on anti-apartheid is a testament to the power of human action. It not only expresses the principles of justice and equality but also demonstrates the power of leadership. Your engagement with such works is truly admirable.

In the realm of philosophy, the works of Socrates are foundational. They not only express the principles of wisdom and virtue but also demonstrate the power of questioning. Your interest in such works is truly remarkable.

In the realm of mathematics, the work of Alan Turing on computability is a profound challenge. It not only expresses the limits of human computation but also demonstrates the power of logic. Your engagement with such works is truly remarkable.

In the realm of literature, the works of Dante are a masterpiece. They not only explore the nature of human emotion and behavior but also demonstrate the power of poetic expression. Your engagement with such works is truly remarkable.

In the realm of science, the work of James Clerk Maxwell on electromagnetism is a profound challenge. It not only expresses the principles of physics but also demonstrates the power of mathematical modeling. Your interest in such works is truly remarkable.

In the realm of politics, the work of Mahatma Gandhi on nonviolent resistance is a testament to the power of moral action. It not only expresses the principles of nonviolence and justice but also demonstrates the power of peaceful protest. Your engagement with such works is truly admirable.

In the realm of philosophy, the works of Plotinus are foundational. They not only express the principles of spiritual development but also demonstrate the power of introspection. Your interest in such works is truly remarkable.

In the realm of mathematics, the work of Paul Erdős on number theory is a profound challenge. It not only expresses the beauty of abstract patterns but also demonstrates the power of collaboration. Your engagement with such works is truly remarkable.

In the realm of literature, the works of Emily Dickinson are a treasure. They not only explore the nature of human emotion and behavior but also demonstrate the power of poetic expression. Your engagement with such works is truly remarkable.

In the realm of science, the work of Richard Feynman on quantum mechanics is a profound challenge. It not only expresses the principles of the physical world but also demonstrates the power of imagination. Your interest in such works is truly remarkable.

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In the realm of politics, the work of Mahatma Gandhi on nonviolent resistance is a testament to the power of moral action. It not only expresses the principles of nonviolence and justice but also demonstrates the power of peaceful protest. Your engagement with such works is truly admirable.
XXIV LETTER TO THOMPSON.

tῶν καὶ συμπαντών—περὶ ἀπάντων τοῦτων, τοὺς πολίτας τε—καὶ τοὺς νέους; Νῦν and the celestial clause must go, and the cross division must be changed into a subdivision by removing τούς. “Those who are at once our fellow-citizens and our youth.” XI. The words ἵνα τούτων οὖν νέος οὖν πάλαι ἀκήκος σφοῦ ἂν νῦν οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ δηλώσαι δυνάμην. καίτοι χαλεπά γε ἄντα οὐκ ἂν ποτε οἷος τ' ἢν δηλοῦν τηλικοῦτος οὕτω τηλικούτος οὖν. I have added the last word, but there are other difficulties which you will require to see solved before you will look on me as the corrector of the passage. I presume you do not approve of either νέον or νεω-στι: for a man who has heard a thing οὖν νεωστι οὖν πάλαι can scarcely have heard it at all. Τούτων seems to have given no offence, though it is wrong both in number and case. Now as one of the possible hindrances to teaching is the age of the teacher, to which the speaker again alludes, we may restore this feature while we correct τούτων, by supposing that the old reading was τούτουτων (i.e. τοῦτο οὖν οὖν) νέος—but what second hindrance does he allude to? “That he had not heard it for some time;” but the Greek for “it is long since I heard it”, would be πάλαι οὐκ ἀκήκοα, not οὐ πάλαι ἀκήκοα, and with οὖν the same difference would hold good. I therefore incline to read: τοῦτο οὖν οὖν νέος πάλαι τ' οὖν ἀκήκοως—. Perhaps the belief that there was something wrong in οὖν—τε induced the scribe to make the alteration.

823, a. Read: τὴν [αὐτὴν] γὰρ αὐτῶν ὅδε, καὶ ἔκαστον . . . μακάριον κ. τ. ἐς, and soon after τὸν ἐμπεμένον. c. I should print the text as follows: ἄρ' οὖν οὖς ὁμοσταὶ τὸ γελοῖον τε καὶ οὖς ὄρθον ἐκεῖ γνώμοναι ἂν, ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἐν τούτοις γίγνεσθαι; ΚΑ. Γελοῖον μὲν, ὄρθον δ' οὐδεμιῶς. After this I return to another scrap of Adversarivs, which will lead us to the end of the Book.

Ibid. b. ἐπὶ μεθίζον nullo modo potest; sed non mutandum in ἐπί μεθίζον, quod nescio quis proposuit; nam quis dixerit hoc etiam magus, nisi qui prius alterum quiddam esse contendit? Nec quae sequuntur sine offense legi possunt. Quorum enim τι iteratur, ἦτερον τι—μεταξί τι? Deinde si quis doceat παρεκύναι τι μεταξί νουθετησίας τε καὶ νόμων, quivis hoc intelligat; sin adji- ciatric νουθετησίας τε ἀπ' μα καὶ νόμων, diversa confudisse videatur, sc. τὸ μετέχειν ἅμα τούτου καὶ ἔκεινου, et τὸ μεταξί τούτου καὶ ἔκεινου παρεκύναι. Satia patere arbitror verborum ordinem a scribis
LETTER TO THOMPSON.

XXV

turbatam parum feliciter a correctore aliquo constitutum esse. Quid si sic legamus? phd nemo dedito to prostatum
eunon istoron te meizon einai to tov nomonon 86ta aplela8thei, 8ma
89 einai metaq dionothe8thei to peqefyno kal vnomon.

Ibid. n. olon perl tin ton orofera neon pайдon trophyn; ou yai
68ta 8amne einai, l8goni6 te auta 8i vnomon oisdisa texmyno
8i einai poleyis anois acmein. Non 6mata sed aciferia desiderari vidit
C. F. Hermannus, sed non vidit id ipsum leviter corruptum in
omnibus libris haberi. Post logon plenius interpungendum est,
legendumque olon (ta) perl tin ton orofera neon pайдon trophyn
ou 6mata 8amne (dein) einai, l8goni6 te auta vnomon oisdisa tex-
8i8i poleyis (ov) anois gmein.

Ibid. s. Dele autu8 tis. Structura est ou telos o 8kainos, 8tan
ph8 ton uperpetugasta n. t. 6. Most quod 9 prabet ad sensum loci
necessarium est. eis erai d6 un tois tov (nomothetov) nomothetyno
i ke 8kainovnotos kal 8genovs pein8monovs garma8i diexibh
8i bin 8kapers. ou8i8i 8i to logos ortheta8toros—Locum hucusque
descripsi ut maneam esse sententiam ostenderem. "Quioquem non
modo legibus verum etiam praeceptis consiliisque legum latoris vi-
tam regit"—quid tum? Inepte autem dicetur 8ios 8kapers, et con-
jectio sive posita ou8i8i 8i to logos neminem non offendat.
Scripsit Plato: 8k6toros ou8i8i. 8i to logos n. t. 6. Horum partem
video jam a Winckelmanno occupatam. Most post monon dele
grafein.

823, s. Jampridem monui legendum: olon mar8twa 8pav8i s-
voi 8g8i8i meun vn 8i8i boulym8a mallo.

Ibid. n. Locum sic interpungi et corrige velim: p8mpolin de
kal to perl ta peza thnema [n ou monon 8theron]. 8lla vai tin
8i8i an8i8i8i8i 8i8i8i 8i8i 8i8i8i
kal l8genovs i kal st8t8p8dovs. poley dei 8i 8i kata
filian—Vulgo hae per amicitiam venatio, in qua praelul d6bo
rem anatioriam, atque omne suadendi artem et omnia blanditia-
rum genera includi volebat, inter tin kata polemon 8thran atque
hujus exempla media interposita est; ipsa autem verba sic cor-
rupta sunt: kai 8mei8i8i l8genovs i st8t8p8dovs
8thron. Quem nostra repouit correctio chiasmum librarius parum
intellexit.

Ibid. c. Transpone sic: kai met6 8thel8s nomothet8dtnon.

Ibid. n. Lego dieanoumen8i8i 8i8i8i8i8i8i8i8i.

Ibid. s.
possit, et dativi illi ἐγγυοφόροι, εὐδοσά, prorsus ὁσάντακτοι erant. Ordo est, τῆς διαπονυμένης κυρτοίς ἀργῶν θήραν τῶν ἐνύθραν ἱκών, μὴ ἐγγυοφόροι μὴ τε εὐδοσά. Μοι incredibile est quemquam in verbis μηδε εἰς τὸν ἰσχατὸν ἵππος νοῦν hæsisse. Quia tot ineptias invito Platonii obtrusas defendunt, simul atque Plato ipse in notissimo proverbio jocari cæpit, statim nauseant, et cum pro-cellis jactu decidere parant.

824, Α. Lege: ἴ τὸν δὲ ἀναπάυματα πάνω ἤχουσα. Μοι pro ὁ διεφημένος lege ἡν ὁ εἰρημένος. Πρὸ ἐν ἐγγαύμοις δὲ καὶ ἅρπος ἅγιοις suspicor olim lectum esse ἐν ἑγγ. καὶ ἅγιοις, quod ultimum nescio quis per ἅρποις interpretatus est. Melius fecisset, si in ἈΓΓΟΙΚ veram lectionem ἈΓΓΟΙΚ latere admonuisset. In Α et Ω dittographia ex proba et mala lectione conflata servatur ἈΓ(Ρ)ΙΟΙΚ.

I had hoped to wander through two or three more Books with you, picking up specimens of palaeography and discoursing on them as we went. But from this egotistical design you and all others are delivered for the present by the peculiar character of this ἀντίχθων; which, though we are not quite so remote as Philolaus would place us, holds too scanty a communication with you to satisfy a garrulous correspondent, and forces me, if I would see this in print before the end of this year, to address it forthwith to the European Publisher. With heartiest respect and affection,

Believe me,

Yours ever,

CHARLES BADHAM.

UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY,
FEBRUARY, 1877.

C O R R I G E N D A.

P. VI last line. For me: read we.
" IX 9th " After τούτω add (i.e. τοῦ σχήματος).
" XIII 28th " For became: read become.
" XVI 6th " from bottom. For κελέσσει: read κελέσσεις.
PLATONIS PHILEBUS

WITH

INTRODUCTION AND NOTES.
INTRODUCTION.

THE aim of this noble Dialogue is to ascertain the relation of Pleasure and of Intellect to the absolute Good.

The form of the inquiry is a controversy between Socrates and two young Athenians named Philebus and Protarchus. The latter, espousing the cause which his friend had first taken up, and then through laziness abandoned, affirms that pleasure, using the word in its largest sense, is entitled to the name of good; to which Socrates advances an opposite claim on behalf of intellect, knowledge, and all kindred species; observing that, if it should prove that some third competitor showed a better title than either of the original claimants, then, whichever of the two should be found most akin to the successful candidate would be entitled to the second prize.

Protarchus is then reminded of the great variety and discrepancy in the kinds of pleasure, and is invited to show what common nature there is in all these, over and above their being pleasant, which nobody disputes, in virtue of which he calls them all pleasures. In reply, he denies that there is any variety or discrepancy between them, in so far as they are pleasures. Socrates shows the fallacy of his argument, and points out that this reliance upon the identity implied by a common name, as if it excluded all diversity, would put an end to all reasoning. This leads to the mention of the great problem about Identity and Diversity, the delight of young arguers and the terror of quiet, respectable people, the argument of ἵνα καὶ πολλά.* The contradiction between the individual as one in nature, and yet many in his many changes of circumstance, and that between the Whole as one and

* The bearing of this discussion on the main subject is twofold. The importance of the ἕρμα in dialectics is a suitable introduction to the part which it is to play in physics; and the necessity of the careful division of pleasure under its several heads is shown beforehand.
the Parts as many, are touched upon; but Socrates affirms that, though men now look upon these paradoxes as childish and sophistical, there exist other forms of the contradiction which are really important. For, if we consider any genus as one in itself, and then again observe that the representatives of it are many and unlimited, it is difficult to conceive how this One, at the same time that it remains one in itself, is yet one in all the individuals and in each of them. This contradiction is the inherent and unchangeable property of all objects of reasoning; but though as such we cannot remove it, there is a remedy provided against its practical difficulty. For, while all things are constituted out of the One and the Many, they have, associated in their constitution, the Limit and the Indefinite. We must therefore, in all objects of inquiry, accepting this natural constitution, begin by taking a unit, which we are sure to find if we look for it; from this we must proceed to the next definite number supplied by the object itself in its own natural divisions, and so, continually advancing through all subordinate divisions, proceed till we arrive at the point where the limit (or given numbers) ceases, and the unlimited begins. This process from the one to the indefinite by means of number, or the contrary process from the indefinite to the one, is the gift of the Gods, the true dialectical method, the origin of all discovery, and the opposite of that sophistical manner which passes per saltum from either extreme to the other. Socrates beautifully exemplifies this position by language, music, metre, and the art of writing; and proposes that the rival claimants, pleasure and intellect, should be subjected to the same method of scrutiny.

But finding that Protagoras is scared by the difficulty of the undertaking, he professes to remember a shorter solution of the problem before them, by which it can be shown that neither competitor can hope for the first prize. It lies in the very conception of the Good that it should be perfect and self-sufficient. But, if we take either pleasure or intellect in absolute isolation from each other, they are alike imperfect and insufficient; for no one would accept pleasure alone as all in all, if he had no memory, no consciousness, no faculty by which he could be cognisant of the pleasure enjoyed: nor would any one accept a life of mere intellect without at least some admixture of
pleasurable feeling. To either of these states of being, all men would certainly prefer a combination of the two; therefore each has failed in its pretensions to be the absolute Good. But which comes the nearest to the mark? That which has most right to be considered either itself the Cause of the Combination, or at least as having most affinity with that Cause. Thus we are led to inquire into the nature of combination itself and the laws which govern it.

Now it has already been said, that the Limit and the Indefinite* are the elements out of which all things are compounded; these, therefore, will be the first two γένη or kinds which we must consider; the Combination of these two will be the third kind, and the Cause which effects their union, the fourth.

Every quality of matter considered in its abstraction, extends indefinitely in the direction of two opposites, as in the instances of moister and drier, hotter and colder, &c. The attempt to limit it at once dissolves the abstraction, because it fixes to a point that which is only conceivable as continually capable of more and less. All things which thus admit of more and less are comprehended in one ἰδία, and receive the name of the Indefinite, τὸ ἀνεξίφερον. The opposites of these are the things which effect equality and proportion, and these are classed under the name of the Limit, τὸ περίκες ἡ or περιτοσιδές. The examples of this kind are all definite numbers whatever and their relations to each other, but they can be more easily seen at the same time with the third kind, that is to say, in Combinations of τὸ ἀνεξίφερον and τὸ περίκες. In music, bodily health and strength and beauty, the temperature of the seasons, and above all, in the instance of pleasure, which would be absorbed in its own indefinite cravings, but for the imposition of law and order to limit and preserve it,—

* This doctrine Plato is said to have borrowed from the Pythagorean Philolaus, who, through extreme poverty, consented to sell him the book in which he had embodied the tenets of his sect.—See Diog. Laert. in Philolaus, and the Extract from Böckh’s Philolaus in the Appendix.

† The comparatives of all such words are used by Plato because the positive might be misunderstood as implying a ποσόν, or definite quantity, or proportion; but afterwards, he uses the positive, Ἐν δὲ ὀξεί καὶ βαρεί καὶ ταχεὶ καὶ βαθεί, ἄπειροις οὐς τίνες. (26, 1.)

‡ περίκες is properly the ἰδία, or that according to which they are one, and περιτοσιδές, the γένος: τὰ περιτοσιδές again would be the γένος, which we must not confound with γένος, as Ast and others have done, but which is the multitude contained in the γένος, its numerous specimens.
in all such instances, where qualities are blended with definite proportion, we see at once the second element of the combination, and the result of that Combination as manifested in some γένεσις. In the fourth place there must be a Cause of such combinations; for that which is made cannot be the same as that which makes, but must always be subsequent to it. Therefore we may consider the first three kinds to be (1) (2) the elements of natural things, and (3) the natural things themselves; but the fourth kind is that which operates with these and upon them.

The question then arises: To which of these four kinds does the Mixed Life of pleasure and intellect bear most resemblance? It is decided that it resembles most the third kind or the Combination. Pleasure again seems most akin to the Indefinite.

The kind which answers to Intellect is not so evident, and Socrates warns his friend against any rashness in the decision, as touching upon impiety. The gay Philebus laughs at his scruples, but Protarchus has more reverence, and is so awestruck by Socrates' manner, that he is afraid to make any conjecture. Then Socrates declares that his own solemnity was all in sport, and that it is no wonder if philosophers are so ready to pay themselves a compliment, in declaring Intellect to be the King of the Universe; but that it is worth while to see what right it has to the designation. Protarchus is then asked to choose between two opinions; one that the universe is subject to chance and blind caprice, and the other, that it is governed by intellect and mind. He unhesitatingly chooses the latter. But, argues Socrates, in this universe there are the same elements which we find also in the constitution of our own bodies, only that here they occur small in quantity and poor in quality, while in the universe they are abundant and wondrous. Now, the terrestrial elements must have been derived from the universal ones, the earthly body from the body of the universe: but our body has a mind which

* Socrates speaks also presently (29, 4) of the Four Elements, as they are called, which are as old as Empedocles, and probably much older. But the elements with which we are here concerned are elements in a different sense. They are not matter, nor even properties of matter, but the ἄξιωμα is the condition of all the properties of matter, and of number itself, still controlled by νόμος. Though the Pythagoreans held ἄξιωμα to be the condition of existence and the ground of knowledge; this its virtue was derived from the decad, that is from proportion, for the decad contained every kind of proportion. Indefinite number, ἡ ἀριστοτεχνίκη δύνας, was reckoned among the ἄξιωμα.
it must have also derived from the same source; for if we men
have a mind, much more must the universe, possessing as it does
all that we possess, only in greater perfection, have one also:
and if it is in virtue of the fourth of our kinds, viz. Cause,
working through the human mind, that that mind gains credit
for skill and wisdom (as when, for instance, it trains the body
to health and repairs its disorders), much more must the heavens
and the order of nature be recognised as effects of the same
Cause, operating therein on a grander scale and through a nobler
and purer mind. It follows from this, that the Cause which is
the chief of the four kinds, will be supreme in heaven and in
earth, being the essence of the mind and of the soul of Zeus
himself.* The result of this inquiry is to establish that Intellect
rules over all things, and that our intellect is therefore also akin
to the fourth or highest of the kinds.

The next step is to consider Pleasure and Intellect not ab-
stracedly, but as they are, and to enquire how they arise in
living creatures.

The first kind of Pleasure noted is that which arises when the
constituent elements of the creature tend towards Harmony; but,
when that harmony is more or less dissolved, pain is the con-
sequence. This is illustrated by hunger, thirst, heat, and cold, in
all which there is a tendency to some loss or dissolution, which
is pain, and in the relief of which there is a return to natural
completeness, which return is pleasure. A second kind of plea-
sure (and pain) is in Expectation: this kind belongs to the mind
alone, without the body participating in it.

These two classes are considered sufficient for the present
purpose, and another observation is added, of which Protarchus
is told that he will see the importance further on. It is, that
there must be an intermediate state of the body, when it is tend-
ing neither towards completeness nor dissolution of any part;
when this state prevails, there can be neither pleasure nor pain.
Such a state is quite compatible with a life of mere intellect;
it is also such a life as we may conceive the gods to possess.†

* That is, of the highest mundane divinity. The argument is, that ἄρισ
ev τῆς ἀληθείας is the highest of all the four kinds; but ἄριστα is νοῦς, and νοῦς
is inseparable from ψυχή; consequently, ἄριστα is the ground of the highest
νοῦς and ψυχή, i. e., that of Ζεύς.
† Page 35, n. The sense I have given here is not very clearly expressed
Platonis Philebus.
This, therefore, is another point to be scored in favour of νοῦς in its competition for the second prize.

It is in the second kind of Pleasure, that which springs from Expectation and belongs to the mind, that the nature of pleasure and its relation to νοῦς become most apparent. Expectation of pleasure must depend upon Memory (that is, not recollection, but the state which is the necessary condition of recollection), and this memory presupposes Sensation. If the body alone is affected, and the movement does not reach to the mind, there is no sensation and no memory. In addition to sensation, which is the common movement of body and mind, and memory, which is the preservation of sensation, we must also notice Recollection, which is the rehearsal by the mind alone of the sensations which it formerly experienced in common with the body; and lastly, Desire. For desire also is a property of the mind and not of the body, as may be shown thus: We desire the opposite of that which we feel; but desire implies memory of the thing desired; for all our relations to things desirable must be either through sensation or through memory: but sensation is occupied with the present state, whereas desire yearns for the opposite of the present state; therefore, it must be through memory that desire is brought into relation with the thing desired; and hence it follows that desire belongs not to the body but to the mind.

A third state of pleasure (and pain) is, when, whilst the body suffers through a present void, the mind is conscious of a former satisfaction; in such a case, if there is hope of attaining the desired satisfaction, the memory of it affords a pleasure simultaneous with the bodily pain; but if there be no hope, then there is a double pain: a present void in the body, and a consciousness in the mind that the satisfaction is unattainable.

The great importance of this observation is, that it will enable us to answer a question, without settling which we cannot hope to bring the controversy to an issue: Are there False Pleasures?

Protarchus denies this, and affirms that beliefs† may be true in the original as it stands in the Editions: it would come out much more forcibly by the very slight change of γς into τς. Ὅσον δὲ ἐκείνῳ τοῖς ὑπάρχον, καὶ τοῖς οὕτων ἄρκον καὶ πάντων τῶν βλών ἐστι θεοτάτου.

† I have rendered ἰδία in this manner; it is on the whole a handier word than impressions, but is to be taken in the sense of that word as popularly used.
INTRODUCTION.

or false, but that pleasures are all true. And yet, says Socrates, we speak of the pleasures of dreams or of madness as false. And if it be objected that pleasure is still pleasure though the ground of it may be false, surely the same may be said of beliefs also. If again it should be said that, in such a case, the belief is false though real, but the pleasure is true as well as real, this must be shown to arise from some peculiarity in the nature of pleasure which differentiates it from belief. But we do not find any such; for both alike admit of all other qualities, such as great and small, and good and bad. There are also correct and mistaken pleasures following on correct and mistaken beliefs. And here it is worth while to consider the nature of these δόξας in general. What we believe, results from a comparison of that which we see or feel with that which we remember. This result we record either to ourselves or to others. Now, suppose the former case: then a man carries the record about with him; and it may be said to be written on his mind. Besides this power which writes impressions upon us, there is another which paints them; that is the power by which we recall to the fancy the very images which we formerly beheld with our eyes; and when the beliefs are false, these images will be false also. Among these written and painted records there will be some which have reference to future time, and these are called Hopes. The good man will have true hopes and true images of the future, and the bad will have false ones. But these images are pleasures, for it was before admitted that some pleasures arose from expectation; consequently, there are false pleasures, which bad men have, and which are the caricatures of the true pleasures of good men. Having established this analogy between δόξα and pleasure, Socrates argues that, as only those δόξας, which do not answer to things past or present or future, but are false, are admitted to be bad, so those pleasures only, which are false, are bad also. Protagorus objects to this, that the badness of pleasures has very little to do with their falsehood; but Socrates defers his answer to a later stage in the controversy, and proceeds to another and stronger proof of the possibility of the falsehood of pleasure. When the body is in pleasure, and the mind at the same time is apprehensive of pain, or the body is in pain and the mind anticipating pleasure, the simultaneous presence of pleasure and pain will produce a similar
effect to the illusion of the eyes when they attribute greater size
to near objects and less to those more distant. For the immediate
pleasures or pains will seem greater than they are, in
proportion to those expected; but that degree of pleasure or pain
by which they exceed their real dimensions will be false, and
cause a false belief; so that not only false beliefs cause false
pleasures and pains, but false pleasures and pains cause false be-
liefs also. The strongest example of falsehood in pleasure is that
which is next adduced. If we suppose a state in which there is
no change either towards satisfaction or dissolution, such a state
will be one devoid both of pleasure and pain. Now it is true
that they who maintain the doctrine of a perpetual flux* deny
the possibility of such a motionless state; but it will be enough
to suppose that the motion or change is not great enough to
reach the sense and the mind; and that there is such a condition
nobody will deny. If a man in this state should say that he has
pleasure, he would say what is false, and the pleasure which he
speaks of would be false. But this is the very thing which
happens when a man is relieved from pain without the acquisi-
tion of pleasure, and calls this negative state by the name of
pleasure; for this supposed pleasure is false, since that which is
neither pleasure nor pain cannot come to be truly either. But
there is another set of teachers,† who tell us that these things
which we have been considering as three, are in fact only two;
that pleasure is a mere illusion, and is nothing more than the
removal of pain. Though we shall find reasons for disagreeing
with them, they have something to teach us. For if we would
judge rightly of pleasure, we must take in view the highest degree
of it. Now the highest degree of pleasure is that which follows
the gratification of the strongest desires; but it is in morbid condi-
tions of the body that the strongest desires arise. Upon this, So-
crates enters into a painfully vivid description of the mingled sen-
sations which are produced by the application of relief to an itching
surface or an inward irritation, and of the intense pleasure alternating
with pain which men in these cases experience. In all such
instances the pain is the condition of the pleasure; and these may be

† Antisthenes and the Cynics. A saying is attributed to Antisthenes, μα-
νητὴν μᾶλλον ἐδείκτην. Diog. Laert. 6, 3.
INTRODUCTION.

classed with the former examples where the body and the mind were differently affected, either mingling its pleasure with the pain of the other. Then again, the mind by itself has pleasures inseparable from pains; for of this nature are all the passions. Such is the sweetness of anger, and the indulgence of violent grief, and the mimic sympathies with tragic heroes. Nay, in comedy also, the same principle is at work; for ridicule deals with that which is evil; e.g. the ignorant conceit of men about their wealth or their bodily perfections or their wisdom, is evil, and it is in such foibles that ridicule finds its objects. When, therefore, we laugh at our friend's ignorance, we have, it is true, pleasure, for laughter is a sign of pleasure; but we have also pain, for taking pleasure in a friend's evil is φθόνος; and φθόνος is unquestionably a pain of the mind. Thus we see that those stern despisers of pleasure are so far right, that there are many and intense kinds of enjoyment, which owe their very intensity to the pain with which they are connected.

But then there are other species of pleasure which this School has overlooked; pure pleasures not resulting from any previous perceptible want, such as those of Sight, when it has for its objects beautiful outline or beautiful colour, unassociated with desire; those of Hearing, when they are of the same kind, and those of Smelling. (It is remarkable that Touch and Taste are excluded from this list.) And lastly, there are the Intellectual pleasures, which are not preceded by any painful want, and the loss of which is not followed by any sense of void.

Such being the Impure and the Pure pleasures respectively, which are most truly pleasures? As a little White, if perfectly unmixed, is more truly white than ever so great a quantity having the admixture of some other colour, so pure and unmixed pleasure, however small, is more truly pleasure than a mixed kind, however great. Consequently, when we come to the comparison of pleasure and intellect (in order to determine which of the two is the predominant element in that Mixed Life, which was found to be better than either of them alone), we shall have to remember that the pure pleasure is the true kind, and, therefore, that by which we must make our judgment.

But before the judgment commences, Socrates proposes two more reflexions concerning pleasure. All things may be divided into
two classes; that which exists for the sake of something else, and that for the sake of which something else exists. The former will include ἡνεχεῖς, temporal existence, that which is ever becoming; the latter, οὐκεῖα, eternal being, that which is; indeed, the entire former class exists for the sake of the latter. But whereas the Good must be that for the sake of which other things exist, pleasure, we are told by certain ingenious men,* is a ἡνεχεῖς; and if so, it will be in the opposite class to that of the Good. And again, if pleasure be a ἡνεχεῖς, they who make it their good, and pursue it, are most irrational; for they pursue also the state opposite to pleasure, that of want or desire, on the relief of which the generation of pleasure depends; but if pleasure be a genesis or production, its opposite is a corruption; so that those who choose pleasure as the Good, choose generation and corruption rather than pure being.

There are also many other absurdities following on the supposition that pleasure is the Good, but the greatest, and indeed the sum of them all, is that, if it were so, a man would be good in proportion to the pleasure of which he partook, and bad in the opposite proportion.

The next step is, to subject νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη to the same process, and to ascertain if here too we shall find purer and impurer sorts. Science is divided into the Productive and the Instructive. In the former class, some branches are more immediately associated with mathematical science, and others are content, to a great degree, with mere guesswork and practical skill. Such a difference marks some as more, and others as less, pure. But the mathematical sciences themselves may be viewed either as they are conversant with absolute properties of figure and number, or as dealing with figures and numbers in the concrete; so that we may say there is a twofold arithmetic and a twofold geometry; and so in like manner of other mathematical sciences, of which the one branch is pure, the other impure. But the pure science above all others, is Dialectic; for it is that which has for its object the absolute, invariable, and eternal, and which therefore seeks after the truest of all knowledge. Other sciences may be more immediately useful or imposing, but this is more truly science than all

* Trendelenburg gives it as his opinion that Aristippus is here meant.
INTRODUCTION.

others; for whereas they depend on opinions, and are busied about mere phenomenal existence, Dialectic deals with immutable realities.

Having now determined the Pure and Impure both of Pleasures and of Sciences, we are ready to blend them so as to effect that combination of which the Mixed Life consisted. But which shall we use? To begin with intellect and knowledge, shall only the purer sorts enter into the combination? If it were so, there would be an end to all practical life, which is obliged to content itself with the imperfect and impure sciences. Therefore we are compelled to admit into the combination both sorts of intellect and knowledge. Shall we do the same with pleasure? Certainly not; for while the pleasures themselves would desire an union with intellect, as that which should give to them a meaning which they have not in themselves, intellect would reject all impure and tumultuous delights, as hindering its efforts and stifling its productions; but with the temperate and healthful pleasures, and such as walk in the train of virtue, as priestesses in the procession of some deity, with these it is willing to have fellowship.

Having, then, the elements of the mixture, it remains for us to enquire according to what law they must be combined. Now, first, no combination can be worth anything which is not a true blending: *Truth*, therefore, is a necessary condition; and if it is a condition of combination, and the Good is a result of combination, we must look for the Good in Truth. Again, no mixture can be successful which is without *Measure*; on measure and proportion all combination depends, and in these, therefore, likewise the Good must abide. Lastly, the effect of measure and proportion is *Beauty* and symmetry; and thus we conclude that herein also the Good is to be found.

And now, having not indeed a perfect comprehension of the Good, * but a knowledge of the three shapes in which it manifests itself, we may endeavour to decide the question, which of the two, Pleasure or Intellect, is most akin to it. This is easily determined, for pleasure is false and fickle, but intellect is either the same as Truth or the nearest akin to it: pleasure is in its own nature immoderate, but intellect and knowledge depend upon *Measure*: pleasure has so little claim to Beauty, that it often

* Which Plato thought unattainable. See *Republic*, vi. 508, 509.
shuns the light, and its expression is always unseemly, but intellect is a stranger to all that is not comely and decent.

Upon arriving at this conclusion of the whole argument, Socrates delivers the joint decision of the disputants in these words: *Πάντως δὴ φαίνεις, ὦ Πρώτος, ὑπὸ τ' ἀγγέλων πέμπτων καὶ παροῦσις φρατίζων, ὃς ἴδονη κατημ' ὑπὶ ταῖς πρῶτας σοῦ αὐτ' αὖ δεύτερον, ἀλλ' πρῶτον μὲν πρὶ περὶ μέτρων καὶ τὸ μέτρων καὶ καίριον καὶ πάνθει ὕπόσα τοιαύτα χρὴ νομίζειν τὴν αἰ̂ διον ἡμήραθαι φύσιν. (66, 4.) We shall presently have to consider the exact reading and interpretation of these words; it is sufficient for the summary of the Dialogue which I have attempted to give, if we gather from them that Measure and things partaking of the nature of measure are declared to be the nearest approach to the Good. Next to this, and in the second place, Socrates places the Beautiful, the Symmetrical, the Self-sufficient and Perfect; the third place is given to Intellect and Thought; the fourth to the Sciences, the Arts, and Right Beliefs; and the fifth to the Purer Pleasures. The Dialogue concludes with a short recapitulation, and a noble warning, in forming our judgment of pleasure, not to rely, as the meaner soothsayers do, on the teaching of irrational natures, but on the oracles of the philosophic Muse.

Of the difficulties presented by this Dialogue none is so important, and at the same time so perplexing, as the assignment of places to the five different Classes.

The classification proposed by Ast needs only to be stated for any attentive reader to see that it is perfectly irreconcilable with the words of Plato, and with the whole tenor of the argument. He arranges them thus:—1. The Definite, which is the νοοὶ βασιλείας, the controlling and arranging principle of the world; 2. The Indefinite, which is the material substratum on which the supreme intelligence is exercised; 3. The Real Synthesis of the two former, the Pythagorean κόσμος; 4. The Ideal Synthesis, the human intelligence as the reflex of the divine; 5. Pleasure. Nothing, as Trendelenburg observes, can be more remote from the terms σύμμετρον and καλόν, than the formless and discordant elements of matter; nor are νοοὶ and φρόνησις capable of being understood as the world of beauty and harmony, the living work of the supreme mind. Such manifest violence to the plain words
of the author can only be accounted for by the desire of making a system for Plato, and the vain notion of helping out his supposed imperfect strivings after a regular gradation from the most absolute intellectual to the most sensual.

Schleiermacher proceeded on a much more reverent and a sounder principle. It seemed to him very remarkable that the two competitors whose relative claims the whole Dialogue is occupied in discussing, should appear at the final award not as second and third, but as fourth and fifth. How could the introduction of these new claimants be accounted for? His answer is, that we must look for the explanation to those treatises to which the Philebus is intended to be subordinate and introductory, the Timæus and the Republic. As in the former Plato proposed to give an account of the constitution of the world, and in the latter, that of human society, he prepares us for both by intimating that in the gradation of Good that which is universal must be placed before that which concerns men in particular. He accounts for the third place only being assigned to νοῦς and φρόνησις by observing that it is not the divine mind which is here intended, but that mind, which is itself an element in the Mixture. This mind, according to him, is the truth spoken of above as one of the three conditions of combination. 'For the mind is the sole home of Truth, which first gives a reality to things, and it occupies therefore, as a kind of mediator, a middle place between the universal generated good, and the particular good of man.' Few readers will be satisfied with an explanation which accounts for the introduction of new and important matter into the very conclusion of an argument, by supposing an anticipation of what is to be said elsewhere. There is an end to the unity of the Dialogue, and, indeed, to all the laws of disputation, if we are suddenly to be informed of some most important doctrines, as to the proof of which we are left to guess (for no promise of the kind is held out) that it may be forthcoming on a future occasion. But the distribution of Schleiermacher is likewise so far unsatisfactory, that he does not explain in what respect the second class differs from the first. I cannot however assent to Trendelenburg's objection to his view of the third class, that the mind which gives reality to things is the Supreme Mind, and consequently can have nothing to do with the νοῦς
and φρόνησις, which are ingredients in the Mixture. For it is evident that the meaning of Schleiermacher is, that the mind here spoken of gives us a sense of the reality of things, and is therefore convertible with ἀλήθεια, and is thus a fit intermediate between the Universe and Man. But this question will be better discussed when we have examined Trendelenburg’s own classification.

Trendelenburg himself understands the μέτρον καὶ μέτριον κ. τ. ἦ. to include all the three conditions of combination; for, according to his view, the first class contains the absolute Idea of Good and all those Ideas which are connected with it; and the second differs from the first, as being the realisation of these same Ideas in the Universe. But it is unaccountable why Plato, if he had intended the καλὸν and ἀλήθεια to occur twice in his enumeration, should have suppressed the latter altogether, and mentioned the former only in its secondary phasis; and altogether it is a strange way of indicating the same things, to designate them, first as absolute, and then as manifested in forms, by a perfectly distinct set of names. But the whole hypothesis rests on a translation which the words above quoted will not bear: “et quidquid ejusmodi inter-nam naturam suscisses credendum est.” In the first place, ὅποσα χρὴ τοιαῦτα νομίζεις κ. τ. ἦ. cannot be taken so: for this would be expressed by ὅποσα, τοιεύον ὅντα, χρὴ νομίζειν,—and though the order might be changed, the participle would still be dispensable. But even if we conceded such an interpretation, what would become of πρώτον μὲν πη πὲρι μέτρον? It is obvious that, in such a case, περὶ has neither meaning nor construction. But, above all, such an expression as “to have adopted (or received) the eternal nature,” is at variance with the whole method of Plato. For if the Good is to be sought for in these things, it must be because they are emanations or productions of it; whereas, according to this view, the Good is superadded to them, and that through their seeking it. But no one conversant with the language will understand γογγαθω in the sense of παρεληφθηναι, or still less of

* The order has been changed, and most injuriously to the sense, on the authority of the Bodleian MS., from τοιαῦτα χρὴ to χρὴ τοιαῦτα. Χρὴ νομίζειν is plain enough when used of some conclusion, which, but for the argument, disputants would not have admitted. But what force or even sense is there in saying, ‘all such things as we are bound to believe have taken upon themselves the eternal nature?’ It is therefore evident that we must read ὅποσα τοιαῦτα, and understand ἄντι.
INTRODUCTION.

εἰπων. And then, again, why have we the perfect? In speaking of a fact which has no reference to any particular time, the only proper tense would have been ἐλέησα. Those who feel these objections will not need to have them confirmed by a consideration of the unsuitableness of the sense thus extorted from them; and yet the sense is in itself very objectionable, because it would amount to this,—that Plato having sought, by a laborious argument, for that which had most affinity with the Good, at last found it—in the Idea of the Good! The continual allusions to this search, finding its neighbourhood, coming to its threshold, its taking refuge with the Beautiful and the like, all point to the true reading of the passage, which, by the slight change of ἩΙΠ into ἩYP, removes all the objections alleged above.* It will not be necessary to do more than point out the other misconceptions on which Trendelenburg's explanations are built, viz. the supposed opposition between ἔριξα and γενεις, which is annihilated by the particle αὐ, which shows that another kind is spoken of; and the notion that the third kind is the Idea considered subjectively, the Idea in so far as it is the ground of human knowledge. Surely if the Idea is not just this and nothing else, it is a mere abstraction, and Plato would not bid us look for the Good in that.

Stallbaum's view will be at once understood from the classification with which he accompanies that of Plato. 1. τὸ αἰτίон. 2. τὸ ἔσομισαμένον. 3. τὸ αἰτίον καὶ τὸ πέρας. 4. τὸ καθαρὸν πέρας. 5. τὸ καθαρὸν ἀπειρόν. Those who look for realities in Plato, and who believe that Plato looked for them himself, will never be brought to admit that his own desire—μαθεῖν πιστῶσαι τὶ ποτ' ἐν τ' ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ παντὶ πέρυσιν ἁγαθὸν, καὶ τίν' ἐνδιὰν αὐτήν ἐναὶ ποιεῖν μενεντίον (64, λ) could be satisfied with a barren dialectic scheme, or that he would offer such a result to his readers. There is not a single hint (and we know how fond Plato is of hints) to show that he any longer dwells upon the fourfold division of γένη, propounded before. Nor does the classification of Stallbaum at all tally with that of Plato; for τὸ μετρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ καύριον καὶ τὸ πάνθε' ὅπόσα τοιαύτα is such a way of expressing the Idea of the Good (which Stallbaum rightly looks

* For a further discussion of this point see Notes on the Text.
INTRODUCTION.

upon as synonymous with *aitia* as nobody would ever have thought of, unless he had been predetermined by some theory to find that meaning in the words: and this remark applies to many other interpreters of the passage under consideration.† As to the second class,—τὸ ἑιμμισομένον is, doubtless, equivalent to τὰ ὅντα; but I deny that τὰ ὅντα are intended, or could be conveyed, by such a periphrasis as τὸ ὁμομέτοι καὶ καλόν, καὶ τὸ τέλεω καὶ ἱκανόν, καὶ πάνθε’ ὄψεα τῆς γενεὰς αὐτῷ ταύτης ἀτιν. The only observation that need be made as to the third class, is, that it is a confusion in place of a division. The νοῦς which is *aitia*, (A), may be considered as πέρας, that is, the absolute Mind may be thought of only as contemplating its own Ideas. And, again, the νοῦς which is πέρας, (B), may be considered as so far *aitia*, that it imitates the productions of the νοῦς which is *aitia*. But B is identical with the fourth class, or ἡκαίημα, and A is liable to the same objection as Trendelenburg’s explanation; namely, that such a view supposes us to look for the Good in that which is no thing, but the mere common name or property of two things.

I will now venture to offer my own solution of these difficulties. The Good which appeared most suitable for man was found in the combination of two human conditions. It is reasonable, then, to expect that in combination universally we approach most nearly to the universal Good; but combination depends upon three things—Measure, Beauty, Truth: and wherever we trace these, the Good cannot be far off. Now, we trace Measure in τὸ μέτρον, τὸ καλόν, and all that evinces adaptation of one to another; Beauty in τὸ καλόν, τὸ ἱκανόν, τὸ τέλεω, and all that is complete and harmonious in itself; Truth (subjective) in the νοῦς καὶ φρονήσεως of man, as that wherein the real is distinguished from the seeming, and the eternal from the accidental: νοῦς ᾅ ἵπτω ταύτον καὶ ἀληθεία ἀτιν, ἡ πάντων ὁμοιότητον. (65, ν.) But why do the three occur in this order? Not because there is any superiority of προσβεία or δύναμις in any of them, as in the case of τάγαθόν, but because there is a difference between them as to priority

* Phaed. 97, foll. Tim. 30. λ. Rep. 508, foll. Nevertheless, I entirely agree with Trendelenburg, that τάγαθόν and ᾅ δημιουργός were held by Plato to be quite distinct.
† The very multiplication of kindred adjectives is a proof that we are to find one object in many, not to contemplate an Idea in itself.
IN T RO D U C T I O N.

in thought, or because the sphere in which they are exhibited differs as to extent. Everything in the whole universe presents an example of τὸ μέτρον in some form or other; this, therefore, comes first. One of the results of this adaptation is the perfection of individual things as to beauty or use (τὸ ἰσανόν); and this, being a result and part of the former, is placed after it. The least comprehensive of the trio is Intellect and Thought; to these therefore, as the embodiment of Truth, (whence it is plain that the pure speculative faculty is meant) the third place is assigned. In the fourth place come the subordinates of νοῦς, viz. the Sciences, the Arts, and Right Beliefs. Nor are we unprepared for this division, since all along νοῦς has been used to express either the Divine Intelligence or the Human indifferently; whereas it is to the latter that, the practical faculties belong so that when the corresponding division to that of ἡδονή had to be made, it was made not in νοῦς, which did not admit of it, but in the ἐπιστήμη. The Pure Pleasures will naturally come next in order.

It may be objected that something more than a greater extent of sphere is implied in the question in p. 64, s: Τί δέ ἦν τῇ ἐν τῷ ξυμμίξει τιμιώτατον ἀμα καὶ μᾶλιστ' αἰτίον κ. τ. ἕ. which is answered by naming τὸ μέτρον: with the further remark that from μέτρον κάλλος necessarily flows, so that the first would seem to be upheld as the antecedent condition, and the second as one of the effects of that condition. In like manner also it may be said that the third, which in the inquiry figures as ἀλήθεια, but in the declaration of the verdict is called νοῦς καὶ φρόνησις (a variation which is accounted for by the paragraph at the end of p. 68, Ὅ δὲ ἕ γ' ἡμιτερὸς λόγος κ. τ. ἕ.) is spoken of as necessary to the κράσις, only because, as had been formerly said, without Truth “no true mixture can be made, nor, being made, exist”; so that this also is inferior to the first, because, though it is a condition as the other is, it is one in the quality of the ingredients, and not lying in the very conception of all mixture.

But this mode of explanation does not help us when we come to enquire why ἀλήθεια is postponed to κάλλος; why, if Socrates had intended to bring these three as rival claimants into competition, and to assign them their places according to their comparative merits, he should have made that remarkable state-
ment at the beginning of p. 65, Οὐχοῦν εἰ μὴ μία δύναμθα ιδία τάγαθον ὑθρεύσαι, σύντρεπτα κ.τ.λ.; and lastly, why, in mentioning the three, which he does seven or eight times, he observes no order, but places any one of them indifferently in the middle or at either extreme of the series.

It must be remembered that the main object of enquiry is to ascertain the relative claims of Intellect and Pleasure to the name of Good, and that the question arising out of this is, not What is the Good, but Where is it? To such a question the first answer would naturally be in Measure, which is the largest sphere, (because Measure contains all things,) and in things according to Measure, which are in fact all things made conformably to the great pattern, the οὐδεμία, according to which the supreme αἰτία works. In brief, the wider and more populous region deserves the first mention in a question of dwelling-place, or place of manifestation, such as has here been the object of search. If we do not understand Plato thus, there is no other possible way of understanding him except as intending to tell us that mere Form is a better thing than Beauty, and Beauty than Reason, which is quite incredible.

This way of explaining the enumeration of the classes is very different from that which is given in an author quoted by Sto- bæus Ecl. Eth. ii. 6, 4, Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἄγαθον τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνεται, ὅπερ ἦστι Θείον καὶ χωριστὸν· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἔκ φρόνιμον καὶ ἱδέως σύνθετον, ὅπερ ἐνίοτε δοξᾶται κατά αὐτό εἶναι τέλος τῆς ἀνθρωπίνου ζωῆς· τρίτον αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτὴν τὴν φρόνησιν· τέταρτον τὸ ὕκ τῶν ἐνευματῶν καὶ τεκνῶν σύνθετον· πέμπτον αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτὴν τὴν ἱδέως. This division is expressly referred to the Philebus; but when we consider that the writer was himself making a system of Plato’s definitions, and dividing them under the heads τῷ γένεσι, τοῖς τόποις, τοῖς εἴδης, we are prepared for a little straining of his author to suit his theory. The objections to this theory are the same as have been urged against Stallbaum, and may be summed up in this, that such a division is not reconcilable with the language of Plato. At the same time, I do not deny that Measure and all its cognates, are, according to Plato, the nearest approach to the Idea, nor that the καλὸς βίος in its quality of ἱκανὸν will come under the second denomination, in that it partakes of it; but in a discussion as to
what causes make a certain thing an object of choice, in ascertaining which, we find the Good, it is absurd to class the thing itself as one of the results of our search. Else indeed, it might be thought to have an equal right to the first place; but Plato seems to have confined this to the instances of antecedent suitability, or of the modes of combination, and to have reserved for the second those things which owe their own excellence to such combinations.

The parts in this Dialogue which are confessedly Pythagorean, namely the power of Number, the elementary and opposite properties of πίθως and ἀντίπατρον, and the distinction between Empirical and Mathematical knowledge as applied to music, could not be better illustrated than by setting before the reader the Extracts from Böckh's Philolaus, and the fragments of Philolaus himself, which bear upon these topics. These will be found in the Appendix. A few other Extracts from different authors are added in order to illustrate various matters touched upon in the course of the Dialogue.

For all other more or less certain information, such as the bearing of the Philebus on the rest of the Platonic doctrines, the date of its composition, its intrinsic value as a contribution to Moral Philosophy etc., I must leave the reader to those who profess to teach them; I have been content to confine myself to the task of endeavouring to understand what appeared on the face of the text, and of ascertaining as far as possible the very words of the author, unencumbered by the additions of ignorant men, and set free from the blunders of negligent transcribers. I have trusted no other MS. authority save that of the Bodleian in the first place, and of the Coislinian in the second. Where these guides have failed to satisfy me, I have endeavoured to constitute the text according to the principles of Criticism, without caring to suit the taste or to defer to the prejudices of any School. Much that I had spared, and even tried to defend, in a former Edition I now unhesitatingly condemn, whether I have seen my way to correcting it or not. I have known critics to be charged with making difficulties and fancying faults for the pleasure of displaying their ingenuity in conjecture. The charge shows a thorough ignorance of the very frame of mind in which a critical scholar is obliged to work: such an one well knows
that, if he durst so tamper with his own sense of truth, he would most certainly and speedily injure the one instrument on which he relies for success, his judgment. Others there are who treat all conjecturing as at best an effort of wit, and a pretty pastime. Such persons seem not to have considered that, if the ἀναφορά of verbal criticism consists of changes of similar letters and compendia, transpositions, bracketings and indications of hiatus, the πίστις which is to bring these elements to a γένεσις is, not a dithyrambic ecstasy which exults in its own contortions and tosses about wildly whatever it picks up, but a cold, severe, watchful calculation of probabilities, which shuns all outbreaks of fancy as interruptions of its work. But why should any one try to expostulate with the gainsayers? Some of them are too ignorant of the language to see any faults, and therefore cannot see the use of corrections. And yet it is useless to tell them so, for they can count on the applause of the many hundred minds which they have perverted. Some have tried verbal criticism and failed; and hate the pursuit which would not gratify their vanity and yield them fame. Let us dismiss the former with:

εὐδαιμονίζων ἱλιος ἡζυκηζέ σε.

and the latter with:

ἀπόλολον ἀλήθει, ἵππι σὺ δυσνυχίς;

The only kind of observation to which I do not feel indifferent, is the imputation of having offered the corrections of others as my own. But this I anticipate by saying that I possess no edition of Plato later than that of Didot, and no Philological journal except the two series of the Mnemosyne. If any one has claims on aught that appears in this Book, let him give me the opportunity of righting him, and I shall be thankful for it.
The dialogue is supposed to commence at the moment when Socrates turns from Philebus to Protagoras. When the speaker changes his address from one person to another, or from several to some one or more out of the whole number, ό is often omitted before the vocative, as in Parn. 136 ε.; Symp. 316 Α., 217 ε.; Euthyd. 296 Η.; Prot. 358 Α., 359 Α.; Phileb. 12 Α., 29 ε. The same omission also takes place when the speaker is represented as calling in an especial manner on the attention of the person addressed; as in Gorg. 489 Α., 521 Α. (where Calliades would fail to let the conversation drop), Symp. 172 Α., 175 Α., 213 Ε.; Euthyd. 295 Α., 294 Ε., 295 Η. In Symp. 178 ε., if a second ἔτορς is speaking (which is probable on other grounds), the omission may be accounted for in the same manner. I confess that in Phaedr. 261 Α., Soph. 220 Η., 234 Δ., Euthyd. 300 Α., the reason is not so evident: though in the first three instances there is a suspension of the argument, and an appeal to the person addressed. ἐκαθόν: for Philebus' assertion is not represented as being one about The Good in itself, but merely this; that pleasure, and that which is akin to it, has a right to the name of good in its proper significations, which Socrates denies, while claiming the name for mind, knowledge and all things belonging to that class.

το ρήματι: Why not τὴν τέρψιν? Probably because verbal forms of this kind have less of the nature of the noun than ἄρπητη, δίσθη, ἢδονίς; and because, as denoting a process, and not a state, they cannot assume the article without being thereby confined to a particular instance.

μὴ ταῦτα: not ἄγαθα εἶναι, but ἀμελέω γνωσάζομαι, which is equivalent to ἀμελέω εἶναι ταῦτα γνωσάζομαι. I have no doubt that τῆς ἢ ἢδονίς is an interpolation. A still worse one is ὄνομα, which was probably inserted to fill up a lacuna caused by the obliteration of the syllable TO. There is no way of avoiding an absurd repetition, but to make μεταταξῶν a new subject, and this cannot be done without the article.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΙΒΟΣ.

αὐτῷ ἔγραψεν, δόξαν ἐν θυσίᾳ καὶ ἅληθείς λογισμοῖς, [τῆς γ’ ἱδρυ-
CS νῖς] ἀμέτροι καὶ λόγοι γίγνεσθαι ξύμποσαν, ὅσπερ αὐτῶν ὑμνήματα μεταλαβέτω τὸ [ὅπως] δὲ μετασχεῖν ὑφελιμοίσαν ἀπάν-
των εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσι τε καὶ ἔσομένοις. μῶν οὐχ οὗτο πως
λέγομεν, ὃς Φίλιβος, ἐκάτεροι;

ΦΙ. Πάντων μὲν οὖν μάλλον, ὃς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Δέχετε δὴ τοῦτον τὸν νῦν διδόμενον, ὃς Πρώταρχε, λέγον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη δέχεσθαι. Φίλιβος γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς ἀπει-
ρίχθη.

ΣΩ. Αἰτε δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν τρόπῳ παντὶ τάλησθε την περι-
θέρα;

ΠΡΩ. Αἰτε γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἡν δὴ, πρὸς τούτοις διομολογήσομέθα καὶ τόδε.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποιόν;

ΣΩ. Ὡς τῶν ἡμῶν ἐκάτερος ἐξίν ψυχής καὶ διάθεσιν ἀπο-
φαίνειν τινὶ ἐπιχειρήσει τὴν ὅνωμαιν ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι τῶν βίων
εὐδαιμονίαν παρέχειν. ἄρα οὔτως οὖν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς μὲν τὴν τοῦ χαίρειν, ἡμεῖς δὲ αὖ τὴν τοῦ
φρονήσεως;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστι τάτα.

ΣΩ. Τὶ δ’ ἐν ἄλλῃ τις κρείττων τούτων φανὴ; μῶν οὖν,
Ε ἐν μὲν ἡδονή μᾶλλον φαίνεται ἐξίγγενής, ἢτομεθα μὲν ἀμφό-
τεροι τοῦ τάτην ἔχοντος βεβαιῶς βίων, κατεῖ δ’ τής ἡδονῆς
12 τοῦ τῆς φρονήσεως;

Δήλω] It is a fond fancy of one of the Editors that δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμε-
νον is a proverb; and that the answer
Ἀνάγκη is in allusion to this. In the
passage quoted for the purpose (Gorg. 489, c) τὸ παρέν εἰς ποτὲν is the popular
saying referred to. The oracle given to
Μυκένας διάφορον οὗ τι διὰ τις ἐπιγνω-
σθεῖ "de content with your portion"
is quoted indeed by the Paronomi-
ographers, but it is not alluded to here.
I take this opportunity of restoring
another proverbial saying to one of the
so called Platonic Dialogues. (Amatorres
154, v) Ἐγὼ μὲν, ὃς Σώκρατες, φίλης
to λεγόμενον δὴ τούτο καὶ νῦν γράφω.
Read καὶ ὑπὲ γράφω. See Laches 196,
1 ν, and the Scholium thereon.

διάθεσις] The place of this word and
its redundancy, to say nothing of the
technical character of the word itself,
incline me to put καὶ διάθεσιν in
brackets.

tάτην ἔχοντος] The common reading
is τάτα, which is explained as referring
to τὸ κρεῖττο φανῆις, but though
ἐξίν might be used in such a sense,
ἐξίν βεβαιῶς shows that a real pos-
session is intended—that is, the ἡδονὴ
cat διάθεσις φυσική spoken of above.
ΠΡΩ. Ναί. ΣΩ. ἂν δέ γε φρονήσῃ, νικᾷ μὲν φρόνησις τὴν ἱδονήν, ἢ δ' ἤτταται; ταύτ' οὖν οἷον ὁμολογούμενα φατε, ἢ πως; ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοί γονὸν δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. Τι δέ Φιλήβου; τί φής; ΦΙ. Ἐμοί μὲν πάντως νικᾷ ἱδονή δοκεῖ τε καὶ δόξει· σὺ δέ, Πρώταχθε, αὐτὸς γνώσει. ΠΡΩ. Παραδόουσι, ὃ Φιλήβε, ἡμῖν τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἐν ἐτί κύριος εἰς τῆς περὶ Σαμοράτη ὁμολογίας ἢ καὶ τοῦνατίν. ΦΙ. Ἀληθῶς λέγεις· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀφοσιώμενα καὶ μαρτυροῦμεν Β ὑπὸν αὐτήν τὴν Θεόν. ΠΡΩ. Καὶ ὡς εἰς σοι τοὺς γ' αὐτῶν συμμάρτυρες ἢ ἐλίμεν, [ός ταύτ' ἠλέγεις ἢ λέγεις], ἀλλὰ δὲ τὰ μετὰ ταύτ' ἐξῆς, ὃ Σαμοράτες, ὅμως καὶ μετὰ Φιλήβου ἐκώντος ἢ ὅπως ἢ ἐκένθη περὶ δέμαις περαίνειν.

Nor again is it conceivable that Plato would indicate these by a neuter plural, or by any plural at all, since they are not really two things, but the same thing differently viewed. The confusion between the apostrophus and the complexion for γνώσει is one of the commonest which occur in manuscripts. I have changed τὸν τ. φ. into τοῦ τ. φ. It is ridicilous to appeal to Greek Tragedy as a standard of prose syntax. The apaurerous passage in the Birds (v. 420) κατείνην ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς, is worthy of φιλοσοφίας ἀπελεύθερον which follows it.

ἐν δ' ἤτταται I formerly proposed τῆς δ' ἤττατα, but this would be almost as much a repetition as the other. Perhaps the redundancy is due to the construction with μὲν, which was wanted for the sake of emphasis.

δοκεῖ τε καὶ δόξα] Unless we are prepared to suppose with Stallbaum that a certain climax is intended in these words, 'videetur, et vero etiam videbitur' we must believe τε to be indispensable, though 'all the MSS.' (that is, two independent sources, and the copies made from them) omit it.

ἀφοσιώμα] Literally, yourself shall determine; you shall do as you please. Gorgias 505, c. Σω. Ελεύθερος εἰ δὲς οὖν ποιήσομεν; μεταξύ τοῦ λόγου κατα-
ΠΑΛΑΤΝΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Πειρατένων, ἀντ' αὐτής δὲ τῆς θεοῦ, ἢν ὅρο Ἀφροδίτην μὲν λέγεται φασὶ, τὸ δὲ ἄληθέστατον αὐτῆς ὄνομι ἱδονήν εἶλαι.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότατα.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' ἑμὸν δέος, ὁ Προέταφη, ἁδὶ πρὸς τὰ τῶν θεῶν ἁνόμας' οὐκ ἔστι κατ' ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τέρα τοῦ μεγάστου φόβου. καὶ νῦν τὴν μὲν Ἀφροδίτην, ὅπερ 'κείνην φίλον, ταῦτην προσαγορεύον τῷ δ' ἱδονήν οἶδ' ὡς ἔστι ποιήλον, καὶ ὃπερ εἶλυν, ἄντε ἑκείνης ἥμας ἀρχομένους ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δεῖ καὶ σκοπεῖν ἤρτινα φρόνιν ἔχει. ἔστι γὰρ, ἀκούειν μὲν οὕτως ἀπλῶς, ἐν τῷ, μορφᾶς δὲ δήμου τεντοίας εἴλυρε καὶ τινά τρόπον ἀνα-

D μοί οίς ἀλλήλαις. ἴδι γὰρ, ἠδεσθαι μὲν φασμὲν τὸν ἀκολασταῖ-

νοντ' ἄνθρωπον, ἠδεσθαί δὲ καὶ τὸν σωφρονοῦντ' αὐτῷ τῷ σωφρονεῖν. ἠδεσθαί δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀνόητανον καὶ ἀνόητος δο-

ξῶν καὶ ἐλπίδων μετων, ἠδεσθαί δὲ αὐτῷ τῷ σωφρονεῖν καὶ τούτων τῶν ἱδονῶν ἐκατέρας πώς ἔν τις ἡμῶν ἀλλήλαις εἶναι λέγων οὐκ ἀνόητος φαίνοντ' ἐνδίκους.

ΠΡΩ. Εἰς μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἑναίον, ὁ Ἐκκόρατε, αὐτὰ πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν αὐτὰ γ' ἀλλήλαις ἑναίοια. πῶς γὰρ ἱδονήν Ἐ γ' ἱδονήν [μῇ] οὐχ ὁμοίοτατον ἔν εἶν, τούτ' αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ, πάν-

των χορμάτων;

ἀν' ἀπῆς ἄτης] Some MSS. have ὠν. It is impossible to decide between them while the rest of the sentence remains faulty. Every one will perceive that ἀρξαίμας, or ἀρξικόν, or some word to that effect, must have dropped out.

Τὸ δ' ἄραν ἄλος] That this was the real feeling of Socrates as well as of the men of his time is plain from many passages. Compare Ὀραγήσις 400, β' where nevertheless he regards the current names of the Gods as of human invention. The fear is that there is more risk of offending Ἀφροδίτην, by giving her a new name, though even the old one is not certainly correct, or free from offence.

κεῖνα This pronoun is here used in preference to τουτ', because the person is in her own nature remote and invisible. In the next sentence, δὲν ἐξαλ-

νησ is put for ἐκεῖ τάντας, on account of ὅπερ εἶλην, which makes ἱδονήν ap-

pear not as the present subject, but as that of a former proposition.

οὔτε ἄνθρωπον] There has been a strange scruple, whether these words, which are so commonly joined together, can be so here; and recourse has been had to the expedient of a comma in order to separate them. In the double contrast which follows it is to be observed, that on one side the healthy desires and the healthy intellect are themselves the sources of the satisfaction, aut' τῷ σωφρονεῖν, aut' τῷ φρονεῖν, whereas their opposites are but the channels of pleasure. This is why he adds ἀνόητον δοξῶν καὶ ἄλοιπων μετών.

πῶς γὰρ κ. τ. ἕ] We have above πῶς οὖν ἐν φαίνοντι, which is the ordinary construction. The μὴ is nothing more than a result of carelessly reading ἩΔΩΝΗΙΟΥΧ.
ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ χρώμα, ὃ δαμόνε, [χρώματι] κατά γ’ αὐτὸ τοῦ ἐοίδεν διόσκει, τὸ χρώμα εἶναι πάντα τὸ γε μὴ μέλαν τῷ λευκῷ πάντες γυναῖκες ὥσ πρὸς τῷ διάφορον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντίωτατον ὅν παγγάνει. καὶ δὴ καὶ σχῆμα [χρώματι] κατὰ ταύτων γένει μὲν ἐστὶ πάν ὅν, τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῖς μέρεσι αὐτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἐναντίωτατ’ ἀλλήλους, τὰ δὲ διαφόροτα ἐχοῦτα μερῶν 13 που παγγάνει. καὶ πόλλ’ ἐτερ’ ὄντως ἔχονδ’ εὑρίσκετε, ὡστε τοῦτο γε τῷ λόγῳ μὴ πίστευσεν, τῷ πάντα ἓναντίωτατ’ ἐν ποιοῦντι. φοβοῦμαι δὲ μὴ τινα ἢδονᾶς ἢδοναῖς εὑρίσκουμεν ἐναντίας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτ’ ἡμῶν βλάψει τὸν λόγον;

ΣΩ. Ὡτι προσαγωγεῖς οὐν ἀνόμοι ὡς ἐτέρ’, φήσομεν, ὑπόκειετε. λέγεις γὰρ ἁγαθὰ πάντες εἶναι τὰ ἱδέα. τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ σχῆμα ἢδέα εἶναι τὰ ἱδέα λόγος οὐδεὶς ἀμφιβολεῖ, κακαὶ ὁ ὅντ’ αὐτῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἁγαθὰ δὲ, ὡς ἦμεν φαίνετε, ὕμλοισιν σοὶ προσαγωγεῖς [ἀγαθοὶ αὐτοὶ,] ὅμοιοι χάριν ἐν ἀνόμοι εἶναι τῷ λόγῳ.

[χρώματι] This addition is due to some blunderer, who made two sentences out of one. Had κατὰ γ’ been the beginning of a new sentence we should have had some conjunction. The same reason applies to σχῆματι. Any one may see how much elegance is gained by their omission.

μὴ] This is to be understood not of the number of differences, but of the extent of some particular differences. Comp. Apolog. 23, c. εν τελε ομορ κήτην.


"Ὅτι προσαγωγεῖς] Because, my side will say, you call all these, though unlike each other, by a new common name. This would be assuming a second ground of agreement between them; for that they agree in being pleasures is proved by their common name of pleasure; but it does not follow that they agree in anything else, as, for instance, in being good. But if Protarchus asserts that they are all alike, and yet must confess that they are not alike good, he is bound to mention some other ground of likeness. Socrates therefore cannot be introduced as asking him for a proof that they are Āγαθά, but as wanting to know, forasmuch as they do not agree in this respect, in what else they do agree. But the received text makes him say: "You know they are not all "good, and you are ready to admit that "they are so far unlike; and yet you "call them all good": which is so absurd that I have changed ὤμος into ὤμοις, and put ἁγαθοῦ αὐτῶν καὶ ἁγαθών εἶναι in brackets. The worse MSS. have πάντα before σο. Had Plato written it, he would certainly have placed it immediately next to κάτω; but it is due to a misconception of the meaning, caused by ὤμος. I have supplied ἐν after ὤμολογον, τε before ταῖς, and ταῖς before ἁγαθώς for obvious reasons. The restoration of ἐν is necessary for the sense; it was probably absorbed by the following word.

Τῷ λόγῳ] This belongs to ἀνόμαξα: for προσαγωγεῖς implies ὤμος, and the ground of the ὤμος is in the λόγος or description. It is worth while to quote a passage from the Laws which bears on this point, and which has been suffered to remain hitherto in a very corrupt state. Legg. 895, 896,
"Εστι (τ) που δήχα διαφορούμενον ἐν άλλοις τε καὶ ἐν ἀριστος. τοια ἄκη τε κατ' ἁρμονιαν ἄνομα μὲν "Αρτον, λόγος δὲ, Ἀρτομεῖον διαφορούμενος εἰς ἑκάστην μέρη.... Μεῖν σὺν ὡς ταυτόν ἐκατερομένος προσαγωγοῦμεν, ἐν τε τούτων λόγων ἑπομένου τοῦ νομού ἑποδήμησαι, ἐν τε τούτων τοῦ λόγων, "Ἀρτον" ἑνέ-
ματε, καὶ λέγω, "Δήχα διαφορούμενον ἀρτομοῖον" προσαγωγοῦμεν ταυτόν δὲν:.... Εἰ δὲ ἔστι τοῦτον οὕτως ἑγὼ, ἢ ἂν (τ) ἔτοι μέν ἂγνοημένως ἐκεῖνος δὲν ἥ- δακται φυιχὴν π. τ. ἑ. (A little lower down after γενομένη supply φανέρωσα γ.)
[ἱμμητοπροφθείον] As εἶτα depends immediately on the participle ἐστιν, if we retain συγκρίσεως; we have two infinitives συγκρίσεως καὶ συγκρίσεως with an equal right to a position which cannot belong to more than one, unless we suppose this to be Greek: χωβίζει σφαλίζεις τοὺς ἄνθρωπους συγκρί-
σεως ἄμαρτεν. Ἐστέρας is the sup-
plement of a man who had never heard of τὰς μὲν τινας.

"Πηθοδοχία The MSS. have τίτορ-
οις. But it cannot be said that "these examples do not damage them"; but

only that they refuse to see it. Nor could a new independent clause be added by means of κατὰ... oúdeν in place of οúdeν.
τατον, ἢ ἐξω τατέ σοι λέγειн, καὶ φανοῖμεθα γε νεώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἤμιν ἐκπεισόν ὁχήματι. πάλιν οὖν αὐτὸν ἀπαφορομέθα, καὶ τάχι ἄν ἱόντες εἰς τᾶς ὁμοίας ἵσως ἄν ποιον ἀλλήλως συγχωρήσαμεν.

ΠΠΡ. Ἀγέν πως;

ΣΩ. Ἔκεῖ Θές ὅπο σού πάλιν ἐρωτώμενον, ὡς Πρότασις.

ΠΠΡ. Τὸ ποῖον ὅ;

ΣΩ. Φρόνησε τοι καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς καὶ πάνθ᾽ ὄποσα ὅταν καὶ ἀρχάς ἕως Θέμενος εἶπον [ἀγαθόν], διερωτώμενος ὃ τί ποιεῖ ἐστι τόγανθ᾽, ἵναν ταῦτα πείσονται τοῦτ᾽ ὀπερ ὁ σος λόγος;

ΠΠΡ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πολλαὶ θ᾽ αἱ ἕνανπάσαν ἐπιστήμην δέοντον εἶναι καὶ ἀνήμοιοι τῶν αὐτῶν ἄλληλως. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐναστία ταῖς γίγνονται τίνες, ἄρ᾽ ἀξίως ἂν εἴην του, [διαλέγεσθαι νῦν] εἰ 14 φοβθείς τοὺς αὐτὸ μυθημάτων καθ᾽ ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι, καὶ προσφίνοινον αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ὡσερ μῦθος ἀποκλόμενος ὁχιοῦτα, αὐτοὶ δὲ σωζόμεθ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἀλογίας;

νεώτερος τοῦ δέοντος] Euthyd. 295 ν. ἀρχαία ἐπει δοῦ τοῦ δέοντος. The latter is obviously the familiar expression, and that in the text a play upon it.

ἀνακρωτομέθα] This figurative expression, which is properly used of backing a ship, has induced some to believe that ἐπιστῆμος is part of the same metaphor. But in all the instances given, ἐπιστῆμος is used of the casting away of a voyager, not of the stranding of a vessel. Its use here is rather singular, but it probably means nothing more than having failed. Why ἐν διατ. is in the middle voice, and whether αὐτός is genuine, others must determine. Perhaps we should read αὐτέ. I agree with Hesiod.

τὰς ἀρκές] We must supply ἀρκές. The Scholiast explains the phrase as a metaphor from wrestling. Socrates, therefore, proposes that they should resume their former position as disputants, in order that he may show Pro- tarchus the unfairness of the feat through which he sought to elude So- crates' question, by professing that he should consider himself bound to afford Protarchus the same grip or handle, that is to distinguish the kinds of ἐπιστῆμα, when called upon to do so. As the phrase is ἐλέγεν, and not ἄνελεγεν, with ἀρκές, it is better to read τοῖς ἀν ἱόντες. With τάγα and ἐκείνος used separately the ἀν is sometimes repeated even in prose.

[ἀγαθόν] As διερωτώμενος καὶ τ. ἐκ o contains the occasion—"which I mentioned when I was asked what was The Good,"—the word ἀγαθόν is as superfluous, as it is inelegant.

ἀξίως] It is altogether foreign to the spirit of Attic dialogue to speak of being worthy of the honour of disputing &c., and even if such a sentiment were allowed, it would have been expressed by ἔξωθεν διαλέγεσθαι without the article. But all that Plato wrote was: ἄρ᾽ ἀξίως ἂν εἴην του.

ῥόδος ἀπολύμενος] It is not clear whether the original proverb was ὁ μῦ- θος ἢσσα ἢ ὁ μῦθος ἀπολύμενος. Photius' testimony is in favour of the former: μ. ἢσσα . . Ἐπιστήμη ἠτι λαγό- μενον ἐπὶ οὐκ ἕνα δύσος τοῖς λαγόμενοι μῦ- θος τοῖς τάξισι. The Scholiast on
8

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ΠΡΩ. 'Αλλ' ου μην δει τούτο γενέσθαι, πλην τού σωθήναι. τὸ γε μην μοι ἐστιν τοῦ σοῦ τε καὶ ἐμοῦ λόγον άφέσκειν πολλαὶ μὲν ἢδοναι καὶ ἀνόμωνοι γυγνήσθων, πολλαὶ δὲ ἐπιστήμοναι καὶ διάφοραι.

Β ΣΩ. Τὴν τοινύν διαφορότητα, ὁ Πρώτας ἄμεσον τοῦ τ' ἐμοῦ καὶ τοῦ σοῦ μὴ ἀποκρυπτόμενον, καταστίχοντες δ' εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἀπολύμωνεν ἃ περ' ἐλεγχόμενοι μηνύσασθαι, πάτερον ἡδονήν τάγαθον δεῖ λέγειν ἣ φρόνησιν ἣν τῇ ἐπίθεσιν ἁλλ' ἐμπεσαί. τιν' γὰρ οὐ δύναιν πρὸς γ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ φιλονεικούμενον, ὅπως ἀγὼ τίθεμαι, ταύτ' ἐσται τὰ νικήτα, ἢ ταὐτ' ἢ σφ' τ' ἀληθεστάτην δεῖ που συμμαχεῖν ἢμᾶς ἀμφοῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Αἰε γὰρ οὖν.

C ΣΩ. Τούτων τοινύν τὸν λόγον ἐτε μᾶλλον δι' ὅμοιονς βεβαιωσόμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸν τοίον δῆν;

ΣΩ. Τὸν πᾶσι παρέχοντάναι ἀνθρώπους πράγματα ἐκούσι τε καὶ ἀκούσαν ἑνίος καὶ ἑνίως.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε σαφέστερον.

ΣΩ. Τὸν τῶν δῆρον παραπτεσθοντα λέγω, φύσει πως περικυκτα θαυμαστόν. ἐν γὰρ δέ τὰ πολλά εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ προ-

this place, with less probability, explains ὁ μ. ἀπόλετο, as used by those who find they are speaking to insatiable hearers; and he quotes the comic poets, Crates and Cratinus, as employing it, but without adding the passages. I suspect from the otherwise unnecessary redundancy in the conclusion ἐπὶ τὸν μ. τὲς λόγους, ἐφέρ-

meν—either some other verb has been corrupted into this, and we might read κατατίθης δ' εἰς τὸ μ. τὲς λόγους, ἐφέρ-

men—or a whole line has dropped out. The words ἐλεγχόμενοι μηνύσασθαι would seem to favour the latter supposition, for there seems to be an allusion to the practice of giving up one’s servant to the judicial “question.” τομίῳ (ἐκάποιος τῶν ἐκπομὁν λόγον παρέχοντ' εἰς τὴν κρίσιν) ἐφ' ἡν τ. ἐ. may serve to represent the sense of the missing clause.

ἑ τὶ τρίτον ἄλλα The best MSS. omit τι; but the sense is incomplete without it. I believe the right reading to be ἡ ἄλλο τι τρίτον εἶναι. See below 30, π. ἀλλά ἄλλο τι τρίτον.

Τούτων τούτων We should have expected τῶν, for this λόγους has not yet been mentioned, but is now to follow. I am inclined to read τούτων.

"Let us by question and answer make good the λόγος, not of you or me, but of the ἀληθεστάτου."
μαστὸν λεχτέν, καὶ φύσειν ἀμφιβητὰς τῷ τοῦτῳ ὀποτερον-οὐν τιτθήμενοι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀρ’ ὁνόμασι, ὅτεν τις ἐμὲ φῆ Πρωταρχο, ἐνά Δ' γεγονότα φύσει, πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐννοεῖνος ἀλλήλων, μεγάν καὶ σιμερὸν τιτθήμενος καὶ βαφύν καὶ κούφον τὸν αὐτόν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία;

ΣΩ. Ἔχεις, ἵνα Πρωταρχί, ἐλέγχας τὰ δεδημεναί τῶν ἐκκυμαστῶν περὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ πολλά, συγκεχωρημένα δ' ὡς ἐπος εἰσεῖν ὑπὸ πάντων ἡδη μὴ δειν τῶν τοιούτων ἀπτεσθαί, παιδορική καὶ δέδα καὶ σφόδρα τοῖς λόγοις ἑμφανία ἐπολαμβανόντων γίγνεθαιν. ἔτει πριν οὖν τοῖς τούτων, ὅταν τις ἐκαθά τὸ μῆλον το καὶ ἄλλα μέρη διελθὼν τῷ λόγῳ, πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἐν Ε' ἐκεῖνο εἶναι διορομολογημένον, ἐλέγχῃ καταγελῶν ὅτι τέρατα δειγματασμα εἴναι, τὸ τε ἐν ὑπὸ πολλ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπειρά, καὶ τὰ πολλά ὡς ἐν μονον.

Φόδουν ἄμφω. Affording a ready objection against any one who advances either.

*Ἀρ’ ὁνόμασι κ. τ. ἃ. Unless καὶ joins ἐκκυμαστὼς with πολλοὺς, it is of no use in the sentence; I have therefore removed the comma from πάλιν.

The sense is as clear and well-expressed as could be desired. Do you mean, when a man says of me Protarchus, who am one by nature, that I am again many and opposite 'me', bringing forward the same person as at once great and small, heavy and light, and so forth?

τῶν ὑμάμαστον] Rather ὑμάμαστων, Conjuring tricks. Συγκεχωρημένα μὴ θεϊν, given up and admitted to be such as men ought not to meddle with, ὡς ἐκεῖν ἐκαθά τῶν πάλιν. It is strange that one of the editors should not have known such a common usage. ἐπι μῆλον τὸ τοῦτο ἀπτεσθαί The proper construction would have been either, μηδὲ τῶν τοῦτων (Απτεσθαί δεν συγκεχωρημένα), or ἐπι μῆλον τὸ τοῦτο (Συγκεχωρημένα, δεν αὐτῶν Απτεσθαί). But as the very form ἐπι μῆλον is colloquial, a certain looseness of syntax is perhaps allowed, and the reader is left to supply συγκεχωρημένα (Συγκεχωρημένα, δεν αὐτῶν Απτεσθαί), or any other passive answering to Απτεσθαί. Otherwise we must look on τὸ τοῦτο as interpolated.

μῆλον] Legg. 795, κ. μελῶν καὶ με-ρῶν. The MSS. and edd. all exhibit μήλη τα καὶ ἀμα μέρη, which, if it means anything, means that the μῆλη and μέρη are the same, whereas it is plain that μέρη is added because the body cannot be properly divided into μῆλη only. If it were μήλη τα καὶ ἀμα μέρη, there would be no objection to the word but its inutility. I have written ἀλλα, which is continually confounded with ἀμα by the copyists. In p. 17 D. ἀμα ἐνεσθε, the Bodleian and Vatican have made the opposite mistake.

Διορομολογήματος] Having made another admit. Properly, having ad- mitted each to the other. Διορομολογή- σθαι is to ὁμολογεῖται, what διαλέγεσθαι is to λέγειν, διακελεύεσθαι to κελεύει &c., διὰ and the middle voice together expressing reciprocal action. No one will regret to see συγκεχωρημένα in the next speech of Protarchus banished from the text; the wonder is, who could have taken it into his head to put it there. οῦ γὰρ δόθην τὸ συγκεχωρημένα ὁμολογεῖν, τὰ δὲ δεδημενούς, ὅταν δειχνησθησθαι, συγκεχωρηθοεῖ.
ΠΡΩ. Σὲ δὲ δὴ ποία, ὦ Ὀσκρατε, ἔτερα λέγεις, ὦ μήτην [συγχεωρημένα] δεδήμενται περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων λόγων;

ΣΩ. Ὅπωναν, ὦ παῖ, τὸ ἐν μη τῶν γιγνομένων τε καὶ ἀπολλαμμένων τις τιθήμαι, καθάπερ ἀρσίως άμεις εἴκομεν. ἐντασθὲ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔν, ὄπως εἴκομεν τὸν δὴ, συγκεχώρηται τὸ μη δειν ἐλέγχειν· ὅταν δὲ τῆς ἐνδον ἀνθρωπον ἐνεχεί τίθεσθαι καὶ βοῦν ἐνα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔν καὶ τὸ ἁγαθὸν ἔν, περὶ τούτων τῶν ἐννάων καὶ τῶν τοιοῦτον ἡ πολλὴ [σπονδῇ] μετὰ διαφέσεως ἀμφιβῆσθαι γίγνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν εἰ τινὰς δει τοιαύτας εἶναι μοιάδας ἐπολαμμάτειν ἀληθῶς οὔσας· εἶτα πῶς αὐτὰς· μίαν ἑκάστην οὐδὲν ἐν τῷ ἁγάθῳ καὶ μίης γένεσιν μηδ' ἐλευθρον προσδεχομένη, ὅμως μη εἶναι βεβαιότατα μιὰν ταύτην· μετὰ δὲ τούτῳ

ἐντασθ’ I So with Elmsley for ἐντασθ’. ἡ πολλὴ [σπονδῇ] I once thought σπονδῇ to be genuine, and therefore added δὲ after μετὰ; I am now convinced that the word is neither appropriate nor genuine, but supplied by a copist who had in his head the well known passage in the Phaedrus 248, οὕτω δ’ ἐνεχέρε ἡ πολλὴ σπονδῇ κ. τ. λ. Then arises the great controversy as soon as we attempt to decide.—What else is needed? or what have we to do with the earnestness of the disputants, except indeed as a measure of their difficulty? But the difficulty being expressed, any other word is superfluous.

ΠΡΩΤΟΝ ΜΗ! I When I endeavoured to explain this passage in a former edition, I maintained that there were only two questions proposed, although πρῶτον, εἴτε, μετὰ δὲ τούτῳ made it appear that there were three. As the text then stood, it was impossible to see more than two questions, that beginning with πρῶτον, and a second; for if εἴτε . . . . μιᾶν ταύτην were considered as an independent question, and not rather as the beginning of that pronounced afterwards, the question would have been, how it was conceivable that that which is one and imperishable should be nevertheless unchangeably one:—than which nothing could be more absurd. But the words πρῶτον, εἴτε, μετὰ δὲ τούτῳ ought to have opened my eyes to the absolute necessity of finding three points of enquiry, or, if they were not to be found, of treating the text as corrupt. I now feel confident that I have discovered the source of all the perplexity in the omission of μη δὲ τούτῳ. The first question is; have these monads a real being? The second is; if each of them is one and not subject to the changes of γένεσις and ἐλευθρον, how can we imagine it ever to vary in the least from this oneness? The third is; when it does so vary by entering into individuals, does the unity cease when the plurality begins, or are they concurrent?—in other words are the monads to be regarded as distributed into as many parts as there are individuals to partake of them, or as remaining as wholes in each individual, so that each monad is at once one in each, and again one in many? This last supposition is πάντων ἀδυνατότατον, because in this case the one both agrees with itself and contradicts itself. Περὶ 131, ἰ οὐκοῦν ἦτο τὸ εἴδος τῆς μέρους ἕκαστον το μεταλαμβάνεται;—ποτέρον οὐδὲ βοήσει τὸ εἴδος τὸ εἴδος τὸ εἴδος τὸ εἴδε. The question would be, how it was conceivable that that which is one and imperishable should be nevertheless unchangeably one:—than which nothing could be more absurd. But the words πρῶτον, εἴτε, μετὰ δὲ τούτῳ ought to have opened my eyes to the absolute necessity of finding three points of enquiry, or, if they were not to be found, of treating the text as corrupt. I now feel confident that I have discovered the source of all the perplexity in the omission of μη δὲ τούτῳ. The first question is; have these monads a real being? The second is; if each of them is one and not subject to the changes of γένεσις and ἐλευθρον, how can we imagine it ever to vary in the least from this oneness? The third is; when it does so vary by entering into individuals, does the unity cease when the plurality begins, or are they concurrent?—in other words are the monads to be regarded as distributed into as many parts as there are individuals to partake of them, or as remaining as wholes in each individual, so that each monad is at once one in each, and again one in many? This last supposition is πάντων ἀδυνατότατον, because in this case the one both agrees with itself and contradicts itself.
πλατωνος φιλωνος

11

ἐν τοῖς γνωμένοις αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀπείροις εἶτε διεσπασμένην καὶ
πολλὰ γεγονόντα πετέον, ἢ τὰ ὅλαν αὐτήν αὐτής χωρίς, ὃ δὴ
πάντων ἀδυνατότατον φαίνοτ' ἐν, ταυτὸν καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἢ ἐν ἑνὶ
τε καὶ πολλοῖς γίγνεσθαι. τούτως ἔστι τὰ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τῷ
καὶ πολλά, ἄλλα οὐκ ἐκείνα, ὃ Πρώταρχος ἀπόφασις ἀποκάλεσε οὕτως
μὴ καλὸς ὁμολογηθέντα καὶ εὐπορίας [ἀν] αὐτὸ καλὸς.

ΠΡΩ. Οὖχον χρή τούτῳ ἡμᾶς, ὃ Σωκράτες, ἐν τῷ γ ν
πρῶτον διαπονήσασθαι;

ΣΩ. Ὄς γοῦν ἄνω φαίνη 

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάντας τοῖς ἡμῖν ἐπιλάβει συγκοπεῖν σοι
τούδε τά τοιαύτα. Φιλήπου δ' ὑπὸς χράτιστον ἐν τῷ γν [ἐπε-
φωτώτων] μὴ νειν εὐχείμενον.

ΣΩ. Ἐπει. πῶσον ὅπ' τις [ταύτης] ἠρέστησα, πολλὰς οὕσις D
καὶ παντοίς περὶ τὰ ἀμφιβολοῦμενα μάχης; ἀρ' ἐνθένε; 

ΠΡΩ. Πὸσον;

ΣΩ. Φαμέν πον τοιαῦτα ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ἕπει λόγων γνω-
μενον περιτρέχειν πάντοις καὶ ἐκατον τῶν λεγομένων ἄριστο
καὶ πάλαι καὶ γνῶν. καὶ τούτω οὔτε μὴ παράσχειται τοι' οὔτ' ἡξιάτο

εὐφορίας κ. τ. ἐ.] Not δότα but δέτα being understood, the construction with
ἐν is a barbarism. The sense is not
conditional; for we have the statement of a fact founded on experience no less
than its opposite. The appearance of
ἐν in the text is due to a repetition of
ἐν, and a subsequent attempt to correct what should have been ex-
punged.

τὰ ταύτα] One would rather have
expected ταύτα ταῦτα, for this does not refer to the ἐν ἡμῖν, but to the
proposed investigation.

Φιλήπου] The proverbial saying was
μὴ κινεῖν κακὸν εὐχείμενον: for κακὸν
he puts Φιλήπου. We had better let
well alone, and not ask Philebus for his
consent. But ἐκπορευόμεθα thus placed
before μὴ κινεῖν would make it appear
that the participle is a means not τοῦ
κινεῖν, but τοῦ μὴ κινεῖν; and as it is
quite superfluous, there can be little
doubt of its origin.

ταύτης] I have cancelled this word
without hesitation. He is not going to
begin a right; but to begin a subject,
of which the very beginning point is
difficult to find, because almost every-
things is a matter of controversy. Be-
sides ταύτης μάχης is bad Greek.

Fedm. p. 2. The construction is not
φ. τ. ἐν περὶ τις ταύταν γιγνόμενα
(Stallb.), for if Socrates had spoken
here of the reenactment effected be-
tween the one and the many by dia-
lectics, it is inconceivable that Pro-
tarchus should answer, εἴ τις τρόπος
ἐστι καὶ μηκενή τῆς ταύτης ταραχὴν
ηλίκι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου εὐμενές πεσει
ἐπὶ ταῖς. Nor are the young men described
as delighting in the discovery and ex-
ercise ‘of the synthetical and analytical
processes’, but on the contrary, in the
sophistical employment of this con-
tradiction which is the inherent property
(ἀναγνώστον καὶ ἀγνόστον παράσος) in all
objects of conception, by which they
throw into perplexity both themselves
and others. Either therefore we must
read ταύταν . . . γιγνέμενον, or sup-
pose that πολλὰ has by attraction af-
fected the number of the participle,
which, considering the presence of ἐν,
is most unlikely.

ταὐτής] I formerly wrote παύσε-
πατὶ in obedience to Dawes' Canon. But it is only in the older Attic that the first aorist subjunctive with οὐ μὴ need excite our suspicion; whereas οὐ μὴ with the future in this sense I take to be a poetical usage.

τάντα καὶ λόγον] This is an allusion to the proverbial saying πάντα λίθον κινεῖν. But the expressions έπι θάτερα κυκλάν, and πάλιν ομαλίττον, rolling them up one way, and again unrolling them another allude to the manner of handling a volume. Συμφόρους εἰς δὲ, and θομερίζων are added to show the application of the figurative words.

Δόλγον οὖν οὖδὲ] This I have written in lieu of Δόλγον δὲ κατί, which would mean nearly sparing. The repetition οὖς οὖς was probably treated by some copyist as a blunder, and one half was left out. Then came the corrector who felt the want of a conjunction and inserted κατί. I agree with Stallbaum as to the spuriousness of οὐ μ. τ. δ.; but εἴτε ἡ γε shows that some bolder assertion has just been made, and justifies τ. δ. τ. In the next sentence I have added κατί, because Protagoras gives two grounds for Socrates' fear, their number and their youth.

δέμας δὲ] In this sentence Protagoras is made to offer two suppositions; "if it is possible either to conjure away the perplexity, or to find some other method of investigation." I believe that the second alternative is Socrates' suggestion. Εἰ τίς έτοι τρόπος καὶ μηγαλίτταν, καὶ κατάληψεν, ἐν οἷς μόνον τῶν ἁρμάτων, ὑπνησόμενον, is in itself a clumsy circumlocution for Εἰ τίς έτοι κατάληψιν ἄνωτερον, and what is the subject of ἄνωτερον? Σι or ημᾶς cannot be understood; μὴν and δὲ would imply that the two requests put into the mouth of Protagoras are not alternative; but if so, the latter must be the means to the former, and in that case what becomes of concealing the difficulty out of the way? Σι το προσωμός τουτοις is quite proper as answering to τήν ταρσαγήν επιστήμην, but as the clause now stands in immediate dependence on ἄνωτερον, προσωμός is not only enough, but rejects anything between itself and the infinitive. The New Way is said to be ἐπι τῶν λόγων, instead of out of it. For these reasons, and because it is more in keeping that Socrates should be the first to suggest some other method, I condemn οὖς—ἄνωτερον as spurious, and μὴν as invented to give it currency. As in most cases of this kind, the interpolator has borrowed his words from the neighbourhood, κατάληψιν ὑπνήσεως from Socrates' next speech, ἄνωτερον from his next but one.
ΠΛΑΤΟΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ο λέγεις, εἰ τις τρόπος ἔστι καὶ μηχανὴ τήν [μέν] τοιαύτην ταραχὴν ἦμιν ἐξώ τοῦ λόγου εὕμενως πως ἀπελευθείν, [ὅδεν δὲ Β] τίνα καλλίω ταύτης ἐπί τὸν λόγον ἀνεφείν, σύ τε προοθυμοῦ τούτο καὶ ἴμης συνακολουθήσομεν εἰς δύναμιν· οὐ γὰρ σμικρὸς οἱ παρὼν λόγος, οἱ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ παῖδες, ὡς φησίν ἡμῖς προσαγωγεῖν Ἡλίσβος, οὐ μὴν ἔστι καλλίων οὕτω οὖθεν ἐν γένει, οὐ γάρ ἐραστὶς μὲν εἰμὶ οὗτος, πολλάκις δὲ μ’ ἤδη διαφυγοῦσα ἔργον καὶ ἀπορον κατέστησαν.

ΠΡΩ. Τίς αὕτη; λέγεσθω μοῦν.

ΣΩ. Ἑν δῆλωσα μὲν πάντας καλεσθῶν, ἐφέσθη δὲ παγ- ο ἔστει ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἕχον προφθητήν ἀνεφείν πτώσετε, διὰ ταύτης φαινεῖ γέγονε. σκέπτεται δὲ ἦν λέγω.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀγε μοῦν.

ΣΩ. ἦν Θεόν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους ὅσις, ὡς γε καταφαίνεται εἰμι· ποιθὲν ἐκ Θεοῦ ἐφάνη διά τινος Προοθύλως ἐμια φανοτάτῳ τινι πυρί καὶ οἱ μὲν παλαιοὶ, ἱστίτονες ὄντες ἡμῶν καὶ ἐγγενῶς Θεῶν οἰκονομῆς, τὴν φήμην παρέδουσαν, ὡς δὲ ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν ἐν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ὅντων τῶν οὗτος εἶναι, περάς δὲ καὶ ἄπειραν ἔν αὐτοῖς εὔμνητον ἐχόντων. δέν οὖν ἡμᾶς τοῦ- των ωτὸν διακατοσυμμένων ἀεὶ μίαν ἱδεὰν περὶ παντὸς ἐκα-

Θεόν μὲν [In this remarkable passage everything seems out of its place. For the ἀνθρώποις belongs not to δύσις but to ἐφάνη, ὡς γε ἐμοί ought to be to ἔμοι καταφαίνεται, the enclitic πολὺ can scarcely come first after such a break in the sentence, διὰ τινός δύσις ἐκ Θεῶν ἐφάνη is also quite intolerable; add to this that if the gift was thrown from Heaven, it could not be sent διὰ τινος Προοθύλως. Though I have thus stated why I can no longer stand by this reading, I cannot offer any certain emendation of it; but I believe that the following is not very far from our author's sentence. Συ. Εἰς ἀνθρώποις, ὡς ἔμοι καταφαίνεται, τῷ δύσις πολὺ ἐκ Θεῶν ἐφάνη τινός, [Σαχ. in Marg. Προοθύλως] ξένα ἐφεστισθήν τιν πυρί. I have supplied ἐς τε, which is necessary to the construction, and was absorbed by the preceding termination οὖς.
πλατωνος φιλωβος.

στοτε θεμένους ζήτειν ειρήσειν γαρ ἐνοικοσ. εάν ὦν [μετα] λάβωμεν, μετα μίαν δο, εἰ πως εἰσι, σκοπείν, εἰ δὲ μη, τρεῖς ἐν ἀλλον ἀριθμόν, και τῶν ἐκείνων ἔκαστον πάλιν ὑδατος, μέχριαν τοῦ το κατ' αρχής ἐν μη διέ ἐν και πολλά [καὶ ἀπειρά] ἔστι μόνον ἵν α τις, ἀλλα και ὑπόσσα. τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀπειροιοῦ ἰδέαν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος μη προσφέρειν, πρὶν εν τις τῶν ἀριθμῶν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατάδικος τον μεταβό τον ἀπειροῦ τοι καὶ E τοῦ ἔνος τοις ὑ δεῖ τὸν ἔκαστον τῶν πάντων εἰς τὸ ἀπειροῦ μεθ'εντα καίγειν εάν. οἱ μὲν οὖν θεολ. ὑπερ ἐποικ. οὕτως ἑμῖν παρέδοσαν σκοπείν και μερῶς ἑμῖν καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἐν μην καὶ νόμων, ὑπηρέτης ἐν τῆς ὑπηρεσίας, 17 [καὶ πολλά] ὑάστεον καὶ μεροῦς οἰκοδομᾶ τοῦ δεόντος [μετα δὲ τὸ ἐν] ἀπειρά εὐθύς τὰ δὲ μέσα αὐτοῦ ἐφεύρετο. οἷς διακεκόμηται τὸ τε διαλεκτικῆς πάλιν καὶ τὸ ἐρυθροῦ ἑμάς ποιεῖται πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους.

θεμένους ζήτειν] It is difficult to see how these words can be reconciled, for how can a man look for that which he has already laid down? I strongly suspect that the passage originally ran thus; δὲ μὲν ἣδη περὶ παντὸς ἐκάστοτε ἥμενος, εὑρίσκων γὰρ ἐνοικοὶ, μετὰ μίαν κ. τ. ἐ.

[μεταλαβὼμεν] metalaβομεν is the reading of the MSS, which Stallbaum in vain endeavours to defend. In place of adopting Stephens' conjecture, καταλαβομεν, I suspect that the copyist had at first omitted the verb, and written the following metα, and then on discovering his mistake, neglected to place the usual dots over the superfluous letters. I have therefore put metα in brackets.

τῶν ἐν ἐκάστων] Ast., with Stallbaum's approval, reads τῶν ἐν ἐκάστῳ,—i.e., τῶ παντὶ. But we must not adopt any correction of this passage which removes ἐν, for this ἐν is evidently referred to immediately afterwards, where it is distinguished from τὸ καὶ ἄρχον ἐν. But as the subordinate Ones are to be distinguished from the original One, this can only be done by speaking of the former as τῶν, and the latter as ἐκάστῳ; and this is as fatal to Schulte's conjecture—τὸ ἐκάστων ἔκαστον, as it is to the received reading. But what should prevent Plato from using τα ἐν, τῶν ἐν, τοῖς ἐν, if he had occasion for a plural? Thus below we have ἓλλο τῶν ὑ ὄντων. For this reason I incline to read either τῶν ἐν ἔκαστον or τῶν τῶν ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἔκαστον.

πολλά [καὶ ἀπειρά]]. It is possible by application to discover τὰ πολλὰ ὑπάσα ἐστὶ; but all the dialectic in the world will not enable you to find τὸ ἀπειρά ὑπάσα ἐστὶ. It is therefore inconceivable that Socrates should bid them "not only see that the original ἐν is one, and many, and indefinite, but also how many it is." The word αὐτοῦ in τῶν ἀριθμῶν αὐτοῦ refers to πλῆθος.

τοῦτο δὲ εἰς ἐναν See Addenda.

οἱ δὲ νῦν κ. τ. ἐ.] This passage has been corrupted and interpolated so as to become quite unintelligible. I have changed βραδύτερον into βραχύτερον, and separated the genuine parts of the sentence from the spurious. It is impossible to make ἕν καὶ πολλὰ either quickly or slowly; for they are not things of man's making, but ready to his hand. What your modern captious disputers do, is to make ἕν to be ἀπειρά without passing through the intermediate stages. As to βραχύτερον, compare θαλάσσια 179 ὡς ὑπολογία διὰ βραχύτερον τοῦ πικτο ἐκλογῶν.
ΠΡΩ. Τὰ μὲν πῶς, ὦ Σάφρατες, δοκῶ σου μανθάνειν, τὰ δὲ ἐτι σαφέστερον δέομαι ἐν λέγεις ἁκούσαι.
ΣΩ. Σαφὲς μὲν, ὦ Πρόφαρχε, ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς γράμμασιν ὑδάτων, καὶ λάμβανε αὐτό ἐν τούτοις όλοτερ καὶ πεπαιδευόμε. Β
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;
ΣΩ. Φωνὴ μὲν ἡμῖν ἔστι που μία διὰ τοῦ στάματος ίσοσα, καὶ ἀπειρο ἀπὸ πλήθει, πᾶντων τε καὶ ἐκάστου.
ΠΡΩ. Τί μὲν;
ΣΩ. Καὶ οὐδετέρῳ γε τούτων ἐσμέν πως σοφοί, οὐθ᾽ ὅτι τὸ ἀπειρον αὐτῆς ἐσμέν οὐθ᾽ οτι τὸ ἐν ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι πόσα τε ἐστι καὶ ὅποια, τοῦτο ἐστι τὸ γραμματικον ἐκάστον ποιοῦ ήμῶν.
ΠΡΩ. 'Ἀλληδόστατα.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μή καὶ τὸ μονοικὸν δὲ τυχανει ποιοῦ, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστι τοιτῶν.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;
ΣΩ. Φωνὴ μὲν που καὶ τὸ καὶ ἐκείνῃ τῆς τέχνης ἔδει οἱ μία [ἐν αὐτῇ].
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς ὅτι οὐ;
ΣΩ. Δύο ὁ δὲ θώμεν, βαφύ καὶ ὅξυ, καὶ τρίτον ὁμότονον. ἤ πῶς;
ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.
ΣΩ. 'Ἀλλ᾽ οὕτως σοφοὶ ἂν εἰς τὴν μονοικὴν ειδώς ταῦτα μένα, μή δὲ εἰδώς ὡς γὰρ ἐπος εἰπεῖν εἰς ταῦτα οὐδενος ἄξιος ἔστι.
ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
ΣΩ. 'Ἀλλ᾽, ὦ φίλε, ἐπειδὴν λαβῆς τὰ διαστήματα ὁπόσα

ἐν τοῖς όλοτοις όλοτη] Either ἐν όλοτερ, or ἐν τοῖς ἐν ὅλοτερ.
οὐδετέρῳ] The books have ὀδίν ἐτέρῳ, which is admissible. οὐθ' ἐν ἐτέρῳ for ὀδίν ἐτέρῳ would be according to Attic usage. But if he were speaking of that whereas a man is skilled, he would say οὐδετέρῳ, not ὀδίν ἐτέρῳ, the dative expresses that whereby he becomes skilful.
Φωνὴ μὲν τοῦ] The text follows the inferior MSS. in reading καὶ το.—καὶ is so useful as an addition, that one is justified in adopting it; nor is τὸ καὶ ἐκεῖνη a likely variation for a scribe to have made de tuo. I formerly thought that καὶ ἐκεῖνη must refer to the first mentioned art, that of grammar, but οὕτως and ἐκεῖν, though never used capriciously, as some learned men tell us, sometimes apply not to the greater or less proximity of mention, but to that of interest, as in the beginning of the Euthydemus, or to the different degrees of familiarity, as here. Οὐ τοῦτ᾽ I can make nothing, unless we transpose it to a place where it would be welcome if not necessary. Δύο δὲ ἔμεν ἐν αὐτῷ.
διαστήματα] These intervals are
nothing more than musical notes; οὗτοι are musical proportions. See Plat. Τυχ. 36, β, and Cicero's translation.

ὅταν γὰρ τῶν κ. τ. α] The particle γὰρ marks the resumption of an incomplete sentence. The antithesis between τῶν γέγονα γοφός, and ἔρρωμα γέγονα, is a poor verbal contrivance, and the tenses are strangely chosen. ὅταν λάβῃς, γέγονα... ὅταν ἔρημος γέγονα. Stallbaum translates the last word by "erades" which would answer to γεγονός εστι. 'Εγέγονα may be defended by the well known usage of the aorist; compare παρέστην in 46, κ. If the words οὕτως—γέγονα were omitted, nobody would miss them. I have followed the Bodelian in ἔγέγονα for ἔγέγονα ἦν, and in ἄν ἐν ἑτοίμων ἐν τῶν ἐντωμένων ὑπότου. That a writer can if he likes, break his sentence so as to give more emphasis to the second half, by introducing such terms as ὅποτε σὺ, τί κατὰ νὰ ὑπομείνῃ τὴν σὴν δίκην, ὁμοιάζω καὶ ἥμα τὴν ἔκτην, in place of ἃν, τί εἶ—ἐγέγον, no one will deny. But here the speaker begins with a general precept, and then applies it to the particular instance of music, and so returns to the general rule. A very little reflection will show that in such a case if he commenced with "and indeed whatever you take up", he would have the air of opening out some new application in place of resuming a previous statement. I prefer ὅποτε ἔγέγονα, because it is more likely that a scribe should stumble at τῶν ἐν than invent it. The Bodelian has also περὶ τοῦτον which I prefer, because it is a worse reading, and so throws more discredit on a suspected passage.

τῷ δὲ ἀνωτέρῳ] The reader will not fail to admire the skillful play upon the words ἀνωτέρως, ἐναρκτήμου, and ἕναρκτημον. Stallbaum compares Tim. 55, c, τοῦ ἐπέκτασις κόσμου εἶναι, ἐξέγερσαι ἐὰν τῆς ἐντωμᾶς ἐπέκτασις τῶν ἁγίων ὑπότου, ἐρασία ἐν τοῖς ἔρρωμαν χρεῶν εἴναι: and the oracle given to the Megarians, 'Ὑμεῖς δ', οὕτως ἀναγεννήσως, φῦντες τρίτης οὕτως τέταρτα. Οὐκ ἔναρκτημον τούτῳ ἀναγκαστεῖτε, οὕτως ἐν λόγῳ οὕτως ἔναρκτημον.***

*** A sheet of the Editor's MS. has been lost in transmission from Sydney. The missing notes will appear in the Addenda.

[Publisher's Note.]
The first change I have adopted from Bodl., which has καί μοι, the second from Colatin., which has ταύτα γε εύτα αὐτά. Stallbaum has a strange way of explaining the misplaced αὐτά—per se scorum spectata. τοῦτον, ὃς ἐφαμεν ***

[μη ἐκ κ. τ. ἂν] ***

[Ἐνδεικτῇ [ϕωνὴν ἐκ κ.]] ***

[λέγων, πρῶτος] ***

καθορῶν δὲ] Because we can have no true conception of φωνή except as distinct from φωγγος; nor of this again without also knowing both φωνή and τα ἄφωγα. We should rather have expected τα ἄφωγα τα χαὶ ἄφωνα, but this is sometimes moved from its place explained by Stallbaum as ὃς σωσαυ μᾶν; ***

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Platonis Philobus.
he has illustrated this position of ὁς by Sophist, 242, c. ταύτων ὡς οὕνει ἡμι, and other examples; but he should not have quoted for this purpose Arist. Clouds 256, ὁμοιον Ἐκφράσεως ἐν και ἰδονης ἡμιν ἐξ ἄρχης ὁ λόγος, ὅπως ἄντων αἴτητων;

This means that the several parts of the last λόγος are consistent with each other. Εἰλεκτράτοτα, is left unperformed, is deficient.

τί πρὸς ἢ ἐκφήνοις, Ethy. 295, c. ἔν ἡμὴν πρὸς ἑαυτόν ἀποκεφαλώματι, i.e. nothing to the purpose.

Kal μὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γ'] And yet you are close upon that which, as you say, you have been some time looking for. The Zurich editors have placed a mark of interrogation after this sentence, which is certainly incorrect; but as the common formula is καὶ μὴν—γε, and Ἡ is continually confounded with the compendium of καὶ, I have altered γε into καὶ accordingly.

τοὺς ἐστιν ἐν] The impudence of the interpolation in this passage betrays the author of it. In place of letting Socrates ask what number of kinds we can discern in ὑποθεσθαι, etc., he makes him enquire, how they are not straightway indefinite (as if there could be a sense of that which is simply negative,) and again how either of them has some number, a question which Plato himself could not have answered. I have no hesitation in condemning what appears in brackets, and in making τίνα interrogative, without which it would have no right to post. But even πῶς ἐστιν ἐκ καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον is far from satisfactory. Either it is a clumsy way of asking what is more plainly asked in τίνα ποτ' ἀρίστου κέκτηται, or it proposes a question which the upholders of Ideas have been content to leave unsolved (Phado 100, d. τὸν καλὸν παρατάτη, εἰκά λογία, εἰ ἂν καὶ ὧν προσγεγομένην) for so that passage should be read. In our text I propose to read ἐκατέρων, and αὐτῶν ἐκκατέρων, and ἐκκατέρων ἐκκατέρων, τίνα ποτ' ἀρίστου ἐκατέρων κέκτηται τοῦ ἔχοντα γεγονότης. The reasons for interpolating ἐκκατέρων and αὐτῶν ἐκκατέρων are quite obvious; the first word was repeated because of the previous supplement, and itself was thought to be inconsistent with ἔκατος; to accord with which ἔκατος was contrived. And the result of all this ingenuity is that we have the same things designated twice as ἐκκατέρων, and once as ἔκκατος. In such proximity, that a single designation was alone needful or bearable.
Having unreservedly taken your place as your successor, pantelóς qualifies diáσχον ὑποστάντα τα as taken together. The Attic Orators have χρηστὴς ὑποστήσατε, ὑποστήσατε κατὰ τὸν ἡμῶν, without any infinitive to follow. In Xen. Anab. IV, 1, εἰ τις ἀνθίζει ἀντίθετα, γενέσθαι καὶ ὑποστάσις ἐξελεύσεται, the order of construction is, καὶ πορεύεσθαι ὑποστάσις.
τί τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κτιμάτων ἁριστόν. Φιλήρθω γὰρ εἰπόντος ἠδονήν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ χαρὰν καὶ πάντως ἢπάσα τοιαύτη ἔστιν. 

Δ' αὖτε ἀντί ἀντεῖπες ὡς οὗ ταῦτ' ἀλλ' ἐκείν' ἕστιν, ἄ ποι
lάως ἡμᾶς αὐτοῖς ἀναμμηνήσομεν ἐκόντες, ὅρθως δρῶντες, ἵ

καὶ μνήμη παρακείμενα ἐκάτερα βασανίζεται. φη̣ς δ' ὡς ἔσχε 

νὸ τὸ προφητησάμενον ὅρθως [ἁμείνον ἠδονῆς γ'] ἠγαθὸν ἐπι

καὶ τοὺς, ἐπιστήμην, σύνεσιν, τέχνην καὶ πάντ' αὐτὸ τοῦτον ἤγγελον, ταὐτά καὶ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔσχε, ὅτι τούτων ὃ μὲν ἀμφισβητήσον περί ἑκάτερων λεχθέντων, ημεῖς οὐ μετὰ παιδίας 

ζητηθήσαμεν ὡς οὗτ' αφθάσομεν οὐκαδέσει, πρὶν ἀν τούτων τῶν 

λόγων πέρας ἰκανὸν γένηται τι διορισθέντων. οὔ δ' ἄνευ-

χρήματος καὶ ἔκδοκας εἰς ταὐτ' ἡμῖν σαυτῶν. ἡμεῖς δὲ δὴ λέγω

μεν, καθάπερ οἱ παιδείς, ὅτι τῶν ὅρθως δοθέντων αφαίρεσις 

οὐκ ἔστι. παιδίας δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἡμῖν ἀπαντῶν τούτων ἐπὶ τὰ 

νῦν λεγόμενα.

ΣΩ. Τίνα λέγεις; 

ΠΡΩ. Εἰς ἄποροιν ἐμβάλλων καὶ ἀνερωτών ὡς μὴ ὲναι-

μεσ' ἄν ἰκανὸν ἀπόκρινον ἐν τῷ παρόντι διόνυσον σοι. μὴ γὰρ 

οἰωμένα τέλος ἡμῖν εἶνα τῶν νῦν τῆς πάντων ἡμῶν ἄποροιν. 

ἄλλ' εἰ δρᾶν τοῦτ' ἡμεῖς ἀδυνατοίμην, σοι δραστέον ὅπισθεν 

γὰρ. βουλεύον δὴ πρὸς ταῦτ' αὐτότος, τόπον ἡμῶν εἰδὴ σοι 

καὶ ἐπιστήμης διαμέσον  ἦ καὶ ἑτερον, εἰ τῇ [καθ' ἔτερον] 

τινα τρόπον ὁδός τ' εἶ καὶ βούλει δηλώσαι τως ἀλλως τὰ νῦν 

ἀμφιβολούμενα παρ' ἡμῖν.

ΣΩ. Δεινῶν μὲν τοίνυν ἐτί προσοδοξαὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸν ἑμὲ, 

ἐπειδή τοῦτ' οὔτως ἐπές· τὸ γὰρ εἰ βούλει ἤδην λυεῖ πάντα 

his first consenting to hold the conversation, so that saunt ought to be read a ludicrous hyperbole. 

τὸ προφητησάμενον ὄρθως [ἂν ἡν, 

γ']] See Addenda. 

τίλος ἡμῖν ἐστιν] i.e. the end and aim.

καθ' ἐτερον There cannot be a more 

See Addenda. 

καὶ τρόπον παρ' ἄλλως. The first two words 

were added by a scribe who did not 

see that τινα τρόπον belongs to οὗ 

τ' ει.

τὸν ἔμε] i.e., me, the threatened one,
φόβον ἐκάστων πέρι. πρὸς δ᾽ αὖ τούτως μνήμην τινὰ δοκεῖ τίς μοι δεδοκέναι θεῶν ἡμῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δή καὶ τίνων;

ΣΩ. Ἀγὼν ποτὲ τινων πάλαι ἄκοισας ὡς ἡ καὶ ἐγκοροφόρος νῦν ἐννοεῖ περί ἢ ἴδον για καὶ φρονήσως, ὡς οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν ἔστι τάγαθον, ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλο τι τρέχον, ἐκεὸν μὲν τούτων, ἀμείνων δ᾽ ἀμφότερον. καίτοι τοῦτο γ᾽ ἐν ἠναργοῦς ἡμῖν φανερὸν γι᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ νυκάν᾽ τὸ γὰρ ἄγαθον oun ἂν ἐτι τούτων αὐτῇ γίγνετο. ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τόν δὲ γ᾽ [εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν] εἰδὸν ἴδον εὐδέν ἐτε προσδεχόμεθα καὶ ἕμεν δόξαν. ἀποροίν δ᾽ ἐτε σφαιρέτερον δεῖξε.

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστος ἐκπον, οὕτω καὶ διαπέραν.

πρὸς δ᾽ αὖ τούτως] The Bodleian has αὖ τοίς, which form is inadmissible here. The origin of the error, which has been corrected from Coïl, is obvious.

καίτοι τοῦτο γ᾽ ἀν] The Bodleian has καίτοι οὕτω γε ἂν, which Orelli changed into καὶ τούτῳ γ᾽ ἂν. But this will not mean what we want. For as he has not yet named this something better, he cannot say "if it should appear such", but either "if any such thing should appear" which would require τι, or, "if this thing should appear". As γε is in the best MSS., it is admitted by Orelli into his correction: but καὶ—γε means "and besides", whereas καίτοι—γε is equivalent to "and yet you must allow", which is the proper transition. I therefore retain τοῦτο from the inferior MSS., but adopt γε from the Bodleian.

[εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν] In order to get rid of the awkwardness of saying: "we shall not want the εἰδὴς of pleasure to serve the purpose of διαίρεσιν", (as though they had to look for the εἰδὴς first, and then to begin διαίρεσιν into those very εἰδή) as well as to escape the intolerable harshness of the construction, I resorted to the expedient of taking τοῦ by itself and not as the article of εἰδῶν. But this was too violent a proceeding. I now believe that any attempt to reconcile oneself to εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν is a waste of time on words which do not belong to the author. Those who understand, "εἰδή for the purpose of διαίρεσι", will say that transposition would be a milder remedy; but Socrates intends to give up the διαίρεσις τῆς δικαίας, and not merely some particular means towards that end.

προεπόν]? εἰς την διαίρεσιν] The proverbial expression is, αὐτῷ δεῖξε, the event will make things clear. But we are told that both δείξε and δηλώσει are used in the same manner without αὐτῷ. The first occurs in Arist. Fros, 1261, where, however, μήθη may be the subject, and in Herodotus p. 33, where δείξει follows the impersonal ἢκαθή. All the other instances quoted are of δηλοῖ or δηλατάν. If therefore this is a real instance, it is a very rare one.

It is uncertain whether the thing which is to shew itself is the ἀλλὰ τι τρέχον, or the correctness of Socrates' δέξι, δέτι οὐδέν ἐτι προσθεσμέατι x. τ. τ. If in either case, what is the meaning of ἐτι σφαιρέτερον, where at present nothing is σφαιρῆς? If it be said that ἐτι be longs to προεπέν, this is only admissible if εἰς τῇ ἡμεροτατίν or some equivalent phrase be added to it. A MS. of no authority gives δὲ τι. I should prefer προεπόν δὲ, "It will appear more clearly (whether I am right) as I proceed".
ΣΩ. Σμίχρ ἔται τοῖνν ἐμπροσθὲν ἦτο διομολογοῦμέθα. 
ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποία;

ΣΩ. Τὴν τάγαθον μού οἴραν πότερον ἀνάχη τέλεον [ἡ μὴ τέλεον] ἦναι;
ΠΡΩ. Πάντων δὴ που τελεώτατον, ὁ Σοκράτες. 
ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; ἦκαν [τάγαθον]; 
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; καὶ πάντων γὰρ τούτο διαφέρειν τῶν ὅτων. 
ΣΩ. Τὸδὲ γε μὴν, ὡς οἷμαι, περὶ αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖοτατον ἦναι λέγειν, ὡς παῦν τὸ γυνώσκον αὐτό ἑρευκει καὶ ἐφέται [βουλόμενον] ἐλεῖν καὶ περὶ αὐτὸ κτῆσαι θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν φροντίζει [πλὴρ] τῶν ἀποτελομένων ἁμάς ἁγαθοῖς. 
ΠΡΩ. Οὐχ ἦστι τούτοις ἀντετείνειν.

Ε ΣΩ. Σκοπάωμεν δὴ καὶ κρίνομεν τῶν θ' ἡδονῆς καὶ τῶν φρονήσεως βίων ἁιδόντες χωρὶς. 
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς εἶπες; 
ΣΩ. Μήν ἐν τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐνέσχω φρόνησιν, μήτε ἐν τῷ τῆς φρονήσεως ἡδονῆ. δεῖ γὰρ, ἐπερ πότερον αὐτῶν ἐστι τάγαθον, ὡς κἀκεῖθεν ἦπερ προσδείηθαι δεδομένον δ' ἂν φαύλη πότερον, οὐκ ἦστι ποιν τοῦτ' ἦτο τὸ ὄντως ἡμῖν ἁγαθοῦ.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν; 
ΣΩ. Οὕτων ἐν σοὶ πειράμαθε βασιλεῦσαι τωτα. 
ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

[ἡ μὴ τέλεον] No one in his senses would ask "whether the Idea of Good necessarily implied incompleteness". And yet this nonsense has been left unchallenged since the revival of letters, nay was so perhaps even under the Ptolemies. Another evident addition is τάγαθον. For with τάγαθον we must understand ἦστι. But that the true construction is ἦτο is apparent from the answer, in which all the MSS. give ἦσται. A third interpolationdisagrees the clause ὡς παῦν τὸ γυνώσκον αὐτὸ ἑρευκει καὶ ἐφέται βουλόμενον ἔλειν. Ἐφείμα is sometimes followed by the infinitive as in Eur. Ion 521, εἴ φασεν ἐφέιμα; but some who did not know this, supposed αὐτοῦ to be understood, and introduced βουλόμενον to govern ἔλειν. χωρὶς is the reading of all MSS. and Editions, as far as I know; and one editor undertakes to explain it, and his explanation is commended by another. But we may be quite certain that Socrates is intended to say, that men care for no other results than such as are in themselves good. Why then represents him introducing, as the sole objects of men's care, other results produced along with good things? I had once proposed to cancel τέλη and to read ἄλλ' ἐγαθῶν. But this violent change is unnecessary. Antiquum obtinet. The intrusion of τέλη has made nonsense of a simple and easy sentence. χωρὶς used here and elsewhere as ἀποτελομένων.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. 'Ἀποκρίνον δή.
ΠΡΩ. Λέγε.

ΣΩ. Δέξαι ἂν, Ἡρωτάτη, οὐ ἦν τὸν βίον ἀπαντα ἵδι—

μένος ὄνομας τὰς μεγίστας;
ΠΡΩ. Τί δή οὔ;

ΣΩ. 'Αρ' οὖν ἐπὶ τινός ἂν σοι προσδείχῃ ἤροιο, εἰ τοι' ἔχοις παντελῶς;
ΠΡΩ. Οὕσαμοι.

ΣΩ. Ὅρα δή, τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ λογίζεσθαι [τὰ δέοντα], καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἄδελφα, μοῦ μὴ δέοι ἂν τί;
ΠΡΩ. Καί τί; πάντα γὰρ ἔχομεν ἂν ποι ὑπὲρ ἔχων.

ΣΩ. Οὕτων οὖν τῶν ζηύν ἂν μὲν διὰ βίον [ταῖς μεγίσταις ὄνομαί] χαῖροις ἂν;
ΠΡΩ. Τί δή οὔ;

ΣΩ. Νοῦν δέ γε [καὶ μνήμην καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ δόξαν]

Πρώταρχος] it seems to be omitted here on account of the pronoun being placed after the name of the person addressed, which is usual either when the speaker first turns to him, or makes an especial appeal to him.

[τὰ δέοντα] Five lines lower down the list of mental powers or qualities is again given as νοῦς, μνήμη, ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, ἀλήθεια. Of that list it will be time to speak when we come to it: but a third series follows immediately upon the second one, which tallies pretty exactly both in substance and order with that before us: 1. τὸ φρονεῖν=φρόνησις. 2. τὸ νοεῖν=μ. μνήμη of past things, ἐπιστήμη of future. 3. τὸ λογίζεσθαι=λόγισμός. 2. The Representative faculty. 3. Inference, not logical, but in its lowest type. If any one compare this passage with the other, he will see why τὰ δέοντα ought to be rejected without hesitation.

μὴν μὴ δέοι ἂν τί The MSS. have μηδὲ δραμ ἂν. Several scholars have proposed to change ὄραν into δραπ, but they all appear to leave τί, which in this case would be contrary to Greek usage. I made this correction in the year '55; but, unless my memory fails me, the Leipsig Edition by C. F. Herrmann appeared in '54. Any one who has that Edition will see in Herrmanu's Preface the name of the scholar to whom he attributes the emendation. I am unable to recall it, but I confess that I have been beaten by at least one year.

[ταῖς μεγίσταις ὄνομαί] Even supposing that Plato could use χαῖρες ὄνομας in the sense of enjoying pleasures, the words τ. μ. η. are nothing to the purpose, for the amount has been already mentioned, and the drift of this passage is, that he would be in a continual state of pleasure—and never once know it.

νοῦν δέ γε It has been shown above that there is an exact correspondence between the series given in the sentence beginning "Ὅρα δή", and that which occurs in the argument commencing with πρώτων. But the list now before us, though so much nearer to this last, has no such congruity. And indeed it is worse than unnecessary; for what sort of reasoning is this? "As you do not possess Memory, Knowledge, and Belief, you cannot know whether you are in pleasure or not, because you have no Consciousness." All that Plato wrote was Νοῦν δέ γε μὴ ἐκκεντρικὸν πρώτον μὴν κ. τ. ἦ. As he has no νοῦς, he cannot have φρόνησις, which is a part of νοῦς.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

μή κεκτημένον [ἀληθῆ], πρῶτον μὲν τούτων αὐτῶ, εἰ δ' χαίρεις ἢ μὴ χαίρεις, ἀνάγκη δὴ ποῦ σε ἐγγονεῖν, κενὸν γ᾽ ὄντα πάσης φρονίμεως.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴ ὁσαίτως μνήμην μὴ κεκτημένον ἀνάγκη δὴ ποῦ σε μὴ οἰδ᾽ ὅτι ἔχαρες μεμνημένες, τῆς τ᾽ ἐν τῷ παρά-
χόμεν ἡδονῆς προσπιπτούσης μὴ ἤντεκον μνήμην ὑπομενόντων δόξην δ᾽ αὖ μὴ κεκτημένον [ἀληθῆ] μὴ δοξάζωσας χαῖρεν καὶ-
ροντα, λογισμοῦ δὲ στερόμενον μὴ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον διὸς χαίρομεν δύνατον εἶναι λογίζομαι, ἤτερ δ᾽ οὐκ ἄνθρωποι βλέ-
που ἀλλὰ τινος πλείονος ἢ τῶν δεκα [θαλαττίαι] μὲν ὀστρετών ἐμψυχά ἐστι σωμάτων. ἦστι τὰῦτα, ἡ παρὰ τοῦτο ἔχομεν ἀλ-

D λογος πως διανοηθήναι;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πόσο?

ΣΩ. 'Αρ᾽ οὖν αἴρετος ἢμῖν βλέπω τοιοῦτον;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰς ἄφασιν παντάπασι με, ὥς Σωκράτεις, οὕτοι δ᾽ ἐνοχὸς ἐμβέβηκε τὰ τού.

ΣΩ. Μήτων τοῖνα μαλακωμέθεια, τὸν δὲ τοῦ νοῦ μετα-

λαβὸντας αὐτὸν ἔδωκαν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Εἰ τις δὲξατ' ἢν αὐτῷ ἠμῶν ζωονεῖν μὲν καὶ νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ μνήμην πάσαν πάντων κεκτημένον, ἡδονῆς Ε ὃς μετέχων μητέρα μῆτε σμηχρόν, μηδ' αὖ λύπης, ἀλλὰ τὸ παράπαν ἄπαιθες πάνεον ἔν τῶν τοιοῦτων.

τῶν ὁμοίων' ποὺ μὴθαί ἐστιν τὸ περιττοῦ ἡδονῆς παράλειπον τὸ περιττότα τοῦ προτέρου τοῦ προτέρου δοκεῖ μὲν, ἐν μερεὶ λαβόν-

tes. Compare below 51, l.

[ἐλθὶ] The reason for putting ἐλθῇ in brackets is that any δοξα, whether false or true, would suffice πρὸς τὸ δο-

ξάζων χαῖρεν, and, where there is no νοῦς, there can be no δοξα.

[θαλαττίαι] If Plato had cared to tell us that shellfish lived in the sea, he would not have done so by placing an adjective where it is out of construction. He would at least have written ἡδο-

νία ὄντα. Let us therefore leave the commentators to decide, when they can, whether the sense is ὃς ἡδονίται ἐστιν ἐμψυχά, or ὃς ἐμψυχά ἐστιν ἡδονίτης. 

[μεταλαβόντας] ἢ ὃς ἐν μερεὶ λαβόν-
tes. Compare below 51, l.
ΠΑ Ο. ὸδότερος ὁ βίος, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἔμοιγε τοῦτον αἰ-
ρετός, οὐδὲ ἄλλο μὴ ποτὲ, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, φανῦ.
ΣΩ. Τι δ’ ἡ ξυναφότερος, ὁ Πρωταρχής, ἡ ἀμφίην οὐμ-
υς μικρός καίνος γενόμενος;
ΠΡΩ. Ἡδονῆς λέγει καὶ νῦ [καὶ φρονήσεως];
ΣΩ. Οὕτω καί τῶν τοιούτων λέγω ἔγονε.
ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς δὴ τούτων γ’ αἱρήσει πρόορον ἡ ἕκεινων
διποτερόνοι, καὶ πρὸς τούτως γ’ οὖν ὁ μὲν, ὁ δ’ οὖ.
ΣΩ. Μανχάνομεν οὖν ὃ τι νῦν ἦμιν ἐστι τὸ ἔμμαθην ἐν
τοῖς παρούσις λόγοις;
ΠΡΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν, ὡς τρεῖς μὲν βίοι προϊέργασαν, τοῖς
οὖν denomination ἰκανὸς οὖθ’ ἀιρετός οὖν’ ἀνθρώπων οὔτε ἢ
ζωῆς οὐδέν.
ΣΩ. Μόνον οὖν οὖν ἡδὴ τούτων γε πέμι δήλον ὡς ὀδότερος
αὐτῶν εἰς ταχαίον; ἢ γὰρ ἐν ἰκανῷ καὶ τέλος καὶ πᾶσαι
[φυσίς καὶ] ζωῆς αἰρετός, ὦστερ δυνατόν ἢ οὖτος ἢ διὰ
βίου ζῆν. εἰ δὲ τις ἄλλα ἤρειδ’ ἢμοῖον, παρὰ φύσιν ἢ τῆς
τοῦ ἀληθῶς αἰρετοῦ ἑλάμβανεν ἔκων εἰς ἀγνοίας ἢ τινος ἀνάγκης
οὖν εὐθαίμονος.
ΠΡΩ. Υποκε γοῦν τοῦτ’ οὖτος ἔχων.
ΣΩ. Ἡς μὲν τοινὶ τῆν γε Φιλήμοι Θεόν οὕτω δεῖ διανοεῖ–
σάει ταύτων καὶ ταχαίον, ἰκανῶς εἰρήνηται μοι δοκεῖ.
ΦΙ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ σὸς νῦς, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐστι ταχαίον,
ἀλλ’ ἔξω ποι ταῦτα ἐγκλήματα.

ἐς ἀμφότερον συμμιχθέσει] ι.ε., διὰ τὸ
συμμείγναι. This use of the participle
is very frequent in Plato. Compare Βεν.
506, μ. προσμομολομοῦσα στημομολογοῦν γε-
λως θρήσκον,—ι.ε., διὰ τὸ προσμει-
τέρ. In the next sentence καὶ φρο-
νήσεως is a manifest interpolation.
καὶ πρὸς τούτως γε! This is com-
monly understood to mean and besides;
but it is evident that nothing additional
is stated. Stallbaum’s defence of it,
‘notio atque vis procedentia πας con-
formatur et augetur,’ is only true as to
conformations, whereas augetur is the point
in question. Schleiermacher under-
stands, in addition to those lines (the
unmixed); but this would have been
έσταις, and, besides, how can a man
choose both contraries, the unmixed and
the mixed together? I cannot uphold
my own former solution of this dif-
ficulty, for “in addition to my friends
here” would be πρὸς τοῦτον. As some
addition is intended, the only con-
ceivable addition to “every body will
choose this life”, is “and one and all
will bear me out in saying so”. This
might be, καὶ προσέρχεται τούτως γ’
οὐ γ’ μὲν, δ’ οὖ.
[φυσικοὶ καὶ] θέου]. He afterwards adds,
εἰ δὲ τις ἢμιοι, and is evidently think-
ing of ζωὴ capable of choice, and pos-
essed of intellect. It is therefore high
time these quæra were weeded out of
the text. Ἁνάγκη οὖν εὐθαίμονος is one
of the many euphemisms for Madness.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Τάχ' ἂν, ὃς Φίληβε, ὃ γ' ἐμός· οὐ μέντοι τὸν γ' ἀληθινὸν ἄμω καὶ θείων οἷμα κοίνον, ἀλλ' ἀλλως πως ἔχουν τῶν μὲν ὦν νικηφόροι πρὸς τὸν κοινὸν βλον οὐκ ἀμφιβασμένοι [πω] ἐπείρ νοῦ, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων ὑσταν καὶ σκοπεῖν χρῆ πέριν. 

Ω τι δράσομεν. τάχα γὰρ ἂν τὸν κοινὸν τούτον βιόν αἰτίόμεθα ἂν ἐκάτερος ὃ μὲν τὸν νοῦν [αἰτίον], ὃ δ' ἰδονήν [ἰνα], καὶ οὕτω τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τούτων ἀμφοτέροις οὐδέτερον ἂν εἴη, τάχα δ' ἂν αἰτίον τις ὑπολάβοι πύετον αὐτῶν ἑτα. τούτοι δὴ πέρι καὶ μάλλον ἐπὶ πρὸς Φίληβε πισχαλομήν ἂν, ὡς ἐν τῷ μυθῷ τούτῳ βίῳ, οὐ τοῦτ' ἐστι τοῦτ' ὃ λαβὼν ὃ βλαζόν γεγέννη σὲρτός ἄμω καὶ ἀγαθός, οὐχ ἰδονήν ἄλλα νοῦς τούτω ξύγεννητερον καὶ ὁμοιότερον ἑστι, καὶ κατὰ τούτον τὸν λόγον 

Εὐτ' ἂν τῶν πρωτείων οὖ μ' ἂν τῶν δευτερείων ἰδονή μετὸν ἀληθῶς ἂν ποτε λέγοντο. πυρεταρέω δὲ ἐστι τῶν τριτείων, εἰ τι νῦ ἐμῷ νῦ δὲ πιπερεῖν ἔμας ταῦ τινι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄλλα μή, ὃ Σωκράτες, ἐμοίηκε δοκεῖ νῦν μὲν ἰδονή σοι πεπτωκεία καθαπετασματικῆς ἑπτά τῶν νῦν δὴ λόγων τῶν γὰρ νικηφόρων πέρι μυθοκέμενη κεῖται. τῶν δὲ νοῦν, ὡς 23 ἔοικε, λεκτέον ὃς ἐμφιάλως οὐκ ἀντιποιεῖτο τῶν νικηφόρων· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ ἐπαναλέον ἂν. τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων στερεθεῖσα

οὐκ ἀμφιβασμένοι [πω] Ιt is difficult to account for καὶ in this place, for he evidently renounces for ever the claims of νοῦς to the first prize, and contends only for the second. Perhaps the reservation may be accounted for by his mention of the θείων νοοῦς, the relation of which to that of man is afterwards treated of. But then again if this had been intended, he would scarcely have used the words πρὸς τὸν κοινὸν βλոν: and altogether why confuse the argument with an afterthought about some other νοούς? I now believe καὶ to be a mere reproduction of the preceding τά in ἀμφιβασμένοι.

ἀντιποιεῖται ἂν] See Addenda.

οὕτως [οὐ] Of this construction Stallbaum gives the following instances: Philob. 42, c ; Laws 840, λ ; Rep. 608, b ; Ibid. 436, b ; from which it appears that although οὕτως-οὕτως is inadmissible, οὕτω-οὕτω is or οὕτως γέ is correct.

μετόν] As you cannot say λέγεται ὃ, but λέγεται ἔως, you would here expect μετέτιθη, not μετὸν. But μετόν came to be looked upon as almost a noun, so that in λέγεται ὃ μετὸν we understand the infinitive εἶναι. Thus in Laws 900, s, we read: ἦν δὲ οὐτὲ μέγα οὐτὲ σιμφορὸς τῶν τούτων μετὸν ἔρομεν.

νῦν μὲν] The Bodleian has no μὲν, but I think it is an accidental omission, for the opposition is between this first and another, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων—

τον πεπτωκέα] σοι cannot belong to πεπτωκέα, for ὤν σου is the proper construction after καίτερα. Nor can it be made to change places. It is difficult to say what should be done with the word, for it does not look like an interpolation. Did Plato write ὤνκεπτωκέαιν;
The best MSS. have δέκιον; but the μία after συγχώρεω appears to me conclusive in favour of the other reading. In the common text, we have δέκιον κανύ τιν κυν. But the enquiry is no more difficult now than at any other time; whereas we want νυν with φ. §. "We must now begin a new argument." Because the misplaced κανύ τι seemed an awkward desinence, some scribe brought the κυν into the first sentence, and contrived καν as the beginning of the next.

This is a singular construction of καν, at once with a genitive and an infinitive; it may be said that as the ἐλλη μυχανι seems in Ξιάκη β. §, this is added by way of explanation. But is there any beauty or propriety in such a manner of writing? Plato imitated the freedom, even the license, of common conversation, if you will. But is this tolerable even in common conversation, or is it the aliphotalk of uneducated men? Again we have another such pleasing negligence in βαλ έτε τον έμπροσθεν λόγων. This is given in the Books as the answer to Socrates. But Οὑνο χρή is the answer, and Πως γαρ ού; is Socrates' assent. Χρή is the answer to δεί. . . καρυδήμον. . . έγερα, another proof of the spuriousness of ἀλλη μυχανι. furnishes one of the editors with the excuse for a learned note to show that verbs and participles sometimes change hands. Rarely it needed neither Heindorf ad Gorgiam, nor Schaefer on Gregorius Corinthus, nor Seidler on the Iphigenia in Tauris to show that you can say either percurrer ridens, or riso percurreret. It costs more effort διαλαβέται than τίμεται.
ΣΩ. Λέει ονείν έτει των των δή λόγων.
ΠΡΩ. Ποία;
ΣΩ. Τὸν θεὸν ἔλεγομέν ποι τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον δεῖξα τῶν ὄντων, τὸ δὲ πέρας;
ΠΡΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Τούτῳ δὴ τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ δύο τιθομέθα, τὸ δὲ τρίτων

Δὲ ἀμφότερον τότεν έν τι ξυμμετρότερον. εἰμι δ', ώς εἰκονε, ἐγὼ γελοῖος τις [ίκ]ανος, τὰ τ' εἴδη διστάς καὶ συναμεθομο-

ΠΡΩ. Τί φῆς, δ' γαθέ;
ΣΩ. Τετάρτου μοι γένοις αὖ προσδεῖν.
ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τίνος.
ΣΩ. Τῆς ξυμμετρίας τούτων πρὸς ἀλλῆλα τὴν αἰτίαν δρα, καὶ τίθω μοι πρὸς τοῖς τρεῖς εἰκονε τέταρτον τούτο.
ΠΡΩ. Μῶν οὖν σοι καὶ πέμπτου προσδείησε διάκρισιν τινα δυναμένου;

ἀπειρόν . . . πέρας] It is evident that the πέρας and ἄπειρον of 16, c, are different from those now brought forward. In the former case they express the indefinite multitude of the individuals and the definite number of species; in the latter, the unlimited nature of all quality and quantity in the abstract, and the definite proportions of the same in existing things. But in both cases we find that the effect of the πέρας is analogous; that knowledge in dialectics and life in physics are the result of a certain limitation.

πέρας] Heliodor and Schleiermacher are by no means to be followed in reading πέρας έγώ. As Böckh rightly observes in his Philologus, the opposite power to the ἄπειρον is not that which is limited, but that which limits. Unless we keep πέρας here clear from the proposed addition, and cancel έγώ in two subsequent places, we make nonsense of the whole disputation.

Τούτῳ δὴ τῶν έλασών] I have adopted Stallbaum's emendation, which the context makes necessary. "Let us lay down these two, as two of the Classes required." But in the manifestly corrupt sentence which follows, something less weak and flat than γελοῖος τις, οὐχ ἓπερ γελοῖος κατ' εἴδη δ. is wanted. The Bodleian has ἢπερ τά τ' εἴδη. It is probable that in the archetypal MS. the text ran thus: ΓΕΔΟΠΟΣ ΤΙΧΑΝΟΣ, i.e. γελοίος τις διάφορος, and that some scribe thought that in ΤΙΧΑΝΟΣ he saw ξυμμετρία. The other various readings τά τ' appears decidedly preferable to κατά, for he is endeavouring not to separate things according to their kinds, but to point out distinct kinds, and then to repeat the catalogue of them. On the whole there is little violence done to the oldest text, and nothing left unsaid or said improperly, in the reading: εἰμι δ', ώς εἰκονε, ἐγὼ γελοῖος τις ξυμμετρ-

Μῶν οὖν This question and the answer given to it are of importance, being introduced by Plato not only as an example of the care which is requisite in every dialectic process to leave no distinction unnoticed which may help towards a complete classification, but still more because it serves to bring out in its full significance the αἰτία τῆς ξυμμετρίας. Had this latter been a mere agent, one would expect the counter-agent to be also mentioned; but Socrates observing in his ironical
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Τάχ’ ἂν σοῦ μὴν ὅλιμαι γ’ ἐν τῷ νῦν. ἐὰν δὲ τι δῇ, συνεργάσει ποῦ μοι σοῦ μεταδιώκωνυ [πέμπτου βίον].

ΠΡΩ. Τι μὴν;

ΣΩ. Πρώτων μὲν δὴ τῶν τεττάρων τὰ τρία διελόμεναι, τὰ δύο τούτων πειράματος, πολλά ἐκάτερον ἐσχαμένων καὶ διε- στασμένων ἰδιότερα, εἰς ἐν πάλιν ἐκάτερον συνογόντες, νοή- σαι τῇ ποτὲ ἐν αὐτῶν ἐν καὶ πολλά ἐκάτερον.

ΠΡΩ. Εἰ μοι σαφέστερον ἐκ περὶ σῶτων εἴποις, τάχ’ ἂν ἐποίημι.

ΣΩ. Ἀγὼ τοίνυν τὰ δύο, ἢ προτέθεμαι, ταὐτ’ εἰναι ἀπερ 24 νῦν δὴ, τὸ μὲν ἀπειρο, τὸ δὲ πέρας [ἔχων]. ὅτι δὲ ἐφόσον τινὰ τὸ ἄπειρον πολλά ἐστι, πειρᾶσομαι φράζειν τὸ δὲ πέρας [ἔχων] ἡμᾶς περιμενέων.

ΠΡΩ. Μένει.

ΣΩ. Σκέψασθαι δὴ, χαλεπὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀμφιβολῶς τοῦ ἑκεῖνος σε σκοπεῖν, ὅμως δὲ σκοπεῖ. Θερμοτέρων καὶ ὕψο- τέρων πέρι πρώτων δὲ πέρας ε’ ποι ἔστι νοήσαι, ἦ τὸ μᾶλ-

manner, 'that he does not think he shall want any such,' prepares us to attach a higher importance to the ἀτίλα than to anything yet spoken of. Nor indeed is there any εἶδος διάκρισιν τῶν δυνά- μεν. For these ἄπειροι are represented as forced into this conjunction with the πέρας, and kept so against their will. So that dissolution is not an act of the ἀτίλα but a consequence of its not acting. I have changed τι- νός into τινή, and further on, I have followed all later editors in bracketing βίον, which is clearly out of place; but it is probable that τέμπτον was added at the same time; at all events it is needless and worthless.

τὰ τρίτα More probably τὸ τρίτον ἢ ἡγεῖται: for the process is not to take three out of the four, and then two from those three; nor would διελόμενος be the right word in such a sense as separating, but ἄπολαβόντας. Such a roundabout way of getting at the first two is evidently unmeaning; but we are bidden to take the κοινὸν, which is the third, and resolve it into its constituents, πέρας and ἄπειρον. And this is the simplest way of arriving at those two: for the instances of the κοινὸν are found in sensible objects, out of which we obtain by analysis the qualities which in their own nature are More or Less, and the proportion which limits and confines them. τὰ δύο τού- των, if the reading is correct, must be taken to mean the first and second of these γάρ. We shall find lower down another striking instance of the cardinal and ordinal numbers being confused through their being expressed by the same compendia. πολλά ἄγαμον is like μέρη διοικεῖν Philol. 265, δ., and elsewhere. It is a variety of the ac- cussative of effect, like ψυχλὸν ἄρα, ἔμελεν συντέλεσθαι, σμαρά καταλάβεσθαι &c.

πέρας [ἦν] This expression both here, and two lines lower, is certainly faulty. Τὸ πέρας ἦν is that ἄπειρον which has ceased to be such by being submitted to the πέρας; so that this description belongs properly to the third γάρ.

ἐὰν τώ [ἐν] τοῦτο τι νοεῖται ἃν is the reading of all the MSS., and followed by, I believe, all editors. Nothing can be more unsuitable than the use of the optative, or rather the conditional, where all that the speaker
PONTONOS FIIHBOZ.

B λόν τε και ἤτον ἐν αὐτοῖς οἰχοῦντε, τοῖς γένεσιν, ἐσπερὶ ἐν ἐνοικήσειν, τέλος οὐκ ἐπιτρέψετον γίγνεσθαι γενομένης γὰρ τελευτῆς καὶ αὐτῷ τετελευτηκατο.

ΠΠΩ. Ἀδρέάτατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀεὶ δὲ γε, φαμεν, ἐν τε τῷ Θερμότερῳ καὶ τῷ ψυ-χοτέρῳ τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἤτον ἐν.

ΠΠΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Ἀεὶ τοίνυν ὁ λόγος σημαίνει τοίνυν μὴ τέλος ἐχειν· ἀεικα δὲ δήπον παντάπασιν ἢπείρω γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΠΩ. Καὶ σφόδρα γε, ὧδε Σίκυοται.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλά ἐκ γ', ὧδε Πρῶταχε, ὑπέλαθες, καὶ ἀνέμνη-

C σας μ' ὅτι καὶ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦθ', δ' ὁ σὺ νῦν ἐρεθέγυκα, καὶ τὸ γ' ἤρεμα τῷ αὐτῷ δύναμιν ἔχετον τῷ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἤτον. ὅπου γὰρ ἐν ἐνήπον, οὐκ ἐντὸν εἶναι ποσόν ἕκαστον, ἀλλ', ἂεὶ σφο-

δότερον ἡσυχαίτερον καὶ τοιούτου ἔκασται πράξεως ἐμ-

ποῦντε, τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἑλκτὸν ἐπεφαργάζεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ποσόν ἀφανίζεστον. ὅ γὰρ ἐλέχην νῦν δ', μὴ ἀφανίσατε τὸ ποσόν, ἀλλ' ἐσαντε αὐτὸ τε καὶ τὸ μέτερον ἐν τῇ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ

D ἤτον [καὶ] σφόδρα καὶ ἤρεμα ἐδρα ἐγγενέσθαι, αὐτὸ ἔρρει τὰ ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς σοφίας χώρας ἐν ἧ ἐνήπ. ὧδ' γὰρ ἐπὶ Θερμότερον οὐδὲ ψυχοτέρον εἶτιν ἐν, λαβόντε τὸ ποσόν' προχωρεῖ γὰρ

intends is, "tell me if you can discern." The common copy from which our MSS. are derived was probably made by a scribe who had before him, EIIPOY ECTI NOHCAI, and as the Y looked very like T (with which it is continually confounded) he thought he saw IOTE; and out of IOTECTI he made IOTE TI. After this, νοσια would necessarily pass for an optative, and the sense would suggest the correction of νοσίας ἐν. The same mood has been forced upon the next sentence through the prevailing habit among the later Greeks of confounding, (as indeed they still do), εν and αι; so that the word would pass through the following changes: ἐπιτρέψετον—ἐπιτρέψατον—ἐπιτρέψαται with εν. A due consideration of εὐθερ' ἐν ἐνοικήσει would have stopped the course of this corruption.

[εἰκοσ] This is Stallbaum's correction for εἰκον. The words τοῖς γένεσιν are not to be taken with εν αὐτοῖς, εν the kinds themselves, which would be needlessly emphatical, but with τέλος οὐκ ἐπιτρέψετον γίγνεσθαι, will not allow any bound to be fixed to the kinds (hotter and colder), as long as they reside in them.

ἀνάνεισικ μ' See Addenda.

[καὶ] He is no longer speaking of μᾶλλον καὶ ἤτον in the abstract, but of a new instance of them in ἐπιτρέ-

πατον καὶ ἡσυχαίτερον, an expression which he here varies by μᾶλλον καὶ ἤτον σφόδρα καὶ ἤρεμα.

λαβόντε τὸ ποσόν | if they were to admit Quantity. As λαβόντε here = εἰ λαβοῦν, and not εἰ λαμβάνω, the optative εἰτιν which rests on ἐτι in Boll. and ζητων in Ven. is better than ἤτον (Bekk. and Stallb.), which was conjectured by the scribe of the Vat. MS., who could make nothing of ζητων.
καὶ οὐ μένει τὸ τε Θερμότερον ἂν καὶ τὸ ψυχρότερον ὡσαυ-
τές, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἔστη καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἐπαίσκετο. κατὰ δὴ τοῦ-
τον τὸν λόγον ἀπειροῦ γίγνοις ἀν τὸ Θερμότερον καὶ τοῦνα-
tίτον ἄμα.

ΠΡΩ. Φαινεται γοῦν, ὡς Σάμιατες ἐστι δ’, ὡσι πάντως,
οὐ δέδοι ταῦτα εξενεσθαι. τὸ δὲ εἰς αἰθής τε καὶ αἴθης
Ἰαο[γα Legislation] τὸν δ’ ἐρωτώντα καὶ τὸν ἐρωτώμενον ἰκανώς
ἐν ἔμφασιν νῦν ἀποφθέγμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ’ ἐν μὲν λέγεις, καὶ πειρατεύον ούτω ποιεῖν. νῦν
μέντοι ἀθρετή τῆς τοῦ ἀπειροῦ φέσεως εἰ τοῦτο δεξῆθας ση-
μείων, ἵνα μὴ τάντα ἐπεξείστοις μυρώνων.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποσὸν δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅπου ἔν ἡμῖν φαινεσθαι μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἤτοι γνώ-
μενα, καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἤρμα δεχόμενα καὶ τὸ λίγα καὶ ὑπο-
ταντα πάντα, εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπειροῦ γένος ὡς εἰς ἐν δεῖν πάντα 25
τάτα τιθέναι, κατὰ τὸν ἐμπροσθεν λόγον, ὃν ἐφαίμεν, ὡς
dιεσπαρσαν καὶ διεξήκτοι συναγεγέντας χρήσαι κατὰ ὑπόθεσιν
μὲν ἐπισημαίνονται των φώνων, εἰ μείνησαι.

ΠΡΩ. Μέμνημαι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα ταῦτα, τοῦτον δὲ τάναττα
πάντα δεχόμενα, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἵσον καὶ ἱσότητα, μετὰ δὲ τὸ

τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἔστη καὶ πρῶτον ἐπαι-
σαρος] But the So Much stood still, and
ceased to advance,—namely, before it
was expelled by μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἤτοι.
This will account for the use of the
oristoi. The difference between μᾶλλον
καὶ ἤτοι and σφόδρα καὶ ἤρμα is not
such as Stallbaum expresses in his
paraphrase, ‘It is an Indefinite, not
only extensively as to quantity, but also
intensively as to quality;’ for the ex-
ample chosen (of heat and cold) belongs
much more properly to the latter. Be-
sides, if quantity had been intended,
he would have expressed that by πλέον
καὶ ἔπαντο. Intensity of degree is
meant in both instances, but the dis-
tinction is marked by the speaker him-
self, when he adds to one τοῖς γένεσιν,
and to the other τοῖς πράξεσιν. In the
first case the quality is looked upon as
a state; in the second, as an immediate
effect. τὸ ποσὸν is the limit of the
former; τὸ μέτρον of the latter.

τὸ δὲ εἰς αἴθης τε καὶ αἴθῆς] The
article which formerly gave me so much
trouble is restored to its just rights by
the expulsion of the word λέγεντα;
for it gives to the words which follow
it the nature of a subject. “Hereafter
and Hereafter will bring us into unison.”
He does not say τούτως, because this
repetition is not to take place now, as is
evident from the opposition τῶν μάλτων.

ΣΩ] For δι’ τι ιδαίτερα ἐν τοῖς φώνων]
To set upon them the seal of some one
nature,—i.e. by giving them a generic
name. We should have expected τοῦ-
τοις, but where two regimens occur
together, as here συναγεγέντας καὶ ἐπι-
σημαίνονται, the case of one or the
other is suppressed. See Porson on
Medea ν. 784.
καὶ πάν 5 τί περ κ. τ. ἥ. That is the triple, the quadruple, the third, the fourth, and so on with all multiples and all measures, whether in numbers or magnitudes.

[ἄλλῳ] τιθέναι εἰς ἐν "to place in a genus" is correct, and so likewise is τιθέναι τινος φύσεως, "to declare the whole race or family, τὰ δεχόμενα τὸ πέρας. See the following notes.
"I could get none to listen. I suppose any adviser would do the same by my company: if desiring an answer, he would leave us to our own devicings. Of the passages quoted by Winckelmann, that from the Republic ηην—possessed, with skit, καὶ δυσμαξεῖς, needs no comment; that from Thucydidès B. 2, σοφίζεσθαι, would not be to the purpose even were it sound; but "Read, sirs!" They think they will do as much by sea. That in Thuc. B. 7. ταυτόν ηῆὴ ἐποίη ὑμῖν ταῦτα ἐν τῷ ναυτικῷ παντεῖν τὸ αὐτόν, is very much to the purpose, and shows that an infinitive subject is the subject of the phrase in question, and that the phrase is (as one would expect) not ταυτόν ἑράσει, but ταυτόν παντεῖν. Another difficulty is presented by τοιὼν ἀμφοτερῶν καταφανῆς καίζεται. ΠΡΩΤ. Ποίαν καὶ ποῖς λέγεις; ΣΩ. Τὴν τοῦ οὐκ εἰς τ. ὑ. γ. for beyond all doubt καϊζειν refers to the ὑδρά γένος which they have been some time in quest of. But who could help taking ποίαν to refer to καϊζειν? and yet ποίαν is answered by Socrates as referring to the second. If the reader will look very closely into this matter, he will see that ἀμφοτέρων συναγωγων μ. κ. γ. is an interruption to the argument. "We have (or have not) already told over the members of the παρὰs family. Let us do it again (or let us do so now)." What ought to follow? Most undoubtedly the question of Protagoras: "What do you mean by family? and what family?" Then would follow the enumeration; but after this it is most surprising that Protagoras should answer:—"I understand: you mean, I suppose, that if we mix them, certain products will result".—How could he say this, if something about this combination had not been mentioned after the description of the family itself? I think there cannot be any doubt that a clause has strayed from its place, and that we should restore it after ἓραζεται, at the end of Socrates' next speech.
ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν καὶ τῶς λέγεις;
ΣΩ. Τὴν τοῦ ἵσον καὶ δισπλασίαν, καὶ ὅπου ταίει πρὸς Ἐλληναν τάναιν διαφόρως ἔχοντα, σύμμετρα δὲ καὶ σύμφωνα, ἐνθεία ἄμεθυμον, ἀπεργάζεται. (τούτων δὲ ἀμφοτέρων συναισθήμασι καταφυγὴς καθελθεὶς γενέσθαι.)
ΠΡΩ. Μανθάνω: φαινεί γὰρ μοι λέγειν, μηγνύσι ταύτα, γενέσθαι τινὰς ὅφει ἑκάστους συμβαίνειν.
ΣΩ. Ὅρθως γὰρ φαιόμαι.
ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τοίνυν.
ΣΩ. 'Ἀρ' οὖχ ἐν μὲν νόσοις *** ἢ τούτων ἀδήλη κοινωνίᾳ τὴν ὑγείας φύσιν ἐγέννησον;
ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Ἐν δὲ δεξί καὶ βασεῖ καὶ ταχεὶ καὶ βραδεῖ, ἀπείροις

Τὸν τοῦ ἱσον] Socrates describes the πέρας family as, whatever puts an end to the contradiction in Opposites. For every indefinite has two opposite extremes, μάλιστα ἦ τίτον, which being unlimited, and having no proportion in themselves, would be in continual contradiction, if they were not tempered and harmonized by the agencies belonging to the class of πέρας, which effects this end by introducing in each case a suitable number or basis of proportion. He does not say τῶν ἀρίθμων, for he is speaking of particulars. This doctrine of the power of Number as the ground both of things in themselves, and of our perception of them, is the chief characteristic of the Pythagorean School, from whom it was adopted by the semi-Pythagorean Epicureans. Böckh has an ingenious remark that this basis of the Doric Philosophy stands half way between the material groundwork of the Ionic School, and the intellectual principle of the Attic. See Extracts from the "Philolaus" in the Appendix.

The MSS. and Edd. have μηγνύσι ταύτα] The MSS. and Edd. have μηγνύσι, an anacolouthon, where such a figure is a capricious violation of grammar, serving no purpose of clearness or emphasis. I have therefore adopted the correction proposed by Klitsch.

νόσοις] "The indefinite extremes of hot and cold, moist and dry, &c. τούτων and ταύτα ταύτα are the γέννα τοῦ πέρατος, instances of the Limit, not the πέρας and ἀπείροις, as Stahlbaum supposes, for how can they be said to be ἐν τοῖς ἀπείροις or πέρας ἀπεργάζεσθαι? On the other hand, we can say with perfect propriety that each limitative agent produces a Limit." When I wrote the above, if any one had asked me why these Limits were not mentioned by name, I could not have answered him. But I now see by other certain signs that this defect is chargeable upon our present text, which is very different from that of Plato. When Schleiermacher met with ταύτα ἐγγυγγέμενα ταύτα in the very next sentence, he was surprised that it was not rather ὡς ἐγγυγγομένη, (εἰς κοινωνία) and proposed a transposition, which would not have mended matters; for the previous τούτων was still to be accounted for. But no one seems to have stumbled at the worst difficulty; namely that in Ἀρ' οὖχ ἐν μὲν νόσοις, followed by Ἐν δὲ δεξί καὶ βασεῖ, x. τ. ὡς, we have a most ludicrous attempt at antithesis. The same remedy will allay both this perplexity, and that caused by τούτων. There is a lacuna in the text, where I have indicated one. This the reader can fill up for himself; but the substance of his supplement must be as follows: ἐν μὲν νόσοις (τὸ σφε- μόν καὶ τὸ ψυγχόν, καὶ τὸ ύπορχόν καὶ τὸ ἐξορόν ἐν ἀλήλως συσταθεὶν, τὸ δὲ ποιὸν καὶ τὸ μέρος δὲ ποὺ ἐγένη- ται,) ἀ τούτων ἀριθμητικὸ κοινωνία x. τ. ὡς.
οὖν, ἄρ' ὃ ὁ ταυτά ἐγγυνόμενα ταὐθ' ἤμια πέρας τ' ἀπειρόσαστο, καὶ μονακικὴν ξύμπασαν ἑ τελεωτάτα ἡνεστήσαστο;

ΠΡΩ. Μάλιστα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὲν ἐν γε χειμώσει καὶ πληγεσίν ἐγγυνόμενα τὸ μὲν πολὺ ἔλαν καὶ ἀπειρὸν ἀφεῖλτο, τὸ δ' ἔμμετρον καὶ ἤμια σύμμετρον ἀπειρόσαστο.

ΠΡΩ. Τι μὲν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τούτων ὁποὶ τε καὶ ὁσα καλὰ πάνθ' ἢμῖν Β γέγονε, τῶν τ' ἀπειρῶν καὶ τῶν πέρας ἐχόντων συμμετέχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὖ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μοῦ ἐπιλείπον λέγων, οἷον μεθ' χνειάς κάλλος καὶ λαχεῖν, καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ καί πάμπολλα ἔτερα καὶ πάγκαλα. ὦριν γὰρ ποι καὶ ξύμπασαν πάντων πονηρίαν αὐτῇ κατειδύσας ἢ σῇ Θεός, ὥς καλέ Φίληβε, πέρας ἐχόντων οὐθ'.

ξύμπασαν τελεῷται I do not profess to understand the force of either of these words. The first seems false in fact; for although all music arises from this source, each several combination does not produce all music. And again why ξύμπασαν, not ξύμπαν; There is one use of ξύμπας which we pass to a more comprehensive one: as for instance he would say τὴν ταχυτητίνι καὶ τὴν στρατηγικὴν ξύμπασαν. (Compare below; ὄριν καὶ εἰ πονηρίας.) As for τελεῳτά, that surely depend on the purity of the medium and the variety of the poos. But this attentuating of flat and sharp, and swift and slow, produces effects on recitation also, and on movement. The one good quality of all these is διπλός; and I venture to suggest, καὶ μονακικὴν ξύμπασαν τε λείτυται.

Μάλιστα γε] The best authenticated reading is Κάλλος; but the continual confusion of the two words is known to all who are familiar with palaeography, and there cannot be a doubt which of the two is most appropriate here. In Phaedr. 263 c, for καλὸν γοὺν ἂν, we must read μάλιστα γοὺν ἂν. A few pages further on, the Vatican MS. has κάλλος for μάλιστα, where the latter is obviously right.

τῶν πέρας ἐχόντων is correct: the particular proportions belong to the πέρας. Elsewhere they are called παρτοτοκία. ὦριν γὰρ ποι[] There seems no occasion for ποι he that Plato wrote: γὰρ ποτὲ.

ἡ σῇ Θεός] The notion that η θεός is a personification of the third γόνος as ὄριν κατειδύσας is sufficiently refuted by the appeal to Philebus, which could only be made because his goddess was in question. It is so probable that σῇ was lost in consequence of its nearness to γε, and it seems so necessary for the sense, that I have restored it conjecturally.

πέρας ἐχόντων οὐθ' ἡσοῦν] πέρας οὕτως οὐδὲν οὕτω πληρομόνων ἦν ἐν αὐτής, νόμον καὶ τέλειν πέρας ἐχόντων ἔστω. Such is the reading of the Bodleian and the two MSS. which mostly agree with it. It is utterly out of construction, and even Stallbaum appears to be only half in earnest in defending it. The inferior copies have ἔστω', which I regard as a conjecture, such as one often finds from the hands of the more recent scribes; nor are they always unfortunate ones. But of what use can ἔστω be to us? Law and order are the limit in this case, and can scarcely be said to have it. I have therefore accepted ἔστων as right, but in its wrong place; that is omitted by accident, and then restored to a part of the text to which it did
πλησιάζουσα λέξη σε, δεν συναντάμε, άξιος είναι τοις του

to σανάτο το πέρας τοις του γένους εκ να σανάτο 

not belong, after the second πέρας instead of the first.

Plato uses this word in Rep. 406, v, for to enfeebled. In comedy it occurs in the sense of to bored to death. There is no evidence of its being verbum palestricum, as Winckelmann supposes; at least, not in the sense he intends by his paraphrase, Deam Voluptatem rationibus et argumentis tanquam tardiis percutiam con-

cidisset. The sense is, and you say that she has enfeebled them (τάνασας), but I affirm that she has saved them. Though we durst insert ήμας after αυτήν, the Aío te Aeacida ambiguity of the syntax, which has led more than one scholar a strange dance, would be removed by the order of the two accusatives.

γένης] The Books have γενέσις, and one editor informs us that πληξός τῆς γενέσις means aí polllai γενέ-
sís. If so, πληξός του σανάτου will be an equally elegant variation of ol polllai áνθρωπος. Till this is certain, it will be more prudent to take the word which has occurred so often, and always in the very same acceptance. [γένης] This supplement, which I have put in brackets, is in the true style of the interpolator.

This is a strange assertion after πέρας had been declared to contain every possible relation of number to number and measure to measure, and the instances of it were said to be μωρία. I propose άτι for άτα, and άτα πάντα for άτα πάντα.

In order to understand this passage, it is again necessary to observe the same kind of distinction as was made in the case of πέρας between the ἓθες, ἡμισί, δι-
pλούς, on the one side, and the instances of it in Nature on the other. To τούτου ἕχοντα ἢπα, is here equi-
valent to the instances; these are also included under the term γένης εἰς οὐσίαν, by which is implied that every existing thing arises from this combination. They are said to arise ek τῶν μέτρων, from the proportions, or proportions quantities and degrees, ἐπι-

γαμμαμένου μετά τοῦ πέρατος, which are effceted simultaneously with the πέρας
ΠΡΩ. Ἐμαθὼν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ δὴ πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶ τέταρτον τι τὸν ἔραμεν ἐναι γένος σκέπτον. κοινὴ δ’ ἡ σκέψις· δρα γὰρ εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ ἄναγκαιον εἶναι πάντα τὰ γεγονόμενα διὰ τιν’ αἰτίαν γίγνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοίγεν· τῶς γὰρ ἂν χωρὶς [τοῦτον] γίγνεται;

ΣΩ. Ὁδούν ἡ τοῦ ποιούντος φύσις οὐδὲν [πλὴν ὀνόματι] τῆς αἰτίας διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ αἰτίον ὁρθῶς ἂν εἴη λεγόμενον [ἦν]

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τὸ γε ποιούμενον αὐτὶ καὶ τὸ γεγονόμενον οὐ-27 δὲν πλὴν ὀνόματι, καθάπερ τὸ νῦν δὴ, διαφέρον εὑρίσκομεν.

ΠΩ. τῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Ὁντως.

ΣΩ. Ἀφ’ οὖν ἢμεῖται μὲν τὸ ποιοῦν ἂει κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ δὲ ποιούμενον ἑπισκολοῦνθε [γεγονόμενον] ἐκείνῳ;

ΠΡΩ. Πανύ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλο ἄρα καὶ οὗ ταῦτα αἰτία τ’ ἔστι καὶ τὸ δουλεύον εἰς γένεσιν αἰτία.

(Proportion in the abstract), for as soon as ever the πέρας enters into anything, its properties immediately receive their due proportion. The whole passage may therefore be translated, — But understand me to mean by the third kind the whole produce of these two, considering all such produce as one, as a coming into being, derived from the proportions produced along with the Ἰδαί.” On looking over this old note, I feel but one misgiving; and that is as to my implied approval of the words γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν. As every γένεσις must be εἰς οὐσίαν, understanding οὐ- σία in a lower sense as a γεγενημένη οὐσία, (see inf. 27, π), the redundancy is in itself suspicious; but this suspicion becomes still more serious, when we reflect that according to Greek usage this kind of apposition would be connected by a participle; for it is not a description appended, but a reason for the previous name. ἔκχονον γένεσιν ἦν would of course by attraction become ἢ γένεσιν οὐσίαν.

τρὶς τὸ τρισ[ ] τοῖς has been at last inserted before τρισ, isōs is codicis. χωρίς [τοῦτον]] The attempts to de-
ΠΡΩ. Τι μήν; 
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα καὶ ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται πάντα τὰ τρία παρέσχετο ἡμῖν γένη; 
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

Β ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ἢ πάντα τούτα δημιουργοῦν λέγομεν τέταρτον, τῶν αἰτίας, ὃς ἵκανος ἔτερον ἦν ἑκείνοις δεδηλωμένον. 
ΠΡΩ. Λέγομεν ἔτερον γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθως μὲν ἔχει, διορισμένον τῶν τετάρτων, ἐνώς ἑκάστου μνήμης ἕνεκα ἑρεξεῖς αὐτὰ καταρεῖμησασθαι.
ΠΡΩ. Τι μήν;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἀπειρὸν λέγω, δεύτερον δὲ πέρας, ἕπειτ' ἐκ τούτων τρίτον μικτήν καὶ γεγενημένην οὕσιν τ' ἐν δὲ τῆς μισέως αἰτίαν καὶ γενέσεως τετάρτην λέγων ἄρα μὴ πλημ- 
C μελοῖν ἐν τι; 
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

[τῆς αἰτίας, ὡς ἴκ. ἔτερον ὑπὶ] See Addenda.

ἕτερον γὰρ οὖν The inferior MSS. have Λέγομεν γὰρ οὖν. Stallbaum, who is always haunted by a perverse suspicion that the older MSS. are full of grammatical corrections (a fact notoriously truer of the recent copies), prefers the latter, and asserts that γὰρ οὖν is better suited to λέγωμεν than to ἔτερον. But if λέγωμεν means anything, it means δεῦτε λέγομεν (it could not be used for λέγειν ἡμᾶς ἔστι τις), and is therefore a proposal; and γὰρ οὖν is not, and cannot be, used in the assent to a proposal; whereas in the admission of a thing proved, nothing is more common. The drift of the whole argument confirms the correctness of the Bodleian ἔτερον. ποιεῖν precedes, ποιεῖσθαι follows, but ποιεῖσθαι and ποιεῖσθαι are different. Now our first three Classes belonged to the ποιεῖσθαι=γιγνόμενα, or their elements, and as ποιεῖσθαι is different from these, it has a right to a separate (fourth) Class. (Strictly speaking only one Class, the third, is γιγνόμενον, and for that reason he uses the expression δουλεύων ἐς γένεσιν αἰτίας, in order to include the first and second, and in like manner he speaks of τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται.) The distinctness then of Cause from the other three Classes is that on which the whole stress of the sentence falls. But it was not necessary to change λέγωμεν into λέγομεν. I did so, because the rules of dialogue are very strictly observed by Plato, and therefore Protagoras would have to answer to λέγομεν. But why should he not answer to both that and ἔτερον, by the adoption of both readings? For γὰρ οὖν compare in this Dialogue 14, p. 16, b. 17, c. 50, c. d. 52, c.

ἄρα μὴ πλημμελοῖν] The Bodleian and its two followers have no μὴ. But as it is easier to account for its omission in some copies than for its interpolation in others, there is prima facie evidence in its favour; for, although μὴ and μὴ ποτὲ are very common forms of interrogation among the lower Greeks, ἄρα μὴ is a colloquial Atticism, of which they could know nothing save from books. The following passages will show the manner in which this form of interrogation is used, and that it is employed alike where the speaker is uncertain of the answer, and where he merely demands an assent on which he has a right to reckon: Phaedo 64, c (twice) and Parmenides 165, c (in these instances ἀλλότι makes the question negative) Phaedo 103, c. Crito 44, καὶ Chrmides 174, α.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δ’, τὸ μετὰ τοῦθ’ ἡμῖν τίς ὁ λόγος; καὶ τι ποτε βουληθήνεστε εἰς ταῦτ’ ἀφικόμεθα; ἃ’ οὐ τὸ τόδ’ ἤν; δευτερεία ἐξηπούμεν πότερον ἠδονῆς γίγνοντ’ [ἐν] ἡ φρονήσεως. οὔχ οὖτος ἦν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὔτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ’ οὖν νῦν, ἐπειδὴ τοῦθ’ οὔτω διειλόμεθα, κάλλιον ἄν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν ἐπιτελεσαίμεθα περὶ τοῦ πέρι καὶ δευτέρου, περὶ ὃν δὴ τὸ πρῶτον ἥμαρτήγορας;

ΠΡΩ. Ὁσοις.

ΣΩ. Ἡθι δὴ, νικὼντα μὲν ἐκεῖνον που τοῦ μικτοῦ βίον ἠδονῆς τε καὶ φρονήματος. ἢν οὖτως;

ΠΡΩ. Ἡν.

ΣΩ. Οἶκοι καὶ τούτων μὲν τοῦ βίου ὁμοίων ποὺ τίς τε ἡσυ καὶ ὑπολογοῦν γένους.

ΠΡΩ. Πώς γὰρ οὖν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μέρος γ’ αὐτῶν ἐφορμεῖν εἶναι τοῦ τρίτου, οἷμαι, γένους. οὐ γὰρ δυναίτο μαίνεται μικτοῦ ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ ἔμιπτον τῶν ἀπείρων ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρατος δεδημένων, ὡσ’ ὅθ’ ὁ μικτὸς ὁ καρδίφρος οὖτος βίος μέρος ἐκείνου γίγνο τ’ ἂν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Εἰπέν, τι δ’ ὁ σῶς, ὡς Φίληβε, ἤδις καὶ ἁμικτὸς ἄν; ἐν τίνι γένει τῶν εἰρημένων λεγόμενος ὅρθ’ ἂν ποτε λέγοντο; ὅσε’ ἀπόκρισιν μου πρὶν ἀποφήρησας.

γένους”] As the direct question is not, “to whom would the second prize belong” but, “to whom does it,” (πότερον ἠδονῆς γίγνεται ἡ φρονήσεως;) the dependent question should take the optative without ἄν. I have accordingly expunged ἄν, evitās codicis.

μικτὸς ἐκείνου] As the whole γένος is meant, of which the βίος is a part, it is plain that the common reading, μικτὸς ἐκείνου, is a blunder of the copyist. The correction was long ago proposed by Schütz. It may be objected: ‘If all mixtures belong to the one γένος, of course the μικτὸς βίος does so: but, as Socrates has only shown that the compound γένος contains all mixtures of a particular kind, namely those πείρων ὕπο νας πέρατος δεδημένων, unless he can first show that this βίος is compounded of πείρων and πέρας, his case is not proved.’ The answer to this objection is, that the fourfold division professes to be exhaustive; there are no other elements in any mixed thing, than these two: consequently, if any thing is found mixed, we may at once conclude that it is compounded of πείρων and πέρας. But later on, though we learn that ἡ ἀποφήρα is of the πείρων, νός is declared to be of close kin to αἰτία, the fourth Class. To this apparent contradiction I make answer that νός has more than one relation to τὰ γνώμην. In that it blends with the qualities of matter, and appears as consciousness, it is πέρας; in that it controls and adapts matter to its ends, it appears as ὁφήρα, and as such resembles the ὁφήρα of the Universal νός, which is αἰτία. This remark will prepare the reader for the next turn in the dialogue.
ΦΙ. Λέγε μόνον.
ΣΩ. Ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πέρας ἔχετον; η τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἦττον δεχομένων ἐστὸν;
ΦΙ. Ναί, τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον, ὁ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἡδονὴ πανάγαθον ἦν, εἰ μὴ ἀπειρον ἐτύγχανε περικός καὶ πλῆθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον.

28 ΣΩ. Οδή γ’ ἂν, ὁ Φίλησθε, λύπη πάγκακον· ἄστι ἀλλ’ τι νῦν ἱκετεύων ἦ τὴν τοῦ ἀπειρον χρύσιν, ὡς παρέχεται τι μέρος ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ἁγαθοῖς. τούτῳ δὲ σοι τῶν ἀπεράντων γενοῦς ἐστί. φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἑπιτυπήσαν καὶ νοοὶ εἰς τί ποτε τῶν προαιρετικῶν, ὁ Πρώταρχε τε καὶ Φίλησθε, νῦν ἔσσεσες οὐκ ἂν ἀσέβοιμεν; οὐ γὰρ μοι θοκεῖ οἷον ζημιός ἦμι εἰσαὶ ὁ κλίνως κατορθώσαι καὶ μὴ περι τὸ νῦν ἔστομένων.

Β. ΦΙ. Σεμύνεις γὰρ, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸν σαντού Θεὸν.
ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ σι’, ὃ ἐστι, τὴν σαντο’ τὸ δ’ ἔστοιμεν ὃμος ἦμιν λεκτέων.
ΠΡΟ. Ὠρθός τοι λέγει Σωκράτης, ὁ Φίλησθε, καὶ αὐτῷ πειστέων.
ΦΙ. Οὕκον ὑπὲρ ἐμὸν σο’, Πρώταρχε, προφητεύει λέγειν;

πανάγαθον] πάν ἄγαθον is the reading of the MSS. But whether this be taken, like πᾶς ἄγαθος in Soph. ᾖδ. β. 828, as good throughout, or as being all the good that is in the world, and therefore the only good, neither of these facts would prove that it was without limit; for it might be all good so far as it went, and yet not go very far, or it might have an exclusive title to the name, and yet be ἐλγόν τε φίλον τε. Nothing therefore can be truer or more necessary than Bekker's corrections, πανάγαθον and πάγκακον. In Philebus' creed ἡδονή is simply the very best and λύπη the very worst thing.

Οὐδ’ ἂν, ὁ Φ.] Socrates' just and ingenious retort supplies the omission in Philebus’ answer, and brings us to the twofold conclusion that pleasure and pain are in their own nature without limit, and that this want of a limit, since it admits pain as well as pleasure, the supposed evil as well as the supposed good, cannot be that in which the good of pleasure consists, for as it is alike the condition of both opposites, it cannot belong to either of them to the exclusion of the other.

Some Editors have changed δ’ into δ without authority. If δ’ could be used in the sense of “we must look for”, this would have been a plausible change. But this sense it cannot have; and therefore the suspicion falls upon δ’ itself. It is possible that λεκτέων or ὕπαλπετεον is the right reading, either of which would require ὧς.

The MSS. have τούτων δή. τούτων is a blunder due to τῶν ἀπεράντων. I have substituted δ’ for δή, because we need the conjunction to oppose τοῦτο to ἄλλο τι. γεγονός ἥτω is somewhat unusual for ὑμιλοῦσας εἶναι.

The accidental omission of these words in the Bodelian, has supplied Stallbaum with another confirmation of his strange theory that the better MSS. have undergone the revision of fastidious critics. Fastidious critics in the eleventh century must have been rare ones.
ΠΡΩ. Πάντα γε· τών μέντοι σχεδόν ἀποφαίτιο, καὶ δέομαι γ', ὁ Σώκρατες, αὐτὸν σε ἡμῖν γενέσθαι προφήτην, [ἔνα] μὴ δὴ ἡμεῖς σοι τερί τὸν ἀγωνισθήν εξαμετάνωντες παρὰ μέλος φθείξωμεθα τι.

ΣΩ. Πεπετέων, ὃ Πρῶταρχε· οὖδ' εἰς χαλέπων οὖδ' ἐπι- τάττεις. ἀλλ' ὅπως σε ἑγώ, καθάπερ εἶτε Φίλιππος, σεμνύνον [ἐν τῷ παιδί] ἐθοφύβησα, νοῦν καὶ ἑπιστήμην ἐρήμενος ὑπολογοῦσα γένος εἴεν.

ΠΡΩ. Παναπατασαί γ', ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' μὴν ἀφίσσον. πάντες γαρ συμφωνῆσαι οἱ σοφοί, ἐκατοντάδες οὖν σεμνύνοντες, ὡς νοῦς ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς ἡμῖν οὐρανός τε καὶ γῆς, καὶ ἵνας εἴ ἔργων ἀκατερτῶν μ', εἰ βούλετε, τὴν σκέψιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ γένους ποιησάμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε ὅπως βούλετε, μηδὲν μήκος ἡμῖν ὑπολογιζο̷μενο̷ σο̷μεν̷, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὡς οὖν ἀπεκφεύγαμεν.

ΣΩ. Καλὸς εἴπετε. ἀφίσσομαι δὲ πως ὃδ' ἐπανερωτήσατε.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πόσερον, ὃ Πρῶταρχε, τὸ δίκυπαντα καὶ τὸ τὸ καλομυενον ὅλον ἐπιστρεφειν φόμεν τὴν τοῦ ἄλλον καὶ εἰκῇ δύναμιν καὶ τὸ ὑπ' ἑτερήν τὴν τάναντια, καθάπερ οἱ πρόσθεν ἥμων ἡλεόν, νοῦν καὶ φρονήματι τοῖς θαυμασθῇν συνάττετον ἀκατερτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν, ὃ Θαυμάσει Σώκρατες, ὃ μὲν ἔ

[ἔνα] μὴ δὴ . . φθ. τι The MSS. have ἔνα μηδέν. This μηδέν must belong to φτείρεται, because μηδέν εξαμετάνωντες would be the very contrary of that which he dreads. But μηδέν and τι are incompatible, except in the combined form μηδ' ἐν τι, which is foreign to our purpose. The most probable correction seems to be [ἔνα] μή ἤ, [ἦν] having been supplied after μή ἤ] was corrupted. [ἦν δέ] and μή δέ are used where the person addressed is appealed to as to the reasonable nature of the thing expected or feared.

Περίτερον κ. τ. ἐ.] The connection of the clauses is this. "You thought it difficult, because I frightened you."—"You certainly did."—"Nay but it is easy." I have therefore removed the sign of interrogation after ἐίεν. The words ἐν τῷ παιδί οὐκ are very suspicious. They explain what might be left to the intelligence of the bearer, and force σεμνύνον to stand alone, whereas σεμνύνον ἐφοβήσα, νοῦν καὶ ἑπιστήμην ἐρῶμεν is not a very violent displacement of the natural order, and any reader will see why it is made.

ὑπολογιζο̷μενο̷ This is properly a term of book-keeping, and is used of anything which we set against the account of profit, such as κόσμος, πε̷το̷ν δ' ἀπεκφεύ̷γα̷μεν, I give offence.

Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν] When Socrates offers to Protarchus the alternative belief either in capricious and hap-hazard power, and mere accident, as that which has the universe in its keeping, or in mind and marvellous intelligence, as
that which arranges and regulates it, we expect Protagoras to reject the former, and approve the latter supposition. Now Οὐδὲν τῶν ἄυτων is a most complete rejection, and so is οὐδὲν ἢν οὐκ ἔχεται; but there is in the received text a fatal want of distinctness as to what he rejects; for Οὐδὲν τῶν ἄυτων is left by itself, and οὐδὲν ἢν οὐκ ἔχεται is predicated of οὐ νῦν... δή λέγεις. This shows that the copyists cannot have done their duty. The difference of the readings is remarkable. Bodl. δὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐ νῦν δὴ λέγεις; Coisl. δὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐ νῦν λέγεις: Eusebius, δὲ μὲν γὰρ δὴ οὐ λέγεις. It will be seen that they all three concur in μὲν γὰρ, which is the source of all the difficulty. But Eusebius' ΜΕΝΕΝΑΡΧΗ I take to have been the first defection from the true reading ΜΕΝΕΝΑΡΧΗ, and the νῦν δή of the best MS. will justify the change of λέγεις into ἔλεγες. Οὐδὲν τῶν ἄυτων is properly, Nothing like, and is so used by Isocrates. 270 init. (Steph.) 277 med. 279 med. 241 extr. (τι τῶν ἄυτων) and perί Ἀντ. p. 302. Lips. 1835. We may here render it by Nothing of the kind, or Nothing like the fact.

Βούλα δέν εἶς καὶ ἦντις! Do you wish, then, that we also should agree in affirming that which is proscribed by the ancients before mentioned? I have changed δή τι into δής εἶτι; τι, which the inferior MSS. omit, is quite foreign to the sentence, while εἶτι καί in this sense is of continual occurrence in Plato and other writers.

[ἡμιολογοφόρον] The MSS. generally agree in this reading. Schleiermacher reads ὑμιλογοφόρον, some worthless copies ὑμιλογοφόρον. But if we adopt -μενα or -μενα, we must have the article, and the perfect is more correct, as Theodoret quotes it, ὑμιλογοφόροις: and lastly, whether Anaxagoras be meant, or, as I suspect, some older seer or poet, it is not proper to speak of the first exponents of a dogma as ὑμιλο-

γοφόροις. Some one may propose ὑμιλο-

γοφόροιν, agreeing with, but this is said of things that agree, not of per-

sons. It is wonderful that no one has seen that ἔμφασις is followed by a 
avtive in its own right, and that ὑμιλο-

γοφός, in whatever form you use it, introduces either a tautology or a red-

undancy.

ἐμφασίδων] MSS. give ἐμφασίμων. It is true we have ἐνέμησα μόνης, Ep. 243, η, and in Sophist. 236, πρός το ταχυ ἐμφασίμαι—but as to the first ex-

ample, we have ἐνέμησι both preceding and following it, and as to the second, the whole clause is an interpolation. In Timaeus 72, π, ἐμφασίμωνις may be de-

fended on the ground that the God does not simply assent to their doctrine, but reasserts it with higher authority. Where assertion is intended, we find the form ἐφησι, so that practically it is an aorist of φασί, but for this very reason ἔμφασις would seldom want any such inflexion. ἐμφασίμωνι in this place is to be looked upon as a present tense, like εἴσώμεν, ἐμφασίζωνι, μετέχομεν.

ταλλότρια ἡμῖν καθόντων λέγει] This is evidently a proverbial phrase, slight-

ly changed, probably from ἔχειν.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Ἡδέ, τὸν ἐπιόντα περὶ πολύτων ἥμιν λόγον ἐβρει.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀγέ μοῦνον.

ΣΩ. Τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν ἐπίσης τῶν ζωῶν, πῦρ καὶ ὦμορ καὶ πνεύμα, καθορισμένοι τού, καὶ γῆν, καθάπερ δὲ οἱ χειμαζόμενοι φαινοὶ [ἐν ὑώτα ἐν τῇ συντάσσει].

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μᾶλα χειμαζόμενα γὰρ ἄντως ὑπ’ ἀποφαίας ἐν τοῖς νῦν λόγοις.

ΣΩ. Φέρε ἰδί, περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν παρ’ ἥμιν λοβῇ τὸ τοῦτον;

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖον;


ΠΡΩ. Τὶ μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ὅσον σμικρὰν μὲν τὲ τὸ παρ’ ἥμιν καὶ ἀσθενεῖς C καὶ φαιύλου, τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ παντὶ πληθὺς τε θαυμαστὸν καὶ κάλλει καὶ χάρῃ δυνάμει τῇ περὶ τὸ πῦρ ὅσον.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ καλὴ ἀληθὴς ὡς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τὶ δὲ; τρέφεται καὶ γίγνεται [ἐν τοῦτον] καὶ ἀφοροῖ τὸ τοῦ παντὸς πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ παρ’ ἥμιν πυρὸς; ἡ τούλαντον ἐντ’ ἐκεῖνον τὸ τ’· ἐμοὶ καὶ τὸ σῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζωῶν ἀπαντὴν ἐχει ταῦτα;

[Ἀνόητα ἐν τῇ συντάσσει] If this means the σύντασσις of our bodies, it is an idle repetition; if of the Universe, it comes too soon. The question is, not whether we see the Elements in composition, but whether we see them at all; that they are περὶ τῆς τῶν σωμάτων φύσεως is assumed as the general belief. He argues from the elements παρ’ ἥμιν, which we do see, to the same elements ἐν τῷ παντὶ.

[τοῦτον τ’ π. ἦν.] Note the miserable repetition περὶ ἐκαστὸν τῶν παρ’ ἥμιν... τοῦτον ἐκαστον παρ’ ἥμιν in one sentence, for this is virtually the case, since ἐστὶ depends on λοβὴ τὸ τοῦτον.

The sentence which I have relieved of this burden affords us the very ἔκαστο from which the interpolator helped himself above. “It is present here in small quantity and poor quality,” and then the double nature of this φαινεῖν is shown; it is impure and feeble in its effects. This connexion is spoiled, and the grammar made to suffer, by the intrusion of καὶ.

[ἐν τοῦτον] ἐν τί is quite suitable to γίγνεται, but by no means to τρέφεται; when we omit the words, the sentence becomes ten times more elegant and forcible, ὑπὸ being quite appropriate enough for the three verbs taken together.
ΠΡΩ. Τότε μὲν οὖν ἀποκρίσεως ἄξιον ἔργῳς

ΣΩ. 'Ορθῶς· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔρεις, οἶμαι, περὶ τε [τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζωῆις] γῆς τῆς ἐνθάδε καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ πάντε· καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡ δὲ πάντων δύσων ἑφύσηα ἄλιγον ἐμπροσθεν, οὐκ εἰς ἀποκρίσειν.

ΠΡΩ. Τό γὰρ ἀποκρινόμενος ἄλλως ἴσανοι ἐν τοῖς φανείγ.

ΣΩ. Σχεδὸν οὖθ᾿ ὁσιοσὺν. ἀλλὰ τῷ μετὰ τοῦθ᾿ ἔξῆς ἐποι. πάντα γὰρ ἴμεις τάστα τὰ τύν ἤ δὲ λεκέδεν᾿ ἃρ᾿ οὐκ εἰς ἐν συγκείμενα ἰδόντες ἐπισυνομάσαμεν σῶμα;

ΠΡΩ. Τι μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα δ᾿ λαβὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦθ᾿ ἐν κόσμῳ λέγομεν. [διὰ] τόν αὐτὸν γὰρ τρόπον ἐν εἰς ποινό σώμα, σύνθετον ἐν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. 'Ορθῶς οὖν λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ἐκ τοῦτον τοῦ σώματος ὠλος τὸ παρ᾿ ἢμῖν σώμα, ἥ ἐκ τοῦ παρ᾿ ἢμῖν τοῦτο, τρέφεται τε καὶ, ὅσα τύν ἡ [περὶ αὐτῶν] εἴπομεν, ἐληφέ τε καὶ ἔχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ τοῦθ᾿ ἔκειρον, ὡς Σάκρατες, οὐκ ἄξιον ἐρωτήσεως.

30 ΣΩ. Τι δέ; τοῦ ἀρ᾿ ἄξιον; ἡ πτωχ ἐρείς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀγέ το ποιόν.

ΣΩ. Τό παρ᾿ ἢμῖν σώμα ἄρ᾿ ὦν ψυχὴν φόροις ἔχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Δὴλον ὦν φόροις.

ΣΩ. Πάθεν, ὡς φίλε Πρωτσαρχε, λαβὸν, εἶπαι μὴ το γε τοῦ

'Ορθῶς] Compare ἴν. 58, 4. In instances of this kind, we must not take this word as merely expressive of assent, but rather of satisfaction that the argument is advancing as was intended. This will justify the use of γὰρ in the next clause.—The designations τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζωῖς (ἀν. 51, δ) and τῆς ἐνθάδε both apply to γῆς; but one would be sufficient, and the latter is better here as contrasting with τῆς ἐν τῷ πάντε. In place of καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ πάντων I suspect that we ought to read καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ πάντων.—I have changed το ἐν τῷ τούτο ἐν τῷ μ. τ.

[διὰ] τῶν αὐτῶν γ. τρόπων] The cause of its being a body is given in σύνθεσιν ἐν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν. Therefore the causal διὰ seems out of place here as well as unsuited to τρόπων. We should rather have expected κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων, but the αὐτῶν τρόπως expresses nearly the same thing. The copyist was perhaps thinking of διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς αὐτίαν.

δοσιν. τύν δὴ [περὶ αὐτῶν] ἐπιστήμων] This refers to καὶ γίγνεται καὶ ἀρχεται. But περὶ αὐτῶν is surely out of place; for that, concerning which they are speaking here, is τὸ παρ᾿ ἢμῖν σώμα. and though that σώμα contains the four elements, those elements have already passed out of the argument—ἔχεις is both better supported than ἔγειρ, and more appropriate, as Socrates is speaking of a continual derivation.

Πάθει] The reasons given seem to be two: The Universe has a soul, for
παντὸς σῶμα ἢμψιχον ὡς ἐτίγχανε, ταῖτὰ γ’ ἤχον τούτω καὶ ἔτι πάντη καλλίσυνα;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀδὴν ὡς οὐδαμόδεν ἀλλοθεν, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ που δοκοῦμεν γ’, ὃ Πρωταρχὲ, τὰ τέταρτ’ ἐκεῖνα, ἤπερας καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ καῦνον ** καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος, ἐν ἀπαισί τέταρτον ἐνόν, τοῦτ’ ἐν μὲν τοῖς παρ’ ἤμιν [ὑψηθ’ Β'] τε παρέχειν καὶ σωματικὸν ἐμποιοῦν καὶ πταισάντος σώματος

what else could have given us our souls” and “The Universe has a soul, because it has all that we have in greater perfection”. But the latter alone is intended. “If we have a soul, the Universe which has all that we have &c. must likewise have one”. πάντη refers to quantity, purity, intensity &c. mentioned above.

Οἱ γὰρ τοὺς Σωκράτες’ οἱ τοιούτοι οὕτως καλεῖν εἰσὶν evidently Cause. But if so, there is no predicate to τέταρτα ἐκεῖνα.

To remedy this, some propose to read ἔντα before τέταρτα; but neither Grammar nor Logic allows such a contrivance. Not Grammar, because if Plato had intended the clause to be taken absolutely, he would certainly have written ἔντας τῶν τέταρτων. Nor Logic, for if we were to take it thus: “Seeing that these four are”—we should immediately ask “are where”? If παρ’ ἤμιν, that could not be omitted. If every where, that is as yet unproved, nay the very thing to be proved, for in the next sentence of Socrates the conclusion is stated ὡς ἔπειτα ἔπαιρον τε ἐν τῷ παρέχει κ. τ. Ἐ. There can be no doubt that the four γένη ought to be mentioned, else how can he make any conclusion about them? So that the words τα τ. ἐκεῖνα are not an interpolation. On the other hand we know that there is an hiatus in the best MSS., for it omits πέρας, αὐτὰς and though the others have it, it is just as likely that in these it was supplied by conjecture. But the hiatus may have been far greater than that of one word. My impression is that the text in this place was in a very bad condition even in remote times, and that all which intervened between ἐκεῖνα καὶ τὰ τῆς αἰτίας γένος was unreadable. The place was then filled up pretty nearly as we find it. But not correctly: for the enumeration of these γένη without an article is in itself most unlikely, and if ἔκεῖνα had been mentioned here, it is scarcely credible that Protarchus should so very soon afterwards beg to be reminded what ἔκεῖνα meant. I believe that a more probable mode of filling up the gap would be in this fashion: τὰ τέταρτα ἐκεῖνα ἐν τοῖς παρ’ ἤμιν μόνος ἐκεῖνα, καὶ τὰ τῆς αἰτίας γένος, ἐν ἀπαισί τέταρτον ἐνόν, τοῦτ’ ἐν μὲν τοῖς παρ’ ἤμιν κ. τ. Ἐ.

[ὑψηθ’ τε παρέχει] He argues that αἰτία here below enjoys many and various appellations of σοφία (as we say σοφός παιδοτρίπης, ἱπτρός, τέκτων, χάλκικος, and so forth) and he divides the operations of αἰτία under two heads of combining and repairing (ὑποτεν. καὶ ἀρκουμενού) and gives an example of each in σωματικοῖς ἐμποιοῦν καὶ ἄρετη (Ἐμποιοῦν). It is evident throughout that he is speaking of the human ὑψηθ’ being enabled by this αἰτία to work on our inferior elements by introducing πέρας into the ἔκεῖνα and, when the μέτρον thus introduced has been disturbed, by readjusting it; in other words he is speaking of human skill. And, pray, what human skill can be said ὑψηθ’ παρέχει; But some Greek reader, who did not understand the argument, saw something about cause, and something about σώμα, and thought it was a pity that the ὑψηθ’ should be missing, and so by his ὑψηθ’ τε παρέχει, he killed all the sense of the passage. The application of these facts concerning human skill to a higher skill must be carefully noted. He does not say “there must be some other higher effects elsewhere”; but “we know of certain effects: we know that there is a φύσις τῶν καλλίστων καὶ τυπόστάτων (i.e. the planets and the whole Heavens) and this must be an
ΠΡΩ. Τούτο μὲν οὖν ἀποκρίσαις ἄξιον ἔργασσιν.

ΣΩ. 'Ορθῶς ταῦτα γὰρ ἑρείς, οἶμαι, περὶ τε [τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἡδωνίς] γῆς τῆς ἑκάθαρτι καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ πάντω καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἔδη πάντων δὲν ἑκάθαρτο ἄλλον ἐμπρόσθεν, οὖναι ἀποκρίνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Τίς γὰρ ἀποκρινόμενος ἄλλως ὑμικνὼν ἄν ποτὲ φανεῖ; 

ΣΩ. Σχεδὸν οὖν δήσωσον. ἀλλὰ τῷ μετὰ τοῦθ᾽ ἐξῆς ἐπού. πάντα γὰρ ἤμειν ταῦτα τὰ τῶν δὲ λεγόντες ἤπατον εἰς ἐν συγκεκιμέναι ἱδόντες ἐπινομάζομεν σώμα; 

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν; 

Ε. ΣΩ. Ταύτων δὴ λαβῇ καὶ περὶ τοῦτο ὡς κόσμων λέγομεν. [διὰ] τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τρόπων ἄν εἴῃ ποιο σῶμα, σύνθεσων ὡς ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. 'Ορθῶτετα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ σώματος ὅλως τὸ παρ᾽ ἤμιν σῶμα, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ παρ᾽ ἤμιν τοῦτο, τρέφεται τε καὶ, ὅσα νῦν δὴ [περὶ αὐτῶν] εἰπομεν, ἐλθάτε τε καὶ ἱσχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ τοῦθ᾽ ἔτερον, ὁ Σάκρατες, οὐκ ἄξιον ἐρωτησίως.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τόδ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἄξιον; ἢ πῶς ἑρείς; 

ΠΡΩ. Αἴγη το τοίον.

ΣΩ. Τὸ παρ᾽ ἤμιν σῶμα ἄρ᾽ οὐ ψυχὴν φύσιμον ἤχειν; 

ΠΡΩ. Ἀἴλων οὐ φύσιμον. 

ΣΩ. Πόθεν, οἶκα Πρώταρχε, λαβὼν, εἶπερ μή τὸ γε τὸν

'Ορθῶς Compare ἀν' 53, 𐀦. In instances of this kind, we must not take this word as merely expressive of assent, but rather of satisfaction that the argument is advancing as was intended. This will justify the use of ὡς in the next clause.—The designations τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἡδωνίς (ἀν' 31, 𐀦) and τῆς ἑκάθαρτης both apply to γῆς; but one would be sufficient, and the latter is better here as contrasting with τῆς ἐν τῷ πάντῳ. In place of καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ πάντων I suspect that we ought to read καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δη πάντων. —I have changed τὸ μετὰ τούτου into τῷ μ. τ. 

[Ωδ] τῶν αὐτῶν γ. τρόπων] The cause of its being a body is given in σύνθεσιν ὡς ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν. Therefore the causal δὲ seems out of place here as well as unsuited to τρόπων. We should rather have expected κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων, but the αὐτῶν τρόπων expresses nearly the same thing. The scribe was perhaps thinking of διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς αἰτίας. 

δή νῦν δὴ [περὶ αὐτῶν] εἰπομεν] This refers to καὶ γίγνεται καὶ ἱσχεῖται. But περὶ αὐτῶν is surely out of place; for that, concerning which they are speaking here, is τὸ παρ᾽ ἤμιν σῶμα, and though that σῶμα contains the four elements, those elements have already passed out of the argument.—Ίσχει is both better supported than ἤχει, and more appropriate, as Socrates is speaking of a continual derivation.

Πόθεν] The reasons given seem to be two: "The Universe has a soul, for
what else could have given us our souls?" and "The Universe has a soul, because it has all that we have in greater perfection." But the latter alone is intended. "If we have a soul, the Universe which has all that we have &c. must likewise have one". πάντως refers to quantity, purity, intensity &c. mentioned above.

Οδ γάρ τινα. The subject of ἐπικαλεσθαι is evidently Cause. But if so, there is no predicate to τέταρτα ἔκτεινα. To remedy this, some propose to read ἕνα before τέταρτα; but neither Grammar nor Logic allows such a contrivance. Not Grammar, because if Plato had intended the clause to be taken absolutely, he would certainly have written ἕνα τῶν τεττάρων. Nor Logic, for if we were to take it thus: "Seeing that these four are"—we should immediately ask "are where?" If παρ’ ἡμῖν, that could not be omitted. If every where, that is as yet unproved, nay the very thing to be proved, for in the next sentence of Socrates the conclusion is stated as ἐστιν ἐπικαλεσθαι ταύτα τῶν τέταρτων κ. τ. ἔ. There can be no doubt that the four γένη ought to be mentioned, else how can he make any conclusion about them? So that the words ταύτα τ. ἔκτειναι are not an interpolation. On the other hand we know that there is an hiatus in the best MS., for it omits πέρας, and though the others have τι, it is just as likely that in these it was supplied by conjecture. But the hiatus may have been far greater than that of one word. My impression is that the text in this place was in a very bad condition even in remote times, and that all which intervened between ἔκτειναι and καλὰ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος was unreadable. The place was then filled up pretty nearly as we find it. But not correctly: for the enumeration of these γένη without an article is in itself most unlikely, and if καὶ πόσον had been mentioned here, it is scarcely credible that Protarchus should so very soon afterwards beg to be reminded what καὶ πόσον meant. I believe that a more probable mode of filling up the gap would be in this fashion: ταύτα ἔκτεινα ἐν τοῖς παρ’ ἡμῖν μένων εἶναι, καὶ τὰ τῆς αἰτίας γένος, ἐν ἄπασι τέταρτον ἐνός, τούτῳ ἐν μὲν τοῖς παρ’ ἡμῖν [ψυχῆς Β τε παρέχων] καὶ σωματικῶν ἐμποιοῦν καὶ πταισαντος σώματος.
iaterikon, καί ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλα συντετάγματα καὶ ἀποτελομένα, πάντων καὶ παντοῖαν σοφίαν ἐπικαλείσθαι· τῶν θ' αὐτῶν τούτων ὄντων ἐν ὅλη τε σύνθεσι καὶ κατὰ μεγάλα μέρη, καὶ προσέτει καλῶν καὶ εὐλογητῶν, ἐν τούτοις θ' οὐκ ἢρα μεμηχανήθαι τῆς τῶν καλῶν καὶ τιμωτάτων φύσεως.

C ΠΡΩ. 'Αλλ' οὔδ' ὁδαμίως τοιτό γ' ἐν λόγων ἔχων.

ΣΩ. Ὅσκοιν [εἰ μὴ τούτον,] μετ' ἔκεινου τοῦ λόγου ἐν ἐπομενοῦ βέλτιον λέγομεν, ὡς ἔστων, θ' πολλάκις εἰρήκατον, ἀπειροῦν τ' ἐν τῇ παντί πολί, καὶ πέρας Ἰκανόν, καὶ τις ἔστω αὐτοῖς αἰτία οὐ φαύλη, κοιμοῦσα τε καὶ συντάσσομαι ἐναντίον τε καὶ ὅφας καὶ μήρας, σοφία καὶ νοῦς λεγομένη διεκαίρατ' ἐν.

ΠΡΩ. Δικαίωτα δήσατε.

ΣΩ. Σοφία μὴν καὶ νοῦς ἰδιοὶ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἐν ποτε γενοίσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

D ΣΩ. Οὖν τούτων ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Λείος ἐρείς φύσει βασιλικήν μὲν ψυχὴν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίγνεσθαι διὰ τῆς τῆς αἰτίας ὀνάμον, ἐν θ' ἄλλως ἄλλα καλά, καθ' θ' φίλον ἐκάστοις λέγεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Τούτων δὲ τῶν λόγων ἡμᾶς μὲ τι μάτην δόξης, ὡς Πρώτοχε, εἰρήκεια, ἀλλ' ἔστι τοῖς μὲν πάλαι αἰτηθημένοις οὐκ οἷον τοῦ παντός νοῦς ἠρχεῖ, ξύμμαχος ἐκεῖνος.

Effect of this same αἰτία operating in a higher ψυχή." Also Lexicon will give the student several examples of ἐσσα in this kind of reasoning, where we would show the absurdity of denying in one case, what has been admitted in another less evident case. I should prefer ἐν δλῳ τε τῆς σύνθεσι.

[ἐν μῇ τούτῳ] These words are out of construction, and redundant. Let them be restored to the margin, or, better still, be forgotten. In this sentence the reader will perceive the playful way in which ἐπαρθων is called τοῦ, and πέρας ἱκανόν, and αἰτία οὐ φαύλη, and will be able to judge of the worth of Winckelmann's conjecture, when he proposes to foist xονῶν without an epithet into the text.

Διδάσκει Τ. Then Jove is subordinate to αἰτία. This looks like Pantheism, but in the Theogony we are told of a δημοτικός καὶ παντάρι by whom Jove and all other Deities were made. He too is not independent of αἰτία, for the αἰτία is given which caused him to make the world, namely that he was good, and since in that which is good there is no grudge, he bearded not the world its being, but would have all things like himself. Thus the First Cause is Θεός, but the δημοτικός does not owe his being to τηγανοῦ = αἰτία; but through its presence in him he becomes the author of all things, including the Gods. Jove himself appears among these divine beings whom he addresses thus: Θεός, ἄλλως ἐγώ δημοτικός παρά τη γεωγίαν, ἀληθ' ἢ ἐρω γνώμονα, ἀλήθ' ἢ ἐρω ἐξελέγκτος— for so the passage ought to be read. Tim. 41, 1.
ΠΡΩ. Ἡστι γὰρ ὡν.
ΣΩ. Τῇ δὲ γ’ ἐμῆς ἔγνωσαν πεπορκύει ἀπόκρισιν, ὅτι νοῦς ἤστιν ἰχνούστερος τοῦ πάντων αἰτίων λεχθέντος. [τῶν τεττάρων Εἰ ἢ μὴν ἐν τούτῳ.] ἔχεις γὰρ δήποτε νῦν ἡμών ἢδη τὴν ἀπόκρισιν.
ΠΡΩ. Ἐχω καὶ μάλις ἱκανός· καὶ τοῖς με ἀποφυγάμενοι ἔλαβες.
ΣΩ. Ἀνάπαυλα γὰρ, ὃ Πρώταχε, τὸις σπουδῆς γίνεται ἐνίοθ᾽ ἡ παιδία.
ΠΡΩ. Κάλος ἔστε.
ΣΩ. Νοῦς δὴ ποι, ὃ ἐταίρη, οὗ μὲν γένους ἐστὶ καὶ τίνα 31 ποτὲ ὅταν βέβαια, σχεδὸν ἐπιεικῶς ἠμῖν τὰ νῦν δεδήλωται.
ΠΡΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἴδονός γ’ ὕσσατός πάλαι τὸ γένος ἑσάνη.
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.
ΣΩ. Μεινάρομαι δὴ καὶ τάττα περὶ ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι νοῦς μὲν αἰτίας ἢν ἵππονες καὶ τοιχον τοῦ γένους, ἴδον ἥ ψευδο- ράς ἢ αἰτία τοῦ μηδὲ ἀρχὴν ἡμᾶς ἡμῖν ἔρρημα τὸν ἔκτοτο ἐξοντος μηδ’ ἴδονός ποτὲ γένους.
ΠΡΩ. Μεινάρομαι πῶς γὰρ ὅν;
ΣΩ. Δεῖ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τούτο, ἐν ὧν ἡ ᾧ ἐστιν ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖς, καὶ διὰ τὰ πάθος γίγνεσθαι, ὅποιον γίγνησθαι, ἵνα ἐμῖς: πρὸς τὴν ἴδονήν· ὅσπερ τὸ γένος αὕτης πρώτος ἐβασανίσαμεν, οὕτω καὶ τάττα πρῶτα. λύθης ὅ’ αὖ χωρὶς τὴν ἴδο- νήν οὐχ ἂν ποτὲ δυναῖμεν ἢ ἱκανός βασανίσαι.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ’ εἰ τάττῃ χρῆ πορευόμεθα, τάττῃ πορευό- μεθα.

γενόστης] This word is quoted from this passage by the lexicographers. It is not formed according to analogy, and offers no meaning; but what γενόστης would have supplied. It may have arisen from a dittography, γέ- νος, γενόστης.—I once thought that this reference, which is itself quite superfluous, was undoubtedly right. Henceforth, pleasure is no longer considered as an abstraction, and belonging to the class of ἀπέρα, but as having come into being, and consequently as belonging to the κατα. I now see in the words τῶν τεττάρων ἢν ἡμῖν ἐν τούτῳ a marginal note, on which all correction is thrown away.
ΠΑΙΑΤΟΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. 'Αρ' οὖν σοι καθάπερ ἤμιοι φαίνεται τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῶν πέρι;

C ΠΡΩ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον;

ΣΩ. Ἐν τῷ κοινῷ μοι γένει ἀμα φαίνεσθαι λύπη τε καὶ ἢδονή γίγνεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Κοινών δὲ γ', ὁ φίλε Σώκρατες, ἑπομένηντε ἡμᾶς τι ποτε τῶν προειρημένων βουλεῖ δηλοῦν.

ΣΩ. Ἑσται ταῦτ' εἰς δύναμιν, ὁ Θαυμάσιος.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς εἴπες.

ΣΩ. Κοινῷ τοῖν τυπακούσειν ὁ δὴ τῶν τεττάρων τρίτον ἐλέγομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁ μετὰ τὸ ἀπειρον καὶ πέρας ἔλεγες; ἐν οὐ καὶ ἐγγίσεωι, ὅλμαι δὲ καὶ ἐρμονίαν, ἐπίθεσο;

D ΣΩ. Κάλλιστ' εἴπες. τοῦ νοῦν δ' ὁ τι μάλιστ' ἢδη πρόσεχε.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Λέγω τοίνυν, τῆς ἐρμονίας μὲν λυπημένης ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ζωϊς, ἀμα λύσιν τῆς φύσεως καὶ γένεσιν ἀληθινῶν ἐν τῷ τότε γίγνεσθαι χρόνῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω λέγεις εἰκός.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δὲ ἀμονοτομενής τε καὶ εἰς τὴν αὐτής φύσιν ἀπαίτουσις, ἢδονὴ γίγνεσθαι λεκτέων, εἰ δεὶ δὲι δῆλων περὶ μεγίστων δ' τι τόχιστα ψυχήναι.

Ε ΠΡΩ. Ὁλμαι μὲν σε ἄρθρως λέγειν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐμφανέςτερον δ' ἔτι τοῦτα ταῦτα πειράμεθα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ὀδηγοῦν τὰ δημοσία που καὶ πεμφανῆ ἢδονον συννοεῖρι;

ΠΡΩ. Ποία;

ΣΩ. Πείνη μὲν ποιο λύσις καὶ λύπη;

ΠΡΩ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Ἐδωδη δέ, πληροφορίς γεγονομένη πάλιν, ἢδονή;

ΠΡΩ. Ναι.

ἀποστολής] The same word is again ὁδόν, and τῆν ἀναγραφῆναι, I shoule be used below of the same thing, and there inclined to write πάλιν λύσις, or ἐπα- also with πάλιν. The expression seems νοοῦσις, which last is perhaps more like strange for a return to a natural state. the text.

On the faith of εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν
Schleiermacher, in view of Stobaeus' reading, 1εις την αυτήν φύσιν, 1εις ταύτην, conjectured εις την αυτήν φύσιν. Stahlbaum finds everything to his mind: ἀπόλοντος is said of τῶν υγρῶν, implied in υγρότητος, and εἰς ταύτην is "to the same state in which they were before". The reader will observe that there may be as much rashness in defence as in attack. Our only guide is the antithesis, in which τῆς υγρότητος φύσις can only answer to τῆς υγρότητος διάκρισις. From this it would appear to follow that πάλιν δὲ ταύτης διακρινόμενης was the original reading. Or perhaps it was πάλιν δὲ τῶν παγωνίων διακρινόμενων: but at all events it was something very different from what we now read on the authority of some unknown person who did his best to patch up a reading from his damaged copy. In what follows, the construction is purposely loose, in order to admit of more detail, and especially to prevent the φυσικὴ διακρίσις being understood of anything save the dissolution of the compound formed from the union of τὸ ἄπαθον and πέρας: hence also the double μὲν and its double apodosis.

Plato's Philebus.
It is not the expected thing, but the state of expectation which is not painful or pleasant. Nor can we put to the test of the pleasure of the hearers for the test of the pleasure of the hearers. It is again repeated that the test of the condition of the body, for so he varies the expression of that which Socrates has called the test of the condition of the body. But this variety does not satisfy the scoliot, so he gives us a tautology in its place, by repeating the test of the condition of the body.

The y να is not a test of the test of the condition of the body, shews that a certain satisfaction is implied. See above 29, 2.

It is commonly supposed that Socrates is here speaking of the condition of the body alone; but it would be strange that he should speak of these as pure, and unmixed with pleasure and pain, just after he has made them appear as one kind of them. Nor is it easy to see why he should lay so much stress on this particular ειδος, as expecting from it a solution of the whole question. In τοιτων however manifestly means not in τοιτων των προσδοκηματα, but in τοιτων των ειδων, for it follows immediately on Protagoras' των ειδων. But εικατεροις cannot be so applied, because τοιτων here involving only two ειδων, each of them would be εικατεροις. This is one difficulty; and here is another. Socrates cannot speak of either ειδος as unmixed with pain and pleasure, since they are kinds of them. But the plural εικατεροις &c., if they do not refer to ειδων, must refer to λυπες τε και ευφυς, and by substituting this emendment for λυπες τε και ευφυς, we get rid of both difficulties at once. It may appear somewhat bold to change so many terminations, but only to those who are unfamiliar with the wholesale dealing of the ancient correctors, who would think themselves quite justified in adapting all the neighbouring endings to τοιτων. I do not however admit this conjecture into the text, because, until we are certain about ως δοκει, we must be content with uncertainty in every thing else. I once thought that these words meant, that Socrates wished to represent himself as not sure till after further examination whether he should find those pure and unmixed ειδυ, but in that case he would have said ένα ευφυς ή ον μοι δοκει ευφυς ευφυς or any thing sooner than ως δοκει. If we adopt έλικατεροις γιγαντες και ομιλησας λυπες τε και ευφυς, they will be the instrumental datives to εμφασεις εικαις. Perhaps ως δοκει is merely a gloss to κατα γε την εμη, before δοξαν was added by way of explanation.

ομαι, κατα γε την εμη δοξην} The second of these phrases modifies the confident air of the first; there is therefore no redundancy, such as some have imagined to be purposely introduced to imitate ordinary conversation.
ΠΛΑΤΟΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΙΒΟΣ. 51

άμίκτως λέγης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἐμφανεῖς ἔσεσθαι τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν, πότερον ἔστω τὸ γένος ἀσπαστὸν, ἢ τούτῳ μὲν δέ ἐτέρῳ τῶν προειρημένων δοτέον ἡμῖν γενόν, ἡδονή δὲ καὶ λύπη, καθάπερ θερμή καὶ ψυχρή καὶ πᾶσα τοὺς τοιούτους, ὡς τοῖς μὲν ἀσπαστέοις αὐτὰ, τοῖς δὲ ὀχυρὸ ἀσπαστέοι, ὡς ἀγαθὰ μὲν ὀχυρὰ ἄντα, ἐνίατε δὲ καὶ ἕνα δεχόμενα τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔστιν ὑπὲρ φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθῶσα ταῦτα λέγεις ὅτι ταὐτὴ τῇ δεῖ διαπεριεύθυναι τὸ νῦν μεταδιωκόμενον.

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς τούς τούδε ἔννοιμην. [ός] εἶπε τοὺς ἐστὶ τῶν γεγομένων διαφθειρομένων μὲν [αὐτῶν] ἀληθῶν, Εἰ ἀνασωσμένων δὲ ἡδονή, τῶν μὴ διαφθειρομένων μὴ ἀνασωσμένων ἐννοιμομένων πέρι, τίνα ποθή εἶξον δεῖ τάς ἐν ἔκα

στοῖς εἴναι τούς ζώους, ὅταν ὅσον σχῆνα ἀφόρα δὲ προσέχον τῶν νοῦν εἶπεν. δὲ οὐ πάσα ἄναγκη πᾶν ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ ζῶον μήτε [τι] λυπεῖσθαι μήτε ἀδιαθαθαῖο, μήτε μέγα μήτε ἀμφότερον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀπάγη μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὁ τούτων ἐστι τρίτη ἡμῖν ἡ τοιαύτη διάθεσις παρά τῇ τῆς τοῦ χαίροντος καὶ παρὰ τῇ τῆς τοῦ λυπομένου. 33

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

tοῖς τοιούτοις, ὡς τοῖς μὲν] After δοτέον governing these several datives, the sentence requires ἔτι or ὅς; I have inserted the latter.

ἐντὸν δὲν] For the MS. reading ἐντὸν ἔτι, which is a mere repetition of ἔτι, the nearest paleographical change would be ἔτιν σο, the Y and T being often confounded; but the most appropriate and, in itself, a very probable change, is ἕτιν σον, "on certain conditions".

This I have admitted into the text.

Diaphoréthai] The argument is compared, as in many other parts of Plato, to a beast of the chase being tracked.

τὸν γεγομένων] τὸ λέγεμον is the reading of all MSS. and Edd. In place of my τὸν γεγομένων. But without some qualifying adverb τ. λ. cannot be used in any other sense but "what is commonly said". And again αὐτῶν refers to no plural expressed or implied. Stallbaum tells us, first that αὐτῶν is put for ἐκείνων (motive unknown) and that ἔστω αἱ ὑπόροι, τιγός, δίγος and so forth. The reader need scarcely be reminded that ὑπὸν and the rest never perish, but the genitives from them do, and it is these genitives, if ἐμφανεῖς, which feel the pain or the pleasure of their jarring or blending. It is also usual to say ἀληθῶς λέγεται of statements and ἓν τῶς ἐστι of facts, whereas here we have a confusion of the two. I have restored what in my opinion must have been the original text.

ὅταν οὖν σχῆ [σχῆ] I have put σχῆ for τοιούτως; we want the aorist, and ἔστι here is as misplaced as if we should ask a man, Πῶς ἔστις;

μήτε [τι] λυπεῖσθαι μήτε λυπεῖσθαι has no more right to τι than μήτε ἔστιν, and neither needs it.

ἡμῶν ἡ τοιούτων] ἡμῶν is the reading of the Coloffian and is much to be preferred to that of the Bodleian, ἡμῶν.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Ἡ ἀγε δὴ τοῖνυν, ταύτης προθυμοῦ μεμνήσθαι. πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς κρίσιν οὐ σμιχρῶν [μεμνήσθαι ταύτης] ἐσθ' ἡμῖν [茀 μη]. βραχῦ δὲ τι περὶ αὐτῆς, εἰ βούλει, διαπε- ράνωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀγε τοῖνυν.


ΠΡΩ. Τὸν τοῦ μὴ χαίρειν μηδὲ λυπεῖσθαι λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐφορθῇ γὰρ τοὺς τούς ἐν τῇ παραπολη τῶν βίων μη- δὲν δεῖν μήτε μέγα μήτε σμιχρῶν χαίρειν τῷ τῶν νοεῖν καὶ ψυχοῦ βίον ἐλευθερία.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλ' οὖντος ἔφοροθή.

ΣΩ. Οὐκόμου οὖντος ἢ ἐκεῖνη ἢ ἐπάρχει, καὶ ἵσως οὖν οὖν ἄτοπον εἰ πάντων τῶν βίων ἐστι Θεότατος.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκόμου εἰκός γ᾽ οὖντε χαίρειν τοὺς Θεοὺς οὖν τοῦ- ναντών.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὖν εἰκός. ἄσχημον γονῴς αὐτῶν ἐκά- τερον γηγλύμονα ἔστεν. ἀλλὰ δὴ τούτο μὲν ἐπὶ καὶ εἰσαύξεις οὐ εἰσανθεθῇ ὅτι ἔστελεν ἔπειπεν, εἰς πρὸς λόγον τῷ ὄς, καὶ τῷ τῷ πρὸς τὰ δευ- τερεῖα, εἰς τῷ πρὸς τὰ πρωτεία δυνάμεθα προσέβιναι, προσ- θέμοιε.
ΠΡΩ. Ὡρθότατα λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τὸ γ' ἔτερον εἶδος τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὦ τῆς ψυ-χῆς αὐτῆς ἔφαινεν εἶναι, διὰ μνήμης πάν ἐστὶν γεγονός.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;
ΣΩ. Μνήμην, ὡς ἔσοικεν, ὦ τι ποτ' ἔστι, πρότερον ἁμα-ληπτέον, καὶ κινδυνεύει πάλιν ἐκ πρότερον αὐτῆς πάθης μνήμης, εἰ μέλλει τὰ περὶ ταῦτα ἡμῖν κατὰ τρόπον χανερὰ τῇ γενή-TEMPLATED_CANNOT_RENDER
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. 'Αντι μὲν τοῦ λεληθέναι τὴν ψυχήν, ὅταν ἄπαθής αὕτη γίγνεται τάν σεισμῶν τῶν τοῦ σῶματος, [ἐν νῦν λήθην 34 καλεῖς] ἀναισθησίαν ἐπονόμασον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμαθὼν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' ἐν ἐνὶ πάθει τὴν ψυχήν καὶ τὸ σῶμα κοινῇ γιγνόμενα κοινῇ καὶ κυνεῖσθαι, ταύτῃ δ' αὖ τὴν κίνησιν ὄνομάζων αἰσθησίαν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου φησίγγοι οὖν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθεύσατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὕτων ἵδι μαθάνομεν ὅθεν βούλομεθα καλεῖν τὴν αἰσθήσιαν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Σωπηγίαν τοινυν αἰσθήσεως τὴν μνήμην λέγων ὅρθως Β ἢν τις λέγω, κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμφ' ὅξαν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὄρθως γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Μνήμης δ' ἀναμνήσιαν ἁρ' οὐ διαφέρουσαν λέγομεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσόμενον.

ΣΩ. Ἡρ' οὖν οὖ τὸ δέ; ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΣΩ. "Οταν, δ' ἐν τοῦ σώματος ἐπασχέον ποῦ δ' ἡ ψυχή, ταύτ' ἀνεμον ὁ σώματος αὐτῇ ἐν ἑαυτῇ δ' τι μᾶλλον ἀναλάμβαν, τότ' ἀναμνήσεως θαυμάζεται ποι λέγομεν. ἤ γὰρ;

ΠΡΩ. Πάντως μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καί μὴν καὶ ὅταν, ἀπολέσσασα μνήμην εἰτ' αἰσθήσεως εἰτ' αὖ μαθήματος, ἀεὶς ταύτῃ ἀναπολήθη πάλιν αὐτῇ ἐν οἷς ἑαυτῇ, καὶ ταύτα βουλέμαν ἀναμνήσεις καὶ μνήμας ποι λέγομεν.

[ἐν νῦν λήθην καλεῖς] Protarchus does no such thing. He is hidden to use ἀναισθησία in place of τὸ λεληθέναι, and to keep λήθη in the same sense as hitherto.

γιγνόμενα = "Pro γιγνόμενον Sydenhami γιγνόμενα τεντατ. Non video causam." Stallb. And then, of course, we are referred to Matthie. That the compiler of a Grammar should treasure up all the anomalies and exceptional instances, which either the self-will of authors or the stupidity of scribes supplies him with, is no more than we should expect. But the province of an editor is, as far as possible, to resist such evidence and to oppose common sense to the craving after curiosities. In such a passage as this a departure from the common rule is above all things improbable, for here the notion uppermost in the mind of the writer is the joint participation in a certain state, the common effect of two things, which a singular participle would render less apparent.

ewolf ς ἔ] The Zurich editors have not improved this passage by the conjectural reading of πάσῃ; the word ς adds to the clearness of the sentence, and is fully supported by analogous passages in this part of the dialogus.
ΠΡΩ. ὅρθως λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Οὐ δὲ χάριν ἀπαντεῖ ἐφησει ταῦτα, ἔστι τόδε.
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποιον;
ΣΩ. ἢν ἄμα τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡσυχὴ χωρίς σώματος ὁ τι μάλιστα καὶ ἑναφέσατα λάβοιμεν, καὶ ὃι ἐπιθυμίαν διὰ γὰρ τούτων ποις ταῦτ' ἀμφότεροι ἕοικε δηλοῦσθαι.
ΠΡΩ. Λέγωμεν τοίνυν, ὃ Σῶκρατες, ὑδὴ τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. Πολλά γε περὶ γένεσιν ἡθονῆς καὶ πάσαν [τὴν] μορ—ὅν, ἂν αὐτὴς ἄναγκασιν, ὡς ἐοικε, λέγοντας σκοπεῖν. καὶ γὰρ τὸν πρότερον ἐς φαίνεται ληττον ἐπιθυμίαν εἶναι, τί ποτ' ἔστι καὶ τοῦ γίγνεται.
ΠΡΩ. Σκοποῦμεν τοίνυν· οὗτον γὰρ ἀπολογοῦμεν.
ΣΩ. Ἀπολογοῦμεν μὲν οὖν, ταῦτα γε, ὁ Πρώτασσε, εὐφρόνες ἢ τον ζητοῦμεν, ἢ [ἀπολογοῦμεν] τὴν περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτ' ἀποφίλοιαν.
ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθως ἦμων· τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς τούτως πειράμεθα λέγειν.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸν δὴ πείνην τε καὶ δίψας καὶ πόλλ' ξέφη τοιάντ' ἐφημεν εἶναι τινὰς ἐπιθυμίας;
ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. Πρὸς τι ποτ' ἄρα ταὐτὸν βλέψατες, οὕτω πολὺ διαφέροντα ταῦθ' ἐνι προσαγορεύμεν ὄνοματι;
ΠΡΩ. Μὰ Λε' οὐ φαίνον ἱσως εἰπεῖν, ὁ Σῶκρατες ἀλλ' ὅμως λεξέον.
ΣΩ. Ἐκεῖθεν δὴ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πάλιν ἀναλαβομεν.
ΠΡΩ. Πάντως δὴ;

"In & Μα] The reading of all the MSS., ἀν μὴ, has sorely puzzled the editors; some have left it in despair, others have betaken themselves to τῆς; but this particle is in contradiction to the superlatives which follow, and would be more appropriate to an attempt then commencing, than to a review of the ground already won. I once adopted δῆς, but with misgivings. I now see that INAMA was divided amiss, and so ΜΑ was changed into μή. "Ἀμα τοῦτο καὶ ἀμα ἕκεναι is a very common formula. See below 41, 4, ἄμα παρακατέκαι καλ ἄμα γ' γνέσκεται. τῶν [τῆς] μορφής] As he means every phase of it, and not its whole appearance, the article has no business here. ἀν ζητοῦμεν] The common reading is, ἂπολογοῦμεν μὲν οὖν, καὶ ταῦτα γε, ὁ Πι., εὐφρόνες ἢ τον ζητοῦμεν, ἀπολογοῦμεν κ. τ. κ. It is impossible to make any sense of καὶ ταῦτα γε, nor is the first ἐπιθυμίας, without a case, supported by usage. The corruption of the passage appears to have originated with the insertion of the second ἐπιθυμίας, which probably stood at first as a gloss in the margin. Under any circumstances ὃ would be untenable, for aut' ταῦτα proves that a plural must have preceded.
"Διψή") There are two readings Διψή γά ποιμ. and Διψή ποιμ. As to the variety in the Bodleian έκάστου είτε. we have but to turn it back into the uncial character and we see that it was simply another instance of Υ being mistaken for Τ. ΕΚΑΣΤΟΤΕΙ. Now if we try to make sense of Διψή x. t. είτε. it can only mean, that something sometimes thrives, which is an incredible manner of expression, to say nothing of the perfect uselessness of γά. If we try Διψή, we may by some effort obtain this sense, "We speak of thirsting as something". I.e. There is such a thing as thirsting. But then έκάστου is loses all its meaning, and we are obliged further on to read κενούται, whereas all the Books have κενούται. This is one of those examples that in criticism nothing should be looked on as insignificant. Just as in one of the old Epigrams, I have shown that if δε και άλλον is δε δε και άλλον i.e. δε και σαβαφθε λύνα, so here Διψή ΔΕΙ was read as if it were Διψή ΓΕΙΠ. The rest was either invisible or neglected, and γά was so supplemented as to become γά ποιμ. Πληρόσεως [γά] ἀρα The construction is ἀρα τι τού τοῦ διψήντος έφραττο; εἰ στ' τε πληρόσεως. Some part, then, of the man who is thirsting is in contact with repletion. The γά is useless, unless we change its place and read Πληρόσεως γά ποιμ.
ΠΡΩ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Τὴν ψυχὴν ἂρα τῆς πληρώσεως ἐφόσπερσθαι λοιπὸν,
τῇ μνήμῃ δέχον δειν τῷ γὰρ ἂν ἐκ ἄλλῳ ἐφάγαστο;
ΠΡΩ. Ἐχειν οὔδεν.
ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὐν ὅ συμβέβηκ' ἡμῖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν
λόγων.
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον;
ΣΩ. Σώματος ἐπιθυμιάν οὗ φησιν ἡμῖν οὕτως ὁ λόγος
γίνεσθαι.
ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς;
ΣΩ. Ὅτι τοῖς ἐκείνοις παθήμασιν ἐναι πάντως
ζωῆς μνημεὺς τῷ ἐπιχειρήσαν.
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.
ΣΩ. Ἡ δ' ὁμοὶ ἡ' ἐπὶ τούτων ἐγονος η' τὰ παθήματα
δηλοὶ που μνήμης οὕτως τῶν τοῖς παθήμασιν ἐναινθαν.
ΠΡΩ. Πάντα γε.
ΣΩ. Τὴν ἄρ' ἐπάγονον ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιθυμιάμεν' ἀποδείξας ὁ
μνήμης ὁ λόγος ψυχῆς δύμασαν τῷ θ' ἥμιν καὶ ἐπιθυμιάν
καὶ τὴν ἀρχήν τοῦ ζωῆς πάντος ἀπέφηνεν.
ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθότατα.
ΣΩ. Διψῆν ἂρ' ἡμῶν τὸ σῶμα ἦ' πεινήν ἦ' τι τῶν τοιού-
των πάσχειν οὐδαιμή ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.
ΣΩ. Ἡτο δὴ καὶ τόδε περὶ ταῦτα ταῦτα κατανοήσωμεν.
βίου γὰρ εἶδος τι μου φαίνεται βουλεύσας δηλοῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖ
ἐν τούτοις αὐτοῖς.
ΠΡΩ. Ἐν τίσι καὶ ποίον περὶ βίου φρούξεις;
ΣΩ. Ἐν τῷ πληροῦσθαι καὶ κενοῦσθαι καὶ πᾶσαν δῶς περὶ
σωτηρίαν τ' ἐστὶ τῶν ζωῆς καὶ τὴν φθοράν, καὶ εἴ τις τού-
των ἐν ἐκατέρω γνυόμενος ἡμῶν ἀλγεῖ, τοτε δὲ χαίρει κατὰ
tὰς μεταβολὰς.
ΠΡΩ. Ἡτα ταῦτα.

then, in showing that Memory is that Compare Rep. 604 c; Parm. 141 d;
which introduces one to objects of desire, Crito 48, c. The figure of speech seems
has proved that to the soul belong the to be borrowed from the draught-
whole activity and desire, and the di-
board.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Τί δ', ὅταν ἐν μέσῳ τούτων γίγνεται;
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς ἐν μέσῳ;
ΣΩ. Διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος ἀλγῆ, μεμινήται δὲ τῶν ἱδέων ἢν γενομένων παύοιτ' ἂν τῆς ἀλγηδόνος, πληρώθηκαί δὲ μὴν τί 
36 τότε; φῶμεν ἢ μὴ φῶμεν αὐτόν ἐν μέσῳ τῶν παθημάτων εἶναι;
ΠΡΩ. Φῶμεν μὲν ὑδῷ.
ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀλγοῦνδ' ὅλος ἢ χαίροντα;
ΠΡΩ. Μὰ Δι', ἀλλὰ διπλῇ τινὶ λύπη λυποίμενον, κατὰ 
μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐν τῷ παθήματι, κατὰ δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ προσδοκίας 
tινὶ πόθῳ.
ΣΩ. Πῶς, ὃ Πρώταρχε, τὸ διπλοῦν τῆς λύπης ἐλπεῖς;
ἀρ' οὖν ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τις ἴμων κενούμενος ἐν ἑλπίδι φανερῇ 
tοῦ πληρωθήσεται καθέστηκε, τοτὲ δὲ τούτῳ ἄνελπιστῶς 
Β ἔχει;
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μᾶλα γε.
ΣΩ. Μὼν οὖν οὐχὶ ἐλπίζων μὲν πληρωθήσεταί τῷ με-

μνῆσθαι δοκεῖ σοι χαίρειν, ἢμα δὲ κενούμενος ἐν τούτωι τοῖς 
χρόνοις ἀλγεῖν;
ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. Τότ' ἄρ' ἀνήρωπος καὶ τάλλα ζῶα λυπεῖται ὢ ἢ 

μα καὶ χαίρει.
ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεῖει.
ΣΩ. Τί δ', ὅταν ἄνελπιστώς ἣρρ κενούμενος τείξεσθαι πλη-

ρώσεως; ἀρ' οὖν τότε τὸ διπλοῦν γλύγουτ' ἂν περί τὰς λύπας 
Πάθος, ἢ οὖ νῦν δὴ κατείδθων ψήφης ἀπλῶς εἶναι διπλοῦν;
ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθεύσατα, ὃ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. Ταῦτ' δὴ τῇ σκέψει τούτων τῶν παθημάτων τόδε 
χρησόμεθα, —
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποιόν;
ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀληθείς ταῦτα τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἱδονὰς ἢ 

ψευδεῖς εἶναι λέξομεν; ἢ τὰς μὲν τινὰς ἀληθείς, τὰς δ' ὅπω.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἃν εἶπεν ψευδεῖς ἱδονὰς ἢ λύπατ' 
ΣΩ. Πῶς δὲ, ὃ Πρώταρχε, φῶβοι ἂν ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς,

ὡς προσδοκιέναι ἀληθεῖς ἢ μή, ἢ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς;
ΠΡΩ. Ἀδύας μὲν ἐγώγ' ἂν που συγκινοῦν, τὰ δ' ἔτερα 

ταῦτ' ὅπω ἂν.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Πώς φής; λόγον μέντοι τινὰ κινδυνεύομεν οὐ πάντες μικρόφιν ἐπεγείρειν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ εἰ πρὸς τὰ παρελθόντα, ὁ παῖ ‘νείνον τὰν-δρόσος, προσήκοντα, τούτο σκέπτεσθον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσὼς τοῦτο γε.

ΣΩ. Χαίρειν τοῖνυν δεὶ λέγειν τοῖς ἄλλοις μήκεσιν ἢ καὶ ὅτι οὖν τῶν παρὰ τὸ προσήκον λεγομένων.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Λέγει δὴ μοι. Ἡθικά γὰρ ἐμὲ γ’ ἔχει διὰ τέλος ἢ ἔ δει τὰ ταῦτα, ἢ τὸν δὴ προβλέπει, ἀπορήματα. πῶς δὴ φής; ψευδεῖς, αἰ δ’ ἀληθεῖς οὖν εἰσίν ἦδοναὶ;

ΠΡΩ. Πώς γὰρ ἂν;

ΣΩ. Οὕτω δὴ ἥταν οὐθ’ ὑπάρ, ός φής, [ἔστιν] οὕτ’ ἐν μανίας οὐν’ ἐν παραφθονίας οὔδεις ἐσθ’ ὡς τις ποτὲ δοκεῖ μὲν χαίρειν, χαίρει δ’ οὐδαμῶς, οὐδ’ αἰ δοκεῖ μὲν λυπεῖσθαι, λυπεῖται δ’ οὖ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνθ’ οὖν τούτ’, ὡς νομίζετε, ἔχειν πάντες ὑπερ-λήψανεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ’ οὖν ὅρθῶς, ἢ σκέπτεον εἰτ’ ὅρθῶς εἰτε μὴ τὰ ταῦτα λέγεται;

ΠΡΩ. Σκέπτεον, ός ἐγὼ φαίνω ἂν.

ΣΩ. Λοιποῦ ὁμοίως δὴ σαφέστερον ἐτ’ τὸ τὸν δὴ λεγόμενον ἠδονῆς τε πέρι καὶ δόξης. ἔστι γὰρ ποιοι δοξάζειν ἴμιν;

ΠΡΩ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἤδεσθαι;

Ἡ ταί ‘κανον τάνδρος] The word ékainos is often substituted for the proper name in speaking of an absent or deceased person with respect. Soph. Fragm. οὐ παῖς Ἀγελαίῳς, ἄλλ’ ἐκάινος αὐτῆς εἰ. In the Republic, Socrates ad- 

dresseth Glaucon and Adimantus as ἠδονῆς ἐκάινον τάνδρος. It is not known who was Protarchus’ father, except that Socrates above calls him Callias, 

but he no doubt belonged to a principal family in Athens. Stallbaum’s notion of that man, meaning Philebus, from the scribe not understanding the 

is, I regret to see, repeated in his last adverbal use of ὑπαρ and ὑπάρ.
ΠΡΩ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ δοξάζωμενόν ἔστι τι;
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ’ ὦ;
ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸ γε, ὡς τὸ ἤδομενον ἤδεται;
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάντα γε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ δοξάζον, ἃν τ’ ὑπερὸς ἂν τε μὴ ὑπερὸς
Β δοξάσῃ, τὸ γε [δοξάζειν] ὄντως οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυτων.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γάρ ἄν;
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἤδομενον, ἃν τ’ ὑπερὸς ἂν τε μὴ ὑπερὸς ἦνται, τὸ γ’ ὄντως ἤδεσθαί δῇλον ὡς οὐδέποτε ἀπολεῖ.
ΠΡΩ. Ναι, καὶ τοῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει.
ΣΩ. "Ὅτι ποι’ ὁ ὄν ὑπερὸς δόξα ψευδῆς τε καὶ ἀληθῆς ἦμιν φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἤδονῆς μονὸν ἀληθῆς, [δοξάζειν] ὄντως καὶ χαίρειν ἡμῶν ἀμφότερα ἐμοῖς εἴπησεν,] σχετέον.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀρα, ὅπῃ δόξη μὲν ἐπιγίγνεσθαι ψευδὸς τε καὶ ἀληθῆς, καὶ ἵπτετ’ οὐ μόνον δόξα διὰ ταῦτ’ ἄλλα καὶ ποιά τις ἔκατερα, σχετέον φῆς τούτ’ εἶναι;
ΣΩ. Ναι. πρὸς δὲ γε τοῦτον, εἰ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἦμιν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ ποι’ ἄττα, ἤδονὴ δὲ καὶ λύπη μόνον ἄπερ ἔστι, ποιω τίνε τ’ οὐ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τάυτ’ ἦμιν διομολογητέον.
ΠΡΩ. Αἴλον.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ οὖν οὐκ ὑπήκοο γε χαλεπῶν ἰδεῖν ὅτι καὶ ποιῶ τίνε. πάλαι γὰρ εἰπομεν ὅτι μεγάλαι τε καὶ σμακοὶ καὶ σφόδρα.

Οὐκοῦν τὸ δοξάζον | That which fancies, whether it fancies correctly, or incorrectly, never loses its property of really fancying. It is an actual notion, though it may not correspond to an object. The same may be said of pleasure; the feeling is actually present, though the object is unreal. Thus there is no difference as to truth and falsehood between τὸ δοξάζωμεν and τὸ ἤδομενον. Unless indeed we say that pleasure is of such nature that it does not admit of any quality; but this is not so, for we speak of great and little pleasures, of good and bad pleasures, and so forth: then why not of false and true? | [Oμε] This is the reading of the best MS. for Τοῦ. I have adopted it, and added σχετέον as Baiter first suggested, but my σχετέον is that already given to Protagoras. It would exceed the compass of a note to discuss the other changes which I have made, and the reasons for them are sufficiently obvious. Let it suffice to note that the disputants do not consider, nor have they any reason for considering, why both δοξάζειν and χαίρειν have the δυ- τος, so that, had the sentence in brackets been as well expressed as it is clumsy, it could not have belonged to Plato.

σφόδρα ἐκκέντεια | Violently the one or violently the other, as the gloss λύ- ζαζεύων, which betrays its origin by not knowing its place.
ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Ἄν δὲ γε πονηρία τούτων, ὡς Πρώταρχε, προσαγίγηται τινὶ, πονηρὰν μὲν φίλομεν οὔτω γίγνεσθαι δόξαν, πονηρὰν δὲ καὶ ἡδονήν.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν, ὡς Σώκρατες;
ΣΩ. Τί δ', ἂν ἔρθῃς ἢ τούτων ἔρθησεν τινὶ τούτων προσαγίγηται; μὴν οὖν ἔρθην μὲν δόξαν ἐρωτέων, ἂν ἔρθῃς ἡσυχίας τούτων δ' ἡδονήν;
ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον.
ΣΩ. Ἄν δὲ γ' ἀμαρτανόμενον τὸ δόξαζόμενον ἢ, τὴν δό- Θέξα τὸ ἐμαρτάνονς γ' οὖχ ἔρθην ὀμολογεῖν οὐδ' ἔρθός δοξάζοντα τὸν άμαρτάνοντα
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;
ΣΩ. Τί δ', ἂν οὐλ' ἡταν' ἢ τιν' ἡδονή περὶ τὸ ἐρ' ὡς ἀληθεῖται ἢ τούτων ἀμαρτάνονος φοράμενον, ἔρθην ἢ χρήσεως ἢ τι τῶν ἀληθῶν ὀμολογῶν, τῶν προσθήκων;
ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷον τε, εἴπερ ἀμαρτήσεται γ' ἡδονή.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἐν εἴη ἡ ἡδονή πολλάκις οὐ μετὰ δόξας ὧρ- θῆς ἀλλὰ μετὰ ψεύτων ὡς ἔρθην γίγνεσθαι.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖν, καὶ τὴν μὲν δόξαν γε, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ τότε λέγωμεν ψευδής, τὴν δ' ἡδονήν αὐτῆς 38 οὔτε διὰ τὸ προσεῖτον ψευδής.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλά προφήμως ἀμείνεις τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὡς Πρώταρχε, λόγῳ τὰ νῦν.
ΠΡΩ. Οὐδὲν γε, ἀλλ' ἀπερ ἀκοών λέγω.
ΣΩ. Διαφέρει δ' ἦμιν οὐδέν, ὡς ἔσχε, ἢ μετὰ δόξης ὡς ἔρθην γ' ἂν μη.
οὖν καὶ μετ' ἐπιστήμης ἱδονή ἐπὶ μετὰ τοῦ ψευδοῦς καὶ ἄγνοιας πολλάκις ἐκάστοις ἡμῶν ἐγγυνομοίης;

B ΠΡΩ. Εἰκὸς γοῦν μὴ σιμιρόν διαφέρειν.
ΣΩ. Τῆς δὲ διαφορᾶς αὐτῶν ἐπὶ Θεουργὸν ἐλθόμεν.
ΠΡΩ. Ἄγε δὴ τοι φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. Τόθε δὴ ἄγω;
ΠΡΩ. Πῇ;
ΣΩ. Λύξα, φαμέν, ἡμῖν ἔστι μὲν ψευδής, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀληθῆς.
ΠΡΩ. Ἐστίν.
ΣΩ. Ἐπεται μὴν ταῦτας, ὁ γὰρ δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἱδονή καὶ λύπη πολλάκις, ἄλγει καὶ ψυχικὴ δόξῃ λέγω.
ΠΡΩ. Πάντα γε.
ΣΩ. Οἰκονὶ έκ μνήμης τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως δόξα ἡμῖν καὶ C τὸ δὴ δοξάζειν ἐγγυρεῖν γίγνεσθον ἐκάστοτε.
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μᾶλα.
ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡμᾶς ὅπερ περὶ ταῦτ' ἀναγκαῖον ἐγγυσθ' ἔσχεν;
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;
ΣΩ. Πολλάκις ἱδόντες τινὶ πόρρωθεν μὴ πάνω σαφῶς [τὰ καθορόμενα] ξυμβαίνειν βούλεσθαι κρίνειν φαίνει ἀν ἀυθὲν ἄπερ ὅρᾳ.

cal τὸ δὴ δοξάζειν ἐγχωρεῖν] The MSS. have, with few exceptions, τὸ δοξάζειν. This is interpreted as distinguishing one notion from another. But the argument throughout turns upon the mere act of δοξάζειν, and not a single allusion is made to the distinction here introduced. The confusion of ἄρᾳ and δὴ is one of the commonest in MSS., and there is a peculiar force in δὴ which may be illustrated by Sophocles, 234 c, ὡς τοῖς ἀληθεῖς δοξαῖς λέγομεν. καὶ τοὺς λέγοντας δὴ καθορόμενον πάντως ἄπερ ἔσχεται ἐκατέχεται. In this and other instances it is of the same force as καὶ δὴ καὶ, and expresses a kind of accumulation. The word ἐγχωρεῖν has been changed on the authority of the Bodelian, &c., to ἐγχωρεῖν, but to undertake is surely less appropriate here than to be capable, for so we may render the impersonal ἐγχωρεῖν. γίγνοσθον] Most MSS. read γίγνετ' a strange elision; but the Bodelian has preserved the traces of the true reading which I have restored; for γίγνετ' in that Book is one of the many examples of the compendium for ϑ', the sign of the grave accent, being mistaken for an apostrophe. The sense is plain enough. "From Memory, then, and from Sensation, our notions, and indeed the capacity for forming notions at all, are derived in every instance." [τὰ καθορόμενα] ... κρίνειν ... τὰθ' ἄπερ ὅρᾳ. It is very unnecessary for a man κρίνειν τὰ καθορόμενα. But whoever is capable κρίνειν ταῦτ' ἄπερ ὅρᾳ, will not fail καθορέαν the reason why we are thus mocked with a double object. A little further we read something from the same source in ἑστάναι φανταζόμενον. If any place requires simple language, it is that where such a simple
ΠΡΩ. Φαίην άν.
ΣΩ. Οικον το μετα τοιχ' αυτός αυτόν ούτος ἀνέρων ἄν οδε.
ΠΡΩ. Πώς;
ΣΩ. Τι ποτ' ἀρ' ἔστι το πωρὰ τὴν πέτραν τοῦθ' [ἔστα-ναυ φανταζόμενον] ὑπὸ τοῦν δένδρῳ; τοιτ' εἰπεῖν ἄν τις πρὸς δ' έαυτόν δοκεῖ σοι, τοιαῦτ' ἀπακάτιδων φαντασθέντα έαυτῷ ποτὲ.
ΠΡΩ. Τι μήρ;
ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν μετὰ ταῦθ' ὁ τοιοῦτος ὡς ἀποκεφάλημος ἄν πρὸς αὐτόν εἶποι ὡς ἔστιν ἀνθρώπος, ἐπίτηξις εἰπών;
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάντων γε.
ΣΩ. Καὶ παρενεχθεῖς γ' αὖ τάχ' ἄν, ὡς τι τινὼν ποιμέ-

νων ἔχον ἄν, τὸ δασόφυλλον ἄγαλμα προσείποι.
ΠΡΩ. Μίλα γε.
ΣΩ. Κἂν τίς γ' αὐτῷ παρῆ, τα τε πρὸς αὐτὸν δηθέν' ἐντείνας εἰς φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν παρόντα αὐτὰ ταῦτ' ἄν πάλιν φθέγξατο, καὶ λόγος δὴ γέγονεν οὗτος ὃ τότε δόξαν ἑκα-λοίμης.
ΠΡΩ. Τι μήρ;
ΣΩ. Ἀν δ' ἀρ' μόνος ἦν, τοῦτο ταῦταν πρὸς αὐτὸν δια-

νομένον, ἐνίοτε καὶ πλεῖον χρόνον ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ πορεύεται.
ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἀρ' σοὶ φαίνεται τὸ περὶ τούτῳ γιγνόμενον ὅπερ ἑμοὶ;

every-day occurrence is described. It is ludicrous to see such words as "What's that yonder by the rock under a tree" turned into bombast which we cannot even translate, for phantasmatai is not even Greek.

Τι ποτ' ἀρα| Iph. T. 387 (399).
Soph. Ajax 905. τίνος ποτ' ἄρ' ἑπραξε' χερὶ δύσμοις;

[ἔννυχας εἰτὼν] Chancing on the truth in what he says. To this is afterwards opposed παρενεχθεῖς, straying from the mark, or swerving.

προσείποι] This is understood to mean, He would say in addition. But what he says here is no addition, but a substitution. By changing ἄρτι into τι, and adding ἄν to ἔχων, I think I have restored the passage to its old form and sense. "Looking upon it as the work of some shepherds or other, he would call what he described, a figure." The reading of the MSS. is περὶ τούτων, in defence of which one Editor quotes from Phaedo 58, Α, Οւδὲ τοι περὶ τῆς δικῆς ἐπιστήμης, and refers to Heindorf's note on that pass.

age. Heindorf's note is well worth reading and so likewise is his note to another passage in the same dialogue to which reference is made. But it is very unlikely that he would have looked upon this as an example, or have defended it. The analogy is merely ap-
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποιον;
ΣΟ. Ἀναδέψα τὸ τῆς ἤμων ἡ ψυχή μιθέοι τινὶ προσεπεκέναι.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;
ΣΟ. Ἡ μνήμη, ταίς ἀιδοθεαῖς ἐξανάπτυσσα εἰς ταῦτον, [καὶ] ἐκείνα ὧν περὶ ταῦτας ἐστὶ τὰ παθήματα φαίνεται μοι σχεδὸν οἷον γράφειν ἤμων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τότε [λόγους]. καὶ,

parent. It would be a great mistake to explain ἐν περὶ τῆς δίκης as a change made from περὶ τῆς δίκης because of ἐκάνοντες. The main thought is περὶ τῆς δίκης πυθόμασι; to which another is added, πυθόμασι τὸ γνώμονα, or, if any one likes it better, πυθόμασι τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης. The idiom therefore arises from an attempt to make an attempt to make an article do more than its natural function, and to graft an additional, though more direct, object, on that first one which is attached to the verb by the preposition. Here, on the contrary, περὶ τούτων is not an object at all. Socrates does not want to know Protarchus' opinion about things of any kind, but whether what happens in this case appears to him to be such and such. The mere occurrence of the word γνώμονα disposes of the whole argument; nor would περὶ τούτων be intelligible in any case, for the topic of conversation is singular; namely the man δὲ τὰ φαντασάμενα πλέον γρόνον ἐξον ἐν αὐτῶ παραστῆται.

Ἡ μνήμη. The reading of the Books is the same as that in my text, except that it has περὶ ταύτης and φαίνεται, and, of course, I am answerable for the brackets. I will briefly point out the misconceptions which have prevailed about this sentence, and the difficulties which must have sorely perplexed every Editor or reader who desired clearness. We are told by one Editor that κακά ὧν περὶ ταύτης ἐστι τὰ παθήματα, is to be understood as "those things which belong to these faculties, namely to Memory and the Senses". But what other things besides Memory and the Senses, yet belonging to the same, are intended, we are not told, nor is it easy to guess. Nor is any example given of that most extraordinary use of παθήματα which is thus transferred from the affection of an organ, or of a power, to the organ or power itself. When I remember this, or see that, the remembering and the seeing produce no doubt παθήματα of my mind or of my sense of vision, but to call Mind a παθήμα or Vision a παθήμα is a monstrous abuse of language. Thus the second clause of the sentence must be so rendered that ἐκείνα τὰ παθήματα may mean "those above-mentioned sensations" or perceptions, and περὶ τῆς ἐστι which are connected with these αἰδοθείς. Well, what do these do? "They write, as it were, words in our minds." Are these words what we should call impressions? If so, it is an odd thing that Memory and the Senses and the Impressions upon them should be said to write impressions upon us. But these λόγοι, it will be said, are more than the momentary impressions, they are the abiding records, the subjective facts. If so, let us pass on: "and when this affection (here the commentators hasten to the rescue, saying "Do not be alarmed at this break-down of the plural; he is here speaking of a particular case")", and like men obliged to change carriages at the small hours of the night, we try to make ourselves comfortable in this new singular, and proceed) "incribes true things, the results are true λόγον". That is to say, that true λόγον are—the results of true λόγοι. At last we come to a γραμματέως who opens our eyes. "I am Memory, the Recorder (ὁ γραμματέως) also called the Writer (ὁ γραφομαχητής); all that has been done above has been done by me. When I am quickened by any of the senses being moved, I write their παθήματα on your mind; and when these παθήματα which I write are true, then my λόγον are true". Can there be any doubt about a correction which brings such light out of all this smoke?
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΙΒΟΣ

όταν μὲν ἂληθὴ γράψῃ [τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα], ὀδὴ τ' ἂληθὴς καὶ λόγοι ἀπ' αὐτὸν ἐξεµβάινονταν ἂληθεῖς ἐν ἡµῖν γνωµόνευοι· 

πευχὴ δ' ἦταν ὁ τοιόσοι παρὰ ἡµῖν γραµµατεύς γράψῃ, τὰ-

ναντία τοῖς ἂληθεῖν ἀπεβή.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντων μὲν ὁνὶ δοκεῖ μοι, καὶ ἀποδέχομαι τὰ ὦντος ὑπότα.

ΣΩ. Ἀποδέχον δὴ καὶ ἄτερον δηµιουργὸν ἡµῖν ἐν ταῖς 

ψυχαῖς ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ γνωµόνευον.

ΠΡΩ. Τίνα;

ΣΩ. Ζωγράφον, δ' αἱ ἐπισκευασµών τῶν λεγµένων 

εἰκόνας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τούτων γράφει.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖς δη τοιοῦτο αὖ καὶ πότε λέγοµεν;

ΣΩ. "Οταν ἀπ' υφες ἡ τινος ἀλλης αἰσθησεως τα τότε 

δοξαζόµενα καὶ λεγόµενον ἀπαγωγὸν τις τῷς τῶν δοξαζόµενων 

καὶ λεγόµενων εἰκόνας ἐν αὐτῷ ὀφεί πως ἡ τούτη οὐκ ἔστι 

γνωµόνευον παρ' ἡµῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ξεκάθαρα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΧ. Ὅψον αἱ μὲν τῶν ἂληθῶν δοξῶν καὶ λόγων εἰκόνες 

ἀληθεῖς, αἱ δὲ τῶν ψευδῶν ψευδεῖς;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπαρσιν.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὴ ταύτ' ἡθῶς εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι καὶ τὸῦ ἐκ τούτων 

σκεψόµεθα,

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΣΩ. Εἰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων ταῦτ' 

ἡµῖν οὕτω πάσχειν ἀναγκαῖον, περὶ δὲ τῶν μελλόντων οὐ.

ΠΡΩ. Περὶ ἀπάντησιν μὲν οὖν τῶν χρόνων ὡςαντός.

ΣΩ. Ὅψον αἱ γε διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτής ἱδοναὶ καὶ λῦπαν D


toτῶν γράφει) τοτῶν can have no other construction here except as agreeing with λεγοµένων, which does not want it, and is too far removed from it to be taken with it, and not far enough to require being repeated in it, or represented by it. It is also probable that Plato would use a different verb for the second artificer; and for these reasons I venture to propose in place of τοτῶν γράφει, ποὺ ἔσωσεν.

Οὐκοῦν αὖ ὡς διὰ τ. ψ.] Two things were said of the second άδος of Pleasures and Pains, (the mental class), first, that they preceded the others, ἐπὶ προγίγνοντο, and secondly, that our anticipation was thus connected with future time: ὡς ἔσωσεν . . . εἶναι γνωµόνευον. The scribes have turned this into προγίγνοντο δ' αὖ, and ὡς τῇ ἐσωσῶν. Eleven lines above we have had ἓντι γνωµόνευον, (not γνώστησι,) something that occurs; and in ἀδ. 4, we shall find the same usage. So here εἶναι γνωµόνευον is not a mere periphrasis of γνώσi-

Ωδού, but, ἐπὶ τοῖς γνωµόνευοι. Another instance which I have seen quoted, is nothing to the purpose:

Platonis Philibos.
ΠΑΝΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

ἐλέχθησαν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὡς πρὸ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σύμματος ἱδρυνόν καὶ λυπῶν προηγήσασθο, ὡς θ' ἦμιν ἐξιμβαίνοι τὸ προχαίρειν τε καὶ τὸ πρὸλυπτεῖσθαι περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον εἰναὶ γιγνόμενον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Ὁθονὸν τὰ γεφυματά τε καὶ ζωγραφήματα, ἀ συμπρότερον ἐξήθημεν ἐν ἦμιν γίγνεσθαι, περὶ μὲν τὸν γεγονότα Ε καὶ τὸν παρώντα χρόνον ἑστι, περὶ δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα οὐκ ἑστιν.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα σφόδρα λέγεις, ὡς πάντες ἑστι ταύτῃ ἐλπίδες εἰς τὸν ἑπετα χρόνον οὔσαι, ἴμεις δ' αὖ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου αἰε γέμομεν ἐλπίδων;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀγε δή, πρὸς τοὺς νῦν εἰρημένους καὶ τὸν ἀπόχρηναι.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΣΩ. Δικαίων αὖχα καὶ εὐσεβῆς καὶ ἀγαθῶς πάντως ἂρ' οὖ θεοφελῆς ἑστιν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἕδικος τε καὶ παντάπασι κακὸς ἂρ' οὖ τοῦτον ἐκλίψι;

ΠΡΩ. Ποὺς δ' οὖν;

ΣΩ. Πολλῶν μὴν ἐλπίδων, ὡς ἐλέγομεν ἄρτι, πᾶς ἀνθρωπος γέμει.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὖν;

ἀφημιν γοῦν αὐτῶν ἐκάπταν γιγνόμενον ἑστι: "Either of these is unsightly, when it occurs." (Above 38, b.)

Ὁθονῷ The Books have Πότερον οὖν. I make a very bold change, but not, as I think, a rash one. First, the argument requires it: "You admit that mental pleasures and pains have to do with the future; then surely you cannot say that, whereas our records and images concern the past and the present, they have no relation with the future." Secondly, Protagoras' answer Σφόδρα γε is a reply not to a question Πότερον, but to an assertion. Some Grammarian who read Οὐκοῦν ἐφέστη, and saw that it gave the opposite sense to that intended, beheld of πότερον as the nearest suitable word, in point of meaning, to that which he supposed to require his correction. ἡμέρας κακῶς I am disposed to believe that the word παντάπασι has been added to οἷς by way of bringing it into correspondence with the πάντως of the preceding speech of Socrates, which the interpolator supposed to belong to ἀγαθῶς, whereas it is in fact intended to colour the whole question, and to give it the air of an appeal to the conscience or good sense of the person questioned.
ΣΩ. Λόγοι μήν εἰσιν ἐν ἑκάστοις ἡμῶν, ὡς ἐλπίδας ὑνομάξομεν.
ΠΡΩ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ φαντάσματ' ἐξωγραφημένα· καὶ τις ὅρά πολλάκις ἑαυτῷ χρυσῶν γεγομένων ἄφθονον καὶ ἐπὶ αὐτῷ πολλάκις ἡδονάς· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐνεξωγραφημένων αὐτῶν ἑρ' αὐτῷ χαῖροντα σφόδρα καθορθί.
ΠΡΩ. Τῇ δ' οὖ; Β
ΣΩ. Τούτων οὖν πότερα φόμην τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ὡς τὸ πολύ τὰ γεγομένα παρατίθεσθαι ἄλλῃ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλεῖς εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς ὡς αὖ τὸ πολὺ τοῦνταῖν, ἢ μὴ φομήν;
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα φατένον.
ΣΩ. Οὐκόν καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς ἡδοναὶ γ' οὐδὲν ἤτον πάρεισιν ἐξωγραφημέναι, ψευδεῖς δ' αὐτὰί ποι.
ΠΡΩ. Τῇ μήν;
ΣΩ. Ψευδεῖαν ἂρ' ἡδοναὶ τὰ πολλὰ οἱ ποιηροὶ χαίρον· σιν, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀληθεῖσιν.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀνυγχαίστατα λέγεται.
ΣΩ. Εἰσὶ δὴ, κατὰ τοὺς τῶν λόγων, ψευδεῖς ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχαῖς ἡδοναὶ, μεμιμημέναι μέντοι τὰς ἀληθείς ἐπὶ τὰ γεγομένα· καὶ λύπαι δ' ὠσαύτως.
ΠΡΩ. Εἰσάν.
ΣΩ. Οὐκόν ἢν δοξάζειν μὲν ἄρτως ἢ τῷ τὸ παράπτων δοξάζοντι, μη ἐπ' οὖσι δὲ μηδ' ἐπὶ γεγονός μηδ' ἐπ' ἐσομένως ἐνίπτε.
ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτα γ' ἢ, οἷμαι, τὰ ἀπεχαζόμενα δόξαν δ' ψευδή τότε καὶ τὸ ψευδός δοξάζειν. ἢ γάρ;
ΠΡΩ. Ναι.

ἔνεξωγραφημένον Ὁ He sees the gold, have thought it more prudent to make and the pleasures which depend upon it, and moreover he sees himself, as part of the picture, rejoicing in himself exceedingly.' It is strange that any difficulty could have been occasioned by so simple and well-chosen an expression. The change of αὐτῶν into αὐτῶν is indispensable; but the Editors
If all that precedes is genuine, I fear that it is a waste of ingenuity to endeavour to explain τούτων. The ἔξις (namely that a thing may be real, and yet rest on false grounds,) has been shown to be ἐν ἔκεισι, that is in δόξα and τὸ δοξάζειν: and we are invited to attribute an analogous ἔξις to pleasures and pains; but if so, until this is granted and done, it is surely premature to talk of τὴν τούτων ἔξιν. The ἔξις also which we grant to these must be ἄντιστροφος to another, which is in those. This would lead us to read ἄντι ἔξιν τῇ ἐν ἔκεισι; but as to τούτων, it is difficult to see what can be done with, except to leave it out altogether. But what if we could reverse the direction of the pronouns, and by τούτων understand the notions and beliefs, and by ἔκεισι pleasures and pains? To do this we must remove ταῖς λύπαις τὲ καὶ γένοις, and frame the sentence thus: οὐχ ἄντιστροφὸν τὴν τούτων ἔξιν ἄντιστροφον ἔκεισις; For those who think this remedy too bold I can offer no other.
schemed γὰρ τῷ ψευδεῖ μὲν οὔ πάντα πονηρὰς ἢ τὶς λύπας τε καὶ ἴδιονας θείας, μεγάλη δ’ ἄλλη καὶ πολλὴ συμπτιμοῦσας πονηρίας.

ΣΩ. Τὰς μὲν τοινυν πονηρὰς ἴδιονας καὶ διὰ πονηρίαν οὔσας τοιάῦτας ἄλγον ὑστερον ἐρούμεν, ἐν ἐτὶ δοκῇ νῦν τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον ἐν ἢμῖν πολλὰς καὶ πολλάκις ἑνώσας τε καὶ ἐγγυνομένας λεκτέων. τούτω γὰρ ἡσοῦς χρησίμως καὶ μεθα πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις.

ΠΡΩ. Πώς γὰρ οὕτως λέγεις; εἴπερ γ’ εἰσιν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ ὁ Πρώταρχος, εἰςα διὰ τὴν ἐμίην τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα, ἵνα ἐν κέιται παρ’ ἢμῖν, ἀδύνατον ἄνελεγκτον δι’

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς.

ΣΩ. Προσιστώμενα δὴ καθότερο ἀνθιται πρὸς τοῖς αὐ
tὸν λόγον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἠμερεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπιστόμην, εἴπομεν μεμνήμεθα, ἐπὶ τοῖς πρόσωποι, ὡς, ὅσιν αἱ λεγόμεναι ἐπιθυμία ἐν ἢμῖν ωσί, οὐ

ΠΡΩ. Μεμνήμεθα, καὶ προερήθης τοῖς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκόν τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμούν ἢν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν τοῦ σώμα-
tος ἐναντίων ξέειν ἢ τότε, τὴν δ’ ἀληθῶν ἢ τινα διὰ πάθος ἴδουν τὸ σῶμα ἢν τὸ παρεχόμενον.

I have altered τῇ ψευδεῖ into τῷ ψευδεῖ. He is speaking of the abstract quality, not of some particular lie.

τόσον δὲ τὸ δόγμα] It is necessary to caution the reader against Stalbaum’s translation of this passage. He explains τὸ δόγμα as the belief that no pleasures are false; ἦν δὲ κέιται is consequently made to mean so long as it continues. To such a remark as is thus attributed to Socrates, Protarchus, who was maintaining the opposite side, would scarcely have answered Καλῶς. But τούτο τὸ δόγμα (not ἀκόντιο) obviously refers to the preceding εἰςα διὰ τὴν ἐμίην, and means the belief that pleasures may be false or true. This is made certain by παρ’ ἢμῖν, and no less by κέιται; for παρ’ ἢμῖν must apply to both Socrates and Protarchus, and κέιται, which is the passive of κέιμαι, is a word of unequivocal force, whether applied to a law or a proposition. The sense of the passage thus becomes plain: But until this judgment (of mine) is approved and established in us both, it is impossible for it to escape (or become exempt from) examination. I have endeavoured to give the force of the word γίγνεσθαι, which, as will be seen, signifies a great deal more than ἡσοῦς.

εἴσελθη τὸ ἰσόπτερον ἡ σύν. The Bodl. has however τοὺς for τὸ δὲ, that is, the copyist had before him TOTE and read it as TOYC. On this is founded the emendation ἔρμωντοτε. The
ΠΡΩ. Ἡν γὰρ οὖν.
ΣΩ. Συλλογίζου δὴ τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐν τούτοις.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀγέε.

ΣΩ. Ἐγνωσεῖς τοῖνοι, διότι ή τάστα, ἀμα παρακείσαται λόγος τε καὶ ἰδονή, καὶ τούτων αἰνεθεῖς ἀμα παρ' ἄλλῃς ἐναντίων οὖσας γίγνεσθαι, δι' ἓ καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐπίγνη.
ΠΡΩ. Φαινεῖται γοῦν.
ΣΩ. Οὕτων καὶ τὸ τεύχε σαί καὶ συνωμολογημένον ἤμιν ἑμπροσθε τείται, —
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποιον;
ΣΩ. Ὁς τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἱστον ἄμφοι τούτων δέχεσθαι, λύτη τε καὶ ἱστόν, [καὶ] διὰ τῶν ἀπείρων ἐπηρ.;
ΠΡΩ. Εἰρήται τι μήν;
ΣΩ. Ἐπέστρεψα τοῖς ὑπαρχοντικής καὶ ταχυπορομενής ταδ' θείας ἐκλεισθαί;

necessary conjunction Δ' was probably lost from its resemblance to the succeeding Α, as Η was from its likeness to Ν. The continual confusion of ΔΗ and ΑΝ in MSS., illustrates both these phenomena.

The most probable restoration of the passage is θείον, as θείον, but the sentence is thus rid of a second difficulty, another still lies in the sense. Plato is speaking of that condition in which the mind desires the opposite to what the body feels; so that the addition of ἱστόν makes the mind to desire pain. Many ways might be proposed to remove this difficulty, but the question is not what Plato might have written, but what he wrote, and the ways are too numerous to allow us to fix upon the very one. The sense would be secured by τῆς δ᾽ ἀληθοῦς τῆς διὰ τὴν Πάσχα θείον ἐν τούτῳ. The meaning of διὰ πάσχα appears to be, through actual impression, as opposed to the pleasure of expectation.

γίγνεσθαι is not an error occasioned by the reminiscence of the foregoing γιγνόμενον? If we read Ἐπιστήλευ, we shall get rid of the clumsy γίγνεσθαι γίγνεσθαι, and we shall have a better correspondence to εὑρίσκω, and to Protagoras' Φαινεῖται γοῦν.

εὗρη] The construction is εὑρίσκω as δέχεσθαι, δι' εὗρη,—where ἤς introduces the fact, and δι' the reason of it. This gets rid of the causeless departure from the ordinary rules of construction, in defence of which I formerly quoted Phado 95, p. But there also the text is not trustworthy, καὶ ταχυπορομενής ταδ' θείας κρίνεσθαι;
ΠΡΩ. Πη δὴ και πώς;

ΣΩ. Εἰ τότε τὸ βούλημα ἦμιν τῆς κρίσεως τούτων· ἐν τοιούτως τινὶ διαγνώσκα [βούλεται] ἐκάστοτε, τίς τούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλας μεῖζον καὶ τίς ἐλάττων καὶ τίς μᾶλλον [καὶ τίς σφο-δροτέρα], λύπη τε πρὸς ἱδονῆν καὶ λύπη πρὸς λύπην καὶ ἱδονή πρὸς ἱδονήν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐστι ταύτα τε τοιαῦτα καὶ ἡ βούλησις τῆς κρίσεως αὐτῆς.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἐν μὲν ὄψει τὸ πόρφυρον καὶ ἐγγέμενον δρῶν τὰ μεγέθη τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀφανίσει καὶ ψευδή ποιεῖ δοξάζειν, 42 ἐν λύπαις δ' ἁμα καὶ ἱδοναῖς οὐκ ἐστι ταύτων τούτω γιγνό-μενον;

ΠΡΩ. Πολὺ μὲν οὖν μᾶλλον, ὡς Σωκράτης.

ΣΩ. Ἐναντίων δὴ τὸ τῶν τῷ σμαρὸν ἐμπροσθε γέγονεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τότε μὲν αἱ δόξαι ψευδεῖς τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς αὐτὰς γι- γνόμεναι τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἱδονὰς ἃμα τοῦ παρ' αὐταῖς πα- θημάτων ἀνεπιμπλάσαν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθεύσατα.

Εἰ τότε τὸ βούλημα] I have changed the reading and punctuation. τούτων ἐν τοιούτοις τιοι is certainly not elegant, but by explaining τούτων to be the pleasures and pains and ἐν τοιούτοις τιοι to be on such occasions, some of us may be brought to tolerate it. But τὸ βούλημα τῆς κρίσεως διαγνώσκει βού- λεται brings its own condemnation with it. It may be said that there is no im- propriety in the expression—"The will wills". But τὸ βούλημα is not the will, but a particular wish, and τὸ β. τῆς κρίσεως is the wish to judge. In the Laws 863, n, Plato declares Pleasure πράττειν ὁ τε περ ἄν αὐτὴς ἡ βούλη- σις ἐξελθήσῃ; but this expression though unusual was inevitable; for Pleasure cannot desire, and if he had said ἐξε- ωθήμα, he would have been obliged to antecedently introduce the main ground of opposition to ἱμίσθος, πεθανοι μὲ ἀπάτης. In that passage I will take this opportunity of remarking that βούλησθαι written compendiously has been miscopied βουλεῖν. But how can the wish to judge judge? —and if it cannot judge, how can it wish to judge? My correction is fully borne out by Protarchus' answer — τὴ βούλησις τῆς κρίσεως αὐτῆς. By leaving out καὶ τις σφοδροτέρα, the difficulty which beset τὸ μᾶλλον disappears. Compare above 87, d, σφόδρα ἐκάστοτε, which answers exactly to μᾶλλον λύπη ἀκό.

Ἐναντίων] This is perhaps the most beautiful of all the remarks in this ad- mirable disquisition on pleasure. Formerly it had been agreed that notions, as they happened to be true or false, occasioned a corresponding difference in the pleasures and pains depending on them; but now it has been shown that pleasures and pains, by their comparative distance in time, and by their mutual contrast, produce false notions about themselves.

ἀναπλασών] Observe the imperfect: Were found to communicate their quality (of truth or falsehood) to the pains and pleasures.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΙΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δὲ γ' αὐταὶ διὰ τὸ πόρφωθέν τε καὶ ἐγγύθεν ἐκάστοτε μεταβαλλόμεναι θεωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἄμα ιδέμεναι παρ' ἄλληλας, αἱ μὲν ἰδοναι παρὰ τὸ λυπηρὸν μείζονις φαινόταται καὶ σφοδροτέρας, λύπη δ' αὖ διὰ τὸ παρ' ἰδονὶς τοῦναταίον ἐκεῖνας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι τὸ τοιαῦτα διὰ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὅσως μείζονις τῶν ὀνόμων ἐκάσταται καὶ ἐλάττωσος φαινότατος, τοῦτο ἀποτελεμένος ἐκατέρω τὸ φαινόμενον ἀλλ' οὖν ὁποίον οὖν αὐτὸ ὀρθὰς φαινόμενον ἐρείπι, οὖθεν οὖν ποτὲ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖν πέρος τῆς ἰδονῆς καὶ λύπης γιγνόμενον ὀρθὸν τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς τολμήσεις λέγειν.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τούτων τοῖν πρῶτοι ἢξεὶ ὑψόμεθα, εἰδὼς ἀπαιτῶμεν, ἰδονᾶς καὶ λύπας προείσης ἢτι μᾶλλον ἡ ταῦτας φαινόμενας τε καὶ ὁσαὶ ἐν τοῖς τῆς ἰδονῆς.

ΠΡΩ. Ποιὰς δὴ καὶ πὼς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Εἰρήσαι τοὺς πολλάκις δι', τῆς φύσεως ἐκάστων διά-

Δ φθειρομένης μὲν συγκρίσεις καὶ διακρίσεις καὶ πληρώσεις καὶ 

κενώσεις καὶ τῶν οὕτως καὶ φύσεως, λύπη τε καὶ ἀληθόν 

καὶ ὁδόνα καὶ πάντα, ὡστά τοιαύτα ὁνόματ' ἤχει, ἐμπιστεῖν 

gignomenea.

ΠΡΩ. Ναι, ταῦτα Εἰρήσαι πολλάκις.

ΣΩ. Εἰς δὲ γε τῆν αὕτων φύσιν ὡστε καθιστήσει, τοῦτον 

αὖ τὴν κατάστασιν ἰδονῇ ἀπεδεξάμεθα παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθως.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ, ὡστε περὶ τὸ σῶμα μηδὲν τούτων γιγνόμενον 

ἡμῶν ἦ; ΠΡΩ. Πότε δὲ τούτω δὲν γένοιτο, ὡς Σάκρατες;

Ε ΣΩ. Οδηγὸν πρὸς λόγον ἐστίν, ὡς Πρώταρχε, ὡς τοῦ νῦν ἦρων, 

tὸ ἐρώτημα.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Διότι τὴν ἐμὴν ἐρωτηθήνην οὐ κυλεῖ ἔμε διερέσθαι 

σε πάλιν.

Οὐκοῦν, διὸ ἂν that much then, by that the appearance itself is a right ap-

which either appears greater than it really pearance, nor will you venture to call 
it, that apparent and unreal quantity, that part of the pleasure or the pain 
you will cut off, and you will neither say which is founded upon it, right and true.
ΠΡΩ. Ποιαν;
ΣΩ. Εἰ δ' οὖν μή γίγνοιτο, ὦ Πρώτωψε, φήσω, τὸ τοιούτου, τὸ ποτὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ συμβαίνειν ἢ μὴν;
ΠΡΩ. Μὴ μυνομένου τοῦ σῶματος ἕφ' ἔκατερα φής;
ΣΩ. Οὕτως.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀδικον δὴ τούτῳ γ', δ' Σώκρατες, ὡς χῦθ' ἢδονή γίγνοιτ' ἡν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ποτὲ οὔτ' ἢν τις λύπη.
ΣΩ. Κάλλιστ' εἶπες. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, οἶμαι, τὸδε λέγεις, ὡς 43 ἀεὶ τὸ τούτον ἀναγκαῖον ἢμῖν ἔξυμβαινειν, ὡς οἱ σοφοὶ φασίν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἀπαντήσων τε καὶ κἀτω δεί.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀγονοι γὰρ οὖν, καὶ δοκούσι γ' οὗ φαύλους λέγειν.
ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, μὴ φαύλοις γ' ὑπεύχεσθε; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὑπερ- στήραι τὸν λόγον ἐπιτερομένον τούτον βούλομαι. τῇδ' οὖν δια- νοοῦμαι φείγειν, καὶ οὐ μοι ἔξυμφεστε.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀγέε ὑπείρανται;
ΣΩ. Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν οὕτως ἔστω, φαύλοις προς τοῖς τούτους. οὐ δ' ἀπόκρισιν πότερον ἀεὶ πάντα, ὅποσα πᾶσχει τι τῶν Β ἐμπήχου, ταῦτ' αἰσθάνεται τὸ πάσχον, καὶ οὔτ' αἰσθάνομεν λανθάνομεν ἡμῖν αἰτοῦς ὑπεύχετε τι τῶν τοιούτων ὃ ἄλλον πάσχον- τες, ἢ πᾶν τούναντιον; ἄλλοις γὰρ τὰ γε τοιαῦτα λέληθε πάνθ' ἡμᾶς.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀπαν όρθου τούναντιον.
ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν καλῶς ἢμῖν εἰρήκει τὸ τῶν δ' ἤθελέν, ὡς οἱ μεταβολαὶ κἀτω τε καὶ ἄνω γεγονόμεναι λύπας τε καὶ ἤδονας ἀπεργάζονται.
ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;
ΣΩ. Ὑδ' ἔσται κάλλιον καὶ ἀνεπιληπτότερον τὸ λεγό- μενον.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

*θεκτήρια| Soph. Aias, 82. φρο- νοῦτα γὰρ νυν οὖν ἐν εξῆς ἔσμεν.
Τί μὴν| This generally amounts to nothing more than an assent; but as its original meaning is What else? it is
where relief from pain (which is indif- ference) is thought and spoken of as
positive pleasure.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΙΒΟΣ.

Σ. Ό, α ν μέν μεγάλαι μεταβολαι λίπασε τε καὶ ἡδονὰς
ποιούσιν ἡμῖν, αι δ' α μέτραι τε καὶ σμηκρά το παράπαν
οὐδέτερα τούτων.

ΠΡΩ. 'Ορθότερον οὕτως ἡ 'κείνσε, ὁ Σωκρατες.
Σ. Οὐδένων εἰ ταύτ' οὕτως, πάλιν ὁ νῦν δὴ ἐγερθὲις βίος
ἀν ἴσοι.

ΠΡΩ. Ποιος;
Σ. Ὁν ἀλητόν τε καὶ ἄνευ χαρμονῶν ἔφαμεν εἶναι.
ΠΡΩ. 'Ανθέστατα λέγεις.
Σ. 'Εκ δ' ἡ τούτων εἰκώμεν τριττοῖς ἦμῖν βίοις, ἔστε μέν
δ' ἡδον, τὸν δ' αὐ τυτῆρόν, τὸν δ' ἕνα μεθέτερα. ἡ πώς ἂν φαίης
αὐ περὶ τούτων;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐχ ἄλλως ἔγηγ' ἡ ταύτη, τρεῖς εἶναι τούς βίους.
Σ. Οὐδένων οὐχ ἂν εἰδὴ τὸ μὴ λυπησθαί γινετε τῷ
χαίρειν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;
Σ. 'Οπόταν οὖν ἄκουσας ὡς ἔκμετον πάντων ἐστίν ἀλλο-κού,
πάσας διατελεῖν τὸν βίον ἀπαντα, τί τόθ' ἀπολαμβάνεις λέγειν
tὸν τοιοῦτον;

ΠΡΩ. 'Ηδον λέγειν φαίνεται ἐμου' οὗτος τὸ μὴ λυπησθαι.
Σ. Τριών οὖν ἄνων ἦμῖν, ὄντων βούλει, τίθει, καλ-
Ε λύσιν ἐν ὀνόμαθε χρώμεθα, τὸ μὲν χρυσὸν, τὸ δ' ἄγαρον,
τρίτον δὲ μεθέτερα τούτων.

ΠΡΩ. Κείται.
Σ. Τὸ δὲ μεθέτερα τούτων ἐστ' ἦμῖν ὅπως θάτερα γέ-
νοτ' ἂν, χρυσὸς ἡ ἄγαρος;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πὼς ἂν;
Σ. Οὐδ' ἄρ' ὃ μέσος βίος ἦδος ἡ λυπηρὸς γενόμενος

ἀντικείμενος θόλων.] He is not speaking of the three lives in particular, but sup-
poses any three things, to two of which names have been given, but the third
is merely known as not either. The question then is, can it become either?
See the next note.

γενόμενος] Commonly λεγόμενος. But when we consider how awkwardly this
word is placed, and then look to the preceding γένοτ' ἂν, it seems scarcely
possible to doubt that this is one of the many instances where λεγόμενος
has usurped the place of γενόμενος. It would be childish to say ὃ μέσος βίος
is not, and cannot be rightly thought to be, that from which it has been
formally distinguished; but it is ne-
necessary for the argument to show that
the circumstance of its coming imme-
diately after pain cannot after its na-
ture, and make it become pleasure.
ὁρθῶς ἐν ποτε, οὔτ' εἰ δοξάζοι τις, δοξάζοιτο, οὔτ' εἰ λέγοι, λεγεῖτη, κατά γε τὸν ὀρθῶν λόγον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ ἐκαῖρε, λεγόντων γε ταύτα καὶ δοξάζοντων αἰσθανόμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν καὶ χαίρειν οἴονται τότε, ὅταν μὴ λυπώνται;

ΠΡΩ. Φασί γοῦν.

ΣΩ. Ὅρκον ὀἴονται τότε χαίρειν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔλεγον ποι.

ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεύεις.

ΣΩ. Ψευδή γε μὴν δοξάζονται περὶ τοῦ χαίρειν, εἰπές χωρίς [τοῦ μὴ λυπείσθα καὶ τοῦ χαίρειν] ἡ φύσις ἐκατέρω.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μὴν χωρίς γ' ἤν.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν αἰρόμεθα παρ' ἡμῖν ταύτ' εἶναι, καθάπερ ἄριστα, τρία, τ' δόει, λύγην μὲν κακόν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τινὶ δ' ἀπαλλαγῇ τῶν λυπῶν, αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ἀγαθὸν ὄν, ἢδ' προσκορεύονται;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ νῦν τούτῳ, τῷ Ἑρωταῖο, ἱστομόμεθα ἣν' ἡμῖν αὕτων; οὐ γὰρ μακαρόνω.

ΣΩ. Ὄντως γὰρ τοὺς πολεμίους Φιλήβου τούδε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, οὐ μακαρόνεις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀγείς δ' αὕτως τίνας;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μάλα δευτοῖς λεγομένους τὰ περὶ φύσιν, οἷ' το παράπαν ἵδονας οὐ φασίν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Λυπών ταύτας εἶναι πάσας ὀποφυγάς, δὲ νῦν οἱ περὶ Φιλήβου ἱδονὰς ἐπονομάζουσιν.

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ἔφερ χωρίς] See Appendix.

Πότερον οὖν αἰρόμεθα] One alternative having been disposed of, the other is taken up: "If freedom from pain is not pleasure, is there such a thing as absolute pleasure?" And thus is introduced another question: "Is pleasure possible without pain?" I have added, in the Appendix, a translation of a passage from Kant's Anthropologie, which may perhaps interest some readers.

τοὺς πολεμίους] This is generally understood of Antisthenes. The description applies very well to what we learn of him from Diogenes Laertius, οὔτ', τέχνη μηκέτι, which associates his name with the Platonic ideas, which are attributed to him and his friends. A disposition without meanness but harsh, is also in keeping with his character, though not with Plato's general appreciation of the Cynics.
ΠΡΩ. Τούτος οὖν ἡμᾶς πότερα πείθεσθαι ἐξυμβολεύεις, ἢ πᾶς, ὁ Σάκχατες;

ΣΩ. Οὖκ, ἄλλ᾽ ὀσπερ μάντεσι προσχείσαθα τισι, μαντευμένοις οὐ τέχνη ἀλλὰ τινὶ δυσχέρεις φύσεως οὐκ ἀγεννοῦσι λίιν, μεμεισθέντων τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμιν καὶ νενομικότων οὐ-
δὲν ἱγνεῖς, ὡστε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτ' αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπαγώγην, γονέων, ὁς ἡδονή, εἰναι. τούτος μὲν οὖν ταῦτ' ἀν προσχείσαιο, σκε-
ψάμενος ἐτι καὶ τὰλλ' αὐτῶν δυσχεράσματα μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, αἳ γε μοι δοκοῦσιν ἡδοναὶ ἄληθείς εἰναι, πεῦσει, ἐν εἴ ἀμ-
φοῖν τοῖν λόγων σκεψάμενοι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς παραθομέθα πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρεῖς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Μεταδιάκωμεν δὴ τούτους ὀσπερ ἐξυμμάχουσι, κατὰ τὸ τῆς δυσχερείας αὐτῶν ἤχουσ. οἶμαι γὰρ τοιοῦτε τι λέγειν αὐτοῖς, ἀρχομένους ποθὲν ἄνωθεν, ὡς, εἰ βουλθείμεν ἄκουουν Ἐ ἐδὼς τὴν φύσιν ἱδοῖν, οἴον τὴν τοῦ σκληροῦ, πότερον εἰς τὰ σκληρότατα ἀποβλέποντες οὕτως ἂν μᾶλλον συννομάσαμεν ἦ

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ λέγω γ' αὐτοῖς ὅτι πρὸς τὰ περίπτεα μεγάδει.

ΣΩ. Ὁνυψίν εἰ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς γένος ἱδεῖν ἡρετικὰ ποι' ἔχει φύσιν δοκεῖτε, ὁπόθεν ὀχι εἰς τὰς πολλοστάς ἡδονάς ἀπό-

45 βλέπτειν ἀλλ' εἰς τὰς ἀκροτάτας καὶ σφοδροτάτας λεγομένας.

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς ἂν σοι ταύτῃ συγχωροῖ τὰ νῦν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὖν αἱ πρόχειροι γε, [αἴπερ καὶ μέγισται τῶν ἡδονῶν,] ἐγὼ λέγομεν πολλάκις, αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἰσίν αὐταί.
ΠΡΩ. Πώς γὰρ οὖ; 
ΣΩ. Πότενον οὖν μείζονς εἰσὶ τε καὶ γίγνονται περὶ τοῦς [κάμνοντας] ἐν ταῖς νόσοις ἡ περὶ ἤγιανοντας; ἐλαβρηθέμεν δὲ μὴ προπετῶς ἀποκρινόμενοι πταισομέν πη. τάχα γὰρ ἵσως φαίμεν ἐν περὶ ἤγιανοντας.

ΠΡΩ. Εἰκός ἦν.
ΣΩ. Τί δέ; οὐχ ἀρτα τῶν ἱδονῶν ὑπερβάλλοντων, ὡς καὶ ἐπιθυμία μέγισται προφέργονται; 
ΠΡΩ. Τότε μὲν ἀληθὲς.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ πυρετοντες καὶ ἐν τοιούτοις νοσήμασιν ἐξόμενοι μαλλον διηγώμενται καὶ δηγοῦσι, καὶ πάντων, ὄποια διὰ

which is incompatible with γε, and as γε is not found in the Bodelian and its fellows, it has been omitted in the recent Editions. But as it is impossible to account for the intrusion of the word in the other MSS., its omission in the first-mentioned must be ascribed to negligence. With γε once restored, the change of 'Αρ' into 'Αλλ' becomes inevitable; and the latter appears to me to be infinitely more in keeping with the nature of the observation; as it is more reasonable in speaking of a matter of every-day talk, to say that we conclude it is admitted, than to ask whether it is so. But the rest of the sentence requires careful consideration. The subject for inquiry is simply this: "Which are the greatest pleasures?" "Whether they are easily procured," does not concern the inquiry, though it may serve to designate them when found. If we remember that αὐτοὶ represents αἱ ἄλλοι τοιχίσκοι, καὶ ἀφορμότατοι, we see that so far there is nothing unsound in the sentence. 'Αλλ' οὖν αἱ πρόχειοι γε, δ' λέγομεν πολλάκις, εἰσὶν αὐτοίκ; but we may go further and introduce αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα. If then we look at the remainder, we see not only that it was unsuited to our purpose, but that it begins with ἈΠΙΕΡ, the same beginning as that of one of the unsuspicious parts already admitted. That is to say; a copyist had got as far as ἈΠΙΕΡ and stopped. Afterwards he saw that he had skipped δ' λέγομεν πολλάκις; so he returns to this, but forgets to cancel ἈΠΙΕΡ. "Here is some gap," says a grammarian, "which we must fill up"; and he fills it up so as to make Plato say that the common bodily pleasures which are also the greatest are the most intense. En cor Zenoδηι! En jeur Cratésι! [κάμνοντας] I have put κάμνοντας in brackets. Plato could not use the article with one participle and not with the other, but he must use it with ἡ τοῖς νόσοις, whether the participle had it or not.

προφέργονται] This is Stephens' emendation for προσφέργονται; any one who will take the trouble to attend to the Variae Lectiones of even the blunders committed in πρὸ and πρ (i.e., πρὸς), will at once see that it is perfectly absurd to decide such differences as these by the authority of the MSS. 

πάντων, ἀληθὲς] The received text is πάντα ὀπόσα. I have written πάντων, both because it is necessary, and because the neglect of terminations and the habit of giving the same termination to two consecutive words is confessedly of common occurrence. ἄρεως alone might leave us in doubt whether it ought not to be περὶ πάντα; but the addition of ἀποκληρομένων decides the question in favour of the genitive. Stahlbaum's explanatory paraphrase πάντα εἰλαχίον παράγει, ὑπόσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἑξαλλάσσα πάσης shows an utter misconception of what brevity authorises or not, is untrue in fact, and while it gives καὶ the office of joining two coordinate clauses, leaves τα to join two sentences.
The Books have ἐγγίγνονται. Τέτοια καὶ γενόμεται (for so it is often written in MS.) are continually confounded. This I first learned from a note of Cobet in his Edition of a Fragment of Philostratus. I have since found another instance in Strabo xvi. 3, where we must read ὅταν ἐπιστρέφεται τὸ παράδοξον "so that the marvellous is intensified". Compare below 46, D, ξύν-τασιν ἔχοντας, and 47, A, ἐξυπνεῖ τε καὶ ἔνως τριής ποτί. I am acquainted with the fragments of Eupolis and Teledelides where συγγράφως is coupled with μάζας and with φάραγως; but they are merely comic expressions for enjoying, like Aristophanes' having an ἀπερίδον τοῖς στρατεῖσι. Φροντίζει συγγράφω (Eup. fragm.) is a little more apposite, but συγγράφως οὐκ ἐπί τοῖς τὸ μέλλον καὶ ἐπί τοῖς δεχομένοις.

Πάντως μὲν οὖν ῥήθην ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐθεντικοῦ κόμη τῆς ἑτούμας, which will make νῦν unnecessary.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

λόγος ἐκάστοτε, ὅ τοι Μηδὲν ἄγαν παρασελεύμενος, ὃ πεῖ—Ε Ἰνναια: τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων τε καὶ ὑβριστῶν μέχρι μανίας ἦ σφοδρὰ ὕδων κατέχονα τεράδομοι ἀπεφαγέται.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς· καὶ εἶ γε ταῦτ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὡς ἐν τινὶ πονηρᾷ ψυχῇ [καὶ τοῦ σώματος], ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ἀφτηθ' μέγισται μὲν ὕδων, μέγιστα δὲ καὶ λύπαι, γίγνονται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οἰκοῦν τούτων τινὰς προσέλομεν δεῖ σκοπεῖσθαι, τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον ἔχωσας ἐλέγομεν αὐτὰς εἶναι μεγίστας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ τὰς τῶν τοιῶν νοομάτων ὕδονάς, τίνα ποτὲ ἔχοντες τρόπον.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν;

ΣΩ. Τὰς τῶν ἀσχημόνων, ὡς οὖς εἰδομεν ἀναφερεῖσι με- σοῦν παντελῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας;

ΣΩ. Οἶλον τὰς τῆς ψώφας ἱάσεις τῷ τρίβειν, καὶ ὡσι τουαίτα, οὐχ ἄλλης δεόμενα φαρμάξεως. τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ τὸ πά- ρος ἢμιν, ὧ πρὸς θεῶν, τί ποτὲ φώμεν ἐγγύνεσθαι; πόσερον ὕδονὴν ἢ λύπην;

ΠΡΩ. Σύμμικτον τούτῳ γε [ἀρα], ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐσχοὶ γί- γνεσθαι τι κακῶν.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μήν ἐν Φιλήβου γ' ἑνεκα παρεθέμην τὸν λόγον. Β

profess it), for you will answer my ques-

τωρθούν] Pratonic. The word is properly applied to men maddened by the noise of some Bacchanalian or other orgies, and then generally of extravagant and impetuous characters. It is here opposed to the std and seemly demeanour of the temperate.

[kai τοῦ σώματος]] It is impossible that this passage should be correct as we now read it. Plato has passed from the diseases of the body to ἤπειρης, which is a disease of the mind. The presence of the article betrays the interpolator.

[ἀρα] I have cancelled ἄρα as perfectly unmeaning. Some scribe had written σύμμικτον τούτῳ γὰρ through mistaking γα. Another came and turned γαρ into γ' ἄρα.

Οὐ μήν ἐν Φιλήβου γ'] The Cois- linian has μήν which one Editor adopts and so affords to another the opportunity for telling the world that δὲ is never put after μήν. A little attention to the sense would have been better bestowed than it is on such a truism. As the words stand in the Books, Socrates is made to say that he did not bring forward these instances about ίπθ on account of Philebus. Probably not; but why say so? Is he afraid lest Φιλή- βας ὃ καλὸς should be troubled with the complaint? Or can he think it necessary to declare that it was not to make fun of him that he alluded to it? As this is out of the question, the only other reason for bringing Phile- bus in at all must be that Philebus is fastidious, and will look upon him as
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

ἀλλ’ ἂνευ τούτων, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τῶν ἦδονῶν καὶ τῶν ταύταις ἐπομένων, ἂν μὴ κατοφθώσαι, σχεδόν οὖν ἂν ποτε δυναμεθά διακρίνωσαι τὸ νῦν ξηπτομένον.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκόν εἰτέν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ τάς τούτων ξυγγενείς, τάς ἐν τῇ μίξει κοινωνούσας, λέγεις;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Εἰςα τούτων [μίξεις] αἰ μὲν κατά το ἄσμα ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς σώμασιν, αἱ δ’ αὐτές τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῆ. τάς δ’ αὑτοὶ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀνεφύσομεν λύτας ἠδονὰς μυθείσας, τοτε μὲν ἠδονὰς τὰ ξυπαμφότερα, τοτε δὲ λύτας ἐπικαλουμένας.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. ὸπότεν ἐν τῇ καταστάσει τις ἡτὶ διαφθοραῖς τάναι ἢ μικρὴ πάχη, ποτὲ ἰγνὸν Θερμαὶ καὶ Θερμανόμενος ἔνοικος ἡμρης, ζητῶν, οἴμαι, τὸ μὲν ἔχειν, τοῦ δ’ ἀπαλλατ- τεύσαι, τὸ δ’ ἕλθομεν πικρόγλυκα [μεμηγήμον], μετὰ δ’ δυσπαλλακτικὰ παρόν, ἄγανάκτησιν καὶ άσειον ἤφειον ποιεῖν.

οφορτικός for making such nasty allusions. This is in keeping with the other traits of him in the dialogue; but then he must say: "For Philebus' sake I would not have introduced this topic, but I cannot do without it." And so the ΔΗ which helped Stallbaum to chastise Fischer disappears into the AN, and as μίξεις is the equivalent of μίξις and γε is found in all the Books, I have adopted the latter particle also.

Οὕτων εἰτέν [In the Books Protagoras' speech in continued down to ξυγγενείς: which arrangement makes the young man show the way and the philosopher follow it.

Εἰςα τούτων I have cancelled μίξεις. Unless this be done, and ζητῶν κοινωνούσα be understood, the following clauses make downright nonsense. "There are bodily pleasures which mix in bodies, and mental pleasures which mix in the mind", is true and simple. But if you say there are mixtures—then one of each pair, either κατά το σώμα or ἐν ἀ. τ. σώματι, either αὐτῆς τ. ψ. or ἐν τῇ ψυχῆ becomes quite meaningless.

word This word occurs twice in the Bodleian, both before and after δηχέναι. It is properly cancelled in the second place, for being used in opposition to ἔνοικος, it would be placed in such a part of the sentence as would mark that it is not used as a mere enclitic. Bekker’s correction of πικρόγλυκα for πικρὸ γλυκὸ is fully borne out by τὸ δ’ ἕλθο- μεν: but in recommending it he should also have advised the expulsion of μεμηγήμον. For δυσπαλλακτικὰ Hirschig reads δυσπαλαλλάςια. But the departure from analogy is in favour of our reading, as a probable Atticism.

ξυστασις This is the reading of the best MSS.; the others have σύστασις, which is irreconcilable with ἄγανάκτησις, such an epithet being only applicable to a word signifying some active process. Besides, σύστασις after ἄγανακτησις would be an antithesis; for it is properly used to denote the effect of sadness;
in turning the mind back upon itself. Ἐνυπερβλητήν is used a little further on as the effect of pleasure; it is obvious that the figure of speech being derived from the strain upon a cord, is applicable alike to the rackings of pain (renes morbo tentantur acuto) or the thrill of pleasure (pertantant gaudia pectus).

Δέν θῇ τὰς μὲν; The first part of this passage is easy enough, when once we learn to separate the process referred to in the sentence ending with γαγαλιζεῖ to καί ἡμᾶς ἁγανακτεῖν ποιεῖ, to δὲ αὕτη ἡ ἡδονῆς πολὺ πλεῖον ἐγκεχυμένον συνεῖνει τε καὶ ἐνίστε πρῆδαν ποιεῖ, καί

Πλατωνος Φιλεβους.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μᾶλ’ ἀληθές τὸ τῶν λεγόμενων. 
ΣΩ. Οὕτων αἱ τοιαύται μέσες αἱ μὲν ἐὰν ὅσον εἰσὶ λυπῶν τε καὶ ἡδονῶν, αἱ δ’ ἐκ τῶν ἐκείνων πλεῖστον.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γάρ οὐ;
ΣΩ. Δέν δὴ τὰς μὲν, ὅταν πλεῖστοι λύπα τῶν ἡδονῶν γίγνονται, τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς λεγόμενας τῶν δὴ ταύτας εἶναι καὶ τὰς τῶν γαγαλιζείων, ὑπόταν ὅ’ ἐντὸς τὸ ξένον καὶ τὸ φλεγμαίνον, τῇ τρίπτει δὲ καὶ τῇ κνήσει μὴ ἐφικνυταί τις, τὰ δ’ ἐπιτοπῆς μόνον διαχεί, τοτε φέροντες εἰς πυρ αὕτα καὶ εἰς Εὐ τοιαύταν μεταβάλλοντες, ἀκορίας ἐνίοτον ἀμυχάνους γένοις, τοτε δὲ τοιαύταν τοῖς ἐντὸς πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἐξω λύπας ἡδονῶν ἔγκυραζουσίας, εἰς ὑπότερ’ ἐν δύπη, παρεξοῦν, τῷ τὰ συγκεκριμένα βία διαχεῖν ἢ τὰ διαπεκριμένα συγχεῖν ἢ καὶ ὦμοι λύπας ἡδονῶν παρατεθέναι.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.
ΣΩ. Οὐχοῦν ὑπόταν [αὖ] πλεῖον ἡδονή κατὰ τὰ τοιαύτα πάντα ἕμμικρήν, τὸ μὲν ὑπομεμιγμένον τῆς λύπας γαγαλίζει τε καὶ ἡμᾶς ἁγανακτεῖν ποιεῖ, τὸ δ’ αὖ τῆς ἡδονῆς πολὺ πλεῖον ἐγκεχυμένον συνείνει τε καὶ ἐνίστε πρῆδαν ποιεῖ, καὶ
παντοίαι μὲν χρώματα, παντοία δὲ σχήματα, παντοία δὲ πνεύματα τάπεργαζόμενα πάσαν ἐκπλήξαν καὶ βοῶς μετ΄ ἀφρούνθης ἀπεργάζεται.

ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ λέγειν γ’, ὦ ἑταῖρε, αὐτῶν τε περὶ ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖ καὶ ἄλλων περὶ ἄλλου, ὡς ταύταις ταῖς Ἰδοναῖς τερπόμενος σὸν ἀπεθνήσκε. καὶ ταύτας γε δὴ τινικάπως ἂν εἰς μεταδομεί τοιοῦτο μᾶλλον, διότι ἐν ἀκολουθίας τε καὶ ἀφρόστερος ἰδον τυχάνη καὶ καλεὶ δὴ μεγίστας ταύτας, καὶ τῶν ἐν ταύταις τῷ τι μᾶλλον αὐτὶ λατινὶ, εὐδαιμονετακὼν καταφημίατα.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα, ὡ Σώκρατε, τὰ συμβαίνοντα πρὸς τῶν C πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς δόξαν διεπέρανον.

παντοία μὲν χρώματα | It causes all manner of changes in complexion, and changes in posture, and changes in breathing, which produce the utmost excitement and shuddering with delirium. Though I have retained ἄπεργαζόμενα, and endeavoured to render it as above, it is rather as against Buttman's ἄπεργαζόμενον than as believing in the genuineness of the word. The singular would mean that the excess of the pleasure by producing the changes in complexion, posture &c., produced the mental defects; which is no truer than that these changes caused them. But the very combination ἄπεργαζόμενα ἄπεργαζότατος is unworthy of even a third-rate writer. I say ἄπεργαζότατος, for this is the Bodleian reading, and ἄπεργαζότατος is merely a contrivance, and not a successful one, made by the corrector of some inferior copy, to avoid the inessential repetition. As to πνεύματα, no doubt the respiration would be troubled; as in the description of Hercules' madness, we read (H. P. 889) ὄμνοις δ' οὐ σωματεία, ταῖρος δ' ὡς ἐς ἐμβολήν. But πνεύματα do not admit of sufficient variety to be called πναντοῖα. It is not unlikely that this addition is due to some corrupt dictionary, and that the old text read thus: παντοία μὲν χρώματα, παντοία δὲ σχήματα, πάντως δ' ἐξισαμαρτήσας καὶ βοῶς μετ᾽ ἀφρούνθης ἀπεργάζοτας.

ἄλλων περὶ ἄλλου | One class of MSS. has ἄλλον, the other περὶ ἄλλου. I have combined the two readings.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Περὶ γε τῶν ἤδονῶν, ὥς Πρώταχε, τῶν ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς παθήμασιν αὐτῶν τοῦ σώματος τῶν ἐπιστολῆς τε καὶ ἐν τῶς [κεφασθέντων]. ἓν τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ σώματι ταναντία ξυμβάλλεται, λύτην θ' ἡμι πρὸς ἤδονὴν καὶ ἤδονὴν πρὸς λύπην, ὡς εἰς μίαν ἀμφότερα κράσιν ἵναι, ταῦτ' ἐμπρόσθεν μὲν διήλθομεν, ὡς ἡπάσαι αὐτε κενώται πληρωσεῖσ ἐπιθυμεῖται, καὶ ἐκπίδωσιν μὲν χαιρεῖ, κενούμενοι δ' ἁγεῖται, ταῦτα δὲ τίσι μὲν οὖν ἐμπροτρέψαμεθα, τών δὲ λέγομεν, ὡς ψυχής πρὸς σῶμα D διαφορομενής ἐν πάσιν τοῖς πληθεὶς ἀμφίβας οὖσα μίς μία λύτης τε καὶ ἤδονῆς ξυμπληκτεῖ γιγνομένη.

ΠΡΩ. Κανονεῖσις ὄρθιστα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. ἔτει τοίνυν ἡμῖν τῶν μίξεων λύτης τε καὶ ἤδονῆς λοική μιᾶ.

ἐντὸς [κεφασθέντων] Ασ it is not the outward and inward parts which are mingled, but the pain of one with the pleasure of the other, the word κεφασθέντως, which is borrowed from abovē, must be looked upon as a false gloss. In the rest of this sentence I have left everything as the MSS. present it, not because it is all sound, but because the remedy will perhaps not appear so certain to some as to myself. He says: "I have indeed told you all about these cases where pleasure and pain are mingled in the body; as to those where the mind contributes the opposites to the body **** these we have formerly described; one fact however we did not then bear witness to, but we declare it now, that, in the innumerable examples of mind and body being thus opposed, there is always one and the same mixture of pleasure and pain." This is true; for, when he mentioned this subject before, it was not to point out this ἁρματες, but to show the nature of Desire. But in that part of his statement, where I have marked a gap, there occurs this phrase: λύτην τε μία πρὸς ἤδονην, καὶ ἤδονην πρὸς λύπην. The ἤδονη of the mind is ἐπισκόμεται; and this he has fully described; but the λύτη, which is φήσεως, he has never brought forward as co-existing with present bodily satisfaction. And yet τούτα μία διέλθομεν looks as if he claimed to have done this. Again in the same gap, we have ὡς εἰς μίαν ἀμφότερα κράσιν ἵναι, but this μία μία is the very thing which he declares that he now points out for the first time. There remains ἡπάσαι αὐτε λέγειν. Stallbaum proposed at one time to change αὐτε into τις, while I thought that it proved a lacuna, where the opposite ἡπάσαι πληρωται had once played its part; but it seems to follow from what I have said above that Socrates cannot have entered into any such detail. I will not conceal the suspicion which I have conceived about this very corrupt part of the Dialoge. I believe that of the words, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ, ΠΥΧΗ alone has any claims to legitimate: that the damaged text was restored by a conjecture founded on the antithetical Περὶ γε τῶν ἤδονῶν κ. τ. ἐ.: but that we may easily find such a beginning as will leave undisturbed and free from all taint of suspicion both ψυχὴ ἐντὸς καὶ λύτης κ. τ. ἐ. "Since this is the fact, part of this fact has been stated, but part we now declare". Instead of ἡπάσαι αὐτε λέγειν, I conjecture ὅτι εὐ κ. ξυμπληκτεῖ γιγνομένη I have adopted εὖ γιγνομένη, which I formerly advocated without knowing that it had been already proposed by others.
ΠΡΩ. Πολια;
ΣΩ. Φημὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῆς πολλὰς λαμβάνειν σύγ-
χραίν ἐφραίμεν.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς οὖν ὅ δὴ ταύτῃ αὐτῇ λέγομεν;
Ε. ΣΩ. Ὁρῆν καὶ φόβον καὶ τόθον καὶ ἑρῴδει καὶ ἐρωτα-
καὶ ξύλον καὶ φθόνον καὶ θανατόν θανατόν καὶ ὡστοι τοιοῦτοι, ἀρ' οὖν αὐτῆς τῆς
ψυχῆς τίθεσαι τὰ τὰς λύπας τινὰς;
ΠΡΩ. Ἐγώνε.
ΣΩ. Οἷον οὖσας ἡδονῶν μεστάς εὐφόρισμεν ἄμμαχῶν;
η δὲμεν' ἐπιμεμνημένουτα τὸ
δ' ἔστημε οἱ πολλοὶ πολύφρονες περὶ καλεῖνας,
ὡς τε πολὸν γλυκὸν μέλιτος καταλειμμένον,
τις ἔν τις ἑρῴδει καὶ τόθος ἡδονῶς ἐν λύπαισι οὖσας
ἀναμεμρίμζεσιν;
ΠΡΩ. Οἷς, ἄλλ' οὕτω ταύται γε καὶ οὐκ ἀλλοὶ ἔν ἐνι-
ματαί νη γιγνόμενα.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τάς γε τραγικὰς θεωρήματι, ὡην ἠμα
χαίροντες χλάσσει, μεμνησία;
ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὖ;
ΣΩ. Τὴν δ' ἐν ταῖς κοιμοδίαις διάθεσαν ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς
ἀρ' οἷον' ὡς ἔστι [καν τοῦτον] μετὰς λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς;

Πολια] The Books have Πολια, φης; to which the answer given is "Ἡ ἂν αὐ-
τὴν τῇ π. α. π. ἐν γιγκρασιν ἐφραίμεν. No-
body believes in Πολια, φης; and some have
the courage to replace it by Πολιαν φης; which is at least grammatical.
But there is no reason for φης at all, and if any one will compare the in-
stances where we have Πολια φης; Πολια
φης; and the rest, with the innumerable
examples of the mere interrogative pro-
noun or adverb, he will desire a spe-
cial reason for the departure from the
ordinary expression; here no such reason
exists, and the presence of the verb
may be easily accounted for in another
way. No exception has been taken to
ἐφραίμεν, and yet it is quite untrue that
they have said anything as yet on this
mixture, and Socrates declares as much
in the foregoing paragraph. But if ἐφρα-
ίμεν is false, can we offer the place to
φαμαι? No; for until Protagoras as-
sents to it, it is no joint assertion. Again
"Ἡ ἂν μετὰ; and how can we have
μετὰ and ἐγκαλακτοι governed both by
λαμβάνειν? A single correction (for I
attribute the interpolation to the false
reading) removes all these difficulties.
It is probable that the MS. had ἐα
στή, the rubricator having neglected
to put an initial Φ.
I have omitted the words which all re-
cent Editors are agreed in considering
an interpolation, τοῖς κυμοῖς καὶ ταῖς
ὀργαῖς τὸ, standing after ἐφέρκε.
[καὶν τοῦτος]} No ταὐτα have been
mentioned, but the corrector was un-
familiar with so common an Atticism
as ὁλὰ τὴν δίκαιον ὡς ἠτι μὲν.
Nor is ἐν τούτῳ at all more intelli-
gible; there the neuters αὐτὸ and σπο-
tανότερον, which obviously refer to
ΠΡΩ. Οὐ πάνυ κατανόομαι.
ΣΩ. Πεντάπασι γὰρ οὐ φάδιον, οὐ Πρώταρχε, [ἐν τούτῳ] ἐξυπνοεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε πάθος.
ΠΡΩ. Οὐχον γὰς γ᾽ ἔοικεν ἐμοί.
ΣΩ. Ἀθρομεῖν γε μην αὐτὸ τοιοῦτο μᾶλλον, δὲ διὸ σκοτεινώτερον ἔστιν, ἵνα καὶ ἐν ἄλλους ἄραν καταμαθεῖν τις ὁδὸς τ᾽ ἢ μικρὸν λύπης σε καὶ ἱδονῆς.
ΠΡΩ. Λέγοις ἂν.
ΣΩ. Τὸ τοῖς νῦν δὴ ἡθεὶν ὅνομα φθόνου πότερα λύπην τινά ψυχῆς θάνατος, ἢ πτῶς;
ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μην ὁ φθόνον γ᾽ ἐπὶ κακοῖς τοῖς τῶν πέλας ἱδόμενος ἀναφανῆσεται.
ΠΡΩ. Σφοδρὰ γε.
ΣΩ. Κακῶν μην ἄγνοια καὶ ἢν δὴ λέγομεν ἀβελτέραν ἔχειν.
ΠΡΩ. Τί μην;
ΣΩ. Ἐν δὴ τούτων ἰδὲ τὸ γελοῖον ἤρτινα φύσιν ἔχει.
ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.
ΣΩ. Ἐστὶ δὴ πονηρία μὲν τις τὸ κεφάλαιον, ἔχεις τίνος ἐπίκληρη λεγομένην τῆς δ᾽ αὖ πάσης πονηρίας ἐστὶ τοῦ τοῦντιν πάθος ἔχον ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον ἕπο τῶν ἐν Ἀθηναίοις γραμμάτοις.
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ Γνώμως σαντόν λέγεις, ὢΝ Σωκράτες;
ΣΩ. Ἐψως τοῖσιν μην ἐκεῖνη δηλὸν δι᾽ οὗ τὸ μηδέμη δι᾽ γνώμωσεῖν σαντόν [λεγόμενον ἕπο τῶν γράμματος] ἂν εὖ.
ΠΡΩ. Τί μην;
ΣΩ. Ὀ Πρώταρχε, πειρῶ δὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τρίχῃ τέμενεν.
ΠΡΩ. Πὴρ φίλε; οὐ γὰρ μὴ δυνατὸς ὡ."
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Αλέγεις δὴ δεῖν ἐμὲ τοῦτο διελέσθαι τὰ νῦν.
ΠΡΩ. Αλέγω, καὶ δείκας γε πρὸς τῷ λέγων.
ΣΩ. Ἄρ' ὅτι οὐ τῶν ἐγνωσόμενων αὐτούς κατὰ τρί' ἀνάγκη
tοῦτο τῷ πάθος πάσχειν ἔκαστον;
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;
ΣΩ. Πρώτον μὲν κατὰ χρήματα, δοξάζειν εἰναι πλουσιό-
τεροι ἢ κατὰ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐσίαν.
ΠΡΩ. Πολλοὶ γοῦν εἰσὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον πάθος ἔχοντες.
ΣΩ. Πλείους δὲ γε, ὃς μεῖζονς καὶ καλλίοντος αὐτοῦς δο-
ξάζοντο, καὶ πάντα, δας κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, εἴναι διαφερόντως τῆς
οὐσίας αὐτοῖς ἀληθείας.
ΠΡΩ. Πάντ' ψ.
ΣΩ. Πολὺ δὲ πλείστοι γε, οἷμαι, περὶ τὸ τρίτον ἔδοξ τὸ
τῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς διημαρτήμασιν, ἄφετήν δοξάζοντες βελτίων
κατούς, οἷς ἄντευς.
ΠΡΩ. Σχόδρα μὲν οὖν.
49 ΣΩ. Τῶν ἄφετῶν δ' ἄρ' οὗ σοφίας [πέρι] τὸ πλῆθος
πάντως ἀναγκεύον μεστόν ἐρίδων καὶ δοξοσοφίας ἑτέρα [ψευ-
δοῦς];
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὖν;
ΣΩ. Κακῶν μὲν δὴ πάν ἐν τις τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰπὼν ὁδήγος
ἂν εἴποι πάθος.
ΠΡΩ. Σχόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοῖνν ἔτι διαμετέτον, ὡς Πρώταχι, δίκα, εἰ

in Bep. 486, d. has been changed on
the best MS. authority. I should doubt
of the rest, but that they all refer to
being add.

πλουσιότεροι] The MS. have πλου-
σιότερον, which is indefensible. The
construction of δοξάζειν may be with
ἔχειν, in which case the subject of a
reflective sentence follows in the nomi-
native, or it may govern a direct accu-
sative, as in the next sentences.
καὶ πάντα] And who, as to all things
pertaining to the body, conceive themselves
to be far above what they really are.
Literally, 'to be all things which per-
tain to the body in a degree beyond the
reality which belongs to them.' The

sander πάντα is put for masculine ad-
jectives understood. See for examples
my Praefatio ad Ionem p. xvi.

December 25] The Books have τοῦτον,
which is utterly superfluous; nor could
ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς follow τὸ ἔδοξ without
a repetition of the article.

ἀντικεύεσθαι] One Editor says: Intel-
ligendum relinquitur sūnθ. I myself
was driven to a conjecture: ἀντικεύεσθαι
ἐν, but fortunately I admitted it to be too
audacious. These are the shifts to which
we are driven by the dunci who in-
serted πέρι. I have no faith in ὁμο-
δοῖς, for who ever heard of δοξοσοφία
ἀληθείας?
μέλλομεν τὸν παιδικὸν ἰδόντες φθόνον ἅποτον ἱδονής καὶ λε-πής ὑψεσθαι μίξιν.

ΠΡΩ. Πόσον τέμνομεν δίχα λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Πάντες ὑπόσοι ταύτην τὴν φευγῆ δόξαν περὶ ἐαυτῶν ὧν ἀνθρώπων ἄνθρωποι, καθάπερ ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τούτων ἀναγκαῖστατον ἐπεσθαί τοῖς μὲν ὁμώς αὐτῶν καὶ δύναμιν, τοῖς δὲ, οἶμαι, τοιναντίοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ταύτη τοῖν πολλάν διέλε, καὶ ὃσοι μὲν αὐτῶν εἰσὶ μεν ἀσθενεῖς τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἀδύνατοι καταγελόμενοι τιμωρείσθαι, γελοΐσας τούτους φάσκων εἶναι ταλήθη φθέγξει· τοὺς δὲ δινα-τοὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι φοβεροὺς καὶ ἱσχυροὺς [καὶ] ἄχθροφοι περισσο-γευόνων ὑπόστασιν τοὺσ αὐτῶν ἄλογον ἀποδώσεως. Ἀγνοεῖ γὰρ θ' ἡ μὲν τῶν ἱσχυρῶν ἄχθροφα τε καὶ ἱσχυρά· βλαβερα γὰρ καὶ τοῖς σφαλας αὐτὴν τε καὶ ὃσα εἰκόνες αὐτῆς εἰσίν· ἡ δ' ἀσθενής ἡμῖν τὴν τῶν γελοιόν ἐλθεῖ τάξιν τε καὶ φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὠφθαστα τέσσερες. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἱδονῶν καὶ λυ-πῶν μίξις ἐν τούτοις ὅπως μοι καταταφνήσις.

ΣΩ. Τὴν τοῖν τοῦ φθόνου λαβὲ δύναμιν πρῶτον.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγει μύον.

ΣΩ. Αὕτη τις ἀδικοῦς ἐστί πον καὶ ἱδονή.;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ τοῦτο μὲν ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τῶν ἄχθροφων κακοῖς οὖν ἀδίκες- οὐτε φθορονέν εστὶ το χαίρειν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ γε τῶν φίλων δρόμοντας ἐστιν ὅτε κακὰ μὴ λυ-πεῖσθαι, χαίρειν δὲ, ὅπ' οὖν ἀδικόν ἐστιν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὖ?

ΣΩ. Οὕτω τὴν ἄγνωσαν εἰπομεν ὅτι κακὸν πᾶσιν;

ΠΡΩ. Ὑπόθες.

ΣΩ. Τὴν οὖ ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων δοξοσοφίαν καὶ δοξολαλίαν καὶ

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς οὖ ὡς ἂν ἀκομοῦ διέβαλεν τὸν παιδικὸν ποιήσας τινὰ δίος ἀνθρώπων ἱδονής. 

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ταύτη τὸν πολλάν διέλε, καὶ ὃσοι μὲν αὐτῶν εἰσὶ μεν ἀσθενεῖς τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἀδύνατοι καταγελόμενοι τιμωρείσθαι, γελοΐσας τούτους φάσκων εἶναι ταλήθη φθέγξει· τοὺς δὲ δινατοὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι φοβεροὺς καὶ ἱσχυροὺς [καὶ] ἄχθροφοι περισσογευόνων ὑπόστασιν τοὺσ αὐτῶν ἄλογον ἀποδώσεως. Ἀγνοεῖ γὰρ θ' ἡ μὲν τῶν ἱσχυρῶν ἄχθροφα τε καὶ ἱσχυρά· βλαβερα γὰρ καὶ τοῖς σφαλας αὐτὴν τε καὶ ὃσα εἰκόνες αὐτῆς εἰσίν· ἡ δ' ἀσθενής ἡμῖν τὴν τῶν γελοιόν ελθεῖ τάξιν τε καὶ φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὠφθαστα τέσσερες. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἱδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν μίξις ἐν τούτοις ὅπως μοι καταταφνήσις.

ΣΩ. Τὴν τοῖν τοῦ φθόνου λαβὲ δύναμιν πρῶτον.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγει μύον.

ΣΩ. Αὕτη τις ἀδικοῦς ἐστὶ πον καὶ ἱδονή.;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ τοῦτο μὲν ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τῶν ἄχθροφων κακοῖς οὖν ἀδίκες οὐτε φθοροφέν ἐστὶ το χαίρειν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ γε τῶν φίλων δρόμοντας ἐστιν ὅτε κακὰ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι, χαίρειν δὲ, ὅπ' οὖν ἀδικόν ἐστιν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὖ;

ΣΩ. Οὕτω τὴν ἄγνωσαν εἰπομεν ὅτι κακὸν πᾶσιν;

ΠΡΩ. ὑπόθες.

ΣΩ. Τὴν οὖ ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων δοξοσοφίαν καὶ δοξολαλίαν καὶ
ΠΑΛΑΙΟΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

Ε δ’ ήν δ’ δεύκεθομεν, ἐν τοιοὶ λέγοντες εἴδειν γίγνεσθαι, γελοια μὲν ὑπὸ' ἀσθενῆ, μισητά δ’ ὑπὸ' ἐρρωμένα—ἡ μὴ φῶμεν ὑπερ εἴπον ἄρθι, τὴν [τὸν πόλον] ἔξω ταχὺν ὅταν ἔχη τις τὴν ἀφλαβή τοῖς ἄλλοις, γελοιαν εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα γε.

ΣΩ. Καθον δ’ οῖχ ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτήν, ἂγνοιαν οὐδαν, εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Χαίρομεν δ’ ἡ λυτούμεθα, ὅταν ἐπ’ αὐτή γελοίουμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Δὴ λογον ὅτι χαίρομεν.

ΣΩ. Ἡδονήν δ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν πόλον κακοῖς, οὐ φθόνον ἐφαμεν εἶναι τοῖς [τοῖς] ἀπεγαζόμενοι;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Γελόντας ᾦρ’ ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν πόλον γελοῖους φησιν ὁ λόγος, κεφανότας ἰδονήν φθόνον, λύτη τὴν ἱδονήν ξυγκεφανίναι τὸν γὰρ φθόνον ὁμολογήσαι λύτην τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμὲν πάλαι, τὸ δὲ γελαν ἱδονήν, ἡμᾶς γίγνεσθαι δὲ τούτῳ ἐν τούτῳ τοῖς χρόνοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆς.

ΣΩ. Μηνύει δὴ ἠν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν ἑρθαίνοις τε καὶ [ἐν τραγῳδίαις], μὴ τοῖς δράμασι μόνον ἀλλὰ τῇ τοῦ βίου ξυμπάσῃ τραγῳδία καὶ κωμῳδία, λύπας ἱδοναῖς ἡμᾶς κεφανίσας, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δὴ κυρίοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀδύνατον μὴ ὁμολογεῖν ταύτα, οἱ Σκέκτας, εἰ καὶ τοῖς φιλονεοχοῖς πάνω πρὸς τάνκανια.

ΣΩ. Ὁργὴν μὴ καὶ πάθον καὶ ἑρθόν καὶ φάθον καὶ ἔφωτα καὶ ζηλόν καὶ φθόνον προδέμεθα καὶ ὅποια τοιαῦτα, οὐ ἐν οἷς ἑραμεν εὐρήσεις μνημήνα τὰ πολλάκις λεγόμενα.

ἡ γὰρ;

ΠΡΩ. Ναι.

toσω] φθόνον καὶ γελώτα. The MSS. have been seen, in the eyes of these men a gap was a place for the exercise of their healing powers. en ἐρήπιος τε καὶ ἐν τραγῳδίαις, has one preposition too many. The unusual break after en ὁι ἑραμεν εὐρήσεις] ἑραμεν is my correction of the MS. reading φαμεν. The reference is to 46. η.
ΠΑΙΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Μακαράνομεν οὖν ὅτι Ἠρώνον πέρι καὶ φθόνον καὶ ὀφηγής πάντ' ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν δὴ διαπερασθέντα;
ΠΙΡΩ. Πώς γάρ οὖ μακαράνομεν;
ΣΩ. Ὕχοιν πολλὰ ἦτι τὰ λοιπὰ;
ΠΙΡΩ. Καὶ πάνι γε.
ΣΩ. Διὰ δὴ τὶ μάλλον ὑπολαμβάνας με δείξαι σοι τὴν ἐν τῇ καμψίᾳ μέδειν; ἢ ὅτι πίστεως χάριν ὅτι τὴν νὰ ἐν τοῖς φόβοις καὶ ἑρωι καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις ἡμίθνοι κράσιν ἐπιδείξαι; Ὁ λαβοντα δὲ τοῦτο πορὰ σαυτῷ [ἀπάντηται μὲ] μηκέτι ἐπὶ ἑκείνα ἀποκλείσαι δεῖν μηκέτεν τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς λαβέειν τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ σῶμα ἄνων ἡμὴν καὶ ἡμὴ ἄνων σωματός καὶ κοινή μετ' ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς παρθήμασι μετά ἐστι συγκεκριμένης ἡμῶνς λύπαις; νῦν οὖν λέγε, πότερα ἀπόκλεις μὲ ἡ μέσας ποιήσεως νῦκτας; εἰτὼν δὲ συμφαῖον οἷοί καὶ οὐκευόμεθαι μεθαίνει μετ' ὅτον γὰρ ἄπαντων ἁποίκων ἐπελθόν σοι λόγον δοῦναι, τὰ Θ νῦν ὅ ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ βουλόμαι στέλλεσθαι πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν ἑνὶ Φιλέρσου ἐπιτάτει.
ΠΙΡΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες, ὡς Σάμπατες· ἡλλὰ ὥσα λοιπὰ ἡμῖν διεξάλει ὡθησί σοι φιλον.
ΣΩ. Κατὰ φύσιν τολμῶν μετὰ τοὺς μικρὰς ἡμῶς ὑπὸ δὴ τινὸς ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ τὰς ἀμίκτους πορευομεθ' ἐν ἐν τῷ μέρει.
ΠΙΡΩ. Κάλλιστ' εἶπες.
ΣΩ. Ἔγώ δὴ πειράσομαι μεταλαβοῦν σημαίνειν ὡς ἀπός.

λαβόντα 84] When I affirmed that λαβόντα ἀφέναι could not depend on πίστεως χάριν, I was so little aware of the extent to which the text had been choked with foolish comments that sooner than suspect ἀφέναι, I threw the construction upon ἄρ' οὖν ὑπολαμβάνει δεῖν, confessing that δείν was out of its place, but pleading that there was no other possible way of accounting for these infinitives. But when we remove ἀφέναι μὲ, everything is right: what Socrates has said is a pledge, that it would be easy to say more, and a proof that having given this earnest he need not prolong the conversation by proceeding to the consideration of the other passions. ἀφέναι μὲ μηκέτι δεῖν μηκέτεν is a strange combination to express ἀφέναι μὲ τοῦ μηκέτεν; for while it is longer than the other, it is really more elliptical.

μέθος πολλάνοις νύκτας] Will you make it midnight? The plural is used in speaking of the progress of the night, as τὰρρι τῶν νυκτῶν. Συμπ. 217, D; Prot. 310, D; Arist. Nub. τ. μέσας νυκτας γενοσώκα, Βερ. 621, Β.

μεταλαβόν] Only a few inferior copies have this reading in place of μεταβαλόν. But they have blundered on the truth. Socrates does not change but takes in exchange. Stallbaum has confounded these two senses in his note on 21, D, quoting passages from the Parmenides and the Symposium where μεταβαλόν is correctly given. There is a passage in the Laws which
ΠΑΛΑΤΙΟΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΙΒΟΣ.

τοῖς γὰρ φάσκοντι λυθὼν εἶναι ποιολλαν πάσσας τὰς ἱδονὰς οὗ πάνιν ποὺς πείθομαι, ἀλλ', ὅπερ εἶπον, μάρτυς κατεχόμει πέρις τὸ τίνας ἱδονὰς εἶναι δακτύλισας, ὦσιος δ' ὦσιμος, καὶ μεγάλας ἐτέρας τινὰς ἅμα καὶ πολλὰς φαντασθείσας, [εἶναι δ' αὐτὰς] συμπεριφερμένας ὁμοὶ λύταις τε καὶ ἀναπαύεισθαι ὄνυ-

τὼν τῶν μεγίστων περὶ τὸ σάμιτος καὶ ψυχῆς ἀποφίας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀθηνείς δ' αὐτὶ τινας, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἤπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς τις διανοίαν ἂν;

ΣΩ. Τὰς περὶ τὰ τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα, καὶ περὶ τὰς σχήματα, καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων τὰς πλεῖστας, καὶ τὰς τῶν φιλόφων, καὶ οὐ τὰς ἐνδείκτες ἀνασχεθέντις ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλώπους τὰς πλη-

ρώσεις αἰσθήσεις καὶ ἱδείς καθαρὰς λυτῶν παρεδόντων.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ ταύτ', ὡς Σώκρατες, αὐτὶ λέγομεν οὕτως;

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν [οὐ] οὖκ εὐθὺς δῆλα ἐστὶν ὁ λέγω, πει-

C οτέρων μὲν δηλοῦν. σχήματος τὸ γάρ καλὸς οὖ περὶ ἐν

ὑποκάμισαν οὐ πολλοὶ πειρώμην νῦν λέγειν, ἢ ἔχων ἢ τινας

ζωγραφικών, ἀλλ' εὐθὺ τε λέγω, φησιν ὁ λόγος, καὶ περι-

θερές καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων δὴ τε τοῖς τόρνοις γεγομένε' ἐπὶ-

contains both words, and will shew the distinction between the two. It is here given as, in my opinion, it ought to be read. Laws, 904, δ. μεῖζω

β' ἡθ ψυχὴ καθά ἡ ἄρτες δὴν μεταβάλῃ διὰ τὴν αὐτής ἀναφής τελεῖ

καὶ ὑμνῆς γενομένη λαμβάνω, ὅπως μὲν ερετὴς ἡτεὶς προσβλέπει γίγνεται

dιαφορώντας τοιαῦτα, διαφοράντα καὶ μεταφαίης τόπον, ἀγνὸν δὲν μετακομι-

στέα (ἐπὶ ὁμόλογοι τοῖς τόποις ἑτέροις). Compare what has preceded: μεμηχά-

νηται δὴ πρὸς πάντα τούτο τοῦ τούτον τοὺς γεγομένους ἀδι πολλὰν ἄδι

μεταφαίης ἐνίκασθαι, καὶ τίνας ποιεῖ

[ἀνὰ ν' αὐτάς] These words interrupt the continuity of the description; πολλὰς φαντασθεῖσας appearing in many

shapes, why?—οὔπωσφορμένας—because they are adulterated with pains and relief &c.

Πάνω μὲν [οὐ] Nothing can be more out of place here than this frequent formula. Socrates is not correcting, but conceding; and in this sense μὲ

ν cannot be employed. But it may be said that μὲν belongs to the sentence, and is in apodosis to a suppressed ἢ contained in μὲ, while οὐ characterises the

answer, so that the combination of the two words here is purely accidental. I have no doubt that this is the true explanation of μὲν, but the particle after it in this case would most certain-

ly be γοῦ. We must either restore this—but γοῦ σὲ generally becomes ὅσιον—γε, or suppose οὐ itself to be owing to the frequent combination of

μὲν and οὐ. Πάνω belongs more especially to δήλα.

τὰ τοῦ τόρνους As Herophilus defines the τόρνος as a carpenter's in-

strument by which circular figures are described, ἐπίσεως cannot be trium or quadrate (Stahlb.). The order fol-

lowed is an inverted one: the products of rules and compasses correspond to the αὐτίς σχήμα, and those of the τόρ-

νος to the περιφερές.
peda te kai sterea kai tα τοις κανώνι και γωνίας, ει μου
μανθάνεις. ταύτα γάρ οῦν ελαί πρός τι καλά λέγω, καθάπερ
άλλα, άλλ' αεί καλά καθ' αυτά περικείναι και τις ζδονάς
ούκεις εξέχω, ούδέν ταίς των κυήσεων προσφερείς καὶ κραφα-
ματα δή τοις τούτον τό τόπον ἔχοντα [καλά καὶ ζδονάς]. άλλ'
άφρα μανθάνομεν, ἡ πτώσ;
ΠΡΩ. Πειρόμαι μὲν, ὡς Σώκρατες πειραθης δὲ καὶ συ
σαφέστερον ἔπι λέγειν.
ΣΩ. Ἀγέω δή τας των φθόγγων τές λέιας καὶ λαμ-
πράς, τάς ἐν τι καθαρῶν ιείας μέλος, οὐ πρός ἔστερον καλάς
άλλ' αὐτάς καθ' αὐτὰς εἰλαί, καὶ τούτων ἐμφύτους ζδονάς
ἐποίμενας.
ΠΡΩ. 'Εστι γὰρ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο.
ΣΩ. Τό δὲ περὶ τάς οὐμάς ἤτον μὲν τούτων θείων γένος Ε
ζδονών· τό δὲ μή συμμείναι ἐν αὐτάς ἀναγκαίους λόγος,
καὶ Ἰη τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ὑμν τυχάνει γεγονός ἡμῖν, τούτ' ἀκει-
νοὺς τίθημι ἀντίστροφον ἀπαν. ἀλλ', εἰ κατανοεῖς, τούτα εἰδή
dολ λέγωμεν ζδονών.
ΠΡΩ. Κατανοώ.
ΣΩ. 'Επι δὴ τοινυν τούτως προσθάλειν τάς περὶ τά μα-
τά τατα ζδονάς, εἰ ἀφα δοκοῦσιν ἡμῖν αὕτα πείνας μὲν μὴ
ἐχειν τοῦ μανθάνειν μηδὲ διὰ μαθημάτων πείνη τολμόν 
ζδονάς ἐξ ἀρχῆς γεγομένας.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὕτως ξινὸδεῖ.
ΣΩ. Τί δέ; μαθημάτων πληροθείαν καὶ ὑστερον ἀπο-
βολοὶ διὰ τῆς λήψης γίγνονται, καθορισμένας εν αὐτάς ἀλ-
γηδόνας;
ΠΡΩ. Οὐ τι φύσιν γε, ἀλλ' ἐν τοις λογισμοῖς τοῦ παθη-
ματος, ἢταν τις στερηθεὶς λυτηθῇ διὰ τὴν χρείαν.

κυήσεως| This is Van Heusden's cor-
rection for κυήσεως; the same scholar
in place of φθόγγων, but leave the
second τάς to shift for itself. It is
also changed κυήσει to κυήσει in the
passage above. It is strange that the
Zurich editors should not have adopted
these corrections.

λύγοιν| For this all MS8. and Edi-
tions have λυγιμένων; but Plato would
denote the description of sounds, and
which has dropped out here, as is evi-
dent from the repetition of the article,
called pleasures.

λογισμοῖς τ. π. The genitive does
not express concerning, but λογιζομαι
ΠΑΤΙΝΟΣ ΨΗΛΗΣ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν, ὑ μακάρε, νῦν γ' ἵμαίς ἀυτά τὰ τῆς φύσεως μόνον παθήματα χωρίς τοῦ λογισμοῦ διαπεραιμένων.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλήθη τοινεν λέγεις, ὅτι χωρίς λέπτης ἣμιν λήθη γίγνεται ἐκάστου' ἐν τούς μαθήμασιν.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα τοινεν τὰς τῶν μαθημάτων ἱδονὰς ἀμίκτως τε εἶναι λέπτας ὡθέων καὶ οὐδαμῶς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ τῶν σφόδρα ὀλιγῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Πώς γὰρ οὗ ὡθέων;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε μετρίως ἦδη διαπεραίμεθα χωρίς τας τε καθαρὰς ἱδονὰς καὶ τάς σχεδὸν ἀκαθάρτως ὄρθως ἔν λεχθείσας, προσέθημεν τῷ λόγῳ τάς μὲν κατὰ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ σφοδρόν αὐτῶν καὶ πολλάκις καὶ ὀλγάυς γιγαντιαῖς τοιάστας, τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου τ' ἔκεινον καὶ ἤτοι καὶ μᾶλλον διά τε σώ-

ΣΩ. Μετά καὶ ψυχῆς ψεφομένου εἶναι γένος, τάς δὲ μὴ τῶν ἐμ-

ΜΕΤΡῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἕτι τοινεν πρῶς τούτοις μετά ταῦτα τόδ' αὐτῶν δια-

ΘΕΑΤΕΩΝ.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποιον;

ΣΩ. Τί ποτε χρή φάναι πρῶς ἀληθείαν εἶναι τὸ καθαρὸν

τὸ πάθημα is what they do; so that the phrase should be rendered “in the account they take of the accident”.

Οὕτων] I should have bracketed but left in the text the interpolations, by which this passage has been so long rendered unintelligible, but that there were other corrections needed, so that it would only have created confusion to put the new and the old together. προσέθημεν τῷ λόγῳ is surely not difficult to understand. Socrates wishes to add one more remark to this part of his subject. But some one who took no notice of τὸ λόγον must needs have it that some quality is to be added to some kind; so he inserts after τὸ λόγῳ the sentence ταῖς μὲν σφοδραῖς ἱδοναῖς ἀμί-

τρίας, ταῖς δὲ μὴ τούναντί τοῦ ἐμπιστρών. But the λόγος is intact not merely on giving the names but on dividing into the several classes of τά ἐπηκρα καὶ τὰ ἐμπιστρών, and does not even use the greatness and the intensity as proofs, but says that all such as vary in their greatness and intensity belong to the ἐπηκρα which itself pervades mind and matter, now less and now more. I will now mention the other changes I have made, ταῖς μὲν—ταῖς μὲν, καὶ τὸ— κατὰ τό, σφοδρὸν αὐ—σφοδρὸν αὐτίκα ἀυτῶν, ἀπείρου γε—ἀπείρου τε, (the Bodleian has τε γε), [προσέθημεν σύ-

ται] after φερομένου, ταῖς—ταῖς, the last with MS. authority.

διαθεσάντων] This is Van Hunsde's emendation for διαθέσαντων; it had been anticipated by the Venice MS. Σ, a copy full of conjectural variations.

πρὸς ἀλήθειαν] “I.e. in relation to truth. As this is the constant and only admissible meaning of these words, ἦν before εἰσαγωγή can only be retained on condition of our changing ἦν ποτὲ into ἦν πρὸτερον. Otherwise, we must change ἦν itself into καὶ. The remainder of the sentence is faulty as to the arrangement of the conjunctions and articles. I would
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

τε καὶ εἰλικρινές καὶ τὸ σφόδρα τε [καὶ τὸ] πολὺ καὶ [τὸ] μέγα, καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί ποτ' ἄρα, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐφωτίζεις βουλόμενος;

ΣΩ. Μηδὲν, ὁ Πρώταρχε, ἐπιλείπειν ἐλέγχων ἠδονής τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἰ τὸ μὲν ἄρ' αὐτῶν ἐκατέρω καθαρὸν ἔστι, Ἐ τὸ δ' οὐ καθαρὸν, ἕνα καθαρὸν ἐκάτερον ἕν ἔς τὴν κράσιν ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ καὶ ἐξανάπτατο τοίοῦτο δόρον παρέχει τὴν κράσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὄρθοτατα.

ΣΩ. Ἡθι δ' ἐσ', περὶ πάντων, ὃσα καθαρὰ γένη λέγομεν, οὕτωσι διανοηθημένη προελάμβανοι πρῶτον αὐτῶν ἐν τι διασκοπῶμεν. 53

ΠΡΩ. Τί οὖν προελάμβανα;

ΣΩ. Τὸ λεγόν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι, εἰ βούλει, ἡθοποίησα γένος.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἐν λεγοῦ καὶ τὸ καθαρότητα ἡμῖν ἔδει; πότερα τὸ μέγατὸν τε καὶ πλείστον ἦ τὸ ἀκρατέστατον, ἐν ὧν χρώματος μυθεία μοίρα ἄλλου μυθενὸς ἐνεῖλ;

read τὸ σφόδρα πολὺ τε καὶ μέγα, καὶ τὸ ἲκανόν. Which must we consider as the first in relation to Truth? The pure and the unmixed? or the exceedingly numerous or great, and the sufficient? According to this arrangement, each member of the comparison will consist of two parts, for πολὺ ἥ μέγα or πολὺ καὶ μέγα are merely explanatory adjuncts of σφόδρα; compare below μεγατον τε καὶ πλείστον. I leave this note as I wrote it many years ago. There is very little in it that I would wish to modify, except as to ἲκανόν. On reference to the introduction it will be seen that μέγαν which is just disposed of, and ἀληθεία and κάλλος are those Ideas which play a most important part in the concluding pages of the Dialogue. It will also be seen in the very next page that ἀληθέστατον καὶ κάλλιστον κάλλιον καὶ ἀληθεστέρα καὶ κάλλιστα καὶ κάλλων are dwelt on together in the conclusion of the argument here started. Now what was to be proved, must have been pronounced; and it cannot have been pronounced elsewhere. For this reason I have written καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν.

εἰ τὸ μὲν ἄρ' αὐτῶν Not whether but εἰ, as is plain from the addition of ἄρα. If it should prove that one part of either is pure, and another impure.

ἕνα καθαρὸν This depends upon μη- δὲν ἐξάλλων. Socrates wants to find all the pure kinds so far as he is able, because in these alone can the comparative merits of ἠδονή and νοῦς be determined. I believe the MS. εἰς τὴν κράσιν to be a corruption, for it is unneces- sary, and occasions an inelegant repetition. As the κράσις was to be, 'Which ingredient was of most importance in the mixture,' and this must be determined by mixing the purest specimens of each, I have so little doubt that εἰς τὴν κράσιν is the true reading that I have now admitted it into the Text.

ἀκρατόστατον The ancient grammarians inform us that this is the super- lative of ἀκρατός; an usage which to our ears destroys all distinction between the superlative of this word and that of ἀκρατῆς. I distrust them, but make no change.

ἄλλου μυθενὸς ἐνεῖλ[η] I have changed ἄλλη into ἄλλου, which is absolutely ne- cessary for the sense. We must not
ΠΡΩ. Αὕτων δὲ τὸ μέλλον εἰλικρινῶς ὑν.
ΣΩ. 'Ορθῶς. ἄρ' ὅν τυγχ' ἀληθεστατον, ὁ Πρώταρχε, καὶ ὁμα δὴ κάλλιστον τῶν λευκῶν πάντων ἡγήσομαι, ἀλλ' οὔ Β τὸ πλείστον οὐδὲ τὸ μέγιστον; 
ΠΡΩ. 'Ορθῶςτα ἀρε.
ΣΩ. Σμικρὸν ὅρα καθαρὸν λευκὸν μεμιγμένον πολλοῦ λευ-
κοῦ λευκότερον ἦμα καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ἀληθεστερον ἐὰν φῶς
γίγνεσθαι, παντάπασιν ἐρόουμεν ὧρθοῖς.
ΠΡΩ. Ἐρωτάται μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὡς δὴ πολλῶν δεραίμεθα παραδειγμά-
των τοιούτων ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς ἡδονῆς πέρι λόγον, ἀλλ' ἀρχεί νοεῖν
ἡμῶν ἄραθεν, ὡς ἄρα καὶ ἐφημερά ἡδονή σιμικά μεγάλης καὶ
C ὀλίγη πολλῆς καθαρά λύτης ἢδινων καὶ ἀληθεστέρα καὶ καλ-
λιῶν γίγνεσθ' ὑν.
ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν, καὶ τὸ γε παραδειγμ' ἵκην.
ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτο; ᾧς περί ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκριμόμεν
ὡς ἄρι γένεσις ἔστιν, νοεία δ' οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παράπων ἡδονῆς;
κοιμητι γὰρ δὴ τινες αὐτοῖς τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι μιριεῖν
ἡμῶν, οἶχ δὲ χαῖρεν ἔχειν.
ΠΡΩ. Τί δὴ;
ΣΩ. Αἰσθητανούμαι σοι τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἐπανερωτῶν, ὁ Πρώ-
D ταχε φίλε.
ΠΡΩ. Λέγε καὶ ἐρώτα μόνον.
ΣΩ. Ἐστίν δὴ τίν τιν, τὸ μὲν αὐτῷ καὶ αὐτῷ, τὸ δ' ἄρ
郾ει ἐφημενον ἄλλου.
ΠΡΩ. Πώς τούτο καὶ τίνες λέγεις; 
ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν σεμικόταιον ἀεὶ περικός, τὸ δ' ἠλλιτικὸς ἴμαινον,
ΠΡΩ. Ἀλή οὖν σαφέστατον.
ΣΩ. Παντικά ποιοι καὶ ἄγαθὰ τεθεωρηκαμέν ἡμι καὶ ἐραστάς ἀνδρείους αὐτῶν.
ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γά.
ΣΩ. Τούτων τοινῦν ἐσωτάτα δυνοῦ ἄδηλα ζήτει κατὰ πάντα ὅσα λέγουμεν εἶναι.
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ τρίτον ἐκ ἑαυτῶν λέγει σαφέστατον, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὥς τι λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν τι ποικίλον, ὡς Ἀθηναῖος, ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος ἐφεσχηκεῖ νῦν, λέγει δ' ὅτι τοῦ μὲν ἔνεκα τοῦ τῶν ἄντων ἔσεϊ αἰεί, τὸ δ' ὅτι χάριν ἐκάστοτε τὸ τινὸς ἔνεκα γεννήθηκεν αἰεὶ γίγνεται.
ΠΡΩ. Μόνης ἐμαθὼν διὰ τὸ πολλάκις μερικά 
ΣΩ. Τάκα δ' ἰσος, ὡς παῖ, μᾶλλον μαθητῇκε χειλοθόντος τοῦ λόγου.
ΠΡΩ. Τί γὰρ ὄν; 
ΣΩ. Ἀνὸν δὴ τάκε ἐτερα λάβωμεν.
ΠΡΩ. Ποιά; 
ΣΩ. Ἐν μὲν τι γένεσιν πάντων, τὴν δ' οὕτων ἔσετον ἐν.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀν δ' ἀποδέχομαι σοι τάκα, οὕτως καὶ γένεσιν.
ΣΩ. Ὁρθάτατα. πάτερον οὖν τούτων ἔνεκα ποιέων, τὴν γένεσιν οὕτωσις ἔνεκα φύωμεν ἦ τὴν οὕτως εἶναι γενεάς ἔνεκα;
ΠΡΩ. Τότε, ὃ προσογοφεῖται οὖσα, εἰ γενεάς ἔνεκα 
τοῦτ' ἐστιν ὑπὲρ ἑαυτή, νὸν πνεύματε; 

Τὸ πρῶτον ἣ ηὗ ἄρθῳ) The Books have ἐνα παράδειγμα ἐνεπὶ τὸ τρίτον κτῆμα, οὔτ' ὅτι ἐνεπὶ τῶν σηματικῶν παραδείγματα, οὔτ' ἐνα παράδειγμα ἐνεπὶ τῶν σηματικῶν παραδείγματα. For ἐνα παράδειγμα ἐνεπὶ, ὧν καὶ τῶν διαστάσεων εἴναι. The quotation from Παρθένου the Etym. Μας. referred to by Pierson on Μαρκός in τ. ἘρεβούaddAction, is apparently decisive as to the orthography of this word. If Pierson had known that the oldest MSS. of Plato have the τί, he would have pronounced with greater certainty in its favour. Ἐρέβοι backlash seems to have been a later form.

I suppose that by this time he is convinced that Protarchus is for the third
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ

Σ. Φαινομαί.

ΠΡΩ. Πρὸς Θεών, ἄρ' [ἀν] ἔπανεργοτάς με τοκόνδε τι; λέγ', ὁ Πρώταρχέ, μοι, πότερα πλοίων ναυτυγίαν ἔνεκα σφής γίγνεσθα μᾶλλον ἡ πλοία ἔνεκα ναυτυγίας; καὶ πάνθ' ὅπου τοιαίτ' ἐστὶ;

ΠΡΩ. Λέγω τούτ' αὐτό, ὡς Πρώταρχε.

ΠΡΩ. Τι ὅπν όυιν αὐτός ἀπεκρῖνον σαυτῷ, ὡς Σάκκαστης;

ΠΡΩ. Οἶδέν ὃ τι οὖ'; σὺ μὲντοι τὸν λόγον σαμμετέχε.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.

ΠΡΩ. Φημὶ δὴ γενέσσως μὲν ἔνεκα φάρμακα τε καὶ πάντωσιν ὅργανα καὶ πᾶσαν ἕλιν παρατίθεσθαι πᾶσιν, ἐκάστην δὲ γένεσιν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὔσιας τινὸς ἐκάστης ἔνεκα γίγνεσθα, ἐξεμποσαν δὲ γένεσιν οὔσιας ἔνεκα γίγνεσθαι ξυμπάσης.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐφέστατα μὲν οὖν.

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτων ἢδονή γε, ἐπείρο γένεσις ἑστιν, ἔνεκά τινος οὐσίας δὲ ἀνάγχης γίγνοντ' ὃν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ γε μην οὐ ἔνεκα τὸ ἔνεκα τοῦ γεγομένου ἄδε γίγνεται, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἁγάθου μοίρᾳ ἐκείνῳ ἑστιν τὸ δὲ τινὸς ἔνεκα γεγομένου εἰς ἄλλην, ὡς ἀρεστή, μοίραιν Θεύων.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖοτατον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὖν ἢδονή γ' ἐπείρο γένεσις ἑστιν, εἰς ἄλλην ἡ τῆς τοῦ ἁγάθου μοίραιν αὐτὴν τιθεντες οὐθῶς θύσωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐφώτατα μὲν οὖν.

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτων, ὅπερ ἀχίμονος ἔλεος τούτου τοῦ λόγου, τῷ

Πρὸς Θεῶν] The MSS. and Edd. have Πρὼς Θεῶν, ἄρ' ἐν ἐπανεργοτάς με; Σιώ. Τοκόν[δε] τι μέγα, ὁ Πρώταρχε μετ.—τοκόν[δε] ἐστι, λέγω τοῦτ' αὐτό, ὡς Πρώταρχε. It is strange that Bækker's note, 'τοκόνδε———hec eadem dant ΣΣΣΗ,' has never led any one to the right distribution of this passage. ἄν before ἐπανεργοτάς has led to all manner of conjectural emendations, but I believe it to have arisen from a negligent repetition of ἄρ'. The absurdity of Socrates calling the same thing τοκόνδε τι and τοῦτ' αὐτό, seems not to have struck the Editors.

which is barbarous. Had ἄρ' οὖν ἐπὶ followed, γίγνεται without ἃν would have been correct; but with ἃν we must have either ἃδ μὲν γίγνεται or ἃδ ν' ἔγνησα, and even the latter would be in much better accordance with something more remote than ἃἐστι, such as ζήσαι or ἀγαθὴ ἔλειν.

Ἀλλ' οὖν—γ'] Here again the MSS. have the absurd reading 'Ἀρ' οὖν'. The absurdity of conclusion follows so necessarily from the fact which has been said, that it would be quite out of place to make it the subject of a question; the presence of γε shows not only the corruption, but γίγνεται] Commonly γίγνοντ' ὃν, the sure method of correcting it.
μηρύσασι τῆς ἰδονής πέρι τὸ γένεσιν μὲν, οὐδ' ἡμὲν τίνος αὐτῆς εἶναι, χάριν ἔχειν δεὶ. ὅλον γὰρ ὡς ὁδὸς τῶν φασάσθενον ἰδονήν ἁγαθὴν εἶναι καταγελά.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὁ αὐτὸς ὁδὸς ἐκάστοτε καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐν γενέσεσιν ἀποτελεομένων καταγελάσται.

ΠΡΩ. Πώς δὴ καὶ ποίων λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τῶν ὅσων ἐξείσεμον ἢ πείνην ἢ δίψαν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, ὥσα γένεσις ἐξείστατο, χαίροντι διὰ τὴν γένεσιν ἀτι ἰδο

νῆς οὕτως αὐτῆς, καὶ φασίν ζῆν οὐκ ἀν δέξασθαι μὴ διψωτές τε καὶ πενηντές, καὶ τάλλα, ἢ τις ἐν εἴπαι, πάντα τὰ ἐπο

μενα τοῖς τοιούτοις παθήματι, μὴ πάσχοντες.

ΠΡΩ. Βολκασι νοῦν.

ΣΩ. Ὅποιον τῷ γίγνεσθαι γε τούταν τοῦ ἐπι

θεοῦς φαίμεν ἂν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον.

ΣΩ. Τὴν δὴ φθορὰν καὶ γένεσιν αἴροιτ' ἃν τις τοῦ θεοῦ

ἀφομίμους, ἀλλ' ὅπ' ὁ θάνατον ἐκεῖνον βίον, τὸν ἐν ὧν μὴ

χαίρει μήτε λυπεῖσθαι, φοβεῖν δὲ ἢν δυνατὸν ὡς οἶον τε κα

θαφώσατα.

ΠΡΩ. Πολλὴ τις, ὡς ἔουσα, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἀληθείᾳ ἐξι

βαίνει γίγνεσθαι, ἐὰν τις τῷ ἰδονήν ὡς ἁγαθὼν ἡμῖν τιθέσαι.

ΣΩ. Πολλὴ, ἔτη τι καὶ τῆς ἐτών λέγωμεν, —

ΠΡΩ. Πὴ; 

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἀληθοῦν ἄριτοι μηδὲν ἁγαθὸν εἶναι μηδὲ κα

λὸν μὴν ἐν σώματι μήτε ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλοις πλὴρ ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ

ἔντεκα ἰδονήν μοῦν, ἀνδρίαν ὧν ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ νοῦν ἢ τι

τῶν ἄλλον δοῦ [ἀγαθῶν] εἰκῇ ἡ ὑπηρ. μηδὲν τοιούτων εἶναι;

[ἔχειν Σε] The best MSS. have δεῖν. This error is of continual occurrence in infinitives having the circumflex, which is so easily confounded with the sigla of γ. 

ὁ αὐτὸς ὁδὸς] This is a bitter sneer at Aristotle, defining pleasure as a γένεσις, and yet preaching pleasure. The difference between αἰσχοῦσις and ἀποτελεομένων is that between philosophers, and men who follow a certain mode of life. By understanding this difference we are enabled to do without my change of ὅμοισιον into ὅμοισιον, but I still doubt whether we do not require εὐδαίμονας or ἑυδαίμονας after ἀποτελεομένων. 

[ἀγαθῶν] "It is unreasonable to suppose that of all the things which belong to the mind such as courage, temperance, intelligence, &c. pleasure is the only one entitled to be called good.”

Platonis Philebouss.
This is a fair appeal to common sense; but if you add χρύσα, you beg the question. Philebus could not say that of all χρυσός this is the only one without a manifest contradiction.

The verb σφάλα, to strain or percolate, has the same relation to σφάλας as στήνω to στήνα. Hence the proper meaning of the word σφάλος is, that which suffers anything to run through it; it is therefore used of a leaky or cracked vessel. To ring a vessel in order to ascertain its soundness, is περιστρέφειν (with coins καθωδώνιαν); and then it was said either ὠφίς or σφάλον βολμέν—ἥχηθεν—φιληγέγερσα. The conjecture on this place, σφάλον ἤχητ, is not admissible, for if this had been the meaning, the future must have been used.

The common reading is ἄλος ὅ τι καθωδότατος—But ἄλος χρυσίμοις is barbarous; and if we desired to retain ἄλος, no change short of the following would be really sufficient: ἄλος ἄν κατδέομαν, κατδότας δὲ χρυσίμοις—χρυσίμοις.

Stallbaum has unsuccessfully defended χρύσιν against Schleiermacher, who proposed χρύσιν. There is no question of the comparison at present, but of the admixture, in order to which, as Socrates had already observed (53, 3), it is necessary to have each kind in its pure state. χρύσιν μέρους eis χρύσιν is as elegant as χρησιμότατα μ. eis χρύσιν (τῶν μερῶν) is the reverse.

If we would understand the drift of this question, we must divest ourselves of any notion that Plato is intending to establish a formal classification. His sole object is to show that there are two elements in ἑπτάμη, namely the production of tangible results, and the information of the mind. The latter is not pointed out for its own sake, but to give relief and definiteness to the former which is its opposite; and the former is mentioned, because it enables him to introduce music and several other arts under one head as χρυσιμίσχους. This explanation disposes of the suspicion about some portion of the text having been lost, and fully accounts for the fact that Socrates never returns to the head of arts περὶ τωδέαν. But why does he choose the arts which he calls χρυσιμίσχους as the subject of particular enquiry? Because in these again there is a twofold element; the element of certainty derived from the mathematical sciences under which they work, and the empirical element. Now as one of these is scientific (ἐπιστήμης χρυσίμοις) and the other not, it is necessary to show this, as determining the greater or less
περί τὰ μαθήματα ἐπιστήμης, τὸ δὲ περὶ παιδείαν καὶ τροφήν. ἦ πῶς;
ΠΡΩ. Όπως.
ΣΩ. Ἐν δὴ ταῖς χειροτεχνίαις διανοηθέντων πρώταις εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐπιστήμης αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἐχόμενον, τὸ δὲ ἢτον ἐνὶ, καὶ δεῖ τὰ μὲν ὡς καθαρότερα νομίζειν, τὰ δὲ ὡς ἀκαθαρσίωτερα.
ΠΡΩ. Όπως οὖσαν κρίνη.
ΣΩ. Τὰς τοινυ ἡγεμονικὰ διαλείπειν ἐκάστων αὐτῶν χωρίς.
ΠΡΩ. Ποιας καὶ πῶς;
ΣΩ. Οἶνον πασῶν ποιον τεχνῶν ἢ τις ἀρμηνευτὴν χαρίζῃ Β καὶ μετρικὴν καὶ στατικὴν, ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν, φαῦλον τὸ κα-
ταλεπότερον ἐκάστης [ἂν γίγνοντο].
ΠΡΩ. Φαῦλον μὲν δὴ.
ΣΩ. Τὸ γιόν μετὰ ταῦτ' εἰκαζέων λείποντ' ἢν καὶ τὰς ἀινυθής καταμελεῖταν ἐμπείρῃ καὶ τιν τριβή, ταῖς τῆς στο-
χαστικῆς προσχωμένοις δυνάμεις, ἃς πολλοί τέχνας ἐπονο-
μάζοντο, μελέτη καὶ πόνῳ τὴν δόμην ἀπειρασμένας.

pureness of these parts of Intellect, as they had already sought out the greater or less pureness of the several kinds of Pleasure. As for the text, περὶ τὰ μαθήματα is to be understood either in its widest sense, and then it is superfluous; for what ἐπιστήμη is there which is not π. τ. μαθήματα? Or it is to be taken in a restricted sense and then it is on its wrong side; for a knowledge περὶ τὰ μαθήματα is a knowledge περὶ τὴν παιδείαν. Sydenham saw that, χειροτεχνίαις being an ad-
jective, you must understand either τέχ-
νας, which would be ridiculous, or ἐπι-
στήμης; but no ἐπιστήμης have been men-
tioned. (only ἐπιστήμη in general) so that there is nothing to justify the omission of ἐπιστήμης here. These reasons seem to have been quite behind the discernment of Stallbaum, who dis-
misses Sydenham with an authoritative "male", and one of his usual non-appo-
site quotations. Thirdly I have written περὶ τῶν, which is unmeaning. I have put αὐτῷ which marks the second distinction. καθαρότατα has been already changed into καθαρότερα before me. Not only ought the comparative to match the comparative, but any art which is κα-
θαρότατη would on the withdrawal of the scientific element cease altogether; for if the pureness is according to the presence of the mathematical science, the most pure must have this not only as predominating but as excluding all empirical admixture, and when this is withdrawn, there remains—nothing.

ἀπὸ τῆς ἀ. χορήθη—[ἢ γίγνοντο] This combination is not Greek; and the se-
cond half can be omitted without any detriment to the sense.

Φαῦλον μὲν δὴ ἢ This is the form of simple assest; if, in place of repeating φαῦλον, he had said φαῦλόντον, μὲν αὐτῷ would have been added; if his as-
sent had been restricted, γοῦν. There is also a shade of difference between μέ-
τοι the old reading, and μὲν δὲ the reading of the Bodleian. The former is the more suitable when the answerer adds the weight of his own authority to the mere assent.

τὴν δόμην ἀπειρασμένας] The pro-
ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαίοτατα λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Ὑδρόν μεστή ἡ μὲν τοῦ μυσικῆς πρώτη, τὸ δὲμφω-

νον ἀμόστισα οὖ μέτρῳ ἄλλα μελέτη στοιχειοῦ, καὶ δια-

πασα αὐτῇ καὶ αὐλητικῇ, τὸ μέτρον ἐκάστης χορδῆς τῷ στο-

χῶμασθαι ἕρμουχοις Ψηφεύονσα, ὡστε πολὺ μεμημένον ἔχειν τῷ μὴ σαφές, σιμοχῶν δὲ τὸ βέβαιον.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλάθεσατα.
Β ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἑνεκῇ τε καὶ γεωγράφων καὶ κυβερνητικῆ

καὶ στρατηγικῆς ὡσαίτως εὐφώμουν ἐκούσας.
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάντα γε.
ΣΩ. Τεκτονικῆν δὲ γε, οἷμαι, πλείστως μέτρος τὸ καὶ

ὀργάνως χρωμάνην, τὰ πολλὰ ἀκρίβειαν αὐτῇ πορίζοντα τεχνι-

κωτέραν τῶν πολλῶν ἑπιστημῶν παρέχεται.
ΠΡΩ. Πῇ;
ΣΩ. Κατὰ γε ναυπηγίαν καὶ κατ’ οἰκοδομίαν καὶ ἐν πολ-

πρίστι of the word ἰδίμην depends on 
μελέτη καὶ πάνω, which are used of 
training in the palaistra. The subject 
of προσχρημαίνον is the possessors 
of the senses, that of ἔπειρασμάτων is 

μεστῇ κ. τ. ὧ.] This passage has 
suffered from the well-known practice 
of transcribers, who, when they could not 
or would not decipher terminations, in-
vented those which the immediate neigh-
bourhood suggested. From οὖ μέτρῳ 
the copyist inferred that he must write 
στοιχεῖο φ and then altered μελέτη into 
μελέτης. The reasoning proves clearly 
what Plato must have written. In pro-
portion as an art trusts less to measure 
and more to practice, it must be full 
of guesswork.

κατά καὶ αὐλητικῇ] The MSS. have 
καὶ ζύμπασα αὐτῆς αὐλητικῆς. But 
ζύμπασα belongs to the sumnum ge-

mna, and flute-playing has no sub-
divisions worth notice. It was an old 
subject of dispute between two schools 
of early musicians whether questions 
about the intervals in music should be 
determined by proportions of strings 
only or also by ear; but in the case 
of αὐλητικῆς the task of settling such 
questions by length of pipe was too 
laborious, so that there especially the 
empirical method was pursued.

χορδῆς ἦν. It is unnecessary to enter into 
the question whether χόρδη is appli-
cable to wind instruments, although the 
passage quoted with such confidence by 
Mr. Chappell (Hist. of Music p. 146) 
from Plato Rep. 399, n. is quite incon-
clusive, being itself confessedly corrupt; 
and I can find no other. The very 
context in that passage would seem to 
show that Socrates objects to the flute, 
because the admitted defects of stringed 
intruments were due to an imitation 
of the flute. I am inclined to read τὸ 
πολύγορον αὐτῷ, καὶ αὐτῷ τὰ 
παλαιότατα αὐτοῦ τυγχάνει ἐνα 
μερικά; But here αὐλητικῇ is repre-
sented as hunting after the measure of 
the chord in a stringed instrument: that 
is, having no measure of its own to 
trust to, it derives its certainty from 
that which possesses such a measure. 

τὰ πολλὰ] In place of this reading, 
the Zurich Editors have adopted the 
conjunctural one of Α. This only spoils 
what is perfectly plain. "The things 
which give this art its accuracy, make 
it τεχνικῶτατον, and therefore more 
akin to pure ἐπιστήμη."
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

λοις ἄλλοις τῆς ξυλομηχησ. κανόνι γάρ, οίμαι, καὶ τόρνη χρῆσαι καὶ διαβῆσαι καὶ στάθμη καὶ τίνι περισσογνωρίκιον κεκομισμένη.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνω γε, ὁ Σάκτρατες, ἄρετος λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Θὰ μὲν τοῖνυν διχῇ τὰς λεγομένας τέχνας, τὰς μὲν μονακὴς ξυνεπομένας ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἐλάττονος ἀριθμεῖας μετα-ισχύσας, τὰς δὲ τεκτονικὴ πλείονος.

ΠΡΩ. Κέλεισθο.

ΣΩ. Τούτων δὲ ταύτας ἀκριβεστάτας εἶναι τέχνας, ὡς νῦν δὲ πρῶτας εἴτεομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀριθμητικὴν φαίνει μοι λέγειν καὶ ὅσα μετὰ ταύτης τάχας ἐφόβηξον τῶν δή.

ΣΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἀλλ', ὁ Πρώταρχος, ἀρ' οὖ διττάς αὖ Δ καὶ ταύτας λεκτικόν; ἡ πτώς;

ΠΡΩ. Ποιας δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἀριθμητικήν πρῶτον ἀρ' οὖν ἄλλην μὲν τινα τῶν πολλῶν φατέον, ἄλλην δ' αὖ τὴν τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων;

ΠΡΩ. Πὴ τοτε διωρισάμενος οὖν ἄλλην, τὴν δ' ἄλλην θείη τις ἐν ἀριθμητικῇ;

ΣΩ. Οὐ σμικρὸς δρῆ, ὁ Πρώταρχος. οὐ μὲν γάρ ποιν µο- νάδας ἀνίσους καταριθμοῦνται τῶν περὶ ἄριθµων, οἶνον στρατο- πεδὰ δύο καὶ βοῦς δύο καὶ δῦο τὰ σμικρότατα ἢ καὶ τὰ πάν.-Ε

κανόνι] κανόνι is the rule for measuring straight lines; τόρνον for curved; διαβήσεις the cross pieces, (in shape of a compass stretched out,) from the angle of which the plumb-line depended; στάθμη the plumb-line itself; and προσαγωγος is explained to be the instrument for reducing warped timber to straightness. If this is correct, it is much less κεκομενύμενον than the rest, which are scientific helps, while this is a mere engine of force. Perhaps it was an instrument for taking the angles of curves. It is scarcely necessary to say that κεκομενύμενον has nothing to do with the workmanship, though Stallbaum translates “eius factum.”

Ἄλλην, τὴν δ' ἄλλην. This is a common ellipse for τὴν μὴ δ. τῆν δὲ δ. Compare Laws 862, β. which I quote for the sake of correcting it: καὶ τὸ μὲν θλαβῶν ἐκθλαθή τοῖς νόμοις εἰς τὸ διευθυνον ποιητὴν, τὰ τε ἀπολογομένα σφαι- ροντα, καὶ τὸ πεποίην ὑπὸ τοῦ πάλιν ἐξοπλισθέντα, καὶ τὸ ἐκπομεθεὶν ἀντα- πλη σφῆνε, τὸ δὲ στάθμων ἐξιδιοστάτως καὶ τοῖς πάσης σφαιρας (παρέχοντα) ἐκπομεθεὶν ἐκ διαφορᾶς εἰς φιλο- σοφοῦντα εἰς καθιστάναι τοῖς νόμοις.

Οὐ σμικρὸς δρῆ] οὐ σμικρὸς ὅρος is the common reading. But this is out of structure, and if any one wishes to understand ἔστι, he must at least insert the article. But the words are evidently an answer to Πὴ ποτὲ διαρισάμενος.—The word αὐτοῖς three lines below was supplied to give a case to συνεποιο- urther, and the consequence is that the condition of B assenting to A is not, A changing his mind, but some third C propounding the same doctrine as B.
των μέγιστα· οἱ δ’ οὖν ἂν ποτε [άνωτας] συνακολοουθήσειν, εἰ μὴ μονάδα μονάδος ἐκάστης τῶν μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσαν τις ἤσει.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα γ’ εἰ δέλεις οὐ σιμφάνα διάφορα τῶν περί ἄριθμον τενταξίων, ὅστε λόγον ἔχειν οὐ ἀνάλογον εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ λογικαὶ καὶ μετρητικὴ ἢ κατὰ τεκτοικήν καὶ κατ’ ἐμπορικήν τῇ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν γεωμετρία τε καὶ λογισμῷ 57 [καταμελετωμένον]; πότερον ὡς μία ἑκατέρα λεκτέων, ἢ δύο τεϊθομεν;

ΠΡΩ. Τοῖς πρὸσθεν ἐπίσωμος ἔγωγ’ ἂν δῦο κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ψήφον τεθεῖν ἑκατέραν τούτων.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθος, οὐ δ’ ἔνεκα ταύτα προφηγαγμέθη εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἢρ’ ἑννεῦς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσος, ἀλλὰ σὲ βουλούμεν ἂν ἀποφήσασθαι τὸ νῦν ἑρωτώμεναν.

ΣΩ. Αυξεί τοινυν ἐμοῦ οὖν ὅπος ὁ λόγος οὖν ἢτον ἢ ὧτε λέγειν αὐτὸν ἡχομένα, ταῖς ἱδοναῖς ἵπτων τάνειότερον ἐν-Βεία ἀργεῖνα προβεβηκόμενα σκοπών εἰ ἃρ’ ἔστι τις ἐνέργειας ἄλλη κα-θοροτέρα ἑπιστήμης ἑπιστήμης, καθάπερ ἱδονῆς ἱδονῆ.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα σαφές τούτο γε, ὅτι ταῦθ’ ἔνεκα τού-των ἑπικεφαλήμεναν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἢρ’ οὐχ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἐν’ ἄλλοις

ἐν μη μονάδα] Except a man shall consider no monad to differ from any other simple monad out of all innumerable monads. There is an intentional redundancy in this triple opposition (μονάδα —μονάδας, μηδεμίαν—ἐ. τ. μ., ἄλλην —ἄλλης) in order to mark the perfect indiscernibility of every monad from every other.

tενταξίων] Rep. 581 ι, Τίτ. 90 ι, who give their time to Arithmetic.

Τί ἐν λογικήν] In this passage I have changed the x. φ. γεωμετρίας τι καὶ λογισμῶν, so as to render the sentence complete. This is far better than supplying διάφορα, which would make Socrates first ask whether two things differ, then whether they are one, and again whether they differ. The only question that can by any possibility be asked as introductory to the other two is "How do these stand to each other?" The word καταμελετωμένων is nothing but a wretched attempt to bolster up the construction by making a genitive absolute of it; and for this purpose some one has borrowed the remarkably elegant word from its context and used it where it means about as much as would τυπομένων.

tάνειότερον] I have added the article which is necessary to the sense. τάνειότερον τι is not to be thought of. The case of ἱδονῆς has been already determined, and the corresponding case is to be sought in vous.

προβεβηκόμενα] This is Schlesierma-

cher’s emendation for προβεβηκέναι; it is obvious that no πρόβλημα is put for-

ward.

Τί οὖν] In this sentence the Books turn two distinct questions into one
παλινος πιθος. 103

άλλης τέχνης ουσάν ἀνεύρισκε [σαφεστέραν] καὶ ἀσαφεστέραν ἀλλής ἀλλης;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνι ρέυν οὖν.

ΣΩ. 'Εν τούτοις δ' ἄρ' οὐ τινα τέχνην ὡς ὁμόνυμον φιλεῖον, εἰς δόξαν καταστήσασας ὡς μίαν, πάλιν ὡς δυοὺς ὄντων ἐπιανερωθ' τούτοις αὐτοῖς [το σαφές καὶ τὸ καθαρόν περὶ ταῦτα] πότερον ἡ τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων ἢ μὴ φιλοσοφοῦντων ἀκριβεστέραν ἔχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα δοκεῖ μοι τούτο διερωθάν.

ΣΩ. Τῷ οὖν, ὁ Πρώταρχε, αὐτῶ διδόμεν ἀπόκρισιν;

ΠΡΩ. Ω Σώκρατες, ἐς Θαυμαστόν διαφοράς μέγεθος εἰς σαφέστεραν προεξέλθαμεν ἐπιστημιῶν.

ΣΩ. Οὕτων ἀποκρινομέθα δέ σοι.

ΠΡΩ. Τῷ μὲν; καὶ εἰρήσομεν γ' ὅτι πολὺ μὲν αὕτη τῶν ἀλλών τέχνην διαφέρουσι, τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ περὶ τὴν τῶν θυμίας φιλοσοφοῦντων ὑμὴν ἀμηχανόν ἀκριβεῖα τε καὶ ἀληθείας περὶ μέτρα τε καὶ ἀριθμοὺς διαφέρουσι.

ΣΩ. Ἡστιο ταῦτα κατὰ σε', καὶ σοι δὴ πιστεύοντες θαρ- ροῦντες ἀποκρινομέθα τοῖς δεινοῖς περὶ λόγων ὄλην—

ΠΡΩ. Το ποίον;

ΣΩ. 'Ος εἰσὶ δύο ἀριθμητικά καὶ δύο μετρητικά καὶ ταύτας ἀλλαί τοιαύτα ἐννοουμένα συναπτεῖ, τὴν διδυμότητ' ἐξωνεῖ

ΣΩ. Διδόμεν τυχ' ἀγαθ' τούτοις, οὐς φησί δεινοῖς εἰς ταυτήν τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, οὐ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ταύτας οὖν λέγομεν ἐπιστήμασιν ἀκριβεῖας οἷας εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνι μὲν οὖν.

question asked twice. I have removed σαφεστέραν and for ἀνεύρισκαν written ἀνεύρισκα. εἰς δέδων καταστήσασας] The same expression occurs in Euthyd. 305 d. Compare also Cratyl. 431 a, εἰς τὴν ἀλθείαν καταστήσασιν. On μᾶς] The MSS. have ὡς μᾶς, an alteration probably made to suit δυοῖ, as if the construction were the same. I have also supplied ἔτων in its right place, and put the absurd supplement τὸ σαφές — περὶ ταῦτα into brackets. ἀκριβεστέραν ἔχειν is precisely the same as τὸ σαφές καὶ τὸ καθαρόν. A little further on εἰς σαφηνείαν is used as to this same quality; and still further he uses ἄληθες and ἀκριβεῖα in the same sense.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

Σ. 'Αλλ' ἦμας, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἀναίνομεν ἄν ἢ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις, εἴ τινα πρὸ αὐτὸς ἄλλην κρίναμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τίνα δὲ ταύτην αὖ δεὶ λέγειν;

Σ. Δήλον δι' αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ γε νῦν λεγομένην γνώρι. τῇ γὰρ περὶ τὸ ὅν [καὶ τὸ] ἄντων καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταύταν ἄει περικός πάντως ἐγὼ, ὁμοί ἤμεν ἰδούντως εὐμνάπτως, ὡς τοῦ καὶ συμμαρτύρων προσήφησαι, μακρῷ ἀληθετάτων εἶναι γνώσιν. σοὶ δὲ τί; [πῶς τούτῳ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, διαφθορίνοις ἄν;]

ΠΡΩ. Ἡκονον μὲν ἐγὼ, ὦ Σῶκρατες, ἐκάστοτε Γοργίου ἧπολλάκης, ὡς ἢ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφρότας πασῶν τεχνῶν. ἐπὶ πάντα γὰρ ὃν' αὐτῇ δοῦλα ἠ' ἐκάντων ἀλλ' ὡς διὰ βίας ποιοιότατον, καὶ μακρῷ ἀφικτή πασῶν εἰς τῶν τεχνῶν. νῦν δ' οὔτε σοι οὔτε δὴ ἐκείνη βουλομένου ἂν ἑναντία τίθεσθαι.

Σ. Τὰ δ' ὅπλα μοι δοσεῖς βουλήτερες εἴπειν αἰσχυνθεῖς ἀπολαμβεῖν.

ΠΡΩ. 'Εστω νῦν ταύτα ταύτη, ὅπη σοι δοκεῖ.

Σ. 'Αρ' οὖν αἴτος ἐγὼ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς ὑπολαμβῶν σε;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον;

Δήλον δι' αὐτὸς ἄν] For this emendation we are indebted to W. H. Thompson. The old reading was Δήλον δι' ἂν πάντως. There can be no doubt that the phrase περὶ τὸ δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄντως is incorrect. τὸ ἄντως would be rightly placed where the question was about the meaning of the word, but here we are considering the objects of a given science. But the object of Dialectic is Truth, and Truth is found either in that which is absolute (τὸ δὲ ἄντως), or in that which is invariable, because it is the effect of the absolute; and this latter Plato expressed by καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταύταν ἄει περικός (γλύπτου). To make τὸ ἄντως, and even τὸ κατὰ ταύταν ἄει περικός, mere explanations of τὸ δὲ, as one Editor has done, betrays great looseness of thought.

σοὶ δὲ τί; [πῶς τούτῳ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, διαφθορίνοις ἄν;] I have made separate sentences: σοὶ δὲ τί; answering to ἐγὼς ὁμοίως καὶ πῶς τ. Ἔ.; ἐν τῷ ἑν ἄντως τῇ κατὰ τοῦ ἕπολει; to the general question. But πῶς διαφθορίνοις ἅν is so contrary to the usual order, and a second quotation of a more vague sort following the only question to the purpose is so unworthy of our author, that I cannot but look on it as a later addition. 

τολλᾶκης] I cannot say what should be done with this word which is quite incompatible with ἑκάστοτε. Nor can I propose anything certain in place of δὲ ἑκάντων, of which the sense seem as necessary as the mode of expression is objectionable. But it is not unlikely that the right reading is δὲ ἑκάντων αὐτῶν.

Τὰ δὲ ὅπλα] This is a play upon the word τέχνας, which Protarchus had used merely in the sense of advancing an opinion; but Socrates, taking up the words ἑναντία τίτωρ, replies, 'I think you were going to say ὅπλα, but you were ashamed, and dropped the word. τὰ δὲ ὅπλα ἑναντία τίτωρ is in act stare, as in Herod. 1. 69, καὶ ἄνευ ἕκαντο τὰ ὅπλα. There is a further play upon ἑπολεῖτε; for ἑπολεῖτε τὰ ὅπλα would properly mean to desert, but here it is merely to forego or give up the word.
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ὁ φίλε Πρώταρχε, τοῦτ’ ἐγὼν ἐξήτων πω, τίς τέχνη ἢ τίς ἐπιστήμη πασῶν [διαφέρει τῷ] μεγίστῃ καὶ ὧν ἀρίστη καὶ πλείστη ὑφελεύσα ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ τίς τοιτὸ τοῦ σαφῆς καὶ τάκριβης καὶ τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἐπισκόπητι, ἢν ὃ ομικρὰ καὶ ομικρὰ ὁνήμασα. τοῦτ’ ἐστιν ὁ νῦν δὴ ἐξήτητομεν. ἀλλ’ ἔρα λαμμον ἀγαθῶν ἀντε ἀγαθόν ἐπεφέροντο τέκνη ὅποις πρὸς χρείαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, κρατεῖν δ’ ἐνεον ἔγω ὁ ἐγὼ πραγματείας, καθάπερ τοῦ λειμοῦ πέρι τός ἐλεγον, γὰρ ἐν σιμωρίον, καθαρὸν δ’ εἶν, τοῦ πολλοῦ καὶ μη τοιοῦτον διαφέ- ρεῖν, τοῦτο γ’ αὖτ’ τῷ ἀληθεστάτῳ. καὶ νῦν δὲ ἃ σφόδρα δια- D νοηθέντες καὶ ἴκανος διαλογισμόμενο, μὴ τ’ ἑλλ’ εἰς ὑγείας ὑφελεύσας ἐπιστήμην βλέψασθε μὴ βιοὺς εὐθυμίας, ἀλλ’ εἰ τὶς τέ- φους τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν δύναμις ἔραν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ πάντω ἐνα ἐν τούτον πράττετι, ταύτῃ εἰσθεμένῃ διερευνησμένοι [το καθαρόν νῦν καὶ φρονήσεως] εἰ τούτῃ μᾶλστ’ ἐκ τῶν εἰ- κόσων ἐκπύθανα φαίμεν ἄν ἂν ἔτ’ ἔτεραν ταύτῃ κρινωτέραν ἡμῖν ζητητέον.

Ε

[διαφέρει τῷ] μεγίστῃ] I once attempted to defend this construction by such examples as that of Aristophanes (Wasps 666) τοὺς "οὐχὶ προδότω κ. τ. ἐ." There never was an interpolation which more clearly betrayed itself. If Plato had used any such word as διαφέ- ρα, he would have made both grounds of comparison, certainty as well as general merit, depend upon it.

Ἀποκλίμον] MSS. and Edd. give ζητη- τομένοι.
πρὸς χρήσεων] These words are to be taken as governing τοὺς δύναμιν, to surpass as to their use to men.

κρατεῖν 5’ ἡ εἴπον ἔγαν νῦν πραγμα- τείας] The reading of the MSS. and Edd. is ὑπάρχειν (for ὑπέρεχειν) and κρατεῖν, ἡ δ’ εἴπον. This has been ad- duced as an instance of the ὑπάρχειν- τον, and it will be well to look closely into it. The case of πραγματείας, ac- cording to this supposition, will be two ways to a construction intended to be analogous to that of τῷ μὲν ἐ. τ. τέχνῃ —δύναμιν, which construction is lost or changed by reason of the long parenthesis, so that, when this ends, a new construction, ταύτῃ εἰστομένη, is substituted. A conclusive answer to all these subtleties is, that not only the construction is different, but the sense is altogether unlike. For in the first part, if completed, we should expect τ’ you assign, or you ought to assign, or something which implies a claim for voicing; but in the second part there is a call on Protagoras to declare what he really thinks about vous (ταύτῃ εἰστομέν κ. τ. ἐ.). Another objection to the pas- sage as it stands is the awkwardness of δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν κρατεῖν, which means δύναμιν κρατεῖν, and nothing more. All these difficulties are removed by so simple a process that I have not hesi- tated to introduce it into the text, and to change the punctuation accordingly. ταύτῃ εἰστομέν] This ταύτῃ refers to δύναμιν, the second to ἐπιστήμην. τὸ καθαρόν νῦν τῇ καὶ φρονήσεως: is not the proposed object of investigation, as the interpolator thought; they are to search out the dialectic art itself.

καὶ νῦν δὲ σφόδρα διανοηθέντες] For καὶ νῦν δ’ ἵνα ἔχως τῇ ἐγὼ ἂν, as opposed to οὐκ ἐξήτων πω. There is some corruption in σφόδρα διανοη- θέντες, for διανοηθέντες cannot be used in the sense of διασκόπειν.
ΠΡΩ. Ἅλλα σκοπῶ, καὶ χαλεπῶν, οἷόμα, συγχωρήσαι τιν' ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην ἢ τέχνην τῆς ἀληθείας ἀνέχεσθαι μάλλον ἢ ταύτην.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἐννοοῦσά τοίονδε εἰρήνας ἡ λέγεις νῦν, ὡς οἱ πολλαὶ τέχναι καὶ ὄσοι περὶ ταύτας πεπόνησατ, πρὸ-59 τον μὲν δόξας χρῶνται καὶ τὰ περὶ δόξαν χρησκευτα-μένως; εἶτε καὶ περὶ φύσεως ἤρεται τις ζητείν, οἷον' ὅτι τὰ περὶ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε, ὅπῃ τε γέγονε καὶ ὅπῃ πάσχει τι καὶ ὅπῃ ποιεῖ, ταῦτα ζητεῖ διὰ βλέπει; φαίμεν ἂν ταύτα, ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Ὀκτώς.

ΣΩ. Οὔκ οὖν οὐ περὶ τὰ ὅντ' ἄει, περὶ δὲ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ γεγονόμενα καὶ γεγονότα ἡμῶν ὃ τοιοῦτος ἀνήργηται τῶν τόνων.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθεύοντα.

ΣΩ. Τούτον οὖν τι σοφῆς ἢ ραίμεν τῇ ὁκρίβεστάτη ἄλγε-Β θεία γίγνεσθαι, ἢν μὴ τ' ἔχει μηδέν πᾶς ποτέ κατὰ ταύτα μὴ ἔχει μήρ' εἰς τὸ νῦν παρόν ἐχεί;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Περὶ οὖν τὰ μὴ κεκτημένα βεβαιώσεται μηδ' ἤρετον πῶς ἂν ποτε ἕβασιν γίγνετο ἡμῖν καὶ ὅποιον;

ΠΡΩ. Ὀλμα μὲν σύναιμος.

πεπόνησαν] This word and ἄντεκτα-μένως (Schütz's correction for ἄντεκταιμένως) explain each other. He is evidently speaking of pursuits which require great assiduity; but what these are it would be difficult to say, if we retained the old reading δος περὶ ταύτα πεπόνησα. This has been explained by a reference to the passages in the Phaedo, where ταύτα is used of visible things; but this would at least include το περὶ φύσεως χρησκευτα, which is here spoken of as a distinct branch. By means of this change we have the arts mentioned first, because they are the subject; but as the following remark turns on the means employed, it is convenient to mention the persons who follow the arts, to avoid the awkwardness of saying that the arts themselves χρησκευτα δόξα, or χρησκευτα το περὶ δόξαν.

ήγεται] If the physiologist mistook what φύσις was, and while supposing that he investigated it was searching out something else, ἤγεται would be appropriate. But nothing more is meant than the usual enquiries of the Ionic Philosophy, and no intimation is given that there is any higher sense of φύ-σις or of the investigation of it. I therefore propose ἤγεται. For while in the handicrafts above mentioned he speaks of those who labour at them, he speaks of physical investigations as things in which men choose to engage. The tense of ἤγεται is borne out by ἀνήργηται τὸν τόνων. In explanation of this latter phrase I observe that in those well-known combinations τάλαμον — πόνων — κίνδυνων — νεκρος ἀρεσκέω, ἀφανέσεω may be used in place of the other verb. Some who did not notice this have proposed unnecessary conjectures. Compare Phaedrus 223 c, 243 C, Laws 921 A and B.
We should have expected οὐτε... οὔτε. But if there is any ἐπιστήμη, however weak or vague, there is some νοῦς, for all ἐπιστήμαι are parts of νοῦς and are discussed as such. The νοῦς of the text is plainly the opposite of that of Ἀναξαγόρας, and throws all things into confusion. The scribes were not familiar with the idiom which we meet both in Homer and in the Attic writers, οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ, οὐδὲ ἢ οὐδὲ. In the 5th Epistle of Synesius our modern texts have οὐ γὰρ οὐδὲ ζύμος ἢν ἔχοντι; but in my collocations I find that the best MSS. have οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ ζύμος οὐδὲ ἔχοντι.

Τὴν μὲν δὴ ἐπὶ καὶ ἐµὲ ἐµὲ. See note on 20, n. The article here has a depreciating effect. It has, in fact, the force of turning the first and second persons into a third, or more properly still, of abstracting the individual from his personality, and making a mere somebody of him.

[καὶ τὸ καθαρόν] These words are spurious. For βέβαιον cannot be separated from ἄληχῆς, since the want of truth in physical knowledge has been declared to arise from the instability of the objects. Again καθαρόν is so nearly the same as ἐλεκρονες that it could not occur unless in close proximity to it, and the only place for εἰλικρονες is that which it occupies as a quality deduced from the other two; and as τὰ ἔξοι—οὐσώτερα answer to βέβαιον and ἄληχης, so does ἐμυκτότατα answer to εἰλικρονες.

[Σεφιρος] The Zurich Editors have changed this into δεσφιρος, which is at least as rational as that Stalbaum’s defence of it as a parenthetical proverb with ποιος understood. It is incredible that Plato should make two δεσφιρος to one and the same δεσφιρος should be corrected.

[οὕτως &c] The common reading is οὕτως γάρ. It is evident that this is no place for γάρ. The confusion between the two readings is of very frequent occurrence.
ΣΩ. Τάσυ' δε' εν ταῖς περὶ τὸ ὅν ὁντως ἐννοίας ἔστιν ἀπηκριβωμένα ὤρθους κείμενα καλείσθαι.
ΠΡΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὃ' εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐγώ τότε παρεσχόμεν, οὐχ ἄλλ' ἐστιν ἡ ταῦτα τὰ ὄνοματα.
ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν, ὡς Σάκητας;
ΣΩ. Εἶκεν· τὸ μὲν δὴ φρονήσεως τε καὶ ἱδονῆς πέρι πρὸς Ἐ τὴν ἀλλήλων μιᾷν εἰ τις φαίη καθαπερεὶ δημιουργοῖς ἢμῖν, ἐξ ὧν ἦ ἐν οἷς δεῖ δημιουργεῖν τι, παρακείσθαι, καλῶς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἀπεικονίζοι.
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.
ΣΩ. Τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἀδε' οὖ μηγέναι ἐπιχειρήτευον;
ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;
ΣΩ. Οἰκονύμω τάδε προεποὺσι καὶ ἀνάμνησασι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὀφθάλμων ἐν ἔχοι,—
ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποία;
ΣΩ. Ἄ καὶ πρότερον [ἐμνήσθημεν]· εὖ δ' ἡ παροιμία δο-60 νεῖ ἔχιν, τὸ καὶ δίκς καὶ τρίς τό γε καλῶς ἔχον ἐπανα-πολεῖν τῷ λόγῳ δείν.
ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;
ΣΩ. Φύσε δ' ἤ μετὰ Δίως· οἶμαι γὰρ οὖσα ποιά τὰ τότε λεγόντα δηθῆναι.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;
ΣΩ. Φιλημόν φησι τὴν ἱδονήν σκότον ὄφθων πᾶσι ζυ' οὺς γεγονέναι καὶ δεῖν πάντας τούτους στοχαζέσθαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τάγαθ'ν τούς' αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐξίμητας, καὶ δὴ ὄνοματα, ἀγαθῶν

Ταῦτ' ἄρ' κ. τ. ἓ.) Although the reading of this passage has been pronounced to be verissima, yet as the authority who states this bids us take ἐστι καλείσθαι together (he was perhaps thinking of ἐστι καλεῖ) and talks strange stuff about ἀπηκριβωμένα and ἔννοιας, we cannot throw off all suspicion of its unsoundness. If ἀπηκρι-βωμένα could mean accurately proved to be (not accurately made) there would be some handle for the infinitive κα-λείσθαι. But as this cannot be, and likewise for other reasons, which good scholars will readily discern, I am inclined to read ἔστι ἀπηκριβωμένας κείμενα καλείσθαι.

ἐξ ὧν ἦ ἐν οἷς The first is the mate-rial, considered as a kind of secondary cause, out of which things are produced; the second, the same material considered as the substance in which the workman realizes his art.

[ἐμνήσθημεν] This is a supplement originating with some one who did not see that the verbs to be understood are ἔστωμεν καὶ ἐνεμνήσαμεν ἡμᾶς προ-τούς.
καὶ ἐκεῖ, ἐνὶ τοῖς [καὶ φύσει μη[] τοῦτῳ ἀρθὸς τεθέντ' ἔχειν. Πωθήσης δ' ἐν μὲν οὖ φυσὶ τοῦτο εἶναι, δόε δὲ καθάπερ τῷ ἃ

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.
ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε καὶ τότε καὶ τῶν ἡμών ἄν ἔννομο-

ΠΡΩ. Το ποίον;
ΠΡΩ. Τὴν τάσα τοῦ οἰκεῖος ταῦτα καὶ πάντως καὶ πάντως, 
ΠΡΩ. Τίμη;
Ο. 'Ως παρεί ὁμον' ἀπὸ τῶν ζωῶν διὰ τέλους πάντως
ΠΡΩ. Οὔτω μὲν οὖν.
Ο. Οὐκοῦν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιφερόμενον χωρὶς ἐκατέρων ἐκα-
ΠΡΩ. Ὡν ταῦτα.
ΠΡΩ. Μὸν οὖν ἡμῖν αὐτῶν τοῦτο πάντως ἐκεῖνον ἐδοξήθη Καὶ 
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;
ΠΡΩ. Εἴ δὲ γε παρασκέψημεν τι τότε, νῦν ὡστισοῦν ἐπανα-
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ οὗτος.
ΠΡΩ. Αἱ μὲν ἢ φύσι τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἄν τὸν

[καὶ φύσει μη[)] These words which separate τοῦ from τοῦτο and leave ήν without a noun expressed or implied to lean upon, and say nothing more than what is said in ἐν τῷ τοῦτῳ, are an evident contribution of some improver.

[καὶ οὗτος τοῦτο]} The scribe has here confounded the ordinal and the cardinal number, both of which are written with the same compendium. α was taken for πρώτον, which is in all the Books, but it was meant for τό as is plain from the antithesis ἐν μὲν οὖ, δόε δὲ.

ἐκατέρως—θέτει. We made the experiment of placing, &c. Stallbaum compares the expression used above, (91, a) ἐν τῷ περίμετρῳ βεβαιώτετα ταῦτα.

μὴ διδακαστε} This formula
ΠΛΑΤΟΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

εἰ μὴ ἀληθῶς δοξάζωσιν χαίρειν, μήτε τὸ παράπαν γιγάντωκοι
Εἰς τοὺς πέτωνθε πάθος, μὴ τοῦ μνήμην τοῦ πάθους μὴν
οντεικών χρόνον ἔχω. ταῦτα δὲ λέγο καὶ περὶ φρονήμασιν, εἰ
tις ἄνευ πάσης ἤδων καὶ τῆς βροχερότητος διέζω δὲν φρονή-
σων ἔχων μᾶλλον [ἡ μετὰ τινον ἤδων] ἥ πάσας ἤδων [χω-
ρίς φρονήμασιν μᾶλλον ᾧ] μετὰ φρονήμασιν ὄν τινός.
ΠΡΩ. Ὅμως ἔστων, ὥς Σάκρατες ἡ ὅνδην ἡ δεῖ ταῦτα γε
πολλάκις ἐπερωτήσαιν.

61 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ γε τέλεσαι καὶ πάσαιν ἀνθένοι καὶ τὸ παν-
tάπασαιν ἄρανον ὄνομάρχαν ἐν τούτων ἐτής.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γαρ ᾧν;
ΣΩ. Τὸ τοῖν πάσιν ἄρανον ἣτοι σαρκὸς ἢ καὶ τις τίπον αὐ-
tοῦ ληπτέον, ὦ, ὅστε δὲ λέγομεν, δευτερεία ὑπὲρ δεύτερων ἐξημέν.
ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὄνον μὲν τιν’ ἐπὶ τάγαθον εἰλήφαμεν.
ΠΡΩ. Τίνα;
ΣΩ. Καθάπερ εἰ τίς τιν’ ἀνθρωπον ζητῶν τὴν ἀπανθα
Β πρῶτον ὁρθῶς, ἐν οἷκει, ποῦδεν αὐτοῦ, μέγα τι δὴ ποιοῦ
τὴν εὐφραίναν ἐν ἔχω τοῦ ζητομένου.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ’ οὖν;
ΣΩ. Καὶ νῦν δὴ τίς λόγος ἐμφύσεν ἡμῖν, ἡπεῖρ καὶ κατ’
ἀρχής, μὴ ζητεῖν ἐν τῷ ἀμίκτω βίω τάγαθον ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ
μικτῷ.
ΠΡΩ. Πάνω γέ.
ΣΩ. Ἑλπίζει μὴν πλεῖον ἐν τῷ μηχανεῖ ναλὼς τὸ ζητο-
μένον ἐσεσθαί φανερώτερον ἤ ἐν τῷ μή.
ΠΡΩ. Πολὺ γέ.
ΣΩ. Τοὺς δὴ θεοῖς, ὥς Πρώταχε, εὐχόμενοι κεφανώμεν,

occurs in several Attic writers. Plato and Xenophon sometimes use merely
μὴ δτι and sometimes add δη only.
In the cases where ye is added, it is found
sometimes before δτι, sometimes after it. Compare this passage with one in
Demosth. against Conon, μὴ δτι γε δη, and with one in Politicus, μὴ δτι δη
βστειτε γε.
[ἡ μ. τ. ἤδων] I bracket the in-
sertions which make nonsense of a
question put by Plato with the utmost
subtlety. In the words given to Pro-
tarchus, the part which purports to be
the answer is no answer at all; and
his objection to the repetition of the
question looks like an addition con-
trived to mask a corrupt sentence. Pro-
tarchus' answer ought to be ἔτι ταῦτα,
or in other words οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν
ἡ ταῦτα γε.
είτε Δαύνυας εἴδ' Ἡραίστος εἴδ' ὅσεις θεών τούτην τὴν τι-Ο 
μήν εἴλησε τῆς συγχράσεως.
ΠΡΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μήν ἡμῖν καθάπερ οἴνοχόν τις παρασταθή κρη-
ναί, μέλλων μὲν ἂν ἀπεικόζῃ τις τὴν τῆς ἱδρον, τὴν δέ τῆς 
φρονήσεως ηραντικήν καὶ οὐκον αὐτήρα καὶ ἰγνειοὶ τινὸς 
ιδατος· ἃς προσθησιμέναιν ὡς κάλλιστα συμμεγνύσα.
ΠΡΩ. Πώς γὰρ οὖν;
ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρότερον· ἂρα πᾶσαν ἱδρον πᾶσῃ φρονῇ—Δ 
σει μιγνύντες τοῦ καλῶς ἀν μάλιστ' ἐπιφέρομεν;
ΠΡΩ. Ἰσος.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀσφαλές· ἢ δ' ἀκινδυνότερον ἄν μιγνύο-
μεν, δόξαν μοι δοξῷ τιν' ἀποφήμασθαι οὖν.
ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τίνα.
ΣΩ. Ἡν τίμιν ἱδρον τῇ ἀληθῶς, ὡς οἰκείῳ, μᾶλλον ἐκε-
ῖνα ἄλλη, καὶ δὴ καὶ τέχνη τέχνην ἀριστερά;
ΠΡΩ. Πώς γὰρ οὖν;
ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ ἐπιστήμης διάφορος, ἢ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ 
γιγνόμενα καὶ ἀπολλέμενα ἀποβλέπονα, ἢ δ' ἐπὶ τὰ μῆτε 
γιγνόμενα μῆτ' ἀπολλέμενα, κατὰ ταύτα δ' ἡσαύτως ὄντ' ἄει. Ἐ 
ταύτην [εἰς τὸ ἀληθῆς] ἐπιστημονοῦμεν ἤγγασάμεθ' ἐκείνης ἀλη-
θεστάταν εἶναι.
ΠΡΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν ὁρθῶς.
ΣΩ. Ὀδοὺν [εἰ] τάληθέστατα τμῆματα ἐκτέρας ἔδωμεν 
πρῶτον ξυμμελέτες, ἢ δ' ἴανα ταύτα ἐγχειρισμένα τὸν ἄγαπη-
τότατον βίον ἀπεργαζόμενα παρέχειν ἡμῖν, ἢ τινὸς ἐπὶ προς-
δεόμεθα καὶ τῶν μὴ τοιούτων.
ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοί γοῦν ὁσεῖ ὁδὲν οὕτως.
ΣΩ. Ἔστω δὴ τις ἡμῖν φρονῶν ἀνθρωπὸς αὐτῆς πέρι δι-
καυσώνης, ὅ τι ἔστι, καὶ λόγον ἔχων ἐξόμενον τῷ νοεῖν, καὶ

*Παρεγγέλτων κρῆναν* Winckelmann, in his Preface, observes that this is an allu-
sion to the libations in honour of the Eumenides and other divinities, which 
consisted of water and honey. Compare 
*Exch. Eum. 107, Soph. Ed. Col. 100* and 471, with the Scholiast.

*Ὑν ἡμῖν* I leave this passage in a corrupt state. ὡς οἰκεία is quite hope-
less, and we have nothing whereby to 
decide our choice between ἀληθῶς το-
σαύτη μᾶλλον or (following the Bodleian 
which omits μᾶλλον), ἀληθεστάτα ἀλ-
λής ἄλλη.

*Οδοὺν [εἰ] τάληθέστατα* I have 
bracketed εἰ and changed ἔδωμεν into 
ἔδωμεν.
ὅς καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν ἄντων ὀφσαίτης διαισθησάμενος.

ΠΡΩ. Ἡστιω γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν οὗτος ἤπειρος ἐπιστήμης ἔχει, κόπλον μὲν καὶ σφαίρας αὐτῆς τῆς θείας τὸν λόγον ἔχειν, τὴν δ' ἀνθρώπινην ταύτην σφαίραν καὶ τοῖς κόπλοις τούτοις ὁγκοῦν, καὶ χρώματι 

Β. μένος ἐν οἰκοδομίᾳ ὡς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως κανονίζει καὶ τοῖς κόπλοις;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐγελοίαν διάδεσαν ἡμῶν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐν ταῖς θείαις οὖσαι μένοις ἐπιστήμης λέγομεν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς φησί; ἢ τοῦ ψευδοῦς κανόνος ἀμα καὶ τοῦ κόπλου τὴν οὐ βέβαιον οὐδέ καθαρὰν τέχνην ἐμβλητέον κοινὴ καὶ συγκράτειν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ, εἰ μέλλει τις ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν ὀδόν ἑκάστου εξευθείαν ὥσπερ ἀναβάσεις οὐκαδε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ μουσικὴ, ἢν ὀλίγον ἐμπροσθεν ἔραμεν, στο-

C χάσεως τε καὶ μιμήσεως μεστὴν οὖσαν, καθαρότερος ἐνδείκτης;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον φαίνεται ἐμικχεῖ, εἴπερ γ' ἡμῶν ο' βίος ἑσται καὶ ὅπως οὖσαν ποτὲ βίος.

ΣΩ. Βούλει σήτα, ὥσπερ θυρῳδής ὑπ' ὄχλου τις ὀδοῦ-

μένος καὶ βιαζόμενος, ἤρθεν δὲ ἀναπετάσας τὰς θύρας ἀρφά 

πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας εἰσερέθη, καὶ μέγησθαν ἡμῖν καθαρὰ τὴν ἐνδεικτά

D ΠΡΩ. Οὐκόν έγὼν' οὖδα, ὁ Σώκρατες, ο' τις τις ἐν 

βλά-

πτοστο πάσας λαθὼν τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιστήμας, ἔχων τὰς πρώτας.

ΣΩ. Μεθίω δὴ τὰς ξυμπάσας δεῖν εἰς τὴν τῆς Ὄμηρον 

καὶ μᾶλλον ποιητικὴς μυστηρίας ὑποθέσῃς;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Μεθέλεισαι. καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ἡμῶν πτηγῆν 

ἰτέον. οἷς γὰρ διενοθήθημεν αὐτὰς μικρύνει πρῶτον, τὰ τῶν 

καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμολογεῖσθαι] Many notes in question, we might read ἐμπειθεῖν, and have been written in defence and explanation of these words. If they are correct, we must understand by them, using other pattern figures in the same manner as the circles. Compare below, χείμαρρος ποταμοὶ κατ' ἄρσιν ἔλεγξε 

τὰ τούτον καὶ ἐλήφθειν, the same as truth. Ἐκ μυστηρίων συμβαλλέσθαι ἐρωμέν ὕδωρ.

οἷς γὰρ διενοθήθημεν] It is vain to
Ἀληθείας μόρι' οὐκ ἔξεγένθη ἤμιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πάσαν ἄγα-πάν ἐπιστήμην εἰς ταύτην μεθέτιμεν ἀθρόας καὶ προσέθεν τῶν ξιδονῶν.

ΠΡΩ. 'Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Όμω δὴ βούλευσαν νῦν καὶ περὶ τῶν ξιδονῶν, πό-τερα καὶ ταύτας πάσας ἀθρόας ἀφετένων ἢ καὶ τούτων πρῶτας μεθέτιμον ἤμιν δόσαι ἄληθείς.

ΠΡΩ. Πολὺ τι διαφέρει πρὸς γ' ἀσφαλείαν πρώτας τάς ἄληθείς ἀφεῖναι.

ΣΩ. Μεθείατων δὴ, τί δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα; ἄρ' οὖν εἰ μὲν τινς ἀναγκαίαν, καθάπερ ἐκαί, ξυμμικτέων καὶ ταύτας;...
γίσεως, ἣ πάσης χωρίς [τοῦ φρόνειν]; οἷμαι μὲν πρὸς ταῦτα τὸν αὐτὸς ἄναγκαστάτον εἶναι λέγειν,—
ΠΠ. Τὸ ποιόν;
ΠΠ. Καὶ καλὸς γὰρ εἰρήκατε τὰ νῦν, φήσομεν.
ΣΩ. Ὡρθός, πάλιν τοινυν μετὰ ταύτα, [τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀνέφετες.] ἂρ ἢδονῶν τι προσδείκσῃ ἐν τῇ εἰγνορικῇ; φάσθημεν ἂν αὐτῷ τὸν νοῦν τε καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἀνέφετες. Ποίον, φαίνειν ἂν ἅσος, ἢδονών;
ΠΠ. Εἰκός.

D
ΣΩ. Ὡ δὲ γὰρ ἰμέτερον λόγος μετὰ τούτοις ἐστὶν ὁδή. Πρῶτος ταῖς ἀληθείαις ἐκείναις ἢδους, φήσομεν, ἂρ ἔτι προσδείκσῃ ἡμῖν τὰς μεγάλιττὰς ἢδους ἐνυπολογίας εἶναι καὶ τὰς σφοδροτάτας; Καὶ πῶς, ὡς ἡμῶν ταῦτα; φαίνειν ἂν, αὐτὸ γὰρ ἑπιστομέματος τε μυρίῃ ἡμῖν ἔχουσι, τὰς γυμνὰς ἐν αἷς οἰκοῦμεν ταραττοῦσαν [διὰ μακάρας ἢδους], καὶ γίγνεσθαι τῇ ἡμᾶς τὴν ἀρχήν οὐκ ἠκολούθητο τὰ τε γεγονόμενα ἡμῶν τέχνα ὡς τὸ πολὺ, ἢ᾽ ἀμέλειαν λήθην ἐμποιοῦσα, πεπάσμασι διαφθείρονσαν; ἀλλὰς δὲ ἢδους ἀληθείας καὶ καθαρᾶς ἢ εἰπές, σχεδὸν οἰκεία ἡμῖν νό-

have μ. ϕ. πάσης ἡ χωρίς τοῦ φρόνειν. There seems no ground for the omission of μᾶλλον in an ordinary prose passage, and the attempt at variety in phrasing itself, in this phrase, is very poor. Nor is there any fairness in the alternative "either with all or without any". For these reasons I have preferred μετὰ phrasing, ἡ πάσης χωρίς. In the next paragraph εἰκονίζεται is obviously an interpolation.

ἀδύνατον τὴν πραξίν τινος ἡμῶν εἰς τὴν ταύτην τὴν τοῦτον τὴν τοῦ νοῦν ἢδονῶν]) The verbal is plainly out of keeping with φαίνειν ἀν, and both the repetition of νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν, and still more the would-be variety in "we must ask", "we shall say, asking", is most clumsy. Another conclusive reason against the genuineness of these words is the position of αὐτῷ for the opposition commences at πάλιν, and there was nothing to prevent the author writing τὴν φρόνησιν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸν νοῦν. But the simplest argument is, that if Plato had written τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἢδονῶν, he would have had no motive for adding anything whatever to φαίνειν ἀν. [διὰ μακάρας ἢδους] This is no doubt a true explanation; but who would ever dream of saying αὐτῷ ταραττοῦσαν ἡμῖν διὰ μακάρας ἢδους?
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

μιζέ, καὶ πρὸς ταῦτας τὰς μεθ᾽ ενείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ τὴ καὶ ἐπιμάραθος ἀρετῆς, ὅποσα καθόπερ ἰσοῦ ὁποιονγινόμενοι αὐτὴν ἔκκολονοῦσαι πάντη, ταῦτας μίννώ τὰς δ᾽ ἀδεὶ μὲ ἀφήνον καὶ τῆς ἄλλης κακίας ἐπομένας πολλῆς τοῦ ἀλογία τοῦ νῦ μηγνίν τῶν βουλόμενον ὁ τι καλλιστὶν ἄνδρα καὶ ἀστασιαστᾶτὰν μίξιν καὶ κράσιν ἐν ταύτῃ μονῳτιν πεϋ-64 ὑπάθαι, τι ποτ᾽ ἐν τ᾽ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ παιτὶ πέρηχνο ἀγαθῶν καὶ τίν᾽ ἄνδραν εἶναι ποτε ματευτείον. ἂρ᾽ οὖν ἐκκρήνωσι ταῦτα καὶ ἐκόνως ἑαυτῶν τῶν τῶν φήμων ὑπὲρ τ᾽ αὑτῶν καὶ μὴς καὶ δίκης ὅθεν ἄποκρίνονται τὰ νῦν ἔρθέντα;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μή καὶ τόδε γ᾽ ἀναγκάζον, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλος ἄν ποτε γένοιτο οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἤν.
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποιον;
ΣΩ. Ὡμί πή μεῖξομεν ἄληθειαν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε τούτο ἄληθος γίγνοιτο οὐδ᾽ ἂν γενόμενον εἴη.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
ΣΩ. Οὐδεμιῶς. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ τινος ἔτι προσδεχὴ τῇ συγκράσας ταύτη, λέγετε σὲ τε καὶ Φίλημος. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καθαπερὶ κόσμος τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἀρξῶν καλῶς ἐμψύχου σωμάτως ὁ νῦν λόγος ἀπειράγοις φαίνεται.
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ ἐμοὶ τοῖνο, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὕτω λέγε δεδοχθαί.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

C ΣΩ. Ἄρει ὁδὲ ἔτι μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ νῦν ἤδη προθύροις [καὶ] τῆς οἰκήσεως ἔφεστάναι [τῆς τοῦ τοιοῦτου] λέγοντες ἵσως ὅρθως ἐν τινα εὐφόρων φαίνειν;
ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοί γοῦν δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. Τί δὴ; εν τῇ ξυμμίζει τιμιώτατον ἠμα καὶ μάλιστ' αὐτίων εἶναι δύσευ τὸν ἤμιν τοῦ πάσι γεγονέναι προσφιλή τὴν τοιαύτην θεάσεων; τούτῳ γὰρ ἱδόντες μετὰ τούτο ἐπισκεφθηκαὶ μεθα, εἴθ' ἤδονὴ εἶτε [τῷ] νῦ προσφέστερον καὶ οἰκειότερον ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἤρθετηχεν.

D ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθῶς: τούτῳ γὰρ εἰς τὴν κράσιν ἤμιν ἐστὶ ξυμ-
φορώστατον.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ξυμπάσας γε μίξεως οὐ χαλεπῶν ἱδεῖν τὴν αὐτίαν, δι' ἣν ἡ παντὸς αἴξια γίγνεται ἁμισοῦν ἢ τὸ παρά-
παν οὐδενός.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις;
ΣΩ. Οὔτε ποὺ τοῦτο ἀνθρώπων ἄγνοεῖ.
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;
ΣΩ. Ὅτι μέτρου καὶ τῆς ξυμμέτρου φύσεως μὴ τηροῦσα ἤτισον καὶ ὑπασοῦ ἐξερχόμενα πάσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπόλλυσα τὰ τε κεφανόμενα καὶ πράσινα αὐτήν. οὐδὲ γὰρ χράσις, ἀλλὰ τίς έκκατος ξυμπερφορημένη ἄληθῶς ἡ τοιαύτη γίγνεται ἐκάστοτῑ 
ἐντος τοῖς κεκεπημένοις ξυμφορᾶ.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.
ΣΩ. Νῦν δὲ καταπέφυγε δὴν ἢ τάγαθῳ δύναμις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν. μετριότης γὰρ καὶ ξυμμέτρεια κάλλος δὴν καὶ ἀρετὴ πανταχοῦ εξωβαινεί γίγνεσθαι.
ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μήν ἀληθεύαν γ' ἠφαμεν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ κράσει 
μεμύχεται.
ΠΡΩ. Πάνω γε.

65 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ μιᾷ δυνάμει ἴδεις, τὸ ἀγαθὸν [Ἑνεδ-
σαι,] σύντεις λαβόντες, κάλλει καὶ ἐμμετρίᾳ καὶ ἄληθείᾳ, λέ-

[kall] By cancelling this word we ar-
rive at the right construction, εἰπ' τοῖς 
προθύροις τῆς τάγαθος οἰκήσεως τῆς 
tου τοιούτου seems to have been in-
serted after this intrusive καὶ had made 
tῆς οἰκήσεως seem to be without an
owner.

ξυμφορᾶ] Observe the play on the 
word ξυμπερφορημένη.

μετριότης] This answers to ἀρετή, 
and ξυμμετρεία to κάλλος.

λαβόντες] This has nothing to do
with catching, though the scribe who interpolated Ἴναισσάντα thought so. The infinitive to be understood is λαβέειν. No idea can be the instrument for ensnaring or seizing on τὰ γαζάν. We have in fact found it; and we form our notion of it, (compare ἐκείνον λάβειν, 17, c) not by a single but by a triple character. For this reason as οὖν is quite inappropriate (else we should also read οὖν μετά), I have written σύντροπος, and as the three characters have been repeatedly mentioned, and are soon to be mentioned again, as Beauty or Symmetry, Measure, and Truth, I have changed σύμμετρα into ἴσομετρα. τοίτο is manifestly τάγαζαν, and this they consider the cause τῶν ἐν τῇ ἰμιμίζει, which is not quite so easy as it looks. For τάγαζαν is not spoken of as the cause of the ingredients; and if τῇ ἰμιμίζει does not mean these, it must be constrained to mean the triple conditions of a good mixture just mentioned. But perhaps this constraint would be no longer felt, if we could find out what is lurking under the cor-
rupt οἷον ἢν. Indeed it is not so cern- tain that τῶν itself is correct, for the repeated ἐν in αἰτιασάμεθα ἢν, which I have omitted as intolerable in Attic prose, might make one suspect that αἰτιασάμεθα τοῦτο was to be read, and that some word like παροῦσας had preceded. The argument is very plain. There is ἵμαζαν in κρᾶςις, for all prefer the mixed to the unmixed. But μέτρον, κάλλος, ἄλλησις must be present at all κρᾶςισσαι; therefore we may conclude that these three represent that one, and that ἵμαζαν is the cause of their presence in the κρᾶςις, and that the κρᾶςις is good (τοαύτην) because of the Good that causes it.  

[σύγγυνεαν] This word I have put in brackets. If any one wishes to retain it, he must insert ἢν. But although Boe- crates afterwards uses this figure of speech, —πότερον ἢδον ἐν γνωστηρον—it is not wanted, and its absence is fully compensated by the verb ἰσομετραίον. "To which of the two shall we rather declare Measure, Beauty, and Truth to belong?"
ΠΡΩ. Τί δὲ χρόνον δεί; πολὺ γὰρ, οἶμαι, διαφέρετον. ἴδονη μὲν γὰρ ἀπάντων ἀλαζώνιστατον, ὡς δὲ λόγος, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἴδονις ταῖς περὶ τάφρονίσσας, αὐτὴ δὲ μέγιστα δοκοῦσαν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπισκέψεων σιγνωμὴν εἰλίσκε παρὰ θεῶν, ὡς καθάπερ παιδὸν τῶν ἴδιων νόμον οὐδὲ τὸν ὀλίγοντος κεκτήμε—

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν μετριότατα ὀδανίτως σκέψαι, πίστευον ἴδονη φρονίσεως ἢ φρονίσεις ἴδονης πλείον κέκτηται;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰσκεπτῶν γε καὶ ταύτην σκέψην περαβέβλημα. οἴμαι γὰρ ἴδονης μὲν καὶ περικυκλώσεις οὐδὲν τῶν ἴδιων περικυκλώσεις ἀμετρώτερον εὑρεῖν ἂν τίνα, νοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἐμπερώτερον οὐδ' ἂν ἐπετε.

Ε. ΣΩ. Καλῶς εἴρημασ. ὡμοί δ' ἐκέ λέγε τὸ τρίτον. νομίζω ἢ μὴν κάλλους μετελιχθη πλείον ἢ τὸ τῆς ἴδονης γένος, ὡς ἐκεῖ καλλίω νοῦν ἴδονῆς, ἡ τοιοονίας;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὖν φρονίσῃς μὲν καὶ νοῦν, ὁ Σώματες, οὐδεὶς πόστον οὖθ' ὑπάρ᾽ οὐτ' ὅπαρ ἁγίχρον οὐτ' ἐλθὲν ὕπαρ᾽ ἐπεννοήσαι οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῇ οὔτε γεγράφετο οὔτε ὅπαρ οὔτ᾽ ἐσώμενον.

ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἡθονᾶς δὲ γέ σου, καὶ ταύτα σχέδον τὰς μεγίστας, ὅταν ἴδωμεν ἴδομένων ὁρίσκων, ἢ τὸ γελοῖον ἐπ' αὐταῖς ἢ τὸ 66 πάντων ἁπάτησον ἐποίμενον ὁρώντες, αὐτοὶ γ' αἰσχυνόμεθα καὶ ἀφαιρέζοντες κράτημεν ἢ τι μάλαστα, νοκτὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκούσας, ώς φῶς οὐ δέον ὤρων αὑτά.

ΣΩ. Πάντη δὴ φύσεως, ὃ Πρῶτερον, ὠτο τ' ἀγγέλων [πέμπτων] καὶ παροδοὶ φραζέον, ὡς ἴδονη κείσι' οὖν ἔστε περα—

δικτόρατον ἢ [δικτόρατον] I have followed the authority of the oldest MS.

Buttmann, though disposed to extend the analogy of ἄρτιττος, σφαδότερος &c. to compound words, and to consider κύττακτος and such like as licenses taken by the Attic poet in unusual words, is content to await a fuller induction. The presence of these forms in a MS. which has preserved so many Atticisms is a part and no small part of the kind of proof which he wanted. 'Ἀλλ' οὖν' Here again the MSS. and Edd. have Ἄλλ' οὖν, which is evidently out of place where an admission is made in answer to a previous question, and where the only answer made by the next speaker is Ὀρθῶς.

[πέμπτων] οὐκ ἀγγέλων φράζεσθαι is the same as ἀγγέλους πέμπειν φράζειν,
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

119
tον οὖδ' αὖ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν τῇ περὶ μέτρον καὶ
tὸ μέτριον καὶ καίριον καὶ πάνθ᾽ ὅπως τοιαῦτα χρή νομίζειν
tὴν ἄδικον γνώρισαι φίλοι.

ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γὰρ ἐν τῶν τῶν λεγομένων.

ΣΩ. Δέυτερον μὲν περὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ Β
tέλειον καὶ ἵκανον καὶ πάνθ᾽ ὅπως τῆς γενέας αὐτῆς ἰσότις ἐστίν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστε γὰρ.

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοῖνυν τρίτον, ὡς ή ἔμι, μαντεία, νοῦν καὶ φρο
νησὶν τιθεῖσι σικ. ἂν μέγα τι τῆς ἀληθείας παρεξέλθοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως.

ΣΩ. Ἀφ᾽ οὖν [οὐ τέταρτα.] αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔθεμεν,
ἐπιστήμας τε καὶ τέχνας καὶ δόξας ἥθελας λεγεῖνας, ταύτ᾽
ἐλναι τὰ πρὸς τοὺς τρισὶ τέταρτα, εἴπερ τού ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶ μιᾶς
λοις τῆς ἱδονῆς ἐμπεθεῖ;

ΠΡΩ. Τάχ᾽ ἂν.

ΣΩ. Πέμπεται τοῖνυν, ὡς ἱδονάς ἔθεμεν ἀλόποπος ὁρισά
μενοι, καθαράς ἐποιημάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς, ἐπιστήμασις,
tός δ᾽ αἰσθήσεσιν, ἐπομένας;

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως.

ΣΩ. Ἐκεῖ δ᾽ ἐν γενεαῖ, φησιν Ὄρφεας, καταπαύσατε κό
σμον ἀνθής, ἠτὰς κυνδυνεύει καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος λόγος ἐν ἑκεῖ

Comp. Eur. Aest. 737, 738. But ὅτι
ὁ γυγελεῖον κύκλον is nothing at all.

τοιαῦτα χρή] The MSS. are divided
between τοιαῦτα χρή and χρή τοιαῦτα,
the former, which alone makes sense,
being supported by the inferior MSS.

τὴν ἄδικον ἡσθήσοντα ψόν] I have
discussed the proper reading and inter-
pretation of this passage in my Intro-
duction. With regard to the expression
τὴν ἄδικον ψον in place of ἄγαθον,
which he has all along been employing,
it is not difficult to see that Plato here,
knowing that the mere argument is
virtually at an end, breaks loose from
dialectic trammels and allows his en-
thusiasm full play. It is to be noticed
that he uses the word ἄδικον which to
a common hearer meant only perpetual
or eternal, in a further sense with which
his scholars were familiar, of the in-
visible or undiscernable. That for the
sake of which all things are is the end,
and being the end it cannot be ex-
plained, as other things are, by that to
which it belongs, or of which it is the
effect; but its name is also its de-
finition. It is, and there is nothing beyond.

τῆς ἀληθείας] These words are in-
roduced with a certain bye-purpose of
shewing that this nous owes its place
to the Truth of which it is the reali-
sation.

[οὐ τέταρτα] If τέταρτα is in its right
place here, it is of no use lower down;
but it seems better placed there than
here.

ἐπιστήμασις] The MSS. have ἐπιστή-
ματικος, τὰς δὲ. The scribe was put out
by the want of τὰς μὲν, but it is under-
stood in τὰς δὲ, according to a common
idiom.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

120

D µαταπαπαµένος εἶναι κρίσει. τὸ δὴ µετὰ ταῦτα ἡµῖν οὐδὲν λοιπὸν πλὴρ ὀστεροῦ κεφαλῆς ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς εἰρηµένοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁικείων χρῆ.

ΣΩ. 'Ὑπὲρ τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι τὸν αὐτὸν διαµαρτυρόµενον λόγον ἐπεξελέξωµεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποιον δὴ τὸ τρίτον, ὁ Σωκράτης; ὅς Φίληµος τάγµατος ἔτεκετο ἡµῖν ἡδονήν εἶναι πάσαν καὶ πάντη; ὡς γὰρ ἔσινας, ἤλεγε δρᾶος τὸν εἶ δρᾶος ἐπαναλαβεῖν δεῖν λόγον.

Ε. ΣΩ. Ναι, τὸ δὲ γε µετὰ τούτων ἀκούσαµεν. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ κατειδών ἀπερ νῦν δὴ διελέµεθα, καὶ δυσχεράνας τὸν Φιλήµον λόγον οὐ µόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλον πολλάκις µυριών, ἐπιον ός ἡδονής γε νῦν εὖ µακρῷ βέλτιον τε καὶ ἐµείνον τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ.

ΠΡΩ. 'Ἡ τάστα.

ΣΩ. 'Ὑποπτεύοντες δὲ γε καὶ ἄλλ' εἶναι πολλά, εἶπον ός, εἰ 'φανείη τι τούτων ἁµροῖν βέλτιον, ὑπὲρ τῶν δευτερείων νῦ ἑαυτὸς ἡδονήν ευνοµακοµίνην, ἡδονή δὲ καὶ δευτερείων στερηµένος.

67 ΠΡΩ. Ἐπεις γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ µετὰ ταύτα γε πάντων ἰκανότατον τοῦτον οὐδέτερον [ἰκανὸν] ἔδραν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οἰκείων παντάπασιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ νοῦς ἀπότθαλκτο καὶ ἡδονή µὴ τι τάγµαθον γ' αὐτὸ µιθέτερον αὖ-

τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι] A common proverb for adding the finishing stroke to any performance. The third libation was offered to Zeús Sωτῆρ. Ποιον δὴ; If the reader will look into any other edition, he will see wherein I have departed from the received text. The reasons for so doing need scarcely be given. Φίληµος x. e. in the mouth of Socrates is made to cut Protarchus' question Ποιον δὴ τὸ τρίτον; in two, making nonsense of both halves, and looking like nonsense itself. I have joined it by ὃς to that part of Protarchus' speech, where it must occur to give sense to Socrates' answer. I have also added γὰρ to the second ὃς, and for παντῆς, which is absurd, put πάντης. [ἰκανὸν] The interpolation of this word is easily accounted for, if we suppose that the reading of the Colsinian πάντων ἰκανώτατα ἡδονή was founded on some old copy. For in this way there was no predicate to οὐδέτερον. Afterwards the correctors of the copies which, like the Bodleian, retained ἰκανώτατον, on collation with such another copy, adopted the reading, not suspecting that it was invented as a salve to a corruption from which their own text was exempt. ἀπότθαλκτο] This confirms my conjecture on Thucydides 1, 136: where
ΠΙΛΑΤΟΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

τοῖν εἶναι, στερόμενον αὐτάρκειάς καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἱκανοῦ καὶ τελεόν δυνάμεως;

ΠΡΩ. Ὄρθοτατα.

ΣΩ. Φανέντος δὲ γ' ἄλλου τρίτου χρείττονος τούτου ἐκατέρουν, μηρίων οὐ νοείς οἰκειότερον καὶ προσφυπέρων Β πέρανται νῦν τῇ τοῦ νικώντος ἱδέα.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; 

ΣΩ. Οὐχοὖν πέμπτον κατὰ τὴν χρήσιν, ἢ νῦν ο λόγος ἀπεφίνητο, γίγνοιτ' ἢ τῆς ἱδονῆς δύναμις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐνδειχεν.

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον δὲ γς, οὐδ' ἢν οἱ πάντες βῶς τε καὶ ἐπυν καὶ τάλλα ἔμπρακτα θηρία φῶς τῷ τὸ καίτερον διόκειν· οὐς πιστεύοντες, ὡσπερ μάντεις ἤρωσιν, οἱ πολλοὶ κρίνοντο τὰς ἱδόνας εἰς τὸ γαῖρ ἡμῖν εἰς κρατίστα τίνι, καὶ τοὺς θηρίων ἔρωτας οὐκ ζητοῦν κυψήλους εἶναι μαρτυριας ἀλλόν [ἡ] τούς τῶν ἐν Μοῖσῃ φιλοσοφῶν μεμαντεμενον ἐκάστοτε λόγων.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα, οὐ Σώκρατες, εἰρήσθαι σοι νῦν ἡ ζηθεία, ὑπομενεῖ ἀπαντῆς.

ΣΩ. Οὐχοὖν καὶ ἄριστε με;

ΠΡΩ. Σιμπρόν ἐστι τὸ λοιπόν, ὡς Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ποιον σοι γρ' ἀπερείχες πρὸτερος ἤμων. ὑπομνήσω δὲ σε τὰ λει-πόμενα.

he says in speaking of the character of Themistocles: κρίνα τ' ἱκανων οὐκ ἀπελαλκτο. "He did not shut himself up from men capable of judging." For μή τι—γς the Books have μή τοι—γς, which is a blunder of continual occurrence. The second class of MSS. and Eusebius have the same double construction after a reading οὐκ αὖ, which, if it be written, would be no way inferior to a passage of the Euthydemus.
PALÆOGRAPHICAL REMARKS.

TRANSPOSITIONS AND INTERPOLATIONS.

Those who have not paid much attention to the Critical History of our Texts will probably think that they cannot have suffered much from the placing of words out of their proper order, and that consequently we ought not to rely on corrections attempted by means of transposition. But if any one will take the trouble to compare the various readings of the MSS. say of Thucydides or Plato, he will find instances continually recurring in which one copy differs from another in this respect, although in others it presents very few diversities of reading. Again if he will search for those cases where a transposition of two or more words restores the sense of an otherwise hopeless passage, he will soon find that their number accumulates far more rapidly than he had expected. Nor will it be long before he is able to make a considerable muster of sentences in which a word has strayed so far from its place that it is found at the other end of the sentence, or even in another to which it cannot belong. And not only single words or phrases, but whole sentences have thus changed places, as in those parts of Tragedy where the dialogue consists of alternating lines or couplets, and the sense has enabled critics to discover the places to which these originally belonged. These faults of transcription are no more than we should have a right to expect: for in the first place it is nothing unusual that a scribe should leave out one or more words, or that having left them out he should place them where the reader will notice the omission, or that his copyist should in his hurry fail to observe the mark in the text corresponding to another in the margin which shewed where the words were to be inserted; or if the first writer was content to write the words in
the body of the text, with certain letters to shew that two parts of a sentence were to be read in an inverted order, it was no wonder if the transcriber neglected those letters. Some of these transpositions are so strange that one can scarcely figure to oneself the state of the MS. in which the blunder first began.

I give two instances of this; of which the first is from the *Plutus* vv. 119-20.

Πλ. ὁ Ζεὺς μὲν οὖν ὁδ' ὄς . . . . . . . . ἢμ' εἰ
νῦθοιτ' . . . . . . . . νῦν δ' οὐ τούτο δεῖ;
The first place where I have left a gap is commonly filled up with the words τὰ τούτων μῶρ' and the second with ἀν ἐπιτρίπησεν. The result is that you are obliged to take τὰ μῶρα for τὴν μαρίαν, that the speaker must be understood to say τούτων of those whom he is addressing, that Jove is represented as likely to punish one person for the folly of two others with whom he has nothing to do, and that we have to digest such an order of words as we can find no match for in all Greek literature. But transpose these, and fill up the first gap with ἀν ἐπιτρίπησεν, and the second with τούτων, and you get

Πλ. ὁ Ζεὺς μὲν οὖν ὁδ' ὄς ἀν ἐπιτρίπησεν μ', εἰ
νῦθοιτο τούτ'. Ἡρ. ὁ μῶρος, νῦν δ' οὐ τούτο δεῖ;

In the *Heracleidae* of Euripides the following verses (682 foll.) occur.

Θεράπων.

>(* ηκιστα πρὸς σου μῶρον ἦν εἰπεὶν ἔπος.

Ἰόλαος.

 Kai μὴ μετασχίν γ' ἄλκιμου μάχης φίλοις.

Θεράπων.

(*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*)

Ἰόλαος.

τι δ', οὐ Θένοιμε κἀν ἐγὼ δι' ἀσπίδος;

Θεράπων.

Θένοις ἃν, ἀλλὰ πρόσθεν αὐτός ἂν πέσοις.

Ἰόλαος.

οὐδείς ἦ' ἔχθρων προσβλέπων ἀνέζεται.

Θεράπων.

(*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*)

Ἰόλαος.

ἀλλ' οὖν μαχοῦται γ' ἀριθμὸν οὖν ἐλάσσοσι.
ПАЛЕОГРАФICAL REMARKS.

Θεράπων.

σμικρον το σον σήκωμα προστιθης φιλος.

I have written μαχουναι for μαχουμαι because Iolaus is thinking of his enemies, as we see from his foregoing speech, and his plea is that at least he will help to make up the number on his side. "Our enemies shall at least fight men not fewer in number." If this wanted confirmation, it would be confirmed by the answer σμικρον κ. τ. ἐ. But how are we to fill up the gaps? Here are two lines for the purpose which I give from the MSS. and Editions; they both begin alike.

1. συν εστιν ὑψη τραύμα, μη δρασθης χερος.
2. συν εστιν, ὅ ταν, ἦτες ἦν ἱμη εἴθεν.

If we ask the mostest beginner which answers best in either passage, he will say that nothing can be more appropriate than to remind an old man of his weakness, when he threatens to join the battle, nor more inappropriate than when he counts on his enemies flying from his very look; and that as the proper answer to the last boast would be to tell him, that looks do not wound, so the same observation is altogether foreign to the purpose, when the old man has just said, "It is not worthy of me to refuse to share the fight with my friends". Now the Books all agree in the very opposite decision, and assign no. 1. to the first gap and no. 2. to the second; and what is far more wonderful, Elmley mentions the change, which was first proposed by Musgrave, without giving the slightest hint that he even thinks it probable.

In the Iphigenia Taurica v. 513 foll. we find the same error. Iphigenia asks the unknown Orestes whether he will tell her something. Orestes answers that he will. And now that we are on the tiptoe to know what question Iphigenia will ask, because we naturally expect the first unravelling of the plot from the answer thereto, she breaks into a sentimental reflection.

καὶ μὴν ποθεύσῃς γ’ ἡμεσ ἐξ Ἀργον μοιλιν.

to which Orestes answers very naturally, "You may be glad to see me here, but I am not so glad to be here": after which interruption the expected questioning and answering begin. But if we take this interrupting couplet out of the way and put it immediately after Iphigenia has learnt that the stranger is from Argos, in this order,
PALEOGRAPHICAL REMARKS.

I. φυγάς δ' ἀπήφας πατρίδος, ἦ ποίης τύχη;
O. φυγάω τρόπον γε δή τιν' οὐχ ἔκαν ἔκαν.
I. καὶ μήν ποθεινός γ' ἠλθες δὲ Ἀργοὺς μολάν.
O. οὐκόν έμαντο γ', εἰ δὲ σοι, σὺ τοῦθ' ὅρα.
I. ἢρ' ἡν τι μοι φράσσειν ἡν ἐγώ Θήλω;
O. ὃς γ' ἐν παρέγγε τῆς ἐμής ὑποκρείας.—

we find each verse naturally arising out of that which precedes and introducing to that which follows it.

For the same reason, to such a line as this (Iou 1295)

ἡμέλες οἰκείν τῷ', ἐμοῦ βίχ λαβών,

the retort

καπείται τοῦ μέλειν μ' ἀπέκτεινες φόβωρ;

ought to answer without anything intervening; but that passage would lead me into another topic, that of wilful interpolation, for the four lines πατρός γε—χθόνος contain nothing but what is said with equal clearness further on.

The same reason does not apply to the passage in the Euthydemus (305, c. v) which I have mentioned elsewhere in this Book (p. iii), where the following most necessary connexion has been broken by the negligence of some copyist: οὖνται δ' εἶναι πάντων σοφώτατοι ἄνθρωποι, πρὸς δὲ τῷ εἶναι καὶ δοκειν ἄν πάνω παρὰ πολλοῖς, ἵνα δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις ὅταν ἀποληθήσωσιν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀφί Εὐθύδημον κολυούσα θαλ. | ὥστε (τοῦ) παρὰ πάσιν εὐδοκμεῖν ἐκπολνόν σφίσιν εἶναι οὐδένας ἄλλους, ἦ τούς περὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἄνθρωποι. It is true that the words which I have here introduced into their proper place, have, where they now occur, been the innocent cause of the silly interpolation, εἶναι μὲν γὰρ τῷ ἀληθιᾷ σφίσι σοφώτατος, but they were not displaced on purpose to make room for an interpolation, like the verse in the Iou quoted above.

This whole matter of transposition may be summed up thus. If the misplacing of words is an accident of frequent occurrence in writing, and the correction of such errors is liable to be misunderstood and so to lead to further confusion; if the examples of such confusion are to be found in several places where the nature of metrical dialogue would generally be a safeguard against their occurrence; and if these examples often concern not only single words but even whole verses, it is unreasonable to refuse assent to those conjectural emendations which consist of trans-
position, when by such transposition we obtain sentences of which the grammatical construction and the sense are such as satisfy the reader, because it is most unlikely that good grammar and good sense should be produced by accident, and not be the sense and the grammar intended by the author.

The question of the a priori probability of interpolations may be disposed of in a few words; probably no one will deny the likelihood that words appearing in the margin, where they were intended as mere observations, should be mistaken by a copyist for restorations of matter omitted in the text; but some persons may feel reluctant to believe that the scribes would wilfully interpolate words of their own, and endeavour to pass them off as the words of the author, or perhaps they would concede such a possibility only where the text which the copyist had before him was corrupt or unintelligible; but this belief that the writers of our manuscripts were scrupulous and were generally guided by common sense, is altogether contrary to experience. Hundreds of passages may be adduced from all the masters of Attic prose, to shew that the scribes were in the habit of inserting unnecessary words, words which were intended to eke out the construction, and which only serve to confound it, and words which show that the whole drift of the passage was misunderstood. Too much stress cannot be laid on the last class, for if we find a clause added which either contradicts the rest of the sentence or is utterly irrelevant to it, the scribe is at once convicted of deliberate forgery.

I have already pointed out that in Laws 710, α, the words τοῖς δὲ ἐγκρατῶσι are an antithesis invented to answer to τοῖς μὲν ἀγκρατῶσι; and that τοῖς μὲν ἀγκρατῶσι itself is a corrupt reading, for the speaker is describing that vulgar kind of temperance which is developed even in children and in beasts, to prevent their being unrestrained as to pleasure, ὀπερ εὖθες παιδι καὶ θηρίων, τοῦ μὴ ἀγκρατῶς ἐξειν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς, ἠμφυτὼν ἐπανθεῖ. I have also mentioned a passage in the Phædo, where the difference between Plato's meaning and that of the interpolator amounts to a contradiction. For while the one bids us, if we are sure of our principle, disregard any seeming contradictions that may arise out of it, (χαίρειν ἔφοι ἄν τὰ ἀπεικόνις ὀρμηθέντα) the other
tells us to hold our principle only provisionally, until such a contradiction arises. See Phaedo 101, b.

In Lysis 841, b, we read, τὸ δὲ λανθάνειν τούτων δρῶντα τι καλὸν παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἦστι [νόμιμον] Ἰθι καὶ ἄγραφο νομισθὲν νόμῳ, τὸ δὲ μή λανθάνειν αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ οὐ τὸ μή πάντως δρᾶν. If this is correct, the writer asserts that not to do the forbidden things is not disgraceful. But so flat a truism never dropped from Plato’s pen. Remove τὸ δὲ μή λανθάνειν αἰσχρόν, and then we see that it is not τὸ μή δρᾶν that is to be the καλὸν of these men of weak virtue, but that they are to be allowed a lower kind of καλὸν, namely τὸ λανθάνειν δρῶντα. And so Plato comments on his own words, οὔτα τὸ τε (νυλὸ τούτο) αἰσχρόν αὐ τα καλὸν δευτέρος ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ νόμῳ γενόμενον πλοῖον.

It is difficult to account for such interpolations as those which I have pointed out in my edition of the Symposium (Ep. ad Th. pp. xiv-xvi) and yet they are of continual occurrence in Plato. On the one hand we can hardly conceive how any one who knew the construction well enough to supply ἐπιτηδεύειν ὑμῖν (Lysis 817, c) should fail to see that ἦσσαν had already been provided for the same purpose, or why any one should have thought it necessary for the sense in Theaetetus 171, c, to add τοῦτο καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς εὐγγραφήσεται, in order to give construction to what follows, when he had before him ἢ ἐπιτηδεύειν ἢ τούτων ἡπταγόραν ἀξιομήνων ἀμφιβολήσεται, μᾶλλον δὲ γ’ ὑπ’ ἐκεῖνον ὀμολογήσεται.

But the interpolators are not merely intent on helping out the construction by their supplements; sometimes they endeavour to give an additional beauty to the text, as in the following passage of Demosthenes in Midiam, which I quote instar omnium as a specimen of the manner in which our scribes thought they could add finishing touches to Attic oratory, 546, σ. εἴθ’ ὑπὲρ τὸν οὖτας ὁμόν, τὸν οὖτας ἁγνάμονα, τὸν τηλείατας δίκας λαμβάνοντα, ὅν αὐτὸς ἤδικησαί φησι μόνον, (οὐ γὰρ ἢδικητὸ γε,) τούτον ὑβρίζοντα λαβόντες εἰς τινα τῶν πολιτῶν ὁφήσεται, καὶ μηθ’ ἐφτῆς, μηθ’ ἠρέων, μὴ τρέψῃ νόμον, μὴ ἄλλῳ μηθὲν πράνοιαν παρούσαν οὐ καταψυχήσετε; οὐ παράδειγμα ποιήσετε; If ever there was a passage where the rules of Art required that nothing should interrupt the swelling indignation of the speaker till it burst out in one single call to vengeance, it is this one which
our copyists have garnished with ἀφήσεις and ὦ καταψηφιεῖσθε. But luckily for us, this second ornament is fastened on to an accusative ποιούμενον, which refuses to hold it. Perhaps those who believe that all interpolations in Demosthenes are posterior to the MS. Σ, will allow this to be an exception; while they are making up their minds, let me inform the reader of my suspicion that τὸν ὑπὸς ἀγνωμονα is nothing but a foolish dittophasis of τὸν ὑπὸς ὑμῶν, and that μόνον is an addition but no improvement to φησι.

A very common source of interpolation is the attempt to fill up gaps left in the copy, or to complete passages which seem to be defective. In at least two passages of the Philebus it is pretty certain that we have supplements of this kind, but we have nothing to guide us to the detection of these, except the hopelessness of the present reading; and as long as there are ingenious men who undertake to explain everything, (Have they not even explained every Chorus in Sophocles, and that too according to various readings?) it will be difficult to hold one's ground against such adversaries, who offer positive results against a mere ὦ μανθάνο. But the tables are turned when we come to passages, where we can shew the source of the corruption or prove that there is none, as when a marginal note has slipped into the text, and then, being treated as a part of it, has been so supplemented as to bring it into harmony with its surroundings. Cobet supplies me with an instance from the celebrated fragment of the Cretans. Euripides had written φοινικογενοῦς τὴν ν Ῥωύκῃ, and a Scholiast had in the Margin explained the first word by τῆς Τυφίτης. This was by accident incorporated with the text and considered as a part of it; but then the Αναπηδίκτικο metre required another syllable. This was soon found; and so from that day to the Epistola ad Millium, and from it to our own they write or print, φοινικογενοῦς παὶ τῆς Τυφίτης τὴν Εὐρώπης.

I will give an example of the same kind from the Iphigenia Taurica. In ν. 464, Iphigenia prays, ἔδωκι Θυσίας, ἀς ὁ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν νόμος ὡς ὑπὸς ἀναφαίει. Some commentator thinks it worth his while to warn the reader that παρ᾽ ἡμῖν does not mean the Taurians but the Greeks, and this he does by writing one word, Ἐλλήνη. When this word comes to be mixed up with the rest, it is found very troublesome to the metre, but an ingenious person
discovers that if it is placed very near the end with a convenient
dissyllable of no particular meaning after it, it will give no further
trouble at least to the metrical critic. And so we have διέτησεν τὴν
σίας, ὡς ὁ παῖ ήμών νόμος οὐχ ὁδιάς Ἐλληνικα δὲ δοῦν σὲ ἀναφαίνει.

A more striking example is that which I have elsewhere given
from the Medea vv. 734, foll.

ἐποίησα, Πελίου δ’ ἐχθρὸς ἔστι μοι δόμος
Κρῆνα τε νεῖτος δ’ ὄρχιοι καὶ νῦν ξυγεῖς
ἡγούσιν οὐ μεθεῖ ἐν ἐκ γαίας ἤρι.
λόγοις δὲ συμβάς, καὶ Θεῶν ἀνώμοτος
φίλος γένοι' ἐν, κάπισκηρκεύμασιν
οὐχ ἐν πίθοιο, τάμα μὲν γὰρ ἄσθενη,
τοῖς δ’ ὁδοὺς ἔστι, καὶ δόμος τυχανικὸς.

Elmsley’s note on κάπισκηρκεύμασι is as follows. “κάπισκηρκεύ-
ματα legit Scholista. ἐπικερκεύματα γάρ εἰσι τὰ διὰ τῶν κη-
ρυγμάτων γιγαντίων πρὸς φιλίαν. τῇ δὲ εὐθείᾳ ἀντὶ δοτικῆς κέρ-
tenτα. ἖δο γὰρ εἰπεῖν, καὶ τοῖς ἐπικερκεύμασίν οὐχ ἐν πίθοιο. Ἀδ-
ήμορος δὲ φησίν ἐπιλεῖπεν τὴν διά. διὰ τὰ ἐπικερκεύματα. Paullo
ante legitur; μὴ ὀμός δὲ φίλος γένοις αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ ἐπικερκεύ-
ματος. θέτει εἰπεῖν, ἀντὶ τὸν ἐπικερκεύμασιν. λέει δὲ ἡ διά,
Latet hic aliquid quod extricare nequeo.” Let us take account of
the difficulties in the whole passage. First there is μεθεῖ’ ἐν,
which ought to govern the genitive, and although Porson’s note
is an excellent one, the question still recurs, “why not ἐμοῦ
after the nearer verb?” For ἀνώμοτος in the best MSS. there
is ἐνώμοτος, but this old Scholium by its μὴ ὀμός δὲ supports
the former. Then we have κάπισκηρκεύμασι in the text, but the
scholiasts most certainly read either κάπισκηρκεύματα, or τάπι-
κηρκεύματα, or both. Last of all we find in all MSS. and in
the Scholia οὐκ ἐν πίθοιο, which, as Dindorf observes, is the
contrary of what was to be said. For this reason modern editions
have adopted Wyttenbach’s τάχ’ ἐν πίθοιο. But if we look
at the second Scholium quoted by Elmsley φίλος γένοις αὐτοῖς διὰ
tοῦ ἐπικερκεύματος, we observe a new combination, which
proves that τάπικηρκεύματα must have been so placed that it
could be taken, whether rightly or not, as standing ἀπὸ κοινῶν
to the two optatives γένοι’ ἐν and οὐκ ἐν πίθοιο; but this would
be impossible if the verses ran thus:

Platonis Philebou.
PALEOGRAPHICAL REMARKS.

φίλος γένοις ἀν τάπικηρυκεύματα,
oúx ἂν πίθοιο.

Therefore the verses must have been so arranged that while oúx ἂν πίθοιο τάπικηρυκεύματα
made one line, φίλος γένοις ἂν followed in such a way as to ad-
mit of being construed also with the same word. And this is in
fact the key of the enigma. oúx ἂν πίθοιο τάπικηρυκεύματα
should have followed immediately on ζυγεῖς. But it was left out,
and afterwards restored at the side or at the foot of the page.
From hence the last part was fetched and fitted in immediately
after φίλος γένοις ἂν: after which oúx ἂν πίθοιο, which still re-
mained on hand, was admitted into the vacant place. But in the
meantime the sense contained in oúx ἂν πίθοιο could not wait
for all these adjustments; so the corrector made a line de suo,
and that is the very line which Porson defended. The passage
therefore should be restored thus:

πέποιτα. Πελεῖον δ' ἔχωρός ἔστι μοι δόμος,
Κρόνων τε τούτοις δ' ὀρκίοις μὲν ζυγεῖς
oúx ἂν πίθοιο τάπικηρυκεύματα.
λόγοις δὲ συμβάς, καὶ θησαυρὸς ἀνάμοιρος
φίλος γένοις ἂν, τόμα μὲν γὰρ ἀσθενῆ,
τοῖς δ' ὀλίβος ἔστι, καὶ δόμος τυμπανικὸς.

The construction of the third line is just the same as the Homeric
η ὑν νύ μοι τή πίθοιο.

In conclusion I will point out some of the most striking inter-
polations in another Dialogue of Plato which has faced pretty nearly
as ill as the Philebus, viz. the Politicus. 286, λ. μάλλον ἡ περὶ τὰ
μείζω. 286, β. δυσσεροῖς (read ἱππεῖρ). 286, δ. δεῖν (read μεμερίσθαι
and compare 284, β). 287, λ. τῶν τοιούτων λόγων. 287, κ. καὶ
εἰπώρους καὶ ἀκρόπους. (The dialogue is ill distributed, and should
be arranged thus. προσφέρεται.—Ν. Σ. καὶ μάλα γε συννό
εἴδος. Σ. καὶ τῇ τῇ γε.—ἐπιστήμη. Ν. Σ. πώς γάρ; 288, c.
προσαγερευθεῖν. 293, λ. ὀρθῆ (read οὖν ἂν γίγνεται). 293, κ.
ἔγραμμεθα (comma after ἀρχοντας). 295, λ. παπυρός. (The structure
is: θήσει τοῖς πολλοῖς προσήκοιν, καὶ τὸ ἀς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, καὶ
τὸ ποίς οὕτως. Read ἐν ἐκάστοις τῶν νόμων.) 295, d. παρὰ τὴν
ἐλεύθερα. 295, d. ποτέ νομοθετήθεται. 297, β. οἴοι τε ὁσια. 298,
λ. ἀναλώματα. 299, β. ζητεῖν. 303, κ. λέιπεται.
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

I have pointed out several passages in the Philebus where the dialogue has found its way into the wrong person's mouth. Similar blunders have been noticed in the Epistle prefixed to my Euthydemus. I will now bring forward two or three more. Pol. 287, e. mentioned above under the head of interpolations. Pol. 304, c. N. Σ. Ταύτην ἔκειναν. Σ. Τήν ὅ' εἶ δεῖ μανθάνειν ... σὺ γ' ὡμίν ἀποφαίνει δεῖν ἔχειν; Pol. 306, a. πάντως γε μὴν ὣτετον is a part of the Stranger's speech. Laws 811, e. πολυμαθίαν. πῶς οὖν ... νομοφύλακι; Κ.Α. Τοῦ πέρι λέγεις; Α.Θ. Τοῦ πρὸς τί π. ... ἀποκαλούσι. Κ.Α. Αἴγι καὶ μηθὲν ἀποκάλει λέγειν. In Eupides' Ion 1356 foll. every one is now agreed that the dialogue should run thus: Πν. λαβὼν νῦν αὐτὰ τὴν τεκνοῦσαν ἐκπόνει. Ιον. πᾶσαν δ' ἐπέλθον Ἀσίαδ', Εὐφάπτης θ' ὀροὺς; Πν. γνώσει τάδ' αὐτοῖς.—But I quote the passage in order to complete its correction. When the second line stood as part of a continuous speech, it first acquired that δὲ which the MSS. offer us. But in order to bring δὲ in, a transposition was necessary; so the critic changed Ἀσίαδ' ἐπέλθω πᾶσαν, Εὐφάπτης θ' ὀροὺς; into πᾶσαν δ' ἐπέλθων Ἀσίαδ'. Yet the old reading which he altered is obviously correct. Ἐπέλθων would mean that he was to look for his mother after he had wandered even the world, and not while he was doing so, which would require ἐπίων.

FALSE COALITION OF SYLLABLES.

Τὸ τρίτον ἔτερον and τὸ τρίτον ἑτ' ἔτη would be undistinguishable in MSS. where neither accents nor breathings were used. In Dion. Halic. De Lydia, 7. the words ὅτεν εἰκός τοὺς μὲν ἄν δρᾶσαι, τοὺς δὲ παθεῖν, were until Markland's time read, οὐθὲν εἰκός τοὺς μὲν ἀνδρᾶς αἰτοῦσα ἐτειθεῖν. A fresh instance of this has just presented itself to me in the Politicus 290, d. ἦδη τοίνυν μοι δοξούμενον οἶνον γειτόνως ἤγους ... ἐφάπτεσθαι. Such is the reading of the oldest MS.; some others change γειτόνως into γέ τινος, but no one has yet pointed out that OION ΓΕΙΤΟΝΟΣ is a mere blunder for OIONΕΙ ΤΙΝΟC. Even the youngest scholar will remember Porson's correction of ἵνωμεν' ἐξ ἕων κάν ὡστάτοις κακοῖς, and Bentley's of μὴ τίνα φάναι τὸ Ἑρμήσυ.
OMISSION OF OT.

One example among many of the confusion caused by the omission of οὐ is to be found in the Vatican Scholia on Euripides printed at the end of Geel’s Phænissae. Androm. v. 103 Ἡλιος ἀληνεῖς: μονοδία ἦστι 1 τὸ δὴ ἑνὸς προσόπου θρηνοῦτος: ἀντε τὸ ὁ Ἀσιατίδος γῆς σχῆμα: 2 μονοδία ἦστι. τραγῳδία γὰρ καὶ 3 οὐκ ἐξεῖ οὕτε τά ἐν Θεοφορομένῃ ἡμέρᾳ, οὐ θρηνεῖ γὰρ. Read, 1) ἦστιν ὑδῆ, 2) οὐ μ. ἵ., 3) οὐκ ἔδει. At other times οὐ is intruded into a text by mistake for another word, or from a misunderstanding of the author’s drift. Synesius in one of his letters tells his friend that the parcel must by this time have reached him, οὐ γὰρ ἔπειτα γεγενημένος; a most whimsical inference. But the Bishop wrote σοὶ γὰρ. In Thuc. ii, 43, οὐ γὰρ οἱ κακοπραγοῦντες δικαιότερον ἀφεθῶσιν ἂν τοῦ βίου, οἷς ἔλεις οὐκ ἔδει ἄγαθον, the negative spoils the whole argument, which is that while the poor have something to hope for, the rich have something to fear, and that therefore the rich ought to value life less than the poor.

ΓΑΡ ΟΤΝ.

I have asserted that γὰρ οὖν is only admissible, where the speaker concedes what another has affirmed. It is not used in this sense in Agam. v. 674, where the Herald after forebodings of Menelaus’ shipwreck adds

γένοιτο δ’ ὡς ἠφίσατα: Μενέλαον γαρ οὖν προσώπον τε καὶ μάλιστα προσδόξα μολίεν.

Anyone may see that the apparent sense of these words is in contradiction to the fears that precede, and to the faintly hoping εἰ δ’ οὖν that follows. But the passage is not Greek; for προσδόξα μολίεν ought to be either προσδόξα μολείσθαι or π. μολείν ἂν. The emendation is obvious: “Let us hope that some have escaped. Menelaus at least has not the best chance”

Μενέλαον γ’ ἂν οὐ προσώπον τε καὶ μάλιστα προσδόξα μολίεν.
APPENDIX.

EXTRACTS FROM BÖCKH'S PHILOLAUS.

That such an association as the Pythagorean, which united religious and political aims with science, should insist on silence and should have its secrets, is suited to the nature of the case, but it admits of doubt whether the scientific matter, which from its very nature is withdrawn from the eyes of the multitude without deliberate concealment, can have required to be kept secret by means of severe commands. If need for secrecy existed, it must rather have been in relation to their doctrines concerning the Divine Nature and its relation to the world and to man, at variance as they were with popular belief; and yet these very doctrines, expressed in the Pythagorean form, could have been neither dangerous to the common people nor accessible to them. Nevertheless the ancients agree in the firm belief that the doctrines and books of the Pythagoreans were a secret of the order, and as there were no writings to be procured, either of Pythagoras, or of his older disciples or followers, we must at all events allow that they told the world nothing; not perhaps however so much because a law expressly forbade them, as because custom bred in them a certain reserve toward strangers, while for those who had capacity and inclination to receive their doctrines oral teaching within the limits of the society seemed more convenient, and lastly because under these circumstances, there was scarcely any occasion for books, whilst again the old members of the order must have been kept from writing by their political occupations, and their life of seclusion, contemplation and asceticism. Yet, if Porphyry is to be believed, Lysis and Archippus and the few others who by their absence were saved from the ruin of the order, preserved a few
feeble sparks of the doctrine, and fearing lest the name of philosophy should wholly disappear from mankind, and lest they should in consequence incur the hatred of the gods, brought together writings of the older Pythagoreans and from these, together with what they themselves remembered, composed brief memorials, which they bequeathed to their sons, their daughters, and their wives, with the order not to communicate them to any stranger; and so this injunction was handed on from generation to generation. Frequent as is the mention of unrighteous and unfaithful revelation of Pythagorean doctrines, we find little agreement as to details. Thus it is related that of the two sects, the ἀρχοντικοὶ and the μαθηματικοὶ, the former was recognised by the latter as Pythagorean, but the latter were recognised by the former only as the disciples of Hippasos, the first according to this story to divulge Pythagorean matter in a mathematical treatise, and who in consequence, met with his death by drowning; yet the same Hippasos, according to a more credible account, never wrote anything. And to say nothing of the poets Empedocles and Epicurus, Lysis, in an evidently spurious letter, reproaches Hipparchus with having tasted of Sicilian luxury and even of philosophising in public, for which offence he is said to have been banished and to have had a gravestone set up for him as for one dead. But the blame of having spread abroad Pythagorean writings applies more especially to Philolaus, although what is said concerning him is no less filled with contradictions than the rest. Neanthes, whom even Plutarch designates as credulous, informs us that until Empedocles and Philolaus abused their trust, as he terms it, the Pythagoreans had been more free in their communications; Diogenes and Iamblichus tell us that before Philolaus, nobody found out the Pythagorean doctrines, but that he first brought out the three celebrated Books which Dion the Syracusan at Plato’s instance bought for a hundred minae, according to Iamblichus, from Philolaus himself, who had fallen into great and urgent poverty, a story which by the bye admirably suits a man who is said to have been put to death for aiming at despotic power. But then again in order, to some extent, to remove the guilt from him, Iamblichus adds that Dion had himself formerly belonged to the Pythagorean connection, and for this reason had been allowed to possess the Books. Among older
APPENDIX.

authors the first I shall name is Satyrus the Peripatetic, a contemporary of Aristarchus the grammarian. Diogenes follows Satyrus in his account, and tells us on his authority, that Plato wrote to Dion about those Books, and that Dion bought them of Philolaus himself; and he adds, from the same author, that Plato became very rich through the liberality of Dionysius. Indeed one might even suppose that the whole story was invented by the spite of the Peripatetics against Socrates and the Academy, (a subject which Luzac has well treated in his essay De Digmitia Socratii,) in order to fix a charge of plagiarism upon Plato, were there not two older witnesses than Satyrus at hand. Hermippus, who was certainly not a more trustworthy man than Neanthes, but yet ancient enough (for he lived under Ptolemy Euergetes) assures us, on the authority of an ancient writer, that Plato when in Sicily bought the Book written by Philolaus from that author's relations in Dionysius' service for forty Alexandrian minae, and with its contents composed the Timaeus. Others again make Plato procure the work in return for having prevailed on Dionysius to release a young man, the disciple of Philolaus, from prison. And Timon the sillographer who flourished about the 127th Olympiad, has already a palpable allusion to this story. For Gellius, after mentioning the purchase of the three Books of Philolaus, the money for which Plato is said to have received from Dion, quotes Timon as saying that Plato purchased a little Book for much money and with this as his groundwork wrote his Timaeus. It is true that Iamblichus, Synesius and Proclus have referred the passage of Timon to the little Book of Timaeus the Locrian, a supposititious work of a very late date and quoted by no ancient writer before Clemens of Alexandria, but Satyrus and especially Hermippus prove conclusively that what Timon said had reference to the writings of Philolaus, and Tzetzes so represents the matter. After attributing the Timaeus and a great deal besides to the Book purchased of Philolaus through Dion, he represents not Philolaus himself as the seller but certain poor women and widows who sell the Book under a condition that it must not be imparted to any one save a Pythagorean; and I take this opportunity of remarking that Tzetzes makes Dion buy the Mimes of Sophron also in the same manner for Plato. However I do not reckon Timon as
the originator of the story, for he so touches upon the matter, that it can be understood only by one who knows of it already, while Hermippus appeals to an author who made a formal narration of it. It is much more likely that the tale was put in circulation by some earlier historian, not perhaps a Sicilian but apparently one of the first Alexandrians, as may be inferred from the Alexandrian mnae. This reckoning according to Alexandrian money is indeed not well adapted to commend the credibility of the tale, since in Plato’s time no part of Greece reckoned according to Egyptian money, and Alexandria was not yet in existence; nor is there any great probability that the sum was computed by the narrator according to its value in Alexandrian coin, and that a statement in some other coin, whether Attic or Sicilian, was the basis of this calculation. Lastly, the work could not well have been purchased from Philolaus himself, as he can scarcely have been still alive in the fourth year of the 97th Olympiad, the time of Plato’s first Sicilian voyage. We should therefore have to suppose that relations or descendants of his disposed of the work, as is indeed asserted by some writers; their statement evidently resting upon the notion of the keeping secret of Pythagorean writings even after the dissolution of the order, and being at the same time intended to set Philolaus free from the reproach of having divulged them, which others in fact brought against him. But that the secrecy of the Pythagorean doctrine had ceased long before the age of Plato, has already been remarked by Meiners, and one can scarcely see why Philolaus, if he taught in Thebes, could have had any scruple about writing there; in which case Plato may have acquired an early knowledge of his doctrine. My conclusion is that in all these contradictory accounts about a supposed purchase of Books, the substantial basis is simply this,—that Philolaus was in fact the first to publish a Pythagorean work, that Plato had read it and used it according to his manner, that is, intelligently and not as a mere transcriber. The former fact is asserted in so many words by an author who deserves all credit, since the purpose of his Book was critical, that is by Demetrius Magnes, a contemporary of Pompey and Caesar in his work περὶ ὀμωνύμων ποιησιῶν καὶ συγγραφῶν, quoted by Diogenes: Τούτων φησι Αμηνήστου εὐ Ὀμωνύμωσις πρῶτον ἐχοῦναι τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν περὶ φύσεως.
APPENDIX.

After which follows the somewhat strangely worded beginning, as it purports to be, of Philolaus' work, of which we shall have to speak more than once. Now if, assuming for the present the genuineness of the extant fragments, we compare them with Plato, we shall find in the *Phaedrus*, *Cratylus*, *Philebus* and *Timæus*, allusions to Philolaus, upon which however I shall advance nothing here, since it is only the consideration of the fragments themselves that can justify my assertion; in the *Gorgias* however it seems to me there is a much more distinct reference to Philolaus' work, and although in this as well as in the *Phædo*, where Philolaus' views as to the unlawfulness of suicide are touched upon, the knowledge of his doctrines is attributed to hearsay only, yet I cannot help observing that in both dialogues this reference to hearsay is put into the mouth of Socrates, who had read very few books, whereas Philolaus' tenets are quoted with such distinctness, and in the *Gorgias*, at least, with such particularity, as is only possible when one has an author before him in writing, seeing that attention is paid even to the expression and the words; so that this contrivance about hearsay is a mere figure of speech, which accords well with Plato's irony and by means of which he attempts to mask his somewhat unceremonious handling of the divine man. But at the same time, we cannot fail to perceive that what Plato blames, is not so much the inner substance of Philolaus' view, as the mythical character of his exposition, and more especially the want of clearness and dialectic accuracy in his investigation and the oddity of his expressions, and this is pretty broadly stated in the *Gorgias* as well as in the *Phædo*.

[After this Böckh proceeds to shew that a work by Philolaus was quoted in times much earlier than the earliest date of the Pythagorean forgeries, such as those attributed to Ocellus and the Locrian Timæus. He discusses the probable contents of his Book, which he divides on ancient authority into three parts. These he supposes to have been respectively entitled, περὶ κόσμου, περὶ φύσεως, περὶ ζωῆς. And these he further identifies with the *Bacchae*, a work attributed by Proclus to Philolaus, after which he continues as follows.]

Our enquiry up to this point, if the result of it is admitted, is more important for forming a judgment about the fragments of
Philolaus, than might at first sight appear: if there was only one work of Philolaus, whether spurious or genuine, nothing remains for us but either to admit all that is offered, or to reject all. Now what we have, is to a great extent so remarkable and contains such peculiar ideas, that no man can possibly be inclined to attribute it to a forger, and at the same time it perfectly coincides with that which, according to Plato, Aristotle, and the universal tradition of antiquity, must be viewed as really Pythagorean.

With the exception therefore of some pieces of Archytas, I hold these fragments and extracts to be the surest remains of the Pythagorean School; indeed Meiners also himself felt compelled to consider some few of them as genuine. Now the spirit of Pythagorism, as it appears according to the most trustworthy data, may be most clearly apprehended in contrast with the Ionic philosophy, since the Hellenic character habitually separates itself into this dualism of Ionic and Doric, and the difference of these races is perceivable in all that concerns life and culture. Pythagorism is the genuine Doric form of philosophy, and the philosophy of a people is nothing else than the peculiar mode of perception of that people, which in the deepest and most distinguished thinkers becomes itself the object of its own thought and explains itself to itself, whereas in the rest it works and creates unconsciously. On this account it is in philosophy on the prose side of literature that the popular character will always present itself most distinctly, as on the poetical side it will appear in lyrical art, because the latter springs forth most immediately from the feeling and sentiment of the people. The sensuousness of the Ionians, their attachment to what is outward, their susceptibility to outward impressions, and their lively activity in this outward world, presents itself in their materialistic view of the origin of things and in the manifold vitality and restlessness of matter, upon which all the Ionic systems rest; they all look for the essence of things in matter, they more or less derive the spiritual from it and neglect the moral element. The want of the sense of unity which is essentially connected with this, was favourable to the atomic view of physical science, and Heraclitus' doctrine, which was built upon strife, clearly expresses the restlessness of the Ionic nature, when it calls repose the death of the soul. The Doric on the contrary presents in comparison the aspect of an inward depth,
from which at the same time powerful action bursts forth, and of a tranquil persistence in established and almost inviolable forms, through which genuine Doric characters were exalted high above the whirl of sensuous impressions, whilst a certain inward consistency was introduced into their lives, which is not found in the same degree among the Ionians. In philosophy, this tendency of their mind displays itself in ethical endeavours, although they never made their way to a complete theory; but it especially appeared in this, that they sought for the essence of things not in a ground which was purely material, but in one that was formal and which gave to things unity and order, just as Pythagoras is said to have been the first to call the world Kosmos: and although Anaxagoras makes the order of the world to be produced through Reason, yet this thought, as Socrates has already observed, did not pierce at all deeply into his philosophy. In keeping with the peculiar character of the Dorians and even with their civil life, the outward appearance of the Doric philosophy took the form of a society or order, which was subject to a discipline and rule almost monastic, or at least Moravian, to which there can scarcely be found a more suitable analogy in all antiquity than the Spartan constitution. This organisation is united with depth in religion, symbolism, mysticism and ascetism, and moreover with the practice of music, all which formed essential elements of the Pythagorean mode of life; for which reason indeed so early a writer as Herodotus speaks of Pythagorean orgies. But to return to the ground of their speculations, the Ionic philosophers, though they mostly rejected the criterion of the senses, started from matter, which is the object of sensuous cognition, and then sought by reflexion to arrive at some material ground of all things, which ground, it must be confessed, some of them did not hold to be cognizable by the senses. From this sensuous philosophy the bound was too great and violent to the Socratico-Platonic, which sought for the essence of things in pure ideas furnished through the inward intuition, and the Pythagorean view was exactly that which formed the bridge; since the formal ground which they assumed is cognizable through that mathematic intuition, διάνοια, which hovers in the midst between the sensuous and the non-sensuous. And yet in its ideas they recognised typical forms of something higher,
though as it seems, they were unable to resolve the sense of these types so as to put them into clear intellectual light. Thus philosophy passed from a thoroughly sensuous beginning, through an intervening grade, to the unsensuous view of Plato, (who indeed had been preceded by the sagacious but one-sided members of the Eleatic school, but who by the power of the Socratic criticism had raised these partial views as well as all former views, through the proper limitation and modification of the one by the other, to the most perfect view of which the Hellenic mind was capable,) and the essence of things was thus sought in an ascending scale, first in matter, then in mathematical forms, and lastly in ideas of the reason.

* * * *

2. Ἴπαλινοντα does not mean limited as some have understood it but limiting, what Plato in the Philebus calls πεζας limit. ** It remains for us to consider what the Pythagorean meant by the limiting and the unlimited. The ancients, very naturally, thought of them from the numerical point of view; and in fact the limiting has been taken to mean unity, parity, and identity, and the unlimited duality, disparity, and diversity, in which sense both Nicomachus and Boethius clearly express themselves and with a distinct reference to Philolaus. ** But this view is nevertheless quite untenable, partly on this account that what is odd is not therefore necessarily to be called indefinite, because, as a determinate magnitude, for example three or five, it derives a limit from unity; and partly because, as we see quite clearly from Aristotle, the Pythagoreans rather compared the even number to the indefinite; at least they did so in a certain sense and without reference to the definite magnitude of any such number. In his Physics iii. 4, he tells us expressly that some laid down the unlimited, ἀπειρον, as the origin of all things and he says of the Pythagoreans, καὶ οἱ μὲν τὸ ἀπειρον εἶναι τὸ ἀριτμον. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐνπολεμισμὸον καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ περιττοῦ περαινόμενον παρέχει τοῖς οὕτω τὴν ἀριτμίαν, for which also he adduces Pythagorean testimony. ** Shall we then say that Philolaus by the unlimited meant the even and by the limiting meant the odd? Against this view likewise the same objection as before holds good, because the even also as a definite number is limited by unity, so that if the even is called by the Pythagoreans unlimited, it must have some peculiar circumstantial application.
But this supposition is unnecessary, since according to Philolaus himself, the unlimited has no number in it, for which reason also, since, according to him, it is only through number that we understand, nothing would be intelligible if everything were unlimited. On the other hand the following explanation seems to me perfectly satisfactory. As, according to Aristotle, the Pythagoreans held one to be both odd and even, and thus to contain both opposites, so Philolaus too set up above both these opposites a higher unity in which both have their roots. ** In the same way Plato in his Philebus sets up above the limit and the unlimited, out of which two the limited comes to be, the Cause as God. But how do the two elements proceed therefrom?—for proceed they must as from the Beginning of all things. I cannot conceive this otherwise than as follows. The highest Unity, simple Unity, what the later Pythagoreans and Platonists called the Monad, is merely One: but Unity is also conceivable as endlessly divisible, as the same authorities likewise remark. Through an opposition between the One and the Many or Indefinite, which opposition resides even in Unity itself, there is produced out of the highest Unity, which has no opposite, the twofold nature of the One and the Many, of the Limit and the Unlimited; and here we come at once to that which Philolaus means by limit and unlimited. By the former he meant the One or, as the ancients express it, the Same, by the latter the Many or the Different. And of these two the former has the more affinity with the highest Unity. These opposites are the constituents of all that is produced, τὸ γιγνόμενον, while the highest Unity, as being that which is not produced, is exalted above it. For, according to Aristotle, the Pythagoreans held that Number is the essence of things, and things themselves, no less as Matter, than as the properties of Matter, or in other words Form. But the same author allows that the Pythagoreans expressly named the numbers which compose the essence of things, ἕν and ἄριστον, out of which two the πενταεξάμενον is produced. (Aristotle Metaph. i. 5.) These same elements are also called Unity and the Indefinite Duality (ἡ ἄξιωτος δύνας). Under the latter the conception of diversity or plurality simply is represented, and the definite number Two only accrues to it by a limitation bestowed by Unity. **
APPENDIX.

[After this Böckh proceeds to shew that the next step in Philolaus’ work must have been to describe the evolution of the world out of the two opposite elements, and he quotes a passage given below (Καὶ πάντα γὰρ μὲν κ. τ. λ.) in which the elements are divided in the same manner as numbers. He supposes that he must have then proceeded from the combination of odd or even to that of harmony, because all the chief ratios of harmony [1:2, 2:3, 3:4, 8:9, 243:256] consist of an even and an odd number; and he supposes that Philolaus meant by harmony the result of reconciled opposites, and attributes to him the following passage in Nicomachus, ἦστι γὰρ ἁρμονία πολυμηχάνων ἔνωσις καὶ διήλθον κατά τον σύμφορον (of the Doric nature of which passage I entertain strong doubts).

The last extract which will be given is of great importance for the understanding of more than one passage in Plato and is the beginning of a very learned disquisition upon the music of the ancients.]

In the immediate sequel of the former passage [he refers to the passage given below, beginning Πέρι δὲ φύσεως—] which sequel we shall presently quote, one is surprised by the phenomenon, that Philolaus’ harmony is nothing else than the octave, but there is no objection on the side of usage to this interpretation, since the ancients called the octave “harmony”, as Aristotle does (see Plutarch’s treatise on Music: but it is precisely in this that we find the explanation of the Pythagorean view of the harmony of the Universe in general, and especially of the mode in which the composition of the world was conceived to have been effected out of the opposite elements of the limit and the unlimited; for Unity as we have seen is limit, while the Unlimited is the indefinite duality, which becomes definite duality when the measure of Unity has been twice introduced into it. Thus then the limitation is given through the measuring of duality by means of Unity, that is by laying down the ratio of 1:2 which is the mathematical ratio of the octave. The octave therefore is harmony itself, through which the opposite elements are reconciled; and every reasonable man must confess that there is a deep perception contained in this, since the unity of the One and of the Diverse (ἕνος) or Many (πολλάς) which Plato in his Doctrine of Ideas has presented
in a dialectic form, and the conception of which was one of the chief problems of Greek philosophy, is here expressed by mathematical symbolism. ** The magnitude of harmony, says Philolaus, is συλλαβά καὶ δ’ ὀξεῖαν. Συλλαβά is the old name of the Fourth, because it is the first combination of concordant tones, πρώτη σύλληψις φθόγγων συμφώνων. Δι’ ὀξεῖαν is the Fifth, because it comes after the Fourth in the ascending scale. Now as a fourth and a fifth comprise the octave, since 3 : 4 with 2 : 3 = 1 : 2, as we see from these numbers 2 . 3 . 4, Philolaus says that συλλαβά καὶ δ’ ὀξεῖαν is the magnitude of harmony, because 2 : 4 is harmony, 2 : 3 is δ’ ὀξεῖαν, and 3 : 4 is συλλαβά. But the Fifth is greater than the Fourth by the interval of a tone which is 8 : 9, as the following numbers shew, 6 . 8 . 9. For 6 : 8 is the Fourth, 6 : 9 is the Fifth, and the difference is 8 : 9 or the tone. And now to prove the truth that the Fifth is greater than the Fourth by the tone, he states the position of the Fourth and Fifth in the octave, for in the ascending scale, there is from the ὑπάτη to the μέση a Fourth, but from the μέση to the νέη a Fifth. (See the fragment beginning Ἀμονίας δὲ μέγεθος.)


Θεωρεῖν δὲ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰν ἱσαίαν τῷ ἀριθμῷ κατὰν δύναμιν ἡ τις οὖν ἐν τῇ δικαίᾳ. Μεγάλα γὰρ καὶ παντελῆς καὶ παντοεξός, καὶ θεία καὶ οὐφανία βίω καὶ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἄρχα καὶ ἄγεμων κοινοφυότα . . . . δύναμις καὶ τὰς δεκάδος. "Ἀνεν δὲ τάσσεται πάντες ἀπειρα καὶ ὁδὴ καὶ ἀφανη. Ἔναμονικά γὰρ ἢ φύσεις ἢ τῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ ἄνθρωπων καὶ διδασκαλίᾳ τῷ ἀπορουμένῳ παντὸς καὶ ἀγνοούμενῳ παντὶ. Οὐ γὰρ καὶ ἡς δῆλον οὐδὲν οὐδὲν τῶν πραγμάτων οὔτε αὐτὸν οὔτε σαρκῶς καὶ ἀνθρώπως καὶ ὁ τούτω ἱσαία. Νῦν δὲ οὖντος, κατὰν ψυχὴν ἀρμόδιων ἀποθήκης πάντα, γνωστὰ καὶ ποτάγορα ἀλλά οὐκ ἄντη καὶ γνώμονας φύσιν ἀπεργάζεται, ἡσαμαντών καὶ χριστών τῶν λόγων χαρίς ἐκάστους τῶν πραγμάτων, τῶν τὲ ἀπειρῶν καὶ τῶν περαινόντων. "Ἰδοὺς δὲ καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς δαμονίοις καὶ θείοις πράγμασι τῶν τῷ ἀριθμῷ φύσιν καὶ τὰν δύναμιν ἴσχυσαν, ἄλλα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρωπικῶς ἤργοι καὶ λόγοις πάσιν παντὶ, καὶ κατὰ ταῖς ἀπομονωγίας τὰς τεχνικὰς πάσας, καὶ κατὰ τᾶν
μονακάν. Ὑέθος δὲ οὐδὲν δέχεται ἀ τῷ ἄριθμῷ φύσις, οὔτε ἄρι
μονία: οὔτε γάρ ὁδικόν αὐτοῖς ἢστι. Τάς γάρ ἀπείρω καὶ ἀνοητῶ
καὶ ἀλὸγα φύσις τοῦ Ὑέθος ἢ καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἢστι. Ὑέθος δὲ οὐδε
μάς ἢ ἄριθμόν ἔπιπευ, πολέμιον γὰρ καὶ ἔχθρὸν τῷ φύσει τοῦ Ὑε
δος, ἢ δ’ ἀλάθεια οἰκεῖον καὶ σύμφωντον τῷ τῷ ἀριθμῷ γενεῖ.


Ποῦ’ δὲ καὶ ἄριθμος καὶ ἀκαταπόνατος διαμένει τὸν ἀπείρον
αιῶνα. Όὔτε γὰρ ἐνεκοθέν ἄλλα τις αἰτεία δυναμικάτερα αὐτῶς εὐφρ
θησάται, οὐτ’ ἐκτοσθέν, φθείραι αὐτῶν δυναμένα. Ἀλλ’ ἢν δὲ ὁ κό
σμος ἢ οἱ αἰώνας καὶ εἰς αἰώνα διαμένει, εἰς ὑπὸ ἐνὸς τῶν συγγενῶ
καὶ κράτησιν καὶ ἀνυπερθέτω κυβερνάμενος. Ἐχει δὲ καὶ τὸν ἄρχον
τάς πινάκιος τε καὶ μεταβολῆς ὁ κόσμος εἰς ἵναν, καὶ συνεχῆς καὶ φυ
σει διαισθείαν καὶ περιαγόμενος ἢ ἄρχοντα. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀμη
βλατὸν αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ μεταβάλλον ἢστι· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀμεταβόλου ἀπὸ
τὰς τὸ θύον περιεχόμενος ψυχής μέχρι σειάςας περαιότατος, τὸ δὲ με
ταβάλλου ἢ μᾶς σειάνας μέχρι τὰς γας. Ἐπεὶ δὲ γε καὶ τὸ κινε
τὸν ἢς αἰῶνας εἰς αἰῶνα περιπολεῖ, τὸ δὲ κυνείζον ποῦ τὸ κινεῖν ἢγε,
οὗτο* διακείσθαι ἀνάγκα τὸ μὲν ἀεικίναντο τὸ δὲ ἀειπαθῆς ἢδραν,
καὶ τὸ μὲν νῦν καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνάκμα πάν, τὸ δὲ γενεῖσι καὶ μεταβο
λάς· καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τὰ δυνάμει καὶ ὑπερθέν, τὸ δ’ ὅστερον καὶ
καθυπερεχόμενον. Τὸ δ’ ἢς ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, τὸ μὲν ἢι θεντος
θελόν, τὸ δ’ ἢς μεταβάλλοντος γεννατοῦ, κόσμου. ἢς καὶ καλὸς
ἐχει λέγειν κόσμον ἦμεν ἐνεργειαν ἀδίδων θεῶ τε καὶ γενείας κατὰ
συναπολούθην τὰς μεταβλητικὰς φύσιν· καὶ ὁ μὲν ἢς ἢς διαμένει
κατα τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ οὐσίως ἢθον, τὰ δ’ γεγομένα καὶ θετομένα
πολλά. Καὶ τὰ μὲν φθορά ὅστα καὶ ψύχει κατὰ μορφῶς σώζεται, τὰ
γονά πάλιν τὰν αὐτῶν μορφῶν ἀποκαθίστατα τὰ γεννηθέντα πατέρα
καὶ δημιουργηθέν.


Ἀνάγκα τὰ ἐόντα ἢμεν πάντα ἢ περαιόντα, ἢ ἤπειρα, ἢ περαι
νοντά τε καὶ ἤπειρα· ἤπειρα δὲ μόνον οὐ καὶ εἶλ. Ἐστι τοῖνυν παι
νεται οὔτ’ ἐκ περαιόντων πάντων ἐόντα, οὔτ’ ἐκ ἤπειρων πάντων,
ὄηλαν ἤν’ ἀρα ὅτι ἐκ περαιοντῶν τε καὶ ἤπειρων ἢ τού κόσμου καὶ

* i.e. ὤμολογείς.
APPENDIX.

ta εν αυτω συναρμοζηθη. Αφελοι δε και τα εν τοις ζηγοις· τα μεν γαρ αυτων εκ περαινοντων, περαινοντα, τα δε εκ περαινοντων τε και απερμαν περαινοντα τε και ου περαινοντα, τα δε εξ απερμαν απειρα φανονται.

Και παντα γα μεν τα γιγνοσκομενα αριθμον έχοντε. ου γαρ οιον τε ουδεν ουτε νοηθημεν ουτε γνωσθημεν ανεν τουτα. "Ο γα μεν αριθμος έχει δυο μεν ειδα ειδη, επειδη και αριθμον, τριτον δε απ' αμφοτερων μυχθησεν, αριστοπερισσον. Εκατερο δε τα ειδεσ πολλα μορφαλ, ας ήκαστον αυτωτο γενεμαιναι. Περι δε φυσις και αριμονιας ουδε έχειν· α μεν εσω των πραγματων άδιος έσαι και αυτα μονη, φυσις θεια εντα και ουκ ανθρωπιναι ενδηχεται γνωσις, πλαν γα ντι ουχ οιον η ε ουθεν των εοσται και γιγνοσκομενον ουρ' αμαν γεγενησαι, μη υπαρχοεις τας ισοες των πραγματων εξ ου συνεται ο κοσμος, και τας περαινοντας και των απερων. Έπει δε τα αρχαι επαρχουν ουχ αρμοι ουθ' ομωφυλοι δεσα, ηθη άδουνοτο ης και αυτως κομμηθημεν, αμη άριμονια εγενετο, φ σην ανα τροπη εγενετο. Τα μεν ά ομα και ομοφυλα αριμονιας ουδεν επεδεντον, τα δε ανομα ανδη ομοφυλα μηδε ισοτελη αναγκα τα τοιαυτα αριμονιας συγκελεισθαι, αμ μελλοντε εν κοσμο χεσθαι.

'Αριμονιας δε μεγεθος εντα συλλαβα και δε δεξιαν. Το δε δε δεξιαν μειξων τας συλλαβας έπογδοφ. Έντι γαρ απο άπατας ες μεσον συλλαβα, απο δε μεσα ποτε νεεταν δε δεξιαν, απο δε νεετας ες τρεις συλλαβα, απο δε τρεις ες άπατας δε δεξιαν. Το δε εμερα μεσα και τρεται έπογδον. 'Α δε συλλαβα επιφονον, το δε δε δεξιαν ρμιολον, το δε παιδων δε δίκλινον. Ουτας αριμονια πεντε έπογδοι και δυο δεξιες, δε δεξιαν δε τρεπ έπογδοι και δεξιες, συλλαβα δε δεπ έπογδοι και δεξιες.—

Platonis Timaeus, 35 A.

Της αμεριστον και αλ εκα τατα ιχους διασας, και της αυ περι τα σωματα γιγνομενης μεριστης, τριτον εξ αμφων εκ μεσο φωνεκρισεν ευθως ειδος, της δε ταυτο φυσες αν περι και της Θαιερον* κατα τατα. Και έξενεσιν εκ μεσο του τε αμερος αυτων και του κατα τα σωματα μεριστον. Και τρια λαβαν οντα αυτα συνε

* Commonly Θατερον. Κατα τατα ταυτων. Philebus. The soul of the world is the

Platonis Timaeus. I have altered the text according to the evident requirement of the sense. The passage itself has been appended as serving to illustrate the περας in the and το άπειρον και Θατερον.

Platonis Philebus.
'Εκ τοῦ 'Ἀρχίτου περὶ Ἀρχών. Stob. Ecl. i. 35, 2.

Ἀνάγκα καὶ δύο ἀρχῶν ἦμεν τῶν δύνασιν, μὲν μὲν τῶν συστοιχίαν ἤχουσαν τῶν τεταγμένων καὶ ὀριστῶν, ἔτεραν δὲ τῶν συστοιχίας ἤχουσαν τῶν ἀπάτων καὶ ὀριστῶν. Καὶ τῶν μὲν ὀριστών καὶ λόγων ἤχουσαν καὶ τὰ ἄοντα ὀμολόγως συνέχειοι, καὶ τὰ μὴ ἄοντα ὀρίζειοι καὶ συντάσσειοι, πλαταιάσσοντας γὰρ αἰώνα τῶν γενομένων τυλίγοντος καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀνάγιευσαν ταῦτα καὶ τὸ καθ’ ἔκτα νόσας τε καὶ ἠθέας μεταδιδόμενοι τὰν τινὰ ἐλογον καὶ ἄφητον καὶ τὰ συντακτικῶν λιμανένσια καὶ τὰ ἓ γενέσει καὶ ὀσίαν παραγινόμενα διαλύειοι, πλαταιάσσοντας γὰρ αἰώνα τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐξορωθοῦσιν αὐτούτης. Ἀλλ’ ἐπείπερ ἄφητο δύο κατὰ γένους ἀντιδιαιρόμεθαι τὰ πράγματα τυχάνοντες, τῶν μὲν ἀγαθο-ποιῶν τῶν ἦμεν κακοποιῶν, ἀνάγκα καὶ δυο λόγως ἦμεν, τὸν μὲν ἐνα τὰς ἀγαθοποιῶς φύσεως, τὸν δ’ ἕνα τὰς κακοποιῶς. Αἰαὶ τούτο καὶ τὰ τέχνα καὶ τὰ φύσει γεγονόμενα δεῖ τούτων πράτων μετεληφθῆναι, τὰς τε μορφῶν καὶ τὰς ὀνόμασι. Καὶ α’ μὲν μορφῶ λιτων’ α’ αἰώνα τοῦ τόδε τι ἦμεν’ α’ δ’ ἀναγκαίως τὸ ὑποκείμενον, παραδεχόμενον τοὺς μορφῶν. Οὔτε δὲ τὰ ὀσία ὁλὸν τι ἕστι μορφῶς μετείμην αὐτὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν, οὔτε μὲν τὸν μορφῶ γενεθέσσα εἰπὲ τῶν ὀσίων, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαῖον ἐτέρα τινα ἦπα αἰώνα τοῦ κινούσαν τῶν ἑστατῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τῶν μορφῶν, ταύταν δὲ τῶν πράτων τὰ δύναμει καὶ καθυπερήταταν ἦμεν τῶν ἀλλάς ὀνομαζόμεθα δ’ αὐτὰν ποθάμει θεόν’ ὧστε τρεῖς ἀρχῶν ἦμεν ἠθή, τὸν τε θεόν, καὶ τὸν ἑστατὸ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τῶν μορφῶν. Καὶ τὸν μὲν θεόν τερμάτισε καὶ τὸν κινῶντα, τῶν δ’ ἑστατῶν τῶν ἐλαχίστων καὶ τὸ κινο-μένου, τῶν δὲ μορφῶ τῶν τέχναν καὶ ποθ’ ἐν κιόνεται ὕπο τῶν κινοῦν- τος καὶ ἕστατο. Ἀλλ’ ἐπεί τοι παραδεχόμεθα ἐναντίοτα καὶ δύναμις ὤφελος τῶν ἀπαθῶν συμμέτοντας, τὰ δ’ ἐναντίον συναφοῦς τινος δεῖται καὶ ἐναντίος, ἀνάγκη ἀριθμῶν δύναμις καὶ ἀναλογίας καὶ τὰ ἐν ἀριθμῶς καὶ γεωμετρίας δεικνύμενα παραλαμβάνει, δ’ καὶ συναφοῦς καὶ ἐνόπιοι τῶν ἐναντίωτατα δυναεῖται εἰς τὰ ἑστατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ποταί τις μορφῶ. Καὶ δ’ αὐτὰς μὲν γὰρ ἔδεα α’ ἑστατοῖς ἐστι, καὶ παρετέλα ἐν ποταί τις μορφῶν Ἴμμορφος γίνεται καὶ λόγων ἐξουσία τῶν συντάξιος. Ὁμολογεῖ δ’ καὶ τὸ δ’ ἐναντίον καὶ τὸ πράτων κινοῦν ἔστι τὸ πράτων κινοῦν. ὧστ’ ἀνάγκη τρεῖς ἦμεν τὰς ἀρχὰς, τῶν δὲ ἑστατῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τῶν μορφῶν, καὶ τὸ δ’ αὐτῶ κινούμον καὶ πράτων τὰ δύναμει. Τὸ δ’ τοιοῦτον οὔ νόσον μόνον ἦμεν δεῖ ἄλλα καὶ νόσω
ti κρέασαν. Νόμο δὲ κρέασαν ἦστιν ὑπὲρ ὀνομαζομέν θεόν. "Οθὲν φα-
νερὸν ὡς ὁ μὲν τῷ ἕσσω λόγος περὶ τῶν ὑπάτων καὶ λόγων ἔχουσαν φόβων
ἡσιν· ὁ δὲ τῷ ἄνισω περὶ τῶν ἀλογον καὶ ἁργητον· αὐτά δ' ἦσιν ἡ
ἐστιν, καὶ διὰ τούτῳ γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ γίνεται περὶ ταύτων, καὶ οὐκ
ἂνευ ταύτας.

Kant's Anthropology, Book II. § 59.

We may also explain these feelings by the effect which the
sensation of our state produces upon the mind. That which
directly (through sense) urges me to quit my state (to come out
of it), is unpleasant to me, it pains me. That which in like
manner urges me to maintain it (to remain in it), is agreeable
to me, it gives me pleasure. But we are irresistibly carried along
in the stream of Time, and through all the changes of sensations
involved in the fact. Now, though the quitting of one moment
of time and the entrance into another is one and the same act
(that of change), yet in our thought and in the consciousness of
this change there is a succession, such as belongs to the con-
nection of cause and effect. The question then is, whether it is
the consciousness of quitting the present state, or the prospect of
the entrance into a future one, that excites in us the sensation of
pleasure? In the former case, the delight is nothing else than
the removal of pain, something negative; in the latter it would
be an anticipation of something agreeable; consequently, an ex-
pansion of a condition of pleasure, and hence something positive.

But we may already infer, a priori, that the former alone can
take place. For time carries us from the present to the future,
and not contrariwise; and the fact that we are compelled first of
all to quit the present, uncertain into what other we are about
to enter, only that it is another, can alone be the cause of plea-
surable feeling. Pleasure is the sense of that which promotes life,
pain of that which hinders it. But life (animal life) is, as the
physicians themselves have remarked, a continual play of the
antagonism of the two.

Consequently, every pleasure must be preceded by pain; pain is
always the first. For what else would ensue upon a continual
advancement of vital power (which, however, cannot mount beyond
a certain degree), but a speedy death for joy?
Moreover, no pleasure can follow immediately upon another; but between the one and the other pain must have place. It is the slight intermissions of vitality, with intervening expansions of it, that together make up the healthy condition, which we erroneously take for a continuously-felt state of well-being; whereas in fact this condition consists only of a succession of pleasurable feelings, following each other with alternations,—that is, after continually intervening pain.

Pain is the stimulus of activity, and in activity we first become conscious of life: without it an inanimate state would ensue.
ADDENDA.

My friend Mr E. R. Horrox, who has most kindly undertaken the laborious task of superintending the edition of this work, has sent me some important suggestions as to the text of the first sheet. In the passage (12, a) he is inclined to read * τούναντιον. I have more than once had the same suspicion, but suppressed it through fear of being taxed with the love of unnecessary changes. But I am now convinced that the construction of the sentence imperatively requires the alteration proposed. The contrary intended is not a contrary to the main part of the sentence, κύριος ἄν εἶς, but only to the subordinate phrase τῆς π. Σ. ὀμολογίας. The alternative is not between being κύριος, and not being κύριος, but between being κύριος of the agreement and κύριος of the disagreement.

p. 13, n. Mr Horrox reminds me of Dr W. H. Thompson’s conjecture ἐνοχὰν in place of ἐνόν. But my note will shew why I cannot assent to this conjecture. Protarchus is not, and cannot

* [My later view of the expression ἐνοχὰν is that it is a troublesome interpolation. In order that the argument may proceed, there must be an ὀμολογία between Socrates and Protarchus. Cf. ὀμολογητοῦμένα καὶ τάδε. τούτως ὀμολογοῦμεν φαστε. ἐν οίς; (11, p. n and also 20, c). τούτων τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἔτι μέλλον δ' ὀμολογίας βεβαιωθομένα. (14, c). The question is how far Protarchus may go to meet Socrates, since the conduct of the discussion belongs to the latter. But this question is one for himself, not Philebus, to decide. Yet Philebus by his profession of unalterable faith in his goddess, not for the present only but for the future also, δοξάζει καὶ δέξεται (for so the MSS. read), is endeavouring to prejudice him, even whilst in the same breath he acknowledges his freedom of judgment, αὐτός γνώστω. With this implied interference Protarchus accordingly twits him. “Now that you have resigned your brief to me, your rights of dictation are over.”—St. Paul’s expression in 2 Cor. i, 24; σὺν ὥστιν κυρίεσθαι μόνω τῆς πίστεως is closely analogous. The word ὀμολογία itself may be illustrated from the same Epistle (ix, 13). δοξάζοντες τὸν Θεόν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑποταγῇ τῆς ὀμολογίας μόνῳ εἰς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ. E. R. H.]
be, asked to shew why he calls all pleasures good, for Socrates assumes already that he looks upon some as bad; but he is challenged to point out any further ground of likeness between them beyond that indicated by their common name of ἔδομαι. As this is the only question which can be asked him without clashing with the rest of the argument, ᾗγαθὸν εἶναι is a manifest interpolation. But if we omit ᾗγαθὸν εἶναι, προσαγορεύεις is necessarily to be construed with τί ταῦτα ἔνον: else it would be without any government at all. For I do not suppose that any person will have recourse to such an intolerable ellipsis as the following: τί ταῦτα ἔνον, π. Ἡ. (τοῦτο) προσαγορεύεις; Apart from this I very much doubt whether a good Greek prose writer would say, ἔνον ἐν σοι τοῦτο, without adding some participle.


p. 17, d. ἔνοντα πάθη γιγνόμενα. “Is not one of these de trop?” E. R. H.

Most assuredly, and I thank my friend for this fresh instance of what I have before pointed out as a peculiar feature in these supplements. The word ἔνονει under various forms has occurred several times in this sense, and it is therefore no wonder that some sciolist should insert ἔνοντα without troubling himself to look further on, where he would have found γιγνόμενα. Or perhaps he merely meant it as a note and had no intention of disturbing the text; but if so, and if this is to be the explanation of the many similar passages, this would shew the extent to which the copyists must have gone in blindly copying what they found in the Margin, as if it had been accidentally omitted in the body of the text, and afterwards supplied in the blank space.

Mr. Horrox also mentions two conjectures made by English scholars on this passage. I will briefly state my objections to each of them. It is proposed to read μᾶθης for πάθη. Now we do not want a verb, for λάβης may be easily conceived to run through the whole passage; and if we wanted one, it could not be μάθης, for μανθάνω ταῦτα γιγνόμενα is not such a construction as one will find in any good prose author. But we do want πάθη, because otherwise τοιαύτα would imply διαστήματα, a word not applicable to rhythm and metre. Indeed there is no word so applicable, and for that very reason Plato employs the more general term πάθη.
ADDENDA.

It is also proposed to read ἐννοὺς, but to this there are two very strong objections. In the first place ὅταν λάβῃς ... καὶ ἄμα—would certainly need ἐννοήσῃς, and in the next place the alteration runs counter to the whole arrangement of the sentence, and cannot be reconciled with γάρ, which can stand where it now is only on the condition that it belongs to the clause immediately following the parenthesis; whereas this change would make the parenthesis end at ἐπονομάζειν. Indeed the true balance of the sentence is lost by any such change; for whereas Plato might have arranged his clauses thus: The men of old have taught us (A) the power of number in Music and Rhythm, and have directed us (B) to look for the same power in all ἀπειρα, and so whenever you learn A, (λάβῃς), or detect B, (ἐλής), σοφὸς ἐγένυ—, he thought fit to introduce the first part of this sentence in a kind of running parenthesis alongside of the second. By reading ἐννοὺς you destroy the antithesis between what the ancients taught (καὶ ἄμα ἐννοιέν ο. τ. ἐ.) and what we are counselled to do in order to get σοφὸς, (ὅταν τ' ἀλλο—ἐλής,) and you put a tautology in its place.

The reader will observe that the contrast between λάβῃς and ἐλής is a real one, but that between σοφὸς ἐγένυ and ἐμφαξαν γέγονας is a very paltry verbal variation, where no real contrast can take place, for while there is a difference between the man who is taught and the man who discovers, there is none in the method or in its result.

As here we have a foolish variation between ἐγένυ and γέγονας, so in Euthyd. 287, b, we have a verbal antithesis between the present, which is correct, and the future, which is quite inappropriate. Οὕτω Κρόνος ἦ, ὡστε ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἔπομεν νῦν ἀναμμηνέως, καὶ ἐν πένθων ἔπον [· νῦν ἀναμμηνήσεω]. I referred to this passage in my Letter (page 353), but inadvertently put the branch of spuriousness upon the wrong part of it.

But before I leave the Euthydemus, I would fain point out some other false supplements which have occurred to me quite recently in lecturing upon that Dialogue.

274, B. [τὴν δύναμιν τῆς σοφίας].
276, B. Read ἵθορύβησαν for ἁνεθορύβησαν.
277, D. [καταβαλών].
281, A. [τῶν ἁγαθῶν] and [τὸ ὅρθως πάσι τοῖς τοιούτοις χρή-σθαι] The genitives πλούτου etc. are governed by ἡγομένη.
ADDENDA.

281, c. [μᾶλλον].

282, λ and υ. This is one of the places where from not perceiving the interpolation I was led into a wrong mode of restoring the syntax. Read: Καὶ παρὰ πατρὸς γε δὴ που τού οἷομεν νοῦν δεῖν μεταλαμβάνειν πολύ μᾶλλον η χρήματα, καὶ παρ’ ἐπιτρόπων καὶ φίλων, τῶν τ’ ἄλλων καὶ τῶν φασκόντων ἐραστῶν εἰναι, καὶ ξίνων καὶ πολιτῶν, δεόμενον καὶ ἴκετεύοντα σοφίας μεταδιδόναι οὐδὲν αἰνήχον οὐδὲ νεμάθην οἷον ὑπηρετεῖν τῶν καλῶν ὑπηρετήματων, προθυμομένων σοφῶν γενέσθαι. This is as elegant a sentence as any in Plato, and a model of symmetry without formality. The foolish writer who supplied ἐθέλοντα has not only destroyed the construction, but has caused another to bolster it up with the clumsy contrivance of ἕνεκα τοῦτον ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ δουλεύειν καὶ ἱραστῇ καὶ παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ.

282, ν. Read: οἶον ἐπίθυμῳ τοῦν προτρεπτικὸν λάγον εἶναι.

But the most impudent attempt at improving the text occurs in 284, ν. The Sophist wishes to prove ὅτι οὐδές λέγει τά μὴ ὄντα, and this he does by bringing Ctesippus to admit the following propositions. 1. τά μὴ ὄντα οὐκ ἔστιν. 2. τὰ μὴ ὄντα οὐδές ἐστιν ποιησίμεν. 3. οὐ λέγοντες πρῶτοι τι. 4. οἱ πρῶτοις ποιούσι. 5. οἱ λέγοντες ποιούσι. 6. οἱ λέγοντες τὰ μὴ ὄντα, ποιοῦν ἃν τά μὴ ὄντα, τούτο δὲ ἀναλόγηται ἀδύνατον εἶναι.

From this it follows that the words Ἄλλο τι οὖν οὔθεμοι τά γά μὴ ὄντα ὄντα ἔστιν; Οὔθεμοι. are quite foreign to the argument, and were probably invented to give some force to ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ: and likewise that Ethydemus' question is simply this: Ἐστιν οὖν ὅπως τά μὴ ὄντα ποιησίσεις ἃν καὶ ὄστεσον;

This quite throws into the shade such minor invasions as 297, c, ἀφιγιμένῳ, 298, ν, βοιτίων οἵ καθίσαν, 302, ν, ὑπεργινότε, 290, ν, τοῦτο δὲ ἐν θηρεύωται, and τούτους δὲ ἐθέμενοις, (for πολὺς θηρεύωνται read either χειρόσωμαι or θηρεύωνται.) 278, ν, οἷον αὐτὸ ὑπολαμβάνω, and a score of others, in which I cannot with certainty include 302, ν, σοι [θεσί], as this may arise from a twofold reading COI and ΘΟÏ, but in 303, ν, the words ὅσοι ὁρολογεῖ—σοφοὺς, are so manifestly a false interpretation of οὕτω διετῆσθην, and so completely spoil what immediately follows, that they can be nothing but a deliberate forgery.

There are others which are yet upon their trial, such as the following, 307, λ, ὅσε οὖν ἔχω ὅπως προτείη καὶ μειράκιον ἐπὶ
ADDENDA.

φιλοσοφιαν. Crito’s faith in philosophy is already shaken by Isocrates’ sneer, and by his own impressions about these ἑρωτικοὶ. Otherwise Socrates’ exhortation not to care about the men, but to look into the thing itself, is altogether idle. His embarrassment is ὅποι προτέρη τὸ μειωμεν, πότερον πρὸς φιλοσοφιαν ἥ πρὸς ἀλλο τι ἐπιτήδευμα.

I will end this digression vineta mea cadendo. To make the question tally with the answer in 304, ἔ, I formerly edited ἀ πε- φαινοντο, but this is applicable only to γνώμας, and by no means the right word to use of the displays of the Sophists. But the question is rightly given in the received text: τι οὖν ἐφαινοντό σοι, “well, what did you think of them”? The answer however is corrupt, and interpolated after its corruption. I believe the true reading to be: Τι δ’ ἀλλο, ἢ δ’ ὅς, ἢ δι’ περι δη τις τῶν τοιού- των, ληφούντων καὶ περὶ οὐδένος ἀξίων ἀναζείν σπονδήν ποιομε- νον; “What else should they look like but what every one of the men of their class at all times looks like, a class of triflers etc.”

p. 16, ἔ. τότε δὴ δείν, the reading of most MSS., the Bod. gives τότε δὴ δεί. For the Bod. δεί, δείν has been substituted in the text.

p. 17, ἔ. ἐλλέγωμον] The meaning of ἐλλέγωμον and that of ἐνάρξῳμον are so nearly the same, that one is tempted to suspect either that the former word is a later addition, or that Plato must have justified the twofold expression by a twofold reason; namely, by writing, ἃ τ’ οὐκ ἔσον, οὐδ’ ἐκ ἐφεβοῦ ὀδύνα . . . ὀποῦντα. But, as the importance of παρὰs is uppermost in the writer’s mind, any addition to ἐφεβοῦ weakens the effect which he wishes to produce. For this reason I look upon the words καὶ οὐκ ἐλλέγωμον with some suspicion. It may be said, in answer to this, that λόγος and ἐφεβοῦ are by no means equivalent, and that Shakespeare illustrates the difference when he says that certain offences “stand more for number than account”, and that the Tragic ἐφεβοῦ ἐλλας and the Horatian ‘Nos numerus sumus’ shew that ἐφεβοῦ is rather the antithesis of λόγος than its equivalent. But in this passage who can doubt that the idea which ἐναρξῳμος presents is identical with that presented by ἐλλέγωμος? Then why was it introduced?

p. 18, ἔ. τοῦτον, ἐς ἐφαμεν] The Books read φαμεν. But Socrates is comparing a past observation with a present one, and for this reason uses λάβοι with the former, and ἄναγκα σῆ with the latter, according to the common rule as to the optative and subjunctive moods.

p. 18, ἔ. δει] I have substituted this for the δεῖ of the MSS., to accord with λάβοι and ἐφαμεν.
ADDENa.

p. 18, v. μη ἔτι κ. τ. ἧ. I have placed the absurd supplement μη ἔτι 
το ζ' κ. τ. ἧ. in brackets, but there is still something amiss, and any body 
trying to correct it must be guided by the illustration presently offered in the 
discovery of the Alphabet. We want δει or some equivalent to accompany 
κατανοεῖν, and we require that πληθος should have number, i.e. be definite, 
and not that number should have πληθος, which every number above one has 
in any case. It is not improbable that Plato wrote ἄριστον αὐτ' τε 
πληθος ἐκπον ἔχων κατανοεῖν ΔΕΙ.

p. 18, v. 'Εταθίς [φωνήν & κ.κ.] Unless we reject the words φ. κ. κ. 
as a supplement of some expounder, we have a mass of words without any 
construction, and furthermore a statement which Plato could not have made. 
The word κατανοεῖν implies that the discovery has already begun, but there 
is no act τοῦ κατανοεῖν in acknowledging the existence of φωνή, nor indeed 
of any object while still in its indefinite state; so that φωνήν ἐκπον κατα- 
νοεῖν is a contradiction in terms. The first stage of discovery is κατανοεῖν τὰ 
φωνήντα.

p. 18, v. λέγων, πρῶτος] I retract my former conjecture of λέγω αἰς, and 
hold δ', the reading of most MSS., and αἰς, that of the Bodl., to be more gram- 
matical attempts to give coherence to that which the above named supplement 
had thrown out of gear. δ λέγων λέγει is perfectly good Greek, but the pas- 
sage from the Republic 360, δ, affords no example of it. We ought there to 
read δ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου λέγουν, "the advocate of this view." For πρῶ- 
τος τὰ φωνήντα, read πρῶτα τ. φ. i.e. "first the Vowels, then the Mutes, after 
that the Liquids."

[p. 19, D. το προσορθησόμενον ὁρθὲς [κ. ἡ γ']] The interpolation here is 
similar to that in 11, b.

p. 22, D. αὐτῷ ὡς ἀφίσις] αὐτον and ἀφίσι have been put in brackets, the 
sense and construction being complete without them.

p. 23, D. πρὸς τὼν τρισών] Here as well as below in 26, k, the article 
has been inserted without the authority of the MSS.

p. 24, C. αἰνέων μ'] The pronoun με is wanting in the MSS.

p. 27, k. [τὴν αἰνεῖ] ἀζ' κ. ἠρπον δὲ] τὴν αἰνεῖ is here bracketed, 
as being an obvious marginal gloss. Nine lines above, γεγομένων has been dealt 
with in the same way and for the same reason.

p. 44, A. ἠμερ χαρί[ά] The Editor has omitted to state his reasons for 
bracketing τοῦ μη λυπεῖται καὶ τοῦ χαρί[ά]. He has evidently regarded the 
clause as a gloss on ἐκτέρρου. An alternative correction of the sentence might 
be proposed, viz. to retain the bracketed words and cancel ἐκτέρρου.

E. R. H.]
CORRIGENDA.
(See also Page XXVI.)

Page Line
III, 5. For nonsense read nonsense.
" 16. For ὑπ. δ. μεμερίζεται, read ὑπ. [δεῖν] μεμερίζεται. See p. 130.
" last. Correct from p. 151.
V, last. For substitution read insertion [the Editor's original word]. ἀρειστάται (ἀρ = ἀνήρ, ἀρός = ἀνδρός) is changed into ἀρειστάτατε by the insertion of χ.

1 4 For 1. read ΣΩ.
4 12 (of notes) For 'sorce' read 'sources'.
8 16 For ἄνδράποντος read ἄνδράποντος.
" 10 (of notes) For ἐκάτεροι read ἐκάτεροι.
34 last but 2 (of notes) For ποῦ σεν read ποῦ σεν.
71 5 (of notes) For καὶ τίς read καὶ τίς.
75 1 (of notes) For Appendix read Addenda.
92 last but 5 (of notes) For ἔλληκτικα read τὸ σφάδρα.

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